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5oTH CoNGREGS, ( [CONFIl)EKTIAL.] ( Executive B. 

.5^ Session. <, ,' ( Part 2. 



A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEiN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 



MESSAGE 






FROM THE 



; PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 



Tl.ANSMITTlNG 



A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 

AND SPAIN. SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS. 

ON DECEMBER 10, 1898. 



ACCOMPANYING PAPERS. 



January 4, 1899. — Read ; treaty read the first time and referred to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, and, together with the Message and accom- 
panying papers, ordered to be printed in confidence 
for the use of the Senate. 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 



i 



LIST OF PAPEES. 



1. Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898. 

2. Protocols of the conferences at Paris (1 to 22). 

3. Peace protocol of August 12, 1898, and correspondence. ^ 

4. Correspondence between the Dexjartment of State and the Embassy of France, 

at AVashington, as representing the interests of Spain. 

5. Consular reports on Philippine affairs. 

6. Statement of Maj . Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., October 4, 1898, before the United 

States Peace Commission at Paris, and accompanying papers. 

7. Memoranda concerning the situation in the Philipiiines, by Maj. Gen. F. V. Greene, 

U. S. v., and accompanying papers. 

8. Statement of Mr. John Foreman, October 8, 1898, before the United States Peace 

Commission at Paris. 

9. Statement of Commander R. B. Bradford, U. S. N., October 14, 1898, before the 

United States Peace Commission at Paris. 

10. Statement of Gen. Charles A. Whittier, U. S. Y., before the United States Peace 

Commission at Paris. 

11. Preliminary report of Dr. George F. Becker, of the United States Geological 

Survey, on tiie geological and mineral resources of the Philippines. (^^ 

12. Data concerning the Philippine Islands: Their history, people, geography, geol- 

ogy, resources, and strategic importance. 

13. A sketch of the economic condition of the Philippines, by Mas L. Tornow. 

14. Protectoratf'S, Colonies, and nonsovereign States. 

15. The Federated Malay States: A sketch of their growth and political organiza- 

tion, by Francis B. Forbes. 

1 



TREATY OF PEACE OF DECEMBER 10, 1898. 



The United States of Amer- 
ica AND Her Majesty the 
Queen KectEnt of Spain, in 
THE Name of Her August Son 
Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to 
eud the state of war now existing 
between the two countries, have 
for that purpose appointed as 
Plenipotentiaries : 

The President of the 
United States, 

William K. Day, Cusiiman K. 
Davis, William P. Frye, 
George Gray, and Whitelaw 
Eeid, citizens of the United 
States ; 

And Her Majesty the Queen 
Kegent of Spain, 

Don Eugenio Montero Eios, 
President of the Senate, Don 
Buenaventura de Abarzuza, 
Senator of the Kingdom and ex- 
Minister of the Crown, Don Jose 
DE Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes 
and Associate Justice of the Su- 
preme Court; Don Wenceslao 
Eamirez de Yilla-Urrutia, 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and 
Don Rafael Cerero, General 
of Division: 

Who, having assembled in Paris, 
and having exchanged their full 
powers, which were found to be in 
due and proper form, have, after 
discussion of the matters before 
them, agreed upon the following- 
articles : 

Article I. 



Los Estados Uniuos de Ame- 
rica Y S. M. LA Reina Regente 

DE ESPANA, en NOMBRE DE SU 

Augusto Hijo Don Alfonso 
XIII, deseando poner ti'rmino al 
estado de guerra hoy exlstente 
entre ambas Xaciones, han nom- 
brado con este objeto por sus Plen- 
il^otenciaros, a saber: 

El Presidents de los Esta- 
dos Unidos de America a 

William R. Day, Cushman K. 
Davis, William P. Frye, 
George Gray, y Whitelaw 
Reid, ciudadanos de los Estados 
Unidos ; 

Y SU JMajestad la Reina Re- 
gente DE ESPANA, A 

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, 
Presidente del S e n a d o. Don 
Buenaventura de Abarzuza 
Senador del Reino, Ministro que 
ha sido de la Corona, Don Jose 
DE Garnica, Diputado a Cortes, 
Magistrado del Tribunal supremo, 
Don Wenceslao Ramirez de 
Yilla-Urrutia, Enviado Extra- 
ordinarlo y Ministro plenipoten- 
ciairo en Bruselas; y Don Rafael 
Cerero, General de divisiihi, 

Los cuales reunidos en Paris, 
despues de haberse comunicado 
sus plenos poderes (jue fueron ha- 
Uados en buena y debida forma, y 
previa la discussicui de las materias 
pendientes, han convenido en los 
siguientes articulos : 

Articulo I. 



Spain relinquishes all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 

And as the island is, ui)on its 
evacuation by Spain, to be occu- 



Espana renuucia todo derecho 
de soberania y propiedad sobre 
Cuba. 

En atencion a que dicha isla, 
cuando sua evacuada por Espana, 

3 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



pied by the Ignited States, the 
United' States will, so long as such 
oeeiipation shall last, assume and 
(lischai\uv the obli-^ations that may 
under inteniational law result from 
the taet of its occupation, for the 
protection of hfe and property. 



Akticle II. 

Spain cedes to the United States 
the ishvnd of Porto Kico and other 
ishmds now under Si)anish sov- 
ereijJTuty in the West Indies, and 
the islaiid of Guam in the Marianas 
or T. ad roues. 

Article III. 

Spain cedes to the United States 
the archipehigo known as the Phil- 
ippine Islands, and comprehending 
the islands lying within the follow- 
ing line: 

A line running from west to east 
along or near the twentieth paral- 
lel of north latitude, and through 
the middle of the navigable chan- 
nel of Bachi, from the one hundred 
and eighteenth (USth) to tlie one 
hundred and twenty seventh 
(127th) degree meridian of longi- 
tude east of Greenwich, thence 
along the one hundred and twenty 
seventh (li'Tth) degree meridian of 
longitiule east of Greenwich to 
the ])arallel of four degrees and 
forty five minutes (4^ 45') north 
latitude, thence along the parallel 
of tour degrees and forty five 
minutes (4^ 45') north latitude to 
its intersection with the meridian 
of longitude one hundred and nine- 
teen degrees and thirty five min- 
utes (110^ 35') east of Greenwich, 
then(;e along the meridian of longi- 
tude one hundred and nineteen 
degrees and thirty five minutes 
(IKP .'55') east of Greenwich to the 
])arallel of latitude seven degrees 
and forty minutes (7- 40') north, 
thence along the ))arallel of lati- 
tude seven degrees and forty min- 
utes (7"' 40') north to its intersection 
with the one liundred and six- 



va a ser ocupada i)or los Estados 
Unidos, los Estados Unidos mien- 
tras dure su ocupacion, touniran 
sobre si y cumi)liran las obliga- 
ciones que por el hechode ocuparla, 
les impone el Derecho Internacion- 
al, para la protecciou de vidas y 
haciendas. 

Aeticulo II. 

Espana cede s'j los Estados Uni- 
dos la Isla de Puerto Rico y las 
deuiiis que estan ahora bajo su so- 
berania en las Indias Occideutales, 
y la Isla de Guam en el Archipie- 
lago de las Marianas 6 Ladrones. 

Articulo III. 

Espana cede a los Estados Uni- 
dos el archie])ii lago conocido por 
Islas Filipinas. que comprende las 
islas situadas dentro de las lineas 
siguientes: 

Una linea que corre de Oeste a 
Este, cerca del 20^ paralelo de lat- 
itud Xorte, a traves de la mitad 
del canal navegable de • Bachi, 
desde el 118^ al 127^ grados de 
longitud Este de Greenwich; de 
aqui a lo largo del ciento veiiitisiete 
(127) grado meridiano de longitud 
Este de Greenwich al paralelo cua- 
tro grados cuarenta y cinco min- 
utos"(4^45') de latitud Norte; de 
aqui siguiendo el pai alelo de cua- 
Iro gra(loscuarenta y cinco minutos 
de latitud Xorte (4^ 45') hasta su 
interseccion con el meridiano de 
longitud ciento diez y nneve grados 
y treinta y cinco minutos (110° 35') 
Este de GreeuMich; de ariui sig- 
uiendo el meridiano de longitud 
ciento diez y nueve grados y treinta 
y cinco minutos {lio^ 35') Este de 
Greenwich, al paralelo de latitud 
siete grados cuarenta minutos (7° 
40') Xorte; de aqui siguiendo 
el i)aralelo de latitud siete 
grados cuaranta minutos (7° 40') 
Norte, a su interseccion con el 
ciento diez y seis (IK)') .grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, de aqui por una hnea recta, a 
la interseccion del decimo grado 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



teentli (110th) degree meridian of 
loiigitudeeastofGreeuwicli, thence 
by a direct line to the intersection 
of the tentli (lOtli) degree i)arallel 
of north latitude with the one hun- 
dred and eighteenth (118th) degree 
meridian of longitude east of Green- 
wich, and thence along the one 
hundred and eighteenth (118th) 
degree meridian of longitude east 
of Greenwich to the point of 
beginning. 

The United States will pay to 
Spain the sum of twenty million 
dollars ($L'0,000,0()0), within three 
months after the exchange of the 
ratilications of the present treaty. 

Article IV. 



paralelo de latitnd Norte, con el 
ciento diez y ocho (118°) grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, y de aqui siguiendo el ciento 
diez y ocho grado (118'^) meridiano 
de longitud Este de Greenwich, al 
punto en que comienza esta de- 
marcacibn. 



Los Estados Uuidos pagaran a 
Espaiia la smna de veinte milliones 
de dollars ($20,000,000) dentro de 
los tres meses despucs del canje de 
ratificaciones del presente tratado. 



Articulo IV. 



The United States will, for the 
term of ten years from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications 
of the i^resent treaty, admit Span- 
ish ships and merchandise to the 
ports of the Philippine Islands on 
the same terms as ships and mer- 
chandise of the United States. 

Article V. 



Los Estados Unidos durante el 
termino de diez afios (x con tar desde 
el canje de la ratificacion del pre- 
sente tratado, admitiran en los puer- 
tos de las Islas Filipinas los buques 
y las mercancias espafioles, bajo las 
mismascondicionesque los buques 
y las mercancias de los Estados 
Unidos. 

Articulo V. 



The United States will, upon the 
signature of the present treaty, 
send back to Spain, at its own cost 
the Spanish soldiers taken as pris- 
oners of war on the capture of 
Manila by the American forces. 
The arms of the soldiers in question 
shall be restored to them. 

Spain will, upon the exchange of 
the ratifications of the present 
treaty, proceed to evacuate the 
Philippines, as well as the island 
of Guam, on terms similar to those 
agreed upon by the Commissioners 
api)ointed to arrange for the evacu- 
ation of Porto Rico and other is- 
lands in the West Indies, under 
the Protocol of August 12, ]81»8, 
which is to continue in force till its 
provisions are comi^letely executed. 

The time within which the evacu- 
ation of the Philippine Islands 
and Guam shall be completed shall 
be fixed by the two Governments. 



Los Estados Unidos, al ser fir- 
mado el presente tratado, traspor- 
tar:in a Espana, a su costa, los 
soldados espafioles que hicieron 
l^risioneros de guerra las fuerzas 
Americana s al ser capturada Ma- 
nila. Lasarmasde estos soldados 
les seran devueltas. 

Espana, al canjearse las ratifica- 
ciones del presente tratado, proce- 
der.i i\ evacuar las Islas Filipinas, 
asi como la de Guam, en condi- 
ciones semejnntes a las acordadas 
por las Comisiones nombradas para 
concertar la evacuacicm de Puerto 
Kico y otras Isias en las Autillas 
Occidentales, segun el Protocolo 
de 12 de Agosto de 1898, que cou- 
tinuara en vigor hasta que sean 
completamente cumplidas sus 
disposiciones. 

El termino dentro del cual sera 
completada la evacuacion de Jas 
Islas Filipinas y la de Guam, sera 
fijado i)or ambos Gobiernos. Seran 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Staiuls of colors, uiicaptured war 
vessels, small arms, .uiuis of all 
calibres, with their carriages and 
accessories, jjowder. ammujiition, 
livestock, and materials and siip- 
l)lies of all kinds, belony,ing' to the 
land and naval forces of Spain in 
the IMiilipjtines and (hiam, renuiin 
the i)roperty ol Si)ain. Pieces of 
heavy ordnance, exclusive of held 
artillery, in the fortifications and 
coast defences, shall remain in 
their emplacements for the term 
of six nu)nths, to be reckoned from 
the exchange of ratifications of 
the treaty; and the United States 
may, in the mean time, pnrchase 
such material from Si)aiu, if a sat- 
isfactory agreement between the 
two Governments on the subject 
shall be reached. 

Article YI. 

Spain will, upon the signature 
of the present treaty, release all 
prisoners of war, and all persons 
detained or imprisoned for i)oliti- 
cal offences, in connection with the 
insurrections in Cuba and the 
Philippines and the war with the 
United States, 

Eeciprocally, the United States 
will release all i)ersons made pris- 
oners of war by the American 
forces, and will undertake to ob- 
tain the release of all Spanish 
prisoners in the hands of the in- 
surgents in Cuba and the Philip- 
pines. 

The Government of the United 
States will at its own cost return 
to Spain and the Government of 
Spain will at its own cost return 
to the United States, Cuba, ^orto- 
Rico, and the Philippines, accord- 
ing to the situation of their re- 
spective homes, prisoners released 
or caused to be released by them, 
respectively, under this article. 

Article VII. 



propiedad'de Espana banderas y 
estandartes, bu(jues de guerra no 
apresados, armas portii tiles, cano- 
nes de todos calibres con sus mou- 
tajes y accesorios, ])t)lvoras, muni- 
ciones, ganado, material y efectos 
de toda clase perteuecientes a los 
ejcrcitos denuiry tierrade Espana 
en las Filipinas y Guam, Las pie- 
zas de grueso calibre, que no seau 
artilleria de campana, colocadas en 
las fortiticaciones y en las costas, 
quedarau en sus emplazamentos 
por el ])lazo de seis ineses a partir 
del cauje de ratiticaciones del pre- 
sente tratado,y los Estados Unidos 
podran, durante ese tiempo, com- 
l)rar a Es])aria dicho material, si am- 
bos Gobiernos llegan ;i un acuerdo 
satisfactorio sobre el particular. 



Aeticulo VI. 

Espana al ser firmado el presente 
tratado, pondra en libertad <! todos 
los prisioneros de guerra y a todos 
los detenidos 6 presos por delitos 
politicos a consecuencia de las in- 
surrecciones en Cuba y en Filipinas 
y de la guerra con los Estados 
Unidos. 

Eecfprocamente, los Estados Uni- 
dos pondra n en libertad a todos los 
prisioneros de guerra hechos por 
las fuer/.as Americanas, y gestiona- 
ran la libertad de todos los prisi- 
oneros espanoles en poder de los 
iusurrectos de Cuba y Filipinas. 

El Gobierno de los Estados Uni- 
dos trasportara, por su cuenta i1 
Espana, y el Gobierno de Espana 
trasportara por su cuenta il los 
Estados Unidos, Cuba, Puerto Rico 
y Filipinas, con arregio a la situa- 
cion de sus respectivos hogares, los 
prisioneros que pongan o que hagan 
poner en libertad respectivaraente, 
en virtud de este Articulo. 

Articulo VII. 



The United States and Spain 
mutually reliiKjuish all claims for 
indemnity, national and individ- 



E span a y los Estados Unidos de 
Anu'rica renuncian mutuamente, 
por el i)resente tratado, a toda rec- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



ual, of every kind, of either Gov- 
eruinent, or of its citizens or sub- 
jects, against the other Govern- 
ment, that may have arisen since 
the beginning of the late insurrec- 
tion in Cuba and prior to the ex- 
change of ratifications of the pres- 
ent treaty, including all claims for 
indemnity for the cost of tlie war. 



The L'nited States will adjudi- 
cate and settle the claims of its 
citizens against Spain relinquished 
in this article. 

Article VIII. 

In conformity with the provisions 
of Articles I, II, and III of this 
treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, 
and cedes in Porto Rico and other 
islands in the West Indies, in the 
island of Guam, and in the Philip- 
pine Archi])elago, all the buildings, 
wharves, barracks, forts, struc- 
tures, public highways and other 
immovable ])roperty which, in con- 
formity with law, belong to the 
public domain, and as such belong 
to the Crown of Spain. 

And it is hereby declared that 
the relinquishment or cession, as 
the case may be, to which the pre- 
ceding paragraph refers, cannot in 
any respect impair the property or 
rights which by law belong to the 
peaceful possession of property of 
all kinds, of provinces, municipal- 
ities, public or private establish- 
ments, ecclesiastical or civic bod- 
ies, or any other associations hav- 
ing legal caj)acity to acquire and 
possess property in the aforesaid 
territories renounced or ceded, or 
of private individuals, of whatso- 
ever nationality such individuals 
may be. 

The aforesaid relinquishment or 
cession, as the case may be, includes 
all documents exclusively referring 
to the sovereignty relinquished or 
ceded that may exist in the ar- 
chives of the Peninsula. Where 
any document in such'archives only 



lamacion de indemnizacion na- 
cional 6 privada de cualquier 
gi'nero de un Gobierno contra el 
otro, 6 de sus subditos 6 ciudada- 
nos contra el otro Gobierno, que 
pueda haber snrgido desde el co- 
mienzo de la ultima insurreccion en 
Cuba y sea anterior al canje de 
ratiticaciones del j)resente tratado, 
asi como a toda indemnizacion en 
concepto de gastos ocasionados por 
la guerra. 

Los Estados Unidos juzgaraii y 
resolverau las reclamaciones de sus 
ciudadanos contra Espaiia, a que 
reuuncia en este articulo. 

Articulo VIII. 

En curaplimiento de lo con venido 
en los Articulos I, II y III de este 
tratado, Espaila renuncia en Cuba 
y cede en Puerto Eico y en las otras 
islas de las Indias Occiden tales, en 
la Isla de Guam y en el Archipiel- 
ago de las Filipinas, todos los edi- 
ticios, mueiles, cuarteles, fortalezas, 
establecimientos, vias publicas y 
demas bienes inmuebles que con 
arreglo a derecho son del dominio 
pi'iblico, y como tal corresi^onden a 
la Corona de Espana. 

(,)ueda por lo tanto declarado que 
esta renuncia 6 cesion, segun el 
caso, a que se refiere el parrafo an- 
terior, en nada puede mermar la 
propiedad, 6 los derechos ({ue cor- 
respondan, con arreglo a las leyes, 
al poseedor paciflco, de los bienes 
de todas clases de las provincias, 
municipios, establecimientos pribli- 
cos 6 i)rivados, corporaciones civiles 
(') eclesiasticas, 6 de cualesquiera 
otras colectividades que tienen per- 
sonalidad juridica para adquirir y 
poseer bienes en los mencionados 
territorios renunciado 6 cedidos, y 
los de los individuos particulares, 
cualquiera que sea su nacionalidad. 

Dicha renuncia 6 cesion, segun el 
caso, incluye todos los documentos 
que se refieran exclusivamente a 
dicha soberania renunciada 6 ce- 
dida, que existan en los Archivos 
de la Peninsula. 

Cuando estos documentos exist- 



8 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



iu part relates to said sovereignty, 
acoi)yotsueli part will be furnished 
whenever it slmll be re([uested. 
Like rules shall be reciprocally 
observed iu favor of iSpaiu iu re- 
spect of documents iu the archives 
of the islands above referred to. 



In the aforesaid relinquishment 
or cession, as the case may be, are 
also included such rights as the 
Crown of Si)ain and its authorities 
possess in respect of the ofticial 
archives and records, executive as 
well as judicial, in the islands above 
referred to, which relate to said 
islands or the rights and property 
of their inhabitants. Such archives 
and records shall be carefully pre- 
served, and private persons shall 
without distinction have the right 
to require, in accordance with law, 
authenticated copies of the con- 
tracts, wills and other instruments 
forming part of notarial i)rotocola 
or tiles, or which may be contained 
in the executive or judicial ar- 
chives, be the latter iu Spain or in 
the islands aforesaid. 



Article IX. 

Spanish subjects, natives of the 
Peninsula, residing in the territory 
over which Spain by the present 
treaty relinquishes or cedes her 
sovereignty, may remain iu sucli 
territory or nuiy remove therefrom, 
retaining in either event all their 
rights of proi)erty, including the 
right to sell or dis])ose of such prop- 
erty o,r of its i)roceeds; and they 
shall also have the ri^ht to carry on 
their industry, commerce and pro- 
fessions, being subject in respect 
thereof to such laws as are apjdi- 
cable to other foreigners. In case 
ihey remain in the territory they 
may preserve their allegiance to the 
Crown of Spain by making, before 
a court ol'record, within a year from 
the date of the exchange of ratifi- 
catious of this treaty, a declaration 



entes en dichos Archivos, solo en 
parte correspondan i\ dicha sober- 
ania, se facilitaran copias de dicha 
parte, siempreque sean solicitadas. 
Keglas auiilogas habran reciproca- 
mente de observarse en favor de 
Esi>aha, respecto de los documeu- 
tos existentes en los Archivos de 
las Islas antes mencionades. 

En las antecitadas renuncia 6 
cesion, segun el caso, se hallan 
comprendidos aquellos dcrechos de 
la Corona de Espana y de sus Au- 
toridades sobre los Archivos y 
IJegistros oticiales, asi administra- 
tivos como judiciales de dichas 
islas, ([ue se refieran a ellas y a los 
derechos y propiedades de sus hab- 
itantes. Dichos Archivos y Re- 
gistros debertiu ser cuidadosa- 
mente conservados y los particu- 
lares sin excepci6n,tendran derecho 
Ti sacar, con arreglo li las Leyes, 
las copias autorizadas de los con- 
tratos, testamentos y demj'is docu- 
mentos ([ue foiuuen parte de los 
l^rotocolos notariales 6 que se cus- 
todien en los Archivos adudnistra- 
tivos 6 judiciales, bien estos se 
hallen en Espana, 6 bien en las 
Islas de que se hace mencion 
auteriormente. 

ARTfCULO IX. 

Lossubditosespauoles,naturales 
de la Peninsula, residentes en el ter- 
ritorio cuya soberania Espana re- 
nuncia «'» cede por el presente tra- 
tado, podrfiu ])ernianecer en dicho 
territorio 6 marcharse de el, conser- 
vando en uno I'l otro c;iso todos sus 
dereclios de propiedad, con inclu- 
sion del derecho devender 6 dis- 
l)oner de tal propiedad 6 de sus 
productos; y ademas tendrau el 
derecho de ejercer su industria, 
comercio 6 prafesion, sujctandose 
ii este respe{;to a las leyes que sean 
a])licables ;i los demas extrangeros. 
l^]n el caso de <\ne pernuinezcan en 
el territorio, podran conservar su 
uacionalidad espanola haciendo 
ante una oticina de registro, den- 
tro de un ano despucs del cambio 
de ratiflcaciones de este tratado, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



9 



of tlieir decision to preserve such 
allegiance ; in default of which dec- 
laration they shall be held to have 
renounced it and to have adopted 
the nationality of the territory in 
which they may reside. 

The civil rights aud political 
status of the native inhabitants of 
the territories hereby ceded to the 
United States shall be determined 
by tlie Congress. 

Article X. 

The inhabitants of the territories 
over which Spain relinquishes or 
cedes her sovereignty shall be se- 
cured in the free exercise of tlieir 
religion. 

Article XI. 

The Spaniards residing in the 
territories over which Spain by 
this treaty cedes or relinquishes 
her sovereignty shall be subject in 
matters civil as well as criminal to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the country wherein they reside, 
pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- 
erning the same; and they shall 
have the right to appear before 
such courts, and to pursue the 
same course as citizens of the 
country to which the courts belong. 

Article XII. 

Judicial proceedings pending at 
the time of the exchange of ratifi- 
cations of tliis treaty in the terri- 
tories over which Spain relin- 
quishes or cedes her sovereignty 
shall be determined according to 
the following rules: 

]. Judgments rendered either in 
civil suits between private individ- 
uals, or in criminal matters, before 
the date mentioned, and with re- 
spect to which there is no recourse 
or right of review under the Si^an- 
ish law, shall be deemed to be final, 
and shall be executed in due form 
by competent authority in the ter- 
ritory within which such judgments 
should be carried out. 



una declaracion de su proposito 
de conservar dicha nacionalidad; 
a falta de esta declaracion, se con- 
siderara que lian renunciado dicha 
nacionalidad y adoptado la del ter- 
ritorio en el cual pueden residir. 

Los derechos civiles y la condi- 
cion politica de los habitantes 
naturales de los territorios aqui 
cedidos a lo Estados Ilnidos se 
determinaran por el Congreso. 

Articulo X. 

Los habitantes de los territorios 
cuya Soberania Esj)aha renuncia 6 
cede, tendran asegurado el libre 
ejercicio de su religion. 

Articulo XI. 

Los espaiioles residentes en los 
territorios cuya soberania cede 6 
renuncia Espana por este tratado^ 
estaran sometidos en lo civil y en 
lo criminal a les tribuuales del i^ais 
en que residan con arreglo a las 
leyes communes que regulen su 
competencia, pudiendo comparecer 
ante aquellos, en la misma forma y 
ampleaudo los mismos pro cedimi- 
entos que debau observar los ciu- 
dadanos del pais si que pertenezca 
el tribunal. 

Articulo XII. 

Los procedimientos judiciales 
pendientes al canjearse las ratifi- 
caciones de este tratado, en los 
territorios sobre los cuales Espana 
renuncia 6 cede su soberania, se 
deter min aril n con arreglo a las 
reglas siguientes : 

1. Las sentencias dictadas en 
causas civiles entre particulares 6 
en materia criminal, antes de la 
fecha mencionada, y contra las cua- 
les no hay a apelacion 6 casacion 
con arreglo a las leyes espaiiolas, 
se consideraran como firmes, y seran 
ejecutadas en debida forma por la 
Autoridad conipeteute en el terri- 
torio dentro del cual dichas sentefir 
cias deban cumplirse. 



10 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



1*. ( 'ivil suits between i)rivate in- 
dividuals which uuiy on tlie <hite 
nientioni'd l)e undetei mined shall 
be i)i'osecuted to Judiiinent belbie 
the eourt in whieh they may then 
be pending or in the court that 
may be substituted therefor. 

3. Criniinal actions ])eiulino- on 
the date mentioned before the Su- 
l)reme Court of Si)ain a^i;ainst citi- 
zens of the territory which by tliis 
treaty ceases to be Spanish shall 
continue under its Jurisdictiou un- 
til final judgment; but, sucli judg'- 
ment having been rendered, the 
execution thereof shall be commit- 
ted to the competent authority of 
the place in which the case arose. 



Article XIII. 

The rights of property secured 
by coi)yrights and patents ac(inired 
by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba, 
and in Forto IJico, the Philippines 
and other ceded territories, at the 
time of the exchange of the ratifi- 
cations of this treaty, shall con- 
tinue to be respected. Spasiish sci- 
entific, literary and artistic works, 
not subversive of public order in 
the territories in (juestion, shall 
continue to be admitted free of 
duty into such territories, for the 
period of ten years, to be reckoned 
from the date of the exchange of 
the ratifications of this treaty. 

Article XIV. 



2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- 
ticulares que en la fecha meucio- 
nada no hayan sido ju/gados, con- 
tin uanin su tramitacion ante el 
tribunal en (]ue se halle el proceso, 
6 ante aquel i^ue lo sustituya. 

3. Las acciones en materia crimi- 
nal i)endientes en la fecha mencio- 
nada ante el Tribunal Sui)remo de 
Esi)aria contra ciudadanosdelterri- 
torio que segun este tratado deja de 
ser espanol, continuaran bajo su ju- 
risdiccion hasta que recaiga la sen- 
tencia definitiva; pero una vez dic- 
tada esa sentencia, su ejecuciou 
sera encomeudada a la Autoridad 
competente del lugar en (jue la 
accion se suscito. 

Articulo XIII. 

Continuaran respetandose los de- 
rechos de propriedad literaria, ar- 
tistica r industrial, ad(iuiridos por 
.espanoles en las Islas de Cuba y en 
las de Puerto llico, Filipinas y de- 
nnis territorios cedidos, al hacerse 
el can je de las ratificaciones de este 
tratado. Las obras espanolas cien- 
tificas, literarias y artisticas. que no 
sean peligrosas, para el orden imb- 
lico en dichos territorios, continu- 
aran entrando en los mismos, con 
franquicia de todo derecho de adua- 
na por un ])lazo de diez anos a con- 
tar desde el canje de ratificaciones 
de este tratado. 

Articulo XIV 



Spain shall have the power to 
establish consular otllcers in the 
ports and places of the territories, 
the sovereignty over which has 
been either relinquished or ceded 
by the i)resent treaty 

Article XV. 

The ( lovernment of each country 
will, for the term of ten years, ac- 
cord to the merchant vessels of the 
other country the same treatment 
in respect of all ])ort charges, in- 
cluding entrance and clearance 



Espaha podra establecer Agen- 
tes Consulares en los puertos y 
plazas de los teiTitorios cuya re- 
nuncia y cesion es objeto de este 
tratado. 



Articulo XV. 

El Gobierno de cada pais conce- 
dera, por el t<''rmino de diez ailos, 
a los buques mercantes del otro el 
raismo trato en cuanto a todos los 
derechos de puerto, incluyendo los 
de entrada y salida, de faro y 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



11 



dues, light dues, and tonuage 
duties, as it accords to its own 
mercliant vessels, uot engaged in 
the coastwise trade. 

This article may at any time be 
terminated on six months'' notice 
given by either Government to the 
other. 



Article XVI. 

It is understood that any obli- 
gations assumed in this treaty by 
the United States with respect to 
Cuba are limited to the time of its 
occuj)ancy tliereof; but it will 
upon the termination of such occu- 
pancy, advise auy Government 
established in the island to assume 
the same obligations. 

Article XVII 

The present treaty shall be rati- 
fied by the President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate thereof, and 
by Her Majesty the Queen Regent 
of Spain; and the ratifications 
shall be exchanged at Washington 
within six months from the date 
hereof, or earlier if possible. 

In faith whereof, we, the resi^ec- 
tive Plenipotentiaries, have signed 
this treaty and have hereunto 
affixed our seals. 

Done in duidicate at Paris, the 
tenth day of IJecember, in the year 
of Our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and ninety-eight. 
[seal] William E. Day 
[seal] Oushman K. Davis 
[seal] William P Frye 
[seal] Geo. Gray 
[seal] Whitelaw Eeid. 



tonelaje, que concede a sus propios 
buques mercantes no empleados en 
el comercia de cabotaje. 

Este articulo puede ser denun- 
ciado en cualquier tiempo dando 
noticia previa de ello cualquiera de 
los dos (4()biernos al otro con seis 
meses de auticipacion. 

Articulo XVI 

Queda eutendido que cualquiera 
obligacion aceptada en este tratado 
por los Estados Unidos con respecto 
ii Cuba, esta limitada al tiempo que 
dure su ocupacion en esta isla, 
pero al terminar diclia ocupacion, 
aconsejaran al Gobierno que se es- 
tablezca en la isla que acepte las 
mismas obligaciones. 

Articulo XVII 

El pasente tratado seraratificado 
por el Presidente de los Estados 
Unidos, de acuerdo y con la apro- 
bacion del Seuado, Su Majestad la 
Reina Regente de Espa&a ; y por y 
las ratificacioues se canjear4n en 
Washington dentro del plazo de 
seis meses desde esta fecha, 6 antes 
si posible fuese. 

En tV' de lo cual, los respectivos 
Plenipotenciarios firman y sellan 
este tratado. 

Hecho por duplicado en Paris a 
diez de Diciembre del aho mil ocho- 
cientos noventa y ocho. 

EUGENIO MONTERO RiOS 

[seal] 

B. DE ABARZUZA 

[seal] 

j. de g arnica 
[seal] 

W R DE Villa Urrutia 

[seal] 

Rafael Oerero 

[seal! 



PKOTOCOLS OF THE CONFERENCES AT PAEIS. 



Protocol Xo 1 

Conference of October 1, 1898. 

Pieseut: On the part of tlie 
I 'nited States, ^Messrs : Day, Davis, 
I'rye, Gray, Keid. 

On the part of Spain Messrs: 
Montero-Rios, Abarzuza, Garuica, 
Villa-Urrutia Cerero. 

There was present, as Secretary 
of the United States Commission, 
Mr. Moore, and as Interpreter of 
the same Commission, Mr. Fergus- 
son. 

Mr. OJeda, Secretary of the 
Spanish Commission, not having 
arrived in Paris, his duties were, 
on motion of Mr. Moutero Kios, 
the American Commissioners as- 
senting, discharged by Mr. Villa- 
Urrutia. 

The commissions and full j)ower 
of the American Commissioners 
were exhibited to the Spanish Com- 
missioners and copies given to 
them. 

Tlie commission of the American 
Secretary was also exhibited, and 
a copy furnished to the Spanish 
Commissioners. 

The commissions, which were 
also full powers, of the Spanisli 
( 'ommrssioners were exhibited, and 
cojjies given to the American Com- 
missioners. 

It was resolved that the ])roto- 
cols of the Conferences should be 
kept in English and in Spanish by 
12 



Protocolo No. 1. 



Confer end a del 1'^ de Octubre 1898. 

Presentes por parte de los Esta- 
dos Unidos de America, los Se- 
nores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid. 

Por parte de Espana los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia. Cerero. 

Asistian en calidad de Secretario 
de la Comision de los Estados Uni- 
dos, encargado de la redaccion in- 
glesa del protocolo, Mr Moore, y 
como Interprete de diclia Comis- 
ion Mr Fergusson. 

No habiendo aun llegado a Paris 
el Secretario de la Comisi<3n Espa- 
nola, Sehor Ojeda, se presto -a hacer 
sus veces, por mediacion del Sr. 
Montero Rios y con el aseutimi- 
ento de los Comisarios Americanos, 
el Sehor Villa-Urrutia. 

Los nombramientos y plenipo- 
tencias de los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos fuerou presentados ji los 
Comisarios espanoles a quienes se 
entregaron copias de los mismos. 

Tambicn fuc prescntado el nom- 
bramiento del Secretario de la 
Comision Americana y hecha en- 
trega de una copia de <'l. 

Asiniismo fueron presentados por 
los Comisarios Espanoles sus pleni- 
potencias de que se dieron copias 
a la Comision Americana. 

Se con vino en (jue las Actas de la 
conferencia se redactasen en espa- 
hol e ingles por los respectivos 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



13 



the respective Secretaries, aud 
that in the event of a disagreement 
between them it shonkl be settled 
by the Commissioners, to whom 
the protocols should always be 
submitted for approval. 

It was also resolved that the 
protocols should contain the prop- 
ositions presented by the Com- 
missioners and the action thereon, 
suppressing any record of the de- 
bates, in order that the discussions 
should be as full, frank, and 
friendly as was desired by all the 
Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
moved that the Commissioners on 
either side should have the right 
to file memoranda on points 
deemed by them to be of sutticient 
importance to warrant such action. 
On this motion no decision was 
reached. 

Upon the suggestion of Mr 
Montero Rios that an order of 
business be established by the 
Commission, Mr. (iray moved 
that a committee be appointed, to 
consist of a Commissioner on each 
side, to agree upon, frame and 
submit to tlie conference rules of 
procedure for the guidance thereof. 
The motion being agreed to, Mr. 
Gray and Mr. Villa Urrutia were 
designated as the Committee, and 
requested to report to the Confer- 
ence at the next session, which it 
was resolved should be held on 
October 3, at 2 o'clock, p. m. 



The President of the S])anish 
Commission stated that he was 
charged by his Government to lay 
before the American Commission- 
ers a i^roposition, in limine and of 
a pressing nature, which he ])re- 
sented in writing and of which a 
copy and translation are hereto 
annexed. Mr Day requested that 
it be read, which was done, the In- 
terpreter translating it into Eng- 
lish. Upon the conclusion of the 
reading, Mr Day said that the 



Secretarios, y que cuando no 
hubiese entre ellos acuerdo, re- 
solviese la conferencia, a cuya 
aprobacion habian de ser siempre 
sometidas. 

Se acordo tambicn que endichas 
actas constasen las proposiciones 
que presentaran los Comisarios y 
los acuerdos que recayeran sobre 
las mismas, suprimiendo en cambio 
cuanto se refiriese a su discusion 
para permitir que esta fuera tan 
amplia, tan franca y tan amistosa 
comos uuos y otros Comisarios 
deseaban. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pro- 
pusieron que los Comisarios de una 
u otra de las partes tuvieran el 
derecho de i^resentar Memoranda 
sobre aquellos puntos que por su 
importancia entendieran que asi lo 
requeriau. No se decidio uada 
sobre este i^unto. 

Indicada por el Senor Montero 
Eios la conveniencia de fijar el 
orden de los trabajos de la Comi- 
si('>n, propuso JNlr Gray el nom- 
bramiento <ie dos delegados en 
representaciou de cada una de 
las partes para que, puestos de 
acuerdo, redacteu y sometan a la 
Conferencia las reglas de procedi- 
miento a que esta deba ajustarse. 
Apiobada la proposicion, fueron 
designados el Sr Villa- Urrutia 
y Mr Gray para la redaecion del 
reglamento que habia de presen- 
tarse a la aprobaci<m de la con- 
ferencia en su pr<')xima sesion, 
acordandose que esta tuviera lugar 
el 3 de Octubre a las dos de la 
tarde. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola manifesto que tenia eu- 
cargo de su Gobierno de presentar 
a los Comisarios Americanos como 
cuesti('»n previa y de carjicter ur- 
gente una mocion que presento por 
escrito y cuya copia es anexa al 
Protocolo. Mr Day pidio que se 
diera de ella lectura, y asi lo hizo, 
traduciendola al ingles el Inter- 
prete. 

Terminada la lectura declaro Mr- 
Day que los Comisarios Ameri- 



14 TREATY OF TEACE. 

American Cominissioners would cauos estudiariaii diclia mocion 

examine the proposition and reply y darian sii respuesta en la sesion 

to it at the next session. proxiuia. 

William K. Day E Montero Ri'os 

CUSIIMAN K. DAYIS B DE ABARZrZA 

Wm. I*. Frye eJ UE Garnica 

Geo. (Jray' W K de Villa Urrutia 

WniTELAAv Reid. Rafael Cerero 

J. B. Moore. 



Annex to Protocol Xo. 1. 

Los Coinisarios esi)arioles para couvenir con los Senores Comisarios 
Americanos nn Tratado de paz entre EspaHa y los Estados-Unidos de 
America tienen el honor de hacer presente a los Senores Comisarios 
Americanos lo signiente: 

Habicndose convcnido en el articulo 6" del Protocolo tirmado en Wash- 
ington el 12 de Agosto ultimo por el Senor Ministro de Estado del Gobi- 
erno federal y el Senor Embajador de Francia en concepto de Plenipo- 
tenciario de Espana en (pie ^'al concluirse y tirmarse aquel documento 
debenau ser suspendidas las hostilidades entre los dos paises" ; y siendo 
de estc couYcnio inmediata y necesaria consecuencia que el Statu quo 
existente en aquel momento en Filipinas no habia de poder alterarse en 
perjuicio de ninguna de las dos Altas partes contratantes mientras 
hnbiera de durar tal suspensi('»n de hostilidades, los Comisarios espanoles 
entienden (pie habiendo de ser el sobredicho Protocolo y su estricta 
obserYancia la base necesaria del Tratado de paz que est;in llamados a 
convenir con los Sefiores Comisarios Americanos, estan en el caso de 
proponer y deniandar a dichos Senores Con)isarios que Juntameute con 
los intVascritos se sirYan declarar que dicho Statu quo debe ser inmedia- 
tamente restablecido por la parte contratante que lo haya alterado 6 
que haya consentido o no imi)edido su alteraci('>n en perjuicio de la otra. 

Y entendiendo los Comisarios espanoles spie tal Statu (fuo fu('' alter- 
ado y contiuua cada diacon mayor gravedad alterandoseen i)erjuicio de 
EspaHa por los rebeldes tagalos que formaron durante la campana y 
contniuan fornuuido una fuerza auxiliar de las tropas regulares Ameri- 
canas, demandan a los Senores Comisarios Americanos (jue juntameute 
con los infrascritos se sirvan declarar que las autoridades y jefes de las 
liierzas Americanas en las Islas Filipinas deben ])roceder inmediata- 
mente a restablecer en su estricta y absoluta integridad aipiel Statu quo 
en los territorios (pie ocnipen y se abstengan de imj^edir por uingnn 
medio dire(;to ni indirecto (jue las autoridades y fuerzas espafiolas lo 
restablezcan en los territorios que no ocui»an las de los Ivstados Fnidos. 

Los Comisarios espanoles se reserYan Yolver a insistir sobre este 
asunto asi conio sobre los derechos (pie a I'^spafia ])udieran corresponder 
por efccto de la indicada alteracidii (pie ha sntVido y i)ue(le continuar 
sufriendo en Filipinas el Statu (pio del IL* de Agosto ultimo hasta su 
restableciiniento. 

Msta con forme 

Emilio de O.jeda 



TREATY OF PEACE. 15 

[Translation.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 1. 

The Spanish Commissioners to arrange with the American Commis- 
sioners a treaty of peace between Spain and the United States of 
America, have the honor to lay before the American Commissioners the 
following" : 

It having been agreed by Article VI of the Protocol signed in Wash- 
ington on Angust 12 last by the Secretary of State of the Federal Gov- 
ernment and the Ambassador of France acting as Plenipotentiary of 
Spain that "upon the conclusion and signing of this Protocol, hostili- 
ties between the two countries shall be suspended"; and it being a 
direct and necessary consequence of this arrangement that the statu 
quo at the time existing in the Philippines could not be altered to the 
prejudice of the two High Contracting Parties during the continuance 
of such susi)ension of hostilities, the Spanish Commissioners, under- 
standing that the Protocol aforesaid and its observance must be the 
necessary basis of the treaty of peace they are called upon to arrange 
with the American Commissioners, feel bound to proi)ose and demand 
of the said Commissioners that jointly with the undersigned they be 
pleased to declare that the said statu quo must be immediately restored 
by the contracting party that may have altered the same, or that may 
have consented to or failed to prevent its alteration to the prejudice of 
the other. 

And the Spanish Commissioners, understanding that such statu quo 
was altered and continues being altered with daily increasing gravity 
to the prejudice of Spain by the Tagalo rebels, who formed during the 
campaign and still form an auxiliary force to the regular American 
troops, demand of the American Commissioners that jointly with the 
undersigned tliey be pleased to declare that the authorities and oificers 
of the American forces in the Philippine Islands must at once proceed 
fully and absolutely to restore the said statu quo in the territories they 
may occupy, and must abstain from i)reventing, by any means, direct 
or indirect, the restoration thereof by the Spanish authorities and forces 
in the territory not occui)ied by those of the United States. 

The Spanish Commissioners reserve the right to insist again upon this 
matter as well as upon the rights that nmy attach to Spain through the 
effect of the said alteration which the statu quo of August 12 last has suf- 
fered or may continue to suffer in the Philippines until its restoration. 

True copy: 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



Commissions and Full Powers Referred to in the Fore- 
going Protocol. 

commissions of american plenipotentiaries. 

William McKinley, President of the United States of America, 
to all who shall see these Presents, Greeting : 

Know Ye I That, rei)osing special trust and confidence in the Integ- 
rity and Ability of William E. Day, of Ohio, I do appoint him a Com- 
missioner Plenipotentiary of the United States, under the Protocol 
signed at Washington of the twelfth day of August, 1808, to negotiate* 
and conclude a Treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, 



IG TREATY OF PEACE. 

and do autliori/.t' and empower liim to execute and fulfill the duties of 
this conmiissidii, witli ;dl tlie ])0\ver.s, privile,ae^, and emoluments there- 
unto of rijiht appertaining, durinj^' the pleasure of the I'resideut of the 
United States. 

In testimony whereof. 1 have caused these letters to be made patent, 
and the seal of tlie United States to be herennto affixed. 

(iiven under my hand at the city of ^Vasliington tlie l.>th day of 
Se])tend)er in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight liundred aud 
uinety eight, and the 123rd year of the ludepeudence of the United 
States of America. 

Signed: William ]\IcKtnley. 
By the President: 

Signed: J. B. MoORE, 

Acting Secretary of State. 

The commissions of the other American Plenipotentiaries were in the 
same form, tlieir names being as follows: 
CusHMAN K. Davis, of Minnesota, 
William P. Frye, of Maine, 
Geor(;e Gray% of Delaware, and 
WiiiTELAW Beid, of New York. 



ri'LL POWER OF AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 

William ^McKinley, President of the United States of America, to 
all who shall see these Presents, Greeting: 

Know Ye! That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integ- 
rity and Ability of the Honorable William R. Day, of Ohio, latel}^ Secre- 
tary of State of the United States, the Houoraljle Cushman K. Davis, 
of Minnesota, a Seinitor of the United States, The Hooorable William P. 
Frye, of Elaine, a Senator of the Ignited States, the Honorable George 
Gray, of Delaware, a Senator of the United States, and the Honorable 
Whitelaw Beid, of Xew York, lately Minister Plenipotentiary of the 
United States to France, I do ai)point them jointly and severally to be 
Commissioners on the part of the United States under the Protocol 
signed at Washington on the twelfth day of August, 1898, to negotiate 
and conclude a Treaty of ])eace between the United States and Spain, 
heicby ejnpowering them Jointly aud severally to meet the Commission- 
ers ai)])ointed or to be ai)])ointed under said Protocol on behalf of Spain, 
and with them to negotiate and sign a Treaty of peace between the 
United States and Sjiain, subject to the ratification of their Govern- 
ment: and the said commission to hold and exercise during the pleasure 
of the President of the United States for the time being. 

In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent 
and the seal of tlie United States to be hereunto affixed. 

Given under my hand at the city of Washington this 13th day of 
September in the year of Our Lord one thousaiul eight hundred and 
ninety-eight, and of the Inde]>endence of the United States of America 
the one hundred and twenty-third. 

Signed: William McKinley. 

By the President: 

Signed: d. P>. MooRE. 

Acting Secretary of State. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 17 

C0MM1SSI0]N»S AND FULL POWERS OF SPANISH PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 

Don Alfonso Xlir, por la gracia de Dios y la Coastitucion Eey de 
Espaila y en su uoinbre y durante su meuor edad Dona Maria Cris- 
TiNA, Keina Eegeute del Keino, 

Por cuauto ha llegado el caso de celebrar entre Espaila y los Estados 
TJnidos de America nn tratado de paz ; siendo necesario que al electo 
autorice Yo debidamente a personas que merezcan Mi Real coiiflanzay 
concurriendo eu Vos Don Engenio Montero Eios, Caballero de la 
Insigue Ordeu del Toison de Oro, condecorado con el Collar de la Eeal 
y distinguida ordeu de Carlos III, Presidente del Senado, ex-ministro 
de la Corona, ex-presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Acade- 
mico de la de Ciencias Morales y Politicas, las circunstaueias que a este fiu 
pueden apetercerse; por tan to. He venido en elegiros y nombraros, como 
por la presente Os elijo y nombro para que, en cumplimiento de lo esti- 
pulado en el Articulo quinto del Protocolo firmado en Washington el 
dia doce del mes de Agosto ultimo y revestido del carncterde Mi Pleni- 
potenciario, conferencieis y convengais lo mas acertado y oportuno, en 
union de los demas Plenipotenciarios que, con esta misma feclia, nom- 
bro y con los que designe al propio objeto el Presidente de los Estados 
Unidos. Y todo lo que asi conferencieis, convengais, trateis, concluyais 
y flrmeis lo doy desde abora por grato y rato, lo observarr y cumplire, 
lo har6 observar y cumplir como si por Mi misma lo liubiere confer- 
enciado, convenido tratado, concluido y tirmado, para la cual Os doy 
Mi pleuo poder en la mas amplia forma que de derecho se requiera.^ Y 
en fe de ello, He liechoa expedir la presente tirmada de Mi mano, debida- 
mente sellada y refrendada del infrascrito Mi Miuistro de Estado. 
Dado en el Palacio de Madrid a veintidos de Septiembre de mil oclio- 
cientos uoventa y oclio. 

Firmado: Maria Cristina= 

El Ministro de Estado = 

Firmado = Juan Manuel Sanchez 

Y Gutierrez de Castro = 



[Translation.] 

Don Alfonso XIII, by the grace of God and the constitution King 
of Spain, and in his name and during his minority, DONA Maria 
Cristina, Queen Eegent of the Kingdom : 

Whereas the occasion has arisen for the concluding between Spain 
and the United States of America of a Treaty of peace, and it being 
necessary that to such end I should duly confer authority upon per- 
sons who shall merit my royal confidence, and you, Don Eugenio 
Montero Eios, Knight of the Worthy Order of the Golden Fleece, 
decorated with the Collar of the Royal and distinguished Order of 
Charles III, President of the Senate, ex-Minister of the Crown, ex- 
President of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Academician of the 
Moral and Political Sciences, embody the characteristics which meet 
the requirements of the case, I have therefore chosen and appointed, 
and by these presents do choose and appoint you to the end that, pur- 
suant to the stipulations of Article V of the Protocol signed in Wash- 
ington of the twelfth day of the month of August last, and invested 
with the character of my Plenipotentiary, you may in unison with the 
T P 2 



18 TREATY OF PEACE. 

other rienipotentiaries I liav^e ap])oiiitod under this date and those 
Avho may be desiuiinted by the President of -the Ignited States for the 
same purpose, eonler and ayree upon wliat may be best and most advis- 
able. And everything you may so confer and a^ree upon, negotiate, 
conclude and sign. 1 now conliiin and i atify, 1 will observe and execute, 
will cause to be observed and executed, the same as it 1 myself had 
conferred and agi'eed upon, negotiated, concluded and signed it, for all 
of which I confer ui)on you ample authority to the fullest extent 
re(juireil bylaw. In witness whereof J have caused these presents to 
issue signed by my hand, duly sealed and attested by the undersigned, 
my IMinister of State. 

Given in the l*alace of Madrid on the twenty-second day of Septem- 
ber of eighteen huiulred and ninety eight. 

Signed: Maria Cristina. 

Signed : Juan Manuel Sanchez y Gutierrez de Castro, 

2Iinister of State. 

The commissions and full powers of the other Spanish Plenipoten- 
tiaries were in the same form, their names and titles being as follows: 

Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and some- 
time Ambassadcu' and Minister of the Crown; 

Doij Jose de Garnica y Diaz, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Justice, De])uty of the Cortes, Member of the General Codification 
Commission, ex- Vice-President of the Congress of Dei>uties; 

Don Wenceslao Eamirez de Villa Urrutia, Knight Grand Cross of 
the lioyal Order of Isabel the Catholic, Knight Commander of the 
Koyal and Distinguished Order of Charles III, decorated with the 
White Cross of the second class of Naval Merit, Grand Cross of the 
Dutch Lion of the Xetherlands, Oak Crown of Luxemburg, the Maji- 
dieh of Turkey, Knight Commander of the Legion of Honor of France, 
of the Concepcion de Villaviciosa of Portugal, decorated with the 
Cross of the second class of the Past of Polivar, Knight of St-Maurice 
and St-Lazarus of Italy, of the Crown of Prussia, of the Crown of 
Christ of Portugal, Licentiate in civil and canonical law, and through 
competitive examination, in administrative law Academician Professor 
of the Iloyal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, my Minister 
Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians; 

])ou Rafael Cerero y Saenz, General of Division, Ranking General 
of ICngineers of the first Army Corps, Knight of the Grand Cross of 
the Orders of San Hermcnegildo and of Military Merit, white insignia, 
decorated with the Cross of the third class of the Order of Military Merit, 
red insignia. 



COMMISSION OF AMERICAN SECRETARY. 

William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to 
all who shall see these presents, greeting: 

Know ye ! That, reposing s])ecial trust and confidence in the Integrity 
and Ability of John Bassett Moore, of New York, I do appoint him Sec- 
retary and Counsel to the Commissioners of the ITnited States appointed 
under the Protocol signed at Washington on the twelfth day of August, 
I.S!»s, to negotiate aiul conclude a Treaty of peace between the LTnited 
States and Si)ain, and do authorize ami em])ower him to execute and 
fulfill the duties of this Commission, with all the powers, privileges, and 



TREATY OF PEACE, 



19 



emolaments thereunto of right appertaining, during the pleasure of the 
President of the United States. 

In testimony whereof, I liave caused these letters to be made patent, 
and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. 

Given under my hand at the city of Washington, the 13th day of 
September in the year of Our Lord one tliousand eight hundred and 
ninety-eight, and the li^Srd year of the Independence of the United 
States of America. 

Signed: William McKinley. 
By the President: 

Signed: William R. Day, 

Secretary of State. 



Protocol No 2. 



Protocolo No. 2. 



Conference of October 5, 1898. Gonferencia del 3 de Octubre de 1898. 



Present: On the part of the 
United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, 
Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Fergus- 
son. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica 
Villa-Urrutia Cerero 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

Messrs. Gray and Villa- Urrutia, 
as a committee on procedure, re- 
ported that they had, after confer- 
ring together, decided that it was 
not advisable iit present to recom- 
mend the adoption of any rules in 
addition to those already deter- 
mined upon or still under discus- 
sion. 

The question of annexing to the 
protocol memoranda on j)oints of 
importance was then discussed. 

The Spanish Commissioners pro- 
posed that the Commissioners on 
either side should have the privi- 
lege of filing memoranda on points 
which they should deem to be of 
sufficientimportanceto justify such 
action, the memoranda so filed to 
be annexed to the protocols. 

The American Commissioners 
proposed that the right should be 
reserved to the Commissioners on 
either side to present memoranda 
on points which they might deem 
of sufficient importance to justify 



Presentes Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de America, los 
Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte deEspana. los Seiiores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza Garnica 
Villa-Urrutia Cerero. 

El protocolo de la sesion anterior 
fue leido y aprobado. 

Los Senores Gray y Villa Urru- 
tia como ponentes para formular 
las reglas de procedimieuto, mani- 
festaron que despurs de haber cou- 
ferenciado, habfan decidido que no 
creian por ahora necesario reco- 
mendar que se adoptasen otras reg- 
las adicionales a las acordadas 
anteriormente y que aun se halla- 
ban sujetas a debate. 

Se discutio la cuestion de unir 
como anexos al protocolo los Mem- 
orandums relativos a asuutos de 
importancia. 

Los ConiisionadosEspaiiolespro- 
jHisieron que los de ambas Partes 
tuvieran facultad de i)resentar 
Memorandums sobre los puntos 
que creyeran de bastante impor- 
tancia para justificar tal determi- 
nacion y que los Memorandums 
formasen parte del protocolo como 
anexos al mismo, 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
propusieron que sedeberiareservar 
a los Comisionados de ambas partes 
este derecho de i)resentar Memo- 
randums sobre puntos que se juz- 
gasen de bastante importancia para 



20 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



them ill so doiii^', the (juestioii of 
aiinexiiiji- such nieinoraiida to the 
protocol to be ik'teiiniiied in eaeh 
case by the f)oiiit Commission. 

No agreement having' been 
reached, it was decided to refer 
the luattci' to the Secretaries for 
their consideration and adjust- 
ment, subject to the furtlier action 
of the Commission. 

The American Commissioners 
then read their rei)]y to the com- 
munication presented by the Span- 
ish Commissioners at the first con- 
ference in rehition to the ])rcserva- 
tiou of tlie status (jiio in tlie Pliilip- 
piues. A copy of the reply is 
hereto annexed. 

The S])anish Commissioners re- 
served the right to put in an an- 
swer to the reply at the next ses- 
sion. 

The Spanish Commissioners then 
asked for the opinion of the Ameri- 
can Commissioners on the order of 
business. 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they were ready with 
propositions as to matters deter- 
mined by the Protocol, 

The Sjjanish Commissioners' said 
they were ready to receive them. 

The propositions, as hereto an- 
nexed, were then read, and a co])y 
of them handed to the Spanish 
Commissioners. 

After the reading was completed, 
the Spanish Commissioners stated 
that they desired to examine the 
l)apci-, and, if necessary, i)resent 
amendments, and moved that an 
ad Jou r n meut be taken until Friday. 

After discussion, it was agreed 
to adjourn to two o'clock, p. m., on 
Friday, October 7. 

William 1*. Day 
CusiiMAN K. Davis 
Wm. p. Frye 
Geo. Cray 

WlIITELAW Reid. 

J. i>. Moore. 



hacerlo asi; pero que la cuestion 
de nnir tales Memorandums al pro- 
tocolo se resolveria en cad a caso 
por la Comision en i)]eno. 

No habiendose llegado a un 
acnerdo, se decidio encomendar 
el asunto al estudio y resolucion 
de los Secretarios, salvo la aproba- 
cion posterior de la Comision. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
leyeron luego su contestacion a la 
comunicacion presentada por los 
Comisionados I'^spanoles en la jiri- 
mera conferencia relativa }'» la con- 
servacion del statu quo en laslslas 
Filipinas. Una copia de la con- 
testacion se acompafia anexa a 
esta acta. 

Los Comisionades espanoles se 
reservau el derecho de contestar en 
la primera sesion. 

Los Comisionados Espanoles pro- 
poneu luego ii los Comisionados 
Americanos (jue expongan su opin- 
i('»n acerca del orden que se seguira 
en los trabajos de la conferencia. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
manitiestan que tienen preparadas 
proposiciones sobre asuntos deter- 
minados por el Protocolo. 

Los Comisionados Espanoles 
dicen que estan preparados para 
recibirlas. 

Las proposiciones que se in- 
cluyen anexas son leidas diindose 
copias de ellas a los Comisionados 
Espanoles. 

Despues de terminada la lectura 
los Comisionados Espanoles mani- 
tiestan que desean examinar el 
documento, y si lo creen necesario 
presentar enmiendas, y proponen 
que se aplace la sesion hasta el 
Viernes. 

Despues de haberse discutido 
esto, se convino en levantar la 
sesion hasta las dos de la tarde del 
Viernes 7 de Octubre. 

E. MONTERO lilOS 
B DE AlJARZUZA 
J. DE (J ARNICA 

W R DE Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 



treaty of pea.ce. 21 

Annex 1 to Protocol No. 2. 

The American Commissioners, having duly considered the communi- 
cation made to them in writing l)y the Spanish Commissioners at their 
conference on the 1st instant, make the following answer: 

The American Commissioners concur in the opinion, which that com- 
munication is understood to convey, that the Protocol of August 12, 
1898, embodies the conditions on which negotiations for peace have 
been undertaken. 

But in the proposal and demand of the Spanish Commissioners that 
the American Commissioners join them in a declaration that the status 
quo existing at the time of the signature of the Protocol " must be 
immediately restored by the contracting party that may have altered 
the same, or that may have consented to or failed to prevent its altera- 
tion to the prejudice of the other", as well as in the demand of the 
Spanish Commissioners that the American Commissioners join them in 
the declaration that the American authorities in the Pliilippines shall 
proceed to restore or else refrain from interfering with tlie effort of 
Spain to restore the status quo understood by the Spanish Commis- 
sioners to have been disturbed by the Tagalo rebels, who are described 
as an auxiliary to the American forces, the American Commissioners 
can see notliing but a proposal and demand to divert the conference 
from the object for which it has met to the consideration of a subject 
which ])roperly belongs to the two Governments, and not to the Com- 
missioners here assembled. The American Commissioners do not 
intend to intimate that the proposal was made with this design, but 
they think it evident that this would be the necessary result of its 
discussion. 

The topics embraced in the communication of the Spanish Commis- 
sioners were set forth in much detail in notes of the French Embassy 
in Washington to the Dei)artment of State of the United States of 
August 29 and September 3 and 11. To these notes the Department of 
State replied on September 5 and 10. An examination of these diplo- 
matic papers will show that they embraced contested matters of fact as 
well as contested matters of law. In respect of some of the questions 
of fact, is is probable that neither Government at present possesses 
full and accurate information; while, in respect of other questions of 
fact, the reports in the possession of the Spanish Government were so 
entirely at variance with authentic information in the possession of the 
United States as to compel the conclusion tliat at least some of these 
reports were not of an official chaiacter. in respect of questions of 
law, the views of the two Governments were also at variance. 

The American Commissioners, therefore, witli a view to jirevent the 
diversion and failure of the present negotiations, as well as on the 
ground of a want of power, deem themselves obliged to rei)ly that the 
questions involved in the present proposals and demands of the Span- 
ish Commissioners having heretofore been presented to the (Tovern- 
ment of the rnited States and answered in notes of the Department of 
State, any further demands as to military operations in the Philippines 
must be addressed by the Government of Spain to the Government of 
the United States at Washington, and consequently that they cannot 
join in the i)roposed declarations. 

True copy : J. B. Moore. 



22 treaty of peace. 

Annex 2 to Protocol No. 2. 

In entering upon negotiations for a treaty of i)eace, the natural pro- 
cedure is to follow tlie order of tlie to])ies in the Protocol of August 12, 
ISIKS, by M'liicli the Tnited States and Spain aj>ieed upon the terms on 
which they would enter upon the present negotiatious. 

I>y Article 1 of the Protocol, Spain agrees to " relin(juish all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba". 

\\'ith a view to the immediate execution of this engagement, steps 
lia\'f already been taken for the evacuation of the island, as provided 
l>y the Protocol. 

Only one thing remains to complete the legal formalities of the trans- 
action, and that is to embody in a treaty of peace an a]>propriate stipula- 
tion by which S])ain reliiH|iiishes, according to the engagements of the 
Protocol, all claim of sovereignty and title. 

The American Commissioners therefore propose, as a part of the treaty 
of peace, the following article: 

''The (iovernment of Si)ain hereby relinquishes all claim of sover- 
eignty over and title to Cuba. 

'• In this relin([uishment of sovereignty and title is included all claim 
to the public domain, lots and squares, vacant lauds, public buildings, 
fortitications and the armaments thereof, and barracks and other 
structur«'s which are not private individual property. The archives, 
state i)apers, public records, and all pa])ers and documents relative to 
the domain and sovereignty of the island and necessary or convenient 
for the government thereof, including all judicial and legal documents 
and other public records necessary or convenient for securing to individ- 
uals the titles to i)roperty or other rights, are embraced in the foregoing 
relin(]uishment; but an authenticated copy of any of them that may be 
recinired will be given at any time to such officer of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment [asj may apply for it. The Government of Spain will likewise 
furnish an authenticated copy of any paper, record or document in the 
Spanish archives, home or colonial, or in the possession of the Spanish 
tribunals, home or colonial, relative to the domain and sovereignty of 
the island and necessary or convenient for the government thereof, or 
necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to prop- 
erty or other rights." 

By Article II of the Protocol, Spain agrees to "cede to the United 
States tlie Island of Porto Pico and other islands now under Spanish 
sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to 
be selected by the United States''. 

The Government of the United States having selected in the Ladrones 
the Island of Guam, the American Commissioners propose as the next 
article of the treaty of peace the following stipulation: 

"The Government of Spain hereby cedes to the United States the 
Island of Porto Pico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty 
in the West Indies, and also the Island of Guam, in the Ladrones. 

'• In this cession is in(;luded all right and claim to the public domain, 
lots and scjuares, vacant lands, public buildings, fortifications and the 
armaments thereof, and barracks and other structures which are not 
private individual ])roperty. The archives, state papers, i)ublic records, 
and all papers and documents relative to the domain and sovereignty 
of tlie islands and necessary or convenient for the government thereof, 
including all Judicial and legal documents and other ]iublic records 
necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to prop- 
erty or other rights, are embraced in the foregoing cession: but an 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



23 



authenticated copy of any of tliem that may be required will be given 
at any time to such ofticer of the Spanish Government as may apply 
for it. The Government of Spain will likewise furnish an authenti- 
cated copy of any paper, record or document in the Spanish archives, 
home or colonial, or in the possession of the Spanish tribunals, home 
or colonial, relative to the domain and sovereignty of the islands and 
necessary or convenient for the government thereof, or necessary or 
convenient for securing to individuals the titles to property or other 
risrhts." 



True copy ; 



J. B. Moore. 



Protocol Xo. 3. 



Peotocolo No. 3. 



Conference of October 7, 1898. Conferencia del 7 de Octubre de 1898. 



Present On the part of the 
United States. Messrs. Day 
Davis Frye Gray Eeid Moore 
Fergussou. 

On the part of Spain Messrs. 
Moiitero Kios, Abarzuza Garnica, 
Villa Urrutia, Cerero. 

Mr. Ojeda, having exhibited his 
commission and furnished a copy 
of it, assumed the duties of Secre- 
tary of the Spanish Commission. 

The protocol of the preceding- 
session was read and approved. 

On the question of procedure 
referred to them at the last con- 
ference the Secretaries made the 
f oil o w i n g report ; 

"Where a proposition is presented 
and rejected, the side presenting 
it shall have the right to file a 
brief memorandum giving its rea- 
sons in support of such proposi- 
tion, and the other side shall have 
the right to tile a brief reply, the 
written discussion to be contined 
to such memorandum and reply, 
which are to be annexed to the 
protocol." 

This report was adopted by unan- 
imous consent. 

The Spanish Commissioners then 
I)resented, in pursuance of the res- 
ervation made by them at the last 
conference, a rei)ly to the Ameri- 
can answer on the subject of the 
status quo in the Philippines, at 



Preseutes. Por parte de los 
Estados Unidos de America los 
Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid, Moore, Fergussou. 

Por parte de Espana los Seiiores 
Montcro Ki'os Abarzuza Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero. 

El Sr. Ojeda despues de haber 
presentado su nombramiento y 
dado copia de el, actuo en calidad 
de Secretario de la Comisiihi Espa- 
nola. 

Se leyo y aprobo el acta de la 
sesion anterior. 

Eespecto del procedimiento que 
habi'a de adoptarse y que en la 
viltima sesion se dejo a cargo de 
los Secretarios, estos informaron 
haber Uegado al acuerdo siguiente : 

"Siempre que una proposicion 
sea presentada y rechazada, la 
parte que la haya ju'esentado ten- 
dr;i el derecho de a nadir un breve 
Memorandum en <[ue se expresen 
las razones en que aquella se funda, 
y la otra parte tendra el derecho 
de contestar en forma breve, limi- 
tandose dicha discusion por escrito 
al citado ^iemorandnm y contes- 
tacion que iran auexos al acta." 

El acuerdo anteriorfue unanime- 
meute aprobado. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pre- 
sentan en virtud de la reserva que 
hicieron en la ultima conferencia 
una contestacion a la comunica- 
cion de los Comisarios Americanos- 
relativa al iStatti quo en Filiinnas, 



24 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



tlie sanu' time stating tliat the 
reply was ])iosoiite(l for the i)ur- 
])()se of rcserviii^i llie ri.ulit to briiisi' 
up tlu' suhjec't liercaftor. 

'riierei)ly was received and tiled; 
copy and translation are hereto 
annexed. 

The Spanisli Commissioners then 
presented, as an amendment to 
the American proposals, a set of 
articles, in Spanish, copy and 
translation of which are hereto 
annexed, in relation to Cuba and 
I'orto Kico. 

Tlie American Commissioneis, in 
order to atVord op])ortnnity lor the 
translation and consideration of 
the articles, moved that the con- 
ference be adjourned till Tuesday, 
October 11. at two o'chx-k, p. m. 

The conference was adjourned 
accordino'lv. 



William K. Day 
CusiiMAN K. Davis 
VsM. P Frye 
Geo. Cray 
WniTELAW Reid. 

John B. Moore, 



maiiifestando al mismo tiempo que 
el objeto-de dicha coutestacion era 
el de reservar el derecho de pro- 
mover este asunto ulteriormente. 

Dicho documento fue debida- 
mente recibido y su copia y tra- 
duc(;i6n tiguran como anexos al 
acta ])resente. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pre- 
sentau a continuaciim, ( omo enmi- 
enda a las proi)osiciones de los 
Ameri(;anos, el articulado que va 
adjunto, relative a Cuba y Puerto 
Kico. 

Los Comisarios Americanos, a 
tin de disi)oner del tiempo necesa- 
rio i)ara la traduecion y considera- 
ci(m de dicho articulado, propusie- 
ron que la conferencia fuese apala- 
zada hasta el Martes 11 deOctubre. 

Se aprobo este acuerdo y se 
apla/(» la ])r6xiina sesion hasta el 
dia 11 de Octubre a las 2 P. M. 

E MONTERO Ei'os 
]> DE AEAEZUZA 
J DE GARNICA 

W K DE Villa Urrutia 

IvAFAEL CeRERO 
Emilio de O.TEDA 



Annex I to Protocol No. 3. 

C03I1S10N PARA LA NEGOCIACION DE LA PAZ CON LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS. 



rKorosicioN. 

No. 2 {((). 

Los Comisarios espafioles se han enterado, con la detenci(>n que 
requiere la inq)ortaiicia del asunto, de la coutestacion escrita en (jue los 
Comisarios americanos se niegan a acei)tar la proposicion que los espa- 
Fioles habiamos i)resentad<) en la sesion celebrada ])or los unos y los 
otros en 1" del corriente, para que so declarase i)or la conferencia, en 
l)leno, (pie debia lestablecerse el statu quo en Filipinas existente en 12 
de Agosto ultimo, en (jue se concluyo y firmo en AVashington el proto- 
colo, cuyo articulo 0" contiene el acuerdo de susj)ender las hostilidades 
enti'c los dos i)aises. 

Vista est'.i contesta(!i<'»n, los Condsarios es])arioles entienden que es de 
su del)er hacer i)resente ;'i los Senores Condsarios ameiicanos, (pie si el 
statu i/itip existente en l-Mbpinas en 12 de Agosto ultimo, lejos de resta- 
blecerse contim'ia pertnrb;indose cada vez mas, en ])erjuicio de Espana, 
el Gobienio de S ^l. C. y en su nond)re sus Plenipotenciarios eu 
esta conferencia, se resei'van proveer, a lo (jue entiendan (jue exige el 



TREATY OF PEACE. 25 

derecho de Espafia, una vez que no conciben conio ha de poder cele- 
brai'se el tratado de paz que estan encargados de convenir con los 
Sefiores Comisarios aniericauos sobre la indeclinable base del Protocolo 
de Washington de 12 de Agosto ultimo, si esta base se esta alterando 
constanteniente en una de sus partes y cada dia eu mayor perjuicio de 
Espafia. 

Paris, 7 de Octubre de 189S. 

Esta conforme 

Emilio d Ojeda 



[Translatiou.] 

Annex 1 to Protocol No. 3. 

PROPOSITION. 

No. 2 {a). 

With the careful consideration the subject demands, the Spanish 
Commissioners have iaformed themselves of the written reply in which 
the American Commissioners decline to accept the proposition which 
the Spaniards presented at the session held by both Commissions on the 
1st instant, to the effect that the Joint body declare that the stati( 
quo existing in the Philippines on the 12th of August last, date of the 
concluding and signing in Washington of the Protocol, Article VI of 
which contains the agreement to suspend hostilities between the two 
countries, shonld be restored. 

In view of this reply, the Spanish Commissioners understand that 
it is their duty to make known to the American Commissioners that if 
the fitatit quo existing in the Philippines on August 12 last, far from 
being restored, continues to be disturbed to tlie prejudice of Spain, the 
Government of Her Catholic Majesty, and in her name its plenipoten- 
tiaries in this conference, leserve the right to act as they may deem the 
rights of Spain shall require, since they cannot conceive how the treaty 
of peace they are charged with arranging with the AmericaTi Com- 
missioners upon the immutable basis of tlie Protocol of Wiishington of 
August 12 last, can be concluded if this basis is being constantly 
altered in one of its parts, and continually to the greater prejudice of 
Spain, 

True copy: Emilio de Ojeda. 



Annex 2 to Protocol No. 3. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados 

UNIDOS. 

Articulo 1". 

Su Majestad la Reina Catolica en nombre y representacion de 
Espafia y constitucionalmente autorizada por las Cortes del Keino, 
renuncia a su soberania sobre la Isla de Cuba, transfiriendola a los 
Estados Unidos de Ami'rica que la aceptan para que puedan a su vez 
transfernla oportunamente al pueblo cubano con las condiciones estab- 
lecidas en este tratado, ofreciendo los Estados Unidos que desde su 
ratificacion seran siempre y tielmente cumplidas. 



26 TREATY OF PEACE. 

ARTICULO 2". 

La renuncia y transferencia que liace Sii Majestad Catolica y que 
aceptaii los Ivstados LTiiiclos de xiiiu'iica, compreiide: 

1". Todas las ])ieir()iiativas, atribucioiios y dercclios que, como parte 
intcyiante do dit-lia Soberauia, correspoudeu a Su Majestad Catolica 
sobre la Isla de Cuba y sus liabitantes: 

-", Todas las earjias y obli^aciones de todas clases, pendientes al 
ratilicaise este Tiatado (le i>az. (|ue la Corona de Kspafia y sus Autori- 
dadcs en la Isla de Cuba, liubieseu contraido legalmeute en el ejercicio 
de la soboranui (]ue renun(;ian y traustieren, y (jue, eu tal concepto, 
lorniau parte integrante de la misma 

ARTICULO 3". 

En cumi»liniiento de lo eouvenido en los dos articulos auteriores Su 
Majestad Catolica, en la rei)reseutaciou con que celebra este Tratado, 
renuncia y transtiere a los Estados Uuidos, (pie los aceptan, en el con- 
ce]>to sobrediclio, todos los edificios, niuelles, cuarteles, tortalezas, estab- 
leciniientos, vias publicas y denias bienes iumuebles que, con arreglo a 
derecho, sou de douiinio i)ublico, y que couio de tal domiuio publico, 
corresj)oiulen a la Corona de Espaua en la Isla de Cuba. 

(^)uedan por lo tauto excei>tuados de esta renuncia ytrausferencia todos 
los bienes iumuebles radicantes en la Isla de Cuba que correspondau 
en el orden civil al Estado, en concepto de su propriedad patrimonial, 
asi como todos los derechos y bienes de cual(piiera clase que sean, que, 
liasta la ratiticaci('ui del presente Tratado, liayan venido paciticameute 
poseyendo, en concepto de duenos, las Provincias, Municipios, Estab- 
lecimientos lu'iblicos o privados, Corporaciones eclesiasticas o civiles y 
cuales(iuier;i otras colectividades que tengan legalmeute personalidad 
juruli('a i)ara adquirir y poseer bienes de la Isla de Cuba, y los particu- 
lares, cualfpiiera que sea su nacionalidad. 

Su Majestad Catolica renuncia tandjit'n, y traustiere a los Estados 
Unidos, a (luien se le entregaran por el Gobieruo Espanol, todos los 
documentos y titulos ([ue se refieran exclusivamente a la soberania 
transt'erida y aceptada, que existnn en los Arcliivos de la Peninsula. 
Habiendo de facilitarle copias cuando los Estados Unidos las reclamasen, 
de la parte correspondiente n diclia Soberania que coutengan los demas 
documentos y titulos tambi^Mi relativos a otros asuntos agenos (i la Isla 
de Cuba, ((ue existan en los meucionados Arcbivos. Una regla aualoga 
liabni reciprocamente de observarse, a favor de Espana, respecto a los 
documentos y titulos agenos en todo 6 en parte a la Isla de Cuba que se 
liallen actualmeute en sus Arcbivos y que interesen al Gobieruo Espanol. 

Todos los Arcbivos y Kegistros oficiales, asi admiuistrativos como 
judiciales, que estan a disposicion del Gobieruo de Espana y de sus 
autoridades eu la Isla de Cuba, y que se retieran a la misma isla () a sus 
babitantes y a sus derechos y bienes, (lue darau a dis[)osici()u de los 
Estados Unidos con los mismos derechos y obligaciones (Jon que hoy lo 
esti'in a disposicion del Gobieruo iCspanol y de dichas sus Autoridades. 
Los ])ai ticulares, asi espanoles como cubanos, tendran derecluj a sacar, 
con anegio a las leyes, las copias autorizadas de los contratos, testa- 
mentos y denu'is docunu^utos que tbrmiin parte de los protocolos uotari- 
;iles 6 (pie se custodien en los Aichivos' admiuistrativos y judiciales, 
bien estos se halleu en Espana 6 en la Isla de Cuba. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 27 

ARTICULO 4". 

Para fijar las cargas y obligaciones de todas clases, que la Corona de 
Espafia cede y transflere como parte de sn soberania sobre la Isla de 
Cuba a los Estados Uuidos, y que estos aeeptan, se atender^ a las dos 
reg'las siguientes : 

Primera. Las cargas y obligaciones que liaj'^au de trausferirse, ban 
de haber sido establecidas eu forma constitucioual y en uso de sus 
legitimas atribucioues, por la Corona de Espafia, como soberana de la 
Isla de Cuba, 6 por sus Autoridades legitimas usaudo de las snyas 
respectivas, antes de la ratiticacion de este Tratado. 

Segnnda, Su creacion 6 constitucioii ha de haber sido para el 
servicio de la Isla de Cuba 6 con cargo li su Tesoro especial 

ARTfCULO 5^ 

En virtud de lo dispuesto eu el Articulo anterior quedan compren- 
didos eu la sobredicha transferencia, las deudas cualquiera que sea su 
clase, cargas de justicia, sueldos o asignaciones de funcionarios asi 
civiles como eclesiasticos, que hayau de continuar prestando sus 
servicios en la Isla de Cuba, y i)ensiones de jubilacit'm y retiro y de 
viudedad u horfandad con tal que en todas ellas concurrau las dos cir- 
cuustaucias prescritas en el Articulo anterior. 

Articulo G°. 

Su Majestad Catolica, eu uombre y representaciou de Espana, y con- 
stitucioualmente autorizada por las Cortes del Reino, cede n los Estados 
Uuidos de America y ('stos aeeptan para si mismos, la Soberania sobre 
la Isla de Puerto Rico y las demus que corresponden en la actualidad a 
la Corona de Espana en las Indias Occidentales. 

Articulo 7°. 

Esta cesion de la soberania sobre el territorio y habitantes de Puerto 
Rico y las demsis islas meucionadas, se eutiende que consiste eu la 
cesion de los derechos y obligaciones, bienes y documentos relativos a 
la Soberania de dichas islas, iguales a los que respecto a la reuuncia y 
transferencia de la soberania de la Isla de Cuba, se delineu en los 
Articulos 2" hasta el 5" inclusive de este Tratado. 

Esta conforme 

Emilio de Ojeda 



[Translation.] 

Annex 2 to Protocol No. 3. 

Article I. 

Her Majesty the Catholic Queen, in the name and representation of 
Spain, and thereunto constitutionally authorized by the Cortes of the 
Kingdom, relinquishes her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba, trans- 
ferring it to the United States of America, which accept it, in order 
that they may in their turn transfer it at the proper time to the Cuban 



28 TREATY OF PEACE. 

l)eople, upon the conditions established in this treaty, the United States 
]»ron)isiiio- liereby that as soon as they are ratified they will always be 
faithfully complied with. 

Article II. 

Tlic rcliiKjuislnnont and transfer made by Her Catholic Majesty, and 
accepted by the United States of America, embrace: 

1st. All the prerogatives, powers and rights, which, as an integral 
])art of the soverciiiuty, belong to Her Catholic Majesty both over the 
Island of Cuba and over its inhabitants; 

LMid. All charges and obligations of every kind in existence at the 
time of the ratification of this treaty of peace, which the Crown of S])aiu 
and her authorities in the Island of Cuba may have contracted lawfully 
in the exercise of the sovereignty hereby relin(iuished and translerrcd, 
and which as such constitute an integral part thereof. 

Article III. 

In compliance with the provisions of the two preceding articles, Her 
Catholic Majesty, acting in tlie same representative character with 
which she has entered into this treaty, relinquishes and transfers to 
the Ignited States, which accei)t them, uj^on the conditions above stated, 
all the buildings, wharves, barracks, fortresses, establishments, ])ublic 
ways of communication, and all other immovable property which 
according to law attaches to the public domain, and which so attaching 
belongs to the Crown of Spain in tlie Island of Cuba. 

All immovable pro])erty situated in the Island of Cuba which under 
the civil law belongs to the state as patrimonial property, and all rights 
and property of whatsoever kiml, which up to the ratification of the 
present treaty have been peacefully enjoyed and held in ownership by 
provinces, municipalities, public and private establishments, ecclesi- 
astical and civil corporations, or any other collective bodies lawfully 
incorporated and having legal authority to acquire and hold property 
in the Island of Cuba, and by private imlividuals, whatsoever their 
nationality, are therefore excluded from the above relinquishment and 
transfer. 

Her Catholic Majesty further relinquishes aiid transfers to the United 
States all right to the documents and papers exclusively relating to 
the sovereignty hereby relinfjuished and accepted, to be found in the 
archives of the Peninsula, said documents and papers to be delivered 
to the I'nited States by the Spanish Covernment. Copies of such por- 
tions of oth^r documents and ]>apers relating to other subjects foreign 
to the Island of Cuba, but relating to the sovereignty aforesaid which 
may exist in the said archives, shall be given to the United States 
whenever desired. A similar rule shall be reciprocally observed in 
favor of Spain regarding documents and papers foreign, in whole or in 
])art. to the island of (kiba, which may be in the archives of the latter 
and of interest to the Sjtanish Government. 

All archives and official records, executive and judicial, which are at 
the disposal of the (lovernment of S])ain and its authorities in the 
Island of Cuba, and which refer to the said island or its inhabitants, 
and to tlieir rights and pro])erty, shall be at the disposal of the United 
States with the same rights and obligations as now attach to them 
while at the disi)Osal of the Si)anish (lovernment and its said authori- 
ties. Private persons, Spaniards and Cubans alike, shall be entitled 
to make according to law authenticated copies of contracts, wills, and 



TREATY OP" PEACE, 29 

other instruments forming; part of the notarial registers and files or in 
the custody of the executive and the judicial archives, be the same 
either in Spain or in the Island of Cuba. 

Article IY. 

In order to establish the charges and obligations of all kinds which 
the Crown of Spain cedes and transfers as a part of its sovereignty 
over the Island of Cuba to the United States, and Avhich the latter 
accept, the two rules following will be observed: 

First: The charges and obligations to be transferred must have been 
levied and imposed in constitutional form and in the exercise of its 
legitimate powers by the Crown of Spain, as the sovereign of the 
Island of Cuba, or by its lawful authorities in the exercise of their 
respective powers prior to the ratification of this treaty. 

Second: The creation or establishment of such charges or obliga- 
tions must have been for the service of the Island of Cuba, or charge- 
able to it^ own individual treasury. 

Article V. 

Pursuant to the provisions of the foregoing article, there shall be 
embraced in the said transfer all debts, of whatsoever kind, lawful 
charges, the salaries or allowances of all employes, civil and ecclesias- 
tical, who shall continue to render services in the Island of Cuba, and 
all pensions in the civil and military service's and of widows and 
orphans; provided that they conform to the requirements prescribed 
in the foregoing article. 

Article VI. 

Her Catholic Majesty, in the name and representation of Spain, and 
thereunto constitutionally empowered by the Cortes of the Kingdom, 
cedes to the United States of America, and the latter accept for them- 
selves, the sovereignty over the Island of Porto Kico and the other 
islands now belonging to the Crown of Spain in the West Indies. 

Article VII. 

This cession of the sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of 
Porto Rico and the other islands mentioned, is understood to embrace 
the cession of the rights and obligations, property and documents 
relating to the sovereignty of the said islands, similar in all things to 
those which, with respect to the relinquishment and transfer of the 
sovereignty of the Island of Cuba, are defined in Articles II to V, 
inclusive, of the treaty. 

True copy : Emilio de O jeda. 



commission of the SPANISH SECRETARY. 

ExcMO. Senor. 

S. M. el Rey (q. D. g.) yen su nombre la Reina Regente del Reino, se 
ha servido expedir el Real Decreto siguiente : 

"Tomando en consideraciou las especiales circumstancias que cori- 
curren en Don Emilio de Ojeda, Mi Enviado Extraordinario y Ministro 



30 TREATY OF PEACE. 

rieiiipotenciario cerca de S. M. Sheriffiana; En iiombrede Mi Angusto 
Hijo el Key Don Alfonso Trece ycomo lieinajvegeiite delReino: Yengo 
en disj)oiier (jue, coiiseiviindo su caigo, pase a desempenar las funcioues 
de Secrctario (leneral de la Comision espafiola eneargada de uegociar 
en Paris el tratado de paz entre Kspauaylos Estos Unidosde America. 

"Dado en Palacio a veintiseis de 8eptiembre de mil ocliocientos 
uoveiita y oclio. 

Maria Cristina. 

"El Presidente del Consejo de Ministros — 

"I'RAXEDES jNIATEO SAC^ASTA.*' 

Loque traslado a V. E. ]»ara su couocimiento ***. 
Dies gue. a V. E. m. a. 
Madrid. 2(5 Septiembre de 1898. 

Sagasta. 
Sen or Don Emilio de Ojeda. 



[Transliition.] 

Most Excellent Sir: 

H. M. the King (whom God preserve) and in his name the Queen 
Regent of the Kingdom has been pleased to issue the Eoyal Decree 
following: 

"Bearing in mind the special qualifications of Don Emilio de Ojeda, 
My Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near His Sher- 
iffian Majesty, in the name of my August Son, the King Don Alfonso 
XIII, and as Qneen Regent of the Kingdom, I will that, still retaining 
his ofiice, he discharge the fnnctions of Secretarj^ General of the 
S])anish Commission entrusted with negotiating in Paris the Treaty of 
Peace between Spain and the United States of America. 

"Done at the Palace on the twenty-sixth of September, eighteen hun- 
dred and ninety-eight. 

"Maria Cristina. 
"Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, 

^^ Fresidenf of the Council of Ministers.'''' 

Which I transmit to Y. E. for your information ***. 

God preserve Y. E. many years. 



Madrid, September 2(3, 1898. 
Sefior Don Emilio de Ojeda. 



Sagasta. 



Protocol No. 4. Protocolo jSTo. 4. 

Conference of October 11, 1898. Conferencia del 11 de Octubre de 

1898 

Present On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los Es- 

United States. Messrs Day Davis tados TJnidos de America los 

Frye Gray Reid Moore Fergus- Seiiores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 

sou. Reid, Moore ,Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain. Messrs. Por parte deEspana. losSeiiores 

Montero Rios Abarzuza. Garnica, Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 

Villa -Urrutia Cerero Ojeda. Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 



TREATY OF PEACE 



31 



The protocol of the i)rece(ling 
session was read and ai)i)roved. 

The American Couiiuissioners 
presented a paper, oo])y of which 
is liereto annexed, in which they 
rejected the articles submitted by 
the Spanish Commissioners at the 
last session as an amendment to 
the proposals of the American 
Commissioners on the subject of 
the relinquishment by Spain of 
sovereignty over Cuba and tlie 
cession of Toito Rico and other 
islands in the West Indies, and the 
island of Guam in the Ladrones. 

The palmer having been read in 
English and in Spanish, and the 
Spanish articles having been re- 
jected, the President of the Span- 
ish Commission on behalf of the 
Si^auisli Commissioners, presented 
under the rules a memorandum, 
setting forth their reasons in sup- 
port of their propositions. 

The American Commissioners 
inquired whether the Spanish Com- 
missioners considered their prop- 
ositions as iinally rejected. 

The Spanish Commissioners re- 
plied that the rejection was set 
forth in the very terms of the 
American reply, and that the oc- 
casion had therefore arisen for the 
presentation of their memorandum ; 
but that, before hling the latter, 
they were ready and even preferred 
to discuss the subject of it orally, 
since this might result in an agree- 
ment and render the tiling of the 
memorandum unnecessary. 

The American Commissioners 
said that the memorandum could 
be read, but that they reserved the 
right under the rules to make a 
written reply, and that any oral 
discussion into which they might 
enter was not to be considered as 
a waiver of that right. 

The memorandum, copy and 
translation of which are hereto an- 
nexed, was then read. 

The reading having been com- 
pleted, the American Commission- 
ers stated that their understand- 
ing of the situation was this — that, 



Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesiou anterior. 

Los Comisaiios Americanos pre- 
seutan una contestacion rechazan- 
do el articulado deTratado que les 
entregaron los Ct)misarios Espaiio- 
les en la sesiou anterior como ea- 
rn ieudaal proyectodel Tratado que 
l)resentaron los Americanos en lo 
relativo a la renuncia de Espana a 
la Soberania de Espana sobreCuba 
y a la cesion de Puerto Kic.o y otras 
islas en las Autillas asi como de la 
isla de Guam en el Archipielago de 
las Ladrones. 

Se lee dicha contestacion en 
ingles y en espahol. 

liechazado el articulado espanol 
el Presidente de la Comision es- 
Ijahola en nombre de dicha Comis- 
ion y en virtud del reglamento, 
presenta un Memorandum en que 
se consignau las razoues en que 
fuudaron su projjosicion 

La Comision americanapregunta 
si consideran los esparioles defini- 
tivamente rechazada su proposi- 
cion. 

La Comision espanola dice que el 
rechazo esta consigiiado en los pro- 
pios terminos de la contestacion 
americana, y que por tanto era lle- 
gado el momento de liresentar el 
Memorandum ; pero que esto no ob- 
stante esta dispuestaa discutiroral- 
mente el asunto antes de que se 
tome acta del Memorandum y hasta 
preferiria este curso, puesto que de 
llegarse a un acuerdo en la discu- 
sion podria prescindirse de la pre- 
sentacion del Memorandum. 

Se admite la lectura del docu- 
mento, si bien los Comisarios amer- 
icanos se reservan el derecho, sea 
6 no leido 6 discutido oralmeute, de 
contestar por escrito eu la misma 
forma. 



Leese en ingles el Memorandum 
que va adjunto al acta presente. 

Los Comisarios Americanos mani- 
fiestan que en su sentir, habiendo 
sido rechazado el articulado pre- 
sentado por los Comisarios Espa'-* 



32 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



the articles presented by the Span- 
ish ('omuiissioners having b«'eii re- 
jected, and the Spanish rununis- 
sioners having tlierenpon Hied a 
meniorandnni nnder the rnles, the 
American Commissioners were en- 
titled to make a written reply, and 
that the question now recurred on 
the articles jjroposcd by the Amer- 
ican Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners de- 
clared that in their opinion the 
l)ropositionsonb()th sides had been 
rejected, and tlmt both i)roposi- 
tions were before the Commission 
ou an ecjual footing for oral dis- 
cussion. 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they were ready to 
hear the Spanish Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners sug- 
gested that, as the American Com- 
missioners wished to reply to the 
Sjjanish memorandum, it would be 
advisable to ])ostpone the oral dis- 
cussion till the reply was before 
the Commission. 

To this the American Commis- 
sioners assented. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission then stated that from 
the rapid reading of the pa])er pre- 
sented by the American Commis- 
sioners at the opening of the ses- 
sion, they had derived the impres- 
sion that those Commissioners 
were laboring under a misappre- 
hension as to the stipulation in 
the Spanish articles touching 
Si)ain's relinquishment of sover- 
eignty over Cuba. In proposing 
that the sovereignty should be re- 
linquished to the United States in 
order that the latter might transfer 
it to the Cuban people, Spain had 
merely conformed to the letter and 
spirit of the joint resolution of the 
American Congress; but it was 
not her intention to impose upon 
the Fnited States an obligation to 
make such transfer, as w^as shown 
by the fact that it was said in the 
articles that the United States 
"may'' transfer the sovereignty, 
not that they were bound to do it. 



holes, y habiendo estos presentado 
el ^Memorandum al respecto, segun 
previcne el reglamento, los Comi- 
sarios Americanos estiin facultados 
para contestar por escrito y que 
por tanto la discusi<'»n debia versar 
ahora sobre los articulos propue- 
stos por los Americanos. 



Los Comisarios Espanolesdecla- 
raron que en su opinion habiendo 
sido rechazados ambos estaban en 
igual caso y debian discutirse a la 
vez ambos proyectos. 



Los Comisarios Americanos en 
vista de esto se manifestaron dis- 
puestos a oir los argumentos que 
tenian que aducir los Espanoles; 
pero estos teniendo en cuenta que 
los Americanos debian presentar 
una contestacon escrita propusie- 
ron aplazar la discusion oral hasta 
que les fuera conocido el contenido 
de la respuesta Americana. 

Se con vino en ello. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola manifesto que por la 
nlpida lectura del documento 
Americano comentando el articu- 
lado presentado por la Comision Es- 
l^aiiola, habia cl comprendido que 
los Comisarios Americanos habian 
sido inducidos en error al creer 
que en dicho articulado se exigia 
que los Estados Unidos al aceptar 
la renuncia en su favor de la Sobe- 
rania de Espaha sobre Cuba, hubie- 
ran de transmitirla al pueblo 
cubano. El Presidente anadio que 
al mencionar en dicho articulado 
([ue diclia renuncia la hacia Espana 
"« fin de que los Estados Unidos 
piiedan transferirla al pueblo cu- 
hano,^^ Espana se adaptaba al 
espiritu y a la letra de la joint- 
resolution del Congreso Americano, 
pero en el proyecto espafiol no se 
imponfa esta obligacion a los Esta- 
dos Unidos puesto que se decia que 
podxan hacer la transferencia de la 
Soberania mas no que hubieran de 
tener la obligacion de hacerla. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 33 

The American Coramissioners re- Los Couiisarios americanos con- 
plied that the hiuguage employed testavon que en efecto habia sido 
in the article would, under the su impresion que la renuucia por 
American law, impress the relin- parte de Espafia estaba hecha en 
quishraent with a trust. terminosquesegnnlasleyesAmeri- 

canas implicabau una obligacion 
tiduciaria. 

The Spanish Commissioners said La Comision EspaFiola contesto 

that if the phraseology would, que si tal era el sentido que seguu 

under American law^ convey that las leyes Americanas podian atri- 

nieaning, they would change it in buirle, se modilicaria el texto en el 

the sense in which they had just sentido que acababa de sugerir, 
suggested. 

The conference was adjourned to Se aplazo la conferencia hasta 

Friday, October 14, at tw'o o'clock el Vierues 14 de Octubre a las dos 

p. m. ' P. M. 

William R. Day E. Montero Eios 

Cu.snMAN K. Davis B. ue Abarzitza . 

Wm. P FrYE J. DE CtARNICA 

Geo. Gray W R de VillaUrrutia 

Whitelaw Keid. Rafael Cekero 

John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex 1 to Protocol No. 4. 

The American Commissioners, when they presented in the conference 
of the ord instant a draft of articles for the relinquishment by Spain 
of sovereignty over and title to Cuba and for the cession of Porto 
Rico and other islands in the West Indies, and the Island of Guam in 
the Ladrones, stated that the disposition of these subjects was deter- 
mined by the Protocol of August 1-, 1898. 

The two articles of the Protocol relating to these subjects are brief, 
and, as it seems to the American Commissioners, easy of comprehen- 
sion and readily to be carried into effect. 

They are: 

"Article I. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and 
title to Cuba. 

"Article II. Spain will cede to the United States the island of 
Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the 
West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the 
United States." 

The American Commissioners were careful, in the articles proposed 
by them, to express the relinquishment or cession, as the case might 
be, in the very words of the Protocol, merely adding thereto the usual 
sult)sidiary and incidental clauses touching public juoperty and archives, 
with a view to making the treaty effectual, and preserving evidence of 
public and private property rights. 

The American Commissioners regret to find in the articles presented 
by the Spanish Commissioners on the 7th instant a departure from the 
terms of the Protocol in the following particulars: 

To the unconditional engagement of the Protocol to relinquish all 
claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba, they have proposed 
conditions : 

1. That Spain shall transfer her sovereignty over the island to the^ 

T P 3 



34 TREATY OF PEACE. 

T'liited states, and that the United States '• sliall in their turn transfer 
it at llie proper time to the Cuban people.'' 

L'. That this transfer shall be made upon the conditions to be estab- 
lished in the treaty between the United States and Spain. 

A. That the United States shall engage itself to S[)ain for the per- 
Ibrmanee of these eonditions. 

In place of the unconditional reliniiuishment agreed to in the Pro- 
tocol, it is i)roposed that the relin(|uishn)ent now offered shall embrace 
all charges of every kind which S[)ain and her authorities in Uuba have 
hiwfully contracted heretofore, and may hereafter contract, prior to the 
ratiliea'tion of the treaty of peace; and these "charges and obliga- 
tions,'" ])ast, present, and future, which it is proposed to "transfer" to 
the United States, are declared to include debts, civil and ecclesiastical 
salaries, and civil ami military ])ensions, ostensibly in arrears, as well 
as yet to accrue. 

To the Ameri(?an Uounnissioners this api)ears to be not a i>roposition 
to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba", but in 
substance a proposition to "transfer" to the United States and in turn 
to Cuba a mass of Spanish charges and obligations.* 

It is difdcult to perceive by what logic an indebtedness contracted 
for any purpose can be deemed part of the sovereignty of Spain over 
the Island of Cuba. In the article proposed it is attempted to yoke 
with the transfer of sovereignty an obligation to assume an indebted- 
ness arising out of the relations of Spain to Cuba. The unconditional 
relinquishment of sovereignty by ^".pain stipulated for in the Protocol 
is to be changed into an engagement by the United States to accept the 
sovereignty burdened with a large mass of outstanding indebtedness. 

It is Y)i'oper to say that if during th.e negotiations resulting in the con- 
clusion of the Protocol Spain had proposed to add to it stipulations in 
regard to Cuba such as those now put forward, the proposal, unless 
abandoned, would have terminated the negotiations. 

The American Commissioners, therefore, speaking for their Govern- 
ment, must decline to accept the burden which it is now proposed shall 
be gratuitously assumed. 

Tlie American Commissioners further observe that in article 3 of the 
draft there is a negative clause, by which i)roperty not belonging to 
the Crown of Spain is excepted fiom the proposed relinquishment and 
transfer of sovereignty. In oue respect this exception appears to be 
unnecessary, and in another illogical. So far as it affects the question 
of legal title it is unnecessary, since such title, if not held by S})ain, 
would not pass to the United States by Spain's transfer of sovereignty. 
On the other hand, so far as it affects the (juestion of sovereignty, it is 
illogical, since the sovereignty, which includes the right of eminent 
domain, would, if excepted fr in the relin(inishment, remain with Sjiain. 
We would thus have the singular si>ectacle of S])ain relinquishing her 
sovereignty over ])roperty behniging to the Crown, but retaining it over 
all other property. 

Thus again we should witness the utter defeat of the ex])licit engage- 
ment in the Protocol that Sjtain would "relinquish all claim of sover- 
eignty over and title to Cuba." 

In the articles presented by the American Commissioners there were 
stii)ulations in relation to archives and official records, which stipula- 
tions were intended to secure, and, as the American Commissioners 
believe, would eflectually secure, the object of preserving and of furnish- 

* See Protocol No. 5. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 35 

iug to those in iuterest evidence of title to x^roperty in tlie islands in 
question. 

In the articles submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, it is provided 
that documents and papers relating to sovereignty to be found in the 
archives of the Peninsula shall be furnished to the United States; also 
"copies of such i)ortious of other documents and. paj^ers relating to 
other subjects foreign to the Island of Cuba and the sovereignty afore- 
said as may exist in the said archives.'' 

It is difticult for the Americans to understand this latter clause; per- 
haps its exact meaning is not conveyed in the English translation of 
the Spanish text. 

It is to be further observed that in the provisions of the Spanish 
articles relating to the furnishing of record evidence of titles to lands 
in Cuba and Porto Eico, it is stipulated that the arcliives and records 
shall be at the disposal of the United States "with the same rights 
and obligations as now attach to them while at the disposal of the 
Spanish Government and its said (insular) authorities." This restric- 
tion, the object of which is not perceived, would seem to limit the con- 
trol over archives and official records, after Spain's relinquishment of 
sovereignty, to uie same power, both in kind and in extent, as was for- 
merly possessed by the Sl)anish Government. This appears to be 
inconsistent with the right of control which every sovereign i)ower 
should possess over its archives and official records. 

All the conditions and qualifications above referred to are by general 
reference incorporated in the articles relating to the cession of Porto 
Rico and otiier islands in the West Indies, and render these articles 
equally inadmissible. 

True Copy : 

J. B. Moore. 



Annex 2 to Protocol No. 4. 
comision para la neoociacion de la paz con los estados 

UNIDOS. 

Memorandum^ en que se exponen sucintamente las razones 6 fimdamentos 
del proyecto de artleulos para el Tratado de Faz, relativoH a la renuncia, 
par parte de Espafia, de su Soherania en Cuba y Puerto Rico, que pre- 
sentan a la Gonferencki las Plcnlpoteuclarios EsjMnloles. 

Los Plenipotenciarios Espaholes aceptau el pensamiento generador 
del ])royecto de articulo presentado por los Sehores Comisarios Ameri- 
canos sobre la renuncia de Espaila a su soberania en Cuba y la cesion 
de su soberania en Puerto liico; pero les es imposible jirestar el mismo 
asentimiento a lo demas que en dicho proyecto se contiene, ya porque 
entienden que i)arte de ello esta" fuera del alcance que cabe dar a la 
renuncia y cesion sobredichas, ya porijue tambicn estas renuncia y 
cesion, tal como aparecen en aquel proyecto, no contienen bajo otros 
aspectos cuanto es indispensable que comprendan. 



LA RENUXCIA QUE HACE S. M. C. DE SU SOBERANIA EN LA ISLA DE CUBA EvS INDIS- 
PENSABLE QUE SEA ACEPTADA POK EL PRE.SIDENTE DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE 
AMERICA. 

El Gobierno de la Union americana nunca exigio al Gobierno espaiiol 
que abandonase la Soberania en Cuba, siuo que la renunciase para que 



36 TREATY OF PEACE. 

hi Isla fuese iiulepeiidiente. Asi consta en la corresi)ondencia diplo- 
inatica que couserva el (iobienio de S. M. Ct «obre las iiegociacioDes 
eiitre Ambas Altas Partes coiitratantes anteriores n la declaracion 
de o-uerra; Asi tambi(*n las Caiiiaras Auiericanas lo declararoii en la 
resoluci(»n conjnnta de 19 de Abril ultimo, aprobada despues por el 
Sefior Presidente de los Estados Unidos. El articulo priniero de la 
{'itada ivsolucion, dice: "'(lue el pueblo de C-uba es y debe ser libre e 
iudependiente." 

Asi tand)i;''U el Sefiov Secietario de Estado en Wasliiniiton ordeno en 
20 del citado nu's a su Ministro en Madrid, <iue lo conuinicase al Gobi- 
erno espanol. enipleando las niisnnis palabras del texto de aquella reso- 
lueii»n [)ara (pie '' I'^spafia renuneiase inmediatamente su Autoridad y 
(lobierno en la Isla de Cuba." 

Y asi tinalmente se consigno en el Articulo 1" del Protocolo firmado 
en Washington en doce de Agosto pasado, cuyo Articulo 1°, segiin el 
texto ollcial, firmado en idioma franci's, a la vez que el tirmado en idioma 
iugh's por los representantes de Ambas Altas Partes contratantes, 
dice asi : 

''Article I. L'Espagne renoucera a toute pretention a sa souverai- 
nete et a tout droit sur Cuba,"' ([ue literalmente traducido al espanol 
equivale a lo siguieute: 

"La Espana reniinciard a toda i^retension si su soberania y a todo 
dereclio sobre Cuba." 

ISena ofender la graude ilustracion de los Senores Comisarios Ameri- 
canos tratar de demostrarles la esencial diierencia que, segun la doctriua 
elemental del derecho publico internacional, y la practica de las nacioues, 
existe entre el ahandono y la rennncia de la Soberania. 

l']l territorio ahandonado tiene derecho para adquirirlo el primer ocu- 
pante; el territorio rennnciado pasa uecesariameute a aqu(''l a cuyo favor 
tiene que bacerse la reuuncia. Y los Estados Unidos exigieron la de 
Esi)ana para el ])ueblo cubauo {\ fin de que se constituyese independiente. 

Aunque es verdad que los Estados Unidos de America, en el caso 
presente, exigieron esto de Espana, exigieron tambien que tal renuncia 
habia de bacerse por su mediacion. Los Estados Unidos habian de 
recibir la Isla de Cuba y conservarla eu su poder tenieu(h) su gobieruo 
hasta su paciticacion, " abrigando el proposito de dejar (no se puede 
dejar lo que no se tiene) el dominio y gobieruo de la Isla al pueblo de 
esta, una ve/. realizada dicha pacificacion," Asi solemnemeute se 
consigno en el articulo 4" de la resoluci<'>:i conjunta de las Camaras 
Americanas y en el despacbo del Senor Ministro de Estado Americano a 
su Ministro en Madrid. Y si hasta la pacificacion de la Isla no han de 
dejar su dominio y gobieruo los Estados Unidos, es de toda evideucia 
que entretanto son ellos los que lo han de conservar. 

Y cfectivamente los Estados Unidos conservaron y conservan en su 
poder ii Santiago de Cuba y los dennis territorias de la Isla en que do- 
minan sus armas, sin haberlos eutregado al pueblo cubauo, por no tener 
todavia (lobierno que lo reprosente. Y en el Protocolo de Washington 
ya citado (articulo 4"), se acordo que la evacuacion de la Isla por las 
tropas espanolas y sus detalles se convendrian i)or una Comishm mixta 
Ibrmada por Comisarios del Gobieruo Esi)ariol y Comisarios del 
Gobieruo de Washington, pero no por Comisario del pueblo cubauo. 

El Gobieruo federal es pues, el (pie, uecesariameute, tiene que aceptar 
la renuncia que hace el de l^^spana a la soberania en la Isla, para con- 
servar esta Isla en su i)oder y gpbernarla hasta que est('' pacificada, en 
cuyo caso, y no antes, segiin sus propias resoluciones, es cuando se pro- 
ponen d(^Jar la soberania de aquel territorio (x disposicion del Gobierno 
(jue se constituya en Cuba. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 37 

ir. 

LA CESI6n Y la RENUNCIA DE la SOBERAXIA COMPREXDEN LAS DE LOS PEltECHOS 
Y DE LAS OBLIGACIONES QUE LA CONSTITUY'EN. 

El coucepto de la Soberaiiia de uii Estado iiiiuca se laa tonfniidido en 
el mnndo antiguo iii mnclio menos eu el imiiido moderno y cristiaiio, eon 
el coucepto del domiuio civil y privado y menos auii con el del doniinio 
del sefior sobie el esclavo. 

El «oberano, es verdad ({ue tieue pierrogativas y dereclios sobre el 
teriitorio y sus babitautes; pero estas prerrogativas y derecbos le 
corresponden no para sn satistaccion y goce, sino para el bnen gobieruo 
y bienestar de los pneblos qne estan a sn soberania sometidos. Por 
esta razun, los derecbos del Soberano se convierten en obligaciones 
para con sus snbditos. El Soberano tiene obligaci<'>n de cuidar de su 
buen regimen y de su progreso y ]>rosperidad. El Soberano no es 
dueno de los impuestos y rentas que percibe de sus snbditos, para 
emplearlos y consnmirlos en su pro])io y personal beneficio, sino para 
invertirlos en le satisfacciun de las necesidades publicas y en el bien- 
estar de aqnellos. El cnmplimiento de estas obligaciones es el fuuda- 
mento de la legitimidad de sus facultades para celebrar con terceras 
persouas todas las convenciones y contraer todas las obligaciones (jue 
seaii necesarias para pro;'urarse los recursos ])recisos al buen rc'gimeu 
y gobieruo de sus snbditos y atender el mejor servicio publico de los 
mismos. 

Estas obligaciones subsisten desde que se contraen basta que se cum- 
plen. 

Y es de toda evideucia que si durante todo el tiempo iutermedio entre 
la constitncion y el cumplimiento de una obligacion de soberania, el 
Soberano la ])ierde ])or renuncia n otro tftulo legitimo, la obligacion 
pendiente pasa como ])arte integraute de la soberania misnui a acjuel 
que en elhi le sucede, Seria contrario a la nocicm mas elemental de la 
jnsticia, e inromi»atible con el dictado de la conciencia universal de las 
gentes, qne un Soberano perdiera sus derecbos sobre el territorio y sus 
snbditos y bubiera de continuar esto no obstante, sometido al cumi»li- 
miento de las obligaciones que babia creado, exclusivamente, i)ara su 
regimen y gobieruo. 

Estas m;i\imas aparecen observadas por todas las nacioues cultas 
qne no ban qnerido atropellar los principios eternos de la jnsticia, 
incluso aquellas eu ([ue estas cesiones se liicieron por la tuerza de las 
arums y como ])remio de la victoria en los Tratados sobre cesiones ter- 
ritoriales. llaro es el Tratado en (jue no lia pasado con el territorio 
cedido al nuevo Soberano una parte ])ropnrcional de las obligaciones 
generales del Estado cedeute, que en la mayoria de los casos tenian la 
forma de deuda publica. 

Pero aun es mas claro el caso a que se rebere la convencic'm que lia de 
elaborar esta conferencia. Aqui no se trata de transferir, con la Sobe- 
rania de Cuba y Puerto Rico una parte proporeional de las obligacio- 
nes y cargas generales de la Metropoli, sino tan solo las obligaciones y 
cargas qne sou j^eculiares a las Islas que se ceden y traiisfieren. Cuando 
no se trata de obligaciones de coujunto y comnnes ;i iodos los territor- 
ios sonu-tidos al Soberano que las contrae, sino de obligat iones especiales 
al territorio mismo cedido y contraidas por sus legitbnas Autoridades, 
ni una sola vez, aun en a(|uelIos Tratados en cjue el vencedor se ba mos- 
trado mas desi)iadado con el vencido, ban dejado de pasar con el terri- 
torio cedido sus proi>ias y ])ecnliares cargas y obligaciones. Asi, puedjB 
coihsiderarse couu) clausula casi obligada, la de que la cesion del terri- 
torio lleva consigo la de las obligaciones y deudas d^partaraentales, 



38 TREATY OF PEACE. 

conmnales y en ^enei-iil liablaiido, ]>eculiaies al territorio de la cesiou. 
VA Giiiu CoiKiuistador de este siglo no se atH3vi6 jamas a violar esta 
re^ila de cterna justicia, en todos los Tiatados que celebrc) con a(!iiellos 
Sobcianos, cuyos territories, en todo o en parte, convertiaen preniio de 
sus victorias. 

Fues bn-n, es de bacer constar, que la soberania de Kspana Jamas 
dejo de adininistrar se])aradamente de la Metropoli sus eolonias en 
Ami'rica, desde su descnbrimiento. La Ann'-rica Espanola estuvo 
sienipre o<)beniada desde la Cai)ital de la Monartjuia i)or un Consejo 
esi>ecial Ilaniado de Indias ()ue en nada intervenfa en el regimen y go- 
bierno de la reninsula, el cual corria a cargo del Consejo llamado de 
Castilla. 

Dividido el territorio descubierto por Colon y por otros ilustres explo- 
radores lOspanoles ((pie tan inmenso, auncjue no siempre agradecido 
servicio ban ])restado ;i la civilizacion) en Virreiuatos y Cai)itanias 
(leiierales, cada uno de estos ])equenos Estados recaudaba sus pro])ios 
ingresos y cubria sus i>roi)rios gastos, o contraia para cubrirlos las pbli- 
gaciones (pie las necesidades de su proi)io .gobierno demandaban; y 
cuando alguno de estos territorios se ballaba en de'ficit permanente, 
coino snccdia a la Isla de Cuba, la colonia heimana mas i)roxiuia acudia 
a su socorro. El Virreinato de Mt^jico desde 170G hasta 18iHj auxilio a 
la Isla de (Jnba anualnieiite con fuertes cantidades para sus atenciojies 
de gobierno y para el desarrollo de su natural riqueza entonces inex- 
l)l()tada, ii cuyos gastos no podia, a la sazon, atender con sus recursos 
propios, Nada raenos que 108 millones de pesos entraron en Cuba pro- 
cedcntes de M('iico bajo tal coucepto, durante aquel periodo; conoci- 
6n(bise estos auxilios en la administracion colonial Esi)afiola con el 
nombre de "situado de Mrjioo." 

Vai el siglo actual llevo Espafia hasta sus ultimas consecuencias este 
sistema de admin istiacion separado t' independiente de sus colonias. 
El Ministerio de Citrainar era el departaniento donde se concentraba 
esta administracion. Cada colonia tuvo anualmente su proprio pre- 
supuesto y sus (b'licits; cuando sus propios ingresos no eran bastantes 
para cubrir sus proi)iios gastos fueron atendidos por operaciones espe- 
ciales de deuda consolidada, hii>otecaria o tiotante para y por cnenta 
de la colonia en cuyo l)eneticio estas o])eraciones se hicieron. 

Y la separaciou entre la administracion de la Peninsula y la colonial 
fuf', durante mucbo tiein[)o tan completa, que el personal de funcion- 
arios pnblitjos para los servicios administrativos y jndiciales de las 
colonias, eia peculiar a las misnias, hasta el punto deque estos funcion- 
arios no tenian a])titud legal i)ara ser incluidos en los cueri)()S gerarqui- 
cos similares de lvsi)aria, ni desem])enar en ella analogas funciones. 

Este rrgimen es bajo el (]ue vino Espana administrando a Cuba hasta 
el momento pieseiite. 

Sabenfos bi;'n (pie I'uera de Espaiia se incurre en gravisimos errores, 
por efecto de no ser conocido el regimen colonial EspaPiol, pero es 
tiempo ya, y sobre todo es necesario, en la occasion presente, (pie estos 
errores se desvanezcan, contrastandolos con la verdad de los Iiechos y 
con los ))rece])tos de las leyes esi)anolas. Cuba y Puerto KMco minca 
ban vivido dentio del ])resu])iiesto general de la Nacion esitanola ni 
en este liguraron Jamas sus ingresos, ni se in(;lny('ron sus gastos. Todas 
las obligaciones que est n pendientes y liayan sido legalmente creadiis 
l)aia el servicio de Cuba y I'nerto llico y ii cargo de sus especiales 
Tesoros, siempie distintos y sei)arados del Tesoro de la Peninsula, 
son ()bliga(^iones cubanas 6 ))nert()rri(pienas, es decir, obligaciones 
locales, (pie afectan I'lnica y exclusivamente al territorio de las Islas y 
a sus habitantes. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 39 

Lo diclio basta aqui sobre la iiatuialeza de las obllgacioiies colo- 
uiales y sobre los obligados a su cunipliiuieuto, jamas lo ban descono- 
cido, (diclio sea en su honor), los pueblos Uispauo-americaiios. Aquellos 
conquistarou por su propio esluerzo su independeneia y la mayor jjarte 
de ellos antes que Espaua la hubiera reconocido, babian, por leyes 
anteriores y solemnes de sus Camaras, declarado propias y como las 
mas privilegiadas de todas las deudas, las que la Corona de Espafia 
habia contraido durante su soberania, para el servicio de aquellos ter- 
ritorios, y se liallabau registradas en sus respectivos libros de Tesoreria. 

Son muy contadas las republicas bispano-americanas ([ue aguardaron 
<i hacer tan bonrada declaracion, a que la Metr(')poli reconociera su 




adquirian los derecbos y privilegios correspondientes a la Corona de 
Espana, contraian tambi/'u todos sus deberes y obligaciones." 

Xutese <ine las Kepublicas bispano americanas, sin excepcion, recono- 
cieron i'> bicieron suyas estas deudas de cnalquier cUise que fveran, 
detallandolas en el Tratado de paz con Bolivia de 21 de Julio de 1817, 
en que se dice que, "comprendiau todos los cn-ditos por pensiones, 
sueldos, suministros, anticipos, lietes, emprcstitos forzosos, depositos, 
contratos y cualquieraotra deuda, ya de guerra, ya anterior a esta, que 
pesaren sobre a(]uellas Tesorerias, sieinpre que proeediesen de (trdenes 
directas del Gobierno Espanol 6 de sus autoridades constituidas eu 
aquellos territorios.'' 

Bspano no reconocio la independencia de ningiiu Estado amerioano 
que antes bubiera sido colonia suya, siuo con e«ta condicion, que 
a(|uellos Estados ex])outaneameute declararon en sus respectivos tra- 
tados, que era de perfecta.justicia. 

Su flerecbo y su dignidad no le peruiiten reconocer sin esta condicion, 
que abora mas (pie antes, si cabe, continua siendo de justicia, la inde- 
pendencia de los ])ueblos cubano y puertoriqueno ([ue estos no ban 
podido conquistar i)or su propio y exclusivo esfuerzo. 

Espana esta dispuesta a <'eder la soberania de Puerto- l\ico y demjis 
Islas de las Indias Occidentales, y a renunciar a la Soberania de la Isla 
de Cuba, todo a favor de los Estados Ujiidos, ({ue babran de aceptarla; 
poniendo a su disposici n esta Soberania en el estado eu que actual- 
mente la posee, y por lo tanto con los derecbos y las cargas que actual- 
meute la constituyen. A esto se oblig«) en los articulos 1 " y 2 " del 
Protocolo tiimado' en AVasbingtou en V2 de Agosto ultimo y esto es lo 
que quiere cuniplir con la mas exquisita lealtad en este Tratado. 

Esta conforme 

Emilio de O.tbda 



[Translation.] 

Annex 2 to Protocol No. 4. 

Memorandum, suecinetly settinfj forth the (/rounds or reasons of the pro- 
posed articles for the treaty of peace relating to the relinquishment by 
Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rivo^ presented to the 
conference by the Spanish ricnipotentiaries. 

Tbe Spanisb Plenipotentiaries accept tbe main idea of tbe proposed^ 
article, as drafted by tbe American Commissioners, relatiug to tbe* 
relinquisbment by Spain of ber sovereignty over Cuba and tbe cession of 



40 TREATY OF PEACE. 

her sovereignty over Porto Eico; but they are uuable to coucur in the 
remain ill. y- portions of said draft; becanse, on-the one band, they nnder- 
stand that part thcriMtf ftoes beyond the proper sc"oi)o of said reliinpiish- 
meiit and cession; and because, on the other, the said reliiKjuishment 
and cession as expressed in the said draft do not embody, in other ways, 
all that it is indispensable they should. 



IT IS liMl'ERATIVE THAT THi: PKESIDKXT OF THE UNFrED STATES SHOULD ACCEPT 
THE I{i<:LIXqUISHMEXT ."MAUK IIY HKli CATHOLIC MAJESTY OE HEK SOVEliEIGXTY 
OVER THE ISLAND IH' CllSA. 

The (iovernment of the American ITnion never demanded that the 
Sitanish Government ((handoii (abandonar) the S(»veieij;nty over Cuba, 
but that it reli)i<iiiisli (renunciar) the same, so that the ishind should 
become independent. It so appears from the diplomatic coriesi)ond- 
ence in the possession of the (iovernment of Her Oatholic Majesty 
relating to the negotiation between the two contracting ])arties prior to 
the declaration of war. It was also thus declared by the American 
Congress in the Joint Kesolution of April 1 J> last, subseciuently a])i)roved 
by the President of the United States. The first clause of that resolu- 
tion reads "that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free 
and independent." 

So also, on the 20th of the same month, did the Secretary of State in 
Washington instruct the American Minister in Madrid to say to the 
Spanish (lOvernment, using the identical language of the Joint Eeso- 
hition, that "Spain should at once relimjuish its authority and govern- 
ment m the Island of Cuba." 

And so, tinally, was it set forth in Article I of the Protocol signed in 
Washington on the ll'th of August last, the ofHcial text of which as 
signed in French and English by the representatives of the two High 
Contracting Parties reads as follows: 

"Article I'^^'. L'Espagne renoncera a toute pr<'tentioii, a sa souve- 
rainete et a tout droit sur Cuba," which literally translated into Spanish 
is as follows: "Espaua renuiiciara a toda pretension a su soberania y 
•A todo derecho sobre Cuba." 

To undertake to explain the essential difference which according to 
the elementary principles of public international law and the usage of 
nations exists between the abandonment (abaiidouo) and the relinquish- 
ment (renuncia) of sovereignty, would be to offend the intelligence of 
the learned American Commissioners. 

Abandoned territi^ries can of right be ac(]uired by the lirst occupant, 
wliile relinquished territories necessarily pass unto him to whom relin- 
quishment is made. And the United States demanded that S[)ain 
reliiKiuish in order that the Cuban peDple might become independent. 

Although it is true that the United States of America demanded 
this of Spain in the present case, they also demanded that such relin- 
quishment must be made Ihrough them. The United States were to 
receive the Island of Cuba and retain tlie i)Ossession thereof, governing 
it until its pacitication was secaired, asserting its '' determination to 
leave [no one can leave what he does not hohl] the government and 
control of the island to its people, as soon as the said pacification is 
aecom])lished." So was it solemnly set forth in section 4 of the Joint 
Kesolution of the American Congress and in the despatch of the Sec- 
retary (»f State to the American Minister at Madrid. And if the United 
States are not to leave the government and control of the island until 



TREATY OF PEACE. 41 

the pacification thereof is accomplished, it is self-evident that in the 
mean time the United States are called npon to administer the one and 
retain the other. 

And in fact the United States held and continue to hold Santiago de 
Cuba and the other territories of the island where their arms are supreme 
without having delivered them over to the Cuban people, as the latter 
have not as yet any Government to represent them. And in the said 
Protocol of Washington (Article IV) it was agreed that the evacuation 
of the island by the Spanish troops and the details thereof sliould be 
arranged and carried out by a mixed commission consisting of Commis- 
sioners appointed by the Washington Government and by the Spanish 
Government, but not of Commissioners appointed by the Cubans. 

The Federal Government is therefore the one which must of necessity 
accept the relinquishment made by Spain of her sovereignty over the 
island, so as to retain the latter under its control and government until 
it is pacified, in which event, and not before, according to its own decla- 
rations, it will leave the sovereignty over that territory at the disposal 
of- the Government that may be constituted in ('uba. 

II. 

THE CESSION AND RELINQUISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY EMBRACES THE CESSION AND 
RELINQUISHMENT OF THE RIGHTS AND ORLIGATIONS CONSTITUTING IT. 

The idea of the sovereignty of a state was never confounded in the 
ancient world, and much less in the modern and Christian world, with 
the idea of individual or private ownership. Much less still with the 
authority of the master over the slave. 

The sovereign, it is true, has prerogatives and rights over the terri- 
tory and its inhabitants; but these i)rerogatives and rights attach to 
him not for his own satisfaction and enjoyment but for the good gov- 
ernment and the weltVire of the people subject to his rule. For this 
reason the rights of the sovereign become obligations with respect to 
his subjects. The sovereign is bound to see that they have good gov- 
ernment and to their progress and pros])erity. The sovereign is not 
the owner of the tax ])ro('eeds or of the revenues he receives from his 
subjects, to be used for his own i»ersonal benefit, but to meet with them 
all public necessities and attend to the public welfare. The fulfilment 
of these obligations is the foundation of the legitimacy of his authority 
to enter into conventions and agreements of all kinds with third par- 
ties, to contract all the obligations necessary to raise means for the 
good administration of the government of his subjects, and to attend to 
the public service in the best possible manner. 

Tliese obligations exist from the moment they are contracted until 
they are fulfilled. And it is perfectly self-evident that if during the 
period intervening between the assumption by a sovereign of an obli- 
gation and the fulfilment of the same, he shall cease to be bound thereby 
through relinquishment or any other lawful conveyance, the outstand- 
ing obligation passes as an integral ])art of the sovereignty itself to him 
who succeeds him. It would be contrary to the most elementary notions 
of justice and inconsistent with the dictates of the universal conscience 
of mankind for a sovereign to lose all his rights over a territory and the 
inhabitants thereof, and despite this to continue bound by the obliga- 
tions he had contracted exclusively for their regime and government. 

These maxims seem to be observed by all cultured nations that are 
unwilling to trample upon the eternal principles of justice, including 
those in which such cessions were made by force of arms and as a reward 



42 TREATY OF PEACE. 

for victories throuiili treaties relating' to territorial cessions. Hare is 
the treaty in which, tofi'ether with the territoiy ceded to the new sov- 
erei,iiii, there is not conveyed a projjortional part of the general obliga- 
tions of the ceding state, which in the majority of cases have been in 
the form of a ])nl)lic debt. 

But the case to which the convention to be framed by this conference 
refers is clearer still. It is not the purpose here to transfer, together 
with the sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Kico. a proportional part of 
the obligations and general charges of the mother country, but only 
the obligations and charges attaching individually to the islands ceded 
and transferred. When not treating of general obligations common to 
all the territories subject to the sovereign contracting the same, but of 
the special obligations of the particular territories ceded which were 
contracted by its legitimate authoiities, in no single cavse, not even in 
those treaties in which the victor has shown himself most merciless 
towards the vanquished, have the individual and sei)arate charges nnd 
obligations of a ceded territory failed to i)ass therewith. Thus it may 
be considered as an absolutely essential condition that the cession of 
territory carries with it the cession of the departmental, communal, and, 
generally speaking, individual obligations and debts of tlie ceded terri- 
tory. The Great Conqueror of this century never dared to violate this 
rule of eternal justice in any of tlie treaties he concluded with those 
sovereigns whose territories he appropriated in whole or in ])art, as a 
reward for his victories. 

Very well: it must be recorded that the sovereignty of Spain never 
ceased to administer its colonies in America, from the time of the dis- 
covery, separate from the mother country. Spanish America was 
always governed from the capital of the monarchy by a special council 
called '•'Council of the Indies", which in no wise interfered in the ri'gime 
and governmei'.t of the Peninsula, which was under a council designated 
as the '^ Council of Castile'". 

The territory discovered by Columbus and other illustrious Spanish 
explorers who have rendered such great though not always appreciated 
services to civilization being divided into vice-royalties and captaincies- 
general, each of these small states collected its own revenues and met 
its own expenses, or contracted obligations to meet the necessities of 
its own separate government; and when one of these territories found 
itself with a permanent deficit, as was the case in the island of Cuba, 
the nearest sister colony came to its rescue. The Vice-royalty of Mex- 
ico from 17<i6 to 18()() annually assisted the Island of Cuba with heavy 
sums for its governmental needs and the development of its natural 
resources, at the time unex])loited, which expenses it could not, at such 
time, meet from its own revenues. Not less than 108 millions of pesos 
came into Cuba from Mexico during that period, this assistance being 
known in the Spanish colonial administration under the name of '■'■ SitH- 
ado (le Mexico."' 

During the present century Spain carried to the last extreme this 
system of the separate and independent administration of its colonies. 
The Ministry of the Colonies was the department where this adminis- 
tration was centered. Each colony had annually its own budget and 
deticits. When its own revenues were not suilicient to cover its ow^n 
expenses, these were met by special operations in the way of consoli- 
xlated, mortgage or floating debts, ami were chargeable to the colony 
for whose beneht such operations weie conducted. 

And the sejtaration of the administration of the Peninsula and the 
colonies was for a long time so complete, that the body of public 



TREATY OF PEACE. 43 

emploj-ees in the executive and judicial services of the colonies was 
separate and independent, to the extent that these eiuph>yees had not 
the legal capacity to be included in the similar hierarchical bodies of 
Spaiu, or to discharge therein like functions. 

This rrgime is the one under which Si)ain has been administering 
Cuba up to the present time. 

We are well asvare that outside of Spain grave errors are fallen into, 
owing to the Spanish colonial system being unknown: but it is high 
time and above all at this juncture is it necessary that these errors be 
dissipated by com])aring tiiem with the actual facts and the ])rovisions 
of Spanish laws. Cuba and Porto Uico have never been included in 
the general budget of the Spanish nation, nor have their revenues ever 
figured therein, which is also true of their expenditures. All outstand- 
ing obligations that have been legally contracted for the service of 
Cuba and Porto Rico, and which are chargeable to their individual 
treasuries, always distinct and separate from the treasury of the Penin- 
sula, are Cuban or Porto Pican obligations, that is, local obligations, 
solely and exclusively affecting the territory of the islands and their 
inhabitants. 

What has been said up to this point regarding the nature of the 
colonial obligations and those bound thereby, has never been disre- 
garded (to their honor be it said) by the Spanisli-Anierican peoples. 
They achieved their independence through their own efforts, and the 
majority of them, before Si)ain had recognized it, had by prior and sol- 
emn act of their legislatures, declared as their own and as having pref- 
erence those debts which the Crown of Spain had contracted during 
the continuance of its sovereignty for the service of such territories, 
and which debts were recorded in their respective treasury books. 
" Very few of the Spanish-American Pepublics delayed so honorable a 
declaration until the mother country had recognized their independence, 
as was said by the Argentine Kcpublic in the treaty concluded with 
Spain on September 21, lS(i3, and by Uruguay, in that concluded on 
July 19, 1870 : "•' Just as tliey acquired the rights and privileges belonging 
to the (Jrown of Spain, they also assume all its duties an<l obligations.'' 

Note that the Si)anish-Americau republics without exception recog- 
nized and assumed as their own these debts of everi/ Und icJuitsoecer, 
si)ecifying them in the treaty of peace with Bolivia of July -1, 1847, 
wherein it is stated that they' "include all <lei)ts for pensions, salaries, 
supplies, advances, transportation, foiced loans, deposits, contracts, and 
any other debt incurred during war times or prior thereto, chargeable 
to said treasuries ; provided they were contracted by direct orders of the 
Spanish Government or its constituted authorities in said territories." 

Spain did not recognize the independence of any American state 
which had previously been her colony save upon this condition, which 
those states spontaneously incorporated in their respective treaties, as 
of right they should. 

lier right and her dignity will not permit her to recognize — without 
this condition, which now more than ever if possible is still just and 
proper — the independence of the Cuban and Porto Ricau peoples, which 
they have not been able to achieve by their own unaided efforts. 

Spain is disiiosed to cede the sovereignty over Porto Rico and other 
islands of the West Indies, and to relinquish the sovereignty over the 
Island of Cuba, all in favor of the United States, which shall accept 
the same; she placing this sovereignty at their disposal in the condition 
in which she now holds it, and therefore, with the rights and charges a^^ 
present constituting it. She bound herself to this by Articles I and II' 



44 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



of the Protocol signed at Wasbington on August lU last, and this is 
what she desires to carry out with the strictest faith in the present 
treaty. 

True copy : 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



Protocol No 5. 

Conference of Octoher 14, 1898. 

Present: Ou the part of the 
United States: Messrs. Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Keid, Moore, 
Fergiusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica 
Tilla-l rrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The ])rotoL'ol of tlie preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The American Commissioners 
presented a repl> to the memoran- 
dum snbmitted by the Spanish 
Commissioners at the last session 
on the relinfiuisliment of sover- 
eignty over Cuba and the transfer 
of debts. The i)aper was read, and 
a coi^y of it is hereto annexed. 

The Spanish Commissioners, re- 
ferring to the paper in which the 
American Commissioners rejected 
at tlie conferen(!e of the 11th in- 
stant the articles presented by the 
Spanish Commissioners at the con- 
ference of the 7th, on the subject 
of Cuba and l*orto-Pico, called at- 
tention to the following sentence: 

"To the American Consmission- 
ers this appears to be not a j)ropo- 
sition to 'relinquisli all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' 
but in substance a proposition to 
'transfer' to the United States and 
in turn to Cuba a mass of Spanish 
charges and obligations." 

The Spanish Commissioners de- 
sired a modilication of this sen- 
t(!nce on the ground that it might 
be thonglit to imply that they were 
not acting in good faith. 

The American Commissioiu'rs 
stated that in their o})inion the 
sentence did not convey such an 



Protocolo No. 5. 

Confer enoia del 11 de Octubre de 
1898. 

Presentes. Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de Anu'rica los Se- 
noresDay, Davis, Frye,Gray, Reid, 
Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana los SeHor- 
es Montero Rios Abarzuza, Garn- 
ica, Villa Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

VA protocolo de la sesion ante- 
rior fue leidi y apro])ado. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
presentaron uno, contestacion al 
Memorandum que los Comisiona- 
dos Espanoles sometieron en la 
fdtima sesion acerca de la renuncia 
de la soberania sobre Cuba y la 
transferencia de sus deudas. El 
documento fu('' leido incluycndose 
una copia anexa h esta acta. 

Los Comisionados Espanoles, re- 
liriendose al escrito en el cnal los 
Comisionados Americanos rechaza- 
ron en la Conferencia del dia 11 del 
corrieute los articulos presentados 
por los Comisionados Espanoles en 
la conferencia del 7, acerca de 
Cuba y Puerto l\ico, llamaron la 
atencion sobre la siguiente frase: 

"Creen los Comisionados Ameri- 
canos (|ue esto no parece ser una 
proposicion para renunciar a toda 
l^retension de soberania y a todo 
derecho sobre Cuba, sino mas bieu 
una ])roposici6n para transferir a 
los Estados Unidos y estos ;i su vez 
a Cuba, una masa de cargas y obli- 
gaciones espanolas." 

Los Comisionados esjtarioles pi- 
dieron la modificacion deesta frase 
fun(landoseenqn.e i)udiera imi>licar 
queellos no i>rocedian de buenaf6. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
manifestaron que en sn oi)inion la 
frase no tenia tal interpretacion^ 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



45 



imputation, but, out of defereuce to 
the Spanish Oouiniissiouers, they 
altered it so as to read as follows: 
''To the American Commission- 
ers this appears to be not a propo- 
sition to 'relinquish all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' 
but in elfect a Y)roposition to ' trans- 
fer' to the United States and in 
turn to Cuba a mass of charges 
and obligations which, in the 
opinion of the American Commis- 
sioners, i)roi)er]y belong to Spain." 

This matter having been dis- 
posed of, the Spanish Commission- 
ers stated that, Ijefore jiroceeding 
with the discussion of the ques- 
tions under consideration, they de- 
sired it to be understood that, if 
certain articles should be agreed 
to, but in the end no treaty should 
be signed, the articles so agreed to 
should not in such case be takeu 
as expressing either Government's 
estimation of its just rights iu re- 
spect of the subjects to which the 
articles related. 

The American Commissioners 
concurred in this view. 

The Joint Commission then j)ro- 
ceded to the oral discussion of the 
points discussed in the Spanish 
memorandum of October 11 and 
the American reply of to-day. 

After the discussion of the iirst 
point, — the question wliether the 
sovereignty over Cuba should be 
relinquished to the United States — 
was exhausted, without any agree- 
ment having been reached upon it, 
the American Commissioners pro- 
posed totakeupthe second point, — 
the question whether charges and 
obligations constituted a part of 
the sovereignty and as such passed 
with it. 

The Spanish Commissioners sug- 
gested that if no agreement could 
be reached on the tirst point, it 
seemed te be needless to discuss 
the second. 

The American Commissioners, 
concurring in this view, proposed 
that, owing to the lateness of the 



peroque por deferencia a losComi- 
sionados Esi)afioles,la modiflcaban 
en los terminos siguieutes: 

"Creeu los Comisionados Amer- 
icanos que esto no parece ser una 
proposicion para renunciar ;i toda 
pretension de soberania y a todo 
derecho sobre la Isla de Cuba, sino 
que en realidad es una proposicion 
para transfer ir a losEstados Unidos 
y estos a Cuba una masa de cargas 
y obligaciones que en opinion de 
los Comisionados Americanos per- 
tenecen realmente a Espafia." 

Eesuelto esto asunto, los Comi- 
sionados Espanoles manifestaron 
que antes de proceder a la dis- 
cusion de las cuestiones sometidas 
a estudio, deseaban que se estab- 
leciera, que si algunos articulos 
fuesen aprobados, pero que al final 
no se llegase a firmar un Tratado, 
tales articulos aprobados no de- 
berian en ninguu caso ser conside- 
rados como exprosando la opinion 
de cualquiera de los Cobiernos 
sobre sus justos derechos respecto 
a los asuntos a los cuales dichos 
articulos se referian. 

Los Comisarios Americanos acep- 
taron esta proposicion. 

Luego la Comision procedio a la 
discusion oral de los puntos que se 
tratan en el Memorandum Espaiiol 
del 1 1 de octubre y ii la contestacion 
Americana presentada hoy. 

Y habii'iidose discutido, sin que 
se llegase jI un acuerdo el primer 
punto, relative ;i si la soberania 
sobre Cuba debena renunciarse a 
favor de los Estados Unidos, los 
Comisarios Americanos propusie- 
ron continnar con el segundo 6 sea 
la cuesti(')n de si las cargas y obliga- 
ciones constituian una parte de la 
soberania y como tales debian 
transmitirse con esta. 

Los Comisionados Espanoles In- 
dicaron que si no se podia llegar a 
un acuerdo en el i)rimer punto, no 
parecia oportuno continnar la dis- 
cusion del segundo. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
opinaron de la misma manera ^ 
propusieron que dado lo avanzado 



46 TREATY OF PEACE. 

hour, tlie couference be adjourned de la Lora, se aplazara la confer- 
to coutinue the discussion of the eiicia i>ara coutinuar la discusion 
iirst ])oiiitat the next session, wliich del primer punto en la proxima 
should be held on .Monday, the J 7th sesion, que se celebrara el Lnnes 17 
01' October, at two o'cloi-k, j), m, de Octubre ;'i las dos de la tarde. 

The Spanish Commissioners i..os Comisionados Espaholes ap- 

agreeing, the conference \vas ad- robaron esta niocion y en su con- 

journed accordingly. secuencia se suspendio la coufer- 

encio. 

William 11. Day E. Montero Ki'os 

Ci SHMAN K. Davis B. de Abarzuza 

Wm. P Frye J. DE Garnica 

Geo. (iRAY W li DE Villa Urrutia 

Whitelaw Ueid. Kafael Cerero 

John 15. Moore. Emilio de O.ieda 



Annex to Protocol No. 5. 

The American Commissioners hereby present their reply to the mem- 
orandum which the Spanish Commissioners, under the rules of the 
Commission, submitted on the 11th instant, for the purpose of giving 
their reasons in supi)ort of the articles which the American Commis- 
sioners had rejected, in relation to Cuba and Porto Rico. 



The Si)anish memorandum, referring to the demands of the United 
States before the war, to the joint resolution of Congress, and to the 
language of Article I of the Protocol of August 12, 1898, maintains 
that it is "imperative" that the United States "vsbould accept the 
relinquishment made by Her Catholic Majesty of her sovereignty over 
the Island of Cuba". This contention is based upon the fact that in 
the various documents referred to the United States required Spain to 
" relinquish"' her sovereignty, but did not demand that she "abandon" 
it. 

A distinction is thus made between a relinquisJnnent and an abandon- 
ment; and it is argued that while ^' ahandoned territories'' become dere- 
lict, so that they may be ac(iuired by the ilrst occupant, '■'■relinquished 
territories^^ necessarily pass to him to whom relin(juishment is made. 

The American Commissioners are unable to admit that such a dis- 
tinction between the words in question exists either in law or in com- 
mon use. 

The word "relinquish", as detined in the English dictionaries, means 
"to give up the i)ossession or occupancy of; withdraw from; leave; 
al)andon: ([uit." Again: "to renounce a claim to; resign; as, to reiiii- 
(/nisli a debt." 

On the other hand, we tind in thut great monument of Si)anish learn- 
ing, the law dictionary of Escriche ( Diccionario de Lef/islaeion i/ J u rispru- 
dencia), under the word rexnnciar, which the Si)aiiish memoiaudum 
declares to be the eciuivalent of the French word reimncer (used in 
Sjtaiirs version of the Protocol) and of the English word "relinquish", 
the followini; delinition: "The voluntary giving up of a right exercised 
or exjtected to be exercased, or of a thing held or possessed or expected 
to be held or possessed." 



TREATY OF PEACE. 47 

Commentiug upou this defiuition, Esciiclie says: 

"•The relinquishment differs from the cession in that the latter 
requires for its completion the concurrence of the wills of the grantor 
and tlie grantee and a just cause for the transfer, while the former is 
perfect with only the will of the relimiuisher. The effect of the relin 
quishment is confined to the abdication or dropping of the right or 
thing relinquished. The effect of the cession is the conveyance of the 
right to the grantee.'' 

The distinction thus drawn, not between relinquishment and ahandon- 
menf, which are treated both in English and in Spanish as practically 
the same, but between reiinqulshment and cession, is written upon the 
face of the Protocol, which, while obligating Spain (Article I) to "relin- 
quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," in the next 
article requires her to "cede to the United States the Island of Porto 
Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West 
Indies, and also an island in the Ladroues, to be selected by the 
United States". 

If it were true, as maintained in the Spanish memorandum, that the 
act of relinquishment includes, and requires for its completion, the 
process of legal transfer from one liand to another, and thus constitutes 
in form and in effect a cession, it is obvious that the contracting par- 
ties, in framing the Protocol, employed, in stipulations which were 
deliberately separated and sharply contrasted, different words to 
express the same meaning. 

The American Commissioners understand the Spanish memorandum 
to maintain that their Government, prior to the war, demanded of Spain, 
in effect if not in words, the relinquishment of her sovereignty over 
Cuba to the United States. The Spanish memorandum doubtless refers 
to the demand a copy of which was communicated by the Secretary of 
State of the United States to the Spanish Minister at Washington on 
the 20th of April last. The precise words of this demand are "that 
the Government of Siiain at once relinquish its authority and Govern- 
ment in the island of Cuba and Cuban waters"; and the demand is 
accompanied by the declaration that the United States, in taking the 
step, "disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, 
and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the 
government and control of the island to its people under such free and 
indei^endent Government as thej^ may establish". 

To this demand the United States required by a certain time "a full 
and satisfactory response * * *, whereby the ends of peace in Cuba 
shall be assured ". 

From the demand thus fully set forth, the Spanish memorandum 
extracts the assertion by the United States of its determination "to 
leave the government and control of the island to its people," and, 
omitting both what precedes and what follows, construes that asser- 
tion as a demand "that such relinquishment must be made through 
them " (the United States). The demand as a whole, however, carefully 
and clearly excludes this construction. Not only is the assertion pre- 
ceded, in the same sentence, by an express disclaimer on the part of 
the United States of any disposition or intention to take the sovereignty 
of the island, but the assertion itself includes an express declaration of 
a determination to allow the island to remain, after pacification, " under 
such free and independent Government" as may be established by its 
people. . 

To this construction of the demand we may apply a simple test. If 



48 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Spain had answered that she woiihl relinquish her sovereignty over 
the Ishmd of Cuba, and had at the same tinw? declared that it was not 
her intention to relinijuish it to the United States, would anyone have 
imagined that she had failed to make "a full and satisfactory response" 
to the demand? 

II. 

The second part of the Si)anish memorandum is devoted to an argu- 
ment to maintain the proposition that "the cession and relinquishment 
of sovereignty embraces the (;ession and relinquishment of the rights 
and obligations constituting it." 

The American commissioners are not disposed to comment u])on the 
indefiniteness of this proposition, or upon the fallacies involved in 
treating the obligations which a sovereign may incur in the exercise of 
his sovereignty as a part of the sovereignty itself. National sovereignty 
{soberania lutcional), as detined by high Si)anish authority {Novisimo 
Dkrioiiayio encidopcdico de la loujua aistellaua, por D. Delflu Donadin 
y Bnignau, based on the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy), is "the 
right which a nation has of organizing the public powers in such a 
way as it may deem advisable.'' This right, though it includes the 
power to contract obligations, is in no sense com])osed of them. The 
thing done in the exercise of sovereignty is not a part of the sover- 
eignty itself; the power to create is not the thing created. Jfor is it 
possible to shut our eyes to the fact that in tlie Spanish memorandum 
the term obligations is used indiscriminately in respect of two different 
things, namely, the duties which a sovereign as such owes to his sub- 
jects, and the debts which he may specially contract in the exercise of 
his sovereign power for his own pur})oses. i 

With these preliminary observations, the American Commissioners 
proceed to the consideration of the specific matter before them. 

The American Commissioners note the declaration in the Spanish 
memorandum tiiat tiiere is no purpose now to transfer with the sover- 
eignty of Cuba and Porto Kico a proportional part of the national debt 
of Spain, but "only the obligations and charges attaching individually 
to the islands," which obligations and charges it likens to the local debts 
■which pass with ceded territory. It api)ears, however, by the expla- 
nation given in the memorandum of the origin of these charges and 
obligations, and of the manner in which they were contracted, that they 
include the whole of what is commonly called the Cuban debt. The 
American Commissioners, therefore, while reaffirming their position as 
to the exclusion by the Protocof of any proposal for the assumption of 
such charges and obligations, will examine the subject in some of its 
aspects. 

It is true that the linancial department of the Island of Cuba, com- 
monly called the "Cuban Treasury," was not a branch of the Spanish 
Treasury, but it is equally true that it was accountable to the Spanish 
Secretary for the Colonies, the Ministro dc Ultromar, and that it was 
mahaged by a body of offlcials ai)pointed by the Crown, at whose head 
was a high functionary, called Infendente General de Hacienda. In each 
year a budget was made uj) by the Si)anish Colonial Secretary on data 
furnished by the Intendente General., and this budget was submitted to 
and acted ui)on by the Cortes. If in any year the revenues collected 
in Cuba were insufficient to meet the burdens imposed upon them, the 
delicit was cliarged to the island, and formed a new item of the Cuban 
debt. It thus appears that the finances of the island were exclusively 



TREATY OF PEACE. 49 

controlled by the Spanish Government, and that tlie debt was in no 
sense created by Cnba as a province or department of Spain, or by the 
people of the island. In reality it is notorious that the denial to Cuba 
of any financial autonomy and of any power to protect herself against 
the imposition by Spanish officials of enormous burdens for purposes 
foreign and adverse to her interests, iias been the most prolilic source 
of discontent in the island. The debt creating power, such as com- 
monlv belongs to communes or municipal corporations, never was dele- 
gated to Cuba. Such a thing as a Cuban obligation, created by the 
island in the exercise of powers either inherent or delegated, is unknown 
to the markets of the world. 

Having briedy sketched the system of financial administration with 
resi)ect to Cuba, we may consider the origin of the debt. 

Prior to 1S<)1 no so called Cuban debt existed. 

The revenues of the island were as a rule far more than sufhcient to 
pay the expenses of its government, and produced in each year a sur- 
plus. This surplus was not expended for the benefit of the island, but 
was sent to Madrid. The smpluses thus disposed of amounted, from 
185G to 1801 inclusive, to upwards of |2(),0U0,000. 

In 1864, in order to meet the national expenses of the attempt to 
" reincorporate" San Domingo into the Spanish dominions, and of the 
"expedition to Mexico", the Spanish authorities issued bonds to the 
amount of $3, 000,000. Subse(inently new loans were made, so that 
the so-called Cuban debt had swollen by 1808 to $18,000,000. 

In that year the ten years war for Cuban independence broke out, a 
war produced by causes so generally conceded to be just as to need no 
exposition on this occasion. All the expenses of this war were imposed 
upon Cuba, so that in 1880, according to a statement made at Madrid 
in that year by a Spanish Secretar}- for the Colonies, the so called 
Cuban debt amounted to upwards of $170,000,000. 

Subsequently the Spanish Government undertook to consolidate these 
debts, and to this end created in 1886 the so called Billetes hipoiecarioa 
de la Isia de Ouha, to the amount of 620,000,000 pesetas, or $124,000,000. 
The Spanish Government undertook to pay these bonds and the interest 
thereon out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national character of the 
debt was shown by the fact that, upon the face of the bonds, "the 
Spanish nation" {la KacUm cspaiioJa) guaranteed their i^ayment. The 
annual charge for interest and sinking fund on account of this debt 
amounted to tlie sum of 39,191,000 pesetas, or $7,838,200, which was 
disbursed through a Spanish financial institution, called the Banco 
IIispa)w-Colonial, which is said to have collected daily from the custom 
house at Havana, through an agency there established, the sum of 
$33,339. 

In 1890 a new issue of bonds was authorized by the Spanish Govern- 
ment, to the amount, as it is understood, of 875,000,000 pesetas, or 
$175,000,000, with the same guarantee as before, apparently with a view 
to refund the prior debt, as well as to cover any new debts contracted 
between 1886 and 1890. It seems, however, that only a small number 
of these bonds had been disposed of when in February, 1895, the last 
insurrection and movement for independence broke out. The Govern- 
ment of Spain then proceeded to issue these new bonds for the purpose 
of raising funds with which to suppress the uprising, so that those out- 
standing on January 1, 1898, amounted, according to published reports, 
to 858,550,000 pesetas, or $171,710,000. In addition to these a further 
loan, known as the "Cuban War Emergency Loan", was, as the Ameri- 
T P 4 



50 TREATY OF PEACE. 

can Cnniinissioiiers are advised, floated to the amount of 800,000, 000 
pesetas, or $l(iO,000,000, represented by what are called "Hve i)er cent 
peseta bonds -'. 

Although it does not api)eai' that any mention is made in these bonds 
of the revenues of Cuba, it is understood that they are regarded in 
Spain as i)roperly constitutinj;- a [)art of the ••Cuban Debt", together 
with various unli(iuidated debts, large in amount, incurred by the Span- 
ish authorities in ()])posing by arms the independence of Cuba. 

Vrou] no point of view can the debts above described be considered 
as local debts of Cuba or as debts incurred for the beuetit of Cuba. In 
no sense are they obligations properly chargeable to that island. They 
are debts created by the Government of Spain, for its own purposes 
and through its own agents, in whose creatit)ii Cuba had no voice. 

From tiie moral point of view, the proposal to impose them upon 
Cuba is e(]ually untenable. If, as is sometimes asserted, the struggles 
for Cubau inde])endence have been earned on and suijported by a minor- 
ity of the ])eople of the island, to impose ui^on the inhabitants as a 
whole the cost of su])pressing tlie insurrections would be to punish the 
many for the deeds of the few. If, on the other liand, those struggles 
have, as the American Commissioners maintain, represented the hopes 
and aspirations of the body of the Cuban people, to crush the inhabit- 
ants by a burden created by Spain in tlje effort to oppose their inde- 
pendence, would be even more unjust. 

The American Commissioners deem it unnecessary, after what has 
been state<l, to enter into an examinaticm of the general references, 
made in the Si)auish memorandum, to cases in which debts contracted 
by a state have, upon its absorption, been assumed by the absorbing- 
state, or to cases in which, upon the partition of territory, debts con- 
tracted by the whole have been by special arrangement apportioned. 
They are conceived to be inapplicable, legally and morally, to the so- 
called "Cuban Debt", the burden of which, imposed upon the people of 
Cuba without their consent and by force of arms, was one of the prin- 
cipal wrongs for the termination of which the struggles for Cuban 
independence were undertaken. 

The American Commissioners have deemed it due to the Spanish 
Commissioners and to themselves to make these observations upon the 
general subject of Cuban "charges and obligations", apart from the 
special circumstances under which the present negotiations were begun. 
But, as they have heretofore stated, they consider the subject to be dis- 
posed of beyond all question by the Protocol. The suggestion that 
their government should assume, either for itself or for Cuba or Porto 
Kico, the burden of the "charges and obligations" now in question 
was not put forward during the negotiations that resulted in the con- 
clusion of that convention, nor, if it had been so put forward, would it 
have been for a moment entertained by the United States. 

From unseltish motives, of which it is unnecessary to make a renewed 
declaiation, the (iovernment of the United States, at great sacritice of 
life and treasure, has prosecuted the conflict which followed its demand 
for the relinquishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba. 

One of the results of that conflict is the unconditional agreement, 
end)odied in the first article of the Protocol, that S])ain "will relin- 
quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". Upon the sim- 
ple fidfilment of that stipulation the American Commissioners are 
obliged to insist. 

True copy : 

John B. Moore. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



51 



Protocol 'No. 6. 
Conference of October 17, 18D8. 

Preseut On tbe i)art of the 
United States Messrs. Day 
Davis Frye Gray lieid Moore 
Fergusson. 

Oil the part of Spain Messrs. 
Montero Itios Abarzuza Garnica 
Cerero. 

Messrs. Villa- Urrutia and Ojeda 
were absent because of illness. 



The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

Tlie President of the Spanish 
Commission stated that, without 
making any formal protest, he de 
sired to bring to the attention of 
the American Cominissioners the 
fact that he had received from his 
Government a telegram referring to 
reports to the eftect that two Ameri- 
can men-of-war were alfout to leave 
American ports with reenforce 
ments of troops for the garrison at 
Manila, and that Spanish prison- 
ers in the possession of the Tag- 
alos are ill-treated. He w<mld not 
read tlie telegram, but as such re- 
ports tended to excite the ])ublic 
mind and embarrass the etfbrts to 
establish peace and concord be- 
tween the two nations, he hoped 
that the American Commissioners 
would bring the matter to the 
knowledge of their Government. 

The President of the American 
Commission replied that the Amer- 
ican Commissioners possessed 
neither information nor instruc- 
tions such as would enable them 
to deal with the subject, which 
properly belonged to the two Gov- 
ernments, but that, prompted by 
motives similar to those avowed by 
the President of the Spanish Com- 
mission, they would communicate 
to their Government the fact that 
the reports in question had been 
brought to their attention 

The discussion of the business 
before the Joint Commission hav- 



Protocolo N° 6. 

Conferencia del 17 de Octuhre de 
1898. 

Presentes Por parte de los Es- 
tados TJnidos de America, los Se- 
nores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Ueid, 
Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espafia. los Sehores 
Montero liios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Cerero. 

Los Comisarios espaholes in- 
forman a los Amei icanos que los Se- 
nores Villa- Urrutia y Ojeda no 
l)ueden asistir a la conferencia por 
liallarse enferinos. 

Se leyo y fue ai)robada el acta 
anterior. 

El Sehor Presidente de la Co- 
misifui Espanola, sin hacer una 
reclamaciini concreta, llama la 
atencion de los Senores Comisarios 
Americanos acercade un telegrama 
que ha recibido del Gobierno Es- 
pahol relativo al envio a Manila de 
dos buques de gnerra Americanos 
y refuerzos de tropas a la guarni- 
ciou de Manila, asi como a los 
malos tratamientos de que son 
victimas ios espanoles prisioneros 
de los tagalos, y sin leer dicho tele- 
grama, ruega a los Senores Comi- 
sionados Americanos lo pongan en 
conocimiento del Gobierno de 
Washington a tin de evitar que 
esos hechos fomenten la eferves- 
cencia del espiritu publico y enar- 
deciendo las pasiones creen dilicul- 
tades i>ara la obra de paz 3^ cou- 
cordia entre ambas iSTaciones. 

El Senor Presidente de los Comi- 
sarios Americanos manifiesta en 
contestacion que carecian de in- 
formes 6 instrucciones necesarios 
para tratar tal asunto, de la com- 
petencia iinica de los dos Gobier- 
nos, pero que iuspirandose en 
iguales tines, 6 sea conseguir una 
])az duradera, comnnicara a Wash- 
ington los deseos expresados por 
los Seiiores Comisarios espaiioles. 



Entrando en la orden del dia, la. 
Oomision coutinuo la deliberacion 



52 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



ill g' been resumed, the Spauisli Com - 
iiiissioners stated that although the 
articles presented by them were 
uot couched iii the same words as 
the Protocol of August li*, ISDS, 
and the ])ropositions in the notes 
preceding its conclusion, the sense 
was in their o})iuion, the same 
Still, they were ready to withdraw 
their articles, and to substitute for 
them articles more nearly in con- 
formity with the language of the 
Protocol. 

The American Commissioners, in 
resjjonse to this statement, pre- 
sented a paper, copy of which is 
hereto annexed, in which, while 
recognizing- the fact that the Gov- 
ernment of the rnited States as- 
sumed all responsibilities for pro- 
tection of life and proi)erty that 
legally attach to it during the oc- 
cupation of Cuba, they tinally de- 
clined to assume the burden of the 
so-called Cuban debt, either for the 
United States or for Cuba, and 
offered as a substitute for the arti- 
cles previously jiresented by them 
the i)recise stipulations of Articles 
I and II of the Protocol, as to Cuba, 
Porto Eico, and other islands in 
the West Indies, and the island to 
be ceded in the Ladrones. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
stated that they reserved the right 
to examine this pro])osal and to 
present another draft of articles 
which should conform to the Pro- 
tocol. 

The conference was then ad- 
journed to the 19th instant at two 
o'clock, p. m. 

William E. Day 

CusHMAN K, Davis 

Wm. P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Eeid. 

John B. Moore. 



iniciada en la conferencia anterior, 
inanifestuiido el Sehor Presidente 
de los Comisarios esi)arioles, que si 
bien el articulado que habian pro- 
questo no estaba redactado en las 
mismas palabras empleadas en el 
Protocolo de 12 de Agosto de 1808, 
y en los despachos (pie mcdiaron 
para llegar a sn conclusion, en su 
opin.iuu, el sentido es el mismo, 
l)ero queestabaii dis})uest(».s a reti- 
rarlas 6 reformarlas nu's en conso- 
naucia con los ti rminos usados en 
el texto del Protocolo. 

En contestacion los Comisarios 
Americanos preseutaron un docu- 
mento de que es copia anexa, en el 
cual, al propio tieinpo que decla- 
raii (jue el (jobierno de los Esta- 
dos U nidos asume las res])onsabili- 
dades inhereutes a la proteccion 
de vidas y haciendas en Cuba, 
mientras dure la ocupacion de 
Cuba, declinan tinalmente el asu- 
niir la carga de la Deuda cubana, 
tanto para los Estados Unidos 
como para Cuba. Asimismo pro- 
poiien sustituir los articulos pro- 
puestos por ellos con las estipula- 
ciones precisas delos Articulos I y 
II del Protocolo referentes a Cuba, 
I*uerto Eico e islas de las Antillas 
y la isla de las Ladrones, (pie ha de 
ser cedida. 

Los Comisarios Espafioles mani- 
festaron que se reservaban el de- 
recho de estudiar la mocion pre- 
sentada, a tin de presentar otro 
proyecto de articulos con arreglo 
al Protocolo, levant;indose la se- 
siou despu'''.s de haber convenido 
el volver a reunirse el dia 19 del 
corriente a las 2 de la tarde. 
E. MONTERO Eios 
B. DE Abarzuza 

J. DE GARNICA 

W E DE Villa (Jrrutia 
Eafael Cekero 

EmILIO de O.TED a 



Annex to Protocol No. 0. 

The American Commissioners having listened with great resi)ect to 
the arguments orally urged by the Spanish Commissioners, in support 
of the articles offered by them, as well as duly considered the written 



TREATY OF PEACE. 53 

memorandum submitted in support of the same, must adbere to the 
rejection thereof as stated in the memorandum of the American Com- 
missioners read to the Commission and attached to the protocol of the 
11th instant. The chief additional reason adduced in the oral presen- 
tation for the acceptance of sovereignty by the United ^States in Cuba 
is that without such acceptance the people of Cuba notably of Spanish 
origin will have no protection of person and property. The United 
States recognizes in the fullest measure that in requiring the relinquish- 
ment of all claim of Spanish sovereignty and the evacuation of the 
Island of Cuba it has assumed all the obligations imposed by the canons 
of international law and flowing from its occupation. The United 
States, so far as it has obtained possession, has enforced obedience to 
law and tlie preservation of order by all persons. It has no disposition 
to leave the island a prey to anarchy or misrule. 

As the S[)anish Commissioners strenuously urge that the acceptance 
of sovereignty includes the assumption of the so-called Cuban debt, 
and as it is evident that this question divides the Commission and stays 
its progress, the American Commissioners, having carefull}^ considered 
the arguments of the Spanish Commissioners, must again and finally 
decline to accept this burden either for the United States or for Cuba. 
In the articles proposed by the American Commissioners on the third 
instant there were contained certain stipulations which, the American 
Commissioners believed, while not enlarging the Protocol, would effect- 
ually preserve the evidence of title to property and make clear the 
nature of public property and rights included in tlie relinquishment of 
sovereignty and title. It having been urged tbat tliese, no less than 
the articles proposed by the Spanish Commissioners, enlarge the terms 
of the Protocol, the American Commissioners are now ])repared, for the 
purpose of disposing of the question of Cuba, l*orto Kico and (niam, 
simply to embody in the treaty the precise stipulations of the Protocol 
on those subjects, neither adding thereto nor subtracting therefrom. 

The American Commissioners, therefore, ofter as a substitute for the 
articles heretofore presented by them, the following: 

"Article I. — S])ain hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty 
over and title to Cuba. 

"Article II. — Spain hereby cedes to the United States the Island 
of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the 
West Indies, and also the Island of Guam in the Ladrones." 

True copy : 

John B. Moore. 



Protocol No. 7. Protocolo No. 7. 

Conference of Oetoher 31, 1898. Conferencia del 21 de Oetuhre de 

18!)S. 

In the protocol of the conference En el acta de la sesion del 17 del 

of October 17th, it is stated that an corriente, se fijo el dia 19 para la 

adjournment was taken to Wednes- proxima conferencia, pero habiendo 

day the lOth. On the 18th of Oc- rogado el Presidente de la Co- 

tober the President of the Span- misiou Espanola el dia 18, al Pres- 

ish Commission made to the Presi- idente de la Comision americana, 

dent of the American Commission que se aplazase dicha conferencia 

a request that the next meeting be para el 21, a tin de que los Comi-- 

postponed to the 21st. of October, sionados Espanoles pudiesen pre- 

in order that the Spanish Commis- seutar en ella ciertos documeutos, 



54 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



sioiieis nii<;lit have an ojjportunity 
to preparo certain ])ai>ers for sub- 
mission to the 'loiiit Coniniission. 

The reassemblin.ii' of the .Joint 
Coniniission was tlierelbre [lost- 
poned until Friday, the 21st of 
October, at two o'clock, ]). in,, at 
which hour there were i)resent: 

On tlie part of the United States : 
^Messrs. Da>-, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Keid, Moore, Fer<;usson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero IJios Abarznza Garnica 
Villa-Uriutia, Cerero, Ojcda. 

The protocol of the preceding- ses- 
sion was read and apiiroved. 

Tlie American Coniniissioners 
stated that they, had telegraphed 
to their (ioverninent the represen- 
tations made to them by the Span- 
ish Coiumissiouers at the last ses- 
sion, as to the reports of tiie send- 
ing of two American men-of-war 
with reinforcements for the garrison 
al Manila and of the ill treatment 
of Spanish jirisoners by the Taga- 
los, but tliat they had as yet re 
ceived no reply, probably because 
of the absence of the President 
from Washington. 

The S))anis!i Commissioners ex- 
pressed their thanks for the action 
of the American Commissioners. 

The Spanisli Commissioners 
stated that they regretted to re- 
ject the projiosals i>resented by 
the American Commissioners at 
the last session, and that they 
therefore ])! esented certain articles 
as a substitute for tlie articles pre- 
viously submitted by them in rela- 
tion to Cuba and i'orto iiico. 

An adjournment was taken to 
Monday,' the L'lth of October at 
two o'clock, p. m., in ordei- that an 
op])()itunity might be aliorded for 
the translation and examination of 
the new articles. 

William E. ]Jay 
CrsiniAN K, Davis 
Wm. p. Fryk 

(J EG. GlJAY 
WhITELAW IvElD. 

John J3. Moore 



se con vino en que se aplazase hasta 
dicha feeha y en virtud de este 
acnerdo se reunen hoy a las 2 de 
la tarde las dos Comisiones hal- 
laudose presentes. 



Por parte de los Estados Unidos 
de America, los Seilores Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Keid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espafia los Senores 
Montero Ivios, Abarznza, (Tarnica, 
Vilia-Grrutia, Cerero Ojeda 

Se leyc) y fni- aprobada el acta de 
la sesioii anterior. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
manifestaroiKine habian telegrafia- 
do a su Gobieruo lo ([ue los Fspano- 
les les encargarou transmitirle re- 
si^ecto del envio de dos bucjues de 
guerra americanos con refnerzos 
para la guarnicion de Manila y del 
mal trato que a los prisioneros es- 
panolesdaban los tagalos, pero que 
aun no habian recibido contesta- 
ciou, debido probablemente a la 
ausencia de Washington del Presi- 
dente, 

Los Comisionados Espanoles ex- 
presaron con este inotivo su agra- 
(iecimicnto a los Americanos. 

Los Comisionados Esjianoles 
inanifestaron quesentiau tener que 
rechazar los articul<>s jiresentados 
por los Comisionados Americanos 
en la ultima sesiini, y (jue en con- 
secuencia presentaron entonces un 
nuevo ])royecto de articulos de tra- 
tado destinadoa sustituira los que 
l)reseiitaron anteriormente, rela- 
tivos a Cuba y a l*nerto IMco. 

Con el objeto de ]»ermitir la tra- 
duccioii y el exameu de estos 
nue\'os articulos, se convino en que 
la i>r(>xima sesion tendria lugar el 
Lunes 24 del corriente a las 2 P. M. 

E. Mo]\tei{() ilios 

B. DE ABAllZUr^A 
J. DE GARNIOA 

W K DK Villa Urrittia 
]Iafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



treaty of peace. 55 

Annex to Protocol No. 7. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados unidos 

ARTICULO 1". 

Six Majestad Catolica la lleina Regeiite de Espaua, en uoinbre de su 
augusto'bijo Don Alfouso XIII, Key de Espaiia, coiistitncionalmeiite 
autorizada por las Cortes del Reiuo, renuncia a su soberaiiia y a todo 
derecho sobre Cuba. 

Los Bstados Uuidos de AuK-rica, aceptaudo esta renuncia, recibeii 
de Espaua la Isla de Cuba para prestarle ayuda y direcciou y tenerla 
en su dominio y gobieruo liasta que, una vez realtzada su paciticaciou, 
dejen diclio dominio y gobieruo al pueblo cubano. 

Articulo 2°. 

La renuncia y transferencia que liace Su Majestad Catolica y que 
aceptan los Estados Uuidos de America, comprende: 

1. Cuantas prei logativas, atribuciones y dereclios correspondau a Su 
Majestad Catoliea, como ])arte de su soberauia sobre la Isla de Cuba y 
sus liabitantes. 

2. Cuantas cargas y obligaciones pecuniarias pendientes al ratiticarse 
esteTratado de paz, que previo un minucioso exameu de su origen, ob- 
jeto y coiuliciones de su creaci('>n, debau reputarse, segun derccbo estric- 
to (' iunegable equidad, distintas de las (pie sou propias y peculiares 
del Tesoro de la Peninsula y liaber sido sieiiipre propias y peculiares de 
Cuba. 

Para bacer el riguroso ex;inien que se prescribe en el ])arrat'o anterior, 
se nonibrara por las dos Altas Partes contratantes una Comisic'in de 
personas competentes (> imparciales, segnn se determinara en el Articulo 
correspondiente de este tratado. 

Articulo 3". 

En cumplimiento de lo convenido en los dos articulos anteriores Su 
Majestad Cat(')licai, en la representacion con <jue celebra este Tratado, 
renuncia y transfiere a los Kstados Unidos todos los ediiicios, muelles, 
cuarteles, fortalezas, establecimientos, vias publicas y demas bienes 
inniuebles (pie, con arreglo a derecbo son de dominio publico, y que 
como de tal dominio publico, corresponden a la Corona de Espana en la 
Isla de Cuba. 

Quedan por lo tanto exceptuados de esta renuncia y transferencia 
todos los derecbos y bienes de cualquiera clase que seau que, basta la 
ratiticaciou del preseute tratado, bayan venido paciflcaraente poseyendo, 
en concepto de duenos, las Provincias, Municipios, Establecimientos 
pnblicos (> i)rivados, Corjjoraciones eclesiiisticas 6 civdes y cualesquiera 
otras colectividades que tengan legalmente personalidad juridica para 
ad(purir y poseer bienes en la Isla de Cuba, y los particulares, cual- 
quiera que sea su nacionalidad. 

Su Majestad Cat(>lica renuncia tambi.'n y transfiere a los Estados 
Unidos, ;i cpiien se le entregarau poi- el Gobieruo espanol, todos los docu- 
meiitos y titulos (pie se refleran exclusivamente a la soberauia trans- 
ferida y aceptada y a todos sus derecbos, que existan en los Arcbivos 
de la Peninsula, Habiendo de facilitarle copias cuando los Estados 
Unidos las reclamareu, de la parte correspondiente a dicba soberauia 



5G TREATV OF PEACE. 

(jue couteiigan los dem:is (locmiientos y titulos que se refieran ademas 
a otros asuntos distiutos de la Isla de Cuba y de su sobeiania y de- 
reclios, (jue existau en los nienciouados Anihivos. Una regia analoga 
liabra ret'iprocaniente de observarse ;i favor <le Espafia lespecto a los 
documentos y titulos agenos en todo 6 en parte a la Isla de Cuba (^ue 
se hallen actualmente en sus Aichivos y (|ue iuteresen al Gobierno 
espafiol. 

Todos los Arcliivos y Registros oticiales, asi administrativos como 
judiciales, (|ue estiin a dis])osici6u del (iobierno de Espana y de sus 
Autoiidades en la Isla de Cuba, y que se retieian a la misma Isla 6 a 
sus habitantes y a sus doreclios y bienes, quedaran sin reseiva de niu- 
guno de esta clase, a disposiciou de los Estados Unidos para que los 
conserve «> dispoiiga de ellos con las misnias facultades que basta aliora 
han tenido sobre los niismos el Gobierno espanol y sus Autoridades, 
Los i>arti('ulares, asi espanoles conio cubanos, tendrrin derecho a saear, 
con arrcglo a las leyes, las copias autorizadas de los contratos, testa- 
nientos y demas documentos que forinen parte de los i)rotocolos nota- 
riales <) que se custodien en los Arcbivos administrativos yjudiciales, 
bleu ('stos se lialleu en Espana o en la Isla de Cuba. 

Articulo 4°. 

En compensaci('»n de las pi'rdidasy gastos ocasionados a los Estados 
Unidos por la guerra y a las reclamaciones de sus couciudadanos con 
inotivo de los dafios y perjuicios que bubieren sufrido en sus personas 
y bienes durante la ultima iusurreci(')n de Cuba, Su Majestad Catolica, 
en uouibre y represeutacibn de Espana, y constitucionalmente autori- 
zada por las Cortes del lleino, cede a los Estados Unidos de America, 
y estos aceptan para si mismos, la Isla de Puerto Rico y las otras Islas 
que actualmente estan bajo la soberania es])auola en las Indias Occi- 
dentales, asi como la Isla de Guam, en el Arcbipielago de las Marianas 
6 Ladrones, que fu('' elegida por los Estados Unidos de America en 
virtud de lo convenido en el Articulo 2" del Protocolo lirmado en Wash- 
ington el IL' de Agosto iiltimo. 

Articulo 5°. 

P^sta cesion de la soberania sobre el territorio y liabitantes de Puerto 
Rico y las demas islas inencionadas se entiende que consiste en la cesion 
de los derecbos y obligacioues, bienes y documentos relativos a la 
soberania de diclias islas, iguales a los que respecto a la renuncia y 
transferencia de la soberania de la Isla de Cuba, se dertnen en los 
articulos anteriores. 

Esta conforrae: 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



[Traiishitidii.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 7. 
Article I. 



Her Catbolic Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, in tbe name of her 
August Sou Don Alfonzo XIII, King of Spain, tbereunto constitution- 
ally authorized by the Cortes of tbe Kingdom, relimpdshes her sover- 
eignty over and title to Cuba. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 57 

The United States of America, accepting- said relinqnislnnent, receive 
the Island of Cuba from Spain to lend it aid and guidance and hold it 
under their control and government until, the pacification thereof real- 
ized, they leave said control and government to the Cuban people. 

Article II. 

The relinquishment and transfer made by Her Catholic Majesty and 
accepted by the United States of America embrace: 

1. All prerogatives, attributes and rights appertaining to Her Catho- 
lic Majesty as part of her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba and its 
inhabitants. 

2. All pecuniary charges and obligations outstanding upon the rati- 
fication of this treaty of peace which, after a minute examination into 
tlieir origin, purpose, and the conditions of their creation, should be 
held, pursuant to strict law and undeniable equity, to be distinct from 
such as are properly and peculiarly chargeable to the treasury of the 
Peninsula, and to have been always properly and peculiarly Cuban. 

To make the strict examination provided for in the foregoing para- 
graph, the two High Contracting Parties shall name a Commission of 
competent and impartial persons in the manner to be determined in the 
proper article of this treaty. 

Article III. 

In obedience to the stipulations of the two preceding articles. Her 
Catholic Majesty, in the representative character with which she con- 
cludes this treaty, relinquishes and transfers to the United States all 
the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, establishments, public high- 
w-ays and other immovable proiierty which in conformity with law are 
of the public domain, and which being of the public domain belong to 
the Crown of Spain in the Island of Cuba. 

Therefore there are excepted from this relinquishment and transfer 
all rights and property of whatsoever kind which up to the ratification 
of this treaty may have been peacefully enjoyed as owners by the prov- 
inces, municipalities, pul)lic or private establishments, ecclesiastical 
or civil bodies and any other associations having legal capacity to 
acquire and ]iossess proiierty in the Island of Cuba, and private indi- 
viduals, whatever may be their nationality. 

Her Catholic INlajesty also relinquishes and transfers to the United 
States, to which they shall be delivered by the Spanish Government, all 
documents and titles exclusively referring to the sovereignty transferred 
and accepted, and to all its rights, which may exist in the archives of 
the Peninsula. Copies of the part relative to the said sovereignty which 
may appear in other documents, and titles which refer moreover to other 
matters distinct from the Island of Cuba or its sovereignty and rights, 
existing in said archives, must also be furnished when the United States 
shall re(iuire the same. A like rule must be reciprocally observed with 
respect to Spain in so far as relates to documents and titles unconnected 
in whole or in part with the Island of Cuba that may now be in its 
archives and which are of interest to the Spanish Ciovernment. 

All ofiBcial archives and records, executive as well as judicial, at the 
disposal of the Government of Spain and of its authorities in the Island 
of Cuba, and which refer to the said island or its inhabitants, their 
rights and property, shall remain without any reservation whatever of 
this kind at the disposal of the United States, to preserve the same or 



58 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



dis]>;)se of them with the same authority exercised over them up to the 
present time by the Spauish Government auTl its authorities. Private 
parties, Si)auiards as well as Cubans, shall have the right to make in 
aceordance with law authenticated coi)ies of the contracts, wills, and 
other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or tiles, all of which 
may be in the executive and judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or 
in the Island of Cuba. 

Article IV. 

As compensation for the losses and expenses occasioned the United 
States by t!ie war and for the claims of its citizens by reason of the 
injuries and damages they may have suffered in their persons and 
property during the last insurrection in Cuba, Her Catholic Majesty, 
in the nanu» and re})resentation of Spain, and thereunto constitutionally 
authorised by the Cortes of the Kingdom, cedes to the United States 
of America, and the latter acce})t for themselves, the Island of Porto 
Kico and the other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West 
Indies, as also the Island of (4uam in the Mariana or Ladrones Archi- 
pelago, which island was selected by the United States of America in 
virtue of the i)rovisions of Article 11 of the ProtO(;ol signed in Wash- 
ington on August 12 last. 

Article Y. 

This cession t)f the sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of 
Porto Kico and the other islands mentioned is understood to embrace 
the cession of the rights and obligations, property and documents relat- 
ing to the sovereignty of said islands alike in all respects to the relin- 
quishment and transfer of the sovereignty of the Island of Cuba as 
defined in the foregoing articles. 

True copy: Emilio de O.teda. 



Protocol No. 8 
Conference of Octoher ;jI, 1898 



Present: On the part of the 
United States: Messrs: Day, 
Davis, Frye, Cray, Keid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

Cn the ])art of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero liios, Abarzuza, Carnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Ceiero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and ai)i)roved. 

The American Connnissioners 
stated that they had carefully con- 
sidered the articles tendered by the 
Spanish (.'ommissionersat the last 
meeting, by which, while Spain was 
to relin(iuisli sovereignty over 
Cuba, such relinquishment was to 
be accepted by the United States 
and was to include such charges and 
obligations, outstanding at the 
ratillcatioM of the treaty as should 
l)e held by a Commission not to be 
proi)erly and pe<-nliarly chargeable 



Protocolo No. 8. 

Conferencia del ;J4 de Octtihre de 

18!)S. 

Presentes Por parte de los 
Estados Unidos de Anii'-rica. los 
Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Cray, 
Eeid. Moore, Fergusson. 

Por i)arte de Kspafia los Seno- 
res Montero Kios Abarzuza, Car- 
nica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fu!' leida y ai)robada el acta de 
la sesi<»n anterior. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
manifestaron que habian exami 
nado con todo detenimieuto los ar- 
ticulos presentados por los Comis- 
ionados Espafioles en la ultima 
sesi(')n, en los (piales Espana hacia 
el abandono de su Soberania sobre 
Cuba que debia ser aceptada i)or 
los I'^stados Unidos comprendieu- 
dose en dicho abandono y en su 
aceptacJcMi todas las cargas y obli- 
ga('iones existentes al tiempo de la 
ratiiicacion del tratado, que una 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



59 



to tbe treasury of the Peniusiila, 
but to be properly and peculiarly 
Cuban, aud that they must reject 
the articles in question as well as any 
articles that re<iuired the United 
States to assume, either for itself 
or for Cuba, the so-called Cuban 
debt. They were willing, however, 
to add to the article in which Spain 
relinquished sovereignity over and 
title to Cuba, a suitable stipulation 
by which the United States would 
assume the obligations as to the 
protection of life and property im- 
posed by its occupation, so long as 
such occupation should continue. 



After much discussion, the Presi- 
dent of the Spanish Commission 
stated that the Spanish Commis- 
sioners did not care for the phra- 
seology in which the reliuquish- 
mentof sovereignty was expressed, 
so long as it embraced an obliga- 
tion as to del)ts, such as was stated 
in the second of the articles 
presented by them. 

The President of the American 
Commission, replying to this state- 
ment, inquired whether the Presi- 
dent of the S|)anish Commission 
intended thereby to say that the 
Spanish Commissioners would re- 
fuse to consider any articles as to 
Cul)a and Porto Eico which con- 
tained no provision for the assump- 
tion of indebtedness by the United 
States, or Cuba, or both. 

The Spanish Commissioners hav- 
ing asked for timein which to reply 
to this inquiry, the conference was 
adjourned to Wednesday, October 
20, at four o'clock, p. m. 

Willia:*! K. Day 

CusHMAN K. Davis 

Wm. P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

WniTELAw Reid. 

John B. Moore. 



Comision especial hubiera de con- 
siderar como no pertenecientes ni 
afectas al Tesoro de la Peninsula, 
sino como inherentes y peculiares 
del de Cuba, anadiendo los Com- 
isionados Americanos que se veian 
precisados a rechazar los articulos 
en cuestion, asi como cualesquiera 
otros en los que se exigieia a los 
Estados Unidos que asumiesen, ya 
sea para si, ya para Cuba, las car- 
gas de la Deuda ( ubana; pero que 
esteban sin embargo dispuestos A 
anadir al articulo en que Espaha 
hacia el abandono de su soberania 
y derechos sobre Cnl)a, una esti- 
pulacion por la cual los Estados 
Unidos asumirian sobre si las obli- 
gaciones relativas a la (jonserva- 
cibn de las vidasy propriedades de 
los habitantes de Cuba, que les 
imponia su ocupaciou mientras 
esta durase. 

Despues de una prolongada dis- 
cusibn, manifesto el Presidente de 
los Comisarios Espaholes que la 
Comision Espahola no daba impor- 
tancia a la fraseologia en que se 
expresara el abandono de Sobera- 
nia, siempre que comprendiese el 
tratado unaobligacion respecto de 
las deudas, tal como figuraba en el 
articulo U^delproyecto de articulos 
presentado. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana contesta a esta declara- 
cion preguntando si el Presidente 
de la Comision Espanola,entendia 
decir con esto que los Comisarios 
Espanoles se negaban a tomar en 
consideracion cualesquiera articu- 
los respecto de Cuba 6 Porto liico 
que no contuviesen una disposicion 
por la que asumiesen sus deudas 
los Estados Unidos ;> Cubar>ambos. 
Los Comisionados espanoles ha- 
biendo pedido nn plazo para con- 
testar a esta pregunta, se ttjb la 
prbxima conferencia para el Mier- 
coles 26 de Octubre a las -t P. M. 

E. MONTERO liios 

B. DE AEARZUZA 

J. DE GARNICA 

W R DE Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



60 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Protocol jS^o. 0. 
Conference of October 26, 1898. 

Present On the part of the 
United States. Mess r s D a y 
Davis Frye Gray Keid JMoore Fer- 
gusson. 

On the part of Spain Messrs. 
Montero iJios Abarziiza Garnica 
Yilhi-Urrutia Cerero OJeda. 

The ])rotocol of the preceding- 
session was read and approved. 

The Spaiiisli Commissioners filed 
under tlie rules a memorandum, 
copy and translation of which are 
hereto annexed, giving their rea- 
sons in support of the articles pre- 
sented by tliem on the Ulst. of Oc- 
tober, and rejected by the Ameri- 
can Commissioners on the 2-4th. 

The American Oommissiouers 
stated that tliey would file under 
the rules a written reply, which 
should be annexed to the protocol. 



The Spanish Commissioners then 
made to the incpiiry addressed to 
them by the American Commis- 
sioners, at the close of the last ses- 
sion, the following reply: 

"The Spanish Commissioners, 
having become acquainted with 
the questions propounded to them 
at tlie end of the last conference 
by tlie President of the American 
Commission, — having read it and 
studied it in order to understand 
with all clearness its meaning and 
its scope; 

"Considering that in the confer- 
ence held by the two Commissions 
on the 14th of this month it was 
resolved that noagreementreatthed 
upon any article should be con- 
sidered as the linal expression of 
the views and opinions of either 
(jrovernment on the2)oints and n)at- 
ter contained therein, until after an 
agreement should be reached on all 
other articles of the treaty, or iu 
other words upon tlie whole of it: 

"(Considering therefore that the 
question pro])ounded by the Presi- 
dent of the American Commission 



Protocolo No. 0. 

Gonferencia del 26 de Octuhre de 
1898. 

Presentes, Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de America, los Se- 
nores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Keid, 
Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espaiia los Sefiores 
Montero liios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fuc leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesi(')n anterior. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pre- 
seutaron para su insercitin en el 
protocolo seguu reglamento un 
Memorandum cuya copia y traduc- 
cion son anexos, en el cual expoiien 
sus razones en apoyo de los articu- 
los presentados por ellos el 21 del 
corriente y rechazados por los 
Comisarios Americanos el 24. 

Los Comisarios Americanos ofre- 
cieron dar su coutestacion escrita 
conforme al reglamento copia y 
traducciou de la cual forman'm 
])arte del protocolo general de las 
conferencias. 

Los Comisarios espanoles dieron 
a la pregunta que al fin de la sesion 
anterior les dirigio la Comision 
Americana la contestacion sigui- 
ente: 

" Enterados los Comisarios Espa- 
noles de la pregunta que, al ter- 
minar la ultima couferencia, les 
hizo el Sr Presidente de la 
Comision Americana, y despues de 
haberla leido y estudiado a(iuellos 
]»ara compreiuler con todaclaridad 
su sentido y alcance: 

"Cousiderando (jue en la cou- 
ferencia celebrada por ambas 
Comisiones el dia 14 de este mes, 
se convino en (|ue el acnerdo de 
cualquier aiticulo no podia (;on- 
siderarse como expresion detinitiva 
de las niiras y oi)iniones de uiio u 
otro (Jobierno sobre los puntos y 
materia contenida en dicho arti- 
culo, si no se llegaba a convenir 
en todos los del Tratado, (') sea en 
su totalidad; 

"Cousiderando por lo tanto que 
la pregunta hecha por el Senor 
Presidente de la Comision Ameri- 



TREATY OF PEACE, 



61 



cauiiot uow be given any answer, 
which without violation of the reso- 
lution uiiaiiiiuously adopted by the 
two Commissions at the aforesaid 
conference of the 14th instant, may 
involve the final approval of the 
article or articles to which the 
question refers : 

"Considering furthermore that 
even in case such resolution as the 
above had not been agreed upon 
by the Commissioners, its adoption 
would have been required by the 
very nature and essence of the 
mission entrusted to them, which 
is to frame a treaty of iieace, set- 
tling not only the question of the 
Antilles but also that of the Phil- 
ippine Islands and all other ques- 
tions, even of lesser im])ortance, 
which may exist between the two 
High Contracting Parties : 

"Considering that this treaty is 
not to be framed, as no other 
treaty has, or can, be ever framed, 
upon the exclusive basis of strict 
justice, as understood by each 
party, but also upon the basis of 
the advantage to be derived by 
either or bj^ both, thus modifying 
in harmony therewith the demands 
of strict law; and that, therefore, 
the Spanish Commissioners, al- 
though understanding that strict 
law decides the question of the 
Cuban debt in their favor, are in 
duty bound and are willing to mod- 
erate the said strictness in view of 
the advantages wiiich Spain may 
derive from other stipulations of 
the treaty which, without being 
prejudicial to the United States, 
may be favorable to Spain; 



"Considering therefore that the 
article or articles to which the 
President of the American Com- 
mission refers can not at this time 
be the subject of final approval, 
since they must remain subject to 
the others to be included in the 
same treaty, meeting the approval 
of both High Parties: — 



"The Spanish Commissioners 



cana no puede tener ahora una con- 
testacion que implicjue una aproba- 
cion definitiva del articulo o arti- 
culos a que dicha pregunta se refl- 
ere, ii no infringirse lo convenido 
por unanimidad por ambas Conii- 
siones en la conferencia sobredicha 
del 14 de este mes : 

" Considerando adennis, que aun- 
que as! aquellos no la hubieran con- 
venido, lo exigia lo indole y la pro- 
pria esencia de la mision que les ha 
sido confiada y que cousiste en ela- 
borar un solo Tratado de Paz en 
que queden resueltas no solo la 
cuestion de las Antillas, sino tam- 
bien la de Filipinas y cualquier 
otra, annque sea jnenos importante 
que exista entre las dos Altas Par- 
tes: 



"Considerando que no habiendo 
de elaborarse este Tratado, conio 
nunca se ha elaborado ni j)uede 
elaborarse ninguno, con el unico 
criterio de la rigurosa justicia que 
cada una de las Partes jiueda en- 
tender que le asista, sino tambien 
con el de la conveniencia de cada 
una de ellas y aun de ambas, para 
modificar A su tenor las exigencias 
del criterio meramente juridico, y 
que por consiguiente, sobre la 
cuestion relativa ;i la deuda de 
Cuba, loft Comisarios Espanoles, 
que entienden qneel rigor del Dere- 
cho la resuelve si su favor, tienen el 
deber y estiin dispuestos a cump- 
lirlo, de moderar este rigor, por las 
convenieucias que para Espana 
pnedan surgir de otras estipula- 
ciones del Tratado, que, sin ser per- 
judiciales a los Estados Unidos, 
puedan serfavorables a Espana: 

"Considerando por lo tanto, que 
el articulo 6 articulos A que se re- 
fiere la pregunta del Sehor Presi- 
dente de la Comision Americana, 
no pueden ser por hoy objeto de 
una aprobacion detinitiva, pnesto 
que no pueden menos de quedar 
subordinados a que los dem.ls que 
han de ser incluidos en el mismo 
Tratado merezcan tambien la apro-, 
bacion de Ambas Altes Partes : 

" Los Comisarios Espanoles con- 



(32 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



auswer the said question by stat- 
ing tliat, reiterating their convic- 
tion tliat pursuant to law tlie colo- 
nial obligatiousotCubaaiKl Puerto 
liico must follow these islands and 
their sovereiiiuty, they do not re- 
fuse 'to consider any articles as to 
Cuba and Puerto Kico which con- 
tain no i)rovislo!i for the assump- 
tion of indebtedness by the United 
States, or Cuba, or both', subordi- 
nating the tinal api)rov^al of such 
articles to that of the others which 
are to form tlie complete treatj^, 
and they, therefore, invite the 
American Commissioners to enter 
upon the discussion of the other 
Ijoints to be embodied in the Treaty, 
and, at the outset, to take up the 
discussion of the i^hilippine Archi- 
pelago, and to propose to the 
Si)anish Commissioners what they 
understand should be agreed upon 
in said Treaty with respect to this 
subject." 

The American Commissioners, 
after the reading of this jtaper, 
inquired whether they were to un- 
derstand that the Spanish Com- 
missioners accepted the articles 
previously presented by them as 
to Cuba, Porto Rico, and Guam. 

The Spanish Commissioners re- 
]died that they accepted them in 
the sense stated in the paper — 
provisionally, subject to the con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace. 



On motion of the American Com- 
missioners, the conference was ad- 
journed to the 27th of October, at 
two o'clock, p. m. 



William R. Day 
CusHMAN K. Davis 
Wm. P Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 
John 13. Moore. 



testan a la sobredicha pregunta 1 
diciendo (|ue afirmando su convic- 
cion de que con arreglo a Derecho 
las obligaciones coloniales de Cuba 
y PuerteRico deben pasarcon estas 
islas y sus oberania ' no rehusan 
tomar en consideracion cualquier 
otro articulo relativo a Cuba y 
Puerto Rico, que no contenga la 
clausula de asumir las cargas por 
los Estados IJnidos 6 i)or Cuba o 
por ambos', subordinando la defini- 
tiva aprobacion de tal articulo ;i la 
de los demas (pie hayan de formar 
la totalidad del Tratado; e invitan, 
en su consecueucia, a los Sefiores 
Comisarios Americanos, a que se 
proceda a la discusion de los demtis 
puntos que en el Tratado se han de 
comprender, y des<le luego ii la del 
relativo al Archipiclago filipino, 
proi)oiueudo a los Comisarios Es- 
pafioles lo que entiendan que debe 
convenirse en aqu; 1 sobre este 
asunto." 

Dcspui'sde dada lectnra de esta 
contestaciou, los Comisarios ameri- 
canos preguntaron si debiau enten- 
der ])or ell a que los Comisarios 
espanoles aceptaban los arti'culos 
j)resentados por la Oomisiou amer- 
icana relativ^os u Cuba, Puerto 
Rico y Guain. 

Los Comisarios Espauoles con- 
testaron que los aceptaban en el 
sentido expresado en su docuiaen- 
to, y subordinada su aceptacion a 
la aprobacion de los demas articu- 
los que haya de contener el Tratado 
de paz. 

xV propuesta de los Comisarios 
Americanos, se aplazo la proxima 
couferencia para el 127 de Octubre 
a las 2 P. M., a fin de que los Comi- 
sarios Americanos pudieran estu- 
diar con todo detenimiento la con- 
testaciou dada por los Comisarios 
E8])aholes. 

E. MONTERO Rios 

B. DE AnARzrzA 

J. DE GARNICA 

W R DE Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



TREATY OF PEACE. 63 

Annex to Protocol No. 9. 
comision paea la negoctacion de la paz con los estados unidos. 

[Meinorandiim ]iivse:il,i(lo en la sesioii de 21 de Octubre 1898.] 

Los Comisarios espauoles se hau eiiterado eon verdadera pena del 
Memorandum presentado por los Sefiores Comisarios auiericanos en la 
confeiencia ultima eelebrada eii 17 del corrieute. En este documeuto 
dicbos Senores, fundandose en afirmaeioiies y apreciaciones con cuya 
exactitud la Comision espailola no puede manifestarse conforme, a pesar 
de la recta intenci('>n con que, no duda, (|ue fuerou expuestas, concluyen 
aquellos por manifestar que sustituyen el proyecto de los dos articulos 
sobre Cuba y las demas islas, que liabian presentado en la couferencia 
de o del corrieute, con otros dos, reducidos ;i la copia literal de los dos 
primeros articulos del Protocolo de Wasbingtou, alegando para esto que 
entieuden que el Tratado de paz, en cuauto se refiere a la soberauia de 
las Antillas y de la Isla de (luam en las Marianas, no debe coiitener 
mas ni menos que Ja reproduccion literal de aquellos dos articulos. 

Mas como estos ya formaii parte de un Convenio obligatorio cual lo 
es el Protocolo de VVasbiiigton, paiece inutil bacer de ellos una mera 
reproduccion en el tratado (]ue ba de elaborarse en la conferencia. Los 
contiatos, asi en el orden privado como en el internacioual, son per- 
fectos, y producen todos sus el'ectos para las partes (jue los bayan otor- 
gado, sin necesidad de niii guna conflrmaciou posterior (jue en nada puede 
aumentar su eticacia. Parece. jior esto, rcduudante esta reproduccion, 
si a clla se ba de limitar el Tratado de \ydz sobre las Antillas, como 
quieren los Senores Comisarios americanos. 

Si esta consideracion es de pura razon y aun de moro bueu sentido, 
la propuesta de los Comisarios americanos no se comprende sino en el 
supuesto de (jue estos entienden que el Tratado, aparte de cualcjuier 
disposicion de caracter secundario que en el pueda incluirse, no dcbe 
versar mas que sobre el Arcbipiclago Filipino. , 

Si tal es el pi'iisamieuto de la Comision Americana, la Espanola no 
puede prestarle su asentimiento porque entiende que su ejecucion seria 
una infraccion del Protocolo. 

Uespues de las tres condiciones que el Senor Secretaiio de Estadode 
Wasbiugton, contestando en 31 de Julio ultimo al Mensaje del Gobierno 
de Su Majestad Catblica, de liU del mismo mes, propuso a Espana para 
terminar la guerra, dijo: "Si las condiciones ofrecidas aqui .son acep- 
tadas en su integridad, los Estados Unidos nombraran Comisarios que 
se encontraran con los igualinente autorizados por Espana, con objeto 
de arreglar los iletalles dti Tratado de paz y de firmarlo en las condi- 
ciones arriba expresadas." Estos detaUe.s no aparecen circunscritos al 
arcbipielago. 

El propio Sefior Presidente de la Eepublica Americana, en la confe- 
rencia que celebro el 10 de Agosto con el Senor Embajador de Francia, 
representaute de Espana para el caso, distinguio perfectamente el Pro- 
tocolo del tratado de paz, diciendo que aquel debia ser un niero documento 
prelimiiiar que no teudria por objeto ni por efecto mas que consagrar 
sin dilacion alguiia el acuerdo de los dos Gobiernos Kobre los principios 
mumos de la paz, y que, por lo tanto, no seria necesario reservar en el, ni 
los derecbos de las Cortes, ni los del Senado federal, llamados imicamente 
a rati bear el Tratado dejinitivo. 

El Senor Presidente, es verdad, hablo del asunto de las Filipinas para 
decir que quedaba reservado a la Conferencia de Paris, pero nunca dijo,. 



64 TREATY OF PEACE. 

iii indict) si<iuiera, que este asunto liabria de ser el I'uiico que se trataria 
en estn (^onfin't'iicia. _ 

Y tiiialmentc.en el Aiticulo .'»" del Pr()tocolo,'redactado de conforraidad 
coil todos estos precedeiites, se dice que los Coiuisarios uoinbrados por 
auibas Altas Partes habiau do pioceder en Paris ;i negociar y coiicluir 
uu Tratado de i)az sin limitar ui coucretar su objeto y eiiipleaiido, por 
la iiiversa, una frase euyo evidente sentido es (jue en el Tratado de paz 
que se elaboi-asc ])or la Coniision habiau de resolverse todas las cues- 
tioues, a la sa/.on pendieutes, entre los dos I'stados, que no estuviesen 
resueltas ya en el acuerdo i)re]!minar del Protoeolo. 

Cierto es (jue los Seuores Co?nisarios Americanos fuudan precisameute 
su ultimo proyecto en la consideraciiui de que todo lo relativo a las 
Antillas espauolas ya liie resuelto en el Protocolo. Mas a esta consi- 
deraciou es precisameute a la que desde la primera confereiicia uo liau 
podido ni pueden prestar su asentiniiento los Comisarios espanoles. 

Los Americanos en su Memorandum de 11 de este rnes mauifestarou 
que los Comisarios espafioles, pouian eu su i)royecto coudicioues a la 
renuncia de la soberauia eu Cuba. Gravisimo error. En a-tjuel pro- 
yecto uo se des(;onoce el car;u;ter puro <• ineondicional de tal renuncia, 
lo unico que aili se bace es cousiguar en lo que esta renuncia cousiste. 
Y esto es eseucialmeute diverso de lo ([ue los Sefiores Comisarios 
Americauos entienden. 

Y (pie, efectivamente, los articulos del proyecto de los espanoles tiene 
pcjr unico objeto iijar el sentido de la renuncia, pero uo someterla a 
coudicioues, esta demostrado por el objeto niismo de las discusiones 
orales y escritas que vieuen niediando eutre los unos y los otros. 

Los Seuores Comisarios Americauos entienden que el viuico sentido 
que puede darse a la reuuncia de soberanui couveuida eu el Protocolo, 
es el propio del ahandono de esta soberauia; para deducir de aqui, que 
Esj)aria debe abandouar la Isla de Cubacomo cualquier potencia puede 
abandonar iiu territorio desierto del Africa que antes liubiera poseido. 

Por mas (|ue la Comisiou espafiola distingue el sentido juiidico de la 
palabra ahaiidono del que es propio de la remriieia, uo sosteudria esta 
discusiou tecuica, impropia de una Coufereucia diplouuitica, siuo fuera 
porque la Comisiou Americana sostiene su opinion como el principal 
fundamento que da a su aspii'acioii de que, por tal supuesto abaudono, 
quede cortado todo vinculo de dereclio y uinguuo nuevo surja de a(iuel 
acto, entre Espana y los Estados Unidos, al a])oderarse de la Isla, bieu 
en su i)ropi() nondjre y para ellos mismos, bieu en nombre y para el 
pueblo cubano. 

Pero esta asi)ira(n6n, siu ejem])lo en los fastos diplomaticos del mundo, 
uo i)uedeu admitirla los Comisarios espanoles, dando por re])roducido 
cuanto expusieron en el primer capitulo del Memoraiuium que xiresen- 
taron eu contra del proyecto de articuladode la Comisiou Americana, y 
afiaden las breves cousideracioues siguientes, (jue les sugiereu los dos 
Memorandum I'cltimamente presentatios por la misma. 

Deja la espafiola a un lado la citai que, en apoyo de su opiniou, la 
Comisiou Americana bace del Diccionario de Escriclie, que es una obra 
muy respetable ciertamente, pero cuyo unico ol)jeto es la exposicion de 
la jurisi)rudeucia i)racticadel Dereclio privado, exposicion nuiy popular, 
es verdad, en Espana. ])orque sirve de mentor a los Jovenes abogados 
en el jirimer periodo de su \ ida i)roresioual, pero (pie es completameute 
agena a la ciencia del Dereclio inrernacional y piiblico. 

Casos de abandono, en el sentido (pie se pretende, no registra la liis- 
toi-ia moderna de los pueblos m;is (pie los de territorios desiertos, 6 alo 
sumo, poblados \)ov las tribus barbaras del Africa. Abandono de uu 



TREATY OF PEACE. 65 

verdadero Estado, ya formado, de existeiicia secular, con una organiza- 
cion social y politica corapleta y poblado de habitantes que gozan y 
tieueii dereclio ;'i gozar de todos los beueflcios de la civilizaciim moderiia, 
no ba habido liasta aliora, ni creeu los Comisarios espafioles que lo 
habra en el nnindo. 

Los territorios abandonados son legitimamente ocupados por el 
Estado que quiera establecer en ellos su soberania. ^las esta ocupa- 
cion, meramente de heclio, no impone al ocupante otros deberes mas 
que los que en las regioues de Africa cuuiplen las potencias de Europa 
con las barbaras tribus que los pueblan 6 los recorren. ^ Oree la 
Comisi(')n Americana que los Estados Qnidos en concepto de ocupautes 
de la Isla de Cuba, puesto que este es el unico en que segun el supuesto 
qne deflenden, babran de posesionarse de ella, no ban de tener i^ara con 
los habitantes de la graude Antilla mas deberes que los que se cuniplen 
con aquellos degradados seres humanosf 

Tenemos la completa seguridad de que no es tal el pensamiento de los 
Senores Comisarios Americanos, pero a esta consecuencia fatalmente 
conduce a la Comision americana, su empeno en negar toda diferencia 
de derecho entre los efectos del abandono y los efectos de la renuncia. 

A esta no obsta la protesta de los Sefiores Comisarios Americanos en 
su ultimo Memorandum, aflrmando que los i?]stados Unidos dispensaran 
a los babitantes de Cuba y a sus propiedades toda la proteccion que 
necesiten, como vienen baciendolo en la j^equeua porciou de territorio 
que en la isla ya ocupan por la fuerza de las armas. ^Creen los Estados 
Unidos que a Espaua con relacion a la Islade Cubay a sus habitantes, 
no deben reconocrrsele por aquellos mas derechos al dejar su soberania, 
que Ids que Estados Unidos o cualquiera otra Potencia sc apresurarian 
arecoijocer a la mas desgraciada de las tribus africanas de cuyo territorio 
se ai)oderaran f Pero, aparte de que ellos mismos no dan a esta obliga- 
cion que dicen (pie tienen, mas fundamento que el hecho de ser posee- 
dores de la Isla, lo cual confirma lo que acabamos de indicar, tambien 
es cierto que dichos Senores Comisarios no se i^restan ji que esta, ni otra 
obligaci(3n alguna de los Estados Unidos, seconsigneen el tratado que, 
segun exigen, ha de limitarse a la rejoroduccion de los dos primeros 
articulos del I'rotocolo. Por lo tauto esaobligacion que en el Memoran- 
dum dicen que contraen no sera exigible por no constar en el Tratado, y 
sin animo de ofensa para los Estados Unidos, la logica no permite que 
se niegue en absoluto, la posibilidad de que pase, en mas 6 en menos, 
con ella, lo que con las obligaciones que expontaneamente contrageron 
los Estados Unidos en las negociaciones que prepararon el Protocolo 
y que, esto no obstante, los Seiiores Comisarios americanos se niegan 4 
que consten en el Tratado. 

Las Camaras de los Estados Unidos en su resolucion conjunta, y el 
Senor Presidente de la Union en su ultimatum a Espana, pudo exigir 
a esta jSTaciou, aunque inutil es decir que Espana no hubiera accedido 
d tan enorme exigeucia, el abandono absoluto de su soberania en Cuba 
en el sentido en que ahora lo exigen sus Comisarios, como pudo tambi(''n 
exigii le su cesion franca y libre de toda carga a los ICstados Unidos. 
Mas lo cierto es que no lo exigio, porque se limito a reclamarle la renun- 
cia de su soberania para que el pueblo cubano/«er« Uhre e independiente, 
6 lo que es lo mismo, la reni'incia, de su soberania en favor del pueblo 
cubano, para que fuera libre ('■ independiente, si bien, al mismo tiemjio, 
no consintio y antes bien exigio, que esta renvincia fuera, desde luego, 
becha d favor de los Estados Unidos, para aquel pueblo a quien los 
Estados Unidos habian de prestar ayuda y direccion, porque no de' 
otro modo era posible que la Tsla de Cuba dejara de pasar directa e 
T P 5 



6S TREATY OF PEACE. 

iiimetliataiiieiite del p( der de Espafia al del pueblo ciibaiio, para haber 
de ponnauecer en poder de los Estados Uiiidos liasta la i)aciticaci6ii de 
la isla. Esto nos ])are(e que los Sef.ores C'oniisarios Americanos no 
pueden menos de reconocerlo conio rigurosamente exacto. 

Y si tales iiicron los t( rminos en que los Estados Unidos encerraron 
su exigeneia n que al tin aceedi(') l^]s]»ana sin que aquellos los liubiesen 
previamenle nioditicado, es claro como laluz del Sol, (lue el convenio de 
que es formula el articulo 1" del Protoeolo, (pues otro no se celebro eutre 
las dos Altas Partes) tiene necesariamente que eutenderse en el sentido 
de los terminos en (pie liie proi)uesto por una de ellas, y aeeptado por 
la otra, y que no es licito ahora a cualquiera de ellas alterar estos termi 
nos con el tin de (tonvertir a(iuella renfaicia, exigida para un objeto 
determinado, y :1 tenor de un procedimiento establecido, en un abandono 
absoluto sin el objeto y ]n'Ocediniiento convenidos, conio el quepretende 
la Comisicni Americana ([ue se baga. 

No es pues el caso del- abandono que la Comision Americana exige, 
sino el de la rent'mcia convenida {]ue la Espafiola sostiene, el que ba de 
consjgnarse en el tratado. Es un caso analogo a tantos otros por (]ue 
ban ])asado las i)otencias coloniales cuando perdieron su soberania en 
todas (') parte de sus colonias. Jamas una potcjicia colonial abandono^ 
en el sentido que ahora se quiere inrponer, una colonia para que se 
convirtiese en un uuevo Esta<lo independiente y libre. (Jaando esto 
sucedi('), la Metr<')])oli cedio o renuncio su soberania, si antes la colonia 
misma no la habia conquistado por la fuer/.a de las armas, pero jamas 
la abandono en el sentido sobredicho. Si los Senores Comisarios ameri- 
canos no estan conformes con esta categorica atirmaci(3n, les rogamos 
que nos citen un caso que la contiadiga. 

Los Comisarios espafioles ruegan tambi^'n a los Senores Comisarios 
americanos que fijen su atencion, tan ilustrada y serena, en la contra- 
diccion palpitante que resalta entre su teoria y los hechos que los 
Estados Tnidos vienen llevando ;'t cabo. Segfin la Comision Americana 
la iMiica situacion legal posible sobre la Isla de Cuba, entre Espaiia de 
una })arte y los Estados Unidos por si, <> en nombre del pueblo cubauo, 
de la otra, es la siguiente: Espafia debc abaudonar la Isla de Cuba. 
Eos Estados Unidos despuc s del abandono ban de posesionarse de la 
Isla para el pueblo cubano. 

Y por consiguiente el transito de la Gran Antilla de UTia a otra situa- 
cion, ba de bacerse sin establecerse vinculo alguuo de derecbo entre 
Espana y su antiguFj colonia y por ella los Estados Unidos, I'ues bien, 
las fuerzas de los Estados Unidos rindieron a Santiago de Cuba, y 
tirmaron con las Autoridades militares espanolas una capitulaciou. En 
esta no exigieron (jue las fuerzas de la Metropoli abandonaran a Santia- 
go de Cuba, sino que se lo entregaran a las Autoridades americanas, 
formandose inventario, que tirmaron ambas i)artes, en el cual consta 
cuanto la una cnfrego y la otra recibvi. La Comision americana que 
estii en la Uabana, por baber sido nombi'ada en cumpliiniento de lo 
prescrito en el Articulo 4" del Protocolo exige a la Comision espanola 
(pie le entregue todo lo que a EspaHa correspondia en uso de su sobe- 
rania, asi en \o civil como en lo »? ///far, y esto, en virtud deinstrucciones 
exp:esas de su Gobierno, y por denuis esta el decir que esta entrega 
tambii'ii ba de ser en forma de inventario. 

Ante estos liecbos ^, es posible negar que Esi)aria, al renunciar a su 
soberania en Cuba, exigen los Estados Unidos que se la entregue a 
ellos mismos? 

Pues aun haynnis que esto: la Comision Americana, a pesar de la 
teoria que sostiene, ba acomodado sus primeros actos a la que sostiene 
la espanola. En el parrafo 2" del articulo 1"* que aquella preseuto en 3 



TREATY OF PEACE. G7 

de octubre, llama cesion (no abandons) ;'i la reuiiucia de la soberamade 
Espafia en Cuba. Y esto no se puede explicar por una simple iucorrec- 
cion de lenguaje, porque en el Articulo 2" fijacuales ban de ser losefec- 
tos de la cesion dela soberania de Pnerto Kico, y eni])!ea para fljarestos 
el'ectos, las niisnuis, exactamente las niismas frases, que acababa de 
emplear en el Articulo 1" para tijar los dela renuucia de la soberania eu 
Cuba. Prueba acabada de que, segun la Coraision Americana, a pesar 
de sus opiniones sosteuidas al calor de la coutroversia con la espanola, 
al redactar su primer proyecto eutendia que los efectos de la reuiiucia 
de la soberania eran los niismos, exactamente los mismos, que los de su 
cesion. 

Y si quisiera decirse que aunque scan ignales los efectos, la reuiiucia, 
que la Comision Americana llama abandono, se distingue de la cesion en 
que aquella no se hace con relacitui a nadie que liaya de adquirir el 
territorio abandonado, y por el contraiio, la cesion se hace a favor de 
quien haya de adquirir el territorio cedido, tarapoco los Comisarios 
Americanos nuircaron esta diferencia en su proyecto, porque, bablaiido 
en ambos articulos de los Arcbbvos y demas papeles que habian de ser 
objecto de la renuucia 6 cesion, dicen por ignal en los dos, empleaudo 
las mismas frases, que toda copia legalizada de aijuellos documentos 
que pudiera ser re<|uerida i)or un funcionario del Gobierno espanol, se 
le ex])edira en todo tiempo, y esto es ininteliglble sino en el sentido de 
que ba <le haber quien pueda expedir tal copia. Y no sera posible esta 
expedicion sin('» por quien tenga en su poder el documento que ba de 
coi)iar. Y no puede tenerlo en su poder quien no lo haya recibido. 
Por consiguieute los Comisarios Americanos al establecer en el Articulo 
1" las reg-las concernientes a la entrega de los Archivos de la Isla de 
Cuba, partian del supuesto de que esa entrega habia de ser hecha a 
alguien. Y eso, y nada mas que eso, es lo que consignarou en el arti- 
culo !i", respecto a la entrega de los Archivos de la Isla de Puerto Rico. 

La Comision americana acude para sostener su iuaceptable opinion 
sobre el abandono por Espafia de la Isla de Cuba, a la diferencia que 
cousta eu el L*rotocolo mismo. Dicen que Espafia se presto solamente 
a eeder a Puerto llico a los Estados Unidos. entretanto que respecto 
a la Isla de Cuba se oblig(') a renunciarla. De esto deducen que los 
efectos de la obligacion de Espana, respecto a una Antilla, son mas 
4mplios <iue respecto a la otra. Y& hemos ])robado con el texto pro- 
pio del proyecto de articulado de dichos Senores que ni aun esta di- 
ferencia en los efectos con relaciou a Espafia entreveian ellos,al redactar 
su proyecto, que existia. La diferencia, no obstante, se comprende bieu 
ba/jootro as])ecto. Los Estados Lnidos exigieron a J^^spanay despucs le 
declararon la guerra para que Cuba fuera libre e independieute. Y claro 
esque habiendo vencido ya nopodian exigirleque se lacediese, dejando 
a uu lado la libertad c iudeiiendencia de la Isla, ])or(iue esto daria 
niotivo al mundo para creer que tal libertad c independeucia no habia 
sido la verdadera causa del contiicto. !No le hicieron la misma exigencia 
respecto a I'uerto Pico, y si reclamaron despucs la soberania de la 
pequena Antilla, y de las demiis que rodeau a la Grande (y que hanin 
en lo porvenir imposible su independeucia, sin la voluutad y gracioso 
consentimiento de los Estados Unidos, que siemi)re la tendran li su 
merced, por su dominio sobre las que la rodeau como un circulo de 
hierro,) fue en concepto de indemnizacion de los gastos de la guerra, 
y de los perjuicios que decian que los ciudadanos americanos habian 
sufrido durante la insurrecciou colonial. Esta es la natural esplicacion 
de que en el Protocolo aparezca la soberania de una isla como renun,- 
ciada y la de las otras como cedida. 



68 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Los Comisarios espafioles eutienden por todo lo dicho, que es para ellos 
un deber ineludible, el coiitiunar sosteuieudo que la remnicia de la 
soberania eii Cuba, a ([ue se oblig(» Espana en el articulo del Protocolo, 
debe eiitendeise no abandoiio de la sobeiaiiia en el sentido (pie dan a la 
frase los Senores Comisarios aiiiericaiios, sino en el de reiiuucia i)ro- 
piaiiieiite (liclia. tal como se ha eiupleado en el ejeniplar eserito en trances, 
que thnm tainbi'ii el (lobierno aniericano, y (pie por lo tanto, no ])uede 
inenos de aceptar como texto oficial. Por consij;niente, Es})aria tiene la 
obligacion de rennnciar a la total soberania sobre la Gran Antilla, para 
(\ne a esta obligaiuon corresponda otra por parte delos EstadosUnitlos, 
y es la de recibir la Isla eu nombre y para el pueblo cubano, por el cual, 
aparte de los altos lines hunmnitarios (pie, sejiuii aflrman, inspiiV) sii 
condncta, por mas que a ello no pueda asentir l^vSi)aria, se constituyerou 
libremente y por su propia expontaneidad mandatarios con todas las 
obli<4aciones (pie se impone el '•'■ negotiorvm (jestor'\ (aunque segun per- 
sisteii en atiriiiarno lo sean '•/« rem snam'''') segun denominael dereclio 
;i a(pii'l que se eneargade reclamar y gestionai' los intereses de otro, por 
mils que <'ste no le liaya conferido expresa y oticialmente su mandato. 

Creen, i)or esto. los Comisarios es]tanoles que el contraproyecto del 
Articulo primero que presentaron,esta redactado en el extricto sentido 
que tiene el articulo 1" del Protocolo, exce])to en iin imi^ortante pimto 
de que pasan los Comisarios espafioles a ocuparse. 

Los Estados llnidos de Ami'rica exigieron a Espana, segun se ha 
diclio, la renuncia de la soberania en Cuba, en los tt'rminos que eu este 
Memorandum (piedan expresados. 

La Comisioii Americana en su penultimo Memorandum dice, que si 
Es))aria liubiese accedido al ser requeridacon el ultimatum, a abandonar 
la Isla de Cuba, sin entregarla a los Estados Unidos, todo el muudo 
hubiera creido que Hspana accedia a cuanto se podia exigirle. Lo 
liubiera quiz4 creido todo el muudo, menos los Estados Unidos, porque 
no parece a la Comisi()n espanola que tenga necesidad de demostrar, 
que baya nadie, ni en Euroi)a ni en Aiiuhica, que crea cpie los Estados 
Unidos se bubieran dado por satisfecbos con que Espana se retirase de 
la Isla de Cuba, habieudo ellos de absteuerse de toda intervencion en 
la Grande Antilla, para que el pueblo que la liabita continuase guerre- 
ando entre si y baciendo de si mismo y de sus destinos, en virtud de su 
natural dereclio, el uso (') el abusoque, supuesto (pie era iudependiente, 
podia liacer sin o contra la voluutad de los Estados Unidos. 

De estos t(''rminos es indeclinable i^ inmediata consecuencia, que los 
Estados Unidos tienen que recibir la Isla de Cuba, no ])ara couservarla 
para siempre, ni siquieraindetinidamente como propia, sin(') para ejercer 
su soberania, mientras la Isla no este paciflcada y para entregarla al 
pueblo que la habita tan pronto la paciticaci(')n se liaya realizaclo. 

l^sto, i)ues, debe constar en el Articulo primero del Tratado relative 'A 
tal renuncia, si lia de acoinodarse al contrato convenido entre las dos 
xVltas Partes. 

Asi lo comprendieron los Comisarios espanoles. Mas inspirandose eu 
sus vivos deseos de transaccion y de i)az, se prestaban a (pie los Estados 
Unidos quedasen eu libertad de transmitir al pueblo cubano la sobe- 
rania (le la Isla, cuando ellos, y solo ellos, considerasen (pie liabia llegado 
la oi)ortunidad de bacerlo. 

Proponicndolo asi los Comisarios espanoles, renunciaban en obsequio 
de los l^^stados Unidos el importantisimo dereclio (pie tiene b^spana 
para exigirles, cuando la ]>acilica('ion de la Isla se realice, (pie no reten- 
gan diclia soberania y la entreguen ;'i a(pu'l ])ueblo. 

La Comision americana persiste en alirmar (pie tal es el prop(')sito de 



TREATY OF PEACE. 69 

los Estiiilos Uiiidos, pero no quiere que couste en el tratado el iiotorio 
derecbo de Espafia para exigir su cninplinHeiito a su debido tiempo. 

Mas una vez que los Sefiores Coiuisarios Americanos seoponen termi- 
nauteniente a la aceptacion del Articulo propuesto por en tender que no 
se aeouioda al priuiero del Protocol©, los espauoles lo sustituyen con 
otro que no solaniente se acomodara de uu niodo estricto al recto 
sentido de aquel Articulo j^riniero, sino que aparecera redactado con 
sus propias palabras i^ero tambien con las frases literalmeiite copiadas 
de los despachos que precedieron a su redaccion y fijaron su sentido. 

He aqui la nueva redaccion que proponen eu sustitucion de la anterior : 

''Su Majestad Oatolica la Keina Kegente de Espana, en nombre de 
su Augusto hijo Don Alfonso XIII. Key de Espana, constitucionalniente 
autorizada por las Cortes del Reino, renuncia a su soberania y a todo 
derecho sobre Cuba. 

" Los Estados Unidos de America, aceptando esta renvincia, reciben 
de Espana la Isla de Cuba para prestarle ayuda y direccion y tenerla 
en su doininio y gobierno basta (|ue, una ve/ realizada su pacificaciou, 
dejen diclio (iominio y gobierno al pueblo cubauo." 

FUNDAMENTO DE ESTE ARTICULO. 

El parrafo 1" es la transcripcion del Articiilo 1" del Protocolo, con las 
variaciones de cancilleria. 

El sentido y las frases del parrafo 2" est;in tomadas del ultimatum 
dirigido por el (iobierno de Washington ;i Espana y comunicado eu 20 
de abril ultimo por aquel Sen or Secretario de Estado al Ministro de 
Espana eu acjuella capital. Figuran asi mismo eu el el pensamiento y 
las frases del (Iobierno Americano consignados eu la contestacion del 
Senor Secretario de Estado en W'asiiingtou eu 31 de Julio ultimo al 
Mensaje del Cobierno espafiol proponiendo la terminacion dela guerra. 
He aqui diclias frases: "el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos no ha com- 
partido las aprensiones de Espana sobie este punto (el de la falta de 
actual aptitud del pueblo cubauo para su iudependeucia) pero pieusa 
que en las coudiciones de perturbaciou y abatimiento eu que estii la 
Isla, esta necesita ayuda y direccion qae el Gohierno amcricano se halla 
dispiiesto a otorgarle.'''' 

Xo hay, pues, en el Articulo nuevamente redactado otro pensamiento 
ni otras frases que las consignadas en el ultimatum de los Estados 
Unidos a Esi:)aiia, en el despacho citado de su Secretario de Estado y 
en el Protocolo redactado accediendo al ultimatun y de acuerdo con 
la intencion de los Estados Unidos cousignada en el desi)aelio sobre- 
dicho. 

Esto no obstante, ruegan los Cpmisarios Espauoles de un modo 
especial a los Senores Comisarios Americanos, que tengan i)resente que 
si la legitima exigencia por parte de Espana para que eu el Tratado se 
consigue su derecho para reclamar, a su debido tiempo, a los Estados 
Unidos de America el cumplimiento del compromise que expontsinea- 
mente contragerou de dejar la Isla de Cuba libre e independiente, asi 
que est ' paciticada, no fuese de su agrado, aquellos est;in dispuestos a 
reniinciar li tal exigencia, dejando a la exclusiva apreciacion de los 
Estados Unidos el resolver cuando hayau de cumplir tal compromise, 
si esta renuncia de la Comisiou espanola hubiera de servir para la con- 
clusion del Tratado pendiente de paz. 

Los Senores Comisarios Americanos rechazau tambien los demas 
articulos del proyecto presentado por los esi)auoles. 



70 TREATY OF PEACE. 

No admiteii que do la soberaiii'aformen i)arte las cargas y obligacioiies 
(U'l Soberaiio (nie ])roce(laii exclusivaiiiente del servicio publico de la 
Coloiiia. Y sin eutrar la Comisiou espailola en la discusiiui purameiite 
t(''cnica de si fonnaii i)arte de la soberauia estas obligacioiies, 6 son tan 
solo efecto del ejercicio de la soberauia niisina, porque el resultado de 
esta (liscusiou seria coinpletainente ineficaz para el punto sobre que no 
conviriien uiios y otros Coinisioiiados, pasan los esi)anoles a rectiticar 
brevoiuente los lieclios y los conceptos (jue se hallan escritos en el 
Meniorauduin aiiiericano de 14 del corrieute. Para demostrar aquellos 
que las obliuaciones coloniales de Espaua en Cuba no deben quedar a 
cargo de esta Isla, exponeu que tales obligacioiies fueron contraidas 
por la Corona con intervenci(')ii de sus funcionarios en la Colonia pero 
sin (pie esta liubiese intervenido ni i)restado su consentiniiento para 
contraerlas. l^'n efecto; el n'-ginien colonial entonces vigeute en Espafia 
no daba a sus colonias la.facultad de tener C.iniaras electivas que 
ejerciesen con el sol)erauo el poder supremo. En los ultimos veiute 
auos ya no succdia asi. Las Antillas tenfan su representacion en ambas 
Cainaras, la ciial, por cierto, interviuo en todos los actos legislativos 
sobr(^ obligacioiies coloniales, sin que nunca liubiese protestado contra 
su legitiniidad y fuerza obligatoria. Mas, aparte de esto, no se puede 
negar (pie raientras aquel r'gimen subsisti*') coiiservando todos los 
caracteres de la legalidad a la sazon establecida. los actos que la sober- 
auia <;olouial ejercieia dentro de las atribucioiies (jue las leyes le con- 
feriaii. fneroii ^lerfe'L^tamente Icgitimos y produjeron lo que no podian 
menos deproducir: todassus justas consecuencias. Esta es una maxi- 
ma fundamental en el dereclio publico, sin la cual seria iinposible el 
credito de un Estado, porque la validez de todos sus actos estaria siem- 
pre a inerced de culquiera causa revolucionaria triuiifante. Puede dis- 
cutirse el acierto de los actos del Soberano, pero no cabe discutir su 
legitiniidad y caracter obligatorio cuandolian sido ejecutados envirtud 
de atribucioiies v con las solemn idades reconocidas y establecidas por 
la ley. 

Este ])rincii)io fu;'' reconocido por el Primer Consul, cuando otorgo 
con r>aviera su Tratado de -4 de Agosto de 1>-01. En su Articulo o*' se 
acordo aplicar lo dis])uesto eu el Tratado de paz de Luneville referente 
a las deudas liii)otecarias de los ]>aises de la orilla izquierda del Kliin. 
En estos territorios liabia Dietas que iiiterveiiian el poder del Soberano 
y ])or esto en diclio Tratado de Luneville se liabia exigido (jue tales 
deudas hubiesen sido por ellas consentidas. Mas en el Ducado de 
J)eux Pouts y en la parte del Palatinado del Rbin que adquiria la 
Francia i)or el Tratado con Baviera, no liabia a(iuella instituci(')n de 
Gobierno, y jior esto conviuo el Primer C('>iisul. en e! Tratado de ISOl 
que las deudas de estos paises ])asarian con ellos, con tal ([ue hubiesen 
sido registradas en su origen i)or sus Autoridades administrativas 
superiores. 

Segini la tcsis coiitraria ii esta doctriiia si llegara a desa]>arecer el 
K'giiiien autociiitico de la Pusia actual, el pueblo ruso podria dejar de 
cumj)lir todas las obligaciones (jue sus Enii)eradores, niientras aquel 
rvgiiiien subsista, liayan contraido y contraigan ]>ara el rc'gimen y 
gobierno de su Imperio. Los misinos l<jstados ITnidos, que, de seguro 
continuaron observando desde su emancipacion muclios de los prcceptos 
legislativos acordados antes sin su intervencichi, ])or el poder de su 
]\Ietro])oli, tendi ian (]ue devolver ;i la Rusia el Alaska que les vendio 
el Em))orador en l.SOT sin liaber intervenido en la venta los liabitantes 
de la region veiidida; como tendrian (pie devolver ii Espafia la Florida, 
]ior identica raz(')n, etc. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 71 

Si para que sea iegitima uua deuda es iiecesario que al crearla inter- 
venga por si unsmo el pueblo que la ha de pagar, cuaudo las leyes no 
le dau tal iutervencioii, cou mucha mas razou liabia de ser uecesaria la 
intervenciou de uu pueblo cuaudo su ttoberano veudiese el territorio que 
aquel habita. 

La propia actual cesiou de la soberania de las Antillas estaria viciada 
de uulidad ya que los pueblos cubano y pueitoriijueiio uo fueron cou- 
sultados iii prestarou liasta aliora su expreso y formal aseutimiento al 
Protocolo de Washiugtou. He abi las cousecueucias de la teoiia (jue 
bajo el calor de la discusion se halla expuesta en el Memorandum de los 
Sefiores Comisarios Ameiicanos. 

Precisameiite el punto que limita mas la libertad de contratacion de 
los Soberanos, en la celebracion de los tvatados, es el relativo a las deu- 
das de sus Estados. Sobie la integridad de su territorio y aun sobre su 
Ijropio bonor puedeu libre y Yalidaineute coutratar porque contratau 
sobre lo que es suyo. Pero carecen de esta libertad cuaudo sus actos 
repercuteu iumediatameute en los legitimos derecbos privados de 
aquellos particulares que, al amparo de las leyes los babian legitima- 
mente adquirido, sin que despui s bayau tenido iuterveucion alguua en 
los confiictos que en los tratados se resuelven, ni tengan por lo tanto 
que iudebidameute sufrir sus consecuencias en perjuicio de sus privados 
y legitimos iutereses. 

Los a<-reedores de un Estado, cuaudo con ;1 contratau tieuen siempre 
rauy en cuenta las eondicioues de solvencia del Estado a quien prestan 
su fortuna. Por esto, cuaudo estas eondicioues de solvencia decrecen 
por efecto de cesiones territoriales, las Altas Partes entre (iuiencs median 
estas, asi las que bacen la cesion como las que adquieren lo cedido, pro- 
curan siempre res])eta)' en su integridad aijuellos derecbos ]jor medio 
del reparto de las obligaciones, entre el territorio conservado por el Sobe- 
rano cedente y el territorio adquirido por el Soberano cesionario. Esto 
es lo que ba venido baciendose en los Tratados de cesion territorial. 

Mas cuaudo los acreedores ban adquirido por el propio titulo de su 
contrato un derecbo directo sobre ciertos y determinados bienes 6 ciertas 
y determinadas rentas para reintegrarse con ellos del capital prestado 
y de sus legitimos iutereses, el Hoberano no puede despu' s, sin contar 
previamente cou su asentimien.to. ceder ui dispouer libremente, como 
si fuerau de su exclusivo y pleno dominio de aquellos bienes y rentas. 

Si uu Soberano se prestara a cometer un atropello semejante de 
derecbos (jue no son suyos, no por eso aquellos a quieues tales derecbos 
correspoudan tendran el deber de resignarse y qaedarau privados de 
reciamar en nonibre de los principios sagrados que amparan la pro- 
piedad ])rivada. el respeto ;; lo suyo, contra quien quiera que sea en 
cuyo poder se balle aquello que legitimameute les pertenece. 

Y bueno es, cou este motivo, bacer formalmente coustar, que aun en 
la hipotesis de que no fuese aceptable el principio que sostieue la 
Comisiou espafiola y que combate la Americana, a saber que la deuda 
colonial no debe quedar ;'i cargo de la Metropoli, esto nunca jiodria sig- 
nificar que Espana hubiese de contraer abora respecto a los tenedores 
de esa deuda mas obliga<'ioues que las que coutrajo al crearla. Y por 
lo tauto; respecto a aquella parte de la deuda en que no coutrajo mas 
que uua obligacion subsidiaria de pago, por baberse cousignado en su 
emisio]! una liipoteca expresa sobre ciertas y determinadas rentas y 
productos, Espana tendra el derecbo de no considerarse nunca obligada 
por tal contrato, con arreglo a derecbo, a pagar tal deuda, sino cuaudo 
despues de baberse destiuado a su pago en primer termino las rentas y 
productos bipotecados resultaran estos insulicientes, pues basta entonces 



72 TREATY OF PEACE. 

110 sei'i'i exigible, seguii las reglas elenieiitales del derecbo, la obligacion 
siibsidiaria que contrajo. 

iSiu deteuerse la Comisicm espafiola lioy sobre las noticias muchas 
iiiexactas. que sobre la dendaeubana se leen en el Memorandum ameri- 
cauo, se limitar;! ;i alirniar ([ue la Isla de Cuba no cubrio, por regla 
general, desde su descubrimiento, sus pro[>ios gastos. 

^lientras I'.spafia conservo las colonias auierieauas, vino la Isla soste- 
nieiidosec.on los auxilios pecuuiarios desus herniauas, y senaladameute 
de los del Mrreinatode Mc'Jieo. En este siglo, durante muy ])Ocos afios 
tll^■o sobrantes, nierced al desarroUo de su natural riciue/a obtenida al 
fin con a(iuellos recursos, y estos sobrantes es cierto que eutraron en el 
Tesoro de la Peninsula. Mas apesar de ellos es lo cierto (jue en la cuenta 
general del Estado espailol, de ISIMJ a 1)7 aparece el Tesoro de la Penin- 
sula con anticipos a Cuba en los afios anteriores de la epoca moderua, 
por valor de 4:1-*9,()02,0]3.0S pesetas, asi conio aparecen tambien adelau- 
tados a Puerto liico 3,220,488.67 pesetas y a Santo DoDiingo l,ob7,lG1.69 
pesetas. 

La prosi)eridad de Cuba fue de corta duraciou, durante la mayor 
parte del tiempo trauscurrido desde los tiempos de Cobm, ya por la 
escasez de sus liabitantes, ya por ia servidumbre de la raza negra que 
formaba la mayoria, y ya, en tiii, porque los espanoles pretirieran 
colonizar otras partes de America, no pudo la Isla desarollar sus^riquezas 
iiaturales, y, sin embargo, bubo que venir gastando constantemeute en 
ella las grandes sunias que exigia el planteamieuto de las reformas y la 
creacion de los estableciniientos que son condicion esencial de la vida 
moderna. 

La Comision espafiola no puede menos de protestar contra la afirma- 
cion que en el Memorandum americano se hace, de que la insurreccion 
de los diez afios fue producto de caiisas /?<-s/rt.v. Y lameuta que sin una 
necesidad que lo reclamara de un modo indeclinable tal atirmacion se 
baya consignado, como la Comision americana, seguramente y con 
razon lamentaria que la espafiola consignase aqui sin necesidad que lo 
exigiera, la justicia de las rebeliones de los aborigeues del inmenso 
territorio americano que los Estados Uiiidos tuvieron que sofocar tantas 
veces con mano ferrea y que asimismo consignase el derecbo a cuyo 
amparo los Estados del Siir babian querido romper por las armas el 
lazo federal. 

Es inutil, por lo que luego se dira, que la Comision espafiola seocupe 
concretamente de los capitulos de la deuda cubana a que se rebere el 
Memorandum americano. Compreuden los errores que bayan podido 
cometerse en este documento, porijue es muy natural que los Sefiores 
Coiiiisarios americanos no conozcan con toda lai)recisi6n que serequiere 
para Juzgarlos con acierto, los actos de la xVdministracion espafiola, ni 
en la Peninsula, ni en sus colonias. 

\ esto aparece ademas conlirmado ])or los becbos. 

Sobre la raz('»n que se cree que bay contra parte de la deuda cubana 
en la pretendida Justicia de la rebelion de una minoria de a(|uel pueblo 
leclaniando su iiide]>endeiu'ia, solo harenu)S laobservacion signiente: 

La minoria insurrecta, es verdad, se levanto en armas en demanda de 
la independencia de la isla. Ijos Estados IJnidos equivocadameute 
creyeron que su causa era justa y se la impusieron con las armas a 
Espana. Mas abora resulta (|ue l^]si)aHa tenia razon, porque los i)ropios 
Estados Unidos recoTU)cen (|ue atiueliuieblo notiene aun lascondicioiies 
ne(;esarias para gozar desde liiego de su ])lena libertad y soberania, y por 
esto estan resueltos a no otorgarsela y a retener en ella su dominio, basta 
(|ue el i)ueblo cubano pueda gozar de esa libertad prematuramente 
reclamada. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 73 

La Coruision Espanola esta ademsis eu el caso de llauiar la ateiiciou 
sobre las oblig:acioues de Puerto Eico. El nieuiorandum a que contesta, 
se refiere unicameute a las de Cuba; ^„es que se cree que a pesar de 
que la soberania de la pequeua Autilla uo es renuuciada, siuo cedida 
por Espaua a los Estados Unidos, debe tambieu pasar libre de toda 
carga a su poder? ^Es que se asienta el i)riiicipio de que las cesiones 
de territorio, cualquiera que sea la causa <iue las produzca, auuque esta 
fuera la conijuista, y mucho mas siendo esta causa puramente conveu- 
cioual, uo llevau ipso facto en si uiismas las cargas que afecteu al terri- 
torio cedidof 

En la discusion oral, los Sres Comisarios Americanos indicaron 
que el gobierno Espanol habia declarado (jue sobre la pequeila Autilla 
no existia deuda alguua. Los Comisarios Espafioles liau registrado 
cuidadosameute todas las negociacioues escritas que mediarou eutre las 
dos Altas partes, desde el ultimatum del Sr. Presidente de la Union 
de 20 Abril de este afio, liasia la firma del protocolo en Washington, 
eu 12 de Agosto del mismo. Eu ninguna de ellas hallaron indicaciones 
ni vestigios de tal declaracion. Y dicho sea de paso, entre otras obli- 
gaciones, pesa desde bace muchisimos anos sobre la pequeua Autilla, 
una parte (pie auuque exigua, no es menos sagrada, de la carga perpetua 
y verdaderauieute de justicia, con que Espaua mas ({ue eu su nombre 
eu el de America, bavenido demoustrando su gratitud al inmortal Colon 
que la descubri<') y a sus legitimos descendientes, y fiue la Ltgica llevaria 
a los Estados Unidos a repudiar para que continuara pag;iudola Espafia, 
si hubieran de prevalecer las couclusiones de la Comi8i(')u, de aquellos. 

Mas es el caso que la discusion sobre la deuda llamada de Cuba uo 
parece teuer oportuuidad eu estos momentos. 

Los Seiiores Comisarios Americanos al ocuparse de los capitulos priuci- 
pales de tal deuda, creyeron siu duda que la Comisiou espanola proponia 
en su proyecto que desde luego fueseu aquellos admitidos como deuda 
colonial, para pasar con la soberania ;i Cuba, <> :i los Estados Unidos. Y 
este es el capital error sobre que descansa su memorandum. Los Comi- 
sarios Espauoles uo propouen siuo ([ue se cousigue en el Tratado un priu- 
cipio basta aliora siempre reconcido, a saber, (jue con una colouia pasa la 
deuda que le es peculiar y afecta a su territorio. Contra este priucipio, 
nada se dice en el Memorandum Americano. Ni esjjcra la Comisiou 
Espanola que se diga a lo meuos por los Estados Unidos, cuyo territorio 
fue por ellos adijuirido, uo solo con su saugre, siuo tambien con el dinero 
de sus cajas. Hoy uo faltau publicistas que afirmen que por los trece 
primeros Estados satisficierou a su Metropoli quince milloues de libras 
esterlinas. Y" sou hechos oficiales que ])or la Louisiana, por la Florida, 
por los Estados Indies, por Texas, por California y por el Alaska se 
pagarou a Fraucia, Espaua, India, Rusia y Mexico fuertes sumas. Esta 
vez seria la primera eu que los Estados Unidos, contra sus propias tra- 
diciones, adfjuirieran gratuitamente territories que anexionar pronto 6 
tarde a la Union. 

El caso de la adquisicion de Texas, tan idrutico en su origen, en sus 
procedimieutos y en su termino al actual de la Isla de Cuba, prueba de 
uu modo barto elocuente cuan distinta es la politica que eutouces siguio 
el gobierno de Washington cou Mexico, de la que ahora quiere seguir 
con el Gabiuete de Madrid. Eutouces sus armas empleadas tambien 
en apoyo de los insuirectos de Texas, se extendieron por la Repiiblica 
mexicana, llegaudo a apoderarse de la propia capital, lo que no ha suce- 
dido ahora; eutouces exigieron de Mexico la independeucia de Texas, 
como ahora de Espana la de Cuba, y ademas la cesiou del Nuevo Mrxico^ 
y de California, como ahora exigieron la de Puerto Eico y demas Au til- 
las Espaiiolas. Pero entonces pagarou a Mexico sin exigirle indemni- 



7-t- TREATY O!'^ PEACE. 

zacion de guerra, el valor de los territorios que se aiiexionaban, y tomaron 
ademiis a sii car^o la indemiiizacicm de los Ohidadanos Americanos por 
aquella Republii;;! pcijr.dicudas. Hoy haii exigido a Espana por una 
indenini/acion an;iloi;a y por gastos de guerra, la cesion de las islas 
sobrediclias, y (piiereu adeiuas que las cargas de estas islas y de sa 
iierniana la grande Antilla (pieden a cargo de la Metropoli, que las 
introdujo por su uiaiio en el niuudo civilizado. 

Lo que proponen los Comisarios Espauoles es iinicamente el recono- 
cimieuto de este principio, porque su ejecuciou eutieudeu que debe 
quedar despui's a cargo de una Coniision de personas rectas c iuipar- 
ciales. iSi esta, reconociendo la cuenta que Espana presente de las 
obligaciones que entiende (jue dcben ser a cargo de Cuba y de Puerto 
Rico, dc'claran (pie deben ser a cargo de la Metropoli, Espafia se con- 
forniar;i. Pero si declaran (pie todas 6 algunas deben ser a cargo de la 
Cokniia, no hay razon para que los Estados Unidos no presten en tal 
caso tanibien su aseutimiento. Si tan seguros estan de su derecho, no 
pueden rehusar lo que la Oomisirui Espanola propone, ya que uinguu 
peligro les oliece. Y si no lo estuvieran, su alta Justificacion y el 
respecto que se tienen a si juisnios, les imponeu el deber de subordinar 
un inter/s pecuniario a la caut^a sagrada de lajusticia. 

Y para deniostrar la Coniision Espafiola a la americana que el pensa- 
miento sobredicho es el iiuico que abriga, y que por lo tauto no intenta 
abora (pie se recouozca el ])ago de cantidad alguna determinada como 
obligaciiMi colonial de cual(]iiiera de las Antillas, no tieue reparo en 
sustituir el articulo U" que liabia presentado y en suprimir el 4" y 5" 
reemplazaudo los tres por el siguiente: 

"Akticulo -J". — La reuuncia y transferencia que liace Su Majestad 
Cat()lica y que aceptau los Estados Unidos de America, comprende: 

"1. Cuantas prerrogativas, atribucioues y dereclios corres])ondau a 
Su Majestad Catolica, como parte desu soberania sobre la Isla de Cuba 
y sus habitautes. 

"2. Cuantas cargas y obligaciones pecimiarias i)eudientes al ratiti- 
carse este Tratado de j)az, que pievio un minucioso examen de su origen, 
objeto y condiciones de su creacichi, debau reputarse, segiin derecbo 
estricto ('* iunegable equidad, distintas de las (pie son prupias y peculia- 
res del Tesoro de la Peninsula j^or ser y baber sido siempre propias y 
peculiares do Cuba, 

"Para bacer el riguroso examen que se j>res(^;ribe en el p;irrafo ante- 
rior, se nombrarii i)or las dosAltas Partes Contratantes una Consision 
de ])ersonas competentes v imparciales segim se determinara eu el 
articulo corresx)ondiente de este Tratado." 

Kespecto del 13' parrafo del articulo 3" del proyecto espanol, A los 
Sres Comisarios Americanos no les parece aceptable la excepci(')n de 
los bienes patrinionialcs del Estado que en e] se establecia. Seguu el 
derecbo administrativo espafiol, el Estado ejerce las i'acultades del 
(lominio sobre todos los bienes que la ley espanola declara de dominie 
publico. Estos claro es que van comprendidos en la cesi<')n de la sobe- 
rania. Mas en Es})ar!a el Estado puede tambien adquirir y conservar 
como persona Juridica bienes inmu(^.bles por los misnu)s titulos (pie el 
dereclio civil establece para, los ])arti('ulares. Estos eran los que se 
exceptuaban en la cesi(')n. No obstante lo que se acaba de decir, para 
deniostrar una vez mas la Comisi<')n Espanola su deseo de transacci('»n y 
de i>az, i'enuiu;ia a esta excepci'ui y]>asa portjuesean tambi(''n compren- 
didos dicbos bienes patrimoniales del l^stado en la cesion y reuuncia 
de su soberania en las Antillas. 

Las (1<Mii;!s excepcioues consignadas en aquel articulo no puede creer 



TREATY OF PEACE. 75 

la Coniision espanola que dejeii de ser aceptadas por la americana. Esta 
en sn proyecto hablaba solo de la propiedad individual. Pero no igiioran 
ciertanieute los HonorablesmdividuosdelaComision Americana, y hasta 
seria ofeuder su grande ilnstracion el supoiierlo, que adeuias del indi- 
viduo hay otras peisonas juridicas en el seno de todas las sociedades 
civiles, que sou capaces,' por las leyes, de adquirir y couservar la 
propiedad mueble e inmueble. Las sociedades mercautiles e indus- 
triales, las de dereclio tomuu civil, los establicimieutos publicos coino 
los de beueticeucia o enseuauza, etc. pueden eu Espana y sus Colonias 
ad(juirir y couservar la propiedad sobredicha, que esta al amparo de las 
mismas leyes que rijen y protegen la propiedad individual. Pues a la 
propiedad de estas persouas juridicas, conocida vu]g:arineute con el 
nombre de propiedad corporativa, porque no es un iudividuo sino una 
corpitracion el duefio, se refieren todas las excepcioues compreudidas en 
el segundo p:irrafo del art." -H" del proyecto espafiol. 

En el cuarto parratb del niisino artfculo tambieu ban llamado la aten- 
ciou de los Senores Comisarios Americauos respecto alaentiega de los 
Archivos, las frases que tieiien por objeto uiauifestar que los I^^stados 
Uuidos dispoudran de ellos con los misnios derechos y obligaciones con 
que liasta abora ban estado a disposicion del Gobernio espaiiol. La 
explicacidn de estas frases es muyobvia: el Estado mas que dueno 
absoluto de los Archivos publicos, es su dej)Ositario y couservador, asi 
es que no puede destruirlos ni enajenarlos, ni privar a los ciudadanos 
del uso que necesiteu hacer de los documentos en ellos conteuidus para 
la defeiisa de sus derechos. i Puede el Estado destruir el Eegistro l^ivil 
donde consta el estado civil f'e cada ciudadano? -Puede destruir el 
Eegistro de la i)ropiedad donde (-onstan los titulos de dominio del patri- 
moiiio de cada cual ? Ciertamente no; pues eso es lo unico que se dice 
en tales frases. Los Estados Uuidos podran disponer de los Archivos 
como podna dispouer (d (Tobierno espanol, pero nada nnis que este 
derecho puede este Gobieruo trasmitirles, porque ninguu otro mas 
tiene sobie ellos. 

A uiayor abundamiento y para que no ofrezL-a v. la Comision Ameri- 
cana duda alguna el sentido del pensamiento de la Espanola, esta sus- 
tituye el articulo 3" (jue tenia presentado con el que presenta ahora, en 
el que, ademas de suprirair la excepcion de los bienes patrinioiiiales del 
Estado, aclara los couceptos que parecieron dudosos a la Comision 
americana sobre los Archivos y sus papeles. He aqui su texto. 

"ARTICULO 3". 

"En cum])limiento de lo convenido en los dos articulos anteriores, 
S. M. Catdlica, en la representaci(')n con que celebra este Tratado, 
renuncia y tvanstiere a los Estados Unidos todos los editicios, muelles, 
cuarteles, fortalezas, estableciinientos, vias publicas y demas bieues 
inuiuebles que con arreglo a 1 )erecho son de dominio publico, y que como 
de tal dominio publico corresjiondeu ;i la Corona de Espana en la Isla 
de CuV)a. 

Quedan ])or lo tauto exceptnados de esta renuncia y transferencia 
todos los derechos y bienes de cualquiera clase que scan que, hasta la 
ratillcacion del presenteTratado,hayan veuido pacilicamenteposeyendo, 
en concepto de dueilos, las Provincias, municipios, Estableoimientos 
publicos o privados, corporaciones eclesiasticas 6 civiles y cualesquiera 
otras colectividades que tengau legalmente personalidad juridica para 
adquirir y poseer bienes en la Isla de Cuba, y los particulares, cualquiera, 
fpie sea su nacionalidad. 



76 TREATY OF PExVCE. 

"S. M, Catiilica reiumcia tainbieu y transfiere a los Estados TJuidos, 
a quieu se le eutregarau por el gobieniO'Espafiol, todos los docu- 
mentos y titulos que se relieran exclusivamente a la soberaiifa 
traiisfeiida y aceptada, y a todos sus dereclios, que existau eu los 
Aivliiv(»s de la Peninsula. Habiendo de facilitarle copias cuando los 
Estados Tnidos las reclamasen, de la parte correspondiente a dicha 
sobeiania ([ue contengan los deuias docunientosy titulos que se retierau 
adeuijis ;i otros asuntos distintos de la Isla de Cuba y de su soberauia 
y dereclios, (lue existau eu los mencionados Arcbivos. Una regla 
aualoga habra reci[)rocaniente deobservarse a favor de Espana respecto 
a los docunieutos y titulos ageuos en todo 6 en parte a la Isla de Cuba, 
que se balleu actualmente eu sus Archivos y que iuteresen al Gobieruo | 
espanol. 

Todos los Archiv^os y Eegistros Oficiales, asi adraiuistrativos come 
judiciales, (pie estiin a disposiciou del (lobieruo de EspaHa y de sus 
Autoridades en la Isla de Cuba, y que se reileran a la misnia isla 6 a 
sus habitantes y a sus dereclios y bienes, quedaran siu reserva de uiii- 
guuo de esta clase a disposiciou de los Estados Unidos para que los 
couserven 6 dispongan de ellos con las mismas facultades que liasta 
abora ban tenido sobre los mismos elGobieruo espanol y sus Autoridades. 

Los particulares, asi espanoles coino cubanos, tendran derecho a 
sacar, con arreglo a las leyes, las copias autorizadas de los contratos, 
testaiueutos y dem:is docunieutos que formau parte de los protocolos 
uotariales 6 que se custodien en los Arcbivos Administrativos y judi- 
ciales, bien estos se halleu en Espana 6 en la Isla de Cuba." 

Eu el articulo vi del proyecto espanol no se consignaba la causa de 
la cesiiui que liace Espana a los Estados Unidos de la Isla de Puerto 
Eico y denias Autillas y de la de Guam en las Marianas. Y sin 
embargo, esta causa esta expresamente consiguada en el ya citado 
despacbo del Secretario de Esrado en Wasbington, contestaudo al 
meusaje del gobieruo Espanol. Eu <d despucs de uianifestarse que el 
Senor Presidente de la liepublica no reclamaba una indeinnizacion 
pecuniaria por la guerra para dar ])rueba de una senalada geuerosidad, 
se lee el siguieute parrafo: "Sin embargo no puede i)ermaiiecer insensi- 
ble a las perdidas y a los g'astos ocasionados por la guerra, ni a las 
reclamaciones de nuestros conciudadauos con motivo de los danos y 
perjuicios (pie ban sufrido en sus personas y bieues durante la ultima 
insurrecci(')U de Cuba. 

"En consecueucia esta obligado a pedir la cesi('>n a los Estados 
Unidos y la evacuaci('>n iumediata por Espana de Puerto Eico y de las 
dein;is islas que se ballau actualmente bajo la soberania de Espana eu 
las Indias Occidentales, asi como la cesicin en las Ladrones de una Isla 
designada por los Estados Unidos." 

Estos designanm la Isla de Guam. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles sustituyen el articulo vi de su anterior 
proyecto con el (pie aliora i)resentan, bacieudo constar la causa de la 
cesi(')n. La C(miisi()n Americana es bien seguro (pie en este punto 
estar;i conforme con la I^spafiola iiara que en el Tratado no aparezcau 
los Estados l^nidos adquiriendo gratuitamente aijuellas Islas. 

Ut- aqui el articulo. 

"Articulo iv. 

^ "En compensaci(')n de las ix'rdidas y gastos ocasionados ;'i los Estados 
Unidos ])or la guerra, y a las reclamaciones de sus conciudadauos con 
motivo de los danos y perjuicios <pie bubiesen sufrido en sus personas 
y bienes durante la ultima insureccion de Cuba Su Majestad Cat(31ica, 
en nombre y representacion de Espana y constitucionalmeute autori- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 77 

zada por las Cortes del Keino, cede a los Estados Unidos de America 
y estos aceptan para si inismos, la Isla de Puerto Rico y las otras Islas 
que actualmeute estau bajo la Soberauia Espaiiola en las Indias Occi- 
deutales, asi como la Isla de (xnam en el Archipii'lago de las Marianas 
6 Ladroiies, que fu(^ elegida i)or los Estados Unidos de Ann'rica en 
virtud de lo convenido en el articulo _!" del Protocolo lirmado en 
Washington el 11* de Agosto iiltinio." 

Eespecto al articnlo 7" del proyecto, la Comision Espanola eutiende 
por cnanto va dicho en este Memorandum, que debe sostenerlo sin otra 
variante que la indispensable para ponerlo en relacion con los nuevos 
articulos que se presentan. 

Quedara pnes i-edactado en la forma siguiente: 

V. 

"Esta eesi('>n de la soberania sob re el territorio y liabitantes de 
Puerto Rico y las denias Islas nienciouadas se entiende que consiste en 
la cesion de los derechos y obligaciones, bienes y documentos relativos 
d la soberania de dicbas Islas, iguales a los que respecto a la renuncia 
y transferencia de la soberania de la Isla de Cuba, se definen en los 
Articulos anteriores." 

En resumen, de todo resulta que la unica cuestion que basta abora 
existe y aguarda una resolueitin de ambas Comisiones, est:1 reducida a 
una cuestion pe(;uniaria de importancia relativamente secundaria ])ara 
una de las Altas Partes Contratantes, la de la Beuda Colonial. 

Y entienden los Comisarios Espanoles que no es posible que una cnes- 
tion de esta indole pueda dejar de tener una solucion satisfactoria, ya 
que media entre i)artes la una el mas grande Estado del Nuevo Mundo, 
inmensamente rico y prospero, con inagotables recursos con que le dota 
la naturaleza y la prodigiosa actividad de sus babitantes, y el cual 
adquiere adennis por este Tratado territorios de grande importancia, 
realizando asi una aspiracicni de su politica en Amf-rica, y la otra una 
grande y noble nacion del aiitiguo, cordial amiga de aquel en dias para 
ella mas prosperos, pero empobrecida boy por las desgracias que sobre 
ella lia acumulado el sigio que termina, con un Tesoro cargado de obli- 
gaciones y a la cual este Tratado se reserva la confirmacion solemne de la 
pcrdida de los ultimos restos del Imperio Americano, cuyo descubri- 
micnto bizo posible la existencia de aquella gran Republica, y que ade- 
mas con <''l tanto enriquecio al mundo moderno, a costa quizas de su 
propio bienestar y del desarrollo que tenia derecbo i\ esperar de sus 
grandes elementos de riqueza acumnlados y no explotados en su seno, 
por dedicar preferente su atencion a Colonias, que como otros seres en el 
orden de la naturaleza a quienes su raadre dedica sus desvelos, ba criado 
y sostenido a costa de su propio bienestar. 

Est4 conforme: 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



[Translation.] 

Annex to Peotoool ISTo. 9. 

[Memorandum.] 



It is with deep regret that the Spanish Commissioners have thor- 
oughly acquainted themselves with the memorandum presented by tbe^ 
American Commissioners at the last session, held on the 17th instant. 



78 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In this document the said gentlemen, relying- upon assertions and views 
to the accnracy of which tlie Spanish Commission (;annot subscribe, 
despite the upriglit intention with which it doubts not they were 
expressed, end by sayini!,' that they substitute for the draft of the two 
articles relating; to Cuba and the other islands, which they presented 
at the session of the 3rd instant, two otlier articles which are limited to 
literally copying the two (irst articles of the Protocol of Washington, 
alleging in this behalf tliat they understand that the treaty of ]»eace, 
so far as it refers to the soveieignty of the West Indies and the Island 
of (luam in the Marianas, should contain neither more nor less than a 
literal re]>roduction of those two articles. 

lint as these already form a part of a binding agreement, which the 
Protocol of Washington is, it seems useless merely to reproduce them 
in the treaty which is to be elaborated in the conference. Contracts, 
private as well as international, are perfect and produce all their effects 
for the parties executing them without the necessity of any subsequent 
contirmatiou, which can in no wise increase their eflicacy. Therefore, 
this reproduction, if the treaty of peace relating to the West Indies is 
to be thus limited, as the American Commissioners desire, seems to be 
redundant. 

If this consideration is pure reason or even mere common sense, the 
proposal of the American Commissioners can only be comprehended on 
the supposition that the latter understand that the treaty, apart from 
any provision of a secondary character that may be included therein, 
should relate only to the Philippine Archipelago. 

If such is the thought of the American Comndssion, the Spanish 
Commission cannot assent thereto, because it understands that its exe- 
cution would be an infraction of the Protocol. 

After the three conditions which the Secretary of State at Washing- 
ton, rei)lying on .inly 30 last to the message of the Government of Her 
Catholic Majesty of the 22nd of the said month, proposed to Spain for 
the termination of the war, he said: "If the terms hereby offered are 
acce])ted in their entirety commissioners will be named by the United 
States to meet similarly authorized commissioners on the part of Spain 
for the purjjose of settling the details oj' the treaty of peace and signing 
and deliveriig it under the terms above indicated." These details do 
not ai)})ear to be circumscribed to the archipelago. 

The very President of the American Republic in the conference he 
held on xVugust 10 with the Ambassador of France, representing Spain 
for the time being, made an absolute distinction between the Protocol 
and tlie treaty of ])eace, stating that the former should only be a mere 
prelhninaru docioneitt which shoukl have no object or effect other than 
to record without any delay the agreement of the two Governments 
upon tliepn'»ci2>/6\v themselves of the peace, and that, therefore, it would 
not be necessary to reserve therein either the rights of the Cortes or 
those of the Federal Seimte, who were charged on!}- with the ratification 
of thejinal treaty. 

The President, it is true, spohe of the Philii)pine question to state 
that it was reserved for tlie Paris conference; but he never said, or 
even intimated, that this subject sliould be the only one to be treated 
by this conference. 

And, linally, in Article V of the Protocol, framed in harmoTiy with 
all these antecedents, it is said that the Commissioners named by both 
High Parties were to i)roceed to Paris to negotiate and conchide a 
treaty af peace, without linuting or restricting their object, and, on the 
contrary, employing a phrase the evident meaning of which is that the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 79 

ti^eaty of peace to be elaborated by the Commission should settle all 
questions at the time pending between the two states which were not 
already settled in the preliminary agreement of the Protocol, 

It is true that the American Commissioners base their last draft on 
the ground that everything relating to the Spanish Antilles is already 
settled in the Protocol. But this argument is precisely the one to 
which thpi Spanish Commissioners from the very first conference have 
not been able and are now unable to assent. 

The Americans in tlieir memorandum of the 11th of this month stated 
that the Spanish Commissioners placed conditions to the relinquish- 
ment of sovereignty over Cuba in their proposal. A very serious error. 
In that proposal the absolute and unconditional character of such 
relinquishment is not disregarded; all that is done therein is to lay 
down what this relinquishment consists of. And this is essentially 
different from what the American Commissioners understand. 

And that, in fact, tiie articles of the draft of the Spaniards have for 
sole object the establishing of the meaning of the relinquishment, but 
not to subject it to conditions, is demonstrated by the very object of 
the oral and written discussions which have been taking place between 
the two sides. 

The American Commissioners understand that the only meaning 
which can be given to the relinquishment of the sovereignty agreed upon 
in the Protocol is that of the abandonment of this sovereignty, to deduce 
tlierefrom that Spain should abandon the Island of Cuba just as any 
power may abandon a desert territory in Africa which it might for- 
merly have possessed. 

Although the Spanish Commission distinguishes between the legal 
meaning of the word ahandonment and that of the word rdiiupiishmeiit, 
it would not engage in this technical discussion (imj^roper in a diplo- 
matic conference) were it not for the fact that the American Commis- 
sion urges its opinion as the principal ground for its claim that through 
such supposed abandonment all legal bond is severed and no new one 
grows out of the act, as between Spain and the United States, upon 
the latter taking possession of the island either in their own name and 
for themselves, or in the name of and for the Cuban people. 

But this claim, unexampled in the diplomatic annals of the world, 
cannot be admitted by the Spanish Commissioners, who make a part 
hereof of all that they set forth in the lirst section of the memorandum 
they presented in reply to the draft of articles of the American Com- 
mission, and they add the following brief observations which are sug- 
gested to them by the two memoranda lately presented by the latter 
Commission: 

The Spanish Commission passes over the citation made in support of 
its oi)inion by the American Commission from the Diccionario de 
Escriche, which is certainly a very respectable work, but whose only 
object is the exposition of the practical principles of private municipal 
law, a very popular exposition in Spain, it is true, as it serves as a 
mentor for young lawyers in the early period of their professional life, 
but which is absolutely foreign to the science of international and 
public law. 

Cases of abandonment in the sense claimed are not recorded in the 
modern history of peoples save those of desert territories, or at best, 
populated by the barbarous tribes of Africa. An abandonment of a 
true state already formed, existing for centuries, with a complete social 
and political organization and peopled with inhabitants who enjoy an(J 
have the right to enjoy all the benefits of modern civilization, has never 



80 TREATY OF PEACE. 

been known up to the present time, and the Spanish Commissioners do 
not boliexe there is such a case in the world. Abandoned territories 
are lejiitimately occupied by tlie state desiring to establish its sov- 
ereignty therein. J>ut this merely dc facto occupation does not impose 
ui)on the occupant duties other than those performed in the regions of 
Africa by the I*hiro[)eau i)()wers with regard to barbarous tribes peo- 
pling or ovcrruuniiig them. Does the American Commission believe 
that the United States, as occupants of the Island of Cuba (since this 
is the oidy condition upon which, according to the view they defend, 
they are to take i)ossession of it,) are to have no duties with respect to 
the inhabitants of the Great Antillian Isle other than those performed 
with regard to those degraded human beings? 

We are fully satisfied that such is not the thought of the American 
Commissioners, but their insistence in denying all difference in law 
between the effects of abandonment and the effects of relinquishment, 
inevitably leads to this conclusion. 

And this, notwithstanding the assertion of the American Commis- 
sioners in their last memorandum to the effect that the United States 
will afford the inhabitants of Cuba and their property all the protection 
they may need, as they have been doing in the small portion of territory 
of the island occupied by force of arms. J)o the United States believe 
that they ought not to recognize more rights in Spain upon her relin- 
quishing her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba and its inhabitants 
than they or any other power would hasten to recognize in the most 
unfortunate of the African tribes whose territory they were taking? 
But aside from the fact that they themselves do not attribute to this 
obligation, wliich they say they have, more than the right to be pos- 
sessors of the island, it is also true that the said Commissioners do not 
lend themselves to this or any other obligation of the United States 
being recorded in the treaty, which, as they demand, must be limited to 
the reproduction of the two first articles of the Protocol. Therefore, 
this obligation, which in the memorandum they say they contract, will 
not be enforcea.ble, as it is not in the treaty; and without any intention 
to offend the United States, logic absolutely precludes the denial of the 
possibility of there hai)pening, more or less, in this connection that 
which happened with resj)ect to the obligations which the United States 
spontaneously contracted in the negotiations leading up to the Protocol 
and which, notwithstanding this, the American Commissioners decline 
to have ai)i)ear in the treaty. 

The Congress of the United States m its Joint Eesolution and the 
President of the Union in his ultimatum to Spain could have demanded 
of the lafter nation (although it is useless to state that Spain would 
not ha\e acceded to so harsh a demand) the absolute abandonment 
of her sovereignty over Cuba in the sense in which it is now demanded 
by the American Commissioners, as he could have also demanded its 
full cession to the United States free of all burdens. But the truth is 
that he did not demand it because he limited himself to claiming the 
relinciiiisliment of the sovereignty in order that the Cuban people 
might become free and indeijcndent, or, what is the same thing, the 
relinijuishment of the sovereignty in favor of the Cuban people, that 
they might become Iree and independent, although at the same time he 
demanded that this reliiKiaishment should be at the outset made in 
favor of the United States for that i)eoph> to whom the ITnited States 
were to give aid and guidance, as it was not otlierwise possible for the 
Island of Cuba to ])ass directly and immediately from the possession 
of Spain to that of the Cuban people, as it was to remain in the con- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 81 

trol of tlie United States iiutil the pacification of the island. It seems 
to us that the American Commissioners cannot fail to recognize this as 
strictly correct. 

And if such were the terms in which the United States expressed 
their demand, to wbich S])ain finally acceded without the former hav- 
ing previously modified them, it is as clear as the light of day that the 
agreement which is formulated in Article I of the Protocol (for no other 
was concluded between the two High I*arties) must necessarily be taken 
in the sense of the terms in which it was i)roi)Osed by one of the i^ar- 
ties and accepted by the other, and that it is not lawful for either of the 
parties now to alter those terms for the i)urpose of converting that 
relinquishment, demanded for a determinate purpose and following a 
procedure agreed upon, into an absolute abandonment, without the 
object and procedure stipulated, as the American Commission now 
contends should be done. 

Therefore what is to be set forth in the treaty is not the abandonment 
which the American Commission demands but rather the relinquishment 
agreed upon which the Sjianish Commission upholds. The case is 
analogous to many others which colonial powers have had to meet 
when they lost their sovereignty over all or a part of their colonies. 
Never did a colonial power abandon, in the sense it is now songht to 
nrge, a colony, that it might be converted into a new state, free and 
independent. When such a case arose, the mother country ceded or 
relinquished her sovereignty if the colony had not conquered it pre- 
viously by force of arms, but she never abandoned it in the sense 
referred to. If the American Commissioners are not in accord with 
this categorical assertion, we beg them to cite one case that will con- 
tradict it. 

The Spanish Commissioners also beg the American Commissioners to 
direct their calm and enlightened attention to the flagrant contradic- 
tion which stands out between their theory and the acts which the 
United States have been carrying into efl'ect. According to the Ameri- 
can Commission the only legal situation possible over the Island of 
Cuba between Spain on tlie one part and the United States for them- 
selves or in the name of the Cuban people on the other is the following: 
Spain must abandon the Island of Cuba. The United States after the 
abandonment are to take possession of the island for the Cuban peoi)le. 
And consequently the transit of the island from one situation to another 
must be made without establishing any legal bond between Spain and 
her former colonies and, for the latter, the United States. Very well; 
the forces of the United States conquered Santiago de Cuba and signed 
a capitulation with the Spanish military authorities. Jn this they did 
not demand that the forces of the mother country should abandon 
Santiago de Cuba, but that it should be delivered to the American 
authorities, an inventory being made which was signed by both parties, 
in which is recorded how much the one delivered and the other received. 
The American Commission which is in Havana, having been aj^tpointed 
pursuant to the j^rovisions of Article IV of the Protocol, demands that 
the Spanish Commission deliver over to it all that belongs to Spain in 
the exercise of her sovereignty as well in the civil branch as in the 
military ; and this pursuant to the express instructions of its Govern- 
ment; and it is unnecessary to state that this delivery must also be 
made with an inventory. 

In view of these facts is it possible to denj- to Spain, upon relinquish- 
ing her soverignity over Cuba, the right to demand that the United-, 
States have it delivered over to themselves? 
T P 6 



82 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Hut tliere is more than this: the American Commission, in spite of 
the theory it is ur<;in<i-, lias aceommodatod its first steps to the theory 
iir<;ed by the Spanish Commission. In tlie second paragraph of Article 
I which the former Commission presented on October ^, it calls the 
relin(|uishment of the sovereignty of Spain in Cuba a cession, not an 
aban(h)nment. And this cannot be explained as a simple inaccuracy 
in language, because in Article 11 it establishes what are to be the 
effects of the cession of the sovereignty of Porto Rico, and employs in 
establishing these effects the sanie, exactly the same, phrases which it had 
just em])l()yed in Article I to establish the effects of the relinquishment 
of the sovereignty in Cuba. A complete proof that the American Com- 
mission, notwithstanding the opinion it sustained in tlie heat of the 
debate with the Spanisli Commission on framing its lirst draft, under- 
stood that the eflects of the relinquishment of sovereignty w^ere the 
same, exactly the same, as those of a cessiou. 

And if it is argued that although the effects are the same, the relin- 
quishment, which the American Commission called abandonmeut, is 
distinguished from the cession in that the former is not made to any 
one who is to acquire the abandoned territory, whereas, on the con- 
trary, cession is made in favor of some one who is to acquire the ceded 
territory, the American Commissioners also failed to mark this differ- 
ence in their draft, for, speaking in both articles of the archives and 
other ])apers which were to be the object of the relinquishment or ces- 
sion, they saj^ the same thing in both, em]>loying the same phrases, 
that every certified copy of said document that might be requested by 
an officer of the Spanish Government should be issued to him at all 
times, and tliis is unintelligible save in the sense that there must be 
some one to issue such copy. And it will be impossible to issue it save 
by the one having in his possession the document to be coi^ied. And 
he who has not received it cannot have it in his possession. Conse- 
quently, when the American Commissioners established in Article I 
the rules relating to the delivery of the archives of the Island of Cuba 
they acted on the supposition that such delivery had to be made to 
some one. And this, and nothing more than this, is what they set down 
in Article II relating to the deliv^ery of the archives of the Island of 
Porto Kico. 

The American CommissioJi, in order to sustain its inadmissible opin- 
ion regarding the abandonment by Spain of the Island of Cuba, relies i 
on the difference W'hich appears in the Protocol itself They say that 
Spain agreed to cede only Porto Eico to the United States while she 
bound herself to relinqidsh the Island of Cuba. From this they deduce 
that the effects of the obligation of Spain with respect to one are 
broader than with resi)ect to the other. We have already proved by 
the very text of the draft of articles presented by the said gentlemen 
that when they drew it nj) they did not even perceive this ditterence 
in the effects with respect to Spain. The difference, nevertheless, is 
Avell umlerstood under another aspect. The United States made a 
demand on Spain and afterwards declared war on her that Cuba might 
become free and independent. And it is clear that having conquered 
they could not demand that the island be ceded to them, ignoring the 
liberty and indei)endence thereof, as this would give cause to the 
world to believe that such liberty and imlependence had not been 
the true cause of the couflict. They did not make the same demand 
regar<ling Porto Eico, and did subsecpiently claim the sovereignty of 
the latter island and of the others surrounding Cuba (which will ren- 
der impossible its independence without the will and gracious consent 



TREATY OF PEACE. 83 

of the United States, which will always have it at their mercy owiDg 
to their control over the islands surrounding it like a band of iron) in 
the way of indemnity for the ex[)eiises of the war and of the damages 
which they said American citizens had suffered during the colonial 
insurrection. This is the natural explanation of why in the Protocol 
the sovereignty of one island appears as relinquished and that of the 
others as ceded. 

The Spanish Commissioners understand from all the foregoing that 
it is their nonevadable duty to continue to maintain that the relinquish- 
ment of the sovereignty in Cuba to which Spain bound herself in the 
article of the Protocol must be understood not as an abandonment of 
sovereignty in the sense given to the plirase by the American Commis- 
sioners, but in that of a relinquishment properly speaking, as expressed 
in the copy written in French, which the American (xovernment also 
signed and which for this reason, it cannot do less than accept as an 
official text. Consequently Spain is bound to relinquish the total sov- 
ereignty over Cuba, so that another obligation may bind the United 
States, which is that of receiving the island in the name of and for the 
Cuban people, for whom, aside from the high humanitarian motives 
which, as they assert, inspired their action (although Spain cannot 
assent to this) they freely and of their own motion constituted them- 
selves agents with all the obligations imposed on the '•'■ negotiornm 
gestor''^ (although they persist in affirming that they are not such "i?i 
rem siiani^^), as the law designates him who charges himself with man- 
aging and defending the interests of another, although the latter may 
not have conferred upon him express and ohicial power. 

The Spanish Commissioners therefore believe that the counterdraft of 
the first article which they presented is framed in the strict sense of 
Article I of the Protocol, save in one important point which the Span- 
ish Commissioners proceed to take u}). 

The United States of America demanded of Spain, as has been said, 
the relinquishment of the sovereignty over Cuba in the terms set forth 
in this memorandum. 

The American Commission in its last memorandum but one says 
that, if Sx^ain had acceded as required in the ultimatum to the aban- 
donment of the Island of Cuba without delivering it to the United 
States, everybody would have thought that Spain had done all that 
could be required of her. Everybody perhaps would have thought so 
except the United States, because it does not seem to the Spanish 
Commission that it is under the necessity of showing that there is no 
one either in Europe or America who believes that the United States 
would have been satisfied with Spain withdrawing from the Island of 
Cuba, they abstaining from all intervention in the Greater Antille, so 
that the people inhabiting it should continue fighting among them- 
selves and, in the exercise of their natural right, making of themselves 
and their destinies the use or the abuse which in view of their inde- 
pendence they could make with or without reference to the will of the 
United States, 

It is the undeniable and immediate result of these terms that the 
United States must receive tlie Island of Cuba, not to retain it for all 
time nor even indefinitely as their own, but to exercise their sovereignty 
until the island is pacified and to turn it over to the people inhabiting 
it as soon as the pacification thereof shall be realized. 

This, then, must, if the agreement which has intervened between the 
two Bigh Contracting Parties is to be complied with, be recorded in thff 
first article of the treaty relative to such relinquishment. 



84 TEEATY OF PEACE. 

Such was the uuderstaiuliug" of the Si)anisli Commissioners. But, 
animated by their keen desire for compositioirand i)eace, they consented 
that the United States should remain at liberty to pass the sovereignty 
of the island over to the Cuban people, when the former, and they alone, 
should consider that the proi)er time for doing so had come. 

liy this pr()i)Osition the Spanish Commissioners gave uj), in deference 
to the Tuited States, the most important right held by Si)ain, to demand, 
when the i)ac;iti cation of the island shall be effected, that they do not 
retain this said sovereignty, and that they pass it over to that people. 

The American Commission persists in affirming that such is the intent 
of the United States, but does not want the notorious right of Spain to 
demand that it be carried out in due time to be of record in the treaty. 

lUit since the American Commissioners are decidedly opposed to 
accepting the i)ro])osed article because of their construction that it is 
not in accord witli the first article of the Protocol, the Spanish Com- 
missioners substitute for it another, which will not only strictly agree 
with the correct meaning of that first article, but will be seen to be 
worded not only in its very terms but also in the sentences literally 
copied from the notes which preceded its drafting and determined its 
import. 

Here is the new phraseology which is proposed in substitution for the 
previous one: 

''Her Catholic Maijesty, the Queen Eegent of Spain, in the name of 
her August Son Don Alfonzo XIII, King of Spain, thereunto constitu- 
tionally authorized by the Cortes of the Kingdom, relinquishes her sov- 
ereignty over and title to Cuba. 

"The United States of America, accepting said relinquishment, 
receive the Island of Cuba from Spain to lend it aid and guidance and 
hold it under their control and government until, the pacification thereof 
realized, tliey leave said control and government to the Cuban people." 

BASIS OP THIS ARTICLK. , 

Paragraph one is the transcript of Article I of the Protocol with the 
changes of diplomatic form. 

The import and phraseology of paragraph two are taken from the 
ultinuitum addressed to Spain by the Government of Washington and 
communicated on the 20th of April last by the Secretary of State to 
the Minister of Spain at Washington. There also appear therein the 
views and the sentences of the Americau Government set forth in the 
reply of the Secretary of State of Washington of the Mist of July last 
to the message of the Spanish Government proposing to terminate the 
war. Here are the said sentencies : 

"The Government of the United States has not shared the appre- 
liensions of Spain (that of the lack of present aptitude of the Cuban 
peo])le for indei)endence) but thinks that in the i)erturbed and pros- 
trate conditions of the island the said island needs aid and guidancey 
which the American (iorcrnment is prepared to (jrant to it^ 

There is, therefore, in the new drafting of the article, no other import 
nor other phrases than those set forth in the ultimatum of the Uiiited 
States to Spain in the aforementioned note of their Secretary of State 
and in the Protocol worded in compliance with the ultinuitum and in 
accordance with the intent of the United States, as set forth in the 
aforesaid note. 

Notwithstanding that, the Spanish Commissioners especially request 
the American Commissioners to bear in mind that, if the legitimate 



TREATY OF PEACE. 85 

demands ou the part of Spaiu tbat the treaty mention her rigiit to ask 
in due time of the United States of America the faltilment of the engage- 
ment spontaneously^ undertaken by them, to leave the Island of Cuba 
free and independent whenever i:>eaee is restored, be distasteful to them, 1 
the former are ready to forego this demand, leaving it exclusively to | 
the determination of the United States to decide at what time this 
engagement should be fulfilled, if the conclusion of the pending treaty / 
of peace can be subserved by such renunciation by the Spanish Com- ' 
mission. 

The American Commissioners also reject the other articles of the draft 
subaiitted by the Spaniards. 

They do not admit that the charges and obligations of the sovereign 
which proceed excluvSively from the i^ublic service of the colony are part 
of the sovereignty. The Spanish Commission, without entering upon 
a purely technical discussion of tlie question as to whether such obliga- 
tions form part of the sovereignty or are merely an efi'ect of the exer- 
cise of the sovereignty itself, for the result of such a discussion would 
be absolutely without effect upon the point on which the Commissioiiers 
on both parts do not agree, will simply proceed briefly to set right the 
facts and the opinions which are set forth in the American memorandum 
of the 14th instant. In order to demonstrate that the colonial obliga- 
tions of Spain in Cuba must not remain a charge upon that island, the 
American Commissioners state that these obligations were contracted 
by the Crown through the medium of its officials in the colony, but 
without any intervention or consent towards such obligations on the 
i:)art of the colony. 

It is true, the colonial system then prevailing in Si)ain did not confer 
upon its colonies the right of having elected Chambers which would 
administer the supreme powers in conjunction with the sovereign. In 
the last twenty years, however, it was not thus. The Antilles had 
representatives in both Chambers who surely intervened in all the legis- 
lative acts bearing upon colonial obligations without ever protesting 
against their lawfulness or binding force. Moreover, besides this, it 
cannot be denied that so long as this system prevailed, maintaining all 
the characteristics of legality establishetl at the time, the acts which the 
colonial sovereignty performed within the powers with which it was 
invested by law, were perfectly lawful, and carried, as they could not 
fail to do, all their rightful consequences. It is a fundamental maxim 
of public law, without which the credit of a state could not exist, 
because the validity of all its acts would always be at the mercy of any 
triumphant revolutionaiy movement whatsoever. The wisdom of the 
acts of the sovereign may be discussed, but when they have been exe- 
cuted by virtue of his attributes and in the solemn form recognized and 
established by law, their lawfulness and binding character are not a 
matter for discussion. 

This principle was recognized by the First Consul when he concluded 
his first treaty of August 24, 1801, with Bavaria. In its fifth article 
he agreed to apply the provision of the Luneville treaty of peace with 
regard to the mortgage debts of the country ou the left bank of the 
Ehine. In those territories there were Diets which participated in the 
power of the sovereign, and for this reason the said treaty of Luneville 
demanded that such debts should -have been agreed to by them. But 
in the Duchy of Deux-Ponts and in tliat part of the Palatinate of the 
Rhine which France acquired by the treaty with Bavaria there was no 
such a governmental institution, and, therefore, the First Consul agreed, 
in the treaty of 1801 that the debts should follow the countries, pro- 



86 TREATY OF PEACE. 

vided they had beeu registered at their origin by the supreme admin- 
istrative autliority. 

If the ])ositi{)ii oi>i)osed to this doctrine were maintained, the Kussian 
people might be exempted from meeting all the obligations that may 
have been or may be contracted by its Emperors while this system 
should obtain, for the administration and government of their Empire, 
in the event ol' the abolition of the autocratic system now. prevailing in 
Eussia. The United States themselves, who as a matter of fact continued 
to observe after their emancipation many of the provisions of law 
enacted i)reviously without their intervention by the power of the 
mother country, would have to return to Kussia Ahiska, which the 
Emperor sold to them in 1807 without the intervention in such sale of 
the inhabitants of the country thus sold; likewise they should return 
to Spain Florida, fur the same reason, etc. 

If in order that a debt be lawful it be necessary that the people 
which has to pay the same should intervene when it is incurred, when 
the law does not confer such intervention, how much more necessary 
must the intervention of a people be when its sovereign sells the terri- 
tory which it inhabits. 

The very act of cession of sovereignty over the Antilles would be 
tainted with nullity, since the Cuban and Porto liican peoples have 
not been consulted and have not expressed their formal assent to the 
Protocol of Washington. Such are the consequences of a theory 
which in the heat of the discussion has beeu advanced in the memo- 
randum of the American Commissioners. 

The very point which most limits the freedom of action of sover- 
eigns in the conclusion of their treaties is tiiat relative to the debts of 
their states. As to the integrity of their territory and even as to their 
own honor they may bind themselves freely and validly because they 
dispose of what is their own. lUit this liberty is curtailed when their 
acts immediately reflect on the lawlul rights of those private parties 
who lawfully ac(|uired said rights under the protection of the laws 
and liav^e thereafter had no ]»art whatsoever in the conflicts which are 
solved by treaties, and should consequently not suffer unduly from the 
consequences of such treaties to the prejudice of their piivate and 
legitimate interests. 

When the creditors of a state make a contract with the same, they 
always take into earnest account the conditions of solvency of the state 
to which they lend their property. Hence, when these conditions of 
solvency are impaired in couseciuence of territorial cessions, the High 
Contracting Parties between whom these cessions are effected, that 
which makes the cession as m- ell as thatM'hich acquires the ceded terri- 
tory, always endeavor wholly to respect such rights by means of a 
])artition of the obligation between the territory kept by the ceding 
sovereign and the territory acipiired by the sovereign to whom it is 
ceded. This is what has been done in the treaties of territorial cession. 

But when the creditors have been granted by the very < ertificate of 
their contract a direct lien on certain defined i^roperty or certain defined 
income, in order thus to recover the loaned cai)ital and its legitimate 
interest, the sovereign cannot then, without first reckoning witli their 
consent, cede or freely dis]>ose of such property and incomes as if they 
were his full and exclusive i)roi)erty. 

If a sovereign should consent thus to trample u])on rights whicih are 
not his own. those to whom such rights api)ertain would not be bound 
to submit and lemain without a])peal, in the nanu' of the sacred prin- 
ciples which protect private pro]»erty, to the resi^ect of what belongs 



TREATS OF PEACE. 87 

to liini, whoever he may be who has in his power that which hxwfully 
belongs to hini. 

And it were well in this connection formally to record that even grant- 
ing that the principle snstained by the Spanish and contested by the 
American Commission, to wit, tliat the colonial debt should not be 
chargeable to the mother country, is inadmissible, this could never 
mean that Spain should now assume, with respect to the holders of that 
debt, more obligations than she contracted upon crejiting it. And, 
tlierefore, with respect to that part of the debt where she contracted 
only a subsidiary obligation to pay (since at issue it was expressly 
secured by certain and deternjinate revenues and receipts), Spain will 
have the right, under the law, to consider that she is not bound to pay 
such debt save in the event of the revenues and receii)ts primarily 
hypothecated to the payment thereof proving insufllcient, for not until 
then, according to the elementary rules of law, will the subsidiary 
obligation she contracted be enforceable. 

Without ex])atiating to-day on the information, very incorrect, which 
is set forth in the American memorandum concerning the Cuban debt, 
the Spanish Commission would contine itself to asserting that as a 
general rule the Island of (Juba has not since its discovery covered its 
own expenses. 

As long as Spain kept the American colonies the island was sus- 
tained by the pecuniary aid of her sisters and specially by that of the 
ViceKoyalty of Mexico. In this ceiitury, for a very few years, she 
had a surplus, thnnks to the <levelopment of her natural resources, at 
last obtained through this assistance, and it is true that this surplus 
was turned over to the treasury of the Peninsula. But with this excep- 
tion it is patent that the general accounts of the Spanish state from 
189G-1897 show that the treasury of the i*eninsula advanced to Cuba, 
in the years preceding that recent period, a sum amounting to 
429,()02,01o.08 pesetas. There also appears an advance to Porto Kico 
of 3,22(),488.(>7 ])esetas, and to Santo Domingo l,397,l(>].<i!i' pesetas. 

The prosperity of Cuba was of shorn duiation: for the greater part 
of the time from the days of Columbus, by reason either of the scarcity 
of its iidiabitants or of the slavery of the black race which formed the 
majority, or lastly because Spaniards preferred to colonize other parts 
of America, the island was unable to develop its natural resources; 
and it was nevertheless constantly necessary to expend in the island 
the large sums which were required for the establishment of reform 
and the creation of the institutions which are the essential conditions 
of modern life. 

The Spanish Commission cannot but protest against the assertion 
made in the American memorandum that the ten years insurrection 
was the outcome of just grievances, and it regrets that such an asser- 
tion should have been made without a necessity which would have 
required it unavoidably, in the same way as the American Commission 
would surely, and with good reason, regret that the Spanish Commis- 
sion should say anything here without an imperative necessity of the 
justice of the rebellions of the natives of the immense American terri- 
tory which the United States had so often to su])press with an iron 
hand, and if it should also say anything of the right by which the South- 
ern States attempted to break the federal bond by the force of arms. 

It is useless, for reasons that will hereafter be stated, for the Spanish 
Commissioners to take u]) the concrete discussion of the divisions of 
the Cuban debt to which reference is made in the American memoran-.^ 
dum. They understand the errors that may have found their way into* 



88 TKEATY OF PEACE. 

that document, beciause it is very natural that the American Commis- 
sioners should not have such accurate knowledge as is requisite for 
precise Judgiiieut of the acts of the Spanish administration ii) the 
Peninsula or in its colonics. 

And Ave llnd a conlirmation of this in the facts. 

In regard to tlie argument against the recognition of a certain part 
of the Cuban debt, on the ground that the rebellion of a minority of the 
Cuban peojile to ol)tain their independence was. just, we have only to 
make the following remark : 

Tlie insurgent minority, it is true, rose up in arms to secure the iude- 
peiulence of the island. The United State's erroneously believed that 
their cause was just, and by force of arms caused it to prevail against 
Si)ain. lUit now the facts have shown that Spain was right, as the 
United States themselves have had to recognize that theCul)an peoi)le 
are not as yet in such conditions as are necessary to entitle them to 
the enjoyment of full liberty and sovereignty. It is upon this ground 
that the United States have decided to withhold from that peojde the 
said privileges and to hold them under American control, until they 
become able to enjoy that liberty prematurely demanded by them. 
X The Spanish Commission feels bound, furthermore, to call the atten- 
^ tion of the American Commission to the obligations of Porto Kico. 

The American "memorandum" which is now answered refers exclu- 
sively to the obligations of Cuba. Is tliis omission due to the belief that 
as the sovereignty over Porto Rico was not reliu<piished but ceded by 
Spain to the United States, it must be conveyed to the latter free from 
burdens of all kinds? Is the principle maintained that cessions of ter- 
ritory, for whatever causes, whether conquest, or a mere agreement, do 
not carry with them ipso f((cto all the burdens which encumber the 
ceded territory ' 

In the oral discussion the American Commissioners stated that the 
Spanish Government had declan^d that no debt reste<l on the smaller 
Antille. The Spanish Commissioners have carefully gone over all the 
written comnuinicatious that have passed between the two High Par- 
ties, from the ultimatum of the President of the Union of April 20 of 
this year to the signing of the Protocol in Wasln'ngfon on August 12 
of the same. In none of theia have they found a suggestion or trace 
of such a declaration. An<l, be it said in passing, that among other 
obligations, the smaller Antille has been burdened for very nmny 
years with a i)art, whicii though small is no less sacred, of the perpetual 
and truly just charge through which S])ain, in the name of America 
rather than her own, has been showing her gratitude to the immortal 
Columbus, who discovered it. and his legititnate descendants, and, should 
the con(;lusioiis of the American Commissioners prevail and Spain con- 
tinue paying it, logic would place the United States in the position of 
repudiating it. 

Put the fact is that the discussion ui)on the so-called Cuban debt 
seems to hudv oi)i)0itunity at the present. 

The American Commissioners, when referring to the principal items 
of the said debt, doubtless be]i(wed that the Spanish Commission had 
suggested in its dralt the said items to be at once admitted as colonial 
debt to be transferred together with the sovereignty either to Cuba or 
to the I'nited States; and this is the capital error upon which the 
American memoi-andum is based. The S])anish (Commissioners only 
wish that the i)rinciple, up to this time always admitted, to wit: that a 
debt being exclusively the debt of a colony and affecting its territory, 
goes with the colony itself, be also recognized in this treaty. The 



TREATY OF PEACE. 89 

American meinoraudum says nothiug iu contradiction of this principle, 
nor do the Spanish Commissioners expect that anything be now said 
against it. least of all by the United States, whose territory was acquired 
by them not only with their blood but also with the money of their 
treasury. There are publicists who maintain that the thirteen original 
States paid over to their mother country fifteen million pouisds sterling 
(£15,000,000); and the facts are officiarthat the United States paid to 
France, Spain, the Indian nations and Russia respectively considerable 
sums of money for Louisiana, Florida, the Indian States, Texas, Cali- 
fornia and Alaska. This instance would be the first one in the history 
of the United States, in which they, acting at variance with their own 
traditions, should have gratuitously acquired a territory which sooner 
or later will be annexed to the Union. 

The case of the acquisition of Texas, identical as to its origin, its 
process and its end with that of the Island of Cuba, eloquently shows 
that the policy then pursued with Mexico by the United States is 
different from the one now pursued with Si)ain. In the case of Mexico 
the American armies, also in supijort of insurgents, the Texan insur- 
gents, spread themselves over the territory of the whole Mexican 
Republic, and went as far (a fact which has not taken place in Cuba) 
as to capture the national capital. The United States demanded then 
from Mexico the independence of Texas as they now demand from 
Spain the indei)eudence of Cuba, and furthermore they caused Mexico 
to cede to them New Mexico and California, as now they cause Spain 
to cede to them Porto Rico and tlie other Spanish islands in the West 
Indies. But in the case of Mexico they did not ask from her Govern- 
ment any war indemnity, and consented not only to pay her the value 
of the territories ceded and annexed to tiie American Empire, but also 
to assume the payment of the American claims then standing against 
Mexico. 

In the case of Spain, however, they have demanded from her, in the 
way of war indemnity, the cession of the islands above mentioned, and 
ask now, additionally, that the burdens which encumber those islands 
as well as their sister Cuba be thrown on tlie mother country, wlio with 
her own hands introduced them into the life of the civilized world. 

The only wisli of the Spanish Commissioners is that the principle 
above referred to be admitted and recognized. Its practical application 
may, according to their understanding of the subject, be afterwards 
entrusted to a Commission of righteous and impartial persons. If this 
Commission upon examination of t!ie bill of items to be tiled by Spain, 
showing what obligations ought in her o])inion to be paid by either 
Cuba, or Porto Rico, should decide tliat those obligations must fall on 
the mother country, Spain shall submit to its decision. But if the Com- 
mission decides that the whole or a part of the said debts ought to be 
paid by the colony, there is no reason why the United States in their 
turn should not also submit to the award. If the United States feel so 
sure, as they seem, in their ])Osition, they cannot see any danger in 
assenting to the proposition herein made by the Spanish Commission. 
But if ihey are not so sure, their high sense of justice and the duty of 
respect which they owe to themselves impose upon them the obligation 
of causing a matter of mere pecuniary interest to be made subordinate 
to the sacred cause of justice. 

And iu order to show to the Ameri(;an Commission that the Spanish 
Commissioners have no other wish than the one stated, and that their 
purpose is not by any means to have a fixed sum adjudged at this time^^ 
as a colonial debt to be paid by the Spanish Antilles, they have decided' 



90 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to withdraw Articles 11, IV and V, as drawn np by them in tbeir former 
draft, and otter as a snbstitute for the three^a single article reading as 
follows: 

"Article II. 

"The relinrinishiiuMit and transfer made by her Catholic Majesty and 
accepted by tlie United States of America embrace: 

" 1, AH the prerogatives, powers and rights belonging to her Catholic 
iMaJesty as a part of her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba and its 
inhabitants. 

"2. All the charges and pecuniary obligations, outstanding at the 
date of the ratification of this treaty, which u[)on careful examination 
of their origin, their purposes and the conditions of their creation, 
should be adjudged according to strict law and undeniable equity to be 
difl'erent from the charges and obligations which properly and spe- 
cifically belong to the Peninsular treasui-y, owing to their having been 
at all times i)rojierly and specifically belonging to ('uba. 

"To secure the careful examination provided for in the foregoing 
paiagraph, a Commission consisting of competent and impartial per- 
sons shall be appointed by the two High Contracting Parties. The 
manner of this api)ointment shall be determined in this treaty by a 
sejiarate article." 

The Ameriean Commissioners do not feel disi)osed to concur with the 
Spanish Commissioners in the exception made by the latter in the sec- 
ond paragraph of Article III of their draft, regarding what is called 
patrimonial ])roperty of the state. The state, under the Spanish laws, 
exercises all rights of ownership over the property declared by law to 
be public property, and it is plain that in this case the cession of the 
sovereignty carries with it the cession of all those rights. Uut the state 
in Spain can also, in the cai)acit3' of a body i)olitic, or corporation, ac- 
quire and hold real property, by the same means and through the same 
processes as private i)ersons can do under civil municipal law. This 
peculiar kind of pro])erty was the one referred to in the excei)tion sug- 
gested by the Spanish Commissioners. Notwithstanding this fact, and 
in order to show once more that they feel disposed to compromise dif- 
ferences, and to promote peace, the Spanish Commissioners do hereby 
waive the said excei)tion, ai;d accept that the patrimonial property of 
the state be also included in the cession and transfer of the sovereignty 
of Spain over the Antilles. 

As to the other exceptions which were then suggested, the Spanish 
Commission cannot believe that the American Commission will ever 
lefuse to accept them. The American Commission in its draft refers 
only to indic'ultial property. But the Honorable Commissioners of the 
United States are not ignorant of the fact, and the mere suggestion of 
it would involve an ottense to their great learning, that in addition to 
individual persons there are other persons, cai)able in all civil societies, 
of lawfully ac(|uiring and holding ])roperty both real and ])ersona]. 
Commercial and industrial firms, ordinary co-])artnershii)s, public 
establishments, whether charitable institutions, schools, or others, can 
in S))ain and her colonies acquire and hold property and enjoy the 
same ])rotection as is given under the laws to the ])roperty of individual 
persons. All the exceptions suggested in the second paragra])h of 
Article 111 of the S])anish draft, refer to the ]nx)i)erty belonging to the 
said cor[)orate entities, which cannot be considered as individual 
persons. 

Certain phrases to be found in the fourth [taragraph of the same arti- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 91 

cle, relating to the delivery of public arcliives, and stating that the 
United States shall exercise over them the same rights and be subject 
to the same obligations as Spain, have attracted the attention of the 
American Commission. The explanation of the reason Avhy these 
phrases were used is easy t(^be made. Properly s])eaking, the state is 
not the absolute owner of the public archives, but rather the keeper or 
depository of the same. It is for this reason that it cannot destroy the 
documents which belong to them, or dispose of them by sale or other- 
wise, and also, that no citizen can be deprived of the right to make use 
of those documents in defense of his rights.^ Can it be in the power of 
the state to destroy the Registries of the Etat-civU and with them all 
the evidence as to the civil condition or statvs of all its citizens? Can 
it be in its power to destroy the property registries, wherein the title 
deeds and the proofs of the ownership of all ])roperty are kept and pre- 
served : Certainly not. But this is precisely what is meant by the 
phrases above mentioned. The United States shall have the same 
rights as far as their archives are concerned as Spain used to have: — 
and those rights, the only ones vested in Spain, are also the only ones 
which she can transfer to the United States. 

Nevertheless, and in order to remove from the minds of the Ameri- 
can Commissioners any possible doubt as to the real intention of the 
Spanish Commissioners, in framing as they did the aforesaid Article 
111, they have decided to consent to modify that article and word it in 
a different way, omitting to except from the operation of the cession 
the i^atrimonial ]»roperty of the state, and explaining the points which 
the American Commissioners deemed to be doubtful. Here is the text 
of the article as amended : 

"Article III. 

"In pursuance of the agreement contained in the two preceding- 
articles. Her Catholic Majesty, acting in the same representative 
capacity in which this treaty is entered into, relinquishes and transfel-s 
to the United States all the buildings, wharves, barracks, fortresses, 
establishments, public highways, and all other real property, which 
appertain under the law to the public domain, and which as such 
belong to the Crown of Spain in the Island of /3uba. 

"The rights and the property of all kinds whatsoever which up to 
the date of the ratification of this treaty have been either peacefully 
exercised, or possessed or held by the i)rovinces, municipalities, public 
or private institutions, civil or ecclesiastical corporations, or any other 
collective entities having legal capacity to acquire and hold property in 
the Island of Cuba, and by private individuals of whatsoever national- 
ity, shall not be included in the relinquishment and transfer above 
made. 

"Her Catholic Majesty also relinquishes and transfers to the United 
States all the docuraent.s and title papers exclusively relating to the 
sovereignty transferrod and accepted and to all rights thereof, which 
may be found in the archives of the Peninsula. Copies shall also be 
given to the United States whenever they may ask for them, of the 
passages concerning the said sovereignty and rights, which may occur 
in other documentsnot relating to the Island of Cuba, but to other sub- 
jects foreign to it, which may exist in the said archives. And the 
same shall be observed reciprocally in favor of Spain regarding docu- 
ments and papers, having nothing to do, either in whole or in part, 
with the Island of Cuba, now to be found in the Cuban archives, which-, 
may be of interest to the Spanish Government. 



92 TREATY OF PEACE. 

"All the official archives aud registries, whether belongiug- to the 
judicial or to the executive departments of the GovernTneut, now at the 
disposal of the S])anish Governinent and its authorities in the Island of 
Cuba, and relating to llie said island or its inhabitants, and to tlieir 
rights and property, shall be left without restriction of any kind at the 
disi)osal of the United States, in order tliat the latter may keep them 
with the sjime powers wliich were heretofore vested in the Spanish Gov- 
ernment and authorities. 

"Private iiidi\iduals, whether Si)aniards or Cubans, siiall have the 
right to ask for and obtain, in the manner provided by law, authenticated 
copies of all contracts, last wills and testaments, and other documents 
to be found in the notarial archives, which are deemed to form part of 
the judicial or executive archives either in Spain or in Cuba." 

Article VI of the Spanish draft did not set forth the reason of the 
cession made by Sj)aiu in favor of the Ihiited States of the Island of 
Porto Kico, the other S])anish Antilles, aud of the Island of Guam in 
the Marianas. That reason nevertheless was explained in the despatch 
of the Secretary of State of the United States in his answer to themes- 
sage transmitted to him by the Spanish Government. Said desi)atch 
states that the President of the Kepublic did not demand the payment 
of any war indemnity, owing to his desire to give testimony of signal 
generosity, and then it says: 

"Nevertheless he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of 
the United States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens 
for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection 
in Cuba. He must, therefore, rerpiire the cession to the United States 
and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the Island of Porto Kico 
aud other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West 
Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected 
by the United States." 

The island designated by them was the Island of Guam. 

The Spanish Commissiouers have now decided to change the text of 
the article as formerly framed by them and otter as a substitute another 
article which will leave on record the reason of the cession. It is quite 
certain that the American Commission will agree with the Spanish 
Commission in the advisability of preventing the United States from 
being shown in the treaty as acquiring gratuitously the said islands. 
Here is the new text of the article: 

"Article IV. 

"In compensation for the loss and expenses incurred by the United 
States on account of the war and for the claims of their citizens for 
damages done to their i)ersons or pro})erty during the last insurrection 
in Cuba, Her Catholic Majesty, in the name and in representation of 
Spain, and constitutionally authorized to do so by the Cortes of the 
Kingdom, cedes to the United States of America, and the latter accept 
for themselves the Ishind of Porto Pico and all other islands in the 
West Indies which are now under the sovereignty of Si)aiii, and also 
the Island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones Ar('hi])eIago, wiiich 
was (;hosen by the I'nited States by virtue of Article II of the Protocol 
sigiunl at Washington on August IL' ultimo." 

In regard to Article VI 1 in the draft of the Spanish (commission, the 
latter understands that it is its duty, for the reasons stated in this 
Tiicmorandum, to leave it as it is, with no other change than that which 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



93' 



is required indispensably to put it in harmony with tlie new articles 
now introduced. In consequence thereof, it will read as follows: 

Article Y. 

" This cession of sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of 
Porto Kieo aud the other islands mentioned is understood to consist in 
the transfer of the rights and obligations, property and documents 
relating to the sovereignty over said islands, in the same way as was 
provided in the preceding articles in reference to the relinquishment 
and transfer of the sovereignty over the Island of Cuba." 

It results, in recapitulation, that the only question up to now in 
existence between the two Commissions aud awaiting their decision is 
a question of money, which as far as one of the High Contracting 
Parties is concerned is relatively of secondary importance. That 
question is the one which relates to the colonial debt. 

The Spanish Commissioners understand that a question of such a 
nature as this cannot fail to be solved satisfactorily between two 
parties, one of which is the greatest nation of the new world, immensely 
rich and prosperous, blessed with inexhaustible resources, whether due 
to nature or to the prodigious activity of its inhabitants, which on the 
other hand acquires by this treaty territories of great importance, aud 
thereby fultils an aspiration of its policy in America, while the other 
party is a great and noble nation of the old world, a cordial friend of 
her late antagonist in days for her more prosperous, but now impover- 
ished through the misfortunes heaped upon her during the century 
which is about to terminate; whose treasury is overburdened by obli- 
gatitms, and for whom the present treaty will mean the solemn confirma- 
tion of the loss of the last remnants of her American empire, although 
through her discovery of the new world she was instrumental in the 
very existence of the Creat American Kepublic, and to the enrichment 
of the modern nations, perhaps at the expense of her own welfare and 
to the detriment of the full development of the great elements of 
wealth accumulated in her own bosom but neglected through her desire 
preferentially to attend to her colonies, creatures who like all others in 
the order of nature enlist the utmost solicitude on the part of their 
mother, who feeds and supports them at the sacrifice of her own 
welfare. 

True copy : 

Emilio de O^eda 



Protocol No. 10. 
Conference of October 27^ 1898. 

Present — On the part of the 
United States: Messrs. Day, 
Davis Frye, Cray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs. 
Montero-liios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 



Protocolo jSTo. 10, 

Conferencia del 27 de Octubre de 
1898. 

Presentes Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de America, los 
Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Keid, Moore, Fergussou. 

Por parte de Espaha los Senores 
Montero Pios Abarzuza Garnica 
Villa Urrutia Cerero Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 



94 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



/ ■ The American Ooramissioiiers 
^ presented their written reply, eojiy 
of which is hereto annexed, to the 
nieinoranduin tih'd by tlie Spani.sh 
Coiiiinissioners at tiie hist session 
in snpi)ort of the articles which 
they i)resented on the 21st instant, 
and wliich were afterwards rejected 
by the American Commissioners. 

The American Commissioners, 
referring- to the acceptance by the 
Spanish Commissioners, in the 
'terms expressed in the ])rotocol of 
the last session, of the articles pre- 
sented by the American Commis- 
si<niers, said that they were uncer- 
tain whether the accei)tance was 
intended to ap])ly to the articles 
hrst or to those last presented by 
them, and sngoested that, if it was 
immaterial to tlie Spanish Commis- 
sioners, the American Comnjission- 
ers ])referred that the acceptance 
should be taken to refer to the arti- 
cles lirst presented by them, as 
/ those articles contained provisions 
"^ as to public archives and records. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that, as his 
acceptance of the articles was con- 
ditional upon the approval of the 
treaty of peace, he had no objec 
tion to accepting tliese or any other 
articles, and especially as the first 
article of the American project was 
the same, saving differences in 
di])lomatic form, as the first para- 
graph of the first Spanish article; 
but that he did not mean that he 
renounced the second paragraph 
of that article, and that witli re- 
spect to this part and to the other 
articles i)resented by Spain, he 
reserved, as provided in the i)ro- 
tocol of the 5th session, all the 
riglits therein contained if there 
was no ultimate agreement upon 
the whole. 

The President of the American 
Commission replied that the 
American Commissioners were con- 
tent to take the' acceptance of the 
Spanish (Commissioners, as ex- 
pressed in their paper and entered 



LosComisariosamericanoshacen 
entrega de su contestacion ejjrita 
que es anexa al acta presente, al 
Memorandum presentado i)or los 
espafioles en apoyo de los articulos 
presentados i)or ellos en la sesion 
del 31 del coriente, que fuerou re- 
chazados por.los Comisarios ameri- 
canos. 

Los Comisarios Americanos refl- 
riendose a la acepta('i(')n por los 
Comisarios Espanoles, en los termi- 
nos expresados en el acta de la ul- 
tima sesion, de los articulos pre- 
sentados por los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos, manifestarou hallarse incier- 
tos sobre si dicha aceptacion se 
referia a los articulos primerameute 
presenta<los pos ellos 6 a los iilti- 
mos, y sugirieron que si a los Co- 
misarios espafioles les era indifer- 
ente, los Comisarios Americanos 
preferirian que la aceptacion re- 
cayese sobre los articulos primera- 
meute presentados por ellos, por 
contener estos disposiciones rela- 
tivas a los Archivos publicos y ex- 
ited ientes. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
espanola contesta que siendo su 
aceptacion de dichos articulos cou- 
dicional de la aprobacion del tra- 
tado de i)az, no tiene inconveuiente 
,en aceptar estos u otros articulos, 
tanto mas cuanto que el articulo 1° 
del proyecto americano, es igual 
salvo las diferencias de cancilleria, 
al primer parrafo del articulo espa- 
nol; pero qneesto no siguilica que 
renuncie a la seguuda parte de di- 
cho articulo 1° presentado por Es- 
l)ana, y que en cuanto a esta parte 
del articulo y A los demas presenta- 
dos por Espana, se reserva todos 
los derechos que contienen, como 
se convino en el acta de la 5 ^ sesion, 
si no hubiese acuerdo ulterior so- 
brela totalidad. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana contesto (pie las Comi- 
sarios Americanos se avenian a que 
la aceptacion de los Comisarios 
Esi)arioles, tal cual la expresaba el 
exrito consignado en el acta de la 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



95 



in the protocol of the List coufer- 
ence, as applying to the articles 
last submitted, which were ex- 
pressed in the words of the Proto- 
col of August IL', 189S. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission repeated that the form 
or wording of those or of the 
other articles was a matter of in- 
difference to him ; and he asked 
whether the American Commis- 
sioners would object to inserting 
in the article in which the cession 
of Porto Kico and the other islands 
in the West Indies and the island 
of Guam was made, or in any of 
the other articles of the treaty, a 
statement that the cession was 
made as indemnity for the expenses 
of the war and the injuries suffered 
during it by American citizens. 

The President of the Ameri- 
can Commission re])lied that the 
articles should stand as when they 
were, accepted, and be considered 
as disposed of for the present, add- 
ing further that the American 
Commissioners did not mean to be 
understood that it should not ap- 
pear in some proper form in the 
treaty that the cession of Porto 
Ivico and the other islands above 
referred to was on account of in- 
demnity for the losses and injuries 
of American citizens and the cost 
of the war. This view had been 
expressed in the note addressed to 
the Spanish Government contain- 
ing the demand of the President 
of the United States, and the 
American Commissioners recog- 
nized the force and meaning of 
that demand. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission said that it was not his 
intention now to discuss this point, 
but to state his desire that the ques- 
tion and the answer to it should be 
entered in the protocol. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission then inquired whether 
the American Commissioners were 
ready to answer the written pro- 
posal presented by the Sj^auish 



ultima conferencia, se refiriese a los 
articulos iiltimamente presentados, 
expresados en las palabras del 
Protocol!) de lii de Agosto de 1898. 

El Presidente de la Comisiou 
Espanolarepitequeleesindiferente 
la forma y redaccion de unos u 
otros articulos, y pregunta i'l la 
Comision Americana si esta tendria 
inconveniente en que en el ai ticulo 
en <]ue se trata de la cesion de 
Puerto Rico, otras islas de las 
Antiilas y la de Guam, 6 en otro 
cualquiera de los articulos del 
tratado, se exprese que esta cesion 
es en coneepto de iudemnizacion 
por los gastos de la guerra y los 
perjuicios sufridos durante ella por 
los Ciudadanos Americanos. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana contesto que los articu- 
los debian permanecer como esta- 
ban cuando fueron aceptados, de- 
biendo por ahora considerarse 
como teriniuados, y anadio que los 
Comisarios americanos no queriau 
sigiiificar que se entendiese que no 
habria de ligurar en forma adecu- 
ada en el Tratado, que la cesion de 
Puerto Rico y las denuis islas an- 
teriormente niencionadas, era a 
cuenta de indemnizaci(')n por pt'r- 
didas y agravios delos Ciudadanos 
Americanos y gastos de la guerra. 
Este ])unto de visto habia sido ex- 
presado en la nota dirigida al Go- 
bierno Espanol en que se consigna- 
bau las demandas del Presidente 
de los Estados Unidos y los Co- 
misarios de los Estados Unidos re- 
conocian la fuerza y el significado 
de esta demand a. 

El Presidente de la Comisiou 
Espaiiola dice que no era su inten- 
cion el debatir ahora este punto, 
sino el de hacer con star su deseo 
de que tignren en el protocolo su 
pregunta y la contestacion dada. 

El Presidente de la Comisiijn 
Espanola pide entonces a la Comi- 
si('>n Americana que conteste a la 
proposicion escrita hecha en la se- 
siou anterior por los Comisarios 



96 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Cominissioiiers at the last session, 
in wliicli tlioy accepted condition- 
ally the tM'O articles of the Ameri- 
can draft. 

The President of tlie American 
Commission said that he under- 
stood that in the said proposal the 
American Commissioners were in- 
vited to i)resent their propositions 
in regard to the Philii)pine Islands, 
and said that as this matter was of 
capital importan(;e, and as the 
American Commissioners were not 
j'et ready to snbmit a i^roposal in 
regard to it, he would propose an 
adjournment in order that they 
might have an opportunity to do 
so, and would suggest that in the 
mean time the Secretaries should 
endeavor to agree on the terms of 
the article relating to public prop- 
erty, archives and records in Cuba, 
Porto Kico and other islands in the 
West Indies, and Guam, for sub- 
mission to the Joint Commission. 
This suggestion was adopted, as 
"well as the proposal for an adjourn- 
ment; and it was agreed, on mo- 
tion of the American Commission- 
ers, that the Joint Commission 
should meet again on Monday the 
31 st of October, at two o'clock, p. m., 
when the American Commissioners 
should present a i)roposal on the 
subject of the Philippines; and 
that if by that time the American 
Commissioners were not prepared 
to do so the meeting should be 
postponed to a later day. 

William R. Day 

CusHMAN K. Davis 

Wm. P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

VVhitelaw Eeid. 

John B. Moore. 



Espafioles, al aceptar condicional- 
mente lesdos articulosdel proyecto 
Americano. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana luani fiesta que entiende 
que en dicha i)roposici6n se les 
iuvita a preseutar sus proposi- 
cioues relativas a Filipinas, y dice 
que siendo este punto de impor- 
tancia tan capital, y no hallandose 
la Comision Americaua en disposi- 
cion de formular aquellas todavia, 
propone un aplazamiento para ha- 
cerlo y sugiere que entre tauto los 
Secretarios Geuerales de ambas 
Coniisiones se })ongan de acuerdo 
para redactar un ai ticulo relativo 
a la propiedad publica, a los Ar- 
chives, expedientes y documentos 
notaiiales en Cuba, Puerto Eico, 
otras islas de las Antillas y Guam, 
que sera sometido a la Comision en 
pleno. 

Se aprueba esta suggestion asi 
como el aplazamiento pedido por 
la Comisiiui Americana, y se con- 
viene que los Comisarios se reuni- 
ran el lunes 31 de Octubre a las 2 
P. M. en que la Comision America- 
na preseutara sus proi^osiciones 
sobre Filipinas, sin perjuicio de 
que si para entonces no hubiese 
auu potlido elaborar sus proposi- 
cioj)es, la Comision Americana, se 
acuerde un nuevo aplazamiento. 



E MONTERO Rios 
B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA. 

W R DE Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



A.TMNEx TO Protocol l^o. 10. 

To the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners in 
sujiport of the articles presented by them on the 21st instant, and 
rejected by the American Commissioneis on the 24th instant, the latter 
submit under the rules the following reply: 

The memorandum opens with an expression of the deep regret with 
which the Spanish Commisjsioners have acquainted themselves with the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 97 

paper in wbioli the American Commissioners, at the session of the 17th 
instant, proposed to substitute for tlie articles previously presented by 
them, in relation to Cuba, Porto Eico and other islands in the West 
Indies, and the Island of (iuam in the Ladroues, the precise stipuhi- 
tious of the first and second articles of the Protocol of August 12, 1898, 
neither adding thereto nor subtracting therefrom. 

The American Commissioners on their }>art feel equal regret that in 
the memorandum now under consideration the Spanish Commissioners 
should have seen fit to reject that proposal on grounds which discTose a 
misconstruction both of the proposal itself and of the stipulations of 
the Protocol on which it was based. 

The American Commissioners in their proposal of the 17th instant 
stated that they were "prepared, for the purpose of disposing of the 
question of Cuba, Porto llico and Guam, simply to embody in the treaty 
the precise stipulations of the Protocol on those subjects." The Ameri- 
can Commissioners are still prepared to take this step, believing that 
the stipulations in question would suffice for the accomplishment of 
the purposes to which they relate. F>ut they have never asserted that 
the treaty of peace should be limited, in respect of Cuba, Porto Eico, 
and Guam, to the repetition of the precise terms of the Protocol on 
those subjects. Their position is, however, that any clauses that may 
be added must be devoted to the execution of the stipulations of the 
Protocol, and must not impair them or affix conditions to what was 
unconditional. 

Having adverted to the misconstruction of their proposal, the Ameri- 
can Commissioners will point out the misconstruction by the Spanish 
Commissioners of the Protocol. The Si)anish Commissioners observe 
that as the stipulations of the Protocol form part of a binding agree- 
meni, which they properly declare the Protocol to be, it is useless merely 
to reproduce them in the treaty that is to be elaborated in the confer- 
ence. The Spanish Commissioners, however, seem to forget that the 
Protocol was an executory agreement, and that it cannot be assumed to 
be useless to ask either ])arty now to do what in that agreement it prom- 
ised to do. "Spain will ', so reads Article I of the Protocol, "relin- 
quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". This is a promise. 
The American Commissioners, having come hither to claim the fulfil- 
ment of that promise, ask the Spanish Commissioners, clothed with full 
powers to conclude a treaty of peace, to say in that treaty: "Spain 
hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba." 

Ul)on what theory can this be deemed a "useless" or "redundant" 
stipulation'? Is it not, on the contrary, manifest that the treaty of 
peace, no matter what else it may include, must contain a stipulation 
to this effect! 

Indeed, in offering the precise stipulations of the Protocol, the Amer- 
ican Commissioners sought to put aside the controversy raised by the 
Spanish j)roiH)sals as to the relinquishment of sovereignty and the 
assumption of the Cuban debt, and to afford the Spanish Commissioners 
an opportunity to meet them on the common ground of what the two 
Governments had unmistakably agreed to. It was and is now appar- 
ent that on the composite subject, as the Spanish Commissioners consider 
it to be, of the relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba and the assump- 
tion of the Cuban debt, the views expressed on the one side and on the 
other are irreconcilable, and that, unless some common ground is found, 
the conference is at an end. In this crisis the American Commissioners 
conceived that both sides might, without any compromise of principle, 
or of opinion, agree that, instead of amplifying the words of the Proto- 
T P 7 



98 TREATY OF PEACE. 

col, or sul>.stitutiii<i- tor tlieiii argumentative stipulatioius, they would 
execute tlie pioiuisc in tlie words in which ft was luade. They regret 
that the Spanish Coniniissioners rejected this conciliatory proposition. 

The Si)anish Commissioners, in the memorandum now under consider- 
ation, recur to the distinction wiiicli they have sought to make between 
tlie words "abandon"' and "• relincpush''. On this verbal (juestion, 
which was raised by the Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum 
ol' the 11th of October, the American Commissioners lind no occasion 
to adU anything to what they have already said; but they feel called 
upon to repel the imputation that they have sought either to leave Cuba 
in a derelict condition or to evade any responsibility to which their 
(lovernnient is by its declarations or its course of conduct committed. 

In their proposal of the 17th instant, the American Commissioners 
made the following declaration: 

•'The United States recognizes in the fullest measure that in requir- 
ing the relin(]uishment of all claim of Spanish sovereignty and the 
evacuation of the Island of Cuba it has assumed all the obligations 
imposed by the canons of international law and ilowing from its occu- 
pation. The United States, so far as it has obtained possession, has 
enforced obedience to law and the preservation of order by all persons. 
It is not dis])osed to leave the island a prey to anarchy or misrule." 

By this declaration it is manifest that the American Commissioners 
have not contemplated the reduction of Cuba to the condition of a 
derelict and abandoned territory. They concede, however, the justice 
of the Spanish contention that the obligations which the United States 
has assumed with respect to Cuba should be acknowledged in the 
treaty, and they stand ready to make such acknowledgment. They are 
ready to insert proper stipulations as to the protection of life and 
property in Cuba during its occupation by the United States, and as 
to the aid and guidance which it may be necessary for the United 
States, in the present distracted condition of the island, to give. 

The Spanish memorandum refers to the capitulation of Santiago de 
Cuba, as well as to the evacuation of Cuba under Article lY of the 
Protocol of August 12, 1898, as proof that the island is to be delivered 
to the United States. So far as this argument goes it is perfectly 
sound. By the evacuation of Cuba the island is to pass for the time 
being into the possession of the United States, and the United States 
will, for the time being, occupy it. The Spanish memorandum, how- 
ever, inquires whether, in view of these facts, it is ]iossible to deny 
that Spain, in relinquishing her "sovereignty" over Cuba, has the right 
to demand that it shall be received by the United States. 

This argument begs the question. The American Commissioners 
have never denied that the Islaiul of Cuba will, upon its evacuation by 
the Spanish forces, come into the possession of the authorities of the 
United States; but this possession is by no means to be confounded 
Avith the sovereignty of the island, which the United States has long 
since declared to Spain an intention not to assume. The Unitetl States 
M'ill take ])ossession of the island for the purpose of pacifying it, but 
not as titular sovereign; and it is not to be charged with ])roposing to 
reduce it to the condition of a "desert territory in Africa", merely 
because it declines to assume the character of such sovereign. 

As to the statement of the Spanish memorandum that Spain's 
relin(|uishmeut of sovereignty over Cuba was described by the Amer- 
ican Commissioners, in the second paragraph of the first article pre- 
sented by them on October 3, as a crs.sion, they have only to say that 
they have searched the paragraph and the whole article for the word 



TREATY OF PEACE. 99 

in question, and that they are forced to the conclusion that an error in 
translation has misled the Spanish Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners, advertiny- to the citation by the Amer- 
ican Commissioners of the dictionary of l^scriche, seek to minimize the 
importance of that citation by saying that the dictionary serves as a 
mentor for young lawyers in the early period of their i)rofessional life. 
Tlie American Comniissioners, however, can do no less than infer from 
this statement that the work in question is recognized in Spain as being 
of the highest authority. 

The American Commissioners are at a loss to conjecture what more 
they can say to render their position clear as to the purpose and mean- 
ing of the relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over 
Cuba, as stipulated in Article I of the Protocol. The various forms 
which the argument of the Spanish Commissioners on this subject 
assumes are nothing but variations of their misconstruction of the 
American Commissioners'" position. For example: Tbe Spanish memo- 
randum argues that the stipulations in the Protocol in regard to the 
relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba and the cession of Porto Kico 
are, in spite of a total ditterence in language, to be considered as the 
same in effect, because the American Commissioners, in the articles 
presented by them on the 3rd instant, seemed to contemplate that the 
archives in Cuba, as well as those in Porto Pico, shall be in the pos- 
session of someone to whom application for copies may be made. The 
Spanish memorandum declares that this would be imi)ossible unless 
someone has the documents in his possession. This is quite true; but 
the observation would be meaningless if it were not for the fact that 
the Spanish Commissioners insist upon saying that the American Com- 
missioners, because they decline to accept for their Government the 
sovereignty of Cuba, have contended that the island must be aban- 
doned by Spain in the sense of being left derelict. 

It is perfectly manifest that the contra(;ting parties in deliberately 
employing different stipulations with respect to Cuba and Porto Pico 
neither expressed nor intended to express the same idea. This differ- 
ence is so clearly and fully explained in the memorandum of the Ameri- 
can Commissioners of the 14th of October that it seems to be idle to 
enlarge upon it. 

The American Commissioners have never based their position as to 
Spain's relinquishment of all claim of sovereignty over Cuba upon the 
English text of the Protocol as distinguished from the French text, as 
the Spanish memorandum suggests. On the contrary, in their memo- 
randum of the i4th of October, the American Commissioners distinctly 
declared that the words used with reference to Cuba in the French 
text were precisely the same in meaning as those used in the English 
text. I 

In their memorandum of the 14th of October, the American Commis- 
sioners applied to their position as to Spain's relinquishment of all 
claim of sovereignty over Cuba a simple test. If Spain, they said, had, 
in reply to the demands of the United States, declared that she relin- 
quished her sovereignty over Cuba, but did not relinquish it to the 
United States, no one could have imagined that the demand of the 
United States would not have been satisfied. The Spanish memorandum 
intimates that everybody would have thought so except the United 
States, and declares that there is no one either in Europe or in America 
who believes that the United States would have been content with 
Spain's withdrawing from the island and would have abstained from alP 
intervention therein, leaving the inhabitants to continue to fight among 



100 TREATY OF PEACE. 

themselves. It is obvious, however, that Spain's reHui[aishineiit of 
soveieiii'iity over Cuba and tlie snbseciuent intervention of the United 
States for tlie ])uri)Ose of establisliin^- order there are different matters. 
AVliatever the Tnited States miglit in (certain contiiij;eneies have done 
with respect to Cuba, Spain would have satistied the demands of thnt 
Government by withdrawin<>: from the island. The question of subsc 
quent intervention in it>s ailairs would then have lain between the 
United States and the people of the island themselves. Tlie United 
States certainly could not have com])lained if Spain, while relincjuish- 
in<>- her sovereignty, had refused to aid in or be a party to this inter- 
vention. 

In the Spanish memorandum an effort is made to answer that part 
of the argumenr submitted by the American Commissioners on the 14th 
instant in which it is maintained that the so-called Cuban debt is not 
in any sense a debt of Cuba, but that it is in reality a part of the 
national debt of S|>ain. The American Commissioners were able to 
show that the debt was (contracted by Spain for national juirposes, 
which in some cases were alien and in others actually adverse to the 
interests of Cuba; that in reality the greater part of it was contracted 
for the purpose of supporting a Spanish army in Cuba; and that, while 
the interest on it has been collected by a Spanish bank from the reve- 
nues of Cuba, the bonds bear upon their face, even where those reve- 
nues are pledged for their payment, the guarantee of the Spanish nation. 
As a national debt of Spain, the American Commissioners have never 
questioned its validity. 

The American Commissioners, therefore, are not required to main- 
tain, in order that they n)ay be consistent, the position that the power 
of a nation to contract debts or the obligation of a nation to pay its 
debts depends upon the more or less popular form of its government. 
They would not (]uestion the validity of the national debt of Russia, 
because, as the S])anish memorandum states, an autocratic system pre- 
vails in that country. Much less do the American Commissioners main- 
tain that a nation cannot cede or relinquish sovereignty over a part of 
its territory without the consent of the inhabitants thereof, or that it 
impairs the national obligation of its debt by such cession or relin- 
quishment. 

Into these questions they do not think it necessary to enter. 

As to the rights, expectations, or calculations of creditors, to which 
the Si)anisli memorandum adverts, the American Commissioners have 
only to say that as regards the so (tailed Cuban debt, as explained in 
their memorandum of the 14th instant, the creditors, from the begin- 
ning, took the chances of the investment. The very pledge of the 
national credit, while it demonstrates on the one hand the national 
character of the debt, on the other hand jn^oclaims the notorious risk 
thai attended the debt in its origin, and has attended it ever since. 

The Spanish memoiandum observes that in the last twenty years the 
Antilles have been lepresented in the Spanish Cortes aiurdeclares 
that their representatives have participated in all legislative acts bear- 
ing upon colonial obligations witliont ever ])rotesting against th«4r law- 
fulness or binding foive. The information in the ])ossession of the 
American Commissioners leads to a different conclusion. 

The American Commissioners have in their hands the l>i((rio dc las 
Sesioncs de Cortes, for Thursday, the liDth of July, 1880, when the 
Cuban budget for 188(i-1887 was introduced and discussed. By this 
record it appears that on the day named Senor Fernandez de Castro, a 
Senator from Cuba, referring to the budgets of 1880, 1882, 1883, 1884, 



TREATY OF PEACE. lOl 

and 1886, declared that he had objected to all of them, and that no 
Cuban debt ought to be created, since the obligations embraced in it 
were national and not local. He entered into a brief examination of 
tbe items which constituted the debt, and created something of a sen- 
sation by pointing out that quinine had been consumed in Cuba, 
during the war of 18(58-1878, at the rate of $5,000 a week. 

Another Cuban Senator, Senor jMorelos, supported the views of 
Sefior Fernandez de Castro. 

Senator Carbonell, representing the University of Havana, in a 
speech of great ])ower, continued the argument, saying: "Have the 
people involved in this matter ever been consulted? The country has 
not been heard, and now for the first time has become acquainted with 
the fact that it has to pay such debts.-' 

The Cuban and Porto Rican Senators, Seiiores Portuondo, Ortiz, Labia, 
Montoro, Fernandez de Castro, Figueras, and Yizcarrondo, went fur- 
ther, and introduced a bill to provide tor the payment by Spain of the 
so-called Cuban debt in proportion to the productive capacity of the 
various provinces. 

The protests of the colonial Senators were not heeded, but their jus- 
tice was recognized by no less a Spanish statesman than Sehor Sagasta, 
the present Premier of Spain, then in the opposition, who said: 

"Our treasury is not now sufficiently provided with funds to aid 
Cuba in tlie way and to the extent that we would like to do; but I say 
the Peninsula must give all that it can, and we must do without hesi- 
tation all that we can." 

Was not this a clear acknowledgment of the national character of the 
debt? 

Perhaps not so clear as that made in the decree of autonomy for 
Cuba and Porto Rico, sigtied by the (^ueen Regent of Spain on the 
2oth of November, 1897, and countersigned by Senor Sagasta, as 
President of the Council of Ministers. In Article II of the "Transient 
Articles" of the decree, we find the following declaration: 

"Article II, The manner of meeting the exjienditures occasioned by 
the del)t which now burdens the Cuban and Si)anish treasury, and that 
which shall have been contracted until the termination of the war, 
shall form the subject of a law wherein sliall be determined the part 
payable by each of the treasuries and the special means of paying the 
interest thereon, and of the amortization thereof, and, if necessary, of 
paying the principal, 

" rntil the Cortes of the Kingdom shall decide this point, there shall 
be no change in the conditions on which the aforesaid debts have been 
contracted, or in the ]iayment of the interest and amortization, or in 
the guarantee of said debts, or in the manner in which the i)ayments 
are now made, 

"When the api)ortionment shall have been made by the Cortes it 
shall be for each one of the treasuries to make ])ayment of the part 
assigned to it. 

" Engagements contracted with creditors under the pledge of the good 
faith of the vSpanish nation shall in all cases be scrupulously respected." 

In these detjlarations we find a clear assertion not only of the power 
of the Government of Spain to deal with the so-called Cuban debt as a 
national debt, but also a clear admission that the pledge of the reve- 
nues of Cuba was wholly within the control of that government, and 
could be modified or withdrawn by it at will without affecting the 
obligation of the debt. 

As to what is stated in the Spanish memorandum touching the aid 



102 TREATY OF PEACE. 

given to Cuba in the last century or the early part of the present cen- 
tury by the V^ice Royalty of Mexico, the American Commissioners might 
offer certain pertinent historical observations; but they deem it neces- 
sary now to say only that Mexico is not making any claim before this 
Joint Commission, either directly or indirectly. As to tiie statement 
that ('nl)a has produced during a very few years in the present century 
a sur])lus whicli was turned over to the treasury of the Peninsula, the 
American Commissioners will cite tlie justly celebrated Diccioimrio 
< i c(>(jni liro- E.stad : st i CO il isforico dr l(( Inla de Cnha, by Sefior Don Jacobo 
de la Pezuela. by which (see article on iSefior Don Claudio Martinez, de 
Pinillos) it appears that after 1825 not only were all the expenses of 
tlie island ])aid out of its revenues, but suri)luses were sent, annually 
and regularly, to the mother country. These surpluses from 1850 to 18B0 
amounted to §:U,41(),83<>. And it is to be observed that in addition to 
the regular annual surpluses turned over after 1825, extraordinary 
subsidies were from time to time granted to the Home (Tovernment. It 
was for services rendered in nuitters such as these that Sefior Pinillos 
received the title of Count of Villanueva. 

As to the recent "advances'' to Cuba, referred to in the Spanish 
memorandum, it is to be regretted that details were not given. IJut, 
by the very term ''advances'', it is evident that the Spanish memoran- 
dum does not refer to gifts, but to expenditures for the reimbursement 
of which Cuba was expected ultimately to provide; and the American 
Commissioners do not doubt that these expenditures were nmde for the 
carrying on of the war, or the ]»ayment of war expenses, in Cuba. 

When the American Commissioners, in their memorandum of the 14th 
instant, referred to the Cuban insurrection of 18()8 as the product of 
just grievances, it was not their intention to offend the sensii)ilities of 
the S])anish Commissioners, but to state a fact which they supposed 
to be generally admitted. They might, if they saw lit to do^so, cite the 
authority of many eminent S])anish statesmen in support of their 
remark. They will content themselves with mentioning only one. On 
February 11, 18(i9, Marshal Serrano, President of the Provisional Gov- 
ernment at Madrid, in his speech at the opening of the Constituent 
Cortes, referred to the revoluiion in Spain and the insurrection in Cuba 
in the following terms: "The Revolution is not responsible for this ris- 
ing, which is due to the errors of ])ast Governments; and we hope that 
it will be speedily put down and that tranquillity, based upon liberal 
reforms, will then be durable." (Annual Register, 1S()9, page 'l-'n).) 

The American Commis.sioners have read without olfeiise the reference 
in the Spanish memorandum to the Indian rebellions which it has been 
neces.sary for the United States to suppress, for they are unable to see 
any parallel between the u})risings of those barbarous and often savage 
tribes, which have disapi)eared before the march of civilization because 
they were unable to submit to it, ami the insurrections against Spanish 
rule in Cuba, insurrections in which many of the noblest men of Spanish 
blood in the island have i)artici))ated. 

Nor are the America'.! Commissioners offended by the reference of 
the Spanish memorandum to the attempt of the Southern States to 
secede. The Spanish Commissioners evidently misconceive the nature 
and the object of that movement. The war of secession was fought and 
concluded upon a (juestion of constitutional principle, asserted by one 
party to the conflict and denied by the other. It was a conflict in no 
respect to be likened to the uprisings against Sjianish rule in Cuba. 

The American Commissioners are unaware of the ground on which 



TREATY OF PEACE. 103 

it is asserted in the Spanish memorandum that the United States has 
been compelled to admit that the Cuban people are as yet unlit for the 
enjoyment of full liberty and sovereignty. It is true that an intimation 
of such unfitness was made in the note of the Spanish Government on 
the 22ud of July last. The (Tovernment of the United States, in its 
reply of the oOth of July, declared that it did not share the apprehen- 
sions of Spain in this regard, but that it recognized that in the present 
distracted and prostrate condition of the island, brought about by the 
wars that had waged there, aid and guidance would be necessary. 

The reference in the Spanish memorandum to the obligations of Porto 
Eico is not understood by the American Commissioners, who had been led 
to believe that there was no Porto Kican debt. On June 30, IS^G, Senor 
Castellano, Colonial Minister of Spain, in submitting to the Cortes the 
budget of Porto Rico for 189(>-97, the last one, as it is understood, ever 
framed, said : 

"Tile duty to report to the National representation the financial con- 
dition of Port;* Pico is exceedingly gratifying. It shows the ever grow- 
ing prosperity of the Lesser Antille, which, through the nuiltiplicity of 
its production and the activity of its industry, has succeeded in securing 
markets for its surpluses in the whole world. 

" It being without aaij puJ>Hc debt [sin denda p''(l>Iica), all its neces- 
sities being covered, its treasury being full to repletion, its imblic serv- 
ices being fulfilled with reguhirity, with economy in tlie expenses, and 
with a constantde\"elopnient of the revenues of the state, the spectacle 
afforded by Porto Rico is worthy of attention." 

The Gat-eta de Madrid of July 1, 1890, which published this budget, 
published also a Law, approved June 1'9, 1S96, providing for the dispo- 
sition to be made of the surplus of $1,750,909 in the treasury of Porto 
Eico at the expiration of the fiscal year l"<9r)-96. 

No Porto Pican Loan was ever contracted or floated before 189(3. 

No Porto Rican bonds are quoted in the markets of Europe or 
America. 

It is possible that the (lovernor General of Porto Rico may have 
borrowed money from a bank or from private persons in order to meet 
in advance expenses authorized by the budget, and that he may have 
given ])romissor3^ notes for the amount borrowed, but these notes, paid 
on maturity, do not constitute a Porto Rican debt, in the sense claimed 
by the Spanisli Commission. 

Nor is it to be sui)posed, in view of the flourishing condition of the 
colonial finances, as explained by the Si)anish Minister of the Colonies, 
that any note of the kind referred to remains unpaid. 

The American Commissioners are not ac(piainted with the works of 
the publicists who maintain that the thirteen original United States 
paid to Great Britain ir),000,000 pounds sterling, presumably for the 
extinguishment of colonial debts. The American Commissioners, how- 
ever, feel no interest in the matter, since the statement is entirely 
erroneous. The preliminary and definitive treaties of peace between 
the United States and Great Britain of 1782 and 1783 were published 
soon after their conclusion, and have since been republished in many 
forms. They are the only treaties made between tlie two countries as 
to American independence, and they contain no stipulation of the kind 
referred to. 

Nor do the American Commissioners perceive the relevancy of the 
citation in the Spanish memorandum of the sums paid by the United 
States to France, Spain, Russia, and various Indian nations for terri-. 



104 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tory acquired from tliem. In none of these cases does it appear that 
the United States assumed any debts. Tlie-^money paid by the United 
States was i)aid for tlie teiritoiy. 

As to the case of Texas, the American (Jommissioners have only to 
observe that Texas was an inde])endent state which yiehled up its 
independence to the I'nited States and became a part of the American 
Ivepublic. In view of this extinction of the national sovereignty, the 
United States discluirged the Texan debt. Indeed, the whole reference 
made in tlie Spanish memorandum to the case of Texas is (piite inac- 
curate. The llnited States did not demand of Mexico the independ- 
ence of Texas. That independence was established by tlie inlialiitants 
of Texas themselves, and had long been acknowledged, both by the 
United States and by other ])o\vers, before the voluntary annexation 
of Texas to the United States. 

The payments of money made by the United States to Mexico for terri- 
tory obtained by the former from the latter at the close of the Mexican 
war are referred to in the Spanish memorandum, but these payments 
establislied no principle. They were made by the United States as a 
pait of the general settlement witli Mexico, and it will hardly be argued 
that if the treaty of peace had contained no stii)ulation in the subject, 
anything would have been due from the United States. 

The Spanish memorandum, however, refers to these transactions as 
if they constituted precedents for the proi)Osal put forward by the 
Spanish Commissioners for the arbitration by the United States and 
Spain of the (piestiou whether the whole or any part of the alleged 
Cuban and Porto IJican debts should be assumed or guaranteed by the 
United States. The American Commissioners are compelled to take a 
difierent view of the subject. They have no doubt that if during the 
negotiations with Mexico a proposal had been put forward by either 
party for the arbitration of the question whether iMexico should cede 
the territories demanded by the United States, or whether if they were 
ceded the United States should pay for them, and if so how much, such 
proposal would have been rejected by the other party as entirely inap- 
plicable to the transaction. 

So it is in the present case. The Commissioners of the United States 
and of Spain have met for the purpose of concluding a treaty which is 
to terminate a war. The matters involved in this transaction are mat- 
ters for mutual adjustment and detinitive settlement. They are matters 
to be determined by the parties themselves, and not by any third party. 
Arbitration comes before war, to avert its evils; not after war to escape 
its results. 

As was shown by the American Commissioners in their memorandum 
of the 14th of October, the burdens imposed by Spain upon Cuba in 
the form of the so-called Cuban debt have been the fruitful source of 
Cuban insurrections. In the opinion of the American C'ommissioners 
the time has come for the lifting of this burden, and not for the sub- 
mission to a third paity of the (piestion whether it shall be lifted at all. 

Ilaving answered so much of the Spanish memorandum as relates to 
the vital articles of the Spanish proposals and expounds the Spanish 
views reganling them, the American Commissioners do not think it 
necessary to discuss the renuiining articles, which may be, for the pur- 
pose of this discussion, regarded as nserely subsidiary, and as to which 
they make all necessary reservations. 

Near the close of their memorandum, the Spanish Commissioners say: 

'•It api)ears by this recai>itulation that the only question now pend- 
ing between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is a 



TREATY OF PEACE. 105 

question of money, wliicli, so far as one of the High Contracting Parties 
is concerned, is relatively of secondary importance. That question is 
the one which relates to the colonial debt." 

In this conclusion the American Commissioners concur. 

The American Commissioners have maintained that the proposal by 
the Spanish Commissioners tliat the United States shall assume the 
so-called Cuban debt is in reaiity a i)roposal to affix a condition to the 
unconditional promise made by Spain ii\ the Protocol of August 12, 
1898, to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba"; 
and they have further maintained that the abstention of Spain from 
proposing such a condition at that time precludes her from proposing 
it now. The American Commissioners have declared, and now repeat, 
that if such a proposal had been made during the negotiations that 
resulted in the conclusion of the Protocol it would have terminated 
them, unless it had been withdrawn. 

In confirmation of the position that the Spanish Commission is now 
precluded from proposing the assumption by the United States of the 
so-called Cuban debt, the American Commissioners, besides invoking 
the unconditional stipulation of the Protocol, are able to point to the 
fact that the Spanish Goveinment, in the correspondence that resulted 
in the conclusion of that instrument, took the precaution, in replying 
to the demand of the United States for the relinquishment by Spain of 
all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of 
the island, to refer to the duty which in her opinion rested upon the 
United States under the circumstances to ]>rovide for the protection of 
lite and property in the island until it should have reached the stage of 
self-government. In his note of August 7, 1898, the Duke of Almo- 
dovar, replying to the demand of the United States, said: 

"The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being 
imperative, the nation assuming Spain's plf'.ce must, as long as this 
territory shall not have fully reached the condition reijuired to take 
rank among other sovereign powei-s, provide for rules which will insure 
order and protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the 
Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country." 

If to this reservation, which the American Commissioners have 
de(;lared their readiness to recognize in the treaty, the Spanish Govern- 
ment had desired to add another on the subject of the Cuban debt, the 
opportunity then existed and should have been seized. Indeed, the 
insertion of a few words in the reservation actually made Mould have 
rendered it applicable to the so-called Cuban debt as well as to the pro- 
tection of life and property. 

A labored argument is made in the memorandum submitted by the 
Spanish Commissioners to prove that the Crovernment of the United 
States in declining to take upon itself the so called Cuban debt is act- 
ing in violation of all principles of international law and assumes an 
attitude hitherto unknown in the history of civilized nations. Cases 
supposed to be apposite are cited, showing the assumption of national 
debts where one sovereignty is absorbed by another, or a division of 
national indebtedness where a nation is deprived of an integral part of 
its domain, either by cession, or the attainment of independence by a 
colony theretofore charged with raising a i)art of the national revenue. 
Elsewhere we have pointed out the ditterences manifestly existing 
between the cases cited and the one in hand. The United States may 
well rest its case upon this point upon the plain terras of the Protocol, 
which, as the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners^ 
well says, contains the agreement between the parties — "for no other* 



106 TREATY OF PEACE. 

was formulated betwoen tlie two parties", aud which is executed when 
Spain reliiKiuishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. If 
the question were still open tlie United States might well challenge the 
fullest iuijuiiy into tlie e(piity of this demand. 

Itisurgedin the Spanish Commissioners' memorandum that theUuited 
States, erroneously believing in the justice of the cause of Cuban inde- 
pendence, nmde it its own, and took up arms in its behalf. ^'The U nited 
States", so declares the Spanish memorandum, "made a demand on 
Spain, and afterwards declared war on her, that Cuba might become 
free and indei)eii(lent.'' Tlie causes of the demand of the United States 
for the termination of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba areami)ly shown in 
the history of the events which i)receded it. For many years the United 
States ])atiently endured a condition of affairs in Cuba whi(,'h gravely 
atfected the interests of the nation. As early as 1875 President Grant 
called attention to all its dread horrors and the conse([uent injuries to 
the interests of the United States and other nations, and also to the 
fact that the agency of others, eitlier by mediatioTi or by intervention, 
seemed to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be invoked 
for the termination of the strife. Dnring that administration, notwith- 
standing that it was clearly intimated to Spain that the United States 
could no longer endure the situation — which had become intolerable—, 
no unfriendly action was taken, and for ten years it suffered all the 
inconvenience and deprivation, destruction of trade and injury to its 
citizens incident to the struggle, which was ended by the Peace of 
Zanjon, only to break out again and to be waged with every feature of 
horroi- and desolation and profitless strife which had characterized the 
former struggle. 

President Cleveland, in his Annual Message of 1890, was constrained to 
say to the Congress of the United States : " When the inability of Spain 
to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it 
is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all pur- 
poses of its rightfnl existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its 
re establishmeut has degenerated into a strife wiiich means nothing 
more than the useless sacritice of human life and the utter destruction 
of the very subject-marter of the conflict, a situation will be presented 
in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded 
by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and 
discharge". Throughout President Cleveland's administration this 
situation was patiently endured, at great loss and expense to the 
United States, which then and at all times was diligent in maintaining 
the highest obligations of neutrality, through the vigilance of its navy 
and its executive and judicial de]>artments. 

The present Chief Executive of the United States, in his first Annual 
jNIessage, in 181)7, again called attention to the disastrous effects upon 
our interests of the warfare still being waged in Cuba. The patient 
waiting of the people of the United States for the termination of these 
conditions culminated in the Message of April L', 18*>8, of the President 
to Congress, in which he said: "The long trial has proved that the 
ol>ject for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire 
of insurrection may flanu^ or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it 
has not been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present 
methods. The only hope ol" relief an;! repose from a condition which 
can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the 
name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered 
American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and 
to act, the war in Cuba must stoj)." Acting upon this JNIessage the 
Congress of the United States, in the Resolution approved by the Presi- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 107 

(lent April 20, 1898, which has been so often referred to in the memo- 
randum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, based its demand 
that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government 
in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its forces from Cuba aiid Cuban 
waters, upon conditions in Cuba (so near the United States) which were 
declared to be such that they could no longer be endured. 

It is not necessaiy to recite the record of the events which followed 
that demand, well known to the members of this Commission, and 
which are now a part of the history of the world. It is true that the 
enforced relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty will result in the free- 
dom and independence of the Island of Cuba and not in the aggran- 
dizement of the United States. This rc'suinc' of events which led to 
the United States taking up arms is not made to wound the suscepti- 
bilities of the Spanish nation, or its distinguished representatives upon 
this Commission, but, in view of the truth of history and the statements 
made in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, 
less could not be said by the representatives of the United States. Not 
having taken up arms for its own advancement, having refrained from 
acquiring sovereignty over Cuba, the United States now seeks to 
attain a peace consistent with its ends and purposes in waging war. 
In asking, as a victorious nation, for some measure of re])aration, it has 
not emulated the exanii)les of other nations and demanded reparation 
in money for the many millions spent and the sufferings, privations 
and losses endured by its people. Its relations to Cuba have been 
those of a people suffering without reward or the hope thereof. 

The American Commissioners therefore feel that they are fully justi- 
fied both in law and in morals in refusing to take upon themselves in 
addition to the burdens already incurred the obligation of discharging 
the so called colonial debts of Spain — debts, as heretofore sho^\n,chietly 
incuried in opposing tlie object for the attainment of which the resolu- 
tion of intervention was adopted by the Congress and sanctioned by the 
President of the United States. If it could be admitted, as is argued 
in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, that the 
United States in this relation stands as the agent of the Cuban people, 
the duty to resist the assumption of these heavy obligations would be 
equally imperative. The decrees of the Spanish Government itself show 
that tiiese debts were incurred in the fruitless endeavors of that Gov- 
ernment to suppress the aspirations of the Cuban people for greater 
liberty and freer government. 



True copy ; 



John B. Moore. 



Protocol No. 11. Protocolo No. 11. 

Conference of October 31, 1898. Conferencia del 31 Octubre de 1898. 

Present On the part of the Presentes. Por parte de los Es- 

United States. Messrs Day tados Unidos de America, los 

Davis Frye Gray Eeid Moore SeHores Day. Davis. Frye. Gray. 

Fergnsson Eeid. Moore. Fergusson. 

On the pait of Spain Messrs. Por parte deEspaha. los Senores 

Montero-Rios Abarzuza, Garnica, Montero liios. Abarzuza. Garnica. 

Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Villa-Urrntia. Cerero. Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding Fue leida y aprobada el acta de- 

session was read and approved. la sesion anterior. 



108 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The American Corainissioners 
stated that, in accordauce with the 
uuderstaudiiig' expressed in the 
protocol wliich liad just been read, 
they were prepared to i)resent their 
proposal on the subject of the Phil- 
ipi)iiies. Tiie proposal was read in 
En.ulish and translated into Span- 
ish, and delivered to the Spanish 
Commissioners. It was as follows : 

"The American Commissioners, 
havin<i- been invited by the Spanish 
Commissioners at the last confer- 
ence to i)resent a pro))Osition in 
regard to the Philippine Islands, 
beg to submit the following arti(?le 
on that subject: 

'"Spain hereby cedes to the 
United States the archipelago 
known as the Philippine Islands, 
and lying within the following line: 
A hne running along the parallel 
of latitude L'l^ 30' ^^orth from the 
118tli to the 127th degree meridian 
of longitude East of Greenwich, 
thence along the 127th degree me- 
ridian of longitude Kast ot'Creeu- 
wich to the parallel of 4'^ 45' j^orth 
latitude, tlience ahjng the i)arallel 
of 4° 40' North latitude to its inter- 
section with the meridian of longi- 
tude 119° 35' East of Greenwich, 
thence along the meridian of longi- 
tude 119° 35' East of Greenwich 
to the parallel of lati tude 7° 40' 
North, thence along the parallel of 
latitude of 7° 40' North to its in- 
tersection Willi the ll<)th degree 
meridian of longitude East of 
Greenwich, thence by a direct line 
to the intersection of the 10th de- 
gree parallel of North latitude with 
the 118th degree meridian of longi- 
tude i^jastof Greenwich, and thence 
along the 118th degree meridian of 
longitude East of Greenwich to the 
parallel of latitude 21° 30' North.' 



"A proper reference to the ces- 
sion thus i)ropose(l maybe inserted 
in the article of the treaty relat- 
ing to i)ublic property, ar(;hives 
and records in tc^rritory which 
Sjtain cedes or over which she 
relinquishes her sovereignty. 



El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana, manifiesta que, con- 
forme al acuerdo (jue consigna el 
acta que acaba de leerse, los Com- 
isarios Americanos estan dispues- 
tosii presentar su proposicion rela- 
tiva a Filipinas. La. proposicion 
es leida en ingles, dispucs en esjia- 
nol, y entregada a los Comisarios 
Esiianoles. Su contenido es el si- 
gn i en te: 

"LosComisarios Americanos, ha- 
biendo sido invitados por los Com- 
isarios Espanoles en la ultima con- 
ferencia a i)resentar una proposi- 
cion respecto de las Islas Filipinas, 
se pcrmiten someter sobre esta 
cuestion el articulo siguiente. 

"Iilspanapor este articulo cede 
A los Estados ITnidos el ar('hi|)icl- 
ago conocido por Islas Filipinas, 
situado dentro de las lineas sig- 
uieiites: una linea (jue corre a lo 
largo del ])aralelo 21° 30' de latitud 
Norte desde el grado 118 hasta el 
grado 127 del meridiano de longi- 
tud Este de Greenwich; y de aqui 
a lo largo del grado 127 meridiano 
de loiigitud F]ste de Greenwich 
hasta el ])aralelo 4° 45' de latitud 
Norte; y de aqui a lo largo del 
paralelo 4° 45' latitud Norte hasta 
su interseccion con el meridiano de 
longitud 119° 35' Este de Green- 
wich; de aqui a lo largo del me- 
ridiano de longitud 119° 35' Este 
de Greenwich, al paralelo de lati- 
tud 7° 40' Norte: de atiui a lo 
largo del paralelo de latitud 7° 40' 
Norte, hasta su interseccicm con el 
grado 110 del meridiano de longi- 
tud Este de Greenwich; de aqui 
por una linca directa a la intersec- 
cion del decimo grado paralelo de 
latitud Noite con cl 1 18 grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, y de aqui a lo largo del 
grado 118 meridiano de longitud 
Este de Greenwich al paralelo de 
latitud 21° 30' Norte. 

'' Una irencion oportuna de la 
cesi(')ii asi propuesta, i)uede scr iii- 
sertada en el articnlo del Tratado 
relativo a la propicdad ])nblica, 
Arcliivos y actas notariales en los 
territorios que Es))afia cede 6 a 
ciiya soberauia renuncia. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



109 



"The American Commissioners 
beg further to state that tliey are 
prepared to insert in the treaty a 
stipulation for the assumption by 
the United tStates of any existing 
indebtedness of Spain incurred 
for public works and improvements 
of a pacific character in the 
Philippines." 

The Spanish Commissioners 
asked for an adjournment in order 
that they might examine the ])ro- 
posal, and either accept it or pre- 
sent a counter proposal, and sug- 
gested that the Commission should 
meet again on Friday, the 4th of 
November, at two o'clock, p. m., 
without prejudice to asking for a 
postponement, if it should be nec- 
essary. 

This suggestion was accepted, 
and the conference was accordingly 
adjourned. 

William E. Day 
CusHMAN K. Davis 
Wm. P Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Eeid. 
John B. Moore. 



"Los Comisarios Americanos se 
permiten ademas manifestar que 
estan dispuestos a insertar en el 
Tratado una estipulacion por la 
que asumiran los Esstados Unidos 
cualquiera deuda de Espana con- 
trafda para obras publicas 6 
mejoras de caracter pacitico en 
Fiii])inas." 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pideu 
un aplazamiento para estudiar 
dicha i)roposicion y sugieren que 
anibas Comisiones se reunan de 
nuevo el vierues proximo a las 2 P. 
M., sin perjuicio de pedir un nuevo 
plazo si fuese necesario. 



Aceptada esta indicaciou, se 
levanto la sesion. 

E. MONTERO Eios 
B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA 

W E DE Villa Urrutia 
Eafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 12. 

Conference of November 4, 1898. 



Protocolo No 12. 

Confereneia del 4 de Noviemhre de 

1898. 



Present — On the part of the 
United States: Messrs. Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs. 
Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Yilla-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission stated that, having 
carefully examined the i^roposal of 
the American (Commissioners in re- 
lation to the J*hilippines, he pre- 
sented a counter- proposal on that 
subject, which counter-proposal he 
delivered to the Secretary of the 
Spanish Commission, who handed 
it to the Secretary of the American 
Commission. 



Presentes Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de America, los 
Senores Day. Davis. Frye. Gray. 
Eeid. Moore Fergusson 

Por parte de Espana los Senores 
Montero Eios. Abarzuza. Garnica. 
Villa-Urrutia. Cerero. Ojeda. 

Fuc leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesi(')n anterior. 

El Presidente de la Comision Es- 
panola maniflesta que despues de 
haber examiuado ateutamente la 
proposici<')n delos Comisarios Ame- 
ricanos, relativa a Filipiuas, pre- 
senta una contraproposicion sobre 
el mismo asunto, que entrega al 
Secretario dela Comision Espahola, 
quien a su vez la pone en manos 
del Secretario de la Comision Ame- 
ricana. 



no 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The American Commissioners de- 
siring? to have the counterproposal 
translated to tlieni immediately, it 
was read in Eniilish by their Inter- 
preter; and it is annexed to the 
protocol. 

The President of" the American 
Commission then stated that as 
they understood from the reading 
of the paper that their proposal 
was rejected, they had under the 
rules aright to lile a memorandum 
in writing in support thereof, and 
that, under the circumstances, and 
in order that the paper presented 
by tlie Spanish Commissioners 
might be carefully translated and 
considered, the American Commis- 
sioners desired an adjournment till 
Tuesday, the 8th of November, at 
two o'clock, p, m. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
agreed to the adjournment, but 
stated that, as their paper, besides 
rejecting the American proposal, 
also i)ut forward a counter i>ro- 
posal, they understood that they 
would have the right to submit a 
memorandum in writing in support 
of such counter-proposal, if the 
American Commissioners should 
reject it. 

The Commissioners concurring 
in opinion upon these matters, the 
conference was adjourned to the 
day ijreviously fixed. 

William 11. Day 

CusHMAN K. Davis 

Wm. P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Reid. 

John B. Moore. 



Los Comisarios Americanos de- 

seando'qne fiiese inmediatamente 
traducida diclia contrai)roi)osici6n, 
fu('' leula en ingles por su inter- 
prete y anadida en calidad de an- 
exo al presente Protocolo. 

VA Presidente de la Comision 
Americana manifiesta que entiende 
que de la lectu^a del anterior doc- 
umento se desprende ser rechazada 
la proposicion de la Comision Amer- 
icana, y que segun el reglamento 
tiene esta el derecho de i)resentar 
un Memorandum escrito en apoyo 
de aquella; que en vista de ello y 
a tin de que pndiera ser traducido 
cuidadosameute y exam in ado el 
documeuto presentado, los Comisa- 
rios Americanos deseaban aplazar 
la conferencia hasta el martes 8 de 
^sToviembre a las 2. P. m. 

Los Comisarios Espailoles asien- 
ten al aplazamiento, pero anadem 
que el documento por ellos presen- 
tado adeniiis de rechazar la propo- 
sicion Americana contiene una con 
tra-proposicion y que por tanto en- 
tienden que asimismo teudrian el 
derecho de presentar un Memoran- 
dum por escrito en apoyo de su 
contra-proposicion si esta fuese re- 
chazada por los comisarios Ameri- 
canos. 

Siendo esto acordado por los 
Comisarios, se aplaza la conferen- 
cia hasta el dia y hora anterior- 
mente citados. 

E. MONTERO Eios 

B. DE Abarzuza 

J. DE GARNICA 

W R DE Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de O.jeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 12. 
comision para la nefxociacion de la paz con los estados 

UNIDOS. 



PROPOSICION. 



La Comision Espafiola ha leido con viva sorpresa la proposicion que 

la Americana ha i)resentado en lasesion del 31 del ultimo mes deOctubre. 

El tmico articulo que en ella se contiene, estd reducido a que Espaiia 



TREATY OF PEACE. Ill 

ceda fi los Estados Uuidos el archipielago coiiocido por Islas Filipiuas, 
sitnado eu el penmetro alii geograticamente determinado. 

Contiene ademas dicha pioposicioii, aunque uo para (jue formen parte 
del articulo, dos parrafos de los cuales el segniido es de una importancia 
tal, que exige que la Comision espafiola ha^-a de ocuparse eu este escrito 
especialmeute de su conteuido. 

Los Couiisarios espauoles acabau de decir que les ha causado viva 
sorpresa esta i)roposici6u, y es de su deber exponer las razones que tal 
sentimiento explican. 

Desde la priineia conferencla liasta la ultima, los Seuores Couiisarios 
Americauos sostuvierou coustanteuieiite, y alegarou conio principal 
fuudamento de los proyectos sobre Cuba y Puerto Rico, (]ue en estas 
conferencias, anibas Comlsiones tenian que atenerse a las bases estable- 
cidas en los preliminares de paz, que liabian sido con venidos y firmados 
el 1-5 de Agosto ultimo, Lo mismo decian y continuan diciendo los 
Comisarios Espauoles. La unica diferencia eutre los unos y los otros 
consistio eu que los Americanos sosteuian que aquel docuiuento babia 
de ser enteudido extrictameute en su sentido literal, sin (pierer tomar 
en consideraciou para fijar este sentido ningiin otro dato, antecedente 
ni docuniento. Y como en el Protocolo no se liabia escrito la frase 
"Deuda de Cuba 6 de Puerto Rico", eutendian que por esta razon 
Espana debia transmitir 6 ceder su soberania sobre aquellas islas, que- 
dandoseconsus obligaciones. Los Couiisarios Espauoles, por la in versa, 
eutendian (jue el sentido literal del Protocolo debia tijarse tenieudo 
preseutes uo solo las reglas geuerales del Derecbo iuternacioual sobre 
interpretacion de los tratados, sino tambirn las negociaciones en que 
anibas partes lo habian preparado y en que de autemano lo liabian 
oficialmente iuterpretado. 

Pues bieu, la proi»osici6u pretendiendo la cesion por Espana de las 
Islas Filipiuas a los Estados TJnidos, no solameute uo cabe dentro de 
los articulos del I'rotocolo, sino que esta en notoria coutradiccion con 
el, y es, eu opinion de la Coniisi(')n espafiola, su tlagrante infraccion. 

Contiene aquel couvenio seis articulos y de ellos solameute el tercero 
se retiere al Archipielago Filipino. Dice asi literalmente traducido 
del texto oficial frances: 

"Los Estados Uuidos ocuparan y teudran la ciudad, la bahia y el 
puerto de Manila, esperando la conclusion de un tratado de paz que 
debeni determiuar la inspeccion (controle), la disposicion y el gobierno 
de las Filipiuas.'*' Esto es lo uuico que hay en el Protocolo sobre el 
archipielago. 

Aunque la Comision espafiola adoptase para la interpretacion de este 
articulo, el estrecho criterio del sentido literal que la americana so- 
stiene (por extrano que sea este sostenimiento), que debe aplicarse, no se 
podria decir otra cosa sino que eu aquella disposicion se acordo la 
ocupacion ineramente temporal o provisional de Manila y su puerto y 
bahia por los Estados LTnidos liasta que se hiciese el tratado de paz en 
que se habia de determiuar 6 convenir sobre la inspeccion, la disposicion 
y el gobierno de Filipiuas. 

;„Qu!^ tiene esto que ver con uu cambio 6 cesion de soberania? 

La priniera parte del articulo es conipletamente clara. ISTo ofrece la 
meflor duda de que alii lo uiiico que se convino sobre Manila, su bahia 
^ puerto, fue su ocupacion, no definitiva, sino provisional, por los 
Estados Unidos, ocupacion que no habia de durar mas que hasta la 
celebracion del Tratado de paz. Ko necesita el sentido literal del texto 
comprobacion alguna. Mas si la necesitara, pueden los Seuores Comi-' 
sarios Americanos registrar el niimero 19 del Libro amarillo, que acaba 



112 TREATY OF PEACE. 

de publicai- el (Jobierno de hi Republica Francesa. Dicho uumero con- 
tieue la Circulai- que a los tres dias de tlnnado el Protocolo, dirigio el 
Seuor Ministro de uegocios extrniig-eros de Fiancia a sns Euibajadores 
en Europa, dandoles cueuta de la uiision a que el (xobieriio de la 
Itepublica se liabia prestado que desempenaia su Eiubajador eu Wasli- 
ingtoii para. otVecer la ])az al Gobieruo de los Estados (juidos eu uoni- 
bre del de !Su Majestad Catolica. Y eu esta Circular dice el Seuor 
Miuistro (jue su Euibajador eu aiiuella capital habia iiriuado eu uombre 
de Ijspaua, y a su ruego, un Protocolo que couteuia las exigeucias de 
los listados Uuidos para la paz. Euuiuera el Seuor Miuistro tales 
exigeucias y respecto a Filijjiuas cousigua, como la uuica (jue couteuia 
a^iuei docuuieuto, la ocupavion PEOVl!SJ()^ AL <le Manila par lasfuerza.s 
anierleaiias. 

Jjos Seuores Comisarios Auiericauos uo descouoceniu la iucoutrasta- 
ble tuerza uioral del testiiuouio del Seuor Miuistro de la Kepublica 
Fraucesa, auiiga por igual de los dos Estados beligerautes, y cuyo Seuor 
Miuistro uo podia saber el couteuido del Protocolo, siuo i)or el aiitori- 
zadisiuio couducto de su Euibajador, que lo liabia disrutido, conveuido 
y tiriuado eu uombre de l^^spafia cou el Gobieruo Americauo. 

El caracter nierameute provisioual de tal ocupacibu subsistio aiin 
despui'S de tirmado el Protocolo, cuaudo, coutra lo couveuido eu su 
articulo 0", el Geueral Merritt se apoderb de la plaza por la tuerza. 
Eu el ultimo p;lrratb del uumero 5 de ias reglas couveuiilas para la 
cai)itulaci(ui y que fuerou firmadas eu 14 de Agosto en uouibre del 
EJcrcito Americiiuo por el Brigadier (ieueral de voluutarios Mr. E. V. 
Greeu, por el (Jtijiitau de la iMariua Americaua ]\[r. Lambertou, por el 
Tenieute Corouel e iuspector (jeueral Mr. Whittier y por el Teuieute 
Corouel y Juez Abogado Mv. Crowder, se lee lo siguieute: "La devo- 
lucitiu de las aruuis depositadas por las fuerzas Espauolas, teudra lugar 
cuaiido se evacue la plaza ]>()r las mismas o por el Ejerclto Americano.'''' 

Euteudiau, pues, los que esto tiruiaban que las fuerzas Amerlcauas no 
ocupabau deiiuitivameute la plaza porque supouiau que ])od!a llegar el 
caso de (pie luibierau de evacuarla. Y si supouuiu esto, claro es que 
enteudian que era merameiite provisioual la ocupaciou. 

Es verdad: las fraces '-iuspeccifui, disposiciou y gobierno delas Fili- 
piiuis'' uo tieue uu seutido claro. El Gobieruo Espauol y su Represen- 
taute eu Washington ya lo hicierou notar reclamado su explicaciou al 
Gobierno Americauo (que no la dib), antes de lirmarse el Protocolo. 
Pero cualipiiera (]ue sea la que ahora iuteute dar, no puede llegarse. eu 
inuguu caso, a pretender (pie tales frases encierreu el pensamieuto de 
la cesi(')U de la soberauia de Esi)ar!a eu el archipit'lago. Esta ceshui 
alii conveuida, o sea la adquisicichi a perpetuida(l del archipiidago por 
los l^^stados Uuidos, estaria en coutradicciou con la occupacion exclu- 
sivauuuite teiuporal do Manila, tauibicm alii acordada, ya (pie esta 
expresamente cousignada en el misuio parrafo. 

i^o podrian uuuca tampoco admitirsc con arreglo a las niaximas de 
interi)retacion de las Tratados por(pie tal supuesta cesiiui seria nn bene- 
ticio :i favor de (piieues se uegarou a aclarar sin alegar para, ello razon 
alguna valedera, cuando oportunameute se les pidio, el<;()ncepto que ya 
eutonces aparecia ambiguo ('■ indeterminado de tales frases; y porque 
aun sin tal razon, habria lugar ;i aplicar a los Seuores Counsarios Ameri- 
canos, con el fundamento (jueellos uotuvierou para aplicarla alos espa- 
holes (segun estos entieuden), la razon (pie cousignaron en su ultimo 
Meuioiaudum, y segun la cual, "la abstencion de Ivspaua de propouer 
en el Protocolo la condi(5ibu del transpaso de la Deiida, la iucapacitaba 
para propoucrla a]u)ra." Los Estados Uuidos se abstuvierou de pro- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 113 

poner a Espafia en el Protocolo, franca y abiertamente, como franca y 
abiertamente debe consig-narse todo en los Tratados que siempie se 
otorgan para ser entendidos y cumplidos de buena fe, la cej>i6n de su 
Soberania en el arcliipi!''la;40. No lo hiciei'on, y por eso estan incapaci- 
tados de proi)oiierla abora. 

Cuanto precede realmente sobra porque existe la prueba irrefutable 
para los Senores Comisanos Americanos de que al lirmarse el Protocolo 
de Washington el dignisirno Senor Presidente de la Union no solo no 
abrigaba el pensamienfo de (]ue Espana hubiese de ceder el Archi- 
pielago Filij)ino a los Estados Unidos, sino que abrigaba el pensamiento 
contrario, o sea el de que Esi>aria hai:)rii de conservar alli su Soberania. 

En la couferencia que el Embajador de Francia Senor Cambon tuvo 
en 4 de agosto ultimo con Mr, Mac-Kinley a i^resencia de su Secretario 
de Estado, liaci -ndole observaciones sobre la cesion de la Isla de Puerto 
Rico en compensacion de los gastos de la guerra, el Senor Presidente 
le contest!) mostrandose inflexible en este punto. y le repitio que la 
cuestion de Filipinas era la linica que no estaba ya definitivamcnte 
resuelta en su pensamiento. Con tal motivo el Senor Cambon le |)idi() 
explicaciones sobre el sentido de las sobredicbas frases de la clausula 
3"' relativa ;\1 Arcbipi -lago Filipino, poniue aparecia redactada en 
terminos que podian prestarse a los temores de Espaila respecto a su 
soberania en aqxeUas Islas. El Senor Presidente le coiUesto las sigui- 
entes textuales palabras: "No quiero dejar subsistir ningun equivoco 
sobre este particular. Los negociadores de los dos paises serau los que 
resuelvau cuales sean las ventajas permanentes" (fijese la atenciim en 
la frase: no " derechos") "que pedirenios en el arcbipielago, y en fin los 
que decidan la intervencion, {contrdle). disposicion y gobierno de Fili- 
pinas" y agrego " El Gobierno de Madrid puede teuer la seguridad de 
que, hasta ahora, no hay nada resiielfo, a priori en mi pensamknto contra 
Espana^ asi como considero que no bay nada decidido contra los Estados 
Unidos." ^ Cabe en lo posible que nadie dude de que el 12 de Agosto el 
Senor Presidente de los Estados Unidos al firmar su Secretario de 
Estado el Protocolo, no tenia el pensamiento de exigir a Espana la 
cesion de su Soberania en el arcbipielago para los Estados Unidos? 

Pero bay m4s: no solo no tenia ese prop(')sito, sino que sus frases 
demuestran que tenia el de que Espana habia de conservar aquella 
Soberania. Segiin el los Comisionados en Paris babian de acordar las 
ventajas permanentes que los Estados Unidos pedirian en el arcbipielago. 
Pnes si Espana no bubiera de conservar su soberania, ; que ventajas 
para el porvenir era posible que pidieranlos Comisionados de los Estados 
Unidos ii Espana y que esta liabia de poder concederles ? Si los Estados 
Unidos se babian de quedar con la soberania, ^como se explica que sus 
Comisionados en Paris bubieran de pedir a Espana ventajas en un 
arcbipielago que el mlsmo tiempo babian de reclamar y recibir como 
suyo ■? 

Mas aiin bay otra prueba, tan irrefutable como la anterior de que el 
Gobierno de Wasbiugtou no solamente entonces estaba ageuo a todo 
pensamiento y proposito sobre la soberania del Arcbipielago Filipino, 
sino que consinti(3 que esta bubiera decontinuaren Espano, excluyendo 
en su propio ])ensamiento toda mudanza sobre este punto ai redactar 
primero y al firmar despues la clausula 3* del Protocolo. 

Contestando al Gobierno de Espana, por su despacbo de 7 de Agosto, 
al Honorable Senor Secretario de Estado en Wasbingtou, que le habia 
hecbo saber en el suyo del 31 de Julio las condiciones, tales como 
aparecen redactadas e incluidas en el Protocolo, bajo las cuales et- 
T p 8 



114 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Gobieriio Americano estaba dispuesto ;'i poner tenniiio ii la guerra, le 
clecia el Miuistro espanol sobrc la base 3 ' k)-que sigue: 

"La base releientea las Lslas Filipiiias parece a iinestra iuteligeneia 
demasiado iiideteriniiiada. Va\ ])riiiier t;''r;iiino el titiilo invocado por 
los Estados I'liidos para la ot'U])aci(m de la bahia, puerto y ciudad de 
Manila, esperando la eoiiclusioii de uu Tratado de paz, no puede ser el 
de coiKjnista, i)orque la eiudad de Manila se detieude ann: a pesar del 
bloqueo por mar y el asedio por tierra, a(|uel ])or la Hota Americana, y 
cste por las fuerzas que acaudilla un indigeua alentado y perlrecliado 
por el Almirante, la baudera espanola no lia sido arriada. Eu segundo 
lugar el Arcliipk'lago Filipino se lialla intacto en poder y bajo la 
soberauia de Espana. Eutieude pues el Gobieruo Espanol que la ocupa- 
ci<')n temporal de Manila liabra de coustituir una garantia. Dicese que 
en el Tratado de paz se determinara la intervencion, la disposicion y el 
gobierno de Filipinas, y como la intencion del Gobierno federal queda 
per dennis velada en esta clausula intercsa d cste Gobierno con.sifjnar 
que aciptiDido la base tercera no reauncia a jyriori a la Sohcrania total del 
Arehipu'laijo Fiii2>ino, dejando a los negociadores el cuidado de estipular 
acerca de las reformas aconsejahles por la situacion de aquellas posesiones 
y el nirel de cultura de sus natKrahs. El Gobierno de Su Majestad acepta 
la base o"- aeompa'uula per la declaracidn siipradicha.'''' 

Bien claro ap'arece que el (Tobierno Es})anol no acept('> la I'lnica base 
que eu el Protocolo hay sobre Filiianas, sino en cuanto en ella se (pii- 
siera decir que Manila no liabia de ser mas (jue temporalmente ocupada, 
como garantia, y que la intervencion, la disposicion y el gobierno de 
que en la base se bablaba, tendrian por unico objeto el regimen y gobi- 
erno interior de aquellas islas, pero no su soberauia total que Espana 
expresamente se reservaba y liabia de couservar. 

Contra esta iuterpretacion dada de antemano por el Gobierno de Su 
Majestad Catolica a la base tercera del Protocolo, y eu cuyo unico 
sentido la aceptaba, nada dijo, nada indico el Gobierno de Washington 
antes de tirniarlo. Por la inversa el Seilor Secretario de Estado al 
remitir al Sefior Embajador de Francia la niinuta del Protocolo que 
liabia de nrmarse le decia en una carta, (pie la nota del Gobierno Espa- 
iiol (que era la eu que se liallaban las frases auteriormente transcritas,) 
contenia en su espiritu la aceptaci(3u por Espana de las coiulieiones 
propuestas ])or los Estados Unidos. Por consiguiente la condicicju 
tercera liabia sido redactada por el Gobierno Americano en el mismo 
sentido en que la enteud.a el Gobieruo I'^spanol, porque no podia decir, 
en otro caso, el ^efior Secretario de Estado, con vista de la isota en que 
constaba el unico sentido aceptable para el Gobierno Espanol, que este 
la aceptaba. 

Asi pues; los Estados Unidos podran reclamar lioy tal soberauia, 
mas para esta re('laiiuici(')n no pueden fundarse en el Protocolo. 

Y ^,que otro titulo que no sea este i)uedeii alegar contra la voluntad 
de Espana? 

Eu el protocolo se fijaron las bases que los Estados Unidos exigian a 
lOspafia para la paz, 6 lo que es lo mismo todas las coudiciones que los 
Estados Unidos iniponian a l^]spana para (jue juidiera acpiella restable- 
cerse entre los dos paises. A la vez se acordo alli, la inmediata susj)en- 
si(')n de las liostilidades, sasi)ensi('in (pie por parte de Espana fue 
religiosamente observada liasta el presente; Por lo tanto los Estados 
Unidos no pueden ni tienen derecho para exigir boy a Espana mas 
coudiciones onerosas, que las contenidas en el Protocolo, por causas 
anteriores a su Ceclia, una vez (pie entonces no impusierou mas (pie las 
(jue alli estan escritas, daudose con su aceptacicm por satisfeclios 5 ni 



TREATY OF PEACE. 115 

por causas posteriores ya que desde eutonces Espana no ejecuto acto 
alg'uuo de agrevSi(')n iii dio motivo ji nuevas exigeucias ui reclamaciones 
de los Estados Uiiidos. 

Si por luotivos que no cst;iu en la esfera de la comijetencia de la 
Coniision Espauola, el Gobierno Americano desea ahora adquirir la sobe- 
rania del arcliipielago filipino, no es cieitaniente el medio adeeuado 
para el logro de su proposito una reclamacion lieclia al amparo de los 
preliminares de paz convenidos en el Protocolo flrmado en Washing- 
ton en 12 de Agosto por ambas Altas Partes. 

Los Comisarios Espafioles indicarou al principio de este escrito que 
el 2'' piarafo que desj)ui's del proyectado articulo contenia la proposi- 
cion Americana era de tal importancia que les imponia la necesidad de 
ocnparse especialmente de su contenido. 

Diehos Sres Comisarios manitestau en el que estan disijuestos a 
insertar en el tratado una estipulacion por la que asuminin los Estados 
Unidos cualquiera denda de Espana contraida i)ara obras publicas 6 
mejoras de caracter pacifico en Eilipinas. 

El Arcbipielago esta efectivamente gravado con una deuda de 200 
milloues de pesetas, garantizada con la liipoteca de los productos y 
reudimientos de la Aduana de Manila; y pesan ademas sobre la Corona 
obligaciones, cargas de justicia y otras pensiones de menor importancia, 
del servicio exclusivo de aquella Colonia. 

IVjr lo que hace a la deuda bipotecaria, ya ban consignado los Comi- 
sarios Espafioles con ocasion de la deuda de la misma clase que pesa 
bipotecariamente sobre la renta de las Aduanas y sobre todos los 
impnestos, directos 6 indirectos de la Isla de Cuba, que no pueden 
siqniera admitir discusion acercadel valor yeticacia de tales bipotecas. 

Constituidas legalmente por un Soberano legitimo y legitimamente 
adquiridas por los particulares de diversas nacionalidades que se inte- 
resaron en equellas operaciones de crcdito, Espan^a no es duefia de los 
derecbos de estas terceras i)ersonas que est;in al amparo de las leyes 
que protegen la i)ropiedad privada, para que en un Tratado con los 
Estados Unidos ni con otra Poteiicia alguua, pueda consentir en nada 
que signibque 6 implique una lesion de derecbos que no son suj^os. Se 
lo vedan los deberes mas elementales de la probidad publica y privada. 

Espafia no reclania el reconocimiento de esas deudas bipotecarias para 
su propio beneticio, puesto que su tesoro no se ba obligado a pagar tales 
deudas sino subsidiariamente, esto es, solamente en el caso en que no 
fueran suticientes las rentas (' im])uestos bipotecados. Si bace tal recla- 
macion es solamente en cumplimiento de un deber moral que pesa 
sobre todo deudor bonrado y adenias en beneticio de los tenedores de 
su deuda propia, los cuales no podrian menos de ver un peligro para sus 
intereses en el becbo de que Espana, sin estar a ello obligada, recargase 
las obligaciones de su tesoro con otras cuantiosas a que bubiera de 
atender juntamente (lue a las suyas propias y corriendo el peligro de 
que sus recnrsos no bastasen para atender a todas. La deuda y obli- 
gaciones de las Colonias que a ella directamente interesan son las que no 
gozan del privilegio de una bipoteca, porque respecto a ellas esta princi- 
palmente obligada al pago, y entieude que no es justo que cuando las 
ba contraido por y para sus colonias, baya de coutinuar despues de 
perderlas, gravada con tales cargas, que son, despues de todo, una 
pequeiia parte del inmenso capital que en aquellas se invirtio y que ba 
cubierto con sus propios recursos. 

Quede dicbo, por lo tanto, y esperan los Comisarios Espafioles que nq^ 
babran de tener necesidad de repetirlo, que Espana no puede ni debe,* 



116 TREATY OF PEACE. 

porijue el lespeto a lo ag'eiio se lo veila, couv^enir eu este tratado, iii eii 
iiinguno, Kobie iiada que iiiipliqne la Iesi<'>U'6 la snpresiou o siquiera 
de.s<'()iio;'iaiient() de dereclios privados y ag'eiios contra la voluutad de 
siis legitiiiios y i)arti('iilares duefios. 

Mas ai'in ])or lo que toca a la dueda colonial no i)rivi]egiada, su dig- 
iiidad y el lespeto ([uc se debe a si misina, le vedan igiialiueiite adinitir 
las bases (]ue resaltau eu el pan-afo de la proposicicni de que se est;! 
ocu])audo y que consiste eu el exaiueu de la inversi(')u que Espafia liaya 
])odido dar a los jjioductos obtenidos pur la cieacithi de dichas duedas. 
Esto equivaldria a soiueter al criterio de una potencia. extrana los actos 
de su gobieruo interior. Acertados (3 uo, (acertados entiende que hau 
sido todos,) fueron perfectaniente legitimos y estau al amparo de su 
Soberauia. 

Y aun eu la iuadiuisible liipotesis de que tal acierto no liubiera babido 
en ellos, no saben los Coniisarios Esjianoles que baya nadic <iue pueda 
liacer depender la legitimidad de una deuda legalmeute contraida, de 
la inversion bueua 6 mala, que, despui'S de constituida, haya dado el 
deudor a sus i)roductos. 

No ban de i^oner tr*rmino los Comisarios Espanoles a este escrito sin 
llaniar la atenciou de los lionorables Comisarios Americanos sobre un 
punto que no puede meuos de ser resaelto en el tratado, eu compli- 
miento de lo conv^euido en la base 6 • del protocolo : dice esta asi : " Una 
vez terminado y lirmado este protocolo, deberan suspenderse las bosti- 
lidades en los dos paises, y a este efecto se deberan dar ordenes por 
cada uno de los dos (xobiernos a los Jefes de sus fuerzas de niary tierra, 
tan i)ronto conio sea p(»sible." 

-Ya antes de la ftrma del Protocolo, el Sr Presidente de la Union, 
despui'S de enterar al Sr Embajador de Fraucia el dia 30 de Julio 
ultimo, de las condiciones que los Estados Unidos imponian a Espana 
para restable(;er con ella la paz, le manifesto que cousentia en conceder 
la suspension de hostilidades en seguida que el jSalor Minisfro de E.stado 
Esiiaiiol hiciera saber al Emhajador de Francia, su represent<(nfe en Wash- 
infjfon, que uceptaha las negoclaciones sobre las bases indicadas par el 
Gobierno federal; y que aiitorhaba a diclio Embajador para firmar en su 
nombre I'l acta prelimiuar (jue pouia tvrnrlno a las hostilidades. 

El Gobierno espafiol manifesto su couformidad con tales bases, y 
autorizo al Embajador de Francia para aceptarlas y tlrmarlas en su 
nombre, por su despaclio de 7 de Agosto, (pie fue immediatamente 
comunicado al (xobieruo de Wasbington. Apesar de esto, las hostili- 
dades no se suspendieron entouces. Mas al fin se acordo su suspension 
pocos dias despucs, 6 sea el dia 12, por el meucionado art 6" del 
protocolo. 

J^^sto no obstante el dfa 13, el General Merritt, Jefe de las fuerzas 
Americanas en Manila, y el Admirante de la flota en aquella babia, exi- 
gierou la rendiciou de la plaza, y por no prestarse a ella sus autoridades, 
rompierou el fuego diclias fuerzas contra el polvoriu de San Antonio 
Abad, y contra las triucheras que defendian la ciudad <lel lado de tierra, 
causando innecesariamente un numero considerable de bajas a las 
fuerzas espanolas, (jue hubiei-au entregado pacificamente la ciudad a los 
Americanos, en cumplimiento de la base 3' del Protocolo, para (pre la 
conservasen en garantia hasta la cclebraciou del tratado de paz. 

El General Merritt eutr<') por la fuerza en Manila, liizo prisionera de 
guerra su guarnicion comi^uesta de 8 a 9,000 hombres, se apodero de los 
fondos i)ublicos y de la recaudaci(')n de los impuestos, iucluso los de 
Aduanas, uombro inteudente general y Administrador de la hacienda 



TREATY OF PEACE. 117 

publica y recolector de diclios impuestos ;i los oficialos de su ejercito que 
tuvo por coiiveuieute, destituyeiido por esto n los fnncioiiiu-ios espaiioles ; 
relevo al Couimandaute Espafiol de la guaidia civil eiicargada del oideu 
publico; constitnyo tribunales militares; abrio el puerto de Manila y 
todos los demas de Filipiuas que se ballabau en posesi(')u de sus fueyzas 
de mar y tierra, al comereio de su naciou y al de los ueutrales, previo el 
pago de los derechos que rigieseu al tieuipo de su iMtioduccioii y que 
sus fancioiiarios percibieron. Todo esto consta en el acta preliniiuar de 
capitulacion del 13 de Agosto, en la capitulaciou niisnia del 14, en el 
bando del Geueral Merritt de ignal fecba, en sus ordenes de 22 y 23 del 
propio lues, y eu las demas dictadas por las xVutoridades y funcionarios 
Americanos en Manila. , 

El Gobierno espauol reclamo al de Washington, contra todo lo alii 
ocurrido, por conducto de la Embajada francesa, en 2!) de Agosto, 3 y 
11 de Septiembre ultimo, insistiendo despues basta el presents en las 
mismas reclaniaciones, y senaladamente eu la innuMliata liberta<l de 
la guarnicion prisionera en Manila y en la devoluci<in de sus arnias, 
questo que por una parte no podia enviar refnerzos desde la Peninsula 
al Archipii'lago, cuyo envio tanipoco veian con liuenos ojos los Estados 
Unidos, y por la otra, necesitaba a<iuellas fuerzas para liberal i\ mil- 
lares de espanok's prisioueros de los insnrrectos tagalos, y victimas de 
sus malos tratamieutos, y para combatir y dominar aquella insurrecciou 
de sus propios subditos. Las reclamaciones del Gobierno Espauol fueron 
hasta ahora ini'itiles. Estos hechos coutinuan cada dia tomando peor 
asi)ecto. K\ 21 de Septiembre el Capitan W. P. Mottot, nombrado por 
el Prevoste Gobernador Americano, encargado de las prisiones de la 
plaza de Bilibid,con facultadde disponar la entrada y libertad de toda 
clase de presos, se la di('> a dos llainados Silvestre Lacoy y Marcos 
Alarcon, que estaban procesados por el delito de robo en cuadrilla, a 
otros dos que lo estaban por desercion, a que lo estaban por desa- 
cato, a .>tro ipie lo estaba por asalto y robo y a otros tres que lo estaban 
por liomicidio. Como se ve, todos estos presos Estaban en la carcel 
por di'litos comunes. Este liecbo inaudito tiK- comunicado al Gobierno 
de S. M.U. por la Comaudancia (leneral del Apostadero de ]Manila. 

Abora bien, se bace i)reciso examinar todos estos liecbos desde el 
panto de vista de su legalidad y con relaci('>n a lo que en la clausula (r' 
del ])rotocolo se babia convenido, y constituia una formal obligacion 
para ambos (5obiernos. 

I Desde cuando debi<') Qomenzar a producir sus efectos la suspension 
le ias hostilidades acordada en dicha cLiusula (V^? La contestaciou no 
es dudosa. El texto es claro yexplicito: las hostilidades habian de 
suspenderse desde la condiision y firma del protocolo. 

Esto ocurri*') en la tarde del 12 de Agosto. Por lo tanto, desde dicha 
tarde los actos de guerra (pie cualquiera de los beligerantes ejecutara, 
habian de tenersecoraono hechos para el efectode restablecer el " statu 
quo ante" el momeuto de la firma del protocolo. 

Es ocioso y hasta seria ofensivo para la alta ilustracion de la Co- 
mision Americana exponer aqui la doctrina, no solo admitida desde los 
tiempos de Grotiiis sin contradiccion en el Derecho y en las practicas 
internacionales, y a que prestan su asentimiento y su apoyo todos los 
ilustres tratadisttis Anglo-Americanos que de la materia se ban oeupado, 
sino que ademas esta elevada en los Estados Unidos a la categoria de 
Derecho establecido, en el arto 140 de sus instrucciones para los 
Ejercitos en Campana, que dice asi: "El armisticio liga a los beliger- 



118 TREATY OF PEACE. 

antes ;'i partiv del dia convenido eiitre ellos para su ejecucioii, pero los 
oliciales de los dos ej^'rcitos no son responsaT)les de esta ejecuci(')n, mas 
que desde el di'a en (jue el armisticio les lia sidooticialmente notitieado." 

El di'a de la ejeeufion tijado en el Articulo G" del Piotocolo fue el en 
que se conclayese y firmase: asi textualmente se dice alii: "A la con- 
clusion y lirina de este Protocolo las hostilidades entre los dos paises 
debcran ser sus[)endidas." 

VA (icneral Meiiitt y el Almirante de la escuadra no seian personal- 
n)ente resi)onsal)les de la sangre (jue iniiecesarianiente deriaraarou el 
dia 13. si eiitoiu-es no tenian noticia oticial del Protocolo (jue se habia 
tinnado el dia anterior eu Washington, pero esto no obsta para que, 
conio dice uno de los mas ilustres tratadisttis del derecbo Internacjioual, 
el honor militar exije abstciierse escrupulosameiite de aprovecharse de 
toda ventaja que podria sacarse de la ignorancia de las trojjas que no 
liubieran sido todavia inlbrmadas del armisticio. En casos como este 
la Potencia beligerante cuyas fuerzas, por ignorancia, ejecutaron un 
acto de guerra, no })uede aprt)vecharse de sus ventajas y debe reponer 
las cosas al " statuo" quo ante" indemuizando al beligernnte perjudicado 
de los dailos y pcrjuicios que }wr nquel acto de guerra se le liubieran in- 
ferido, y restituyendo, como dice el iluslre publicista anglo americauo 
Dudley Field, todas las presas liechas en contravencion del armisticio. 

Esto es tan eleniental y vulg;ar en los Estados Unidos, (jue en sus 
colegios sirve de texto la obra titulada "Elementos de Derecho inter- 
nacional y Leyes de Guerra" escrita por el Mayor Geiieral llalleck y 
en cnya edici(in de Filadellia — pagina "2^3 se lee lo siguiente: 

"'La tregua liga a las partes contratantes dcsdc el vionwiito de su con- 
clusion a menos que no se estipule especialmente otra cosa, pero no liga 
a los individuos <le una uacion hasta el pnnto de hacerlcs personalmente 
responsables de su rujotura mientras no tengan noticia actual y posi- 
tiva de ella. 

" L'or consiguiente, si los individuos sin conociniiento de la suspen- 
sion de hostilidades, matau un encmigo <) destruyeu su propiedad. no 
cometcn por tales actos un crimen ni estan obligados a indemnizacion 
pecuniaria, pero fei se hacen prisioneros <> presas, el soJierano estd en la 
oblifjacwu dc poner a aquellos 'mnwdlatamente en Ubertad y de restUuir 
las presas^ 

El (iobierno americauo no ha puesto, hasta ahora, en libertad a la 
guarnicion prisionerade Manila, ni ha reducido su ocu])aci<)n bidica de 
la plaza a los limites de un sim])le derecho de guarnicion en ella, que es, 
segun el articulo o" del Protocolo, lo linico a que tenia derecho como 
garantia hasta el Tratado de Paz. 

Los Comisionados espanoles, ])or lo tanto, en cum])limiento de lo 
expresamente convenido en el Protocolo, entienden (pie en el Tratado de 
Paz debe con sign arse: 

1". La entrega inmediata dc la ])laza al (lobiei-no Es])anol. 

~". La libertad inmediata dc la guarnicion de la misma. 

.!". l^a devolucion al Gobierno Es])ai~iol de todos los tbndos y i)ropie- 
dades i)ublicas de (jue se apodcro el EjcTt^ito Americano despu 's de 
entrar en la plaza y de los iiiipucstos de todas clases (pie ha venido 
perci)>iendo y (pie perciba hasta su devohuni'm; y, 

4". El comjjromiso ])or paite de los Estados L^nidos de iiidemnizar a 
Espana dc los gravisimos perjuicios (pie le ha ocasionado con la rcten- 
cion de aipiellas tropas i)risioneras, i)or(jue a esto fuc debido (pieimpu- 
nemente se i)ropagase la insurreciou tagala en la Isla de Luzs'm y su 
invasi('>n en las Islas Yisayas, y jxn-que tambi(''n a esto mismo ha sido 
dcbida la contiiiuaci('tn de los malos trataniicntos dc los millares de 



TREATY OF PEACE. 119 

prisioneros espafioles civiles y militares, a que impunemeute contiuiiau 
sometiendoles las fuerzas iusurrectas tagalas. 

En viitud de cuauto precede la Comisii'm Espaiiola tieiie el houor de 
liacer a la Ooinisiou Americana la siguiente proposicion: 

Primbeo. Que no puede acepter la proposicion que lia presentado 
pidieiido la cesi('>n de la soberania del Arclii])ielago Filipino a losEsta- 
dos Unidos por entender que es contraria a los prelimiiiaresdepazcon- 
venidos en el Protocolo de Washington; y 

Segundo. Que en su consecueucia la invita a que, de acuerdo con lo 
conveiiido en los mencionados articulos 3" y G" del Protocolo, se sirva 
presentar una proposicion sobre la intervencion, disposicion y gobierno 
del Arcbipii'Iago Filipino, y sobre el conipromiso que, segun lo que se 
acaba de decir, deben contraer los Estados Tnidos por etecto del becbo 
de guerra ejecutado por sus tropas desput s de lirinado el Protocolo, 
apoderandose ii viva fuerza de la ciudad de Manila y ejecutando los 
actos que estiin fuera de los laiicos dereclios que los Estados Unidos 
podian ejercer en aquella ciudad y su baliia y ])uerto, con arreglo a lo 
convenido en la uiencionada base 3 ' del Protocolo. 

Esta conforme 

Emilio de Ojeda 



[Translation.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 12. 
proposition. 

The Spanish Commission has read with great surprise the proposition 
presented by the American Commission at the meeting held on the 31st 
of October, ultimo. 

The only article which said proposition contains is reduced to pro- 
viding for' the cession by Spain to the United States of the archii)elago 
known as the Philippine islands, situated within the perimeter geo- 
graphically deteimincd in its text. 

But in addition thereto the proposition contains two paragraphs, not 
intended to form a part of the article, the second of which is of such 
importance as to demand from the Spanish Commission to deal with it 
specially in this pa[>er. 

The Spanish Commissioners have stated tb.at the American proposi- 
tion excited in them great surprise, and it is their duty to set forth the 
reasons which explain that feeling. 

From the first to the last conference, the American Comn.issioners 
have b«een alleging constantly— and that allegation was the principal 
ground upon which their drafts relating to Cuba and Porto Rico were 
based— that in their conferences the two Commissions have to abide by 
the bases established in the i)relinnnaries of peace agreed upon and 
signed on the 12th of August ultimo. The same was said and con- 
tinues to be said by the Spanish Commissioners. One dilTerence, how- 
ever, has existed in this respect between the two Commissions, and 
this has been that the American Commissioners understand that the 
Protocol should be construed according to its letter, strictly, and with- 
out taking into consideration any data, antecedent or document. For 
this reason, as the words " Debt of Cuba, or of Porto Pico" were not 
written on the Protocol, they have deemed that Spain should transmit 
or cede her sovereignty over the islands, but should retain the latter's 



120 TREATY OF PEACE. 

oblifiations. The Spanish Commissioners understand, on the contrary, 
that for determining the literal meaning of the Protocol it is necessary 
not only to bear in mind the <ieneral rules of international law as to 
the interpretation of treaties, but also the ne<iOtiations carried on 
between the two parties which culminated in this agreement, and in 
which the interpretation of the latter had been given beforehand and 
oflicially. 

Therefore the proposition relating to the cession by Spain to the 
United States of the Philippine Islands, besides not being included in 
or covered by the articles of the Protocol, appears to be in open con- 
tradiction ot its terms. In the opinion of the Spanish Comnnssion it 
is a Hagraut violation of the agreement. 

The Protocol contains six articles, and only one, the third, refers to 
the Philippine Aichipelago. Literally translated (into Spanish) from 
the ofticial French text, it reads as follows: — 

"The ITnited States shall occupy and hold the city, the bay and the 
harbor of ^Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which 
shall determine the inspection {confrdh'), the disposition, and the gov- 
ernment of the Philipi)ine Islands." 

This is all that the Protocol says about the archipelago. 

Even accepting as a proper standard for the interpretation of this 
article the narrow one of the literal meaning, as claimed (no matter how 
strange it may appear) by the American Commission, the Spanish Com- 
mission would have only to reply that the text of the I'rotocol refers to 
nothing else than the temporary or provisional occupation by the United 
States of IManila, its harbor, and its bay, until the treaty of peace, 
determining or agreeing upon the inspection, disposition and govern- 
ment of the Philippine Islands, should be concluded. 

What has this to do with any change or cession of sovereignty? 

The first part of the article is perfectly clear. Not even tlie slight- 
est doubt can exist as to the fact that the only agreement as to Manila, 
its bay and its harbor, referred to the occupation thereof, not tiiml but 
provisional, by the United States; said occupation to last only until 
the conclusiou of the treaty of peace. Xo proof is necessary to cor- 
roborate this literal construction of the text. But should it be required, 
the American Commission would find it in document number 19 in the 
Yellow Book just published by the (Jovernment of the French Eejmb- 
lic. Said document contains the circular addressed by the French 
^Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassadors in Europe, 
three days after the signing of the Protocol, acquainting them with 
the mission which the Government of the Eepublic had allowed to be 
entrusted to the French Ambassador at Washington, to offer peace to 
the Government of the United States in behalf of the Government of 
Her Catholic ^lajesty. This circular states that the French Ambassa- 
dor at Washington had signed, m the name of Spain and at her 
request, a Protocol setting forth the demands of the United States, 
and after enumerating those demands, and in referring to the Philip- 
pine Islands, the >'rench Minister of Foreign Affairs says that the only 
one contained in that <locument was the prorisio)i(tl ocvnpation of Manila 
hi/ the A)ttcricaH forces. 

The American Commission will not disregard the uncpiestionable 
moi-al weight of the testiniony of the jMinister of Foreign .Vffairs of 
the l"'rench Re] )ublic, ('(jually friendly to the two belligerent states, who 
could know nothing about the Protocol except through the most authori- 
tative channel of the French xVmbassador who had discussed it with 



TREATY OF PEACE. 121 

tlie American Govenimeut, aud agreed to it and signed it, in the name 
of Spain. 

The mere provisional character of that occupation remained even 
after the i'rotocol was signed, when General Merritt, contrary to what 
had been agreed upon in Article VI of the same, forcibly took posses- 
sion of Manila. In the last paragraph of number 5 in the rules for 
capitulation agreed upon and signed on August 15, on the part of the 
United States by Brigadier Gene'-al of Volunteers E. V, Greene, by 
Captain Lambertun of the United States Navy, by Lieutenant-Colonel 
and Inspector General Whittier, and by Lieutenant Colonel Judge- 
Advocate Crowder, the following was said: — 

"The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall 
take place when they evacuate the city or wheii the American armij 
evacHates.^'' 

Therefore it was nuderstood by those Avho signed this agreement that 
the American forces did not permanently occupy the j^lace, as they 
anticipated the case that they would have to evacuate it. Aud if they 
anticipated this, it is clear tliat they understood their occupation of 
the place to be merely provisional. 

True it is that the words "inspection, disposition and government of 
the Philippine Islands" have not a clear meaning. The Spanish Gov- 
ernmenr and its representative at Washington had noticed this fact 
and asked for tlie proper explanation thereof (which was not given) by 
the American Government, before the Protocol Avas signed. But what- 
ever construction may now be placed upon these words, the fact is that 
in no case can their meaning be so stretched as to involve in any way 
the idea of cession of the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago. 
Such a cession or acquisition in perpetuum of the archipelago by the 
United States, had it been agreed npon in the Protocol, would have 
been in contradi(;tion with the mere temporary occnpation of Manila, 
which at the same time was agreed upon in the same clause of that 
instrument. 

Nor could the said construction ev^er be admitted as valid, under the 
rules of interpretation of treaties, because the said admission would 
result in benetitiiig a party who refused to explain, when asked at the 
proper time to do so, the meaning of the words which even then were 
considered ambiguous and indeterminate. Even if this were not the 
case, the rule which the Spanish Commission. understand to have been 
applied to them without reason, set fortli by the American Commis- 
sioners in their last "memorandum", namely, that "the abstention of 
Spain from i)roposing in the Protocol the condition of the transfer of 
the debt prechnled her from proposing it now", would be applicable to 
the case. The United States abstained from proposing to Spain in the 
Protocol, frankly and openly, as frankly and openly as all things must 
be set forth in all treaties, which must never be concluded unless to be 
understood and complied with in good faith, the cession of her sover- 
eignty over the archipelago. They did not do it, and they became 
thereby precluded from proposing it now. 

All the foregoing statements must really be considered in excess of 
necessity, as it is a fact, perfectly well known to the ximerican Com- 
missioners, that when the Protocol was signed at Washington the most 
worthy President of the Union not only had no idea that Spain would 
have to cede the Philippine Archipelago to the United States, but 
entertained, on the contrary, an opposite idea, namely, that Spain 
would retain her sovereignty over it. 



122 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Ill the coiifereuce held on August 4 last, between Mr. Cainbon, 
Ambassador IVom France, and President McKinley, in the presence of 
the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cambon nnide some remarks 
as to the cession of Porto Pico in compensation for the expenses of the 
war, and tlie President, showing himself intiexible upon that point, 
rei)eated his assertion that the Philip])ine question was the only one 
not finally settled in his mind. It was then that Mr. Cambon asked for 
an exi)lanation about the meaning- of the above cited phrases in Article 
III of the Protocol, relating to the Philip])ine Archipelago, as the lan- 
guage of said article might lend itself to inspire fear in Spain in regdrd 
to Iter sovercijintji orer these islands. President Mclvinley answered him, 
verbatim, as follows: 

" I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this i)oint. 
The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve uj^ou 
the permanent advantages (notice that he said "advantages ■"' and not 
"rights*') which we shall ask in the archipelago, and decide upon the 
intervention (controle), disposition and government of the Philippine 
Islands." 

He further said: "The Madrid Government can rest assured that up 
to noa- 7iothiiif/ is decided a priori, in my oa-n mind, against jSpain, nor do 
I consider anytliing decided by it against the United States." 

Is it therefore doubtful that on the 12th of August, when the Secre- 
tary of State of tlie United States signed the Protocol, the President of 
the United States had no idea of demanding from Spain the cession to 
the United States of her sovereignty over the archipelago? 

But there is something more, 'llie President of the United States, 
far from entertaining that purpose, clearly showed by his language that 
he desired that Sixain should preserve her sovereignty. He said that 
the Commissioners ac Paris would have to come to an agreement as to 
the perm((nent advantages to be demanded by the United States in the 
Philippine Archipelago. If Si>ain was to be deprived other sovereignty, 
what future advantages could possibly be asked from Spain by the 
United States Commissioners, or granted tliem b}' Spain? How would 
it be ])ossible for the American Commissioners at Paris to ask Spain 
for advantages in an archipelago which they at the same time liadto 
demand and receive as their own property"? 

There is still another proof, as irrefutable as the above, that the 
Washington Government, far from having at that time any idea or 
intention to acquire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, con- 
sented that said sovereignty continue to be vested in Spain, by remov- 
ing from its own mind all idea of change in this respect, eith.er when 
framing or signing Article III of the Protocol. 

AVhen the Spanish Government, by its despatch of the 7th of August, 
answered the note of the Honorable Secretary of State of the United 
States of the .'Ust of July, wherein he informed Spain of the conditions, 
sucli as set forth in the Protocol, U])on which the American (Tovern- 
nicnt was disposed to ])ut an end to the war, the S])anish Secretary of 
State used in regard to basis ;} the following language: 

" The basis relating to the Philipi)ine Islands seems, according to our 
understanding, to l)e too indeterminate. In the first place, the title 
invoked by the United States lor the occui)ation of the bay, harbor and 
city ol Manila, pending the concilusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be 
conciuest. as the city of .Manila is still defending itself. In s])ite of the 
blockade by sea and the siege by land, the former by the American fleet, 
the latter by forces commanded by a native encouraged and assisted by 
the American Admiral, the Spanish Hag has not been lowered. In the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 123 

second place, tlie Philippine Arcliipelago is wholly i)i the power and 
under the sovereignty of ^pain. The S])anish Goveinmeut understands, 
therefore, that the temporary occupation of Manila must constitute a 
guarantee. The treaty of j^eace, it is said, shall determine the inter- 
vention, di.si)osition and government of the Philippine Islands, and as 
the intention of the Federal Government is too much veiled in this 
clause, it /.v inipartani for tJiis Goi-ernment to state that wliile accepting the 
3d l.asis, it docs not reUnqvislt a priori the entire sovereignty over the 
Philippine Archipclacjo. and leaves to the negotiators the care to siipulate 
in regard to such reforms as it may he adrisahle to introduce there, — in 
view of the situation <f those possessions and the degree of cultivation of 
their 'inhabitants. The Government of Her Majesty accepts the 3d clause 
as supplemented by the aforesaid dedaraiion.'' 

It a])pears very plainly tliat the Spanish Government did not accept 
the only item of the Protocol which relates to the Philippine Islands, 
except in so far as it meant that the occupation of Manila should be 
only temporary and in the nature of a guarantee, and that the inter- 
vention, disposition and government spoken of in the item should refer 
to the interior regime and administration of the government of the said 
islands, and not to the entire sovereignty, which Spain expressly 
reserved and was entitled to retain. 

Against this construction placed beforehand by the Government of 
Her Catholic Majesty upon the od basis of the Protocol, — a construc- 
tion upon which exclusively it was accepted,— the Washington Govern- 
ment said or suggested notliing, before signing the instrument. On the 
contrary, the Secretary of State of the United States, when sending to 
tlie French And)assador the draft of the Protocol which was to be 
signed, said to him in a letter that the note of the Spanish Government 
(the one in which the above (juoted phrases appear) contained in its 
spirit the a('cei)tanceby Spain of the conditions proposed by the United 
States. Therefore, the third condition had been framed by the Ameri- 
can Government in the same sense in which it had been understootl by 
the Spanish Government. Otherwise it would have been imiwssible 
for the Secretary of State of the United States to say, upon examina- 
tion of the note in which the Spanish Government explained the only 
meaning of the article which would be acceptable to it, that the Span- 
ish (iovernment did accept it. 

The result is that while the United States may now come and claim 
the said sovereignty, the claim can never be founded upon the Protocol. 

And what other title, different from that agreement, can they allege, 
against the will of Spain, to be vested in thenj ? 

The bases upon which the United States agreed to make peace with 
Spain, or, in other words, the conditions which the United States 
imposed upon Spain for the reestablishmeut of peace between the two 
countries, were set forth in the i'rotoc d. Xn immediate suspension of 
hostilities was also agreed upon in that instrument; and Spain up to 
the present time has scrupulously kejtt the agreement. Therefore the 
United States can have no right to demand now from Spain any oner- 
ous conditions not contained in the Protocol, either because of events 
prior to its date, — since when the Protocol was signed the United States 
did not make more demands than are written therein, and were satistied 
with their acceptance by Spain, — or because of subsequent events, since 
Spain, after the instrument was signed, did )iot commit any aggression 
or give the United States any occasion to make further complaints or 
demands. 

If for reasons which are beyond the sphere of jurisdiction of the 



124 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Spanish CommissiiMi, tlie Ainericaii Government wishes now to acquire 
sovereii;nty over the Philippine Aichipehigo, the proi)er way to accom- 
plish that purpose is certainly not a claim based upon tlie preliminaries ] 
of peace a<;ieed upon between the two High Contractin<i' Parties and] 
set forth in the I^rotocol signed at Washington on the liith of August.! 

The Spanish Commissioners stated at the beginning of this paper j 
that the second paragraph which the American proposition contained 
after the proposed article was of such importance that it imposed on 
them the necessity of dwelling especially upon its im[)ort. 

The (Joinmissioners assert therein tiiat they are disposed to insert in 
the treaty a sti[)ulatioii whereby the United States will assume any 
debt of Spain contracted for ])Rblic works or improvemeits of a pacific 
character in the Philippines. 

The archipelago is in fact burdened with a debt of 200 millions ofi 
pesetas^ secured by mortgage on the proceeds and revenues of the 
Manila custom house; and there further rest upon the Crown obliga- 
tions, Just charges and other pensions of lesser im[)ortance, exclusively 
connected with the service of that colony. 

With respect to the mortgage debt, the Spanish Commissioners have 
alread}^ stated with relation to the debt of a like nature which by way 
of mortgage burdens the revenues of the custom liouses and all the 
taxes, direct and indirect, of the Island of Cuba, that ihey cannot 
even admit any discussion relative to the validity and eflicacy of such 
mortgages. 

Legally created by a legitimate sovereign, and legally acquired by 
the individuals of various nationalities who interested themselves in 
those provin<aal operations, Spain is not the proprietor of the rights of 
these third parties, who are under the aegis of tlie laws protecting pri- 
vate ])roperty, so as to consent in a treaty with the United States or 
any other jiower in any way to anything which means or implies an 
impairment of rights which are not hers. The most elemental duties 
of public and private probity forbid this. 

S[)ain does not demand the recognition of these secured debts for her 
own beiietit, since her treasury has not bound itself to pay the same, 
save subsidiarily, that is, only in the event that the revenues and taxes 
mortgaged are insufticient to meet them. If she makes the demand it 
is only in obedience to a moral duty resting upon every honest debtor, 
and, further, in behalf of the holders of her own debt, who could not 
but see a danger to their interests in the fact that Spain, without being 
bound thereto, should overburden her treasury with other heavy obliga- 
tions for which it would be liable jointly with her own, and running tiic 
risk of her resources being insufticieiit to meet tliem all. The debt and 
obligations of tlie colonies which dire<*tly inteiesr, her are those nnr 
enjoying the ])rivi!ege of security, because with respect to these she is 
])rimarily bound, and she understands that it is not just that when slie 
lias conti'ai'ted them for her colonies she should continue, after losing 
them, burdened with such charges, which are, after all, a small ])arr im' 
the immense capital invested in those colonies which was furnislu-d 
from her own resources. 

Let it be understood therefore, and the Sjianish Commissioners hf*])e 
there will be no necessity to repeat it, that Spain cannot and ougiit not, 
since respect for the rights of. others forbids it, to agree in this treaty 
or in any to anything implying the impairment or suppression or even 
disregard of the private rights of others against the will of their legiti- 
mate and special jiroprietors. 

Still more with respect to the un]>rivileged (unsecured) colonial debt. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 125 

tlieir dignity and tlie res])eot due to tbeir own selves likewise forbid 
them accepting- the bases wliicli stand ont in the paragraph of the prop- 
osition under consideration, which consists of the looking into the 
investment Spain may have made of tlie y>roceeds resulting from the 
creating of such debts. This would be equivalent to submitting to the 
judgment of a foreign power the acts of her internal government. Judi- 
cious or not (and ithe Commissioners understand they have all been 
jmlicions) they were i)erfectly legitimate acts and they are protected by 
her sovereignty. 

And even in the inadmissible hypothesis that such judiciousness 
were wanting in them, the Spanish Commissioners do not know that 
there is anyone who can cause the legitimacy of a legally contracted 
debt to depend upon the investment, good or bad, which after its crea- 
tion, the debtor may have made of its proceeds. 

The Spanish Commissioners cannot close this paper without calling 
the attention of the honorable American Commisioners to a point which 
cannot but be resolved in the treaty, in obedience to the stipulations of 
the (ith basis of the Protocol, which is as follows: "Upon the conclu- 
sion and signing of this I'rotocol, hostilities between the two countries 
shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as 
possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and 
naval forces." 

Even before the signing of the Protocol the President of the Union, 
after apprising the Ambassador of France on the 30th of July las^ of 
the conditions the United States imposed on Spain for restoring peace 
therewith, said to him that he consented to granting the suspension of 
hostilities as soon as the '■'■Spmiish Minister of State should make Inoirn 
to the Ambassador of France, his representative in Washington, that he 
accepted the negotiations upon the bases suggested by the Federal Govern- 
ment; and authorized the said Aml>assador to sign in his name the prelim- 
inary minute ivhieh put an end. to Hie hostilities."' 

The Spanish Government made known its agreement to such bases, 
and authorized the Ambassador of France to accept and sign them in 
its name throngh its despatch of August 7, wliich was immediately com- 
municated to the Government at AVashington. Notwithstanding this, 
the hostilities were not then suspended. But finally the suspension 
thereof was agreed to a few days later, that is on the 12th, in the said 
6th article of the J^rotocol. 

In spite of this, on the loth. General Merritt, commander of the Ameri- 
can forces in Manila, and the Admiral of the fleet in that bay, demanded 
the surrender of the place, and as its authorities did not agree thereto, 
the said forces opened fire on the San Antonio Abad powder-magazine 
and on the trenches which defended tlie city on the laud side, unneces- 
sarily causing a considerable number of losses to the Spanish forces, 
who would have peacefully delivered the city over to the Americans in 
obedience to the third basis of the Protocol that they might hold it as 
a guaranty pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace. 

(xeneral Merritt entered Manila by force, he made prisoners of war of 
its garrison made up of eight or nine thousand men, he took possession 
of the public funds and the collection of taxes, including customs 
receipts, he named as Intendant General and Administrator of the 
Public Treasury, and Tax Collector, the oflticers of his army he saw fit, 
thereby displacing the Spanish officials. He relieved the Spanish Com- 
mander of the civil guard charged with the maintenance of public 
order; he constituted military courts; he opened the port of Manila, 
and all the other ports of the Philippines in the possession of his land 



126 TKEATY OF PEACE. 

and naval loices to the commerce of his nation and of neutral nations, 
conditioned on the paj^ment of the dues in force at the time of his 
arrival, wliich were collected by his ofhcials. All of this is recorded in 
the preliminary minute of the capitulation of August 13, in the capitu- 
lation of the 14th itself, in the proclamation of iieneral Mcrritt of like 
date, in his orders of the 22nd and 2ord of the same month and in the 
others dictated by the American authorities and oflicials in .Manila. 

The Spanish Government remonstrated to thatof Washington through 
the J'^rencb Embassj* against everything that occurred there on August 
2!) and the .'ird and 11th of September last, repeating such remon- 
strances since and down to the present time, signally insisting upon the 
immediate release of the garrison held prisoners in Manila and upon 
the return of their arms, since, on the one hand, it could not send rein- 
forcements from the Peninsula to the archipelago, nor would the United 
States look favorably upon such an action, and, on tlie other Land, it 
needed those forces to liberate the thousands of Spanish prisoners of 
the Tagalo insurgents, victims of their ill-treatment, and to combat and 
dominate that insurrection of its own subjects. The remonstrances of 
the Spanish Government have been up to the present fruitless. These 
acts are daily assuming a worse phase. On September 21 Captain 
W. P, Molfatt, appointed by the American Provost-Marshal in cliarge 
of the Bilibid prisons with authority to regulate the entrance and 
release of all kinds of prisoners, released two named Silvestre Lacoy 
and Marcos Alarcon, charged with the offense of highway robbery; 
two others charged with desertion; six charged with contempt of 
authority; another charged with assault and robbery, and three others 
charged with homicide. As is seen, all these prisoners were in jail ibr 
common crimes. This unheard of act was communicated to the (Gov- 
ernment of Her Catholic Majesty by tlie Commandant General's Ofh<'e 
of the station of Manila. 

Yery well : it becomes necessary to examine all these acts from the 
standpoint of their legality and with relation to what was agreed on in 
Article VI of the Protocol, which constituted a formal obligation for 
both Governments. 

When was the suspension of hostilities agreed on in said Article VI 
to go into effect? The answer is not doubtful. The text is clear and 
explicit: the hostilities were to be suspended upon the conclusion and 
signing of the Protocol. This occurred on the afternoon of August 12. 
Therefore from that afternoon the warlike acts which either of the bel- 
ligerents should commit were to be held as not done in order to restore 
the siafu quo ante at the moment of signing the Protocol. 

It is idle, and may even be an insult to the great learning of tin' 
American Commission, to expound here the doctrine, not only admitted 
without contradiction since the time of Grotius in international law 
and usage, and to which all the learned Anglo American treatise-writers 
have given their assent and support, but which is furthermore raised 
in the United States to the category of established law in article 140 
of the Instructions to Armies in tlie Field, which reads as follows: 
" The armistice binds the belligerents from the day agreed upon between 
them for its going into effect; but the ofihcers of the two armies are not 
resjtonsible for this except from the day upon which they are ofiticially 
notified of the arndstice"'. 

The day when it was to go into effect determined in Article VI of 
the Protocol was that on which it should be concluded and signed. 
There it says verbatim: "Upon the conclusion and signing of this 
Protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended." 



TREATY OF PEACE. 127 

General Merritt and tlie Admiral of tlie squadron may not be person- 
ally responsible for the blood they unnecessarily shed on the loth if 
they had no official notice tlien of the Protocol which liad been signed 
on the previous day in Washington; but this does not conllict, as one 
of the most learned writers on international law says, with military 
honor, demanding that they scrupulously abstain from profiting by any 
advantage that may be gained through the ignorance of troops who may 
not yet have been informed of the armistice. In cases like this the bel- 
ligerent power whose forces through ignorance commit a warlike act, 
cannot profit by its advantages, and should restore things to the statu 
quo ante, indemnifying the belligerent injured for the damages and 
injuries he may have suffered through said warlike act, and restoring, 
as is said by the learned Anglo American publicist Dudley Field, all 
prizes taken in violation of the armistice. 

This is so elementary and common in the United States that in their 
colleges the work entitled "Elements of International Law and Laws 
of war", written by Major General Halleck, serves as a text-book, and 
in the Philadelphia edition thereof, page liSS, appears the following: 

"The truce binds the contracting parties /roj« the moment of its con- 
clusion unless otherwise specially stipulated; but it does not bind the 
individuals of a nation to the extent of makiiig them personally respon- 
sible for its rupture until they have actual and positive notice thereof. 

" Consequently, if individuals without knowledge of the suspension 
of hostilities, kill an enemy or destroy his property, they do not by 
such acts commit a crime, nor are they bound to pecuniary indemnity, 
but if prisoners or prizes are taken the sovereign is hound to inDnediately 
release the former and restore the prizes.'''' 

The American Government has not released, up to this time, the 
imprisoned garrison of Manila, nor has it reduced its military occupa- 
tion to the limits of a simple right to garrison it, which is, according to 
Article III of the Protocol, the only thing it had a right to do as a 
guaranty until the signing of the treaty of peace. 

The Spanish Commissioners, therefore, in obedience to what was 
expressly agreed to in the Protocol, understand that the treaty of 
peace ought to embody: 

1st The immediate delivery of the place to the Spanish Government. 

2nd The immediate release of the garrison of the same. 

3rd The return to the Spanish Government of all the funds, and pub- 
lic property taken by the American army since its occupation of the 
place, and of the taxes of every kind collected or to be collected up to 
the time of returning the same. 

4th The obligation on the part of the United States to indemnify 
Spain for the serious damage o{;casioned her by the detention as pris- 
oners of the said troops, to which detention is due the spreading with 
impunity of the Tagalo insurrection in the island of Luzon and its inva- 
sion of the Visayas islands, and because, moreover, to this same cause 
has been due the ill-treatment of thousands of Spanish prisoners, civil 
and military; treatment to which the Tagalo insurgents have con- 
tinued to subject them with impunity. 

In virtue of what has been said the Spanish Commission has the 
honor to make to the American Commission the following proposition: 

First. — That it cannot accept the propositions it has presented ask- 
ing for the cession of the sovereignty of the Philippine Archipelago to 
the United States, as it understands that this is contrary to the prelim- 
inaries of peace agreed upon in the Protocol of Washington. 

Second. — In consequence of this it invites the American Commission ' 



128 



trp:aty of peace. 



to present, in accordance with the sti])ul;)ti()n.s of Articles III and VI 
of the Protocol, a |)ro])osition concerning t-he control, disposition and 
government of the I'hiliitpine Ar('hii)elago and concerning the obliga- 
tion which, as has Just been said, it is tlie duty of the United States to 
contract because of the acts of war connnitted by its troops after the 
signing of the Protocol In forcibly seizing the city of Manila and per- 
forming acts beyond the scope of the only rights the United States 
conld exercise in that city, its bay and harbor, pursuant to the stipula- 
tions of the said Article 11 of the Protocol. 
True eox^y: 

B:MiLIO DE O.JEDA 



Peotocol No. 13. 
Conference of November 9, 1S9S. 

On the Sth instant, the day to 
which the conference was ad- 
journed, the American Commission- 
ers requested a postponement of the 
meeting from two to four o'clock, in 
order that an opportunity inight 
be given for the comi)letion of the 
copying of their answer to the 
counter-proposition presented by 
the Spanish Commissioners at the 
last session. The Spanish Com- 
missioners being unable to be j (res- 
ent at tlie latter hour, the session 
was, on their suggestion, post- 
poned till the 9th of November, at 
two o'clock, p. m., at which hour 
there were 

Present On the part of the 
United States: Messrs. Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs. 
Montero Rios, Al)arzuza, (xarnica, 
Villa Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Theprotocol of the precedingses- 
siou was read and approved. 

The American Comnnssioners 
liresented an Answer to the Coun- 
ter-Proposition submitted by the 
Spanish Commissioners on the 4th 
instant in relati(ni to the Philip- 
pines. A copy of the Answer is 
hereto annexed. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
stated that they would examine 
the answer, but that its length and 
the necessity of having it carefully 
translated made it impossible for 



Protocolo No. 13. 

Conferenda del 9 de Noviemhre de 

189S. 

El 8 del corriente, dia seiialado 
l^ara la reunion de las Comisiones, 
solicitaron los Comisarios america- 
nos que en vez de celebrarse a las 
dos tuviese lugar a las cuatro de 
aquella tarde, a tin de completar la 
copia de su respuesta a la contra- 
proposicion presentada por los 
Comisarios Espauoles en la ultima 
sesion. No pudiendo concurir a 
dicha hora los Comisarios Espa- 
noles, se aplaziS a propuesta suya 
hasta hoy "J de Noviembre a las 2. 
P. M. en cuya hora se hallan. 



Presentes Por parte de los P^s- 
tados Unidos de America, los 
Seilores Day. Davis. Frye. Gray. 
Reid. Moore. Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana. losSehores 
Montero Rios. Abarzuza. Garnica. 
Villa Urrutia. Cerero. Ojeda. 

Fu('- leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios americanos pre- 
sentan una contestaci<ni ti la con- 
tra proposicion presentada en la 
sesi('>n del 4 del corriente por los 
Comisarios Espanoles relativa a las 
Islas l^ilipinas y se une dicho doc- 
uniento a esta acta. 

Ijos Comisarios Bspaiioles mani- 
festaron que examinarian dicha 
contestacidn y que en vista de su 
extension y de la necesidad de tra- 
ducirla con esmoro, que hacia im- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



129 



tliem at the moment definitely to 
state what time would be needed 
for a reply; and tbey proposed 
either to advise the American (Jom- 
missioneis later in the day when 
the Commission might meet again, 
or at once to desionate a day with- 
out prejudice to asking for a post- 
ponement, should it be necessary 
and should the nature of the docu- 
ment require it. 

The American Commissioners 
preferring the latter couise, the 
conference was adjourned till Sat- 
urday the llith of November at two 
o'clock, p. m., with the understand- 
ing that tlic Spanish Commission 
ers might if necessary ask for a 
postponement. 

William R. Day 
CusHMAN K. Davis 
Wm P Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 
John B. Moore. 



posible el saber a punto fijo el 
tiempo que se necesitaria para con- 
testarla, proponnin, ya seadar aviso 
a la Comision Americana aquella 
noche misma, del dia en que podia 
reunirse la Comision, ya sea fijar 
en aquel momento un dia sin per- 
juicio de pedir un aplazamiento si 
fuese necesario y resultase de la 
naturaleza del documeuto. 

Los Comisarios Americanos ha- 
bieudo dado la preferencia a la se- 
guuda de estas proposiciones, se 
aplazo la couferencia hasta el sa- 
bado 12 del corriente a las dos P. M. 
en la inteligencia de que los Comi- 
sarios Espaholes tendrian la facul- 
tad de pedir un aplazamiento si lo 
considerasen necesario. 

E. MONTERO Ri'os 

B DE ABARZUZA 

J. DE GARNICA 

W K DE Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerbro 
Emilo de Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 13. 



ANSVv'EU of TliE AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS TO THE PROPOSITION OF 
THE SPANISH COMMISSIONERS OF NOVEMBER 3, 1898. 

The American Commissioners, replying- to the Spanish proposition 
of the 4th instant, will proceed at once to the examination of the 
grounds on which the Spanish Commissioners endeavor to, justify their 
expression of surprise at the American proposals of the 31st of October 
on the subject of the Philippines. 

The Spanish argument sets out with the erroneous assumption that 
the United States bases its demands in respect of the Philippines upon 
the terms of the Protocol in the same sense as it bases its demands in 
regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the terms of the same instrument; 
and, proceeding upon this assumption, it finds in the position of the 
United States on the two subjects an inconsistency. The United 
States, it declares, a<lhered, in respect of Cuba and Porto Rico, to the 
"letter" of the Protocol, while in the case of the Philippines, it has 
presented a demand "not included in or covered by the articles" of 
that agreement. 

The American Commissioners are not disturbed by rliis charge of 
inconsistency, since they deen» it obviously groundless. They based 
their demands in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the precise 
terms of the Protocol, because it was in those very terms that the 
United States had made its demands and Spain had conceded them,' 
by promising to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to 
T p 9 



130 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Cuba", and to "cede'' to the Uuited States Porto Eico and certain 
other islands. The United States, in insisti«g' upon tlie words of the 
Protocol on these subjects, merely asked that the })iecise concessions 
of Spain be made good. 

In the case of the Philii)])incs. the United States, except as to the 
bay, city, and harbor of Manila, contined itself to deuiandiny that the 
subject should be left in the widest an.d fullest sense for future nego- 
tiations. While it did not, with the exception referred to, demand 
specitic concessions, it reserved and secured the right to demand them. 
Its position, therefore, is, not that its present demands in respect of 
the Philippines were specifically set out in the Protocol, but that they 
are justified by and included in the right which it therein expressly 
reserved and secured to make demands in the iiiture. 

Putting aside, however, the erroneous assumption of which notice 
has just been taken, it appears that the S])anish Commissioners differ 
with the American Commissioners as to the scope and meaning of the 
third article of the Protocol signed by the representatives of the two 
Governments at Washington on the 12th of August, 1898. This article 
is as follows: 

"Article 3. — The United States will occui)y and hold the city, bay 
and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, 
which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the 
Phili])i)ines," 

The Spanish Commissioners contend that in the negotiation and 
settlement of a treaty under this article nothing can be demanded by 
the United States which impairs the sovereignty of Spain over the 
islands, and that a fair construction of the terms of the article can 
require only such changes in the government of the islands, reforms in 
admiinstration and kindred changes, as do not affect ultimate Spanish 
sovereignty. 

it is the contention on the part of the United States that this article 
leaves to the determination of the treaty of peace the entire subject of 
the future government and sovereignty of the Philippines necessarily 
embraced in the terms used in the Protocol. 

The Spanish Commissioners supjiort their contention upon two 
grounds: First, that the meaning of the words is not such as to include 
the sovereignty of Spain in the Philippines. Second, that the history 
of the negotiations, and the reservations made by Spain in the course 
thereof, preclude the United States from making its claim. 

It is a i>rinciple of law no less applicable to international differences 
than to private controversies that where the result of negotiations has 
been embodied in a written compact, the terms of such agreement shall 
settle the rights of the parties. The reasons upon which this doctrine 
rests are too well known to need recapitulation here. While the United 
States might well rest its case upon a construction of the terms used, 
it has iH) disposition to avoid the fullest examination and the most 
searching scrutiny of the negotiations which preceded the making of 
the Proto(;ol, as they but serve to make clear the purpose of the parties 
to leave to the treaty now in ])rocess of negotiation the fullest oppor- 
tunity to dispose of the government and sovereignty of the Philippine 
Islands in such a manner as might be recorded in the treaty. 

The two (Joveiiiments being at war, negotiations with a view of 
obtaining a treaty of peace were opened by the (lovernment of Spain 
through the Minister of State addressing to the President of the United 
States, in the mime of the (lovernment of Her Mhjesty the Queen 
Eegeut, a note dated the 22m\ of -July, 1898, which it is not necessary 



TREATY OF PEACE. 131 

to set out in full here. It is sufficieut to say tliat the. ein the President 
of the Uuited States is asked to name the terms upon wliicli peace may 
be had between the two countries. Tliis note was presented to the 
President of the United States on the 2(ith day of July, 1898, by Mr. 
Cambon. Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, author- 
ized to make the application, and represent the Spanish Goveriiment 
in the subser[uent negotiations which led up to the execution of the 
Protocol. At that meeting- the President received the note of July 22 
from the Spanish Cxovernminit and advised Mr. Cambon that after con 
sultation with his Cabinet he would pre[)are an answer which could be 
transmitted to the Spanish Grovernment. On July 3i» following, the 
terms of pi'acje having been carefully considered and agieed upon by 
the President and his Cabinet, the President received Mr. Cambon at 
the Executive Mansiosi in Washington, at which meeting were also 
present Mr. Thi. baut, Secretary of the French Fmb.issy in Washington, 
and the then Secretary of S^ate of tlie United States. The answer of 
the President to the comiuunication of the Spanish Government, dated 
July 30, 1898, wis then read to Mr. (Jambou. This note was in the 
exact form in which it was afterwards signed and delivered to Mr. 
Cambon to he sent to t'ne Spanisli (loveiiiment, with a single exception. 
After some discussion of the terms of the note as to Cuba, and Porto 
Rico and other West Indian islands, Mr. Cambon sanl he did not know 
what the Spanish Government would desire as to the Philipi)ines, and 
no matter what the note might say as to the Commission, the Spanish 
Government would regard the pur])ose of the United States as being- 
fixed to ai-quire not only Cuba and Porto Hico, but the Philippines as 
well. The President said that as to the Philippines the note expressed 
the purposes of this Government, and their final disposition would 
de})end upon the treaty to be negotiated by the Commissioners and 
ratified by the interested Governments. 

Atter further discussion, in which the President reiterated that the 
treaty must derermine the fate of the Philippines, and the note of the 
President on that subject reading then as now with the single exception 
that the word " i)ossession " was then in Article HI, so that it read '• con- 
trol, possession and government of the Philippines'', where it Jiow reads 
"control, disposition and government of the Philippines''. Mr. Cambon 
said that tlie word "possession" translated into Spanish in such a way 
as to be regarded as of a severe and threatening nature, and suggested 
a change in that word. He suggested the word " condition '\ The 
President declined to change the word except for a word of similar 
import or meaning. The word "disi)osition'' being suggested, after 
considerable talk the President consented that that word, not changing 
the meaning, being indeed a broader one and including possession, 
might be substituted. Thereupon the note at the close of the interview 
of July 30, in exactly the form it was originally cast with the single 
change of the word " disposition " for " possession ", was delivered to 
Mr. Cambon to be communicated to the Spanish Government. 

On Wednesday, August 3, in the afternoon, Mr. Cambon having inti- 
mated a desire for a further interview with the President, another 
meeting between the same persons was held at the Executive Mansion. 
Mr. Cambon said the Spanish Government had received the answer of 
the President, and that it was regarded by S])ain as very severe. After 
asking a modification as to Porto Rico, to which the President promptly 
answered that he could not consent, Mr. Cambon said there was a dis- 
position to believe in Spain that the United States intended to take the" 
Philippine group; that the Spanish Government appreciated that 



132 TREATY OF PEACE. 

relonns were uocessaiy in tlie ^oveniuient; that American privileges 
should be granted: but that Spanish soverergnty should not be inter- 
fered with was a matter which Spain would insist upon. The Presi- 
dent answered tiiat the (piestion of Cuba, Porto Kico and other West 
India islands, and the i.adrones, admitted of no negotiation; that the 
disjiosition of the PljiHi)i)ine Islands, as he had already said to Mr. 
(Jambon, must depend upon the treaty which might be negotiated, and 
that he could not make any change in the terms theretofore submitted. 
Mr. Cambon called attention to the wording of the note as to tlie pos- 
session of the city, bay and harbor of Manila to be retained during the 
pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be done with them after- 
wards. The President said that must dejxiid upon the terms of the 
treaty. 

This is the same interview alluded to in the memorandum of the 
Spanish Commissioners as having occurred on the 4th of August. It 
iu fact occurred on the atteruoon of August 3, the diflerence in date 
arising trom the fact, no doubt, that it was reported on the 4th of Au- 
gust. This can nurke but little difference, as there was but one interview 
at that time. 

In reporting tlie conversations, and comparing the ■memoranda made 
by Mr. Cambon with those made by the representative of the American 
Government then present, it must l)e borne in mind that Mr. Cambon 
did not speak or understand English, but communicated with the Pres- 
ident through the medium of an interpreter, his Secretary, and that 
neither of the American representatives understood or spoke the French 
language. Making this allowance, it is perfectly apparent that the 
American President, even in the version reported and transcribed in 
the memorandum of the Spanish Commission, at all times maintained 
that the treaty of peace should determine the control, disposition and 
government of the Philippines. The President did say that the Philip- 
pine (piestion was the only one left open for negotiation and settle- 
ment in the treaty. It is undoubtedly true that it was not then tully 
settled in his own mind as to what disposition should be made of 
the Philippines. Had it been, there would have been nothing to 
leave to negotiation and settlement in the treaty. It was the i)Uipose 
of the President iu everything written and spoken to leave to the 
negotiators of the treaty the most a)n])le freedom with reference to 
the Philii)pines, and to settle, if their negotiations should result in an 
agreenient, the control. disj)osition and government of those islands in 
the treaty of peace. When Mr. Cambon spoke of Spain's purpose to 
retain sovereignty over those islands, the President did say he wanted 
it clearly understood that no ambiguity should remain u|)on that point, 
but that the a\' hole matter sljould be decided as set forth in the treaty 
of peace, which should determine the control, dis])osition and govern- 
ment of the Philipiiinc Islands. He certainly did not use the word 
''intervention" nor limit the subject of negotiation to "advantages" in 
the Philijjpines; nor can it be claimed that any rei)ort was made to the 
Spanish Government of the ])recise l*]nglish words used by the Presi- 
d«'nt. In the same paragraph ([uoted in the memorandum of the 
Si)auish Commission in which it is said he used the woi-ds above 
quoted, it is added tliat the ['resident also said the negotiators should 
decide upon the "intervention'' {contrnlr), disjjosition and government 
of tlie Philippine Islands. I'^ven this version of the conversation is 
ample proof that the President showed no uncertainty as to the scope 
and meaning of the terms used. He did say in substance, in re])ly to 
the inquiry of Mr. Cambon as to whether the United States had pre- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 133 

judged tlie matter of the Philippine Islands and the rights to be 
acquired therein by the United States, that the case had not been pre- 
judged either as to the United States or as to Spain. The whole 
matter would be left to the Commission for negotiation, and to be 
settled by the treaty of peace. In the meantime the United States 
would insist upon holding Manila as laid down in the note, and its dis- 
position thereafter would depend upon the terms of the treaty. This 
is reported in the quotation in the Spanish note as the utterance of the 
President that "the Madrid Government can rest assured that -up to 
now nothing is decided a priori in my own mind against Spain, nor do 
I consider anything decided by it against the United States." This 
may not be an unfair interpretation, though not the exact words used 
by the President. It shows clearly tliat he did not regard the United 
States as limited to "advantages in the Philippines", but the whole 
matter, being undecided in the President's mind, was left open in accord- 
ance with the terms of the note. The case was not decided in advance 
in any of its aspects either for or against either government. 

(Ireat stress is laid iti the Spanish memorandum upon the allegation 
that the President had not then determined to take the Philippine 
group, and indeed did not intend to do so. It is utterly immaterial to 
inquire as to what either Government would then have insisted upon. 
There was a mutual agreement that the question should not then be 
decided. Oi)portunity for full investigation was reserved, the final 
conclusion to be arrived at as the result of t^e negotiations now in 
progress, in the treaty of peace to be here concluded. 

Further conversation as to the number of Commissioners, the place 
of meeting, et cetera, terminated the interview. 

On the afternoon of August *J, Mr. Cambou, having received the note 
of August 7 sent by the Duke of Almodovar, called by appointment at 
the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which interview were pres- 
ent the same parties as at the last meeting. The i)art of that note 
which relates to the Philippines, in the exact terms in which it was 
then jiresentedin English text by the French Ambassador to the Presi- 
dent of the United States, is as follows: 

'"The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, 
to be (piite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the 
United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor 
and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, can- 
not be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade nmintained on 
sea by the American tleet,in spite of the siege established on land by a 
native supported and provided for by the American Admiral, Manila 
still holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. 
On the other hand, the whole Archi])elago of the Philippines is in the 
power and under tlie sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the Government 
of Spain thinks that the tem])orary occupation of ^lanila should con- 
stitute a gnarnnty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine 
the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines; but as the 
intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, 
therefore the Spanish Government must declare that, while accepting 
the third condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of 
Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to 
such reforms as the condition of these possessions and the level of cul- 
ture of their natives may render desirable. 

"'The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with 
the above mentioned declarations.' 

"Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish Gov- 



134 TREATY OF PEACE. 

eniuK'nt has the honor to subiiiit in ye\)\y to your Excellency's coin- 
niuniciition. Tlicj/ ava'pt the prof/'t red teriiiK, i-nibject to the approval of 
the Corte.s nf the Kiiu/ilom, as reiinired by their eouHtltiitional duties. 

"The a*ireenu'nt between the two goveriaoents iin})lics the irremeable 
susi)ension of hostilities and the designation of Comndssioners for the 
purpose of settling the details of the treaty of i)eaee and of signing it, 
under the terms above indicated." 

It is translated in the memoraiulum of the Spaidsh Commissioners m 
language differing somew hat from the terms of the note as i)resented 
to the President. In the translation in the memorandnm it is said that 
the treaty shall determine "the intervention, disposition and goveru- 
ment of the Philii)pine Islands". In the note as jiresented to the I*resi- 
dent it reads "it is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the 
eontrol, disi)Ositiou and government of the lMiilii)piues''. The word 
••entire"' precedes -'sovereignty'' in the translation embodied in the 
Spanish note. 

It is true that, taking these words of the Duke of Almodovar either 
as they were conveyed to the President of the United States, or as they 
are now (juoted iu the Spanish i>roi)Osition, it may be argued that they 
do no more than reserve to S])ain the right to maintain that she did not 
iu advance of the negotiations for peace renounce her sovereignty over 
the archipelago. She did this, by her own declaration, for the reason 
that the intentions of the United States were "veiled"; clejirly per- 
ceiving that by the terms of the demand the United States wonld have 
the right, if it saw fit*to exercise it, to ask that she yield her sover- 
eignty over the group, and that her sovereignty was tliiis put iu 
jeopardy, she took the precaution to say that she did not inteud, iu 
assuming the chance of such a demand, to concede it in advance. 

The American Commissioners do not deny thivt this may be a fiiir 
construction of this particular paragraph of the Duke's note. The 
representatives of the United States were not williug, however, to leave 
auything to construction. When therefore the Duke's answer was read 
to the President it was immediately objected to by him and the Sec- 
retary of State, in that it was vague and indehnite, purporting to 
accept the terms laid down in the note of the United States, while 
requiring some modification. In referiing to the Phili[)pines. while in 
one paragraph it stated the acce])tauce of the terms, in another it 
seemed to retain the full right of sovereigiity, with such reforms, etc., 
as that Government might see tit to grant. The unsatisfactory char- 
acter of this auswer is more clearly shown when in thesubsecpient ]»art 
of the same note, not quoted in the memorandum of the Spanish Com- 
missioners, it was said without qualitication that they (the Spanish 
Government) accept the i)rotrere(l terms, subject to the approval of the 
Cortes of the ivingdom. as reiaiired by their constitutional duties. In 
the ])art of the )iote referred to above it is said "the Spanish Govern- 
ment must declare that, while accei)ting the said condition, they do 
n:»t o priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipe^igo, 
leaving it to the negotiators, etc." These contradictory statements 
were called to the attention of Mr. ('amboii, and nuide the note, as was 
said to him, unsatisfactoiy to the United States. 

It is to be observed, as has already in elfcct been jjointed out. that 
even the terms of this note are inconsistent with the claim now put for- 
ward that S])anish sovereignty shall luit be interfered with, for the 
length to which the statement goes in the note is that the Spanish Gov- 
ernment does not ei priori relin(|uish entire sovereignty over the Philip- 
pine Archiiielago, thus leaving it clearly to be inferred that the Spanish 



TREATY OF PEACE. 135 

Goverumeut recognized that the negotiatioiis resulting iu a treaty might 
require a relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty consequent upon such 
negotiations. 

Mr. Cambon, having heard the objectious raised by the Ameri(;au 
representatives to the note, asserted that allowance must be made for 
different translations which the note had undergone in course of trans- 
mission, and to the desire of the Spanish Government to express regret 
at the loss of its colonies; and he was very confident that it was the 
intention to accept the terms of the Tnited States. It was then sug- 
gested by the American Representatives that if this be true, and the 
note was to be regarded as a full acceptance, the best way to settle the 
matter was to put the terms in the shape of a definite Protocol, which 
the President would authorize the Secretary of State to sign for the 
United States, Mr. Cambon to submit to the Spanish Government the 
exact terms of the Protocol, to which an answer Yes or Xo could be had ; 
and if the Spanish Government accepted the Protocol, that would end 
the controversy. Mr. Cambon concurred in tliis view, and said if the 
Protocol was drawn up in proper form he would submit it to the Span- 
ish Government, and if authorized would execute it on its part. 

On that evening, August 9, the Protocol was prepared in the State 
Department atVVashiniiton,and taken to the Executive Mansion, where 
it was submitted to the President and members of the Cabinet there 
present. On the morning of August 10. Mr. Cambon called at the State 
I>epartment at Washington, a draft of the Protocol was submitted to 
and approved by him, and put into French by Mr.^hit'baut, Secretary 
of the French Embassy at Washington, and expeits in the State 
Dei)artment. It was carefully compared with the English text, and 
then telegraphed by Mr. Cambon to the Spanish (Government. On the 
same day, August 10. the note of the Secretary of State enclosing the 
Protocol was sent to Mr. Cambon in Washington. This note, it is said, 
contains the admission of th(^ Secretary of State of the United States 
that the note of the Duke of xVlmodovar of August 7 "contained in its 
spirit the acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by the United 
States." The best answer to this obvious misconstruction of the terms 
of the note of the Secretary of State is in the text of the note itself, 
which is as follows: 

Dei'aktmkxt ok State, 

irashhif/lon, Aiuiiiit 10, iS9S. 

Excellency, Although it is yonr niiderstiviulinn' that the note of the Dnke of 
AlmoOovar, which you left witli the I'ri'sidfiit on yesterday afteruooii, is iuteuded 
to convey an ac(^6ptance l)y the Spanish (ioverunient of the terms set forth in my 
note of th« 30th ultimo as the basis on which the President would appoint Commis- 
sioners to ne^uotiate and conclude with Commissioners on the part of Spain a Treaty 
of peace, I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Unkc's note, doubtless 
owing to the various trauslormaiious which it has iiudergont' in the course of its 
circuitous transuussion by tclegra]»h and iu cipher, is not, in the form in which it 
has reached the hands of the President, entirely ex])licit. 

Under these circumstances, it is thought that the most direct and certain way of 
avoiding misunderstanding is to embody iu a Protocol to be signed by us us the 
represeutati\ es, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terras on which 
the negotiations for jieace are to be undertaken. 

I therel'ore eniloc herewith a draft of such a Protocol in which you will find that 
I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain iu my note of the 30fch ultimo, 
together with appropriate stipulations for the appointn.ent of Commissioners to 
arrange the details of the iuimediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other 
islands under Spanish sovereiguty in the West Indies, as well as for the appointment 
of Commissioners to treat of peace. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. 

(Signed:) William R. Day. '- 

His Excellency M. Jules Cambon, etc. 



13() TREATY OF PEACE. 

lu tliis note, so far from snyiui^ tliat tbe Secretary of State of the 
United States uuderstauds tluit tbe note of -the Spanish Government 
of August 7 accepts the American terms, it is distinctly said "although 
it is your (Mr. Camboii's) understanding- that the note of the Duke of 
Almodovar is intended to convey the ac(ei)tance by the Spanish (iov- 
ernment of the terms set forth in my note of the o()th ultimo, * * * 
I understand that we concur in the opinion tliat the l)ukc\s note, doubt- 
less owing to the various translbiinations whicli it has undergone in 
the course of its circiiitons transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is 
not, in the form in Avhich it reached the hands of the President, entirely 
explicit." 

Here it is distinctly stated that the Secretary of State and Mr. Cam- 
bon concur that the note is not entirely explicit. Was it then to be 
expected after all this careful negotiation that a note which the Ameri- 
can representatives contended did not acce])t the terms of the United 
States, and which both negotiators agreed was not explicit, was to be 
received as a satisfactory answer to the American demand ? Not so. 

"Under these circumstances it is tliought that the most direct and 
certain w^ay of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a l*rotocol, 
to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United 
States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to 
be undertaken." 

This is a most emphatic and definite declaration that the note of 
August 7 was not satisfactory, and that it w^as the purpose of the 
United States to Jeave nothing open to misuuderstanding, but to 
embody, in acimtract so plain that dispute would be forever foreclosed, 
the exact terms upon which negotiations for peace would be under- 
taken. The note goes on to say "I therefore enclose herewith a draft 
of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have embodied the 
precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the .'iOth ultimo, together 
with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners, 
etc." What does this jiote mean? Does it admit the construction that 
the pro])osal was intended to embody the acceptance of August 7, 
reserving Spanish sovereignty? It is definitely settled, as a perusal 
of the document will show, that the Protocol embodied, not the uncer- 
tain and equivocal terms of the note of August 7, but the precise terms 
stated in the note of the American Government of July ;3<). This note 
to Mr. Cambon enclosed the Protocol just as it was written and just as 
it was signed by the ])arties. It would seem, if ever an attempt was 
fairly made to have a clear understanding, if ever all precautions were 
taken which could leave no room for misunderstanding, such was the 
course luii-sued in the ])resent case. 

It is thus seen liow utterly groundless is the declaration in the Span- 
ish "pro])osition" that, in order to determine the meaning of the Pro- 
tocol, it is necessary to "bear in mind * * * the negotiations carried 
on between the two parties which (culminated in this agreement, and in 
which the interpretation of the latter had been given beforehand and 
officially"! In the corresi)ondenee thus invoked by the Spanish Com- 
missioners as an inter])retation of the Protocol, the two Governments 
did not contem])late the execution of such an instrument; and if the 
resjKuise of the Spanish (Jovernment to the American demands had 
taken the form of a simple accei)tance, no Tiotocol would have been 
made. The first suggestion of such an instrument was that made in 
the interview in which the Si)anish resjjonse was deelariHl to be unsat- 
isfactory. It was because the Spanish response was unaccejitable that 
the United States dennuided a Protocol. And it is upon this rejected 



TREATY OF PEACE. 137 

response tliat the Spanish argument for the limitation of the clear scope 
and meaning of the Protocol is built. 

If further proof of the soundness of the position of the United States 
were needed, it would be found in a most convincing form in the tele- 
gram sent by i\lr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
See the Frencli " Yellow Book" referred to in the Spanish memorandum, 
telegram number 9, Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 

Ko. 9. — M. Jiilei Cambon, -Ainhassador of the French Uepuhlic at Washington, to M, 
Delcasse, Minister for Foreif/n Affairs. 

Washington, Au<just 10, 189S. 

The Federal Government lias decided to state precisely (preciser), in a Protocol, 
the bases upon which tlie peace negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon. 

I send you herewith this document, which I shall thank you to transmit to the 
Spanish (iovernment. 

(Sio-UL'd:) J. Cambon. 

In this telegram, which was immediately communicated to the Spanish 
Government, and which led to the telegram to Mr. Cambon authoriz- 
ing him to sign tlie Protocol, followed by lull power from the Queen 
Regent to Mr. Cambon to that effect, Mr. Cambon distinctly says, not 
that the American Government has accepted the note of August 7, or 
in any wise agreed to such reservations as are contained therein, but 
that "^/(e FedcraJ Government has decided to state precuehj [irrecisp-), in 
a Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its judg- 
ment, l)e entered upon. I send you this document, etc:'' 

It thus clearly appears that the bases of peace negotiations were to 
be determined by the instrument which was enclosed, and which it was 
understood put in definite terms the ultimate agreement of the parties. 

It was because the answer made in the note of August 7 was rejected 
by the United States, and for this reason alone, that hostilities were 
not ui)on the receipt of that note declared to be suspended; and it has 
remained for the Spanish Commissioners in their ■'i)roposition'' to 
advance for the first time in behalf of their Government the sugges 
tion that such a declaration should then have been made. It was not 
so made because that note was not received as an accei)tance of the 
American demands. Hostilities were declared to be suspended only 
upon the signature of the Proto(;ol. 

The correspondence quoted in the French "Yellow Pook," no less 
than the subsecpient communications from Mr. Cambon to the Ameri- 
can Government, shows distincjtly that with the exact terms of this 
Protocol before it, the Spanish Gov^erinnent, on the 1 1th instant, and 
sidiseqnently by full power of the Queen Regent, authorized Mr. Cam- 
bon to execute the Protocol in behalf of Spain. Observe the language 
of the note of Mr. Cambon to the American Secretary of State of 
August 12, 1898: 

Embassy of the Fkexch Republic in the United States, 

If'ashington, August 12, 1S9S. 

Mr. Secretai: Y ok State : I have tlie honor to in form you that I have just received, 
through the intermediation of the department of foreign affairs at Paris, a telegram, 
dated Madrid, August 11, iu which the Duke of Almodovar del Rio ;uinounces to me 
that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish Government confers 
npon me full powers in order that I may sign, without other formality and without 
delay, the Protocol whereof the terms have T)een drawn u]i by common accord 
between you and me. The instrument destined to make regular the powers wliich 
are thus given to me by telegraph will be subsequently addressed to me by the post. 

"His Excellency the Minister of State adds that iu acceiiting this Protocol, nntl 
by reason of the susjjension of hostilities which will be the immediate consequence 



138 TREATY OF PEACE. 

of that acceptance, the Spanish (Joverniueut has pleasure in hopinii' that the Gov 
erunieut of the I'nited States will take the necessary measures with a view t 
restrain (empcfhrr) all a.i^gressiou on tlie part of the ('ui)au separatist forces. 

The Government of the Kepnl)lic havintr, (,n the other hand, authorized me t' 
accept the powers which are conferred u])on me b\' the Spanish Government, I slial 
hold myself at your disposition to sign the Protocol at the hour yon may be pleasec 
to desijiiiate. 

Gongratulating myself upon thus c()oi)eratiug with you toward the re8torati(m o 
peace between the two nations, lioth Iriends of Prance, I bei; you to accept, Mr 
Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very high consideration. 

(Signed:) Jui.es C.\:\ihox. 

Ill the liiiilit of these facts, it appears there is absolutely no fouiida 
tioii for the claim that the American (iovernment accepted the Spanisl 
reservations so far as they are contained in tlie note of tlie Duke o> 
Alinodovar of August 7, Had that note Ix'en oul^'^ a distinct aun 
uiKiualitied accej)tance of the terms as contained in the American note 
of Auo-iist 30. it would have been unnecessary to recpiire that all unceri 
taiuty and doubt should be removed by reducing into few and simple 
terms, which it was believed could never be misunderstood, the finai 
agreement of the parties. iSo far from remaining unanswered, the notd 
of August 7 Avas declared unsatisfactory when presented to the Presii' 
dent. Thus euded the attempt to come to an agreement by correspoudl 
euce; and it was decided that a Protocol should embody the ultimatdj 
terms. i 

The Spanish Government telegraphed the amplest authority to Mn 
Cambon to execute it. We are then remitted to the terms of thd' 
l*rotocol itself. 

The Ameiican Government is at a loss to know how stronger terms I 
could have been u.sed to evidence the purjtose of the President to keep? 
open the most full and absolute right to deal with and determine tlieo 
dominion over the Philippine Islands. This was the purpose of insert-1 
iiig the third article of the Protocol, which embodied the terms of the 
third demand of the United States, as set forth in the note of July 30| 
of the American Government to the Duke of Almodovar, wherein it igj 
said: ''Third. On simihir grounds the United States is eutitled to| 
occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the cou-| 
elusion of a treaty of ])eace which shall determine the control, disposi-i 
tion and government of the Philippines.'' j 

What are these similar grounds! The} are to be found in the uextj 
preceding paragraph of the note of July 30, in which the President says. 
that, though not then making any demand for pecuniary indemnity, 
nevertheless he cannot be insensible to the losses and ex[)enses of the 
United States incident to the war, or to tlie claims of our citizens fori 
injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection iu 
(Juba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States, 
and the immediate evacuation by S])ain, of the Island of Porio Ivico, 
etc. On similar grounds, to wit, among others the right of the United 
States to liave indemnity for its losses, the United States will hold the 
city, bay and liarl)or of .Manila i)ending the conclusion of a treaty of 
peace, which sliall determine the control, disi)()sition and government 
of the Philii)i)ines. 

How could tlie United States receive indemnity in whole or in i»arti 
from the control, disi)osition and government of the Philippines, if] 
S])anish sovereignty was not to be touched? It is diflicult to conceive 
what terms could have been used which would more clearly have 
evidenced the purpose of the parties to afford the fullest latitude in 
dealing with the l'hilii)piiie <piestion. The treaty was to determine not 



TREATY OF PEACE. 13D 

alone the control, disposition and government, but at tbe same time 
had lull power to determine all that is implied in control, disposition 
and government. Certainly the word "control" was not used here in 
the sense of "register" or "inspection", but in its broader sense of 
"authority or command; authority over; power over; the regulation 
or rule of." 

What Mord could be broader than "disposition," which has practically 
the same meaning in both the French and English languages/ "The 
disposal of; distribution of; alienation of; detinite settlement of; ulti- 
mate (lest i nation.''' We have in these two words, then, authority over, 
dominion of, tinal and ultimate destination of the subject nuxtter. What 
is "government" but the right of adniinistration, or exercising sover- 
eignty, the direction, the political management of a state? Either of 
these terms imjjlies power of interfering with sovereignty. Taken 
together, they give the fullest scope in dealing with all power, govern- 
mental, territorial and administrative. 

It is not argued in the Spanish "proposition" that these words should 
have a narrow meaning so far as disposition and government are con- 
cerned, but transcribed into tlie French language it is sought to give a 
narrower meaning to the word "control." It must be construed in the 
connection in which it is found in the Protocol, in its broader sense of 
])Ower or dominion. Xoscitur a soeii.s is a legal maxim which applies to 
the discussion or determination of the meaning of i)hrases. "Control" 
associated witli disposition and government of territory might have a 
very different significance when used in another relation in its less 
familiar meaning of "inspection or register." The word "disposition" 
used in another association might have an entirely different meaning, 
and a meaning which, in connection with government and control, would 
deprive it of all sense. 

The American (iovernment, then, feels itself amply supported in its 
right to demand the cession of the Pliilii)pines with or without conces- 
sions, lelying upon either the exact terms of the Protocol or those terms 
interi)rete(l in the light of the negotiations, oral and written, which led 
to its execution. 

The Commissioners of the United States notice with regret that an 
atteni])t has l)een made in the memorandum of the Si>anish Commis- 
sioners to invoke the high authority of the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in the interi)retation of the Protocol, so as to exclude therefrom 
all mention of the right of the treaty to deal with the control, disposi- 
tion and government of the Philippines. In the French " Yellow Book" 
cited by the Spanish Commissioners, it is api)arent that as early as the 
10th of August the French (Tovernnient was in possession of the exact 
terms of the Protocol, transmitted in the note of that date of its Andjas- 
sador, Mr. Canihon. W^ould anybody believe that in summing up this 
note the Minister would intentioiially omit one of the most essential 
parts of the Protocol! 

The note number 10 referred to is no part of the negotiations; its 
purpose was merely to advise the Ambassadors of the French Eepublic 
at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, etc., of the result of the 
action of the re])resentative of France in brintdng about a suspension 
of hostilities, and tlie preliminary agreement as to peace, between two 
nations toward whi(;h the French Government was actuated by feelings 
of humanity and mutual friendship. In this note it is said that the 
points upon which both parties have reached an agreement were set 
forth in a Protocol. In stating the contents of that instrument, . 



140 TREATY OF PEACE. 

doubtless through inadvertence, it is not stated that the treaty shal 
determine the control, disjwsition and government of the Philippines 
The attention of the Minister being- called to this matter by th( 
American Ambassador in Paris, he very promptly corrected any mis 
apprehension which might exist as to his desi)atch. This appears ii 
the following- letter from the American Ambassador, which has just 
been received by the American Commissioners: 

Ambassade des Etats-Unis, 18, Avenue Kli^ber, 

Paris, November S, 1S9S. 

Dkau Sir: I be<;- to iut'oim yon tluit I saw the French Minister of Foreign Affain 
in regard to that portion of the rei)ly of the .Spanish Peace Coininiesioners in whirl 
they refer to a h'tter sent by him to the French Ambassadors dated August 15, 1S!I8 ! 
whieli appears in the French " VeHow Koolv". and attemi)tto construe the hmguagfr 
used thiTeiu as an interpretation of the French Minister of the meaning of the Pro " 
tocol, and speak of the un(iuestionalde moral weight of tlie testimony therein given 
by him regarding that instrument. He assured me emphatically and unreservedly! 
that the letter referred to was intended to be simply a brief ri^sume of the genera^, 
features of the preliminary peace negotiations carried on between the two belliger- 
ents, and that he did not attempt to ((uote the precise language of the Protocol. He 
disclaimed any intention of given any views of his owii regarding it, having nc 
authority for so doing, and declared that thi- brief mention contained in his letter:' 
could in no wise be construed as an interpretation by him of the terms or meaning, 
of that instrument. He promised that he would at oiice send to the French Ambas- 
sadors the full text of the Protocol in order that they nnght be informed of its con- 
ditions /x e.ctcnso atml that there might be no ground for misapprehension as to its 
terms. 

The Minister repeated what he had said several times before, and which I know 
to be true, that he aud his (iovernment had all along observed a strict and impartial 
ueuti-ality between the two iiowers which were negotiating, being e(|nally friendly 
to both, and that he intended to continue the observance of such neutrality. 
Very truly yours, 

(Signed): Horace Porter. 

Hon. William R. Day, 

Fresident of the American Peace Commission, Paris. 

It is stated that the occupation of Manila was to be only tem])orary. 
This is undoubtedly true. The Protocol, so far as it relates to the Philip- 
pines, is itself provisioiml. It expressly provides for the doing- of certain 
things pending the conclusion of a treaty which is in this particular to 
supersede it. Had it provided for the ])ermanent occupation of Manila 
by the Tnited States, it would have withdrawn the Philippines to that' 
extent from the sphere of future negotiation. 

While the terms of surrender cited in the Spanish memorandum, 
negotiated after fhe execution of the Protocol and liaving nothing to 
do with the negotiations for peace, show the character of this occupa- 
tion, it is to be noticed that the very paragraph cited from the terms 
of that document shows that it was equally contemplated that condi- 
tions might arise which would reqnii-e the evacuation by the Spanish 
forces of the city. In it it is said ^'the return of the arm's surrendered 
by the S])anish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city or 
when the American army evacuates it." The commanders of the 
American and Spanish forces did not undertake to determine the right 
of either party permanently to hold Manila, but contem|)lated conditions 
which might require its evacuation by the forces of either country. 

P>ut it is as idle to cite the stipulations of the ca})itulation for the 
])nrpose of deteiinining the meaning of the Protocol as it would be to 
cite tlu» stipulations of the Protocol for the i)urpose of determining the 
meaning of the capitulation. It is notorious that, owing to the inter- 
rnption of telegraphic communication. Manila was captured and the 
capitulation arranged and concluded by the commander of the American 
forces in the Phili])pines without communication with his (Jovernment, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 141 

which was lit the moment as uiiiuformed of wliat was takiug place at 
Manila as was its commaneler of what was taking place at Washington. 
It is snperHnous, therefore, to argue, even if it were material to do so, 
that the stipulations of the capitulation cannot be invoked in ex]:>lana- 
tion or limitation of tlie stipulations of tlie Protocol. For the same 
reason it is iierhaps unnecessary to comment upon tire statement that 
" General Merritt, contrary to what had been agreed upon in Ariicle VI 
of the same (Protocol), forcibly took possession of Manila"'. The Ameri- 
can Commissioneis are loth to assume that the Spanish " proportion " 
employs these words for the purpose of intimating that General Merritt 
could at the time of the capture of Manila have had knowledge of the 
Protocol. It is a fact doubtless well known to the Si)anish Govern- 
ment that on the 10th of August last, four days after the signature of 
the Protocol, and four days betore the receipt at Washington of the 
news of the capture and capitulation of Manila, the Department of 
State addressed to the French Ambassador a note soliciting the con- 
sent of the Spanish Government to the restoration of cable communi- 
cation between Manila and Hong Kong, in order that continuous 
telegraphic connection with the Philippines might be reestablished. 

It is observed that the Spanish Gommissiouers in their "proposition" 
say that the words of the Protocol in relation to tiie i^hilippines "have 
not a clear meaning", but that no matter what construction may be 
placed upon them, " in no case can their meaning be so stretched as to 
involve in any way the idea of cession of the sovereignty of Spain over 
the archipelago", .since "such a cession or acquisition hi iKypetuum of 
the archipelago by the United States, had it been agreed upon in the 
Protocol, would have been in contradiction with the mere temporary 
occupation of Manila, which at the same time was agreed upon in the 
same clause of that instrument". This statement, as well as the para- 
graph that immediately follows it, merely reiterates the erroneous 
assumption, to which we have already adverted, that the ultimate 
demands of the United States in respect of the Philippines were 
embodied in the Protocol, while, as a matter of fact, the instrument 
shows upon its face that it was agreed that the formulation of those 
demands should be postponed till the negotiations for a treaty of peace 
should be undertaken. 

How, then, stands the demand of the Government of the United 
States for the cession of tiie Philippine Islands with the concessions 
which it is willing to make, as set forth in its ])roposition of the olst 
ultimo I This demand might be limited to the single ground of indem- 
nity, but this limitation the American Gommissiouers do not herein 
concede. The United States does not now put forward any claim for 
pecuniary indemnity to (;over the enormous cost of the war. It does 
not take the sovereignty of Cuba; as has been shown in former memo- 
randa submitted by the American Commissioners, it assumes only bur- 
dens there. It does demand, and Spain has agreed to cede, the Island 
of Porto Rico and the small Island of Guam in the Ladrones. W^hat 
is Spain asked to give up in the Philippines? A country constantly in 
rebellion against its sovereignty, so that if the United States were to 
withdraw therefrom to-day, Spain would immediately have to resort 
to arms to overcome a rebellious and discontented people. 

This situation could not be more vividly portiayed than to use the 
words of the Spanish memorandum in which, after speaking of Spain's 
neglect of her own welfare to the detriment of her full development, 
this condition is attributed to "her desire to preferentially attend to 
her colonies, creatures who, like all others in the order of nature, enlist 



142 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the utmost solicitude on tlie part of their mother, who feeds and sup- 1 
ports them at the sacrifice of lier welfare".- 

The Americau Commissioners note, with some surprise, that the' 
Spanish Commissioners, so soon after having provisionally accepted 
the American articles as to Cuba and Porto Rico, now return to the 
(piestidn of the so called Cuban debt. They regret to tind a position 
which, under certain reserves, had been distinctly waived, iinniediately 
resumed, and now expressed in languag-c rarely employed in diplomacy, 
unless to convey a deliberate ultimatum. The Spanish Commissioners- 
assuiue that this debt, for the most x)art incurred by Spain (not Cuba) 
in the elfort first to subjugate the Cuban insurgents, and subsequently 
to overcome the fJnited States, has the binding- eifect of a mortgage 
upon the very hind wrested from Spain through the defeat of this effort. 
They then say that they cannot even admit any discussion as to the- 
validity and efficacy of such mortgages. In language e(jually unusual,, 
they continue: '■'TM it he understood, therefore, ami the Spaitii^h Com- 
missioners hope there will he no necessity to repeat it. that Spain cannot 
and ought not to agree in this treaty," etc. Now, since Spain, as lately 
as in the next to the last paper filed here by her Commissioners did, 
under reserve, agree in this treaty to waive objections to our articles 
containing no reference to the so-called Cuban debt, the American Com- 
missioners feel themselves justified in inquiring distinctly whether this 
sudden change of position is finalf Do the Spanish Commissioners 
wish it to be understood now, without any necessity for repetition, that 
they will accei)t no treaty wliich does not provide for an assumption of 
this so-called Cuban debt, or for some part of it, by the United States, 
for itself or for Cuba? 

The American Commissioners observe also the declaration that the 
dignity and self-respect of Spain forbid an in(|uiry into the use Spain 
may have made of the proceeds of these loans. Now — to consider only 
a single aspect of the issue thus raised— it is not denied that the pro- 
ceeds of a part of these loans were employed directly in making war 
upon the United States. Is it to l)e understood that the United States, 
after succeeding in the war, is forbidden to take notice even of this 
fact? That would be to require the successful nation to pay the war 
expenses of the defeate<l nation. Is it an acceptance, without inquiry, i 
of this part of the so-called Cuban debt, that the Spanish Commis- | 
sioners declare is demanded by the dignity and self-res])ect of Spain — ' 
which they wish therefore to have now understood, and which they 
hope there will be no necessity to repeat? 

The American Commissioners do not here examine the statements 
that these debts were legally created, that they may have been legally 
ac(]uired by individuals of various nationalities, or that S])ain is not 
the proprietor of these rights of third ])arties. They do question the 
statement that Spain does not demand the recognition of these so- 
called "secured debts" for her own benefit. They are bonds of the 
Spanish nation, guaranteed by the faith of the Spanish nation, with 
another guarantee (which might more properly have been called a 
''subsidiary" (me), pledging Spanish sovereignty and control over cer- 
tain Spanish colonial revenues. Spain has failed to maintain her 
sovereignty and control over these revenues, and is bound to the third 
parties with whom she dealt for that failure to inake good her title to 
the security she pledged. The third parties knew what it was pledged 
for — the continuous effort to put down a people struggling for freedom 
from the Spanish rule. They took the obvious chances of their 
investment on so i)recarious a security, but they must have relied 



TREATY OF PEACE. 143 

on the broad guarantee of the Spanish nation. It is not for us to 
deny that " tlie most elementary duties of public and private prob- 
ity" justify that reliance, but we do deny, emphatically, that they 
require the freed people, or anyone acting for them, to pay the cost 
of all the efforts for their subjugation. To admit that such costs could 
be attached ineradicably to the soil they lived oii, is to put it in the 
power of any unjust ruler to ccmdenm a colony to perpetual subjuga- 
tion and misgovernment by simply loading it with so-called "mortgages" 
for loans effected without their consent by their oppressors, till it can 
neither bear them itself nor find anyone else to assume them. That 
would be a conclusion alike repugnant to common sense and menacing 
to liberty and civilization. 

After reviewing in their " proposition" the provisions of the Protocol, 
the Spanish Commissioners ])roceed to inquire whether there is any 
other "title", not founded on that agreement, upon which the demand 
for the cession of the group can be supported. Under this head they 
discuss the capture of Manila by the American forces, and, after con- 
cluding that the cai)itulation was invalid, they declare that the treaty 
of peace should provide for the immediate delivery of the place to the 
S]>anish Government, the immediate release of the Spanish garrison, 
and the performance of various acts which imply that the military 
occupation and government of the city by the United States has been 
illegal. 

These startling pretentions reciuire at the hands of the American Com- 
missioners a comprehensive examination. 

On the 22nd of July, 1898, the Government of Spain, impelled by and 
admitting the adverse results of the war, made representations to the 
President of the United States by written communication of its ]\!in- 
istei' of Foreign Affairs, transmitted through the Ambassador of France 
at Washington, to the expressed end that "the calamities aheady so 
great" and "evils still greater" to the two countries might "be termi- 
nated otherwise than by force of arms". The response of the President, 
through Mr. Day, Secretary of State, to this communication was made 
July 30, 1898, and was in part as follows: 

The President therefore responding to yonr Excelloucy's re(;iiest will state the 
terms of peace Avhich will be accepted l>y hini at the present time, subject to the 
ap])roval of the Senate of the United .Stiites hereafter. 

Your Excellency in discnssiiig the subject of Cuba intimates that Spain has desired 
to spare the island the dangers of premature inde])endence. The Government of the 
United States has not shared the ai)prehension8 of- Spain in thi8rej;ard, but it recog- 
nizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, aid and 
guidance will be necessary, and these it is prepared to give. 

The I'nited States will re(|uire: 

First. The relinciuishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to 
Cuba and her innnediate evacuation of the island. 

Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now 
put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he cannot l)e 
insensible to the losses and expenses of the Unite<l States incident to the war or to 
the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and proiJerty during the late 
insurrection in Cuba. lie must, therefore, require the cession to the United States 
ami the immediate evacuation by Spain of the Island of Porto Kico and other islands 
now imder the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an 
island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States. 

Third. On similar grounds, the United States is entitled to occnpy and will hold 
the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace 
which shall determine the centred, disposition and government of the Philippines. 

If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety, Commissioners will be 
named l>y the United States to meet similarly authorized Commissioners on the part 
of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing 
and delivering it under the terms above indicated. 



144 TKEATY OF PEACE. 

The negotiations thus entered into were followed by the Protocol of 
agreement between tlie United States and -Spain signed at Washington 
Angust 12, 1898, by which it was provided : • ' 

Articlk I. 

Spain will relinquiali all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cnba. 

Article II. 

Spain will cede to the United States the Island of Porto Kico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones 
to he selected 1)y the United States. 

Articlk III. 

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of ]»Ianila, pend- 
ing the coiiclnsion of a treaty of jicace which shall determine the control, disposi- 
tion and government of the Philippines. 

Article TV of that instrument obligated Spain to the immediate 
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the other islands under Spanish 
sovereignty in the West Indies, and provided for the appointment by 
each government, within ten days of the above date, of Oonimissiouers 
who should meet at Havana in Cuba and at San Juan in Porto Eico 
within thirty days after such date for the purpose of arranging and 
carrying out the details of such evacuation. 

By Article V of the Protocol, the Contracting Parties agreed to 
appoint each not more than live Commissioners to treat of jieace, wlio 
should meet at Paris not later than October 1, 18'JS, and proceed to tlie 
negotiaticm and conclusion of a treaty of peace. Article VI of the Pro- 
tocol is as follows: 

I'pon th 
■ies shall 
by each Government to the couunamlers of its military and naval forces 

Before the notice provided for in Article VI could possibly be given, 
and on the 13th day of August, 1898, the next day after its signa-, 
ture, the American laiul and naval forces at Manila attacked that city 
and, upon the 14th of August, 18!)8, compelled its surrender under the 
terms of a military capitulation, which comprehended not only the sui' 
render and occupation of the city, but also the surrender of its garri- 
son, being from 9,000 to 11,000 troops in number, and comprising 
substantially the entire Spanish military force in the Philippine Islands. 
The United States thereupon, having previously for a long time been 
in possession of the bay and harbor of Manila, took military possession 
of that city, and has ever since been in military occupation thereof, 
administering its governjnent concerns in the manner usual in such 
cases. In so doing, the United States took possession of the public 
l)roi)erty of S[)ain situate in iManila, including certain moneys due to 
tliat Government wliich had been collected as revenues; proceeded to 
administer, collect and exi)end the taxes and customs of that port, and 
also to take charge of and administer the police government of the city ; 
and generally continued to exercise over the city, harbor and bay the 
riglits and powers of a belligerent in rightful military occupancy. 

It is now contended by Spain, wlio also, as a part of that contention, 
rejects the articles tendered by the U'^nited States for the cession to 
that Government of tlie Philip])ine Archipelago, that such occupation 
and acts were in violation of the Protocol, and that, for that reason, 
she is entitled: 

1. To the immediate delivery of the i)lace (Manila) to the Spanish 
Government; 



on the conclusion and signing of this Protocol, hostilities between the two coun- i 
tries shall be susjiended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possil)le { 



TREATY OF PEACE. • 145 

2. The immediate release of the garrison of the same; 

3. The return to the Spanish Uovernment of all the funds and public 
j)roperty taken by the American army since its occupation of the place, 
and all the taxes of every kind collected or to be collected up to tlie 
time of returning the same; 

4. The recognition of the obligation on the part of the United States 
to indemnify Spain for alleged serious damage occasioned by the deten- 
tion as prisoners of her troops, to which detention it is alleged is due 
the spread with impunity of the Tagalo insurrection in Luzon and its 
invasion of the Vizayan islands, and, mtn^eover, because to the same 
has been due the alleged ill-treatment of thousands of Spanish prison- 
ers, military and civil. 

In the dilatory assertion of these extraordinary claims the Spanish 
Commissioners have at times repudiated and at other times have 
appealed to and claimed rights under the stipulations of a convention 
entered into between Spain and the United States, by and under which 
the rights, duties, liabilities and status of the contracting ])arties were 
explicitly settled. That convention is the Protocol of August 12, 181)8. 

It is contended by the American Commissioners that an establish- 
ment of the .status quo provided for by that Protocol, and comprehended 
within its intent and meaning upon a fair construction of its terms, is 
the only demand that Spain can, upon her own theory, make in the 
premises, even if it is hy})othetically conceded, for the mere ])urposes 
of this branch of the discussion, that the legal pro[)ositions which she 
advances are at all applicable to the alleged breach of the armistice. 
For the United States insists and has always insisted (except hypo- 
thetically as stated above and merely for purposes of this argument) 
that the military operations by which Manila was captured were justi- 
fiable and lawful. The status ([iio is the right of the United States to 
occupy and hold the city, harbor and bay of Manila pending the con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disi)osi- 
tion and government of the Philippines. That condition exists. The 
United States does so hold such territory. It has been so conceded 
and insisted by Spain in correspondence which will be particularly 
considered in another portion of tliis paper. That occujiancy is refer- 
able to, and is justified by, the Protocol, and cannot be defeated by 
the alleged illegality of hostilities. To so invalidate it, it will be nec- 
essary for Spain to denounce and repudiate the Protocol in all its 
parts, including, of course, the authority under which this Commission 
is proceeding and the stipulation for an armistice, and thus produce a 
renewal of active war, as we shall elsewhere more fully demonstrate. 

It.is maintained by the American Commissioners that all and singular 
the acts done after the surrender of Manila and com])lained of by Spain 
were and are rightful acts under the Protocol itself; that they would 
have been riglitful if no naval or military operations whatever had been 
conducted against that city after the signature thereof, and that their 
rightfulness is not impaired by such hostile operations. 

The Protocol presents two features : One, general in its character, per- 
taining to negotiations for peace; the other, subordinate and special in 
its provisions, pertaining to the capitulation of the city of Manila and 
its bay and harbor, but which is also an inseparable part and parcel of 
the stipulations and processes by which a treaty of peace is to be 
eflfected. 

The second of these features presents a case of the military capitu- 
lation of a certain defined territory, to be occupied and held by the. 
United States " pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall ' 
T P 10 



.146 TREATY OF PEACE. 

determine the control, (lis])osition and government of the Philippines". 
This stipulation is sometimes ignored andsometimes relied upon by 
the Spanish Commissioners to meet the various exigencies of their 
argument. 

The Spanish Commissioners are entirely correct in treating this par- 
ticular stipulation of the Protocol (as tliey do in one branch of their 
argument) as a military (convention providing for a capitulation, and in 
citing (as they do) the laws of war a])i)licable to military occupancy of I 
a concpieied or surrendered portion of the territory of one of the bel- 
ligerents. If, therefore, as the American Commissioners contend, the 
acts complained of, and for which Spain now demands reparation, were 
rightCnl acts under the i'rotocol, and coukl rightfully have been done 
by that Government if no hostilities whatever had been conducted 
against Manila after its signntnre, the entire contention of Spain for 
rei)aration on account of those acts fails. The Protocol, as respects the 
occupation by the United States of the city of Manila and its bay and 
harbor, was, as we have observed, a military convention for the capitu- 
lation of certain territory therein specifically detined. When executed 
by the United States taking possession it presented a case of military 
occuiiation of that certain (Ictlned territory, and vested in that Govern- 
ment all the rights which the laws of war give to a military occupancy. 
This capitulation was general in its character and terms. It compre- 
hended the delined territory and all that it contained, including the 
forts, the munitions of war, the barracks. It included every thing 
and every jierson left in the city by Spain. It included the garrison 
for that reason. Under the special circumstances of the case the sur- 
render of the garrison was necessarily contemplated by the Protocol. 
The city was closely besieged on the land side by the insurgents. It 
was in extremity for provisions and the insuigents controlled the 
water supply. The Spanish forces had been unable to raise the siege, 
and therefore could not escape from the city on the land side. The 
city was blockaded by the American fleet; the tieet of Spain had been 
destroyed and there was no es< ape for her troops by water. The con- 
ditions were such that even if an escape could have been effected by 
land or sea, the forces of Si)ain would have had no base whatever for 
any military operations. So clearly was this the situation that the 
Spanish Commander-in-Chief tied from the city shortly before it was 
attacked, took refuge on a neutral man of- war, and was conveyed by it 
to I long Kong. Had it been intended that the garrison should be ]x^r- 
mitted to depart from the cai)itu!ated city, the usual provision would 
have been made that it should march out with its arms and with the 
honors of war. Containing no such provision, the exaction that the 
Spanish troops should surrender to the occupying power was as Justi- 
fiable ami legal under the Protocol as was the taking i)ossession by 
that power of the forts, barracks and munitions of war. Consequently, 
no rightful (claim whatever against the ('Uited States can be made 
that afterwards it refused to permit the capitulat(^d army to resume 
its arms and Y)roceed beyond the limits of the cai)itulated territory 
as an organized nnlitary force for the purpose of suppressing The 
Tagalo insurrection, or ftn* any military i)urpose whatsoever. That 
this has always been the i)Osition of the Ihiitecl States upon this ques- 
tion plainly ai)peais IVom the dij)lomatic corresi)ondence between the 
two (iovernments, and ])arfi('ularly in the letter ol' the Secretary of 
State to Mr. Cand)on dated Se])teinber 1(>, 18!KS. The argument wliicli 
would sustain the right of Si)a,in to the release of her army would, 
with e(|ual cogency, support a claim on her part to have delivered up to 



TREATY OF PEACE. 147 

her for the same purpose a ship of war that might have been included 
in the capitulation, and all the munitions of war which came into the 
possession of the United States under and by virtue of its stipulated 
right of occupancy. In all cases where, pending war, a certain defined 
part of the territory of one of the belligerents is by the terms of a 
military convention, agreed to be put in the military occupation and 
possession of the other belligerent, the sovereignty of the occupying 
party (the United States in the ijresent instance) displaces or suspends 
the sovereignty of the other belligerent and becomes for the purposes 
of the military occupation a substitute for it. 

It is not necessary to multiply citations of the many authorities which 
sustain this proposition. General Halleck's work on International Law 
has been invoked by the Spanish Commissioners and the citations in 
this paper will be limited to that work, observing that they are made 
from the chapter which treats of the rights of military occupation dur- 
ing war as contradistinguished from the rights of a complete conquest. 

''Capitulations are agreements entered into by a commanding ofticer 
for the suirender of his army, or by the governor of a town, or a for- 
tress, or particular district of country, to surrender it into the hands of 
the enemy." (Ilalleck, Vol. II, p. 319.) 

"It follows, then, that the rigfits of military occupation extend over 
the enemy's territory only so far as the inhabitants are vanquished or 
reduced to submission to the rule of the conqueror. Thus, if a fort, 
town, city, harbor, island, province, or particular section of country 
belonging to one belligerent, is forced to submit to the arms of the 
other, such i>lace or territory instantly becomes a conquest, and is sub- 
ject to the laws which the conqueror may impose on it; although he 
has not yet acquired the j) I enuni dominium et utile, he has the temporary 
right of possession and goverimient." (Ilalleck, Vol. II, p. 431.) 

To consider more specifically the claims advanced by the Spanish 
Commissioners: 

The lirst is, that Spain "is entitled to the immediate delivery of the 
place (Manila) to the Si^anish Government." 

To do this would contravene the provisions of the Protocol by which 
it is agreed that "the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay 
and liarbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace," 
which treaty the two Commissions have been negotiating ever since 
October 1, 185)8. They are negotiating under the Protocol. That 
instrument is an entirety. Neither party, having entered into it and 
continued the negotiations for which it jyrovides to a date more than 
two months after the acts were done of which Spain now complains, 
can now allege such acts as grounds for the rejection of the obligations 
of that instrument. 

If any riglit of repudiation ever existed, it should have been asserted 
in due time as against the entire instrument and all of its provisions. 
This has never been attempted. On the contrary, the contracting 
parties have proceeded to negotiate, agree, and perform under the 
requirements of that instrument. 

By so doing, Spain has waived the alleged breaches of the Protocol 
which she now advances. 

The second demand is for the immediate release of the garrison of 
Manila. We show in ariother place that this garrison was, under the 
facts and circumstances, necessarily included in the capitulation pro- 
vided for by the Protocol. 

The third demand is for the return to the Spanish Government of 
all funds and public property taken by the American army since its 



148 TREATY OF PEACE. 

occupation of the place (Manila) aud all taxes of every kiud, collected I 
or to be collected. 

We have maiutained iu auotlier portion of this paper that the occu- I 
patioii of 3Iauila is justly referable to the L'rotocol; that that instru- 
meut is a military capitulation : that the effect of the occupancy by the 
United States was to susjjend the sovereignty of Spain in the territory i 
so occupied, and to substitute for the purposes of military ot'Cui)ation I 
the sovereignty of the United States. It follows upon principle and 
authority from these considerations that the United States had the 
right to take the public ])ro|)erty, aud to collect the taxes demanded, 
aud has the right to retain the same. 

" Political laws, as a general rule, are suspended during the military { 
occupation of a conquered territory. The political connection between j 
the people of such territory and the state to which they belong is not | 
entirely severed, but is interrupted or suspended so long as the occu- i 
pation continues. Their lauds and immovable property are, therefore, j 
not subject to the taxes, rents, etc., usually paid to the former sover- j 
eign. These, as we have said elsewhere, belong of right to the con- i 
queror, and he may demand and receive their payment to himself. 
They are a part of the spoils of war, aud the peoi)le of the captured 
province or town can no more pay tliem to the former government than 
they can contribute funds or military munitions to assist that gove; n- 
ment to prosecute tlie war. To do so would be a breach of the implied 
condititjns under which the people of a conquered territory are allowed 
to enjoy their private property, and to pursue their ordinary occupa- 
tions, and would render the offender liable to i^unishment. They are 
subject to the laws of the conqueror, and not to the orders of the dis- 
placed government. Of lands and iaimovable property belonging to 
the conquered state, the conqueror has, by the rights of war, acquired 
the use so long as he holds them. The fruits, rents aud profits are 
therefore his, and he may lawfully claim and receive them. Any con- 
tracts or agreements, however, which he may make with individuals 
farming out such property, will continue only so long as he retains con- 
trol of them, and will cease on their restoration to, or recovery by, 
their former owner.'' (Halleck, Vol. II, p. -loT.) 

"During the war of 1812 the city and harbor of Castine, a port of 
the United States, was taken and occuj)ied by the British forces: their 
commander i^roceeded to levy and collect customs duties. The (pies- 
tion of his right to do so aud the suspension of the sovereignty of the 
United States was afterwards adjudicated by the Supreme Court. 

"'By the con([uest and military occupation of Castine,' says the 
Su])reme Court, 'the enemy acquired that firm possession which 
enabled him to .exercise tlie fullest rights of sovereignty over that 
place. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, 
of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no 
longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabit- 
ants who remained and submitted to the con(iuerors. By the sur- 
rendei', the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the 
British (lovernment, and were bound by such lav,s, and such only, as 
it chose to recognize and im})ose. I'rom the nature of the case, no 
other laws <;ould be obligatory ui)on them ; for where there is no pro- 
tection or allegiance or sovereignty there can be no claim to obedience. 
Castine was, therefore, during this ])eriod, so lar as respected our 
revenue laws, to be deeuied a foreign port, and goods imported into it 
by the inhabitants were subject to such duties only as the British Gov- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 149 

ernment cliose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported 
into the United States.'" (Halleck, Vol. II, p. U6-U7.) 

" The moneys derived from these sources may be used for the support 
of the government of the con(juered territory, or for the exjienses of 
the war." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 447.) 

"Those who are permitted to hold conmiercial intercourse with such 
territory, whether they be subjects of the conqueror, or of foreign States, 
must conform to tlie regulations, and pay the duties established by the 
conquering power; and, in case of conquest by the United States, the 
President, in the absence of legislative enactments, exercises this 
power." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 446.) 

" We will next consider the effect of a military occupation of a State 
upon debts owing to its government. Does such conquest of the state 
carry with it the incorporeal rights of tlie State, such as debts, etc.'? 
In other words, do these rights so attach themselves to the territory 
that the military possession of the latter carries with it the right to 
possess the former ? There are two distinct cases here to be considered : 
First, where the impermm of the conqueror is established over the 
whole State {victoria aniver.salis); and, second, where it is established 
over only ?k part^ as the capital, a province, or a colony {victoria partic- 
iilaris). As has already been stated, all rights of military occupation 
arise from actual, possession, and not from constructive con(|uests; tliey 
are <le facto, and not dejare rights. Hence, by conquest of a part of a 
country, the government of that country, or the State, is not in the pos- 
session of the conqueror, and he. therefore, cannot claim the incorporeal 
rights which attach to the whole country as a State. But, by the mili- 
tary ])ossession of a part, he will acquire the same claim to the incor- 
poreal rights which attach to that ]).'irt, as he would, by the military 
occupation of the whole, acfiuire to those which attach to the whole. 
We must also distii.gnisli with respect to the situations of the debts, 
or rather the locality of the debtors from whom they are owing, whether 
in the conquered country, in that of the conqueror, or in that of a 
neutral. If situated in the conquered territory, or in that of the con- 
queror, there is no doubt but that the conqueror may, by the rights of 
military occui)ation, enforce the collection of debts actually due to the 
displaced government, for the de facto government has, in this respect, 
all the powers of that which preceded it." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 4(il.) 

In other particulars Spain has not only waived any right to insist* 
that the hostilities at Manila were in violation of the Protocol, but has 
acted upon the assumption that they were not such acts of violation. 

On August 15, 1898, the French Ambassador, acting for Spain, in a 
letter of that date, addressed to the Secretary of State, inquired as 
follows: "May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished 
between Spain and Cuba, Porto Eico, Philippines?" 

"Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send supplies in Spanish 
bottoms to Cuba, Porto Kico, Philippines?" 

To these in(iuiries the Department of State answered by letter dated 
August 17, 1898, that: 

''1. This Government will interpose no obstacle to the reestablish- 
ment of the postal service by Spanish steamers between Sixain' on the 
one side and Cuba, Porto Eico and the Philippines on the other. 

"2. The United States will not object to the importation of supplies 
in Spanish l)ottoms to Cuba and the Philippines, but it has been 
decided to reserve the importation of supplies from the United States 
to Porto Eico to American vessels." 



150 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Though it is probable that both of these coinmuuications were written 
before notice of the capture of Manila had been received, yet it is 
believed that S])aiu has, down to the present time, availed herself of the 
privileges thus solicited and granted. 

On August -9, 181)8, the French Ambassador, acting for Si)aiu, \>y 
letter of that date, addressed to the Secretary of State, suggested that 
"the S])anish troo])s, ichom the capitulation of the eiti/ of Manila has 
reduced to inaction, might be placed at once at the disposal of Spain, 
who would use them for the defense of the islands against the insur- 
gents, 

"The Minister of State at Madrid thinks that, if the United States 
Government sees any objection to this arrangement, it will, at least, 
have no reason to oi)pose the despatch of trooi)S directly from the 
Peninsula to the l*hilippines." 

To this letter the Department of State made answer under date of 
September .">, 1898, and observed, among things: 

" In your informal note of the L'9th ultimo it is stated that the Span- 
ish Government suggests that, for the purpose of checking insurgent 
liostilities, the Spanish troo])S now held as prisoners of war by the 
American forces may be phu^ed at the disposal of Spain, to be used 
against the insurgents; or, if this be objected to, that the Sjjanish 
Government may be allowed to send troops from the Peninsula to the 
Philip])ines. It can scarcely be expected that this Government would 
even consider the question of ado.pting the first alternative, in view of 
the lact that for some time before the surrender of ^'Manila the Spanish 
forces in that city were besieged by the insurgents by land while the 
port was blockaded by the forces of the United States by sea." 

It seems impossible to conceive that the correspondence from which 
the above quotations have been made could have taken place except 
upon the basis of the opinion then entertained both by the United 
States and Spain, that the [)ossession by the former power of the City 
of Manila, and the surrender to it of the Spanish forces were either 
lawful ah initio, or had become lawful by acquiescence and waiver by 
Spain, and that nothing had been done or recjuired by the United States 
that was not warranted by the terms of the Protocol respecting the 
occupation by that (irovernment of the city, harbor and bay of Manila. 

And, on the 11th day of September, 1898, the Ambassador of France, 
acting for Spain, in a letter of tliat date to the Secretary of State, dis- 
tinctly stated that "the Spanish Government is of ojunion that the 
occupation by the American forces of the city, bay and harbor of Maiula 
must be considered in virtue of the Protocol of August 12, and not in 
virtue of what was agreed to in the cai)itulation ot the 14th of the same 
month, which is absolutely null by reason of its having been concluded 
after tlie belligerents liad signed an agreement declaring the hostilities 
to be suspended.'' 

Considering together these recpiests and concessions, and ])articu- 
larly the explicit admission ;ibove quoted, it seems a feat of forensic 
and dialectic hardihood to assert now that the military occupation by 
the United States of the City of Maiiila is void under the Protocol, and 
that, for that reason, the city ought to be delivered uj) to Si)ain, its gar- 
rison liberated, its forts, barracks, and numitions returned, the moneys 
collected ])aid back to Spain, and the Pnited States to be mulcted in 
damages lor the military ()])erations of tiie insurgents. 

And, considering from altogether another jwint of view the claim 
that, since Manila was actually ca])tured a few hours after the Protocol 
was signed on the other side of the globe instead of a few hours before, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



151 



it should be retained, the thought might occur to a just and impartial 
mind to remember wliy it was not captured earlier. The world knows 
that the attack was only delayed to protect the city and its Spanish 
inhabitants from the dreaded vengeance of the insurgents. It would 
be extraordinary if this act of humanit}^ should now be claimed by the 
beneficiary as the sole reason for depriving the benefactor of his 
victory. 

It might further occur to a just and impartial mind that the General 
and the Admiral commanding, to whom that humane delay was due, 
were entitled to a more generous recognition of perfectly well known 
facts than is implied in the statements of the Spanish Commissioners 
that "in spite of this (the signature of the Protocol) General Merritt 
and the Admiral of the fleet demanded the surrender of the place, 
etc. * * * opened fire, * * * unnecessarily causing a considerable num- 
ber of losses to the Spanish forces;'' and again that "General Merritt 
and the Admiral of the squadron may not be personally responsible for 
the blood they unnecessarily shed on the 13th, if they had no ofticial 
notice then of the Protocol which had been signed on the previous day 
in Washington", The American Commissioners have too high an esti- 
mate of the chivalric honor of the Spanish people to accept that as the 
tinal record Spain would wish to make of this incident. 

The American Commissioners for the various reasons hereinbefore 
stated are constrained to reject the several demands embodied in the 
"])roposition" to which the present paper is an answer. 

True copy : ' 

John B. Moore. 



Protocol No. 14. 

Conference of November 10, lSf)S. 

The conference having been 
posti)oned at the request of the 
Spanish Commissioners, in order 
that they might have an oppor- 
tunity to ])repare a rej)ly to the 
paper presented by the American 
Commissioners at the last session, 
it was decided to meet on the 16th 
of November, at two o'clock, p. 
m., at which hour there were 



Present: On the part of the 
United States : M essrs : Day, Davis, 
Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergus- 
son. 

On the part of Spain : Messrs : 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Yilla-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The Spanish Commissioners pre- 
sented their answer, copy and 



Protocolo No. 14. 

(Jonfercncia del 16 de Noviemhre de 
1898. 

Los Coniisarios espanoles en vir- 
tud de lo acordado en la sesion 
anterior respecto del aplazamiento 
de la proxima conl'erencia para una 
fecha posterior a la ttjada, solicita- 
ron une prorroga para presentar 
su contestacion al Memorandum 
que en la ultima sesion i)resentaron 
los Coniisarios Americanos y ha- 
bi-'udose lijado de comun acuerdo 
el dia K) a las 2 P. M. para la re- 
uiiii»n de ambas Comisiones, se 
hallan en dicho dia y hora 

Presentes Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de Ami'rica los 
Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana. los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesi(')n anterior. 

Los Coniisarios Espanoles pre- 
sentan la contestacion al Memoran- 



ir)2 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



translation of wliicli are annexed 
to this protocol, to the American 
Memorandnni rchitin,i»' to the Phil- 
ippine Islands, and in so doing the 
President of the Spanish Commis- 
sion stated that the document, 
besides being- an answer to the 
American JMemorandum, was also 
a Memorandum in support of the 
last proposition presented by the 
Spanish Commissioners; and he 
called attention to the concluding 
part, wherein a nu)tion or pro])Osi- 
tion was made with reference to 
the contingency that the American 
Commissioners should think that 
they must insist upon their former 
l^roposal on tlie l*hilippiiies. 

The Anieri(;an Commissioners 
asked that the iinal |)art of the 
Memorandum, to which the Presi- 
dent of the Spanish Commission 
referred, be read, and it was orally 
translated into English by their 
Inter})rt?ter. 

The American Commissioners 
moved that, in order that the whole 
paper miglitbe carefully translated 
and attentively examined, the con- 
ference be adjourned till Saturday, 
November 1!>, at two o'clock, p. m., 
without prejudice to asking for a 
postponement if necessary. 

The S))anish Commissioners ex- 
j)ressed their assent to this moticm, 
and it was therefore decided that 
the next conference should be held 
on Saturday, the 19th instant, at 
two o'clock, p. m. 

William R. Day 

CusHMAN K. Davis 

Wm P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

VVhijelaw Eeid. 

John B. Moore. 



dum Americano, que es anexa al 
acta pr&sente, relativo a las Islas 
Filipinas, y al hacerlo, el Presi- 
dente de la Comisicui Espanola, 
manifiesta que dicho documento a 
la vez que contesta al Americano, 
es asimismo un Memorandum en 
apoyo de la ultima proposiciou 
presentada por los Comisarios 
Espaholes, y llama la atenciou 
sobre su tiltima parte en que se 
hace una mociou 6 ])roposici6n 
para el caso en que los Comisarios 
Americanos crean deber insistir 
en su anterior proposicion sobre 
Filipinas. 



Los Comisarios Americanos piden 
((ue sea leida la ultima parte del 
Memorandum a qne se refiere el 
Presidente de laComision Espano- 
la, y esta es vertida verbalmente al 
ingh's por su intcrprete. 

Los Con)isarios Americanos mani- 
fiestan que considerando que es 
uecesario traducir con esniero y eu- 
terarse .atentamente de dicho docu- 
mento, jiroponen el aplazamiento 
de la sesion hasta el Si'ibado ;i las 
2 de la tarde, sm pcrju'cio de pedir 
una prorrogasi lo estimaseu neces- 
sario. 

Los Comisarios esi)arioles mani- 
tiestau su aseutimiento, y queda 
por tanto tijada la pr<')xima confer- 
encia para el sabado 19 a las 2 P. M. 



E. MONTERO Rfos 

B. DE Abarzuza 

J. DE GARNICA 

W R DE Vtlla-Urrutia 
Rafael Cekero 

EiMlLIO DE U.TEDA 



Annex to Protocol No. 14. 
€omision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados 

UNIDOS, 



|l'ri\sc!it;nl(i en la scsioii del dia l(i de X(p\ iciubrc 1898. (14» coiilerciicia.)] 

El ultimo escrito presgntado por laComision Americana tiene un doble 
objeto. Poi' una parte es el Memorandum (jue presento en apoyo de su 
proposicion de 31 de Octubre ultimo, i)idiendo la cesion de las Islas 



TREATY OF PEACE. 153 

Filipinas a los Estados Unidos. Y por la otra es la exposicioii de las 
razones que tiene la Comisi(')n Americana para no admitir la proposiciou 
espanola de 4 de este mes, eu (jue ia invitaba a (jue preseiitase una cuyo 
objeto fuera el cumpliiiueuto de lo conveiiido eu los Articulos 3 y del 
Protocolo de Wasbiugtou. 

Por lo que liace al primer objeto sobre que versa el Memorandum 
Americano, la Comision Espanola se dedicara primeramente en este a 
replicar a su contenido. Y por lo que liace a la seguuda parte, aquella 
insistira en la forma de Memorandum reglamentario en la exposicion de 
las razones que abonan su proposicion rechazada. 

RKPLICA AL MEMORANDUM AMERICANO. 

Razones de mi'todo y el deseo de reducir las proporciones de este 
escrito, inclinan a los Comisarios Espanoles a ocuparse primeramente 
del punto relativo a las deudas lii{)0tecarias de las colonias de Espaua, 
que, anque de capital importancia, no bubieran vuelto a controvertir en 
esta parte de la discusiou del tratado, si no apareciera iiuevamente 
j)rouiovido por la Comision Americana en el ultimo parrafo de sn propo- 
sicion, pidiendo la cesion del Arcliipit lago Filipino. 

Reconoce la Comision Espanoia la diiicultad que siente para coutestar 
a esta parte del xMemorandum Americano, debida esta diticulrad a los 
graves errores de hecbo de que aquella esta sembrada, y tambicn a las 
extrafias doctrinas juridicas (jue alii campean. 

Ante todo nccesita la Comisicni Espanola liacer constar que en su 
document© no entiende liaber empleado leuguage, ni siquiera frases 
impropias de una discusion diplomatica. Celosa de las consideraciones 
a (jue tiene derecbo, empieza por guardar religiosamente las que cor- 
responden a los demas, y, en sus docunientos evitacon el mayor cuidado 
toda tiase <iue pueda ser ])ersonalmente desagradable ;i (juien vaya 
dirigida, y con niucba mas raz('»n, las (jue pndieran reputarse ofensivas 
a quienes cstan, y lienen dei'echo a cstar, al amparo de las personas 
con quienes los Comisarios Esi)arioles tengan (jue discutir. 

Los Comisarios Americanos diceu <iue notaron con sorpresa que los 
Esi)anoles, despui-s de baber aceptado provisionalmente los articulos 
que aquellos liab'an i)roi)uesto sobre Cuba y Puerto Pico, vuelven aliora 
4 suscitar la cuestion de la deuda cubana, planteando de nuevo un tcma 
que bajo ciertas ref^ervas habia sUio terinintoitenwute aluoidonado. Y no 
satisfechos con tan rotundas atirmacioiics anadieron que la Comision 
Espanola en su contestacicm escrita ])resentada en la sesicni de I'G de 
Octubre, habia retirado sus obs'ervaciones anteriores a los articulos de 
la Comision Americana. 

Por lo que bace a esta supnesta retirada, invitamos a uuestros dignos 
colegas de Aravrica a que, buscando con todo deteiiimiento las frases 
de nuestra contestacion escrita, en que a^iuella conste, se sirvan citarlas, 
pues cntre tanto y siempre nosotros bemos de atirnuir de un modo 
rotundo, que en nuestro documento no existen tales frases, resultando 
de ("1 por lo contrario que nada teniamos (pie retirar, puesto que sos- 
teniamos nuestras atirmaciones, auuque subordinando su sostenimiento 
en lo futuro a las conveniencias de Espana. Eu efecto, como prueba 
de lo que acabamos de decir y como suticiente contestacion a las frases 
dft la Comision Americana, basta transcribir aqni las en que consta 
a<piella supnesta aceptacwn prorisional y aqiiel tenniiiante abandono del 
tenia sobre la meucionada deuda. ''Los Comisarios Espanoles contestan 
a la sobredicba pregunta (que es la que por escrito les babia becbo la-^ 
Comision Americana en la reunion del dia 24 Octubre) y dicen que, afirm- 
ando sus conviccion de que con arreglo a derecho, las obligaciones 



l.")4 TREATY OF PEACE. 

colouiales de Cuba y Puerto Itico debeii i)asar con estas islas y su sober- 
ania, no rcliKsan tomar en consiileracion ciKrtquier otro articulo relativo 
a Cuba i/ Puerto Rico que no conten<ia la clausula de a-sumir las cargas 
por los iJstados i'nidos 6 por Cuba 6 por ambos^^ (estas erau las propias 
l^alabras de la ]>regunta a que c.outestabau), "subordiuaiido la detinitiva 
apiobacion de tal articulo a la de los demas (jue bayan de formar la 
totabdad del Tiatado, etc." Y entre las razoues que por escrito cou- 
sipiarou para dar esta coutestaciiui, esta la ([ue alli se expresa con las 
sigiiientes frases ''('ousideraudo (joe no babicndo de elaborarse este 
Tratado, coiuo uuiica se lia elaborado ni puede elaborarse uiujiuuo, con 
el uuico criterio de la rl^iurosa justicia que cada una de las partes i^ueda 
entender que le asista, sino tambien con el de la conveniencia de cada 
una de ellas y ai'in de aiubas para moditicar a su tenor las exigencias 
del criterio meraniente juridico, y que por consiguieute sobre la cuestion 
relativa ;'i la deuda de Cuba los Coniisarios Espafioles (pie entienden 
({ue el rigor del dereclio la resuelve a su favor, tienen el deber y estau 
disquestos a cuniplirlo, de nioderar este rigor ])or las conveniencias que 
para EspaTia ])uedan surgir de otras estipulaciones del Tratado, (jue sin 
ser i)erjudiciales ;i los Estados Unidos, puedan ser favorables a Espana'". 

Parece bieu claro que el supuesto abandon© de que aliora se habla 
en el Memorandum Americano y la supuesta ace])taci6n de los articulos 
relativos ;i Cuba y Puerto Ivico, estaba limitada al caso en que la Co- 
mision espauola entendiera que en los denn'is que se fueran discutiendo 
y aprobaudo, hubiese para EspaQa ventajas (j[ue, a su juicio, la compen- 
saran de un sacrificio mayor 6 menor de su derecbo sobre las deudas, 
puesto que, si tales ventajas no se ofrecian, no tendria la Comision Es- 
pauola razon para bacer ninguno; y por lo tanto, claro es que podria 
insistir en el reconocimiento de su dereclio. 

Fues bien, ^ i\\\0 ventajas desde entonces se ban ofrecido Ji Espaiia, 
basta este momento, en el curso de las confe; encias ? 

Desde aquella feclia los tiabajos del Tratado no adelautaron nuxs que 
un paso, y este ha consistido en pedir a Espana, sin alegar razon alguna 
en pro de tal peticion cuando se bizo, que ceda a los Estados Unidos el 
Arcliipit'lago de Filipinas. ^ Hntieude la Comision Americana que esta 
cesion es una ventaja para Espana ' tSus Connsionados no se sorpren- 
derian al oir una contestacion en sentido atlrmativo, que ya liaceu pre- 
ver ciertas frases consignadas en el Memorandum a (pie contestan. I^o 
necesitan decir que no ])articii)an de esa opinion. 

Hubiera, pues, estado la Comisicni Espanola en su derecho, volviendo 
ji insistir no de un modo incidental, sino directo y prin(^ipal, en sus 
rei'lamacioues sobre la transmisi(jn de' las deudas y obligaciones colo- 
uiales. i^To lo ban liecbo, ni se i)roponeu baceilo abora, mas esto no ba 
obstado ni obsta a que no deje pasar en silencio su])uestos y atirma- 
cioues, si(juiera i)ara que no llegue un dia en que se diga que babian 
sido porella consentidas i)orque no las bab:a controvertido, negandolas 
expresamente su asentimiento. 

Aiirma la Comision Americana que Espana contrajo (no dice que baya 
in\erti(lo la deuda anteriornuiute contraida) la mayor i)arte do la deuda 
bipotecaria de cuba "e?i su esfuerzo pfhnero para sub//Uf/ar a los insur- 
reclos cubanos^ y luef/o jxo-a oponet'se a los Estados riihlos, y discurri- 
endo sobre el niisnio tenux, anade, que "no se ba negado (]ue ])arte del 
importe de estos empn'stitos se invirti('> directainente en bacer la guerra 
ii los Estados Unidos. '' Para bacer tales afirmaciones es indisjiensable 
snponer que se ignoran las feclias de la creacion de tales deudas. La 
unafui' emitida por JJeal Decreto de 10 de Mayo de 1880, es decir, ocbo 
anos despuc's de establecida la paz en Cuba, y nueve antes de que, por 



TREATY OF PEACE. 155 

las sug-estiones y medios que ya son del domiiiio publico, bubiera 
vuelto a perturbarse. La seguuda emision se hizo por Real Decreto de 
27 de Setiembre de 1890, es decir, doce auos despues que leinaba una 
paz completa eu Cuba y se liallaba esta isla en el apogeo de su prospe- 
ridad, y cinco anos antes que hubiese conienzado su desolacion por la 
nueva rebelion que alii, mas 6 meuos espontaneamente surgio. Y en 
los dos Decretos se dice ademas cuales eran las causas que provocaban 
estas emisiones, y los gastos eu cuya satislaccion se.habia de invertir 
su importe, figurando entre los priucipales el pago de los deficit de los 
presupuestos auteriores y posteriores de la isla, los cuales bien sabido 
es que eran debidos a la gran rebaja que eu sus impuestos habia becbo 
la Metropoli. 

^ Querra decirse que esta, por un don sobrenatural de adivinaciou, 
sabia eu 1886 y 18{>d que en 1895 babia de reproducirse la insurreccion 
de Cuba, y en 1898 los Estados Unidos le babian de dispensar su pro- 
teccion armada! Pues, solamente en tal bipotesis podria admitirse 
la exactitud de las frases que se leeu en el Memorandum Americano. Y 
por lo que bace a los gastos que a Esj^aua ocasiono la guerra de los 
Estados I'nidos, sin duda su Comisinn ignora que eu 20 de Abril de 
este alio, en que comenzarou las bostilidades, el Tesoro Fspanol aun 
estaba realizando las operaciones que, en forma de obligaciones con la 
garantia especial de lasAduanas de la Peninsula, babia acordado bacer 
en 1896 y 1897 por mil millones de pesetas, y otra por doscientos veinte y 
tres millones de pesetas, acordada en 2 de Abril de 1898 con la garantia 
especial de las rentas del tobaco y timbre del Estado y la del impuesto 
de cousumos de Espafia, y (pie, eu tin, para la atencion especial de la 
guerra con los Estados Unidos, se babia acordado ademas emitir por 
Real Decreto de 31 de 3Iayo de este aiio, deuda perpetua interior al 1 
per cent por valor de mil millones de pesetas de las cuales fueron 
iumediatamente uegociadas 806,785,000, Despues de estos datos, es de 
supouer que la Comision Americana no babra de insistir en la atirma- 
cion tan sin fundamento aventurada en su Memorandum, por compren- 
der (jue los gastos de la guerra con los Estados Unidos nadatienen que 
ver con la deuda bipotecaria colonial de Cuba. 

Una rez mas la Comision Americana expoue en su ultimo Memoran- 
dum la extraua teoria de que las colonias Espauolas no tienen obliga- 
cion de pagar la deuda contraida por la Metropoli para sofocar la 
rebelion de pocos 6 mucbos de sus babitautes. Pero esta vez llegan 
basta el punto de poner tan singular teoria al ampuro delsenUclo eoniMn, 
afirmando que la contraria es una amenaza para la libertad y la 
civilizacion. 

Ab! si los colonos y los ciudadauos de la Gran Republica hubiesen 
alegado para justificar una rebeldia, 6 en lo futuro alegasen en caso 
igual de que aquel poderoso Estado no est;i ciertamente exento, una 
teoria semejante, | la bubiera admitido y la admitira el Gobierno Ameri- 
cano'? Lo que no el sentido comuu, sino el sentido moral reprueba, es 
que se intente poner toda rebelion contra los poderes legitimos al 
amparo de la libertad y de la civilizacion. ^ Era 6 no Espana soberana 
legitima de Cuba cuaudo surgio la primera insurreccion y durante toda 
la segunda? ^ Se ba atrevido nadie a negar ni a poner en duda siquiera, 
la soberania de Espana sobre aquella isla eu el tiempo a que nos esta- 
mos reflrieudo ? i No fueron los mismos Estados Unidos y su Gobierno 
los que un dia y otro dia le reclamaron (jue la sofocase, sin excluir el 
medio de las armas, restableciendo lo mas pronto posible la paz en su 
colonia? Pues accedieudo Espana a estas instaucias i quien, inclusolos- 
Estados Unidos, puede negar la legitimidad de los gastos que bizo al 
satisfacerlas °? 



156 TREATY OF PEACP:. 

Teorfa semejante que, por los respetos que la Coraision espaiiola viene 
guardaudo y tiene el deber de guardar, no caiiflca como segurameute la 
calificai ian todos los poderes (^onstituidos de la tieira, no ])uede soste- 
uei'se a la fa/ de los liombres, sino partiendo del sui)uesto de (|ue el poder 
meti'oi)olitauo era ilegitiiuo y su soberania una arbitrariedad del des- 
potisnio. ^Y (ioncreta y cenidauiente se c.alifica asi a la Corona de 
Espana por su doniinacion en Cuba hasta la colebraci(3n del Protocolo 
de Was'.iinjiton! . ;;^Puede, sobre todo, calitiearla asi el Estado que, sin 
cesar, ha solicitado la accion de esa soberanfa i)ara dominar a los que 
contra ella se habi'an levantado en la isla con las avnias en la mano? 

Pasar>-inos a otro asunto, ya que este es muy delieado ])ara tratarlo 
con calnia y serenidad en una discusion diploin;itica en que se intenta 
controvertirlo. 

l*]n el Memorandum a que estaraos contestando, se asienta la singular 
atirmaci('>n deque la liipotecaconstituida en las dos sobrediclias emi- 
siones, puede Uamarse mas ])iopiaineute una garantia .suhsidiaria y que 
quien esta principalmente obligada al i)ago es la nac'i6n esi)anola. Sin 
duda la Comision Americana, al liacer tal aiirmacii'm, no tenia a la vista 
el articulo 2" del Keal Uecreto de 10 de Marzo de 188(5, aeordando la 
emisi(')n de i,240.()()() billetes liqmtecarios de la Isla de Cuba, ni el par- 
rafo tambif'u segundo del articuloigualmentesegundo del Ileal Decreto 
de 27 de Setiembre de 1890, aeordando la emision de 1,750,000 billetes 
hipotecarios tambi;''n de la misma isla. Los dos dicen literalmente lo 
mismo. y bastara por lo tanto <iue tvanscribamos uno de ellos. Dice 
asi: "Los nuevos billetes tendnin la garantia especial de las reutas de 
Aduanas, sello y timbre de la Isla de Cuba, la de las contribuciones 
directas '^ indiiectas que alii existan o puedan establecerse en lo suce- 
sivo, y la niv.end d'' la Isra('i('ui Espanola. Estaran exentos de todo 
im]uiest;o ordinario y extraordinario. etc."' 

Tampoco ha debido ver la Comision Americana ninguno de los tftulos 
emitidos de estas deudas, que se hallan por todas partes esparcidos 
incluso en Cuba y en las mauos de terceros y i)articulares duenos; silos 
hubiera visto, habria lefdo en ellos lo siguiente: 'Hrarantia csprcial de 
las rentas de Aduanas, sello y timbre de la Isla de Cuba, la de las con- 
tribuciones directas c indirectas (pie alii existan 6 puedan establecerse 
en lo sacesivo y hi fieneralde la Xaci(')n Espanola." "El Banco liispano- 
colonial percibira por medio de sus delegados en la Isla de Cube 6 
recibira en Barcelona porconducto del Banco Es})ariol de la Habana, el 
producto de las Aduanas de la misma, reteniendose auticipada y dia- 
riameute lo necesario, segiiu la tabla al dorso, para aplicarlo en cada 
trimestre al pago de intereses y amortizacion." 

Si despui'S de esto la Comisi('>n Americana continna euteudiendo que 
esta deuda no se emiti<'> como liii)otecariay que la hi'poteca no consistio 
en las leutas de las Aduanas de Cuba y sus demTis impuestos; y que 
estas rentas no fueron las que se senalaron i)rincipalmente y en primer 
lugar, y ])or lo tanto antes (jue el Tesoro de la Peninsula para el pago 
de los intereses y amortizacion de esta deuda, nada mas tenemos que 
de(;ir. Xo sabemos deniostrar la evidencia. 

Por lo (pie hace a los tenedores de estos titulos y a la severidad que 
entemlemos es injustificada, con que aquellos son tratados en el Memo- 
randum Amei'icano, no es l<iSi)aria la que tiene el deber de defenderlos. 
Cuando a su noticia llegue el Juicio (jue sobre ellos se emite, es desupo- 
ner (jue ])or si mismos se det'enderau, porcpie desi)u<*s de todo, no nece- 
sitan haccr grandes esliierzos para demostrar la justicia de su causa. 

Por lo (pie a I'iSpana toca, y con esto su Comision procede a contestar 
categoricamente a las preguntas qne se tbrmulan en el Memorandum 



TREATY OF PEACE. 157 

Americano, le basta defender la legitimidad de sus actos y el perfecto 
dereclio cou que creo aquella deuda y establecio sii hipoteca; y por cou- 
siguiente, el estricto que tiene para no pagar los intereses y amortiza- 
cion dela misnia, sino cuaudo se le pruebe la insuticiencia de las rentas 
liipotecadas con que aquellos deben ser piimeramente satisfechos. 

Si los que tales rentas teugan en su poder, quieren <> no cumplir la 
obligaci(5u sobre ellas constituida, es cosa que quedara bajo su respon- 
sabilidad puesto que Espana no tiene niedios de liacerles cumplir esta 
obligacion, ni por otra' parte tiene ella para con los acreedores mas 
deberes que los que iionradamente ha veuido basta ahora cumpliendo. 
Pero Espana, vuelve ^i decirlo su Oomision (y es lo iinico que textual- 
mente ha dicho en su documento anterior aunque en otro sentido apa- 
rezca en el Memorandum Americano) no puede prestarse en este Tratado 
cou los Estados Uuidos, ni en otro alguno con cualquier.Potencia a 
hacer ni declarar en su propio nombre, nada que maniiieste 6 siquiera 
implique que ella misma pone en duda y mucho menos desconoce, ni aun 
voluntariamente merma por lo que a ella toca, los dereclios hipotecarios 
de los tenedores de aquellas deudas. asTo tiene medios eticaces para <iue 
los que hayan de ser tenedores de las hipotecas, respeten tales derechos. 
Por esto no los emplea si los tuviese, ya que no por estricta justicia a 
lo menos por un deber moral, los emplearia, ajustandose asi a los sen- 
timientos de la probidad publica y privada. 

Oreen, pues, los Comisarios Espanoles haber contestado bien categori- 
camente a las preguntas que sobre este particular se les dirigen en el 
Memorandum Americano, y despues de esto pasan a ocuparse del princi- 
pal punto tratado en aquel Memorandum y que se refiere a la soberania 
del Archii)i<'lago tilipino. 

Segun el Memorandum Americano se funda la cesion del Archipielago 
que se pide A Es])ana, no en que tal cesion se haya conveuido en el 
articulo 3" del Protocolo, como se convino en el 2" la de la Isla de Puerto 
Eico, sino eu <|ue. segun aquella Oomision, eutre los asuntos relativos a 
las Islas Filipiuas que en el articulo sobredicho se dejaron ;i la libre 
resolucion de la Oonferencia de Paris, esta el que tiene por objecto la 
cesion por Espana de la soberania en aquellas islas a los Estados Unidos 
de America. 

La Comision espauola sostieiie que lejos de haberse encomendado tan 
grave asunto a la Conferencia de Paris, asunto que sin duda seria mas 
importante que todos los que esta llamada a discutir, el articulo 3° del 
Protocolo descansa sobre el supuesto de ((ue la soberania del Archi- 
pielago habia de continuar siendo de Espana. 

La Oomision Americana busca el fundamentu de su tcsis en la inter- 
pretacion de las frases de la citada clausula 3", y ademas en las nego- 
ciaciones que la prepararon y terminaron con su aceptacion. 

Examinaremos con fria serenidad los razonamientos de esta tesis. 
Dice la Comision Americana que es un principio de derecho que '• cuando 
el resultado de negociaciones se ha conqireudido en un escrito cerrado, 
los t^rminos de este acuerdo deben definir los derechos de las partes." 

La Comision Espahola admite esta regla de la interi)retaci6n de los 
Tratados, si tiene como fundamento indispensable, el de que los termiuos 
del acuerdo sean claros y precisos y de indudable y tijo sentido, porque, 
en tal caso, debe enteuderse que las diferencias que durante las nego- 
ciaciones hubiera habido, entre los Estados contratantes, quedaron 
resueltas por el acuerdo claro, preciso, y de fijo sentido en que conviui- 
eron. Mas ^^es este el caso sobre que discuten al presente ambas 
Comisiones? 

Antes de contestar a esta preguuta, entiende la Comision Espauola,* 



158 TREATY OF PEACE. 

que es bueno transcribir, una vez m^is, el texto del Articulo 3° del Pro- 
t()(;olo. literal y tielmente traducido del orioiual francos. Dice asi : " Los 
Estados I'liidos ()cu])ar;'iii laCiudad, puerto y baliia de Manila en espera 
de la conclusion de un Tratado de paz que debera deterininar la inter- 
vencion (conrrule) la disjiosiciini y el Gobierno de las Filipinas". 

ISTosabe laComision Kspanolasi la Americana ignora (jue, al recibirse 
l)or cl (Tobierno de .Madrid cl despaclio del Senor Secretario de Estado 
de Washington, en feclia 3" de-Iulio, comujiicandole lastrescondiciones 
con cuya aceptacioii ])or Esi)ana, estaban los Estados l^nidos dispuestos 
a hacer la paz, y la tercera de las cuales era la que, sin la nienor altera- 
cion se transcribii) despu'.'S en el Protocolo, forniaudo su clausula 3*^, 
dirigio un despacho telegrafico al Senor Enibajador de Francia en Wash- 
ington .^Ir. Cambon el l"de Agosto en el (lue, sobre este punto le decia 
literahucnte lo siguiente : " El tercer punto en que se determina la forma 
de disponer de las Islas Filipinas, parece falto de precisiim a este Gobi- 
erno. Ha suplido (este Gobierno se entiende) las deficiencias (jue en el 
se advierten, sui)oniendo que no bay cuestic'm rcspecto de la soberania 
permanente de Espaila en aquel Arcliipiclago y (jue la ocu]*aci6n tem- 
X)oral de Manila, su puerto y su babia, por el Gobierno federal, sola- 
mente ba de durar el espacio necesario para un acuerdo en tie ambos 
paises, sobre refornnis administrativas." Tenemos a disposicion de la 
Comision Americana este despacho por si (iuisiera leerlo y estudiarlo 
por si misma. 

^Ir. Cambou, recibido que hubo este documento, tuvo con el Senor 
Presidente de la IJepublica Americana una confcrencia, el dia 3, y que, 
respecto al particular de que la Comision Espahola se ocupa en este 
momento, aparece referida en el despacho de dicho Senor iMubajador 
de 4 de Agosto, en los tcrminos siguientes: "Aproveche esta declara- 
cion para rogar al Presidente ([ue tuviera la bondad de precisar sus 
inteucioiies en lo que posible se refiere ;i Filipinas. En este punto, 
le dije, esta la cojitestacion del Gobierno Federal redactada en tcrminos 
que pueden prestarse a todas las pretensiones de parte de los Estados 
CJnidos, y por consiguiente, a todos los temores de Espana, respecto de 
su soberania" El Presidente le contesto corao luego se dira. Mas el 
Gobierno Espanol, a pesar de las palabras de aquel Alto Magistrado 
insisti.'), en su despacho de 7 de Agosto, en las dudas que le ofrecia el 
sentido de la clausula o^. Inutil insistencia. El Gobierno Americano, 
ni entonces, ni antes, ni despucs, se presto a manifestar concretamente 
su ])ensamiento envuelto en las frases de controle, disposicion y go- 
bierno de Filipinas, de que se habia de ocupar la Conferencia de Paris. 
Ahora es cuando por primera vez entra en esta explicacion. En el 
Memorandum a que esta contestaudo la Comision Espailola, es donde 
la consigna la Americana. Dice: " Ciortamente la palabra control (en 
ingles) no fui' aiui aplicada en el sentido de register (investigacion 6 
inspecci(')n ) sino en su sentido mas amplio de autoridad 6 mando * * * 
I qu<'' palabra podia ser mas amplia que disposicion, que practicamente 
tiene la misma significacion en frances y en ingh'S? * * * tenemos 
por tan to en estas dos palabras '-la autoridad sobre", "dominiode", 
final y detinitiva explicaci('>n de la materia en cuestion." ; Que es 
gobierno sino el derecho de administracion 6 de ejercer soberania, la 
direcci6n, el maiiejo politico de un r^stado? Cuahpuera de estos 
tcrminos implica la facultad 6 ])oder de interveiiir con soberania. 
Juntos tieneii el mas amplio alcaiice, para tratar de todos los poderes, 
guberiiamental, territorial o admiiiistrativo." 

La explicaci('»n, si no ])arcce oportnna i)or lo tardia, tampoco parece 
satisfactoiia. Desde luego se ocurre que si con el proposito de que tal 



TREATY OF PEACE. 159 

cosa significasen aquellas palabras, se eiiipeno el Crobieriio Americauo en 
sostenerlas, aunqiie siu expiicaiias, a pesar de las diversas veces eu que 
asi se le pidio • porque razon no tnvo eutoiices la fraiiqueza que osteuta 
ahora su Coinisioii ' ^ iior([ue en vez de decir que la conferencia de Paris 
Labia de deterininar la intervencion, la disposicimi y gobieino de las 
Islas Filipinas, no dijo que dicba conferencia liabia de lesolver sobre su 
soberania, acordando 6 no, su cesion a los E>;tados Uuidos, como ahora 
la reclaman sus Comisionados fundandose en que en aquellas frases 
esta tambiini coutenida esta cesion? ^, No bubiera sido esto mas breve, 
mas explicito y de mayor franqueza? 

Pero^,es admisible la interpretaci<')n que ahora fuera de sazon pre- 
tenden dar aquellos a las sobredichas frases? Dicen que la palabra 
control (controle en frances) no i)uede toniarse en el sentido de register 
(investigacion oinspeccion) sinoeneldeautoridad(')mando. 1' ^ porque "? 
Porque este es el sentido mas amplio que tal i)alabra tiene en ingles. 
Mas prescinden de tijar su atencion en que el Protocolo fue redactado 
tanibi«''n en trances, cuyo ejempUir tirnn') como olicial el Senor Secretario 
de Estado de Washington. Y que dicha palabra, en franc;'S, no significa 
semejante cosa sino investigacii'm oinspeccion, que tambien signihca en 
ingli'S y ; como ])ueden dejar de reconocer los Comisarios Americanos 
que cuando un Tratado se ha redactado oticialmente en dos o nuis idiomas 
a sus palabras no se j)uede dar otio sentido que el que sea comim a todos 
ellos 1 

Sostienen asimismo que la palabra ditiposiewn significa enajenci(')n. 
No lo negamos por mas que cuando se em])lea en este sentido, es para 
aplicarla a las relaciones juridicas de la vida civil y privada, pues en 
franci's la significacion mas comun y frecuente de tal palabra es la de 
" distribucion segun un orden cierto y determinado." 

Afirman ([ue la palabra (johkrno signilica el derecho de administrar 
6 de ejercer soberania, y aunque tal sentido puede admitirse, tampoco 
l^uede rechazarse el de la "manera de goberuar" 6 la "forma que tal 
gobienio ha de tener." Mas sea uno u otro el sentido en que aquellas 
tres palabras fueron empleadas en la clausula 3^, si no hubiera en las 
negociaciones datos suflcientes para tiJar eiitre tan diversos sentidos 
aquel en que se emplearon, es imposible que se desconozca como se 
acaba de demon strar, que por lo menos no tienen en si mismas y por si 
solas tales palabras un sentido claro j)reciso y que no pueda ofiecer 
motivo ii ambigiiedades y dudas. Asi lo demostraron ya entouces los 
hechos. 

P^l (xobierno Espanol y su represeutante eu Washington, ])recisamente 
porque no tenian esa claridad, reclamarou aunque iuntilmente explica- 
ciones, y ^,quien se empeHo con verdadera tenacidad en sostener tan 
oscuras frases? No se negara que ha sido el Gobierno de Washington. 
Pues sirvanse leer los Sehores Comisionados lo que sobre la iuterpreta- 
cion de frases semejautes, dice el inmortal \'attel,una de las mas grandes 
autoridades en cuanto se refiere a las relaciones internacionales de los 
pueblos, en su Derecho de Cxeutes, tomo o", iKigina 197. "La duda debe 
resolverse contra aquel que ha dado la ley en el Tratado, porque es cl, 
en alguna manera quicn la ha dictado, y falta suya es si no se ha 
expresado mas claraniente; y entendieudo 6 restrigiendo la signiiica- 
cion de los terminos en el sentido que le es menos favorable, no se le 
hace uingun agravio 6 no se le hace mas que aquel a que ha querido 
exi)onerse. JVIas con una interpretaciou contraria se correria el riesgo 
de convertir t(''rminos vagos 6 ambiguos eu lazos para el mas dcbil cou- 
tratante que ha sido obligado a recibir lo que el mas fuerte ha dictado." 



IGO TREATY OF PEACE. 

Acaba de iiidicar la Coiuision Espaiiola que eu las iiegociacioues hay 
datos salicientes i)ara fijar el verdadero seiitido de aquellas tres bien 
ineinoiables palabras Lo rnisnio \)ot sii parte atirma la Comision 
Auiencaua. Veainos ciial de los dos coutradictorios seutidos entienden 
ainbas Comisiones (]ue es el (lue debe pret'eiirse. 

Imi el ^[einoraiiduiii Aiiiericaiio se asienta como base de todo el razo- 
iiainieuto, seguu ya se lia dicho, que eu la clausula 3' del Protocolo, se 
dejo ;i la libre resoUicioii de la Confereii(;ia de Paris que liabiadeelabo- 
rar el Tratado de Pa/ el puiito relativo a la soberania del Archipiidago 
Fdipnio. Pues bieu, -^ lia teuido la Comision Aiuericana eu cuenta 
caaudo liacia tau grav'es afinuacioues, que el SePior Secretario de Estado 
de Washiuuton, eu su despaclio de 30 de Julio, en que comunico al 
Gobieruo Espauol las tres coudicioues, que el de los Estados Uuidos le 
impouia para la paz y eu (]ue la tercera, como (pieda dicho, estada 
redactada cou las mismas palabras cou que se lee en el Protoeolo, 
establecia tambi u el nombramiento de los Coiuisarios que habian de 
redactar el Tratado de paz y lijaba y circuuscribia sus facultades para 
esteobjeto? Eu dicho despacho se lee el parralb siguieute: "si las 
condiciones ofrecidas aqui son aceptadas eu su integridad, los Estados 
Uuidos uombrarau (Jomisarios que se eucoutraran con los iguabneute 
autorizados i>or Espafia cou el objeto de arreglar los dctuUe.s del Tratado 
de Paz y de lirmarlo eu las coudiciones arriba iudicadas." i Eutiende 
la Comision Americana que es un detalle eu este Tratado de Paz la 
iuesperada cesion que reclanian a Espana de uu inmenso territorio que 
tiene mas de 300,000 kilt')metros cuiadrados de sui)erficie y que cuenta 
cou mas de 9,000,000 de habitantesf ^Eutiende que es uu detalle la 
adquisicion de un Archipiclago que para uadie es un secreto que esta 
llauiado a ser pr('>xinuimente un factor iniportaute j)ara la paz del 
muudo? 

Pero acudamos a los precedentes, como hace la Comision Americana, 
eu busca de ese sentido tan ambiguo. 

Eetiere aquella el principio de las negociacioues. Estamos conformes 
con su relato hasta que llega a la narracion de la primera Confereucia de 
Mr Camboji con el yeilor Presidente de los Estados Uuidos: se refiere 
eu el ]\Iemoraiulum que, en tal confereucia el Presidente dijo respecto 
a Filipinas que la uota, (la citada del 30 de Julio) expresaba los propo- 
sitos de su Gobierno y la di.si)0sici6n final de aquellas dependeria del 
Tratado (]ue debia negociarse por los Comisionados. que desi)U(''s de 
uiui i^osterior discusion en que el Presidente reitero (pie el Tratado habia 
de determinar el porveuir de las Islas Filipinas, se leyo el Articulo 3" eu 
<;ue se decfa que los Comisionados resolverfan sobre el controle, la 
2>osesion y el gobierno de aijuellas Islas; (lue 3Ir Cambon propnso la 
substitucion de la \)ah\hia: iwsesion \)0V la de eo)i(Jicu'tn, por en tender f[ue 
aciuella podia ser toumda por el (lobieruo Espafiol como severa y ame- 
nazadora; el Presidente se nego al canibio propuesto mas al tin acepto 
en lugar de la ]>alabra^)o.se.s/o»- la de <lispas-ici('m, que (refieren los Comi- 
sioiuulos Americanos, no sabemos si como opinion del Presidente 6 
suya propia) no cambiaba el significado, y que siendo muy amplio, podia 
incluir el de la posesion. 

Veamos ahora como refiere Mr Cambon lo que paso eu esta eutre- 
vista. Decia en su despacho de 31 de Julio al (lobierno Espafiol: 

" Las peticioues Ibrmuladas en el Articulo 3" (diJo al Presidente) sou a 
proposito para com))rometer eu Madrid el ('xito de esta negociacion 
preliininar, sobre todo si se mautieue entre las palabras controJe y (joln- 
eriio de Filii)iuas la \)\\\\\\)Y2i poseslnn, cpu'. parece poner desde ahora en 
duda la soberania de Espana sobre esta Colonia; observar.i V. me dijo 



TREATY OF PEACE. 161 

eutouces el Presideute de la Eepublica que mis peticioues, en lo que se 
refiere <i los dos piimeros Artieulos, no adiuiten discusion; dejo a las 
negociaciones el cuidado de resolver la cuestion de Filipiuas. Si las 
fuerzas aiiiericanas ' (fijese toda la atenciou en estas frases) ' permaneceu 
hasta hoy en sus posiciones, es para obedecer a un deber (jue me impo- 
iieu respecto a los residentes y extraugeios los progresos * * * 
(aqui uuas palabras que no pudieron traduciise pero <|ue bien se com- 
prende que debian referirse a la insuireccion tagala). Viendo 'al 
Senor Presidente de la Republica resuelto a no moditiear los terminos 
del articulo 3" hice un llamauiiento tan apremiante a su generosidad, 
que '^ * * mando reempla/ar la palabra 2>osesi6n por la de ilisiwsi- 
cion (|ue no prejuzga el resultado de las negociaciones y que no tiene 
el mismo sentido global.'" 

Entre una y otrarelacionnotaran seguramente los Coniisarios Ameri- 
canos bastantes diferencias. En la suya nada se lee respecto a la unica 
razon que manifesto el Presidente que tenia, para no retirar desde 
luego del Arcliipi(dago las fuerzas Americaiias, lo cual acusa que enton- 
ces estaba muy lejos de pensar en que hubiera de pedirse la soberania 
de avjuel para los Estados IJnidos. Segun la relacicni Americana, la 
palabra disposicvm fue aceptada porque contenia el sentido de la pala- 
bra y^oiiesion; nuis segun el despacbo de Mr Cambon aquella palabra 
en lugar de la de poseaion cambiaba el sentido global de la clausula. 

Y tengan 6 uo razon la Comision Americana o Mr Cambon, siempre 
resulta que cste acepto el cambio, porque entendio que asi quedaba 
descartada toda cuesti<3n sobre la conservacion de la Soberania de 
Espaiia sobre Filipinas. 

El viernes, 3 de Agosto, volvi(') a celebrar el Senor Presidente otra 
conferencia con Mr Cambon. Se dice en el Meinorandum que, en ella, 
manifesto rste que Espaiia insistia sobre el asunto de que su soberania 
no fuera inter venida; que el Presidente le contesto que la disposlcion 
de las Islas Filipinas, debia depender del tratado que habia de negoci- 
arse, y que no podia liacer ningiin cambio en los terminos anteriormente 
propuestos. 

Veamos ahora como refiere esta conversaeion Mr Cambon, en su 
despacbo del 4 de Agosto al Ministro de Estado Espafiol. " Mr. Mac 
Kinley. se mostr(') inflexible (sobre la eesion de l*uerto Kico) y me repitio 
que la cuestion de Filipinas era la linica (pie no estaba ya definitiva- 
mente resuelta en su pensamiento." Despu«'s de referir su insistencia 
en las frases que ya quedan transcritas en este Memorandum Mr 
Cambon continiia: "Mr. Mc Kinley me contesto, no quiero dejar sub- 
sistir ningiin equivoco sobre este i:)articular ; los negociadores de los 
dos paises seran los que resuelvan cuales seran (notese) las ventajas 
X)ermanentes que pediremos en el Arcbii)ielago y, en fin, los que decidan 
la intervencion [controle), disposicion y gobierno de las Islas Filipinas. 

Y agrego, el Gobierno de Madrid puede tener la seguridad de que hasta 
ahora, no hay nada resuelto a priori en mi pensamiento contra Espana, 
asi como considero que no hay nada decidido contra los Estados 
Unidos." {Textual.) 

Comparese tambien una relacion con la otra. La del Memorandum 
americano se limita a referir que el Senor Presidente habia dicho, que 
la disposicion de las Islas Filipinas debia depender del Tratado y que 
ningun cambio podia hacer en los terminos. Pero omite la segunda y 
mas importante parte de la conversaeion que refiere Mr Cambon, a 
pesar de que contiene datos que no pueden dejar lugar a la menor duda, 
sobre la cuestion pendiente. Se observa en primer lugar que asi en - 

T P 11 



1(!2 TREATY OF PEACE. 

esta contestaoion, coino en la anterior, de la misma manera que en las 
notas del Gobierno Americano, seomite con el mayor cuidado la palabra 
soberania, al hablar de las Filipinas, entre tanto (jue, con un cuidado 
igual, se e.iijjlea esta palabra iior el (Tobierno Espafiol y por su repre- 
sentaiite en VVasliiiig'ton, para deeir sin cesar que aquella no quedaba 
sonietida a disciision, ITnase esta observacion a las ya hechas sobre 
la persistente y clara aunqne iinplicita resistencia a explicar las tres 
palabras sobredichas. 

31as a pesar de todo esto el Senor Presidente diio,y la Comisiou Ameri- 
cana en su Memorandum no lo niega, categoricamente, que la Confe- 
rencia de Paris seria la (|ue liabia de resolver cuales habian de ser las 
ventajas jjermanentea que los ICstados IJnidos habian de pedir en el 
Archipi.'lago, ademas de cual babia de ser el co7itrole, la (lisposlcion y 
el f/ohieriio <le las Islas. 

Se dice en el Memorandum (jue el Presidente no se limito aliablar de 
las ventajas permanentes. Es verdad que la Comision Espanola no ha 
dicho, ui dice que se haya limitado a eso porque ariadi('> lo que se acaba 
de deeir. ^„ Pero que tiene esto que ver para descouocer el sentido que 
de las palabras del Presidente resultan '/ Si era su pensamiento, ya 
Ijertcctaniente tormado a la sa/on, el pedir en la Conferencia no una sola 
veutaja sino ventajas permanentes en el Archipndago i)ara los Estados 
Unidos es evidente <jue no pensaba i)edir la soberania; ;, imede esta 
caliticarse de mera veutaja permanente de los Estados Unidos en 
aquellas Islas': Y aunque tan singular hipotesis quisiera sostenerse 
I como habia de explicarse en este caso el nuniero plural empleado por el 
Seaor Presidente de los Estados l^nidos ? A esta observacion ya hecha 
en el escrito anterior de la Oomision Esi)ariola no se contesta en el Mem- 
orandum Americano, y se comprende^ porque no tiene contestacion posi- 
ble que pueda ser harmonizada con el })rop6sito que alii se pretende 
sostener. 

No hemos de ocuparnos de las indicaciones que en el Memorandum ,se 
leen sobre el diverse idioma que enteudian y hablabau los interlocutores 
en las dos Confeieucias sobredichas: no puede ciertamente tal circuu- 
stancia dar verosimilitud al supuesto de que el Senor Presidente no 
haya expresado, no ya una idea incidental, sino las importantes y capi- 
tales (lue Mr. Cambon afirnia (jue le ha oido. 

Si este no lo hubiera entendido, a pesar de que tenia a su lado, segnn 
se lefiere en aquel Memorandum, a su Secretario que entiende y habla 
el ingles, no se puede sui)oner que le hubiera atribuido, de modo tan 
positive, sin f^ltar deliberadamente a la verdad, lo que cousigna en su 
despaeho. 

Pasemos ahora a la nota del Gobierno Espanol del 7 de Agosto. La 
Comisiou Americana esta conformecon la espanola en reconocer que en 
esta Nota el Gobierno de Madrid al manifestar que aceptaba la clausula 
3" salvo a priori su soberania sobre el Archipielago Filiinno: por esto 
no cousideramos necesario transcribir una vez mas textualmente sus 
palabras: la unica diterencia entre anibas Comisiones consiste en que 
entretanto (jue la Espanola afirmay se ratifica en estaatirmacion, queen 
la Nota de su Gobierno se enq)leaba el adjetivo entera 6 total, al hablar 
de la soberania que alii se reservaba para Espafia, la Americana dice 
que en la traduccion al ingles de esta nota, que entrego al Gobierno de 
Washington Mr. Cambon, no existe tal adjetivo. Nosotros tenenios la 
copia, no la traduc(;i6n corao se la llama en el Memorandum Americano, 
de la Nota original del Gobierno Espanol, la que ]M)neinos a la disposi- 
cion de la (Jomision Americana. J^^n ella, el adjetivo esta escrito, si al 
hacerse en Washington su traduccion, al ingles, se omitio, cosa es que 



TREATY OF PEACE. 163 

sabra la Comisiou Americana, por haber visto tal traducciou, pero que 
no puede menos de ignorar la espauola, que uunca tuvo de ella couoci- 
miento. La diferencia no tieue importaucia alguna, porque, auu pre- 
sciudieudo de tal adjetivo, queda siempre como verdad y asi la reconoce 
la Comisiou Americana que el Gobieruo Espauol se reservaba alii a priori 
su soberauia sobre Filipinas y (^ue solameute con esta reserva acei)taba 
la base 3". Y si despues el Gobieruo Espafiol no cambio de opinion y 
eu efecto esto no se afirma ni seria posible que se attvmase en el Memo- 
rauduui Americano, siempre resultara que el Protocolo y su clausula 3* 
no obligan, eu buen derecho, al Gobieruo Espafiol, sino con la expresa 
reserva que bizo al acei)tarla, y de que uo desistio despues. 

Mas eu el Memorandum Americano compreudieudose sin duda, la 
incontrastable fuerza de la consecueucia que resultaba de baberse 
firmado el Protocolo sin que el Gobierno de Wasbiugton, una vez 
euterado de aquella reserva, uada bubiera dicbo en contra suya, se 
maniflesta que, asi el Presideute de la Union como su Secretario de 
Estado, al oir la lectura de a(iuella Nota, dijeron que era vaga e inde- 
finida, supouieiido que aceptaba los t/'rminos de la de los Estados 
Uuidos, mientras requeria alguna modiiicacion, y que respecto a Fili- 
pinas, si en un parrafo se expresaba la aceptacion de la clausula eu 
otro parecia reservarse el derecbo absoluto-de soberauia. 

La redexiou es babil, mas por desgracia suya, no jmrece tan exacta 
como babil. Es verdad que dicbos SeDores, leida que les fue la Nota, 
revelaron su desagrado. Lo que no parece exaeto, a juzgar por lo que 
dijo entonces Mr. Cambon, es que la causa de tal desagrado fuese lo que, 
no vaga e iiideHiiid((meHtc, si uo clar<i i/ terinliutntemente, eu la Nota se 
decia sobre la reserva que Espafia hacia de su soberauia sobre el Arcbi- 
piclago. El mismo Meinorandura Americano transcribe el parrafo corre- 
spondieute de la Nota leida y eu el esta, no vaga e indeteiininada, sino 
expresa, clara, y terminaute esta reserva. 

La causa revelada eu aquel acto, por el Sen or Presideute, de su desa- 
grado, fue otra muy diversa, (pie refiere Mr. (,;ambon eu el parrafo 
siguieute de su despacbo de 10 de Agosto. Helo aqui: "Senor Uucjue: 
Tambicu lui sido esta vez eu la Casa Blanca, eu presencia del Mr 
Mc Kinley y por expreso deseo suyo, doude he comuui(;ado al Secre- 
tario de Estado el telegrama (la nota sobrediclia) de 7 de Agosto, en 
que V. E. declara que el Gobierno de Es])ana acepta las coudicioues 
impuestas por los Estados ITnidos. Esta lectura coutrario visiblemeute 
al Presideute de la i\epublica y al Secretario de Estado. Despues de 
un silencio prolongado me dijo el Mr. M(; Kiuley: Yo habia pcdido 
d Uspan-a la cesiim y por consicpiientc Ja er((cuaci6n inmediaia (esta 
evacuacion inmediata no bemos podido averiguar cuaudo liabia sido 
pedida) de Ian Islas de Cuba t/ Puerto Biro; en vez de la aceptacion cate- 
gorica que esperaba, el Gobierno Espanol me dlrige una. Nota en que invoca 
la. necesidnd de obtener hi aprobaciihi de las Cortes: no pnedo preHtarme 
a entrar en estas consideraciones de orden interior. Hice observar ([ue 
al couformarse el Gobierno de S. M. con sus deberes constitucionales, 
no hacia mas que imitar al Presidente, al cual le estau impuestas obliga- 
ciones aualogas, y que en su contestaciou de .'>0 de Julio, habia reservado 
expresamente la ratifleacion del Seuado Federal" (asi era la verdad y 
consta eu dicho despacho de 30 de Julio). 

No alego el Senor Presidente ui su Secretario de Estado otro motivo 
para su disgusto, mas que el sobredicho, y segiin Mr, Cambon, en la 
conversaciou nada dijeron aqucllos Senores sobre la expresada reserva 
de la soberauia del ArcliipiT'lago, que haiMa Espana, ni si)bre otra cosa 
alguna mas que la reserva del Gobieruo li^spanol de la aprobacion de las 
Cortes. 



164 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Asi es que el Seiior Presideiite coucluyo por coutestar al Sefior Cain- 
bou, quelepregiiutaba sobrelas preudas de-sinceridad que podriadarle 
Es[)aria, lo siguieiite: " llabria un medio de poner termino a todo equl- 
voco: podriamos nosotros preparar un proyecto que reproduzca las 
coiidiciones pro})uestas a Espafia en los mi.smos termiiios en que yalos 
he tbrmulado, (hasta acjui esto era en efecto todo lo convenido) y que 
fijen los plazos en (/ite .sr )i<)inhr<ir<'(n par una parte lofi Flenipotenviarios 
e)icar</ados de nefjociar en I'arifi el Tratado de paz, y por otra parte Conii- 
siones eapeciales eneariiadas de deter minar los detalles de la evacuacion de 
Cuba y de Puerto Kieo.''' (Ksto si que se liabia pasado de consiguarlo 
en la Nota del 30 de Julio, y osto por si solo bubiera sido causa bastante 
para explicar el cambio de tormalizacion de lascondiciouesparalapaz). 

N'ease pues si bay una distancia inniensa eutre lo (jue en el Memo-- 
randum Americano se atirma, y lo que Mr. Cambon manifesto al 
Gobierno Espafiol en su Nota del 10 de Agosto, 6 sea immediatameutej 
despues de liaber asistido si tan importante conferencia y cuando por 
consiguiente tenia tan reciente en su memoria lo ocurrido en ella, 
Haciendo justicia a la perfecta veracidad de los Comisarios Americanos 
su relaeion de a(|uella conferencia a l<js ties meses de celebrada, no 
puede ser preferida por los Comisarios espanoles a la del Honorable 
Mr, Oambon que hizo la suya inmediataniente depu: s de ocurrido el 
suceso que en ella tan detallamente nariaba. 

En el Memorandum Americano se niega (jue el Sefior Secretario de 
Estado de Wasliington baya manifestado en su Nota de 10 de Agosto a 
Mr, Caniboii, como la Comision Espanola babia afirmado, que la del 
Gobierno de Madrid, (la de 7 de Agosto) contenia en su esi)iritu la 
ace])taci6n por Espana de las coudiciones propuostas por los Estados 
Unidos; y al efecto se inserta alb literalmente dicba Nota. 

Rectilica la Comision Espanola su alirmaciou anterior acomodandola 
a lo (pie en aquella se expresa, Pero cumple ji su veracidad decir que 
al liacerla se retirio a la Nota de Mr. Cambon, de 11 de Agosto, que 
empieza con el siguiente parrafo: "Sefior Duque: Al transmitirme el 
proyecto de Protocolo cuyo texto be telegrafiado a V. E, el Secretario 
de Estado me ba dirigido una carta que puede resumirse como sigue: 
Auiique la nota eutregada ayer en la Casa Blanca contiene en su 
espiritu la aceptacion x3or Espana de las condiciones propuestas por los 
Estados Unidos, en su forma, no particulariza bastante esplicita- 
niente, lo que sin duda so debe a que ba tenido ([ue ser traducida y 
cifrada varias veces." Estas palabras que bieu pueden explicarse sin 
mengoa de la indiscutible veracidad del Honorable Mr. Cambon, indu- 
jeron y no j)odiaii menos de inducir a error a los Comisarios Espanoles. 
Cumplen noblemeute el deber de declararlo asi. 

Mas desijucs de todo, la diferencia no es de importancia. El Senor 
Secretario de Estado, y esto si (pie consta en su propia carta, no puso 
otro defecto a la Nota Espanola del 7 de Agosto, que el no ser enteramente 
explicita, sin duda a causa de las diversas transformaciones que babia 
sufrido, Pero es el caso, (pie ese defecto no es posible que lo bubiese 
atribuido el Senor Secretario de Estado al p;irrafo de diclia nota per- 
fectanieiite traducida al ingles (salvo el adjetivo total) que en el Mem- 
orandum Ainerit^ano se <;opia, y se dice (lue babiai sido leido al Senor 
Presideiite de la Union y a su Secretario de Estado y en cuyo parrafo, 
clara, esjilicita y terminantemente, el (Jobierno Esi)anol reserva a priori 
su soberania en Eilii)inas. Sena poco explicito todo lo demits que la nota 
contenia si se (piiere decirlo asi, pero aquella reserva no lo fuc segura- 
meiite. I 'or lo tanto, la. carta a <iue nos venimos reliriendo no contradice 
la atirmacion que sostenemos, de que la mencionada reserva, de que el 



TREATY OF PEACE. 165 

Gobieruo de Washington oportunamente se habia enterado y constaba 
tan clara en la traduccion inglesa qne tenia en sii podev, no fue por el 
contradieha, ui sirvio de niotivo para emplear la nueva forma de Proto- 
colo couio medio de solemnizar el convenio sobre las bases de la paz. 
Ese motivo bien resalta en los documentos ya examinados que contienen 
aquellas iiegociaciones. 

I)esi)U(''S de cnaiito precede iios parece qne, bayan sido cualesqniera 
las intimas inteiiciones del Oobierno de Wasliington, suconducta y sus 
palabrns escritas y liabladas no son bastantes para destruir la afirma- 
cion qne liacenios de que Espafia acepto la tercera clausula del Pro- 
tocolo en el sentido comunieado a aquel Gobierno, y no contradieho por 
el, de que ^> liviorl quedaba a salvo su soberania en Filipinas, puesto 
qne su control e, su disposicion y gobierno, que habia de acordar la 
Coiiferencia de Paris, se referian nnicamente a su regimen interior. 
Y esto por si solo seria bastante para sostener sin contradiecion fundada 
que aquella Coiiferencia no puede ocuparse ui tiene atribucioiies para 
ocuparse de la cesion que pideii los Estados ITiiidos, annque j)or nn 
supuesto que consideramos imposible, llegaia a destruirse la i)rueba 
que, tomada de las mismas palabras del tSefior Presideiite de la Uiiidii, 
henios procurado liaeer y creemos que hemos liecho, de que segun su 
propio peiisamiento entonces aquella soberania quedaba fuera de dis- 
cusi(')n ulterior. 

I (}i\e ha de decir la Coiiiision Espanola sobre las palabras que lee eu 
el Memoraiidura Americano y que parecen buscar un fundamento a la 
actual petici<')n de aquellos, en la indeinnizacion de guerra, como si no 
estuviera fuera de discusiiui y no hubiera sido reconocido por la misma 
Comision Americana que esta indeinnizacion de los gastos de la guerra, 
y no solo de ella sino tambi'-n la de los ciudadanos aniericaiios, en su 
mayorfa, si no todos origiiiarios de Cuba aunque, al i)arecer, naturali- 
zados despues en los Estados Unidos, que habian sufrido perjuicios 
en la ultima insurreccion, se habia convenido eu cubrirla con la cesion 
de Puerto Rico, de las demas xintillas y de la Isla de Guam en las 
Marianas"? 

O I es que esa iudemnizaeion lia de ser una cuenta abieita en que 
quepa pedir todo lo demas que a Espafia queda, incluso la propia Penin- 
sula ? 

Por cierto que el haberla liinitado a la Isla de Guam en el Oriente, 
es un indicio mas que acredita que los Estados Unidos no pensaban a 
la sazon en las Islas Filipinas. Si pensarau i se concibe que reclama- 
ran entonces, desde luego, una pequena c insignificante Isla y dejaran 
de reclamar el inmenso Imiierio Filipino que estaba a ella tan proximo? 

Eeconozcase pues, que carece de fundamento la reclainacion 6 peti- 
cion del Archipielago Fipino (jue se liace para los Estados Unidos en 
la forma y con las condiciones que se leen en la proposicion Americana. 
Mientras esta cesi(')n se pretenda en tal forma y con tales condiciones, 
la Comision Espanola no puede menos de recliazarla. 

MEMORANDUM EN APOYO DE LA ULTIMA PROPOSICION ESPANOLA. 

Ell esta proposicion pidieron los Comisarios de Espafia, segun se 
recordara, que los Americanos presentasen otra acomodandola a lo con- 
venido eu los articulos 3" y G" del Protocolo, esto es, proponiendo la 
forma de intervencion disposicion y gobierno que habia de estable- 
cerse por Espafia en Filipinas, la devolucion de la plaza, puerto y bahia 
de ^lanila, la libertad de su guarnicion, actualmente prisionera, la devo- • 
lucion de los foudos publicos, rentes e imijuestos que hubiesen percibido 



106 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Lastii que se hicieia la entrega de la i)laza, y el corapromiso, o sea el 
recouocimieuto i)or jtarte de los Estndos Uiiidos, de la obligacion de 
indenniizar a Espafia por la reteiicioii de las tropas que giiaiueciau la 
eiudad, cuando se riiidio. el 14 de Agosto ultimo. 

La Couiisiou americana ha recliazado esta ])roposici(>n por<iue enti- 
eiide (jue uo esijeu (jue la presente los citados Articulos 3 y 6 del 
Piotocolo. 

Kesi)ecto }1 la piiniera parte que se refieie a la iiitervenciou, disposi- 
ci(')u y gobienio del Arcliijuclago el tiatar de demostrar aqui que do se ba 
euni]dido el artieulo 3" cou la piopcisiciou aniericaua eux|ue, en lugar de 
OfU])aise del ngiiiieu interior de aquellas Islas, se pidio su cesion <i los 
Kstados Unidos, seria repetir lo que en la i)arte anterior de este docu- 
niento deja es])uest(» la Comision Espafiola. I3e sus razonamientos- 
entiende que resulta, con la claridad del medio dia, (jue una cosa es la 
cesion de a(]ne]las Islas, que es de todo punto agena a lo contenido en lai 
eonvencion de Washington y otra es el regimen interior de las mismas^ 
que, segun su referida clausula 3" pnede y debe ser materia del Tratado 
de Paz, 

Faltar.an, pues, los Comisarios Espanoles a sus propiasconvicciones, , 
si no persistieran en demandar a la Comision Americana, la presenta- 
cion de una proj)osici6n sobre tal regimen, a no quedar infringida, no 
solo en su propio sentido, sino hasta en su propio texto, la clasula 3^ de 
aquel convenio. 

En el primer parrafo de la proposicion especial y relativa a la toma de 
Manila, se pide la devolucion inmediata a Espafia de la eiudad y de su 
baliia y puerto. Rectificando aqui una de las equivocaciones de hecho 
(jue abundan en el Memorandum Americano tenemos que hacer constar 
que, en la proposici«')n Espanola, no se i)idi6 esta entrega inmediata ni 
de nada de lo (]ue los siguientes parrafos de la proposicion tambieu 
contienen, para qne se llevase a cabo desde ahora. La entrega inme- 
diata habia de suceder, como no podia menos de ser asi, a la celebracion 
del Tratado de Paz. La prueba es bien concluyente para que los Comi- 
sarios Espanoles debieran suponer que nunca tendrian que hacer esta 
rectiflcacion. Dice asi el primer parrato de la proposicion sobredicha: 
"Los Comisarios Espanoles jior lo tanto, en cumplimiento de loexpresa- 
meute convenido en el Protocolo entienden que en el Tratado de Faz 
dehe consignarse, 1^ la entrega etc ... . * * *".... Si esta se habia 
de convenir en el Tratado de Paz ^como pudo suponerse que la Comi- 
sion Espanola pedia que se hiciese antes de convenirse? 

Vamos a despejar el trabajo de este Memorandum haciendo dos recti- 
ficaciones de caracter personal antes de entrar a discutir el punto de la 
rendicion y capitulacion de Manila y sus consecuencias. 

En el Memorandum Espafiol al (jue el ultimo Americano sirve de con- 
testacion, no hay frase que ofenda ni lastime la honorabilidad del Gen- 
eral Merritt y del Almirante Dewey. En el Memorandum Americano 
quiere darse a entender (jue, con mayor o menor habilidad, se insinua 
en el Esi)ariol la idea de que los .lefes Militares de la Union, rindieron por 
la fuerza de las armas la ])laza de Manila el 13 de Agosto, cuando ya 
sabian que se habia aeordado hi susjiension de hostilidades. Es un 
error. La Comision Es])ariola no cmpleo, ni acostuinbra a emplear, 
habilidades deningun gcnero paiadisfra/ar su ])('nsamiento. Si hubiera 
creido (pie a<iue]los (Tcnerales liabiaii faltado al armisticio despu( s de 
tener iioticia de su celebracion, lo hubiera claiamente dicho. Al hacerlo 
asi, no hubieran laltado a los respctos (|ue a(!uel]os Jet'es inerecen, como 
a nadiese le ocurrio creer en 1S71 (jue se faltaba a los respetos debidos 
al General aleman de Manteuttel imputandole la falta que habia come- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1G7 

tido cuandodespues de celeV)rado iin arinisticio parcial entre las tropas 
francesas y alemaiia-i, se apiove<'li6 del error en que. sobre la exteusiim 
de este Armisticio. habia iuciirrido el (rent-ral Oliiicliant, para eiivolver 
y obligar a refuj^iarvSe en Sui/a a! Cnerpo do Ejercito de sii mando. Nos- 
otros nada lieinos dicho, ni teaeuios que decir, contra la coudacta per- 
sonal de aquellosdos Je fes, al eontrario, podeuios atinnar un heclio que 
redunda en pro de los bellos sentiini.'iitos del Almirante. El 1" de Mayo, 
quiza bajo la eiubriagadora inlineiicia dt^ la victoria, envio desde el 
" Olyinpia" al Goberiiador General de .vlanita, una coniunicaciou que 
dice asi : " De no rendirse inniedintainente t<»dos los buques, torpederos, 
y de fi^uerra que existau con bandera espauola, Manila seni destruidn." 
Bsta coinnnicacion presuinimos que no Hgaarara en el capitulo de la 
historia en que se registran los servicios prestados a la causa de la 
humaindad de que tanto se alardea eu estos tieinpos. Pero nos com- 
placenios en reconoeerque el aut>r de aquella orden draconiana, por la 
espontaiieidad de sus bneiios seiitiinientos. se abstuvo, aunque hnbiera 
podido intentarlo, de llcvarla a cabo. 

Bsto no obsta para que el buen juicio que mevecen personalmeute 
aquellos honorables rlefes, no piieda exteiiderse liasta el punto de tener 
que agradi'ce; les (]ue hubiesen deliberadamoute dilatado la rendicion 
de la plaza hasta el 13 de Agosto, por au proposito de "proteger a la 
Oiudad y a sus liabitantes espanoies contra la terrible venganza de los 
insurrectos". No parece coinpreiisible este propt')sito : los insurrectos 
no sitiaban aiin la plaza por el lado de tierra, en los primeros dias de 
Mayo, que solanientc estaba bloqneada <lesde la babia por la flota 
Americana. Einpezaron desput^s y no can el mismo m'uuero de fuerzas 
desde el principio, pues estas fueron poco a jioco aumentaiidose basta 
foraiar las masas de insurrectos que se ballaban al frente de las triu- 
clieras de defensa por el lado de tierra el dia de la reiidici('>n. De 
suerte que, si por la iiidicada razcm los Jefe Americanos no se lial)jau 
apoderado hasta aquel tiempo de la plaza, mucbo menos debierou 
hacerlo despuc'S. Mas, aparte de esto, los hecbos demuestraii que tal 
peligro no existia, porque sieiiipre bubieran ])odido evitarlo las tuerzas 
Americanas que, ai reiidirse Manila, babnan de desembarcar en ella y 
guarnecerla, como lo evitaron desde el 14 de Agosto si pesar de que, 
segun se ba dicho, era mayor el numero de los insurrectos sublevados 
que domiiiaban en las afueras. 

Vease, i>iies, como sin incurrir en ])ecado de ingratitud, puede dejar 
de recono cerse aquel supuesto servicio a los sobredicbos Jefes sin que 
esto en nada obste al buen concepto a que les hace acreedores su com- 
portamiento ])ersonal. 

En cambio el Memorandum Americano al referir la inesperada rendi- 
cion y la salida de IMauila del (General que niandaba las rro])as enpanolas, 
emplea una palabra de todo panto inconq)atible con el honor de un mil- 
itar. Gualquiera (jue haya sulo la condiicta de aquel Jefe, esta al amparo 
de las Leyes y Tribunales de su Patria, que exammaran sus actos para 
aprobarlos 6 desaprobarlos segun fuese menester pero no estii a merced 
de nadie mas y sobre todo de juicios de caracter oficial que quieran 
emitirse en el extrangero y jjor extrangeros. 

Dejamos asentado en la segunda ])arte de este Memorandum que en 
la tantas veces cita<la clausula 'M del Protocolo, se habia couvenido la 
ocupacion i)or las t'nerzas de los Estados Tnidos de la Oiudad, puerto y 
bahia de iNlanila hasta la celebracion del Tratado de Paz meramente en 
concepto de garantia. 

En tal .sentido queda alii demostrado que acepto esta ocupacion el 
Gobierno de Madrid sin expresa contradiccion i)or parte del Gobierno" 
de Washington. 



168 TREATY OF PEACE, 

En el Memorandum Americano parece que quiere deslizarse la idea 
de que tal ocni)ac'i(')ii debia tener, asimismo,-el carncter de iiideniniza- 
cion i)()r los gastos de guerra, t'nndandose en que en la Nota de 30 de 
flulio en ((ue el Sefior Secretario de Estado conuinico al Gobierno Espa- 
nol las tres condieiones bajo las cuales ])odia restablecerse la paz, des- 
pucs de decir en la segunda ({ue para aquella indemuizacion Espafia 
habia de ceder Puerto llico, las otras Antillas y la Isla de Guam, se 
conienzaba la clausula 3 ' con las liases : " For la misnia razon los Esta- 
dos Tnidos tienen titnlos para ocupar la plaza de Manila ect." La 
observacion no carei-e a priiiiera vista de al.^una fuerza, pero saben 
perfectamente los Comisionados Americanos queesta es aparenteyque 
lo ocuriido ])rueba cumplidauiente lo contrario. Despues de manifestar 
e insistir el Gobierno espanol en su Nota del 7 de Agosto y su repre- 
sentante en las conferencias que celebro con el tSefior Presideute de la 
Eiei)ublica en <jue la ocupacion de Manila no habia de tener otro carac- 
ter que el de una niera garautfa, aparecen siiprimidas en el Protocolo 
las frases sobrediclias. De suerte que dejo de bacerse en cl lelacion 
alguna entre la ocupaci<'>n fntura de aquella plaza y el pago de la indem- 
nizacion de guerra, y ademas dejo de decirse que los Estados Tnidos 
teniau ya el dereclio de ocuparla. Sin duda por esto la idea se insiuiia, 
pero no se desenvuelve, ni categoricaniente se afirnia, en el Memoran- 
dum Americano. 

Los Comisionados esiiailoles reconocen que tuvieron una agradable 
sorpresa al observar que, en este documento, ya no se alegaba, como 
habia alegado el Gobierno Ameiicano al contestara la Nota del Espanol 
de 7 de Setiembre ultimo, la razon perentoria de (jue la suspension de 
hostilidades, segun la clausula (5'' del Protocolo no debia comenzar a 
regir inmediatamente de concluido y firmado este documento sino des- 
pucs de su notiticacion a los Jefes de las fuerzas beligerantes, a pesar 
de que, punto de tanta im])ortancia habia sido expuesto, razouado y 
demostrado con todo detenimiento, en el documento espanol a que aquel 
sirve de contestaci<')n. Esta conducta abona su buen criterio y su ilus- 
traci('ui en la materia porque equivale a un implicito reconocimiento de 
la solidez de aquella afirmacion que, despucs de todo, es elemental en la 
materia y que por nadie, <'omo doctrina corriente, ha sido contradicha. 

En cambio aspirau, insistiendo en analogas indicaciones que se leen 
en la citada respuesta del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos a la nota 
del de Madrid de 7 de Setiembre ultimo, a desvirtuar, por tardia, la 
reclamacion Espailola sobre la capitulacion de Manila. No han podido 
comprender los Comisionados Espanoles la fuerza del razonamiento 
sobre este punto. El Gobiei-no de Madrid forniulo con toda solemnidad 
este reclamaci('>n en la mencionada nota, es decir, 23 dias despues de la 
capitulacion de la plaza; iqvn' ley, ni (|u<^ practica abonan (pie se 
tenga por prescrito el derecho a una reclamacion de esta esi)ecie cuando 
no se hace antes de transcurrir el dia vig«'simo tercero A con tar desde 
el hecho (jue la motiva? 

Se dice adennis, entrando en el terreno de las intenciones del Gobierno 
Espanol, que este suponia que aquel hecho de guerro habia sido i)ertecta- 
mente correcto cuando pocosdias despucs pedia al (Jobierno Americano 
jiermiso para transportar viveres a Fili])inas y restablecer el servicio 
ordinario de sus va])ores correos. Cuando esto acaeci('>, aun ignoraba 
el Gobierno lvsi)ariol loocurridoel dia 14 de aqnel mes en Manihi. Asi 
tambicii deja entender la (Jomision Americana, (jue es verdad. Mas 
aunque lo snpiera, ;, ([u<'' pcrniiso es ese que se supone pedido ])or el 
Gobierno l^^spanol? Lo sucedido es lo t\uv no i)0(lia inenos de ocurrir 
entre Gobicinos (]ue, aun(ine enemigos, guardan siempre los deberes 
que la lealtad impone (i todos. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1G9 

El statu quo que resultaba de la suspension de hostilidades prohibia 
4 cada uno de los beligeriintes, inejorar su situacion en perjuicio del 
otro, micntras aquel estado subsistiera : el Gobierno Espanol, eonio 
cualqniera otro (]ue no quiere faltar a los iiidicados debeies, tenia el de 
comunicar al Gobierno Americano, obrando eon el de acnerdo, el resta- 
bleciiuiento de los servicios que existian antes de la guerra; asi obro el 
mismo Gobierno de Washington cuando en 16 de Agosto solicito del 
Gobierno de Madrid el consent] mien to para restablecer el servicio tele- 
gr;iflco entre Manila y Hong Kong. 

Reconozcase, pues, que la reclamacion del Gobierno Espanol fue 
hecba en tiempo oportuno y aunque entonces no la hubiera heclio, su 
Comision estaba autorizada para hacerla ahora, puesto que lo esta para 
pedir todo aquello que conduzca al cumplimiento fiel y exacto del Con- 
venio de Washington. 

Queda, pues, sentado por no haber sido contradicho en el Memoran- 
dum Americano a que en este se contesta, que la suspension de hostili- 
dades convenida en la chmsnla 6-' del Protocolo. commenzo a regir y li 
producir sus legales efectos, inmedialamente clesput s que aqu('l se 
firm 6 en la tarde del 12 de Agosto de este afio. Y ti^ngase iDresente 
que " si hay un precepto de las leyes de la guerra nnis claro y perentorio 
que otro alguuo es el de que los pactos entre los enemigos, como son las 
treguas, haii de cnmplirse fielmeute y que sn inobservancia debe califi- 
carse no solo como una coiitradicci(jn del verdadero interc s y del deber 
de las partes inmediatas siuo de los de toda la humanidad.'' Estas 
frases no las rechazaran los Comisiouados Americanos porque son de su 
illustre comj)atriota el eminente Wharton eii su Digesto del Derecho 
luteruacional de los Estados Unidos formado con textos de los Presi- 
dentes y iSecretarios de Estado, con las decisiones de los Tribunales 
Federales y con los dictamenes de los Attoney Generales. 

"l Se ha observado con esta escrupulosidad lo convenido en la clausula 
6 del Protocolo 1 El dia 13 de Agosto era canoneada la plaza de Manila 
y el 14 se rendfa. Los Jefes de las fuerzas Americanas, no tieneu los 
Comisiouados Espanoles razon alguua paraatirmar que supieran que las 
hostilidades estaban suspendidas; pero es lo cierto que aciuella accion 
de guerra se ejecuto despnes de esta suspension. 

Y con este motivo tiene la Comision Espafiola que completar la 
pequena historia que se hace en el Memorandum americano sobre el 
restablecimiento del cable de Manila. Se dice alii que en 10 de Agosto 
fue el Gabinete de Washington quien, por medio de una Nota al Emba- 
jador de Francia, solicit<3 el consentimiento del Gobierno Espaiiol para 
restablecer la comunicacion telegraflca entre aquella plaza y Hong Kong. 
Y esto es verdad, pero tambirn lo es lo que se pasa 4 referir. El Almi- 
rante Americano habia cortado en Manila dicho cable al principio dela 
campafia. Despues de varios iniitiles intentos de la Direccion general 
Espanola de Correos y Teh'grafos cerca de la Compania concesionaria 
para el restablecimiento de su servicio, insistio aquella Direccion en 9 de 
Julio ultimo cerca de la indicada Compania sobre tal resta))lecimientocon- 
formandose por parte de Espafia con la absoluta neutralidad del servicio. 
La Compania i)uso esta proposicion en noticia del Embajador de los 
Estados Unidos en Londres para obtener tambien su consentimiento. 
Mas este, en 10 del mismo mes, le contesto que su Gobierno preferia 
que continuase cortado. De esto resulta que si no habia comunica- 
ciones directas con Manila por la via de Hong Kong el 12 de Agosto, 
en que se firmo el Protocolo, era debido al Gobierno de Washington 
que hacia un mes que se habia opuesto ji su restablecimiento. Ilazon de^ 
m4s, si fuera precisa (que no lo es) para que la ignorancia de la suspen- 



170 TREATY OF PEACE. 

sioii de hostilidades en que estaben los (leuerales Americanos al atacar 
la plaza el 13 de Agosto, no solo no pueda servir de niotivo para que los 
Estados Unidos se aprovedien del acto de guerra entonces ejecutado 
contra lo que su (iobierno liabia convenido el dia anterior, sino ])ara 
que tengan (pie respoiider de los indebidos perjuicios que aquel acto 
caust) ii la otra parte beligerante. 

Todos los razonaiuientos extendidos en el Memorandum Americano 
sobre el car;'icter legal que alii se pretende dar a la rendiciou y capitu- 
lacion de i\ranila y ;V los actos que desde entonces ejecutaron en la plaza 
y aim fuera de ella, los Jefes de las fuerzas Militaros de la Union, 
pueden concentrarse en las siguintes atirmaciones : 

Primera. — El caracter legal de la mencionada capitulacion es el mismo 
que corresponderia ii la entrega pacitica de la plaza en virtud de lo con- 
venido en la clausula 3"^ del Protocolo y por esto los derechos que la 
parte beligerante tiene en la plaza que ocupa como garautia son los 
mismos que tendria si la ocupara por haberla rendido en acriun de 
guerra, y 

Segunda. — La ocupacion de Manila, su babia y puerto convenida en 
la clausula 3 ' del Protocolo fue una ocupacion militar. 

La Comision Espafiola no hubiera creido nunca que tuviera (jue recti- 
ficar errores tan graves si no los leyera estampados en el Memorandum 
Americano. 

Es elemental en la materia que la ocupacion de una plaza 6 de un 
territorio convenida entre las partes beligerautes para que sirva de 
garantia ii lo estipulado en un Tratado o al cumplimiento de una obli- 
gacion que pese sobre arpiella ii quien corresponda la soberanfa de la 
plaza 6 territorio ocupado, no tiene, ni puede tener, otro titulo miis que 
el del Conveuio mismo en que se lialla estipulado. Pero el de la ocu- 
pacion it viva fuerza de una plaza <> territorio que se rinde por un acto 
de guerra, tiene un nombre especial y es el de cnpitnlarwn. 

Y el denominar asi lo convenido en el Protocolo para poner ])or tal 
medio ii su amparo la capitulacion ilegal de Manila despues de haberse 
firmado aquel documento, es un error en que hasta iihora uadie ha, 
oticial ni cientiticamente, incurrido y que no consiente el signiticado, no 
ya tecnico sino vulgar de la palabr a c((pnul<ici6n. La ocupaciiSn paci- 
tica de garantia no da uiiis dereelio ii la parte ocupante que el de esta- 
blecer la guarnicion 6 conservar las fuerzas militares que considere 
necesarias en la plaza o territorio, para tenerlos en su poder entretanto 
que no se cumple la obligacion principal A que la ocupacion sirve de 
garantia. EI aprovisionamiento de las tropas de ocupacion, es natural 
que sea it cargo del Soberano del territorio ocupado. Mas aunque este 
Aprovisionamiento es una condicion natural no es esencial del convenio. 
l*or esto, en los casos mils notables que se ban presentado de ocupa- 
ciones de esta especie, tu vo buen cuidado la parte ocupante de estipular, 
de un modo exprcso, la obligacion de este aprovisionamiento. Bien 
conocidos son los casos de ocupacion, en concepto de garantia, que bubo 
en 1815 y 1871 de viirios deparramentos de la Francia, ii la termiuacion 
el primero de las guerras del Impcrio, y el segundo de la franco- 
prusiana. l^]n ellos se estii)ul('>, expresamente, que el sosteniniiento de 
las troi)as de ocu])acion liabia de correr ii cargo del Gobierno Eranci'S. 
r^sto no se hizo en la (diiusula 3' del Protocolo de VVashington. 

Todos los demtis derecliosde la soberaniji, sefialiulamente la percepcion 
de las rentas c impuestos publicos, contiuiian en la piicilica ]>osesi('>n 
del ►Soberano del territorio ocupado. La parte <)cu})ante tiene que 
respetar religiosamente tales derechos. La legitimidad de sus actos no 



TREATY OF PEACE. 171 

se extieiide mas alia de lo (lue sea necesario para el cumplimieuto del 
fin de la ooupacion. 

De estos elenientales principios, que para el caso presente no necesi- 
tan mayor deseuvolvimiento, resulta que los Estados Unidos,en virtud 
de lo convenido en la ch'iusula 'S^ del Portocolo, no teuian nuis derecho 
que el de conservar eu su poder, hasta la Celebraciou del Tratado de 
Paz, la Ciudad, puerto y babia de Manila, como garantia de lo convenido 
en dicbo Protocolo y por lo tanto, nada mas que el derecbo de 
guarnecer dicba plaza, bahia y puerto con las fuerzas necesarias de su 
Ejcrcito y M arina, pero respetando el ejercicio de la Soberania de Espafia 
en ellas en todo lo dem^s que sea compatible con este derecbo de 
guarnicion (que asi propiamente es denominada la ocupacion de 
garantia). 

Pero la de una plaza 6 territorio por uii acto de guerra, da mas amplios 
derechos al beligerante que de la una 6 del otro se ba apoderado por la 
fuerza. Ko ad(iuiere, es verdad, por la conquista, el derecbo de sobera- 
nia en el pais conquistado, pero si adquiere la posesion y ejercicio 
provisional de esta soberania. Mientras la ocupacion subsiste, las 
atribuciones del Soberano en el orden politico, en el financiero y aim 
en el Administrativo, pneden ser ejercidas por el ocupante, aunque 
siempre con la moderacion que requiere el respeto debido a los derechos 
de los babitantes pacilicos, porque hoy la guerra no se hace eiitre los 
pueblos, sino entre las fuerzas armadas de los Estados beligerantes. 

Basta con lo dicbo para que resalte la difercucia capital que a nadle 
permite confiindir la ocupacion pacifica de garantia con la ocupacion 
belica de la conquista. ; En qu«'^ concepto persisten los Estados Unidos 
desde el 14 de Agosto en ocupar la Ciudad, puerto y bahia de Manila? 
En concepto de ocupacion belica; por haberse apoderado de la plaza a 
viva fuerza despucs de firmado el Protocolo. |En que concepto tienen 
exclusivamente derecho los Estados Unidos para ocupar aquella plaza 
y su bahia y puerto? En el de ocupacion pacifica de garantia, y nada 
mas que en este, ])or lo convenido en la cliUisula 3" de aquel Convenio. 
^Como, pues, cabe atirmar que es indiferente para el caso el caracter de 
tal ocupacion f Es ini'itil insistir mas sobre un punto de los mas ele- 
mentales que bay en la materia del Derecho Internacional de la guerra. 

El segundo error que se ostenta en el Memorandum Americano, con- 
siste en suponer qne fne una ocupacion miUtar la convenida en el Pro- 
tocolo. Para aquellos (jne entieiidan esta denominacion en el sentido 
de ocupacion con fuerzas militares, sin duda alguna sera la misma 
denominacion la que aplicaiiin a estos dos tan diversos cases de 
ocupacion. Mas por quienes, empleando el tecnicisino consagrado por 
la ciencia y i)or los Tratados, reserven la denominacion de ocupacion 
militar k la ocupacion belica 6 sea 4 la que se hace por la fuerza, no 
podra calificarse de ocupacion militar, la convenida en el Protocolo. 

Es, pues, ini'itil querer poiier al amparo de una denominacion coniim 
actos esencialniente diversos y cuyas consecuencias legitimas jamas se 
ban confiindido. La ocupacion de la plaza, bahia y puerto de Manila 
d que tienen derecho los Estados Unidos por lo convenido en Washing- 
ton, no es una ocupacion militar 6 belica que le haya conferido legiti- 
mamente los derechos y facultades que esta Ueva en si misma. 

Los Jefes de las ftierzas Americanas en Filipinas, es indudable que 
participaron del error qne en el Memorandum se comete. Se comprende 
que una vez apoderados de la plaza y mientras no tuvieron noticia de la 
suspension de hostilidades, hubiesen comenzado a ejercer todas las fac- 
ultades y derechos de un ocupante militar 6 belico. Mas, en el Memoa, 
randum Americano se reconoce que el 16 de Agosto fueron aquellos 



172 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Jefes enterados de la suspension conveuida de liostilidades. Esto no 
obstante, contiiinaron ejerciendo aquellas fjteultades que no teni'an y 
que debian saber (jue no tenian. En aijuella fecba aun funcionaban los 
organisiiios de la adniinistraidini l'vS])ario]a. Desde el 10 de Agosto fne 
cuando las tnerzas Americanas comenzaion a apoderarse "nianu mili- 
tari '' de tales oiganisinos y de los fondos, rentas e impuestos publicos 
asi conio continuaion reteniendo prisioneias las tropas espafiolas que se 
babiau reiidido el dia 14. 

Consideramos iuutil insistir mas en la refutacliin de errores de tal 
gTavedad <'■ iniportancia, euya unica explicacion solamente puede hal- 
larse en la triste y dura necesidad de tener que eniplearlos comounicos 
medios de defensa de un piinto cuarteado por todos lados. 

Y conio no lieinos podido dar en el Memorandum Americano con 
razo!;es de mayor solidez (]ue las indicadas entre las que se alegaron 
contra la proi)osicioii espanola, se coiisidera esta Comisi<)n en el deber 
de sostenerla y de no poder conformarse por lo tanto, con la conclusion 
que pone tcrniino al sobredicbo Memorandum Con lo dicbo podria la 
Oomision l^s])arM)la dar por terniinado este trabajo, si no fuera i)or el 
vivo deseo qne la aniina de buscar, i)or su parte, nn-dios que removi- 
endo los obstaculos que lioy existen para llevar ;i cabo la obra de paz 
encoip.endada a estas (Jonferencias, puedan fat-ilitar ;i ambas Comisiones 
el desempeno de una misioii, que no puede menos de estar en perfecta 
armonia coii los sentiniieutosdebumanidad y patriotisnto ({ue por igual 
ciertamente las anima. 

Aceptese la iiiterpretacion que la (^omisiim Americana da a fas chiu- 
sulas o ' y () ' del Protocolo d aci'ptese la que sostiene la Espanola, es, por 
desgracia, evidente (pie surge una situaciiMi que tan solo la buena fe de 
ambas partes puede resolver. Ya porque la Conferencia de Paris no 
tenga atribuciones para ocuparse de la cuesti(ni sobre la soberauia del 
Archipit'lago Filipino, auni[ue solo por el modo y forma con que es pro- 
puesta por la Comision Americana, ya porqne, aunque tales atribuciones 
tenga tiene ta,mbi:'n la natural y legitima libertad de ejercerlas en el 
sentido que la conciencia inspire a sus individuos. es lo cierto que, 
por liallarse dividida por igual la opinion de estos, sobre el asunto, se 
bace imposible la solucidn del misnio. La Comision Americana segu- 
raniente no sostendra que en el caso de contlicto o empate de su voto 
con el de la Espanola deba pi-evalecer el suyo para (jue tenga el caracter 
de acuerdo de la conferencia en pleno. 

Y como los Kstados Unidos no llevan sus pretensiones mas albi que a 
que se les reconozca el dereclio, que, segiin ellos, tienen por el Protocolo 
para pedir la soberania del Arcliipielago, pero no llcf/an basta el extreme 
de decir (pre les asiste tambien el dereclio de exigir a la Conferencia que 
acceda a su petici(')n, imponif'udosela como si fuera un maudato, aparece 
nianifiesta la imposibilidad de qne pueda ser atendida la peticnm del 
Gobierno Americano, y en su consecuencia la de que este pueda adcpiirir 
la soberania del Arcbipiclago por el unico titulo legitimo (]ue atirma y 
reconoce ([ue puede trasmitiisela. 

;, Cuales son las consecuencias de una situacion tan apremiante 6 
inflexible? ;,La ruptura delas negociaciones ? ^^La consiguiente reaper- 
tura (le la guerraf 

^Ilabra (juien no se detenga ante consecuencias tan terribles ? ^^ Habra 
quien entienda (pie no es preferible autes (]ue someterse a ellas acudir 
a cual(|uier otro medio <pie la buena f('' no puede meiu)s de inspirar a las 
partes contratantes ? 

Y ; cu;d es este medio? 

Pudieran nniy bien ambas Comisiones acordar (jue la cuestion rela- 



TEEATY OF PEACE. 173 

tiva a la soberaiiia de las Islas Filipinas quedase separada de sus iiego- 
ciaciones y reservada a las que directameute se eutablaran entre am bos 
Gabiuetes, pudiendo eutretauto contiuuar deliberaudo aqueJlas sobre 
todo lo demas que ha de conteuerse en el Tratado de paz. 

Este medio, a })rimera vista tan sencillo, encierra no obstante graves 
peligros y senaladamente los mismos que jjubierau existir ahora si las 
negociaciones se rompierau, con la sola ventaja de dilata por poco 
tiempo su advenimiento. Si las dos Altas Partes no llegaseu a uu 
acuerdo, la situacion seria igual a la en que hoy se halla la couferencia 
de Paris. 

Para la Comisiou Espanola hay otro medio mas seucillo y mas seguro, 
y consiste en que arabas Comisiones acuerdeu proponer a sus Gobiernos 
que un Arbitro 6 un Tribunal arbitral constituido en la forma en que 
aquellos convengan, flje el recto sentido en que deben ser entendidos 
los Articulos 3° y 0^ del Protocolo de Washington. 

La difereucia de opinion entre ambas Comisiones, descansa principal- 
meute en el diverso sentido que cada una da a aquellos Articulos. 

Asi resulta de sus respectivos Memorandums. 

Pues bien, si en los contlictos de las iiacioues hay 6 puede haberalgo 
que en vez de ser resuelto por la fuerza de las armas, deban los hombres 
de buena vohintad tratar de resolvevlo por la fuerza de la justicia, 6 
siquiera por los dictados de la equidad es i^recisamente aquello que 
consiste en la diversa interpretaciou que haya surgido al tratar de ap- 
licarse un Articulo de cuahjuier Tratado en que anteriormente hubieran 
convenido. 

Podran los Soberauos, i»or uu sentimiento de natural fiereza resi- 
stirse a someter al juicio de un tercero todo aquello que afecta a su honor, 
6 siquiera a su amor proi)io. Podran no <juerer encomendar a un juicio 
semejante la existeucia 6 auu la integridad de sus Estados. Pero no 
se concibe que a la faz del muudo moderno y cristiano prefieran eubrir 
la tierra de cadaveres e inundarla de saugre humana, -A someter su pro- 
pia opinion en asuntos tan expuestos a la falibilidad de la inteligencia 
de los hombres, como no puede meuos de serlo el sentido que quiera 
darse a un mero Articulo de cualquier convencion que sobre materia 
libre y agena a las sagradas causas sobredichas haya podido ser cele- 
brada. 

Los Estados IJnidos, son entre todos los pueblos del raundo civilizado 
los <[ue, para gloria suya, han tomado la iniciativa y han manifestado 
mas decidido empeno en que se acuda a este medio tan huniano, tan 
racional y tan cristiano, antes que al cruento de la guerra, para resolver 
los contlictos entre las Naciones. 

Ya en 1835 el Senado de Massachusetts aprobaba una proposicion, 
IJresentada por la Asociacion Americana de la Paz, preconizando la 
creacion de un Tribunal luteriiacional para resolver amistosa y defini- 
tivamente las diticultades entre los pueblos. 

En 1851 el Comite de Negocios Extrangeros de Washington, por unani- 
midad declaraba que era de desear que los Estados Unidos insertasen 
en sus Tratados una clausula para que diferencias que no pudieran 
resolverse por la via diplomacia fueran sometidas, antes de comenzar 
las hostilidades, a la resolucion de Arbitros. 

En 1853 el Senado aceptaba el voto del Comite de Negocios extrangeros. 
En 1873, otra vez el Senado, y en 1871 las dos Camaras, volvian a con- 
signar esta humauitaria aspiracion. Y en 1888 en fin, no bastandoles 
fijar su propria linea de conducta en tan laudable sentido, ambas 
Camaras acordaban por resolucion conjunta rogar al Presidente, que. 
emplease de tiempo en tiempo su influeucia para comprometer a todos 



174 TREATY OF PEACE. 

los Gobiernos que cou los Estados Uuidos sostuvieran relaciones diplo- 
miiticas, a someter las cuestiones que entre los uuos y los otros pudie- 
raii surgir en el porveiiir a la resolucion de Arbitros. 

El caso que se preseuta en las ooiiferencias de Paris, espera la Co- 
misioii Espafiola <|ue no ha de dar motivo a que los Estados Uuidos, apar- 
taudose de tau gloriosos precedeutes, quieran resolverlo i^or el ultimo 
medio que entre seres raciouales y libres es tristemeute inevitable, 
siquiera uunca sea li'cito, en defecto de otros mas humanos, para cou- 
servar inalterable la paz entre los bombres. 

Esta conform e 

Emilio de Ojeda 



[Translation.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 14. 

The last paper ])resented by the American Commission serves a double 
purpose. On the one baud it is a memorandum in support of its propo- 
sition of tbe 31st of October ultimo, asking for the cession of the Phil- 
ippine Islands to the United States. On the other hand it is a statement 
of the reasons why the American Commission refuses to accept the 
Spanish proposition of the 4th instant, by which it was invited to sub- 
mit a draft haviuj*' for its object the fultilment of the agreements made 
and entered into in Articles III and VI of the Washington Protocol. 

As regards the first point of the American memorandum, to which 
the Spanish Commission will lirst give its attention, a reply to its con- 
tents will be presently given. As regards the other point, the Spanish 
Commission will insist on setting forth in the form of a memorandum, 
as provided by the rules, the grounds upon which its rejected proposition 
is based. 

REPLY TO THE AMKKICAN MEMORANDUM. 

For the sake of systematic exposition, and moved by the desire to 
reduce as much as possible the dimensions of the present paper, the 
Spanish Commissioners feel themselves inclined to deal in the lirst 
place with the mortgage debts of the Spanish colonies, — which in spite 
of its capital importance they would have refrained from discussing 
again at the present stage of the negotiation of the treaty, if, as it 
appears, the American Commission had not raised it anew in the last 
paragraph of its proposition asking for the cession of the Philippine 
Archipelago. 

The Spanish Commission acknowledges the difficulty under which it 
finds itself to answer this part of the American memorandum, — said 
difliculty arising out of the grave errors of fact with which said memo- 
randum is strewed, and of the strange doctrines of law which are 
maintained in it. 

The Spanish Commission needs before all to put on record that in its 
opinion, no language, or even a phrase, im[)roi)er to a diplomatic dis- 
cussion, has been used by it. Jealous of the considerations to which it 
is entitled, it begins by paying leligiously those which are due to 
others, and in its documents it avoids with the greatest care the use of 
any phrase which might be i)ersonally unpleasant to whom it might be 
addressed, and much more, and with still stronger reasons, any word 
which might be deemed offensive to those who are and have the right 



TREATY OF PEACE. 175 

to be under the protectiou of the persons with whom the Spanish Com- 
missioners may have to discuss. 

The American Commissioners say that they noticed with surprise that 
the Spanish Commissioners, after having accepted provisionally the 
articles which the fonner had proposed in regard to (]uba and Forto 
Eico, come now and raise again the question of the Cuban debt, reviving 
a point ichich under certain reiser rations Itad been expreasly abandoned. 
And not contenting themselves with such rotund affirmations, they 
further said that the Spanish Commission in its written answer pre- 
sented at the meeting of the 26th of October, had icithdraivn its for- 
mer observations to the articles of the American Commission. 

So far as the said supposed ivithdrairal is concerned, we invite our 
worthy American colleagues to search with care all the phrases of our 
written answer, and show to us where it can be found. In the mean- 
time, now as always, we are bound to state most positively that our 
document does not contain any such phrases, and that it shows, on the 
contrary, that we had nothing to withdraw, since we continued to main- 
tain our views, subject, however, to what might prove in the future to 
be best for Spain. And, indeed, as a proof of what we have just stated, 
and as sufficient answer to the phrases of the American Commission, 
we shall content ourselves with transcribing here the phrases, wherein 
the supposed provisional acceptance and the express rrithdraicai of the 
subject of the Cuban debt, are said to be found. "The Spanish Com- 
missioners answer the said question (the question which the American 
Commission had propounded to them in writing at the meeting of the 
24th of October) by stating that, reiterating their conviction that pur- 
suant to law the colonial obligations of Cuba and Porto Rico must 
follow these islands and their sovereignty, they do not refuse to consider 
any articles as to Cuba and Porto Itico which contain no provision for the 
assumption of indebtedness by the United, iStates or Cvba or both^^ (these 
were exactly the same words of the question which we answered) 
"subordinating the final approval of such articles to that of the others 
which are to form the complete treaty," etc. And one of the reasons, 
set forth in writing, which induced us to the aforesaid answer, was as 
follows: 

"Considering that this treaty is not to be framed, as no other treaty 
has or ever can be framed, upon the exclusive basis of strict justice, as 
understood by each party, but also upon the basis of the advantage to 
be derived by either or by both, thus modifying in harmony therewith 
the demands of strict law; and that therefore the Spanish Commis- 
sioners although understanding that strict law decides the question of 
the Cuban debt in their favor are in duty bound and are willing to mod- 
erate the said strictness in view of the advantages which Spain may 
derive from other stipulations of the treaty, which without being preju- 
dicial to the United States may be favorable to Spain." 

It seems to be very plain that the supposed abandonment, now sjjoken 
of in the American memorandum, and the supposed acceptance of the 
articles relating to Cuba and Porto Rico, were limited to the contingency 
that the Spanish Commission should understand, from the discussion 
and a]»proval of all the other articles, that advantages enough were 
derived by Spain sufficient to compensate a greater or lesser sacrifice 
of her rights regarding said debts, since if such advantages were not 
derived the Spanish Commission had no necessity to sacrifice anything, 
for which reason, it is clear that it could insist upon the recognition of 
its right. 



176 TREATY OF PEACE. 

This being the case, what have been the arlvautages oiiered to Spain, 
up to tliis moment, in the course of the conferences? 

Since the date of that answer the negotiations for the treaty have 
advanced only one step, and this has consisted in asking Spain, with- 
out alleging any reason in support of this request when made, the 
cession to the United States of the Philipi)ine Archipelago. Does the 
American Commission understand that this cession is an advantage 
for Spain ? The Spanish Commissioners would not be surprised by 
hearing this question answered atilirmatively, as certain phrases of the 
memorandum seem calculated to anticipate. But they do not need to 
say that they do not share that opinion. 

The Spanish Commission would have been, therefore. Justified in 
insisting, not indirectly, but directly and princiijally, u))()n its claims as 
to the transmission of the colonial obligations and debts. It has not 
done this nor does it intend to do so at present; but this has not pre- 
vented nor does it prevent it now from not allowing to pass, without 
contradiction, sup})0sed statements and aftiimations, if only that a day 
may Jiot come wlieu it can be charged with having consented to them, 
because of failure to contradict them, and exi^ressly refusing its assent 
thereto. 

The American Commission affirms that S])ain contracted (it does not 
say that it used tlie debt previtmsly contracted) the greatest part of the 
Cuban debt ''■in an effort, first to conquer the Cuban insurgents, and then 
to ojypose the United States^'', and then discoursing upon the same theme, 
it says, "'that it has not been denied that a part of these loans was 
directly used to wage war against the United States.'' To make such 
statements it is indispensable to suppose that the dates of the creation 
of those debts are not known. One debt was contracted under the 
authority of the Decree of May 10, 1886, that is to say, eight years after 
the re-establishmeut of the peace in Cuba, and nine years before the 
fresh disturbances of the same in that island through suggestions and 
by means which now are known to the world. The second issue was 
authorized by Eoyal Decree of September 137, 1890, that is to say, twelve 
years after Cuba had found herself in a condition of perfect peace, and 
at the pinnacle of her prosperity, and five years before the work of her 
desolation began, through the new rebellion which more or less spon- 
taneously broke out there. And the two Decrees explain also what 
were the reasons why the said issues were authorized, and what were 
the expenses to be met by them, the payment of deficiencies in ])revious 
and subsequent appropriation bills in the island being prominent among 
them. It is well known that these deficiencies were due to the great 
reduction of taxes made in Cuba by the mother country. 

Will it ever be said that Si)ain, through some supernatural gift of 
divination, foresaw in 1880 and 1890, that in 1895 an insurrection was 
again to break out in Cuba, and that in 1898 the United States were to 
lend it their armed protection "? Under no other hypothesis the correct- 
ness of the phrases of the American memorandum relating to this point 
could ever be admitted. 

And so far as the expenses incurred by Spain owing to the war with 
the United States are concerned, without doubt the American Commis- 
sion is unaware of the fact that on the -0th of Ajiril of the present year, 
when the hostilities began, the Spanish Government was still engaged 
in operations of credit, in tlie sha])e of bonds, with the direct guarantee 
of the custom houses of the Peninsula, to the amount of 1,000 millions 
of l^esetas, as decided in 1896 and 18!)7, — and in other operations to the 
amount of 223 millions of pesetas, as authorized on the 2nd of April, 



TREATY OP PEACE. 177 

1898, with the special guarantee of the stamp aud tobacco revenues in 
the Peninsula, as well as the revenue called de consumo in Spain, — aud 
that, in order to meet the exi)euses of the war with the United States, 
a Royal Decree had been issued on the 31st of May in the present year, 
authorizing the creation of a 4 per cent, perpetual domestic debt, to the 
amouut of 1,000 millions of pesetas, out of which 806,78r),000 were imme- 
diately ueuotiated. Upon acquaintance with these facts, it is to be sup- 
jiosed that the American Commission will not be willing to insist upon 
the statement so groundlessly made in its memorandum, as it will tlieii 
understand that tlie expenses of the war with the United States have 
nothing to do with the Cuban colonial mortgage debt. 

The American Commission advocates once more in its memorandum 
the strange theory that the Spanish colonies are not bound to pay the 
debt contracted by the mother country to put down the rebellions 
whether of few, or of many, of their inhabitants. But this time, it 
reaches the extreme of putting such a singular doctrine under the shelter 
of eomnion seme, by affirming that a doctrine to the contrary would be 
a threat to liberty and civilization. 

Ah! if the colonists, and the citizens of the Great Eepublic would 
have alleged, in justihcation of a rebellion, — or should allege in the 
future, in an identical case, an emergency from which that powerful 
nation is certainly not exempted, — a theory of that kind, — would the 
American Government have ever accepted it? Will it ever accept it 
in the future ? — What is condemned not by common, but by moral sense, 
is the attempt to ])ut all rebellion against legitimate authority under 
the shelter of liberty aud civilization. Was Spain, or was she not, the 
legitimate sovereign of Cuba when the first insurrection broke out, and 
during the whole term of the second ? Has anyone ever dared to deny, 
or to doubt even, the sovereignty of Spain over that island at the time 
to which we are now referring? Were not the United States them- 
selves, and their Government, those who day after day urged Spain to 
put down the rebellion, without excluding the use of arms, and reestab- 
lish as promptly as possible the peace in her colony? And if Spain 
complied with such demands, who, the United States included, can deny 
the legitimate character of the expenses which, by virtue of that com- 
I)liance, she necessarily incurred ? 

A doctrine of this nature, which the Spanish Commission, through 
considerations of respect, observed thus far by it, and which it has the 
duty to observe, does not deservedly characterize as it certainly would 
be by all the constituted Powers of the earth, cannot be advocated in 
the face of men, except from the standi)oint that the authority of Spain 
was illegitimate, aud that her sovereignty was only an arbitrary act of 
despotism. And is the crown of Spain characterized in this manner, 
concretely and specifically, for her domination in Cuba prior to the 
•signing of the Washington Protocol? Can this be done above all by 
the very same nation which urged Spain to exercise her sovereign 
authority to conquer those who had risen in arms against her in the 
island? 

Let us pass to another subject, as the present is too delicate to be 
treated with calm and serenity in a diplomatic discussion wherein any 
attempt is made to controvert it. * 

In the memorandum which we are now answering, the singular affir- 
mation is made that the mortgage created by the two issues above 
named can be called more properly a subsidiary guarantee, and that 
the party principally bound to pay is the Spanish nation. U ndoubtedly.. 
T p 12 



178 TREATY OP PEACE. 

the Anieiican Coininission in making- this affirmation liad not before its 
eyes Article II of the Koyal Decree of Msiy 10, 188(), authorizing the 
issue of 1,2-10,000 hypothecary bonds of the Island of Cuba, or the 2nd 
paragrajdi of xirticle II of the Koyal Deciee of September 27, 1890, 
autliorizing- the issue of 1,750,000 hypothecary bonds of tlie same island. 
Both texts read literally the same thing, and it ^vill be sufiticient for us 
to transcribe one of them. Their language is as follows: — "The new 
bonds shall have the direct (esi)ecia]) guarantee of the customs reve- 
nue, stamp revenue of the Island of Cuba, direct and indirect taxes 
now levied or to be levied there in the futuie, and the subsidiary 
(general) gnaranteeof the Spanish nation. They shall be exemi)t from 
all ordinary and extraordiiuiry taxes, etc." 

Xor can the American Commission have seen any of the bonds issued 
under these authorizations, which are scattered everywhere in the 
world, Cuba included, and are owned by third i)arties and private indi- 
viduals; had it seen them it might have read the following: "Direct 
(especial) guarantee of the customs revenue, stamp revenue of the 
Island of Cuba, direct or indirect taxes therein levied or to be levied 



hereafter, and the subsidiary (general) guarantee of the Spanish nation.*' 
"The Spanish Colonial Bank shall receive, in the Island of Cuba, 
through its agents there, or in Barcelona, through the Spanish Bank 
of Havana, the receipts of the custom houses of Cuba, and such 
amount thereof as may be necessary, according to the statements fur- 
nished on the back of the bonds, to meet the quarterly ])ayment of 
interest and principal, shall be retained daily and in advance." 

If after this, the American Commission continues to understand that 
this debt was not contracted as a debt secured by mortgage, and that 
this mortgage was not placed upon the customs revenues and other 
taxes of Cuba, — and further that these- revenues were not pledged 
principally and i)rimarily, and therefore prior to the Peninsular Treas- 
ury, to the payment of interest and principal, we shall have nothing to 
say. We are unable to prove v» hat is self-evident. 

Turning now to the bondholders and to the severity, in our opinion 
unjustified, with which they are treated in the American memorandum, 
we shall say that the duty to defend them does not belong to Spain. 
When they know what is the opinion entertained about them, it is to 
be supi)osed that they Avill defend themselves, for after all they will 
not need any great eftbrt to demonstrate the justice of their cause. 

So far as Spain is concerned, and hei'C the Spanish Commission pro- 
ceeds to answer categorically the questions ])ropounded in the Ameri- 
can memorandum, it is sufficient for her to defend the legitimacy of her 
action and her perfect right to create that debt and the mortgage with 
which it was secured, — ami therefore the strict right vested in her not 
to pay either interest or priuci])al, excei)t upon ])r()of of the insufficiency 
of the mortgaged revenues, out of which they should be ]>rinmrily paid. 
If those who hold those revenues are not willing to comply with the 
obligations to the fulfilment ol which said revenues were pledged, the 
responsibility therefor will belong to them, and not to Spain, who has 
neither the means to coni])el them to com])ly with that duty, nor is bound 
to do for the bondholders anything else than what she has honestly 
done u]) to now. *But Spain, the S{)anisli Commission says again, (and 
this is the only thing that she has textually said, although the Ameri- 
can memorandum set;ms to understand it dilferently,) cannot lend itself 
in this treaty with the United States, nor in any other treaty with any 
other Power, to do or to declare in her name anything which may mean, 
or imply, that she herself has doubts, and nuich less ignores or volun- 



TREATY OF PEACE. l^y 

tarily abridges, so far as she is concerned, tlie mortgage rights of the 
bondholders. She has no efticient means to cause those who may 
become hoklers of the mortgaged revenues to respect those rights. 
Therefore she does not employ them; did she have them, she would 
employ them, if not through strict justice, at least through a moral 
duty, thus following the dictates of probity both i)ublic and private. . 

Tlie Spanish Couiinissiouers believe therefore to have answered cate- 
gorically enough the questions propounded to them in this respect in 
the American memorandum, and this being done they proceed to occui)y 
themselves with the principal point which is dealt with in that memo- 
randum wliich refers to the sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago. 

According to the American memorandum the cession of the archi- 
pelago which is asked from Spain does not rest upon any agreement to 
that effect made in Article Hi of the Protocol, as was the case in regard 
to the Island of Porto Eico in Article II of the same; but ou the fact 
that, according to the American Commission, the matter of the cession 
by ^pain to the United States of America of her sovereignty over those 
islands was included in the number of those relating to the Philippine 
Islands which were left to the free decision of the conference of Paris. 

The Spanish Coujmission maintains that such a jjrave subject, 
undoubtedly the most important of all which it is called upon to dis- 
cuss, far from having been entrusted to the Paris Conference, is shown 
by Article III of the -Protocol to have been left beyond its scope, as 
said Article rests upon the basis that the sovereignty over that archi- 
pelago should continue to be vested in Spain. 

The American Commission tries to find an argument in support of 
its views in the construction that it places upon the language of Article 
111, and also upon the negotiations which preceded the Protocol and 
culminated in its acceptance. 

We shall examine with cold impartiality the reasonings upon which 
this thesis is founded. 

The American Commission says that it is a principle of law that 
"when the result of some negotiations has been embodied in a written 
compact, the terms of such agreement shall settle the rights of the 
parties." 

The Spanish Commission accepts this rule of interpretation of the 
treaties, if it has, as an indispensable condition, the fact that the terms 
of the agreement are clear, precise and of settled and indubitable 
meaning, because it must be understood in that case, that all the differ- 
ences wliich presented themselves during the negotiations between the 
contracting states were set at rest by the clear, precise and explicit 
agreement entered into by them. 

But, is this the case with the subject now discussed by the two Com- 
missions f 

Before answering this question, the Spanish Commission deems it to 
be advisable to transcribe once more the text of Article III of the Pro- 
tocol, literally and faithfully translated from its French original. It 
reads as follows: "The United States shall occupy the city, harbor and 
bay of Manila, ])ending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall 
determine the intervention (controle), disposition and government of 
the Philippine Islands." 

The Spanish Commission does not know whether the American Com- 
mission is, or is not, conversant with the fact that when the Govern- 
ment of Madrid received from the Washington Secretary of State his 
despatch of July 30, setting forth the conditions, upon the acceptance 
of which the United States were disposed to conclude the peace, — the'' 



180 TREATY OF PEACE. 

third of wliich was subsequently trauscribed without any change in the 
Protocol, and forms Article III thereof, -^t sent a telegram to Mr. 
Oanibon, Ambassador of France in Washington, dated August 1, in 
whicli, referring to this point, it literally said the following: "The 
third point in which the form of disposition of the Phili})pine Islands 
is determined seems to this (Government to lack precision. It (the 
Spanish (lovernment) has su])plied the deticiency to be noticed in it, 
on the su5)position that there is no ([uestion in regard to the }>ermanent 
sovereignty of 8i)ain over that archii>elago, and that the temporary 
occui)ation of Manila, its harbor and its bay by the Federal Govern- 
ment shall last only the time which may be necessary for the two 
countries to reach an agreement as to administrative reforms." We 
have this despatch at the disposal of the American Commission, should 
it wish to read it and study it. 

Upon the receipt of this document Mr. Cambon had a conference 
(August 31 with the Fresi<lent of the American Republic, and the por- 
tion thereof which refers to the point now dealt with by the Spanish 
Commission, was couched by the French Ambassador in his despatch 
of the 4th of August in the following langnage: "1 availed myself of 
this declaration to request the President to have the kindness to state 
as precisely as ])ossib)e his intentions in regard to the Philippine 
Islands. On this point, I told him, the answer of the Federal <T0\"ern- 
ment is couclied in terms that may lend themselves to all claims on the 
l)art of the United States, and consequently to all apprehensions of 
Spain in regard to her sovereignty." The President replied to him, as 
will be hereafter explained. But the Si)anish (Tovernment, notwitli- 
standing the language of the President, reiterated in its despatch of 
August 7 the doubts entertained by it about the meaning of Article 
111. Useless reiteration. Neither then, nor before, nor afterwards, 
has the American Government ever consented to give a concrete form 
to the idea involved in the phrase '•'■control, disi)Osition and govern- 
ment" of the Philip|)ine Islands, to be determined by the Paris Com- 
mission. Now, for the first time, it has come to give an explanation. 
In the memorandu)n to which the Spanish Commission is now giving 
an answer, the American Commission has set it forth. It says: "Cer- 
tainly the word control was not used here in the sense of 'register' or 
'inspection ', but in its broader sense of 'authority or command'. What 
word could be broader than 'disposition', which has practically the 
same meaning in both the French and the English languages? We 
have in these two words, then, authority over, dominion of, final and 
ultimate destination of the subject matter. AVhat is government but 
the right of administration, or exercising sovereignty, the direction, 
the ])olitical management of a state? Either of these terms implies 
power of interfering with sovereignty. Taken together, they give the 
fullest scope in dealing with all power, governmental, territorial and 
administrative." 

The explanation, besides being as it appears inopportune by reason 
of its tardiness, seems also to be unsatisfactory. It occurs, at once, 
that if the American Government used those woids in the sense afore- 
said, which it never explained in spite of the re])eated requests nmde 
to it for that purpose, what was the reason why it did not show at that 
time the frankness now displayed by its Commission? Why instead of 
stating that the Paris conference should determine the control, dispo- 
sition and government of the Philii)pine Islands did it not say that said 
conference should decide about the sovereignty over said islands, by 
agreeing or disagreeing as to their cession to the United States, as now 



TREATY OF PEACE. 181 

dem9,nded by the American Commissioners, on the ground that such a 
cession is also embraced in those plirases? Woukl not this have been 
briefer, more explicit and more frank ? 

But, is it possible to accept the construction placed now, out of sea- 
son, by the Atuerican Commissioners u]>on the said phrases ? They say 
that the word •' control" (wn^ro/e in French) cannot be taken in the 
sense of register (investigation or inspection), but in the sense of 
authority or command. And why? Because this is the broadest mean- 
ing of the word in the English language. But the American Commis- 
sioners have failed to notice that the Protocol was also written in 
French, that the Secretary of State at Wasliington aftixed his signature 
to the official copy so written of the instrument, and that the word 
"controle" in French does not mean what is claimed, but only, as also 
in English, investigation or inspection. But how can the American 
Commissioners fail to recognize that when a treaty has been ofticially 
drawn in two or more languages, its words cannot be uiven a sense dif- 
ferent from the one which is common to them in those languages? 

They also state that the word (lisposition nu-ans alienation. We do 
not deny it. although when the term is used in that sense it is always 
in connection with legal business in private civil life, because in French 
the most usual meaning of the word is "distribution according to a cer- 
tain and determineci order.'' 

They affirm that the word govcrvment means the right of administer- 
ing or exercising sovereignty; and although it is true that such a sense 
can be admitted, it is also true that the meaning of "manner of gov- 
erning", or of "form which may be given to the govern n^.ent" cannot be 
rejected. 

But whatever the sense may be in which the said three words were 
used in the third article of the Protocol, even if sufficient information 
could not be fonnd in the record of the negotiation to fix the true sense 
in which thej^ were used, it is impossible not to see, as has been pioved, 
that the said words do not j)ossess in themselves a clear, precivse mean- 
ing, incapable of lending itself to doubts or ambiguities. So it was 
already demonstrated by actiial facts. 

The Spanish Government and its representative in Washington, on 
the very ground that the said words lacked clearness, asked, although 
uselessly, for explanations. And who insisted with real stubbornness 
upon retaining snch obscure phiasesi? It cannot be denied that it was 
the Government of Washington. Let the American Commissioners be 
pleased to read what the immortal Vattel, one of the greatest authori- 
ties on all things referring to international relations, says in his Law of 
Nations, Vol. ill, page l()7. "The doubt must be resolved against the 
one who has given the law in the tieaty, because he is in some manner 
the one who dictated it, and it is his fault if he has not expressed him- 
self with more clearness. By extending or restricting the meaning of 
the words in the sense which is less favorable, no injnry is done to him, 
other than tliat which he was willing to incur. But by making the 
interpretation otherwise the risk woukl be run to convert vague or 
ambiguous terms into bonds to tie up the feebler of the contracting 
parties, who was compelled to receive what the stronger dictated." 

Tlie Spa^nish Commission has just stated that the record of the nego- 
tiations contains sufficient data to fix the true sense of those tliree very 
memorable words. 

The American Commission, on its part, affirms the same thing. Let 
us see, then, to which of the two contradictory constructions, adhered'- 
to by either Commission, must be given preference. 



182 THEATY OF PEACE. 

It is stated in the Auiericaii memorandum as the basis upon wliidi, 
as has already been said, tlie whole reckoiiing thereof is founded, tint 
in Article III of the L'rotocol the point relating to the sovereignty o\er 
the Philii)i)iue Archipelago was left to the free decision of the Paris 
conference to which the framing of the treaty of peace was entrusted. 
But lias tiie American Commission taken into consideration, when mak- 
ing such a grave aftirmation, that the Washington Secretary of State, 
in his despatch of July o(> last, in which he (;ommunieated to the Span- 
ish (iiovernment the three conditions imposed upon the latter by the 
Tnited States, before consenting to reestablish i)eace, and in which 
Article III was, as before said, couched in the same language which 
was afterwards used in the Protocol, provided also for the appointment 
of Commissioners to frame the treaty of peace, and tixed and circum- 
scribed their powers in that respects In that despatch the following 
paragrapii occurs: "If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their 
entirety. Coinmissioners will be named by the United States to meet 
similarly authorized Commissioners on the part of Si)ain for the pur- 
pose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing and, 
(leliveriug it under the terms above indicated." Boes the American 
Commission understand that the unexpected demand of the cession by 
Spain of an immense territory, the area of which exceeds 3()(»,(M)0i 
square kilometres, and whose i»opulation is over 9,0(H>,0()1) of inhabitants, 
is a detail in this treaty of peace? Do they understand that the acqui- 
sition of an archipelago, whose im])ortaiu'e as a factor in the near 
future for the peace of the world is no secret for anyone, can be called 
a detail! 

But let us go to the record, as the American Commission does, and 
search for light as to the meaning of those ambiguous words. 

The American Connnission narrates how the negotiations began. 
We agree witli its narrative u]> to the point relating to the first con- 
ference between Mr. Canibon and the President of the United States. 
The memorandum says that in that conference the President said in 
regard to the P!iilii)pines that the note (the cited note of July oO) 
expressed the ])uri)oses of his (Tovernment, and that tlie final disposi- 
tion to be made of those islands should depend upon the treaty to be 
negotiated by Commissioners. That after a subsequent discussion in 
which the President reiterated that the ti'eaty should determine the 
future of the Piiilippine Islands, Article 111 M'as read in which it was 
stated that the Commissioners should decide about the vontnHe. the 
])(>s.'<esfiio)i and the government of those islands; that Mr. Cambon pro- 
posed the change of the word possession into the word coudition, 
be(;ause he thought the fornier could be cousii'ued by Spain as threat- 
ening and severe: rh.at the President refused to consent to the pr(q)osed 
change, but at last was induced to admit the word (lispositioii in place 
of the word j>ossessi<,n, which, ac('ording to the American Coinmissioners 
(we do not know whethei' on their own personal opinion or on opinion 
expressed by the I'resident) did not change the meaning, and which, 
for having so nuudi amplitude, might also end)iace possession. 

Let us see now how Mv. Cambon relates what hapi)ened in that con- 
iei-euce. In his despatch of the olst of July he said to the Spanish 
Government what follows: 

"The demands formulated in Article III (1 said to the President) are 
apt to endanger in ^ladrid the success of this preliminary negotiation, 
especially if the word possession is retained in conjunction with contnUe 
and f/orernmcnt of the J'Jtilippine Jslonds, as it seems to put in doubt 
from this moment the sovereignty of Si)ain over that colony. You will 



TREATY OF PEACE. 183 

notice, the President of tbe Republic then told me, that my demands 
as set forth in Articles I and II, admit of no discussion; I leave it to 
the negotiators to decide the question of the Philippine Islands. If 
the American forces (let full attention be paid to these phrases) retain 
up to now their respective i)ositions, it is in obedience to a duty imposed 
upon me, in favor of residents and toi'eigners, by the progress * * * 
(Here are some words which could not be translated, but which are 
easily understood to mean the Tagalo insurrectiim.) Seeing that the 
President of the Republic was tiriQ in not changing the terms of 
Article III, I made such an urgent appeal to his generosity as to 
secure his order to use the word disposition instead of j)ossession, as the 
former does not prejudge the result of the negotiation, and has not the 
comi)rehensive meaning which belongs to the other word." 

The American Commissioners will notice, no doubt, that between 
the two relations there are many differences. In their own narration 
nothing is said in regard to the only reason alleged by the President 
not to cause at once the American forces to be withdrawn from the 
archipelago, a reason wliich reveals that the President at that moment 
was very far from thinking that the sovereignty over that territory 
should be asked to be transferred to the United States. According to 
the American narration tlie word disposition was ac(,'epted because it 
contained the meaning of the word possession. But according to Mr. 
Cambon's des})atch the word disposition accepted in place of possession 
changed the com])rehensive meaning of the article. And be the Amer- 
ican Commission or Mr. Canibon right or wrong, the result is that the 
latter accepted the change because he understood that all question 
about the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippine Islands was thereby 
eliminated. 

On Friday the 3rd of August the President held another conference 
with Mr. Cambon. The memorandum reads that the latter stated at 
that time that Spain insisted upon the point that her sovereignty 
should not be interfered with; that the President replied that the dis- 
position of the Philippine Islands should depend upon the treaty to be 
negotiated; and that he conld not make any change in the terms pre- 
viously proposed. 

Let us see now how Mr. Cambon narrates, in his despatch of August 
4 to the Spanish Minister of State, what passed at this interview, 

"Mr. McKinley showed liimself unyielding (regarding the (-ession of 
Porto Rico) and he repeated that the question of the I'hilippines was 
the only one which was not as yet finally settled in liis mind.'' After 
narrating liis insistence with resjiect to the phrases whicli are already 
embodied in this memorandum, Mr. Cambon continues: -'^Ir. McKinley 
answered me: 'I do not want any misunderstanding to remain on this 
subject; the negotiators of the two countries shall be the ones to be 
called ui)on to decide what are to be [note this] the permanent advan- 
tages we shall ask for in the archipelago, and, finally, those to decide 
the intervention {contnlle), disposition and government of the Philip- 
pine Islands. And', he added, 'the Government of Madrid can rest 
assured that up to the i)resent nothing against Spain has been settled 
a priori in my own mind, as I myself consider that nothing is decided 
against the United States'." (Verbatim.) 

Compare one narration with the other. That of the American memo- 
randum confined itself to the statement that the President had said 
that the disposition of the Philijjpine Islands should depend upon the 
treaty, and that he could not make any change in the words. But it^ 
omits the second and most important part of Mr. Cambon's conversa- 



184 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tion as narrated by liim, although it contains information capable of 
removing- all doubt in regard to this question. It is to be noticed, in 
the first place, that while the word sovereignty used in connection with 
the rhilippine Islands is careiully avoided, both in this answer and in 
tlie former one and in the notes of the American (lOvernment, the same 
pains aie taken by the vSpanish Government and by its representative 
in Washington to use the very same words and unceasingly repeat that 
the Spanish sovereignty was not under discussion. Let this remark 
be united to the others already made in regard to the persistent and 
clear although in)])lied refusal to explain the meaning of the words 
above mentioned. 

But in spite of all this, the President said, and the American Com- 
mission does not categorically deny it in its memorandum, that the 
Paris conference should be the only one called upon to decide as to the 
permanent advantages to be asked by the United States in the Philip- 
pine Archipelago, and as to the control, (JiHposition and government of 
the islands. 

The memorandum says that the President did not confine himself to 
speaking of permanent advantages. It is true that the Spanish Com- 
mission has not said, nor does it say now, that he confined himself to 
that point, for he added what has Just been referred to. But what has 
this to do with ignoring the meaning of the words of the President? 
If his mind, already fully made up at that time, was to ask of the con- 
ference not merely one but several i>ermanent advantages to be enjoyed 
by the United States in the archii)ehigo, it is self evident that he did 
not think of asking foi' the sovereignty. Could the latter ever be con- 
sidered as a permanent advantage of the United States in those islands '? 
And even though so singular a hypothesis were upheld, how could the 
plural number used by the I*resident of the United States be properly 
exidained"^ To this observation already made in the preceding paper 
of the Spanish Commission no answer has been given in the American 
memorandum, and the reason is that none can be given which can 
harmoni/e with the purposes it is there attempted to uphold. 

We cannot occupy ourselves with the indications made in the memo- 
randum about the different languages spoken by both interlocutors in 
the aforesaid conferences. Such a circumstance cannot impart any 
prol)ability to the supposition that the President did not express, not 
an incidental idea, but the important and capital statements which 
Mr. CamboTi asserts he heard. If Mr. Cambon did not understand what 
the President said, although, as stated in the Meniorandum, he had at 
his side his own Secretary who understands and speaks the English 
language, nevertheless he cannot be sui)i)osed to have attributed to 
him, without deliberately violating truth, such positive language as 
that recorded in his despatcli. 

Let us pass now to the note of the Spanish Governmentof August 7. 
The American Commission concurs with the Si)anish that in said note 
the Government of Madrid, upon stating that it accepted Article III, 
reserved a priori its sovereignty over the Phili])pine Archipelago; there- 
fore we deem it unnecessary again to transcribe its contents verbatim. 
The only diiference existing between the two Commissions ]i< s in that 
while the Spanish Commission asserts, and reiterates this assertion, 
that in the note of its (Government, on referring to the sovereignty 
therein reserved for Spain, the adjective "entire'' or "whole" was 
emi)loyed, the American Commission says that there is no sucli adjec- 
tive in the English translation of the note which iMr. Cambon delivered 
to the Government of Washington. We have the coj)y, not the trans- 



TllEATY OF PEACE. 185 

lation, as it is called in the Americau menioraiidum, of the original note 
of the Spanish Government, which we i>lace at the disposal of the 
Americau Commission. Therein appears the adjective. If when the 
translation thereof into English was made in Washington it was omit- 
ted, it is a matter with which the American Commission is acquainted, ' 
as it has seen sucli translation ; bnt the Spanish Co)nmission, who never 
had knowledge of it, cannot but be ignorsmt of it. The difference is of 
no importance whatever, sinc-e, leaving the said adjective out of the 
question, the truth is, and the American Commission acknowledges it, 
that the Spanish (loverument reserved therein a jjviorl its sovereignty 
over the l*hilipi»ines, and that it only accei)ted Article 111 with this 
reservation. And if the Spanish Government did not change its mind 
afterwards — and this in fact is not asserted, nor would such an asser- 
tion be possible, in the American memorandum — the result must always 
be tbat the Protocol aud its 3rd Article do not in good law bind the 
Spanish Government save with the exj^ress reservation it made on 
accepting it, and which it did not subsequently withdraw. 

But in the American memorandum, doubtless recognizing the incon- 
trovertible force of the consequence Avhich grew out of the Protocol 
having been signed without the Government of Washington, once 
apprised of such reservation, making anj' objection thereto, it is stated 
that the President of the Union as well as his Secretary of State, on 
hearing the said note read, remarked that it was vague and indefinite, 
purporting to accept the terms of that of the United States, while it 
required some modification, and, as regards the Philippines, while in 
one paragrai)h it stated the acceptance of the article, in another it 
seemed to retain the full right of sovereignty. The argument is skill- 
ful, but unfortunately its accuracy is not as apparent as its skilllhlness. 
It is true that the said gentlemen showed their dissatislaction upon the 
in te being read to them. lA hat is ap]iarently inaccui ate, judging from 
what Mr, Cambon then said, is that the cause of the dissatislaction was 
what was said, not raijucly <nuJ ivdcfiiiildi/. lt(f dearly and explicitly^ in 
the note as to the reservation which Si)ain made of her sovereignty 
over the archipelago. The very American memorandum tianscribed 
the paragraph in interest of the note, and therein this reservation 
apiiears, not vague and uncertain, but cxjiress, clear and explicit. 
The cause for his dissatisfaction at the time given by the President 
was a very different one, which ]\lr. Cambon refers to in the following 
paragraph fiom his desi)atch of August 10. Here it is: 

"Duke: Again has it been at the White House, in the presence of 
Mr. JMcKiuley, and at his exjuess request, that I have communicated 
to the Secretary of State the telegram (the iiote aforesaid) of August 7, 
in which Your Excellency declares that the Government of Spain 
accepts the conditions im]>osed by the United States. This reading 
visibly displeased the President of the Republic and the Secretary of 
State. Alter a long silence Mr. McKinley said to me: '7 Jiad asled of 
iSpain the cession, and consequently the immediate eracnation [we have 
been unable to ascertain when this immediate evacuation was requested] 
of the Islands of Cnhu and Porto Eico. Instead of the catefforical accept- 
ance I exijected, the Spanish Government addresses me a note in ivhicJi it 
involas the necessity of obtaining the approval of the Cortes. I cannot 
lend myself to going into these considerations of an internal nature.^ I 
observed that the Government of Her Majesty in complying with its 
constitutional duties did no more than follow the President upon whom 
like obligations are imposed, and that in his re|)ly of July 30 he had 
expressly reserved the ratification by the Federal Senate." (This is' 
the fact, and so it appears from said despatch of July 30.) 



1S6 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Neither the President nor his Secretary of State advanced any reason 
for their xlispleasnre other than the foregoing, and, according to Mr. 
Canibon, these gentlemen said nothing during the conversation respect- 
ing tiie said reservation made by Spain of her sovereignty over the 
archii)elago, nor regarding anything else whatever save the reservation 
of the Spanish (rovernmeut as to the a})proval of the Coi-tes. 

Thus the ['resident ended by answering Mr. Cambon, who questioned 
liim as to the pledges of sinceritj' Spain might give, as follows: "There 
might be a means of putting an end to all misunderstanding; we might 
draw up a projet which shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain 
in the same terms in which I have already framed them. |u]) to this time 
this was in eft'eet all that had been agreed upon] and u-Jtich sJiaU estab- 
lish ihe terms >cifhi)i ivliich there shall he navieil on the one hand the Pleni- 
potentiaries charged icith negotiatinf/ the treatij of peace in Paris^ and on 
the other the special Gom>nissioners entrusted iciih the deter mi nijig of the 
details for the eracnation of Cuba and Porto liico.''^ (The incorporation 
of this was overlooked in the note of July oO, and this alone would 
have been sufticient to explain tlie change in the framing of the condi- 
tions of i)ea('e.) 

See, then, if there is not an immense difference between what is stated 
in the American memorandum and what Mr. Cambon said to the Span- 
ish (rovernment in his note of August 10, or, immediately after having 
been present at so important a conference, and when, consequently, 
what o 'curred thereat was fresh in his mind. Doing justice to the abso- 
lute truthfulness of the American (Commissioners, their account of that 
conference, tiiree months after ic was held, cannot be preferred by the 
Spanish Commissioners to that ol:" Hon. Mi'. Cambon, who gave his 
immediately after the happening of the event, which he so minutely 
recounted in his despatch. 

It is denied in tlie American memorandum that the Secretary of State 
of Washington stated in his note of August U) to Mr. Cambon, as the 
Spanish Commission had asserted, that the note of the Government of 
Madrid (that of August 7) contained in its s})irit an acceptance by Spain 
of the conditions imposed by the United States, and in this connection 
the said note is inserted literally. 

The Spanish Connnission corrects its former assertion, accommoda- 
ting it to the above. But it is due to it to say that on making the asser- 
tion it referred to the note of Mr. Cambon of August 11, which begins 
with the i)aragraph following: 

Duke: IIjiou trausiuitting to me the draft ol' the Protocol, the text of which I 
have wired Your r^xcelleiicy, the >'ecretary of State addressed me a note which may 
be e])itomized as follows: Althoiifjfh the not-e delivered yesterday at tlie White 
House comeys iii i.s spirit an acceptance by S])aiii of the coiiditioiis jnoposed by 
the I'lutc'd States, in its form it (Iocs not so si)t'cify with sulilicicnt explicitness, 
owiu:;- doiibiless to its havijig- to be triinslated and put in cipher several times. 

These words, which may well be explained without detracting from 
the unquestioned veracity of the Hon. Mr. Cambon, led, as they could 
not but do, the Spanish Commissioners into error. They nobly comply 
with the duty of so admitting. 

But after all the difference is unimportant. Tlie Secretary of State 
(and this certainly does appear from his own letter) raised no objection 
to the Spanish note of August 7, other than that it was not entiiely 
ex]>licit, undoubtedly due to the various transformations which it had 
undergone, lint the fact is that the Secretary of State could not i)os- 
sibly have directed his objection to the paragraph of said note, perfectly 
well translated into English (save the adjective "'entire"), which is 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1<^1 

copied ill tlie American memoraudum, aud wliieh it is said was read to 
the Presideut of the American Union and liis Secretary of State, 
wlierein the Spanish Government clearly, explicitly and coiichisively 
reserves a priori its sovereignty over the Philippines. All the remain- 
ing contents of the note may be little ex])licit, if it is wished so to 
assert, but that reservation was not, surely. Therefore the note to 
which we refer does not contradict the statement we are supporting, 
that the said reservation, of which the Government of Washington was 
opportunely apprised and which appears so clearly in the English 
translation" in its possession, was not by it contradicted, nor did it 
serve as a reason for employing the new form of Protocol as a means of 
solemnizing the agreement upon the bases of peace. This reason 
clearly stands out in the documents already examined which said nego- 
tiations embody. 

In view of the foregoing, it seems to us that whatever may have been 
the real intentions of the" Government of Washington, its acts and its 
written and spoken words do not suffice to overcome the assertion we 
make that Spain accepted the ord article of the Protocol in the sense 
communicated to that Government, and not contradicted by it, that its 
sovereignty over the Philippines was preserved* (reserved) a priori, 
since their control, disposition and government, which were to be deter- 
mined by the Paris conference, referred only to their internal regime. 
Aud this, of itself, would be sufticient to maintain without fear of suc- 
cessful contradicti<m that this conference cannot consider, nor lias it the 
power to consider, the cession asked by the United States, even though 
in the hypothesis to our mind impossible that the proof, drawn from the 
very woids of the President of the Union, which we have attempted to 
furnish and we think we have furnished that in his own mind at that 
time the said sovereignty was beyond all subseipient discussion, should 
be destroycil. 

What is the Spanish Commission to say with respect to the words it 
reads in the American memorandum which seem to seek in a war 
indemnity a ground for their present request; as though this were not' 
excluded from discussion, and it had not been acknowledged by the 
very American Commission that it had been agreed to cover this 
indemnity for the expenses of the war, and not only these but also the 
claims of Ameiican citizens, the majority of which, if not all, natives 
of Cuba, although apparently later naturalized in the United States, 
who had sutfered injuries in the la^t insurrection, by the cession of 
Porto Kico, the other West Indies, and the Island of Guam in the 
Mariana 'I 

Or, is this indemnity to l)e an open account in which it shall be 
proper to ask all that renmins to Spain, im-luding the Peninsula itself"? 

Certainly the limiting of the indemnity to the Island of Guam in the 
East is another indication which proves that the United States did not 
think at the lime of the Philippine Islands. If they did. is it conceiv- 
able that they would then claim, at the outset, a small and insignificant 
island and fail to claim the immense Philippine Empire which was so 
near to it? 

Be it acknowledged, then, that the demand or request for the Philip- 
pine Archipelago which is made for the United States in the form and 



'The Spanish text here is "a ^wiori qiieilaba a salvo la sobeianfa", — iu English 
"the sovereignty was a priori or from the beginning left in safety, or preser%'ed, or 
conserved." In'the foregoing page the Spanish text instead of "queciaba a salvoT 
reads reserva. [Note of translator.] 



188 TREATY OF PEACE. 

under the couditioiis set fortli iu the Americau proposition, hicks 
foundations. Wliile this cession is claimed in such form and under 
such conditions, the Spanish Commission cannot but decline it. 

MKMOUAXDUM I.V SUI'POllT OK TlIK LAST SPANISH PROPOSAL. 

It will be remembered that, in that proposal, the Si)anish Commis- 
sioners asked that the American Commissioners should present another 
adjnstinft- tiie same to the stipulations of Articles IU and VI of the 
Protocol, tluit is, expounding the form of intervention, disposition and 
government which should be established by Spain in the Philippines, 
the return of the city, bay and harbor of Manila, the release of its garri- 
son, now held as prisoners, the refunding of the public moneys, revenues 
and imposts which might have been collected up to the time when the 
city might be delivered, and the undertaking or say the acknowledg- 
ment on the part of the United States of the obligation to indemnify 
Spain for the detention of the trooi)S that garrisoned the city when it 
surrendered on the 14th of August last. 

The American Commission has rejected that i)roposal because in its 
judgment the aforesaid Articles III and VI of the Protocol do not 
demand that it be presented. 

\Vith respect to the first part which refers to the intervention, disi^o- 
sitiou and government of the archipelago, all attempt to demonstrate 
here that Article III is not in accordance with the American proposal 
which, instead of addressing itself to the internal regime of these 
islands, asks their cession to the Cnited States, would be a mere repe- 
tition of the statements set forth by the Spanish Commission in the 
preceding part of this i>aper. 

It is believed that its arguments show with the clearness of noon-day 

that the cession of those islands which is in every respect foreign to 

the provisions in the Washington agreement is one thing, and that the 

internal regime of the said islands, which under the albresaid Article 

.III may and n)ust be a matter for the treaty of peace, is another. 

Tiie Si)anish Commissioners would then be remiss in their own con- 
victions if they did not persist in requesting the America'.i Commission 
to piesent a proposal concerning said regime in which the ord Article 
of the said agrement will remain unbroken, not only in its meaning 
but also in its intent. 

In the lirst ])aragraph of the proi)Osal with especial reference to the 
cai)ture of Manila the immediate return to Spain of the city, its bay 
ami harbor is demanded. 

Byway of rectifying here one of the misapprehensions of fact that 
abound in the American memorandum, we have to put it on record that 
the Sjjanish i^rojjosal did not demand that immediate return, nor the 
immediate execution of anything set forth in the following paragraphs 
of the proposition, which contain nothing to be instantly done. The 
immediate delivery was, as it could not otherwise be, to be effected upon 
the conclusion of the treaty of peace. So conclusive is the proof that 
the Spanish Commissioners were bound to suppose that they should 
n(;ver be called upon to make this rectification. The lirst paragraph of 
the aforesaid proposal reads as follows: "The Spanish Commissioners 
therefore in accdrdance with the ex])ress stipulations of the Protocol 
understand that the treaty of i)eace nuist i^rovide for, lirst tiie delivery, 
etc." If this was to be agreed upon in the treaty of i)eace, how can it 
be supposed that the Si)anish Commission should ask that the delivery 
be elfected before it was agreed on? 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1S9 

We shall now clear this menioraiidiiiii of difficulties by making two 
rectifications of a personal character before taking np the discussion 
of the point bearing on the surrender and ca])itnIation of Manila and 
their coiisecjuences. There is not in the Spanish menioraiiduin to which 
the last American memoraiiduni is a reply, a single sentence that 
assails or wounds the respectability of General Merritt and Admiral 
Dewey. The American memorandum would intimate tliat the idea is 
suggested with more or less ability in the Spanish memorandum that 
the military commanders of the Union conquered the city of Manila 
by the force of arms on the 13th of August when they already knew 
that the suspension of hostilities had been agreed on. Tliis is an error. 
The Spanish Commission did not use, is not in the habit of using, cun- 
ning of any kind to conceal its sentiments. If it had believed that 
these generals had broken the armistice after receiving notice of its 
conclusion, it would have said so openly. By so doing it would not 
have been lacking in the regard which these commanders deserve, in 
the same way as it occurred to no one in 1871 that it was a lacking of 
the regard due to the German General de Manteuttel to charge him 
with the oifence which he committed when, after a partial armistice 
between the French and German forces had been signed, lie availed 
himself of the mistake made by General Gliuchant upon the extension 
of the said armistice, and surrendered the army corps under his com- 
mand and comi)elled it to take refuge in Switzerland. We have said 
nothing, we have nothing to say against the personal behavior of these 
two commanders. On the contrary we can state a fact that redounds 
to tlie credit of the line sentiments of the Admiral. On the 1st of 
May, he sent to the Governor General of Manila from the Olympia, 
perhaps under the intoxicating influence of victory, a communication 
which read as follows: "If all the vessels, torpedo-boats and warships 
under the Spanish flag do not surrender immediately, Manila will be 
destroyed." 

We presume that this communication will have no place in the chap- 
ter of history in which are recorded the services rendered to the cause 
of humanity of which there is so much ostentation in these days. But 
we take pleasure in acknowledging that the author of this draconiau 
order, refrained, in the spontaneousness of his kind feelings, from carry- 
ing it out, although he might have had the power to attempt it. 

This cannot prevent us from not carrying the favorable opinion to 
which the honorable commanders are personally entitled to the i)oint 
of considering ourselves obliged to them for their deliberately ])ostpon- 
ing the surrender of the city until the 13th of August for tlie purpose 
of "protecting the city and the Spanish residents against the awful 
vengeance of the insurgents''. This purpose does not seem compre- 
hensible; in the early days of May the insurgents were not yet besieg- 
ing from the land side the city, which was only blockaded from tlie bay 
by the American fleet. They began afterwards and not with the same 
numbers of forces from the outset, since these were increased little by 
little, until they made up the masses of insurgents who were in front 
of the trenches of defence on the day of the surrender. So that if the 
American commanders had not taken possession of the city until then 
for the reason above mentioned, they should much less have done so 
thereafter. But besides this, it is demonstrated by the fact that such 
a danger did not exist, for it could at all times have been avoided by 
the American forces which upon the surrender of Manila should have 
landed in and garrisoned the city, in the same way as it was avoided • 
after the 14th of August, in spite of the fact that as above stated the 



1!)0 TREATY OF PEACE. 

iusiirgeuts in arms who prevailed outside of the city were iu larger 
miuibers. 

It may tUius be seen liow it is ao sin of inl?ratitude to fail in recog- 
nizing that supposed service at the hands of the aforesaid commanders, 
without this being in any way a iiiudrauce to the favorable opinion to 
which their personal behavior entitled them. 

On the other hand, the American memorandum in its reference to the 
unexi>ected surrender and the exit from Manila of the general in com- 
niaiul of the Spanish troops on the evening before the surrender, uses 
a word altogether irreconcilable with the honor of a soldier. Whatever 
may have been the conduct of that commander, he is under the protec- 
tion of the law and tribunals of his country, which will look into his 
actions for the puri)(>se of approval or disapproval as the case may 
rciiuirc; but he is not at the mercy of anyone else and, above all, of 
opinions of an official character that would be delivered abroad and by 
foreigners. 

We have laid down in the second i)art of this memorandum that in 
the so often cited ;5rd article of the Protocol the o;'cupation by the 
forces of the United States of the city, harbor and bay of Manila until 
the conclusion of the treaty of peace had been agreed upon merely by 
way of a guaranty. It is therein demonstrated that the Government of 
Madrid accei)ted this o .cupatiou in that sense, without express con- 
tradiction on the part of the (.Tovernment of Washington. 

It seems that in the American memorandum it is endeavored to 
inject the idea that such occupation should likewise have the character 
of an indemnity for the expenses of the war, based on the fact that in 
the note of July 30, in which the Secretary of State communicated to 
the Spanish Government the three conditions upon which peace could 
be restored, after saying in the second that by way of such indemnity 
Spain must cede Porto Rico, the other West Indies and the Island of 
Guam, the 3rd article began with the words: '' On similar grounds the 
United States is entitled to occupy the city of Manila, etc.'' At first 
sight the argument is not wanting in force; but the American Commis- 
sioners know perfectly well that this is only apparent, and that what 
did occur proves absolutely the contrary. Although the Spanish Gov- 
ernment in its note of August 7 and its representative in the confer 
ences with the President of the Republic, stated and insisted that the 
occupation of Manila was to have no character other than that of a 
mere guaranty, the said words are suppressed in the Protocol. So that 
the latter failed to exi)ress any connection between the future occupa- 
tion of said place and the payment of the war indemnity, and moreover 
it failed to state that the United States werealready entitled to occupy 
it. Doubtless, for this reason, the idea is oidy hinted at, but not devel- 
oped, nor categorically asserted in the American memorandum. 

The Spanish Coiumissioners acknowledge having been agreeably 
surprised on noticing that in this document the American Commis- 
sioners do not allege, as had been alleged by the American Govern- 
ment on replying to the note of the Spanish Government of September 
7 last, the peremptory reason that the snsi)ension of hostilities, accord- 
ing to the<)th Aiticle of the Protocol, ought not to go into ettect imme- 
diately upon the concluding and signing of this instrument, but after 
notice thereof to the commanders of the hostile forces, an alk^gation 
which was made notwithstanding the fact that a point of such impor- 
tance had been expounded, reasoned and demonstrated with all care in 
the S'panish document to which that reply was given. This action of 
the American Connnissioners proves their sound judgment and learn- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 191 

ing- ill the premises, because it is equivalent to an implied recognition 
of the validity of the Spanish view on the subject, which, after all, is 
elementary and which as a current doctrine has never been attacked 
by anyone. 

Nevertheless they endeavor, upon arguments analogous to those set 
forth in the said reply of the Government of the United States to the 
note of the Government of Madrid, of September 7 last, to invalidate 
the Spanish claim as to the (japitulation of Manila, for being tardily 
made. The Spanish Commissioners are unable to see the force of this 
argument. The Government of Madrid formulated this claim with 
every solemnity in ihe said note, or in other words, twenty-three days 
after the cajntiilation of Manila. What laws or practice justify hold- 
ing a claim of this kind as forfeited, when not presented before the 
twenty-third day subsequent to the act giving rise to it'? 

Entering into the held of the intentions of the Spanish Government, 
it is stated further that the latter supposed that tlie above act of war 
had been perfectly correct, when a few days later it requested of the 
American Government permission to transport provisions to the Philip- 
pines and reestablish its regular mail service. When this occurred, the 
Spanish Government was still ignorant of the events whicli had taken 
place on the 14th of that month in Manila. The American Commission 
also leaves it to be understood that this is so. Bat even if the Spanish 
Government had been cognizant of those events, what jxrmisf^lon is that 
which it is supposed the Spanish Government requested! What hap- 
pened was only what could not fail to occur between Governments 
which, although enemies, observe at all times the duties which upright- 
ness imposes upon all. 

The status ([uo growing out of the suspension of hostilities prohibited 
each of the belligerents from improving his situation to the prejudice 
of the other while such status lasted. The Spanish Government, like 
any other which does not wish to fail in its said duties, was bound to 
communicate to the American Government, acting in concert with it, 
the reestablishment of the service which existed prior to the war. The 
Government of Washington acted in the same way when on August 16 
it requested the consent of the Government of Madrid to reestablish 
the telegra])hic service between Manila and Hong Kong. 

Let it be acknowledged then that the claim of the Spanish Govern- 
ment was lodged in time, and that even if it had not been then pre- 
sented, its Commission was authorized to make it now, since it is 
empowered to ask for everything that shall lead to a faithful and strict 
carrying out of the convention of Washington. 

It is therefore settled, since it has not been contradicted in the Amer- 
ican memorandum to which this is a reply, that the suspension of hos- 
tilities agreed ui)on in the Oth Article of the Protocol went into legal 
effect immediately after the latter was signed on the alternoon of August 
1-5 of this year. And let it be borne in mind that "if there is one rule 
of the law of war more clear and peremptory than another, it is that 
compacts between enemies, such as truces and capitulations, shall be 
faithfully adhered to, and their non observance is denounced as being 
manifestly at variance with the true interest and duty, not only of the 
immediate parties, but of all mankind". The American Commissioners 
will not repudiate these words as they are those of their learned coun- 
tryman, the eminent Wharton, in his Digest of international Law, 
made up of passages taken from Presidents, Secretaries of State, deci- 
sions of Federal Courts, and opinions of Attorneys General. 

Have the provisions of the Oth Article of the Protocol been observed 



192 TREATY OF PEACE. 

with this scrupuJousuess? Ou the 13th day of August the city of 
Miiuihi was bDinhavded aud ou the 14th it sttrreudered. 

The Si)auissh Comiuissioueis have uo reasou whatever for assertiug 
that tlie Commanders of the Americau forces kuew that the hostilities 
were suspeuded. lUit it is a fact that the said hostile act was executed 
after this suspeusiou. 

Aud iu this comiectiou the Spauish Oommissiouers have to ('0m[)lete 
the short history recounted iu the American memorandum, regarding 
the reestablishing of the Manila cable. It is stated therein that it 
was tlie Government of Washington which, ou August 10, through a 
note to the Ambassador of France, requested the consent of the 8[>an- 
ish Crovernment to the reestabiishment of telegraphic communication 
between that place aud Hong Kong. This is true, but so also is what 
is about to be related. The Americau Admiral had cut the said cable 
at the beginning of the campaign. After several frnitless efforts of the 
tSi)anish Director General of Posts aud Telegraphs with theconcessiou- 
ary company looking to the reestabiishment of its service, on July 9 last 
the said Director insisted on the reestabiishment, agreeing on the part 
of kSpain to the absolute neutrality of the service. Thecomi)any brought 
this ])ropi)sal to the notice of the Ambassador of the United States in 
London, iu order also to obtain his consent. But tlie latter on the 1.6th 
of the same month replied that his Government preferred that it reuuiin 
cat. It results from this that if there was no direct comnuinication 
with Manila, via Hong Kong, ou August 12, when the Protocol was 
signed, it was due to the Government of Washington, which one month 
before had opposed its reestabiishment. This is another reason, were 
it necessary (which it is not) to prove that the ignorau(;e of the Ameri- 
can commanders, when attacking the place ou August 13, of the sus- 
pension of hostilities, not only cannot serve as a reason for the United 
States to profit !)y the act of war then executed in violation of what 
their Government had agreed to the i)revious day, but fnrnishes a 
ground upon which to base a claim for the unjustified damage the said 
act indicted upon tlie other belligerent party. 

All the argnments set forth in the Americau memorandum as to the 
legal character it is there endeavored to give to the surrender and 
capitulation of Manila and to the acts siiice then executed in the city 
and even outside of it, by the commaiiders of the military forces of the 
Union, may be reduced to the following attirmations: 

First. The legal chara<'tcr of the said capitulation is the same as 
that which would correspond to the peaceful surrender of the place, 
pursuant to the stii)ulations of Articde III of the Protocol; and there- 
fore the rights which the belligerent party has in the place he occupies 
as a guaranty are the same as he would have if he occupied it through 
an act of conquest in an act of war; and 

Second. The occupation of Manila, its harbor and bay, stipulated iu 
Article III of the Protocol, was a military occupation. 

The S])anish Commission would never have believed that it would 
have to correct such grave errors, had it not seen them written iu the 
American memorandum. 

It is elementary on the subject that the occupation of a place or of 
a territory, agreed upon by belligerent ])arties that it may serve as a 
guaranty for the stii)ulations of a treaty, or the x)erlormanceof an obli- 
gation resting on the party possessing the sovereignty over the place 
or territory occupied, has not and cannot have anj^ title other than that 
in the (convention in which it is stipulated. Put the title to occupation 
by main force of a place or territory which surrenders through an act 



TREATY OF PEACE. 193 

of war, has a special name, which is capitulation. And to so denomi- 
nate what was agreed on in the Protocol in order thereby to bring- under 
its terms the illegal capitulation of Manila after the signing of that 
instrument, is an error into which no one up to this time has ofiicially 
or scientifically ftillen, and which neither the technical nor ordinary 
meaning of the word Gapitulation. would admit. The ])eaceful occupa- 
tion as a guaranty conveys no more right to the occupying party than 
of establishing the garrisons or maintaining tlie military forces he may 
deem necessary, in the place or territory, to retain it in his possession, 
until the performance of the principal obligation of which the occupa- 
tion is the guaranty. It is natural that the provisioning of the army 
of occupation should be at the expense of the sovereign of the territory 
occupied. But although this provisioning is a natural condition, it is 
not essential to the convention. Therefore in the most prominent cases 
which have arisen of occupation of this kind the occupying part}^ took 
good care expressly to stipulate the obligation to provision. Well 
known are the cases of occupation by way of guaranty of several depart- 
ments of France which occurred in 1815 and in 1871, the former at the 
end of the wars of the Empire and the latter at the conclusion of the 
Franco-Prussian war. There it was expressly stipulated that the main- 
tenance of the army of occupation should be at the expense of the 
French Grovernment. This was not done in Article III of the Protocol 
of Washington. 

All the other rights of sovereignty, signally the collection of reve- 
nues and public taxes, continue in the peaceful possession of the sov- 
ereign of the territory occupied. The party occupant must religiously 
respect such rights. The legitimacy of his acts does not extend 
beyond what may be necessary to meet the ends of the occupation. 

From these elementary principles, which for the present case do not 
aeed to be enlarged upon, it results that the United States, i)ursuant 
to the stipulations of Article III of the Protocol, has no further right 
than to retain in its possession until the conclusion of the treaty of 
peace the city, harbor and bay of Manila as a guaranty of the engage- 
ments of said Protocol, and, therefore, no more than the right to gar- 
rison the said city, bay and harbor with the necessary forces of its 
army and navy, but respecting the exercise of the sovereignty of Spain 
Dver the same in everything else compatible with this right to garrison, 
fv^hich is the proper designation of a guaranty occupation. 

But the occui)ation of a city or territory through an act of war gives 
Fuller rights to the belligerent who has taken forcible possession of one 
3r the other. He does not acquire it is true, through con(iuest, the right 
)f sovereignty over the conquered territory, but he does acquire the 
Dossession and temporary exercise of this sovereignty. While the occu- 
aation lasts the prerogatives of the sovereign, political, financial, and 
)ven executive, may be exercised by the occupant, but always with the 
noderation required by the respect due the rights of the pacific inhabit- 
ints, since nowadays war is not waged between the peoples but between 
:he armed forces of the belligerent states. 

What goes before suffices to bring out the capital difference which 
jrecludes anyone from confounding the peaceful guaranty occupation 
vith the belligerent occupation or conquest. On what ground does the 
Jnited States persist after the 14th of August in occupying the city, 
larhor and hay of Manila? On the ground of belligerent occupation, 
laving taken the city by force after the Protocol was signed. On what 
ground has the United States the exclusive right to occupy that city, 
T P 13 



194 TREATY OF PEACE. j 

bay and harbor? On the ground of a peaceful guaranty occupation, [ 
and nothing more than this, pursuant to tire stipulations of Article III! 
of the said (•oini)act. How, tlien, can it be asserted that the character; 
of such oc(n])ati()n is immaterial in this case'^ j 

It is neeiUess to lay further stress upon one of the most elementary, 
points in the matter of the international law of war. 

The second error that is displayed in the American memorandumji 
consists in sn])posing that the<)c<!Ui)ation agreed to in the Protocol was 
a militdri/ one. Those who uiulerstand this expression in the sense of 
occupation with military lorces there can have no doubt whatever in 
ai)plying the same denomination to these two kinds of occupation, 
although they are so diHerent. But for those who, using the technical 
term sanctioned by science and by the treaties, call >,i/////Yfn/ occupation 
only that which is belligerent, or effected by force, the occupation! 
agreed to in the Protocol cannot be termed a military one. 

It is therefore useless to endeavor to brina under a common denomi-i 
nation acts which are essentially different and whose lawful conse- 
quences have never been conlbnnded. The occupation of the city, bay 
and harbor of Manila granted to the United States by the Washingtoni 
agreement, is not a military or belligerent occupation, from which cam 
lawfullv be derived the rights and faculties which are inherent therein.i 

It cannot be doubted that the commanders of the American forces ini 
the Philippines fell into the same error as the memorandum. One cam 
understand that once in possession of the place and while they had no 
notice of the suspen'sion of hostilities they should have commenced to 
exercise all the rights and privileges of a military or belligerent occu- 
pant. But the American memorandum admits that on the l(5th ol 
August these commanders were advised of the stipulated suspension oi 
hostilities. Notwithstanding this, they (;ontinued to exercise these 
rights and privileges, which they <lid not ])0ssess, and which they 
ought to have known they did not possess. On that date the machin- 
ery of Spanish administration was still in operation. It was on the 
16th of August that the American forces began to take possessioD 
vuniK viilifari of that machinery, of the pubbc moneys, revenues and 
imposts, and also to hold as prisoners the Spanish troops that had 
surrendered on the 14th. 

We believe it unnecessary to insist any longer upon the refutation 
of errors of such gravity and importance, for which a single explana- 
tion can be found only in the sad and dire necessity of using them 
as the only means of defence on a point which is battered from al] 
quarters. 

And as we have been unable to come across any argument in the 
American memorandum more substantial than those referred to, amon^ 
those that were advanced against the Spanish proposal, this Commis^ 
sion considers it its duty to support it and set forth that it cannot com 
cur in the conclusion with whicli the memorandum closes. 

The Spanisli Commission might here put an end to this paper, wew. 
it not for the earnest desire with which it is animated of seeking on itt 
part some means of removing the obstacles which are now standing ii 
the way of the Avork of peace entrusted to these conferences, and os 
facilitating to both Omimissions the fnllilment of a charge which cam 
not but be in perfect harmony with the sentiments of hunmnity and 
patriotism which surelv inspire them both in the same degree. 

Whether the interpretation of Articles 111 and VI of the Protocol 
given by the American Commission, or as insisted upon by the Spanisli 
Commission, is accepted, the fact remains unfortunately that a situation 



all 



TREATY OP PEACE. 195 

is created which can be settled only by the good faith of both parties. 
Be it because the conference of Paris has no powers to consider the 
question concerning- the sovereignty over the Pliilippine Archipelago, in 
the mariner and form proposed by the American Commission ; be it 
because, even though it had such powers, it also would have to enjoy 
the natural and legitimate freedom of exercising them in the sense dic- 
tated by their conscience to the members thereof, — the real ffict is Ihat 
as the opinion of the Joint Commission is equally divided on tlie sub- 
ject, the solution of the difiiculty becomes impossible. 

The American Commission will surely not contend that in the event 
of conflict, or ticking of its vote with that ol" the Spanish Commission, 
Itheirs should jirevail and be given the character of a decision of the 
Joint Commission. 

And inasmucii as the United States do not claim anything more than 
a recognition of the right which, according to them, they have under 
the Protocol to a.fik the sovereignty ovei- the archipelago, but do not go 
to the extreme of saying that they also have the right to deuiand of the 
confei'ence that their petition be acceded to, and force the same npon 
it as if it were an order, tlse impossibility of the petition of tlie Amer- 
ican Government being complied with, and consequently of the sov- 
ereignty over the archipelago being secured by it tlnough the only 
lawful title winch it professes and acknowledges as the only mode of 
[transfer, becomes manifest. 

What are the consequences of so harassing and unyielding a situa- 
tion f The rapture of negotiations? The consequent renewal of 
hostilities '? 

Is there anyone who will not halt in the presence of such terrible 
consequences? Is there anyone who will entertain the idea that it is 
not better before submitting to them to resort to some other means that 
good faith cannot fail to suggest to the Contracting Parties? 

And what is that means? 

Both Commissions might very well agree to leave the question relat- 
ing to the sovereignty over the Philippine Islands out of their own 
negotiations and reserve it for direct negotiations to be opened between 
the two Crovernnients, and continue in the meanwhile their discussion 
of all the othei' i)oints to be embodied in the treaty of ]>eace. This 
method, whicdi at hrst sight appears so simi)le, is nevertheless fraught 
with serious dangers, and signally those which might exist now were 
the negotiations broken off, with the only advantage of putting the 
dangers off for a short while. Should the two High Parties fail to 
agree, the situation would be the same as that which now confronts the 
'Paris conference. 

In the opinion of the Spanish Commission, there is another means 
more simple still and surer, which consists in an agreement by the two 
Commissions to propose to their Governments that an arbitrator or an 
arbitration tribunal, constituted in the manner by them agreed upon, 
shall determine the true sense in which Articles III and VI of the 
Protocol of Washington should be taken. 

The difference of opinion between the two Commissions lies princi- 
f)ally in the different sense each gives to those articles. 

Tins appears from their respective memoranda. 

Now, it seems that if ever in international conflicts there is, or may 
be, anything which men of good will should endeavor to settle by the 
force of justice, or even by the dictates of equity, instead of force of 
arms, it is that which consists in a difference of interpretation of an 
article of any treaty j)reviousIy agreed upon, arising out of the attempt 
bo put it into execution. 



196 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Sovereigus may, tbrongb a feeling of natural pride, refuse to submit 
to tbe judgUHMit of a tliiid that wbicb atfects tbeir lionor or even tbeir^ 
(imtiiir propre. They may not wish to entrust to such a Judgment the 
existence or even the integrity of their states. But it is inconceivable 
that in the face of the modern and Christian world they should prefer 
covering tbe earth witb corpses and deluging it with human blood, to 
sul)niitting to it their own oi)inion, in matters so exposed to the falli- 
bility of the mind of men, such as cannot fail to be the projier sense to 
be given to an article of a convention, concluded upon matters which 
are alien and foreign to the above sacred subjects. 

The United States are among the peoples of the civilized world those 
which, to their glory, have taken the initiative and have shown the 
most decided interest in resorting to this means so humane, so rational, 
and so Christian, rather than to the bloody one of war, to settle con- 
troversies between nations. 

As tiir back as 1835 the Senate of Massachusetts approved a measure 
presented by the American l*eace Association urging the creation oi 
an international court to settle amicably and linally all difficulties^ 
between countries. 

In 1851 the Committee on Foreign llelations of Washington [sic) 
unanimously declared that it was desirable for the United States to 
insert in its treaties a clause whereby differences which could not be 
settled diplomatically should be submitted before the outbreak of hos- 
tilities to the judgment of arbitrators. 

In 1853 the Senate apj)roved the report of the Connnittee on Foreign 
Eelations. In 1873 the Senate again, and in 1874 the two Houses, reaf- 
firmed this humanitarian aspiration. And, finally, in 1888, not satisfied 
with having marked out their own line of conduct in so laudable a 
direction, both Houses agreed by Joint Iiesolution to request the Pres- 
ident to use his influence from time to time to bind all governments 
maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States to submit all 
questions that might arise between them in the future to the judgment 
of arbitrators. 

The Spanish Commissioners hope that the case which presents itseli 
before the Paris Conference will not lead the United States to depart 
from such glorious precedents, and seek to settle the matter by the last 
means which although never lawful among rational and free beings is 
sadly inevitable, in preference to other means more humane, conducive 
to i)reserve unalterable peace among men. 

True copy: 

Emilto de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 15. Protocolo No. 15. 

Conference of November 21, 1898. Conferencia del 21 de Noviemhre 

de 1898. 

The session having been post- Habiendose aplazado la sesion k 
poned, at the request of the peticion de los Comisarios Amerin 



American Commissioners, till Mon- canos hasta el Lunes 21 del corri 

day the 21st of November, on that ente a las 2 p. m. se hallaron eo 

day there were dichos dia y bora. 

Present: On the i)art of the Presentes Por parte de los- 

United States: Messrs. Day, Davis, Estados Unidos de America, los 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



197 



Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergus- 
sou. 

Ou the part of Spaiu: Messrs. 
Moutero llios, Abarzuza, Garuica, 
Villa-Uri'utia, Cerero, OJecla. 

The protocol of the precediug 
sessiou was read aud approved. 

The Presideut of the American 
Commissiou preseuted a reply to 
the Memoraudum presented by the 
Spanish Commissioners at the last 
session on the subject of the Philip- 
pines. In so doing, he called atten- 
tion to the concluding part of the 
reply, and suggested tliat it be read. 
But, before it was read, he stated 
that he desired to say that the 
American Commissioners had care 
fully examined the very able argu- 
ment of the Spanisli Commission- 
ers, but had felt obliged to adhere 
:o their construction of the i)0wei'S 
Df the Joint Commission under the 
Protocol. The Joint Commission 
had been in session for several 
weeks, aud it was the opinion of 
the American Commissioners that 
a conclusion should be reached. 
They had consulted their Govern- 
ment and had decided to make con- 
cessions, which were embodied in 
the concluding part of their reply, 
which was intended to bring the 
discussioji immediately to a close. 



The concluding part of the reply 
3f the American Commissioners 
was then read by their Interpreter 
the Spanish Commissioners. 

The President of the Spanish 
commission, alter the close of the 
eading, stated that if the memo- 
audum of the American Commis 
doners contained nothing more 
;han what had just been read, he 
ould give an immediate answer j 
)ut, as it was necessary to trans- 
ate and to become acquainted with 
he preceding part, some time 
rould be needed in which to pre- 
>are a reply. He then j^ioposed 
hat the Commissioners meet on 
'Vednesday the 23rd instant, uu- 
ess something should arise to re- 
hire a postponement. 



Sehores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Keid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espaha, los Seiiores 
Montero lli'os, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero Ojeda. 

Fu<^ leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesibu anterior. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana preseuto una coutesta- 
cion al Memoradum presentado por 
los Comisarios Espanoles en la rilti- 
ma sesion relativo ;i las Filipinas. 

Al haccrlo asi' llamo la aten- 
cioM sobre la larte final de su con- 
testaciou y manifesto su deseo de 
que se diera lectura de ella. Pero 
antes de (lue fuera leida, dijo que 
deseaba hacer constar que los 
Comisarios Americanos habian con- 
siderado atentamente los argu- 
mentos habilisimos de los Comisa- 
rios Espanoles; pero que se veian 
obligados a adherirse a su inter- 
pretacion de las facultades de la 
Comision en pleno segun los ter- 
minos del protocolo, Dicha Comi- 
sion habia ]irolongado sus labores 
durante varias semanas, y en vista 
de esto los Comisarios Americanos 
opinaban que debia llegarse a un 
resultado final. Habian consnl- 
tado a su ( ! obicrno y decidido hacer 
las concesiones que estaban con- 
signadas al final de su contestacichi, 
y cuyo objeto era el determinar de 
una vez la discusiou. 

La ultinia parte de dicha contes- 
taciim fuc vertida verbalmente al 
Castellano i)or el Intcrprete de la 
Comision Anjericana. 

El Presidente de la Comisiou 
Espanola nmnifiestaque si el Memo- 
randum de los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos no contuviese otra cosa que 
lo que acababa de leerse podria dar 
una contestaciou inmediata; pero 
que como habia que traducir y en- 
terarse de lo que precedia a su parte 
ultima, se necesitaria algiin tiempo 
para dar una respuesta. Propuso 
en seguida que las Comisiones se 
reuuiesen el Miercoles 23, a menos 
que surja algun incidente que exija 
uu aplazamiento. 



198 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The Americiin Commissioners Asieuten los Comisarios Ameri- 

concurring, it was agreed to ad- canos y se aciierda (jue se levaute 

Jourii the coufereiife to the L*3id of la sesioii hasta el Miircoles I'o de 

November, without prejudice to the Noviembre a las U p. m, sin perju- 

right of the Spanish Commissioners icio del derecho de aplazarla que 

to ask for a postponement. assiste a los Comisarios Espanoles. 

William R. Day E. Moktero Ki'os 

CusHMAN K. Davis B. de Abarzuza 

Wm V Fr\e J. DE Garnica 

Geo. Gray W R de Villa Urrutia 

Whitelaw Reid. Rafael Cerero 

John B. Moore. Emilio de G.teda 



Annex to Protocol Xo. 15. 
reply of the american^ commissioners to the memorandl m 

PRESENTED BY THE SPANISH COMMISSIONERS ON NOVEMBER 16,. 
1898. 

The American Commissioners have examiined the memoradum of thei 
Spanish Commissioners with that deliberate care and attention which 
they have been accustomed to bestow upon all the rei)resentations 
which those Commissioners have been pleased to submit toucliing the 
questions before the conference. 

They note, in the tirst place, that tlie Spanish Commissioners dis- 
claim any intention by their ]>aper of the .'Jrd of November to withdraw* 
their previous accejitani-e of the American articles on the subject of 
Cuba, Porto Rico and the other Spanish islands in the West Indies, 
and the Island ot Guam in the Ladrones. 

This disclaimer, in spite of tlie form in which it is ex]>ressed, the> 
American Commissioners would be content simply to acce])t without 
comment, were it not for the fact that it is accompanied with certain 
observations on the so-called Cuban debt that impose upon them the 
necessity of recurring to what they have pi^i'viously said on thiit subject. 

In citing the Royal Decrees of 1886 and 1800, and the contents of the 
bonds issued thereunder, as something with w^hich the American Com- 
missioners were previously unacquainted, the Spanish Conimissionersf 
seem to have overioolied or forgotten the paper which the American 
Commissioners i)resented on the 14th of October. In that paper the 
American Commissioners expressly mentioned and described thetinau 
cial measures of bS8() and 181)0 and the stii)ulations of the bonds thereby 
authorized. But they did more than this. Being concerned with the 
substance rather than with the form of the matter, they reviewed with 
some minuteness the history of the debt and the circumstances of its; 
creation. They showed that it was in reality contracted by the Spanish) 
Government for national purposes; that its foundations were laid more 
than twenty years before the Royal Decree of 188(5, and at a time when 
the revenues of the ishind were actually producing a sur]dus, in national 
enteri)rises in Mexico and San Domingo, foreign to the interests of Cuba; 
and that it was soon afterwards swollen to enormous dimensions as the 
result of the imposition upon Cuba, as a kind of penalty, of thei 
national exjtenses incurred in the elforts to sui)press by force of aims 
the ten years' war for the independence of the island. At this pointi 



TREATY OF PEACE, 199 

the Araericau Commissioners in their paper of the 14th of October 
referred to the flnaucial operation of 1886, but they properly referred 
to it in its true character of a national act for the consolidation or 
funding of debts previously incurred by the Spanish Government, and 
expressly quoted the national gnarauty that appears on the face of the 
bonds. At the risk of a repetition which should be unnecessary, the 
American Commissioners will quote from their paper of the 14th of 
October the following- paragraph : 

'' Subsequently the Spanish Government undertook to consolidate 
these debts [i. e., the debts incurred in Mexico, San Domingo, and the 
ten years' warj and to this end created in 1880 the so-called Bilhtes 
Mpotecarios de la Ida de Cuba, to the amount of 020,()()0,000 pesetas, or 
$124,000,000. The Spanish Government undertook to pay these bonds 
and the interest thereon out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national 
character of tlie debt was shown by the fact that, upon the face of the 
bonds, "the Spanish jSTation " {la Nacion EKparwla) guaranteed their 
payment. The annual cliarge for interest and sinking fnnd on account 
of this debt amounted to the sura of 39,191,000 pesetas, or $7,838,200, 
which was disbursed through a Spanish financial institution, called tlie 
Banco HiKpano ('olonial, whicli is said to have collected daily from the 
custom house at Havana, through an agency there established, the sum 
of $33,339 ". 

The American Commissioners then referred in the same paper to the 
authorizatioii by the Spanish (Government in 1890 of a new issue of 
bonds, apparently with a view to refund the prior debt as well as to 
cover any new debts contracted between 1880 and 1890, and stated 
that, alter the renewal of the struggle for independence in February, 
1895, this issue was diverted from its original purpose to that of rais- 
ing funds for the suppression of the insurrection. 

The American Commissioners ^re at a loss to perceive how, in recit- 
ing these transactions, in which past and not future obligations were 
dealt with, they could have been understood to intimate that Spain, 
through what is described in the Spanish memorandum as a "super- 
natural gift of divination," foresaw the insurrection of 1895 and the 
ultimate intervention of the United States. The American Commis- 
sioners will not indulge m the ready retort which this fanciful effort at 
sarcasm invites. Whether the cousetiuences of imposing u])on Cuba 
burdens not to be borne, were or were not foreseen by Spain, is a ques- 
tion upon wliich it would be idle now to speculate. 

As to the special "Cuban War Emergency Loan," composed of "five 
per cent peseta bonds," which were referred to as jiart of what was con- 
sidered in Spain as properly constituting the Cuban debt, the American 
Commissioners expressly declared that it did not appear that in these 
bonds the revenues of Cuba were mentioned. 

The American Commissioners, in reviewing in their paper of the 14th 
of October the history of the so called Cuban del)t, necessarily invited 
the fullest examination of their statements. They have yet to learn 
that those statements contained any error. 

They Ireely admit, however, that they had never seen it asserted, till 
they read the assertion in the Spanish memorandum, th;it the deficien- 
cies in the Cuban appropriation bills or budgets which the debts are 
said to represent were "due to the great reductions of taxes made in 
Cuba by the mother country." If, as they are now assured, this is a 
fact " well known," they are compelled to admit that they were, and 
that they still remain, ignorant of it. Indeed, the American Commis-. 
sioners were not aware that Cuban appropriation bills or budgets 



200 TREATY OF PEACE 

existed prior to 1880, in May of which year the first measure of the 
kind was submitted to the Spanish Cortes.- During the discussion of 
that budget, a distinguished Senator, not a Cuban, who had been Min- 
ister of State in the Si)anish Cabinet, SePiorDon ServandoRuiz (lomez, 
presented to the Senate an otiicial statement of the Colonial Depart- 
ment, showing that the alleged debts of Cuba amounted to 8l-(J,834,- 
4:H>.1'5 ingold and 84r),3()0,07(; inpaper,or,in round nnmbers,$l 4(),0()0,000 
in gold. 

It is true that after 1880, and especially after 18S(), deficiencies 
appeared in the budgets, hut a correct conception of their cause may 
l)e derived from the budget of 188G-1887, when the prior debts were 
consolidated. The amount of the burdens imposed upon Cuba by that 
budget, eight years, as the Spanish memorandum observes, "after the 
reestablishment of peace," was $2o,9.")9,734.79, which was distributed 
as folh)WS: 

G;'neral obligations $iO, 8'>3, 836. 79 

Departiiieiit of .Insticc 863,022.22 

Department of War 6, 730, 977. 17 

1 )<'part iiient of the Treasury 903, 326. 29 

Department of tlie Navy 1,434,211.40 

Department of tlie Interior 3,935, 658.92 

Department of Fomento 1,238,702.00 

$25. 959, 734. 79 

Cfthe sum total of this burden, it is seen that the three items of 
General Obligations, War, and Navy, constitute nearly three-fourths. 
And what were the " General Obligations"? The principal item — 
nine tenths of the whole — was that of |!»,«il7, 41*3.02, for interest, sink- 
ing fund, and incidental expenses, on the so-called Cuban debt. The 
rest went chieliy for pensions to Spanish officials. 

The budget for 1890-1897 amounted to 8 28,583, 132.23. 

These figures, which si)eak for themselves, seem to render peculiarly 
infelicitous the novel suggestion that the deficiencies in the Cuban 
budgets have been due to the reduction of taxes. 

As to that part of the Spanish memorandum in which the so-called 
Cuban bonds are treated as "mortgage bonds," and the rights of the 
holders as "mortgage rights," it is necessary to say only that the legal 
difitereiH^e between the i)ledge of revenues yet to be derived from taxa- 
tion and a niortg;ige of property cannot be confused by calling the 
two things by the same name. In this, as in another instance, the 
American Commissioners are able to refer to previous statements 
which, although the Spanish memorandum betrays no recollection of 
tliem, for obvious reasons remain unchallenged. The American Com- 
missioners have shown, in their argument of the 27th of October, that 
the Spanish Government itself has not considered its pledge of the 
revenu(?s of Cuba as in any proper legal sense a mortgage, but as a 
matter entireh" Avithin its control. In proof of this fact the American 
Commissioners quoted in tliat argument certain provisions of the decree 
of autonomy for Cuba and Porto Ilico, signed by the (^)ueen Kegent of 
Spain on the 2r)th of November 1897, and countersigned by Senor 
Sagasta, as l*resident of the Council of Ministers. l>y that decree it 
wjis declared tliat the manner of meeting tlie exi»enditures occasioned 
by the debt which burdened "the Cubiin and Spanish treasury" should 
"form the subject of a law" wherein should be "deternnned the part 
payable by eacli of the treasuries, and the special means of paying the 
intei'est thereon, and of the amortization thereof, and, if necessary, of 
paying the prin(;i[)al:" that, when the "apportionment" should have 



TREATY OF PEACE. 201 

been "made by the Oortes," each of the treasuries should "make pay- 
ment of the part assigned to it," and, finally, that '-'■ emjagements con- 
tracted with creditors under the pledge of the good faith of the Spanish 
nation shall in all cases be scrupulously respected^ 

111 these declarations the American Commissioners find, as they 
stated in the argument above referred to, "a clear assertion not only 
of the jiower of the Government of Spain to deal with the so called 
Cuban debt as a national debt, but also a clear admission that the 
pledge of the revenues of Cuba was wholly within the control of that 
Government, and could be modified ov withdrawn by it at will without 
afi'ecting the obligation of the debt," and, so long as the stipulated pay- 
ments upon the debt were made, without violating the engagements of 
Spain with her creditors. 

Xo more in the opinion of the Spanish Government, therefore, than 
in point of law, can it be maintained that that Government's promise 
to devote to the payment of a certain part of the national debt reve- 
nues yet to be raised by taxation in Cuba, constituted in any legal 
sense a mortgage. The so-called pledge of those revenues constituted, 
in fact and in law, a pledge of the good faith and ability of Spain to 
pay to a certain class of her creditors a certain part of her future reve- 
nues. They obtained no other security, beyond the guarantee of the 
"Spanish ISTation," which was in reality the only thing that gave sub- 
stance or value to the pledge, or to which they could resort for its 
performance. 

One more remark, and the American Conmiissioners have done with 
the renewed discussion into which they regret to have been obliged to 
enter on the subject of the so-called Cuban debt. The Spanish Com- 
missioners are correct in saying that the Government of the United 
States repeatedly urged Si)ain to reestablish peace in Cuba, and did 
not exclude the use of arms for that ])urp()se; but the imjiression con- 
veyed by this partial statement of facts is altogether erroneous, as is 
also the implied representation that Spain's course in the matter may 
be considered as a compliance with the demands of the United States. 
The Government of the United States did indeed repeatedly demand 
that order be reestablished in Cuba; but through long years of ])atient 
waiting it also tried and exliausted all tlieeffcn^ts of diplomacy to induce 
Si)ain to end the war by granting to the island either independence or 
a substantial measure of self government. As early as the spring of 
1S69, not long after the deepening gloom of the ten years' war began 
to settle upon the island, the United States ottered its mediation and 
its credit for the reestablish ment of peace between Spain and her 
colony. Si)ain then as afterwards ])referred war to the relinquishment 
of her rule, and the United States did not assume to discuss the legiti- 
macy of the expenses incurred in the pursuit of that polic3\ But the 
question of Spain's right to incur those exiienses, and that of her right 
or her power to fasten them as a perpetual burden upon the revenues 
of Cuba, after those revenues have passed beyond her control, are 
<[uestious between which the American Commissioners feel neither difli- 
culty nor hesitation in declaring and maintaining a fundamental differ- 
ence both in law and in morals. 

The American Commissioners, before passing to the principal subject 
before the conference, will briefly notice that part of the Spanish mem- 
orandum which treats of the occupation of xVlauila by the American 
forces. 

With the elaborate references to the apparent implication in a pre-.^ 
vious paper that General Merritt and Admiral Dewey might have 



202 TREATY OF PEACE. 

kiiowiiiuly violated the armistice in their capture of Manila a few hours 
after its sionatuie, aud with tlic new remark* about Admiral Dewey's 
dracouian order, the si)ontancousness of his kind feelings, and other 
and similar phrases, we do not occupy ourselves; nor with the objec- 
tions to our use of the word "tied "in describing the escape of the 
Spanish General before the surrender. \Ve are entirely content on 
these points with the record. For the same reason we i^ass without 
comment the remark concerning the claim for indemnity "on similar 
grounds" in the Philippines that "on lirst sight this argument is not 
wanting in force; but the American Commissioners know perfectly well 
that this is only apparent, and that what did occur i)roves absolutely 
the contrary." We interpret this apparent charge of intentional deceit 
in the light of the valued assurance given in another part of the same 
paper by the Spanish Commissioners when they, themselves, admit 
that "no language or even a i)hrase improper to a diplomatic discussion 
has been used by them" and "they avoid with the greatest care the 
use of any phrase which might be personally unpleasant." 

With regard to what is stated in the Spanish memorandum as to the 
Gccu{)ation of territory as a guaranty in time of i)eace, and the liniita- 
tions that are usually atiixed to such occui)ation, the American Com- 
missioners have only to advert to the fact that, as has often been 
observed by the Spanish Covernment in its communications, tlie state 
of war between the United States aud S])ain is not yet ended. In its 
original demands, just as in the Protocol of August Hi, the United 
States declared that it would "occupy and hold the city, bay and har- 
bor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of ])eace." These 
words imported a military occui)ation, with all its usual incidents, 
political and administrative, during the continuance of the state of war. 

The distinction between the occupation of territory as a guaranty 
in time of peace, aud the military occupation of the enemy's territory 
in time of war, is well illustrated in the case of France aud Germany in 
1871, which the Spanish memorandum, unfortunately for its purpose, 
cites in support of its contention as to tlie nature of the Anun-ican 
occujyatiou of Manila under the Protocol. By a convention concluded 
on January 2S, 187 1, France and Germany agreed to a general armis- 
tice, which took effect immediately in Paris and three days later in the 
departments. Under this convention the belligerent armies were to 
preserve their respective positions, which were separated by a detinite 
line of demarcation, and, simply in recognition of the nature of the 
occupation, each of the armies reserved the right "to maintain its 
authority in the territory that it occupies, and to emi)loy such means as 
may be considered necessary for the purpose by its commanders." By 
a subsequent convention of February 15, 1871, the fortified town of 
Belfort, which was besieged by the Germans, but had not been taken 
when the armistice was made, was brought within the Gernurn lines of 
occupation. On February 2(>, 1871. the belligerent powers concluded a 
preliminary treaty of peace. By this treaty, whi<h, unlike the conven- 
tion for an armistice, required the formal ratilication of the two govern- 
ments, the sovereignty of France over Alsace-Lorraine was renounced, 
and i)rovision made ibr the payment to Gerumny besides of a war 
indemnity. By an additional convention signed on the same day it 
"was agreed that the German trooijs sliould "refrain for the future from 
raising contributions in money in the occu])ied territories," but, on the 
other hand, it was declared that the German authorities should "con- 
tinue to collect the state taxes" therein. ^\nd it was provided by the 
preliminary treaty that not until the conclusion and ratilication of the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 203 

definitive treaty of imice should "the administration of the depart- 
ments" remaining "in German occupation" be "restored to the French 
autliorities ". 

"The United States will occupy and hold," so reads the Protocol, 
^'the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty 
of peace". These brief words obviously and necessarily imported the 
military occupation, in time of war, though not of active hostilities, of 
a designated territory, with the usual incidents of such occupation, 
and not an occupation as a guarantee in time of peace. From the 
incidents of one kind of occupation nothing is to be inferred as to the 
incidents of the other, for the simple reason that the two things are 
different in their nature. The occupation by a belligerent army of a 
hostile territory is conceded to involve the exercise of a paramount 
power of control which would be utterly inconsistent with the rights of 
the titular sovereign over his territory and its inhabitants in time of 
peace. 

The American Commissioners have examined with special care that 
part of the Spanish memorandum which deals with the " control, dis- 
position and government ot the Philippines", and to the consideration 
of that subject they will now address themselves. 

Tlie American Commissioners are obliged at the outset to call atten- 
tion to the fact that the i)resent argument of the Spanish Commissioners 
contains the same defects as the previous one, in being directed against 
a position which the American Commissioners not only have never 
assumed, but which they expressly repudiate. The American Com- 
missioners now repeat that their proposal for the cession of the Philip- 
pines is neither based nor alleged to be based upon a specific concession 
of Spanish sovereignty in the Protocol, but upon the right secured to 
the United States by that instrnnient to make in the negotiations for 
peace snch demands on the subject as it should then deem apjnopriate 
under the circumstances. The only obligation therefore now resting 
upon the American Commissioners is to show not that their proposals 
in regard to the Philippines are founded on the Protocol, in the same 
sense as their demands in the case of Cuba, Porto Rico, and Guam, 
but that those proposals are embraced within the right thereby 
expressly secured to the United States to make demands in the future. 

In the light of this plain ami simple propOvSition, which is sustained 
not oidy by the Protocol itself, but by every document referred to or 
quoted in the present discussion, how idle and unavailing is the char- 
acterization of the present demands of the United states as "tardy", 
as well as the insinuation that that Government in postponing, with 
the express concurrence of Spain, the formulation of its demands, was 
guilty of a want of "frankness"! 

The American Commissioners are gratified to find in the passages 
quoted in the Spanish memorandum from Mr. Cambon's reports of his 
conferences with the President, the amplest confirmation of their posi- 
tion. Those reports, as quoted by the Spanish Commissioners, show 
that the Spanish (Government, far from asking, in any proper sense of 
the word, "explanations" of the phrase "control, disposition and gov- 
ernment", fully understood its meaning, and sought but failed to obtain 
a limitation of it. Indeed, there is not to be iband from first to last a 
suggestion that if the words "control, disposition and government" 
were allowed to stand they did not embrace the amplest right to deal 
with Spanish sovereignty in the islands. 

In this relation it is the duty of the American Commissioners to notice 
the fact that the Spanish memorandum, in comparing the reports of 



204 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Cainbou with tliose quoted by the American Commissioners, inti- 
mates that the former are entitled to ])reference because they were con- 
temporaneous. But the record quoted by the American Commissioners 
was also contemporaneous, and was made by the Secretary of State 
under the supervision of tlie President himself. With this observation, 
the American Commissioners will pursue their argument. 

In his report of the conversation of the .iUth of duly, Mr. Cambon is 
quoted as statin*>- that "the President of the Republic was firm in not 
changing the terms of Article III", but that, as the result of an appeal 
to his generosity, he consented to substitute the word "disposition" 
for "possessiou." 

The American Commissioners have already stated that the President 
refused to change the word "jiossession " except for a word of equally 
extensive meaning, and that the reason for which Mr. Cambon was 
understood to desire the change was tliat the word "possession" would, 
when translated into Spanish, seem to be of a severe and threatening- 
nature, Tlie meaning of 3Ir. Cambon, as detined in his report to the 
Spanish (Tovernment, was that the word "disposition" did not "pre- 
judge" the result of the negotiations, ami that it had not so "compre- 
hensive" a meaning as the word ''possession." 

The American Commissioners are unable to concur in Mr. Cambon's 
estimate of the relative comi)reliensiveness of these two Euglisli words; 
but they are obliged to i)oint out, as a matter more nuiterial to the 
present discussion, that he does not, as the Spanish Connnissioners 
affirm, allege that he "accepted the change because he understood that 
all (juestiou about the sovereignty of Si)ain over the Philipi)ine Islands 
was thereby eliminated". On the contrary, his only claim is that the 
word "disposition" did not "prejudge" the "result" of the "negotia- 
tion". His understanding thereiore ap]>ears to have been precisely the 
opposite of that ascribed to him in the Spanish memorandum. 

That this is the case is confirmed beyond all peradventure by the 
unsuccessful efforts subse([ueutly made by Mr. Cambon, under instruc- 
tions of the Government at Madrid, to ol)tain a limitation of the Ameri- 
can dnmand, as it then and has ever since stood, that the treaty of 
peace should determine "the control, disposition and government of 
the Philippines". 

The telegram of the Spanish Goverument to Mr. Cambon, in relation 
to this denuind,has now for the iirst time been disclosed to rei)resenta- 
tives of the Government of the United States. What other instruc- 
tions Mr. Cau)bon may then have had in his i>ossession, it is not uiateiial 
to conjecture. Put, according to his own report, as (luotcd in the 
Spanish memorandum, he reiiuested the President, in the interview of 
the ord of August, "to have the kindness to state as precisely as pos- 
sible liis intentions in regard to the Phili)q)ine Islands. On this 
point," continues Mr. Cambon, "I told him 'the answer of the Pederal 
Government is couched in terms that may lend themselves to all claims 
on the ])art of the United States, and consequently to all apprehensions 
of Spain in regard to her sovereignty.' " 

Here is a clear declaration of Mr. Cambon that the phrase "control, 
disposition and government", admitted of "all claims" on the part of 
tlie United States", and that it created ai)prehensions on the part 
of Spain in regard to her "sovereignty"; and he asked, not for an 
"explanation" of the ])hrase, but for a statement by the President, as 
"precisely as i)ossible", of his "intentions". In other words, Mr. 
Cambon. a(!ting umler the instructions of the Spanish Government, 
endeavored to obtain at that time a statement of the demands which 



TREATY OF PEACE. 205 

the United States would make in regard to the sovereignty of Spain, 
and thereby at least an implied limitation of the rights in that regard. 
The reply of the President, as reported by Mr. Cambon, shows that he 
was firm in his determination both to retain the i)recise words of the 
demand and the fnll liberty of action which they secured. On this sub- 
ject the President, as reported by Mr. Cambon, declared that he did 
not want "any misunderstanding to remain'': nothing was decided as 
against either Government; the negotiators of the treaty of peace must 
determine the matter. 

This is from lirst to last the sum and substance of Mr. Cambon's 
reports, as quoted in the Sj)anish memorandum. The recurrence in 
that memorandum to Mr. Cambon's apparently casual use of tlie words 
"permanent advantages", as an evidence that sovereignty was not in 
question, when he himself declares that the words "control, disposition 
and government" lent themselves to "all claims" and therefore raised 
apprehension as to Sixain's "sovereignty", discloses the intirmity of the 
contention in which the argument is employed. Indeed, the words 
"permanent advantages" are not in thecontextof Mr. Cambon invested 
with the importance which the Spanish memorandum now ascribes to 
them. As the American Commissioners pointed out on a previous 
occasion, it is not pretended that Mr. Cambon attempted to report the 
original words of the President, who spoke in Englisli; and, immedi- 
ately after attributing to the President words which he translates by 
the terms "permanent advantages", Mr. Cambon narrates the Presi- 
dent's undoubted declaration that the "control, disposition and gov- 
ernment" of the Philipi)ines must be determined in the treaty of peace, 
in advance of which the case was not to be considered as decided 
against either Government. 

In his report of the interview of the 9th of August, Mr. Cambon, as 
quoted in the Spanish memorandum, states that, when the note of the 
Spanish Government of the 7th of that month, in reply to the Amer- 
ican demands, was read, the President and the Secretary of State were 
visibly displeased, and that, after a long silence, the President objected 
to that part of the reply which related to the evacuation of Cuba and 
Porto Kico. The Spanish memorandum decdares that neither the Presi- 
dent nor the Secretary of State advanced any other reason than this 
for their displeasure, and that, "according to Mr. Cambon, these gentle- 
men said nothing during thecon versation respecting thesaid reservation 
nuide by Spain of her sovereignty over the archipelago". As no direct 
assertion to this effect bj^ Mr. Cambon is quoted, the American Com- 
missioners are obliged to assume that he made none, and that the state- 
ment in the Spanish memorandum is a mere inference from an omission 
to report what was said on the subject of the Philippines. This omission 
may be accounted for by the fact that Mr. Cambon, although he had 
previously declared that the American demand admitted of " all claims " 
on the part of the United States, expressed and maintained the opin- 
ion that the Spanish reply fully accepted it, and therefore left nothing 
in that regard to be conceded, while in respect of the demand for the 
evacuation of Cuba and Porto Pico, which was to be immediate, the 
reservation by Spain of the approval of the Cortes, which was not then 
in session, presented an obstacle to an agreement. This objection he 
deemed it necessary to report, since it required, in his own opinion, a 
modification of Spain's reply to the American demands. But whatever 
may have been the cause of the omission, it is a fact that no small part 
of the "visible displeasure" of the President and the Secretary of 
State arose from the apparent design, upon which comment was duly 



206 TREATY OF PEACE. 

made, iu some way to limit the scope of the demand in regard to the 
Philippines — a design then as ever afterwards frustrated. In the 
opinion of the American Commissioners the note in (piestion was far 
from "exi)licit"; nor can it be maintained that the President, while 
hearing that note with "visible displeasure" and adhering with "real 
stubbornness'' to the phrase " control, disposition and government*', 
because it '• prejudged" nothing, at the same time accepted the words 
of limitation. 

But what does Mr. Cambon say as to the introduction of the subject 
of tlie Protocol, wliich had not previously been suggested 1 After further 
conversation the President, as reported by Mr. Cambon, said: "There 
might be a means of putting* an end to all misunderstanding; we might 
draw up a projct. which shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain 
in the same terms in which I have already framed tliem, and ivhich shall 
estdhii.sli tlie terms within which there sliall be named on the one hand 
the Plenipotentiaries charged with negotiating the treaty of peace in 
Paris, and on the other hand the special Commissioners entrusted with 
the determination of the details of the evacuation of Cuba aud Porto 
Eico." 

The American Commissioners are unable to perceive the " immense 
difference" between this version of the President's words and that 
given in their own paper. The ['resident suggests a means for putting 
an end, not to any particular misunderstanding, but to "all misunder- 
standing." And liow does he propose to do this? By drawing up a 
Piotocol, which "shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain," 
not with qualifications, reservations or exjjlanations, but "in the same 
terms in which 1 have already franied tliem." There was not, nor could 
there be, anj^ misapprehension as to the meaning aud effect of these 
words, nor was any betrayed in the telegram, heretofore quoted by the 
Ameiican Commissioners, in which Mr, Cambon advised the Spanish 
Government that the (lovernment of the United States had "decided 
to state precisely {prvciser). in a Protocol, the bases upon which peace 
negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon." 

With this telegram ^Ir. Cambon communicated the text of the Pro- 
tocol; and if his telegraphic summary of the note of the Secretary of 
State of the 10th of August was, as the Spanish Commissioners admit, 
inaccurate, it is equally true that his previous telegram conveyed with 
no uncertainty the purpose of the United States in requiring the adoj)- 
tion of a Protocol. 

If the fact were less clear than it is, that the refusal of the President 
to accept the Si)anish rei)ly of the 7th of August as in any respect a 
satisfactory answer to the demands of the United States, gave rise to 
the Protocol, the American Commissioners would deem it proper to 
examine in detail the references to that note in the Spanish memoran- 
dum. But they will, under the circumstances, merely advert to the 
statement that Spain in the paragraph relating to the Phili})pines 
exi)licitly "reserved" her sovereignty over the archi])elago, the impli- 
cation being that slie expressly withdrew it from the sphere of negotia- 
tion. The language of the note is, however, that "the S[)anish Cov- 
ernment must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they 
do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago." 
This language, instead of withdrawing the sovereignty from tliscussion, 
im])lies that it may, as the result of the negotiations, be necessary to 
renounce it. The American contention, however, does not require fur- 
ther analysis of the note of August 7 than has been given in this and 
the preceding memoranda of the Aiuerican Commissioners. It was 



TREATY OF PEACE. 207 

rejected by the President, and the final agreement of tlie parties 
reduced to the clear and unequivocal terms of the Protocol. 

The Spanish Commissioners endeavor to argue that there could have 
been no intention to include in the powers of this Joint Commission the 
question of the sovereignty of the Philippines, because the Secretary 
of State of the United States, in his note of the 30th of July last, after 
stating the demands of liis Government, added: '-If the terms hereby 
offeied are accepted in their entirety, CosMmissioners will be named by 
the United States to meet similarly authorized Commissioners on the 
part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of 
peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated." 
Is the " unexpressed demand " of the United States, inquire the Spanish 
1 ommissioners, for the cession of an immense territory, understood by 
the American Commissioners to be a detail of the treaty of peace? 

The American Commissioners have no difficulty in replying that they 
do so understand it, but not in the sense which the question implies. 
It is evident that the Spanish memorandum seeks to construe the lan- 
guage of the Secretary of State as if he had used in connection with 
the word '^details" the word "unimportant,'' and actually proposed to 
refer to the Commissioners the settlement of only " unimportant details.'' 
It should seem nnnecessary to say, how^ever, that in speaking of 
"details" he merely referred to the particulars of the treaty as consid- 
ered separately an<l m relation to the whole. It can hardly be sup- 
posed that if the two Governments had intended that the negotiations 
of the treaty of ])eace should be occupied with details of little impor- 
tance, they would eaeh have sent five commissioners to a neutral capital 
for the purijose of arranging them. 

But it is argued by the Spanish Commissioners that the words "con- 
trol, disposition and government", even taken by themselves, do not 
comprehend the subject of sovereignty, but merely that of governmental 
"reforms". To the American Commissioners such an interi)retation is 
ineompreheusible. If nothing but "reforms" had been intended, it 
could never have occurred to either party to employ for that purpose 
three words none of wliich expressed its meaning, while each of them 
contained a broader one. On the other hand, the use of the word 
"sovereignty" in conjunction with the words actually employed was 
unnecessary, while, if used alone, it would have defeated the very 
object of postponing the whole subject of the Philippines for future 
determination. "Control, disposition and government" included every- 
thing, -'Sovereignty" would have excluded everything but itself, and 
have left to fiiture determination merely the question of its own exist- 
ence, supreme and unconditional. In the event of the United States 
desiring to take only a part of the archipelago, such a limitation of the 
scope of the negotiations would have been injurious to both parties. 

The Spanish" Commissioners, however, have sought to restrict the 
meaning of the words "control, disposition and government," by an 
appeal to the French text, into which the original English was trans- 
lated; and as the French word "■contr6le^\ by which "control'' was 
translated, bears a significance less extensive than tlie latter, they seem 
to contend that all the other words, both in the English and in the 
French text, should be reduced to harmony with it. 

To the American Commissioners, this argument appears to involve 
the elimination of the entire English text and of the greater part of the 
French. It first strikes out, as at least superfluous, the English words 
"disposition and government,'' and the French words ^'■dls^wsition et 
gourerneo7ienP\ and then limits the meaning of the English "control'^ 



208 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to that of the Fi-ench '■' conir6le''\ It thus virtually reduces the stipu- 
lation to the sinjile French word last mentioned. By no principle of 
construction can tliis process be defended. 

The American Commissioners are therefore, for the reasons which 
they have stated, com])elled to nniintain that by the plain and compre- 
hensive terms of the Protocol, as construed in their normal sense and 
in the li,nht of all the circumstances of its adoption, the future of the 
Philip])ines was left, in the fullest measure, to the determination of this 
Joint Commission. 

This conclusion renders it necessary to answer the proposals of the 
Spanish Commissioners tor the resignation by this Commission of its 
peacemaking' functions under the Protocol of the 12th of August, and 
the transfer to other persons of the duty of determining the question 
now [)articularly before it. 

The Spanish Commissioners propose that the Joint Commission, shall, 
instead of disposing of the (piestion of the Philipi)ines, adopt one of 
the following courses: 

I. Remit that ([uestion to the two Governments, for adjustment, if 
possible, by direct negotiation; or 

II. Advise those governments to submit it to an arbitration, in which 
the true sense of Articles HI and VI shall be determined. 

To the first of these proposals it is sufticieut to reply that both Gov- 
eruments have by the solemn engagement of the Protocol committed 
to their direct representatives here assembled the duty of concluding a 
delinitive treaty of peace which shall determine the destiny of the 
archipelago. That these representatives shall, after weeks of patient 
investigation and interchange of views in oral discussion and written 
argument, surrender their task unaccom})lished to other representatives 
of the same Governments, is a suggestion which cannot be seriously 
enteitained. Indeed, the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners 
frankly admits that in the event of a new disagreement the situation 
would be the same as that which now confronts the Paris conference. 

It is equally futile now to invite arbitration as to the meaning of 
terms plainly expressed in the Protocol. " To avoid misunderstand- 
ing," as the United States declared in its note of the 10th of August, 
the precise agreement of the two Governments was put into a concise 
and simple form. Shall it be said that this Joint Commission is incap- 
able of interpreting the very compact under which it has assembled? 
The i)rinciple of international arbitration can have no application to 
such a case. To avoid war no government, it is believed, will do or 
suffer more than the one wluch the American Commissioners have the 
honor to represent in this conference. Unfortunately no way for arbi- 
tration was opened before the actual conflict began. Arbitration, as 
we have had occasion heretofore to observe, precedes war, to avoid its 
horrors ; it does not come after the trial by battle to enable either party 
to es(;a])e its consequences. 

The American (Commissioners, feeling that this body must accept the 
resi)onsibility of reaching conclusions, must decline to ask the assist- 
ance of an arbitrator. It is true that the very constitution of a joint 
commission like the present presupposes a possible irreconcilable difier- 
ence of opinion of rei)resentatives of one nation opposed to others of 
equal number and authority. In such an event, nothing remains but 
for one of the contesting parties to yield its (q)inions in order that a 
peaceful solution may be reached. In the present case the American 
Commissioners have determined to make concessions to the extent 
embodied in the jjroposals which will conclude this memorandum. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 209 

The United States is accused by tbe Spanish Commissioners of harsh 
and severe measures in dealing with a discomfited enemy. lu the 
light of events which led to and characterized the war, no less than of 
historical })recedents which might be cited, this charge is found to be 
entirely groundless. 

For half a century the attempts of the Cubans to overthrow the 
sovereignty of S[)ain over the island, within a hundred miles of the 
shores of the United States, have produced serious disturbances in 
that country, grave and constant interference with its commerce, and 
frequent danger of the rupture of friendly relations with Spain. How 
could the conditions existing in the island be otherwise than of vital 
concern to us? The Cubans were our neighbors, with whom our rela- 
tions were necessarily intimate and extensive; and they had been 
engaged in a struggle for independence with stronger reasons than 
existed in our own case when we rebelled against the mother country. 
The revolution of 1895, like the prior attempts at independence, entailed 
upon us heavy burdens. It made it necessary to patrol our coasts, to 
tax both civil and military resources in order to detect and prevent 
exjjeditions from our shores in the interests of the insurgents, and to 
repress the natural sympathy of our citizens, while we remained passive 
witnesses of misery, bloodshed and starvation in a land of plenty almost 
within sight of our borders. At length came the destruction of the 
battleshi]) Maine in the harbor of Havana, with the loss of 26Q of her 
crew. While we may not attribute this catastrophe to the direct act of 
a Spanish ofticial, it betrayed, in the opinion of the United States, such 
neglect or inability on the part of Si)ain to secure the safety of the ship 
of a friendly nation in the principal harbor of the island as to induce 
Congress to recite it as an outgrowth of conditions which required our 
intervention. 

War ensued; and in less than four months nearly all the ports of 
Cuba were blockaded, Santiago was taken, the Spanish lleets in tbe 
West Indies and the Philippines destroyed, Porto Pico was about to 
surrender, Manila was on the point of capitulating, and all the colonies 
of Spain lay practically at the mercy of the United States. This 
recital is made, not in an unbecoming spirit of triumph, but because 
it exhibits the conditions that existed, and the advantages that the 
United States enjoyed, when, preferring peace to war, it agreed to the 
Protocol. 

The Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum have in diplomatic 
words expressed their surprise at our want of magnanimity to a defeated 
country. How does the case appear in the light of what has been 
itated ? We might have demanded from Spain indemnity in money 
for the cost of the war, which, even if no unforeseen contingencies occur, 
will have amounted to $240,000,000, at the close of the present calen- 
dar year, to say nothing of further expenses which will be required 
tinder the laws of the United States existing at the outbreak of the 
war. We might have required compensation for our injuries and losses, 
uational as well as individual, prior to the outbreak of the war. Yet 
we have asked for no money. From the relinquishment of Spanish 
■sovereignty in Cuba we derive no compensation. Porto Rico, Guam and 
the Philippi)ies will bring burdens as well as benefits, and, regarded 
simply as indemnity, will be grossly inadequate to compensate the 
United vStates for the mere pecuniary cost of the war; and yet, in spite 
3f all this, for the sake of peace, we propose to make to Spain liberal 
3oncessions. Can we be justly charged with abuse of our opportunities, • 
T P 14 



210 TREATY OF PEACE. 

or with taking- uiulue advantage of the misfortunes of an adversary 1 
The American Commissioners can perceive-iio ground for such a charge 
On tlie contrary, they tliink that the Spanish Commissioners shoulc 
accept our terms at once, and restore peace between the two countries 

Even if the United States were disposed to permit Spanish sover 
eignty to remain over the Philippines, and to leave to Spain the resto 
ration of peace and order in the islands, could it now in honor do so": 
The Spanish Commissioners have, themselves, in an earlier stage o: 
these negotiations, si)oken of the Filipinos as our allies. This is not i 
relation which the Government of the United States intended to estab 
lish ; but it must at least be admitted that the insurgent chiefs returnee 
and resumed their activity with the consent of our military and nava 
commanders, who permitted them to arm with weapons which we hac 
cai)tnrod from the Spaniards, and assured them of fair treatment anc 
justice. Should we be justitied in now surrendering these people to th« 
Government of Spain, even under a promise of an)nesty, Avhich w( 
know they would not accept? 

If, on tiie other hand, the United States should be content to retail 
Luzon alone, could anything but trouble be expected from the divisioi 
of the group ''. Would not contrasts in government, in modes of admin 
istration, and in the burdens of taxatiim, in different islands lying s(- 
closely together, but largely inhabited by kindred peoples, product 
discontent among the inhabitants? If the natives of the islands thai 
remained under Spanish rule should, as doubtless would be the cascf 
continue in insurrection, would not the natives of the American islandi! 
endeavor to help them, by fitting out hostile expeditious and furnishing 
arms and supplies ? Would not complaints then be made by one Gov 
ernment against the other, leading to crimination and recriminatioi 
and probably in the end to another international war? 

The situation that has arisen in the Philippines was neither foresee! 
nor desired by the United States, but, since it exists, that Governmen 
does not shirk the responsibilities growing out of it; and the Americai 
Commissioners now make to the Spanish Commissioners, in the light o 
those responsibilities, a final proposition. 

The proiiosal presented by the American Commissioners in behalf o 
their Government for the cession of the Philippines to the United Statei 
having been rejected by the Spanish Commissioners, and the counter 
proposal of the latter for the withdrawal of the American forces from 
the islands and the payment of an indemnity by the United States tit 
Spain having been rejected by the American Commissioners, the Ameri 
can Commissioners, deeming it essential that the present negotiations 
which have already been greatly protracted, should be l)rought to an 
earlv and definite "^conclusion, beg now to present a Tiew proposition 
embodying the concessions which, for the sake of immediate peace 
their Government is under the circumstances willing to tender. 

The Government of the United States is unable to modity the prO' 
posal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archipelago of th 
P!iilipi)ines, but the American Commissioners are authorized to otte 
to S])ain, in case the cession should be agreed to, the sum of twenti 
million dollars ($20,()00,()(H)) to be paid in accordance with the terms tt 
be fixed in the treaty of peace. 

And it being the policy of the United States to maintain in tk 
Philippines an open door to the world's commerce, the American Cora 
missioners are prepared to insert in the treaty now in contemplation ; 
stipulation to the effect that, for a term of years, Spanish ships am 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



211 



mercliandise shall be admitted iuto the ports of the Philippine Islands 
ou the same terms as American shix)s and merchandise. 

The American Commissioners are also authorized and prepared to 
insert in the treaty, in connection with the (sessions of territory by 
Spain to the United States, a provision ibr the mutual relinquishment 
of all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of 
the United States against Si)ain and of Spain against the United 
States that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrec- 
tion in Cuba and prior to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. 

The American Commissioners may be permitted to express the hope 
that they may receive from the Spanish Commissioners, on or before 
Monday the isth of tlie present month, a definite and ilnal acceptance 
of the proposals herein made as to the Philippine Islands, and also of 
the demands as to Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the 
West Indies, and Guam, in the form in wlii(;h those demands have been 
provisionally agreed to. In this event it will be possible for the Joint 
Commission to continue its sessions and to proceed to the consideration 
and adjustment of other matters, including those which, as subsidiary 
and incidental to the principal provisions, should form a part of the 
treaty of peace. 

In particular the American Commissioners desire to treat of religious 
freedom in the Caroline islands, as agreed to in 1880; of the release of 
prisoners now held by S}>ain for political offenses in connection with 
the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines; the acquisition of the 
island variously known as Kusaie, Ualan, or Strong Island in the Caro- 
lines, for a naval and telegraph station, and of cable-landing rights at 
other places in Spanish jurisdiction ; and the revival of certain treaties 
heretofore in force between the United States and Spain. 

True copy : 

John B. Moore. 



Protocol jSTo. 16. 

Conference of November 28, 1898. 



Protocolo No. 16. 

Conferencia del 38 de Noviemhre de 

1898. 



The conference which was to 
have been held on the U3rd instant 
having been adjourned in conse- 
quence of the correspondence ex- 
changed between the Presidents 
of the two Commissions, which is 
appended to the present protocol, 
in the shape of two letters of the 
President of the Spanish Commis- 
sion and the answers thereto of the 
President of the Ameiican Com- 
mission, the Joint Commission met 
to day at two o'clock, p. m., when 
there were 

Present: — On the part of the 
United States: Messrs: Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 



Aplazada la Conferencia que de- 
bi(') celebrarse el di'a 23 del corri- 
ente a consecuencia de la corre- 
spond ancia cambiada eutre los 
Presidentes de ambas Comisinnes, 
que va anexa al Acta presente, en 
forma de dos cartas del Presidente 
de la Comision Espanola y de las 
dos contestaciones a aquellas del 
Presidente de la Comision Ameri- 
cana, se reunieron ambas Comis- 
iones hoy 4 las 2 de la tarde, hal- 
Mndose 

Presentes Por parte de los 
Estados Unidos de America, los 
Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 



212 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Moiitero Rios, Abarzuza, Gaiuica, 
Villa- Urratia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
conference was read and approved. 

The President of tlie Spanish 
Commission, in accordance with 
the agreement previously reached, 
presented to the American Commis- 
sioners a document containing the 
final answer of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment to the proposition as to 
the Philippine Islands which the 
American Commissioners pre- 
sented as final at the last session. 

The language of the answer is as 
follows : 

"The Spanish Commissioners 
hastened to lay before their Gov- 
ernment the proposition whi<!h, as 
final, was presented to them at the 
last session by the American Com- 
missioners, and they are now spe- 
cially authorized to give within 
the time designated and under the 
conditions expressed the reply 
which was requested of them by 
the American memorandum. 

" Examined solely in the light 
of the legal principles which have 
guided the action of the Spanish 
Commissioners during the course 
of these negotiations, the latter 
consider the American proposition 
in every way inadmissible for the 
reason repeatedly set forth in pre- 
vious documents forming a part of 
the Protocol. 

"Neither can they consider the 
said propositions as a satisfactory 
form of agreement and compromise 
between two opposing principles, 
since the terms which by way of 
concession are offered to Spain do 
not bear n proper i)ro]iortion with 
the sovereignty which it is endeav- 
ored to compel us to relinquish in 
the Pliilii)pin(; Archipelago. Had 
they borne such proportion, Si)ain 
would have at once, for the sake 
of peace, made the sacrifice of ac- 
cepting them. The American 
Commission knows that the Span- 
ish Commission endeavored, al- 



Por parte deEspana. los Senores 
Montero llios, Abarznza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fuc leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

El Presidente de la Comisicui 
Espahola de conformidad con lo 
acordado anteriormente preseuta 
a los Comisarios Americanos un 
documento que contiene la contes- 
tacion definitiva del Gobierno 
Espanol (i la proposicion sobre Fili- 
pinas, que con caracter de final 
presentaron en la ultima sesion los 
Comisarios Americanos. 

Los tcrminos de dicha contesta-i 
cion son los siguientes: 

" Los Comisarios Espanoles sei 
apresuraron a pouer en conocimi-i 
ento de su Gobierno la proposicion, 
que con caracter de defiaitiva les: 
fuc presentada en la sesion iiltima 
por los Senores Comisarios Ameri-i 
canos, y se hall an hoy explicita- 
mente autorizados a dar la resi)ues- 
ta que dentro del plazo seiialado y 
con las condiciones expresadas em 
el Memorandum Americano se les 
pedia. 

"Examinada nnicamente a la lay\ 
de los i)rincipios juridicos que ha; 
veuido inspirando la conducta d& 
los Comisarios Espanoles durante 
el curso de estas negociaciones,- 
encuentran estos de todo puntOf 
inadmisible la proposicion Ameri-i 
cana,porlas razonesrepetidamente' 
exi)uestas en anteriores docu- 
mentos que forman i)arte de Pro-i 
tocolo. 

" Tampoco pueden considerari 
dicha proposicion como satisfacto-i 
ria formula de avenencia y trans- 
accioii eutre opuetos principios,i 
pues las condiciones que a tituloo 
de concesi(')n se ofrecen a Esi^ana^ 
no gnardan ninguna proporcioni 
con la soberania a que se nos 
quiere obligar a renunciar en el 
Archipiclago filipino. Si la hu-i 
bieran guardado, hnbiese hecho 
EspaHa, desdeluego, elsacriticio de^ 
aceptarlas en aras del deseo de la 
l^az. Consta ala ('omisi()n Ameri- 
cana que la Espanola intento, aun^i 
que sin cxito, entrar en esta via,i 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



213 



though fruitlessly, to follow this 
course, goiug so far as to pioi)Ose 
arbitration for the settlement of 
the principal questions. 

"Spain then having on her part 
exhausted all diplomatic recourses 
in the defence of what she consid- 
ers her rights and even for an equit- 
able compromise, the Spanish Com- 
missioners are now asked to accept 
the American proposition in its en- 
tirety and without further discus- 
sion, or to reject it, in which latter 
case, as the American Commission 
understands, the peace negotia- 
tions will end and the Protocol of 
Washington will, consequently, be 
jbroken. The (Tovernmeiit of Her 
Majesty, moved by lofty reasons of 
patriotism and humanity, will not 
iassume the responsibility of again 
bringing upon Spain all the horrors 
of war. In order to avoid them it 
resigns itself to the painful stiait 
of submitting to the law of the vic- 
tor, however harsh it may be, and 
as Spain lacks material means to 
defend the rights she believes are 
hers, having recorded them, she 
accepts the oidy terms the Ignited 
States offers her for the concluding 
Df the treaty of peace." 

This answer was delivered to 
the American Commissioners and 
branslated by their Interpreter 
into English. 

The President of the Spanish 
commission expressed the opinion 
hat, the proposition of the Ameri- 
can Commission having been ac- 
iepted, it was in order for the 
Secretaries of the two Commissions 
;;o confer and agree upon the form 
n which the articles relating to 
Duba, Porto Rico, and the Philip- 
pine Islands should be drawn ui), 
jvhicli articles they should after- 
ivards submit to the Joint Commis- 
liion for approval or modification. 

The American Commissioners 
lissented to this proposal, and sug- 
gested that the correspondence 
exchanged between the last and the 
>resent session be appended either 
this protocol or to the uext. 



llegando hasta proponer el arbi- 
trage para la resolucion de las 
cuestiones priucipales. 

"Agotados pues, por parte de 
Espana todos los recursos diplo- 
uiiiticos para la defensa del que 
considera su dereclio, y aun para 
una equitativa transaccion, se exige 
hoy a los Comisarios Espanoles que 
acepten en conjunto y sin nuis dis- 
cusiones la proposicion Americana 
6 que la rechacen, en cuyo caso 
quedariau terminadas, segun eu- 
tiende la Comision Americana, las 
negociaciones para la paz y roto 
por consiguieute el Protocolo de 
Washington. El Gobierno de S. M. 
movido por altas ra/.ones de pa- 
triotismo y de humanidad, no ha de 
incurrir en la responsabilidad de 
desatar de nuevo sobre Espaha 
todos los horrores de la guerra. 
Paraevitarlosseresignaaldoloroso 
trance de someterse a la ley del veu- 
cedor, por dura que esta sea, y como 
carece Espana de medios materiales 
para defender el dereclio que cree 
le asiste, una vez ya consignado, 
acepta las unicas condiciones que 
los Estados Unidos le ofrecen para 
la conclusion del Tratado de paz." 

Es entregada dicha contestacion 
a los Comisarios Americanos y ver- 
tida al ingles por su interprete. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola manifiesta que aceptada 
la proi)osici6n de la Comision 
Americana i)rocederia en su sentir 
que los Secretaries de ambas 
Comisiones se pusieran deacuerdo 
para la redaccion de los articulos 
referentes a Cuba, Puerto Rico y 
Filipinas, que someterian luego a 
la Comision en pleno para que esta 
los aprobase 6 moditicase. 



Asiente a ello la Comision Ameri- 
cana y su Presidente propone que 
la correspondencia cambiada entre 
los dos Presidentes en el intervalo 
entre la liltima y la presente sesion, 
sean anexas 4 esta acta 6 a la 
proxima. 



214 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The President of the S])aiiisli 
Comniissiou ooiicurring- in this sng- 
gestion, it was agreed that the two 
letters which he liad addressed to 
the President ofthe American Com- 
mission and the answers tliereto 
given l)y the hitter be appended 
to the present protocol. 

The President of the American 
Commission expressed the hope 
that a mutually satisfactory agree- 
ment might be reached as to all 
matters other than those disposed 
of by the acceptance of the Ameri- 
can i)roposition, and, in order to 
hasten the conclusion of thetreaty, 
he proposed that the American 
Commission should draw up arti- 
cles and present them at the next 
conference to be orally discussed, 
thus avoiding the presentation of 
memoranda which would delay the 
uegotiations. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission answered that the 
form in which the American Com- 
missioners should desire to jiro- 
ceed was left entirely to their 
choice and that he had nothing to 
suggest in this respect; and he 
also exi^ressed the opinion that the 
])resentation of memoranda would 
be unnecessary, except in some 
special case which might occur. 
He proposed that the meeting 
should be adjourned until the Sec- 
retaries should have drawn up the 
draft of articles previously men- 
tioned by him. 

The President of the American 
Commission con(;urred in this ])ro- 
posal, and, being desirous also to 
present the articles referring to the 
subsidiary points of the treaty at 
the next session, he moved that 
that session should be held on 
Wednesday the oOth instant, at 
two o'clock, ]). m. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission concurred in thispro- 
])osal, and rccjuested the American 
Commission to hasten as nuicli as 
practicable their proceedings, so 
as to terminate at the earliest pos- 
sible moment the labors of the 
Commission. 



El Presidente del a Oomision Es- 
panola'es de la misma opinion y 
se acuerda que las dos cartas que 
ha dirigido al Presidente de la 
Comision Americana y las dos con- 
testaciones de este, scan an ex as al 
acta i^resente. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana manifiesta su esperanza 
de que i)ueda llegarse ahora a un 
acuerdo satisfactorio respecto de 
los demas puntos subsidiarios de' 
su pr(»]>osici6n, a])arte de los que 
han sido ya aceptados, y dice que' 
con objeto de apresurar la conclu- 
sion del tratado, se propone redac-- 
tar los demas articulos y presen- 
tarlos en la proxima conferenciai 
para ser discutidos oralmente, evi- 
tandose asi la presentacion de Me- 
moranda que retrasaria las nego- 
ciaciones. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola contesta que la fonna en 
que deseen i)roceder los Comisa- 
rios Americanos (jueda completa- 
mente a su elecci('>n, y que nadai 
tiene por tanto que sugerir al re- 
specto, siendoasimismode o])ini(')n 
que huelga la presentacion de 
Memoranda al respecto, salvo algun 
caso es})ecial que pudiera ocurrir 
y propone que se levaute la sesion 
y se aplnce la nueva reunion hastai 
que los Secretarios puedan redac 
tar el proyecto de articulado. 



El Presidente de la Comisinni 
Americana hace asimismo esta re 
serva. y deseando presentar el ar 
ticulado referente a los puntos ^ 
subsidiarios del tratado en lai 
proxima sesion, pr<)])one que estai 
tenga lugar el INlicrcoles 30 dell 
presente a las 2. 

El Presidente de la Comision i 
Espanola conviene en (jue asi seat 
y ruega a los Comisarios Ameri 
canos que apresuren en lo posible i 
sus procedimientos a flu de que 
terminen cuanto antes las tareas>i 
de la Comision. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 215 

The session was accordingly Eq coasecueucia queda aplazada 

adjourned till Wednesday tlie 30tii la proxima sesion para el Mieicoles 

instant, at two o'clock, p. m. 30 del corriente a las 2 P. M. 

William K. Day E. Montero Kios 

CusHMAN K. Davis B. de Abarzuza 

Wm P Frye J. DE Garnica 

Geo. Gray W K de Villa TJrrutia 

Whitelaw liEiD. Rafael Cerero 

John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex 1 to Protocol No. 10. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados 

UNIDOS. 

Sr. D. William R. Day. 

Muy Senor mio, a fin de que pueda esta Comision y en sn caso el 
Gobierno de S. M. 0. deliberar con pleno y exacto conociniiento de su 
sentido sobre la proposicion con que termiua el Memoianduiu presentado 
en la sesion de ayer por la Conusi<>n que diguamente presidis, y que 
acaba de traduciise al espauol, me es necesario rogaros (lue, con la 
urgencia que os sea posible, os sirvais, si os parece conveuieute, aclarOir 
el concepto de los puntos siguientes de dicha proposicion, cuya inteli- 
gencia es para mi obscuia y vaga : 

Primero. La proposicion (pie haceis ^descansa sobre la base de que 
lascolonias espanolas ban de pasar libres de toda carga, quedando por 
consiguiente todas, absolutaniente todas, las obligaciones y deudas 
coloniales pendientes, de cualcpiier clase que ellas sean y cualquiera 
que baya sido su origen y objeto, a cargo exclusivamente de Espana? 

JSegnndo. El otVeciiuiento que los Estados Unidos hacen a EspaHa de 
establecer igualdad de eondiciones durante cierto numero de anos en 
los puertosdel Arcbipitdago entrr los buques y mercancias de ainbas 
naciones, ot'ridiniento que se luice preceder de la afirmacion de que la 
politica de los Estados Unidos es mantener en las Filipinas la pnerta 
abierta el comerico del mundo, ;, debe entenderse en el sentido de que 
los buques y mercancias de las demas naciones ban de gozar 6 poder 
gozar de la misma situacion que por cierto tiempo se conceda a los de 
Espana, mientras los Estados Unidos no cambien dicba politica? 

Tercero. Habiendo consignado el Sr. Secretario de Estado, en la 
nota de .'30 de Julio I'lltimo, que la cesion por Espana de la Isla de 
Puerto Rico y de otras islas actualmente bajo su soberania en las 
Indias Occidentales, asi como de una en las Ladrones, era en compen- 
sacion de las perdidas y gastos becbos por los Estados Unidos, durante 
la gueria, y de los danos que sus ciudadanos babian sufrido durante la 
ultima insurreccii'tn de Cuba, ^^cuales son las reclamaciones ji que se 
reflere la porposicion, al exigirse en ella que en el tratado se ba de 
insertar una disposicion sobre ell abandono nuituo de todas las reclama- 
ciones individuales y nacionales surgidas desde el principio de la idtima 
insurreccion en Cuba basta la conclusion del tratado de paz ■? 

Cuarto. Al decirse que en el tratado se ba de convenir sobre la liber- 
tad de los detenidos por Espana por delitos politicos relacionados con 
las insurrecciones de Cuba y Filipinas, ^se quiere dar a enteuder que a 
la vez no se ba de convenir sobre la libertad de los imsoneros espa- 



216 TREATY OF PEACE. 

fioles que est<4n en poder de las fuerzas americanas y de siis aiixiliares j 
los insnrrectos de Cuba y Filipinas? 

Qiiinto. Tainbii'ii se ha de couveuir eii el tratado sobre la adquisieioii 
por los Kstados Unidos del dereclio de amarre de cables en otios sitios 
bajo la jurisdiccicui de FiSjiafia. ;;En que region estan dichos sitios? 
Esta trase, ^coiiipieiide solaniente los territorios de Espana en el Ori- 
ente o tambicii en lii renmsula' 

Sexto. Se dice asimisino ([ue se renovaran ciertos tratados que hasta 
ahora estnvieion en vigor entre los Estados Unidos y Es})aria, ^Cuales 
son estos tratados f 

Y tinalniente, S(''ptinio. Dicen los Comisarios aniericanos que si los 
esi)arioles aceptan final y concretaniente su ]noposici6n y las nnterioresi 
sobre Cuba, I'uerto liico y dennis islas, sera ])osible <i la Couiisiou en, 
jdeno continnar sus sesioues y proceder al estndio y aireglo de otrosi 
l)untos, ^ signifiean estas frases (lue si la Condsion espanola no acepta, 
tinal y concretaniente dicbas proposiciones, sin inodificacion sustancial, , 
la Comision en pleno no continnara sns sesioues? 

Os ruego y eucarezco la resolucion de estas dudas, si lo teneis a bien, 
sobre la inteligencia de vnestra proposicion, lo m;is pronto qne os sea 
posible, ])ara (pie la Comision es])ariola pueda dar en sesion de la Cond- 
sion en pleno la contestacion que cousidere procedcnte. 

Acei)tad, Senor, os lo ruego, el testimonio de mi tlistinguida conside- 
racidn. 

E. MONTEEO liios 

Paris, 22 de Noviembre de 1898. 



[Translation.] 

Annex 1 to Protocol ^o. 1G. 
commission for the negotiation of peace with the united 

STATES. 

Mr. William 1^ Day 

My dear Sir, In order that tliis Commission and, if necessary, the 
Government of H. C. M., may study with a full and exact knowledge 
the ju'oposition which closes the memorandum presented at yesterday's 
session by the Comnnssion yon worthily head, the translation into 
Spanish of which has just been completed, it becomes necessary to beg 
you that with all possible haste you will be pleased to nuike clear the 
meaning of the following points of said proposition, which to me is 
obscure and vague: 

First. Is the })roi)08ition you make based on the Spanish colonies 
being transferred free of all burdens, all, absolutely all outstanding 
obligations and debts, of whatsoever kind and whatever may have 
been their origin and purpose, remaining thereby chargeable exclusively 
to Spain f 

Second. Is the offer made by the United States to Spain to establish 
for a certain number of years similar conditions in the ports of the 
archipelago for vessels and merchandise of both nations, an offer which 
is i)receded by the assertion that the policy of the United States is to 
maintain an open door to the world's commerce, to be taken in the sense 
that the vessels and goods of other nations are to enjoy or can enjoy 



TREATY OF PEACE. 217 

the same privilege {sUuacion) which for a certain time is granted those 
of Spain, while the United States do not change snch policy ? 

Third. Tbe Secretary of State having stated in his note of Jnly 30 
last that the cession by Spain of the Island of Porto Rico and the other 
islands now nnder Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as one 
of the Ladrones, was to be as compensation for the losses and expenses 
of the United States during the war, and of the damages suffered by 
their citizens during the last insurrection in Cuba, what claims does the 
proposition refer to on reciuiring that there shall be inserted in the 
treaty a provision for the mutual relinquishment of all claims, indi- 
vidual and national, that have arisen from the beginning of the last 
insurrection in Cuba to the conclusion of the treaty of peace! 

Fourth. Upon stating that the treaty must contain an agreement as 
to the release of those held by Spain for ])olitical otienses connected 
with the insurrections of Cuba and the Philippines, is it desired that it 
be taken as meaning that at the same time there is to be no agreement 
as to the release of the Si)anish ])risoners held in tlie possession of the 
American forces and their auxiliaries, the insurgents of Cuba and the 
Philippines"? 

Fifth. In the treaty there is also to be an agreement as to the acquire- 
ment by the United States of cable landing privileges in other places 
under the juris<liction of Spain. Where are such places? Does this 
sentence only include territories of Spain in the Orient, or in the 
Peninsula also? 

Sixth. It is also said that certain treaties which were in force between 
the United States and Spain up to this time will be revived. What 
are these treaties'? 

And, finally, seventh. The American Commissioners say that if the 
Spanish Commissioners accept their proj>osition finally and definitely 
and the previous ])roposals as to Cuba, Porto Kico and other islands, it 
will be possible for the Joint Commission to continue its sessions and 
proceed to the examination and arrangement of other i)oints. Do these 
words mean that if the Si)anish Commission does not finally and defi- 
nitely accept said propositions without substantial modifications, the 
Joint Commission will not continue its sessions'? 

I beg and earnestly request you to settle these doubts, should you be 
so disposed, as to the meaning of your proposition as soon as may be 
possible, in order that the Spanish Commission may, in a session of the 
Joint Commission, furnish the reply it may deem proper. 

Accept, Sir, I pray you, the expression of my distinguished consid- 
eration. 

Signed: E. Montero Rios. 

Paris, November 23, 1898. 



Annex 2 to Protocol No. 16. 

United States and Spanish Peace Commission, 

United States Commissioners. 

Paris. November 22, 1898. 
Sehor Don E. Montero Eios. 

My dear Sir. Having received and read your letter of today, 
touching the final proposition presented by the American Commission- 
ers at yesterday's conference, I hasten to answer your enquiries seri- 
atini, first stating your question, and then giving my reply. 



218 TREATY OF PEACE. 

"First. Is tlie proposition you make based on the Spanish colonies 
beinji" transferred free of all burdens, all, absolutely all outstanding 
obligations and debts, of whatsoever kind and whatever may have 
been their origin and purpose, remaining thereby chargeable exclusively 
to Si)ain .'" 

In reply to this question, it is proper to call attention to the fact 
that the American Commissioners, in their paperof yesterday, expressed 
the hope that they might receive within a certain time "a definite and 
final acceptance" of their proposal as to the Philippines, and also " of 
the demands as to Cuba, Porto llico and other Spanish Islands in the 
West Indies, and Cuam, in the form in which those demands have been 
provisionally agreed to." 

The form in which they have thus been agreed to is found in the pro- 
posal presented by the American Commissioners on the ITtli of Octo- 
ber and annexed to the protocol of the (ith conference, and is as follows: 

"Article 1. Spain hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over 
and title to Cuba. 

"Article 2. Spain hereby cedes to the United States the Island of 
Porto Kico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the 
West Indies, and also the Island of Guam in the Ladrones." 

These articles contain no provision for the assumption of debt by the 
United States. 

In this relation, I desire to recall the statements in which the Ameri- 
can Commissioners have in our conferences rei)eatedly declared that 
they would not accei)t any articles that required the United States to 
assume the so-called colonial debts of Spain. 

To these statements I have nothing to add. 

But, in respect of the Philippines, the American Commissioners, while 
including the cession of the archipelago in the article in which Spain 
"cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also the Island 
of Guam in the Ladrones," or in an article expressed in similar words, 
will agree that their Government shall pay to Spain the sum of twenty 
million dollars (.$2(),(K)(),000). 

"Second. Is the otter made by the United States to Spain to estab- 
lish for a certain number of years similar conditions in the ports of the 
archipelago for vessels and merchandise of both nations, an otter which 
is preceded by the assertion that the policy of the United States is to 
maintain an open door to the world's commerce, to be taken in the 
sense that the vessels and goods of other nations are to enjoy or cau 
enjoy the same privilege [sittuichm] which for a certain time is granted 
those of Spain, while the United States do not cliange such policy T' 

The declaration that the policy of the United States in the Philip- 
pines will be that of an open door to the world's commerce necessarily 
imidies that the otter to place Spanish vessels and merchandise on the 
same footing as American is not intended to be exclnsive. But, the 
otter to give Spain that privilege for a term of years, is intended to 
secure it to her for a certain i)eriod by special treaty stipulation, what- 
ever might be at any time the general policy of the United States. 

"Third. The Secretary of State having stated in his note of July 30 
last that the cession by Spain of the Island of Porto Kico and the 
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well 
as one of the Ladrones, was to be as compensation for the losses and 
exi)enses of the United States during the war, and of the damages 
suttered by their citizens during the last insurrection in Cuba, what 
claims does the proposition refer to on re<iuiiing that there shall be 



TREATY OF PEACE. 219 

inserted in the treaty a provision for tlie mutual relinquishment of all 
claims, individual and national, that have arisen from the beginning- of 
the last insurrection in Cuba to the conckision of the treaty of peace!" 

While the idea doubtless was conveyed iu the note of the Secretary 
of State of the United States of the 30th of July last that the cession 
of " Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain 
in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, 
to be selected by the United States," was required on grounds of indem- 
nity, and that " on similar grounds the United States is entitled to 
occupy and will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the 
conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, dis- 
position and government of the Philippines," no deiinition has as yet 
been given of the extent or precise effect of the cessions in that regard. 
The American Commissioners therefore propose, in connection with the 
cessions of territory, "the mutual relinipiishment of all claims for 
indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of the United States 
against Spain and of Spain against the United States, that may have 
arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to 
he conclusion of a treaty of i)eace." 

And I may add that this offer is made by the American Commissioners 
in full view' of the fact that the citizens of the United States, having 
claims that come within the foregoing relinquishment, will, on the 
strength thereof, apply to their own Government for indemnity. 

As to the fourth, fifth and sixth questions contained in your letter, 
permit me to point out that they do not relate to matters concerning 
which the American Commissioners stated that the acceptance of our 
proposals within the time mentioned would be a condition of continuing 
the conferences. The xVmerican Commissioners confined that condition 
to their proposals touching Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands 
in the West Indies, Guam, and the Philippines. In respect of the other 
matters referred to, they expressed their readiness to "treat", iu case 
the Spanish Commissioners should remove the obstacle to so doing, by 
a definite and final acceptance of the proposals abovementioned, the 
refusal of which would render the continuance of the conferences 
impracticable. 

In what I have just said, you will find an answer to your seventh 
question. 

It does not appear to be necessary to specify at this moment the par- 
ticulars of the subjects referred to in your fourth, fifth and sixth ques- 
tions, since, if our proposals in regard to Cuba, Porto Rico and other 
Spanish islands in the West Indies, Guam, and the Philippines, are 
not accepted, the negotiations will end. I deem it proper, however, 
even at the risk of seeming to anticipate, to say, so far as concerns 
the subject of your fourth question, that the American Commissioners 
would expect to treat for the release of prisoners on the basis of abso- 
lute equality. All Spanish prisoners in the possession of the American 
forces would necessarily be released as the result of a treaty of peace; 
and the American Commissioners would be willing to stipulate that 
their Government would undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish 
prisoners in the hands of the insurgeuts iu Cuba and the Philippines. 

With an expression of regret that the process of translating your 
letter has somewhat delayed my reply, I beg you to accept, my dear 
sir, the expression of my distinguished consideration. 

Signed: William R. Day. 



220 treaty of peace, 

Annex 3 to Protocol No. 16. 

COMISION PARA LA NEG0CIACi6n DE LA. PAZ CON LOS ESTADOS UNIDOb, 

Hon. M. \\'iLLiAM K. Day, 

Presideute de la Comisioii amerieana para la paz con Espana. 

MUY SEXOR MIO de M[ DISTINCIUIDA CO.NSIDERACION. A fill de 

adelantar cuaiito sea posible los trabajos que por ambos Gobieruos a 
una y otia Coiiiisi<')n ban sido (Micomendados, y que ya recjuieren una 
pr<>xima termination, ruego ;V Vd., en nombre de esta Comisicm que se 
sirva proponer a la de su digna presidencia si estj'i disi)uesta a acceptar 
por via de traiisaccicni sobie la soberania del Arcliipielago Filipino 
cualquiera de las tres proposiciones signieutes: 

A. — " Eenuncia de Espana n su soberania en Cuba y cesi(')n de Puerto 
Eico y dennis Antillas, Isla de (hiam en las Ladrones y Archipielago 
Filipino, incluso Mindanao y Jolo, ii los Estados Unidos, habiendo de 
satistacer estos a Espana la eantidad de cien niillones de dollars 
($1()(),0()0,000) en compensaciou de su soberania en el arcbijnelago y de 
las obras de utilidad pilblica ejecutadas durante sudominacion eutodas 
las islas de Oriente y Occidente cuya soberania renuncia y cede." 

B. — "Cesi('>n a los Estados Unidos de la IslaCusayeen las Carolinas, 
del derecho de aniarre de un cable en cualquiera de ellas 6 de las 
Marianas, niientras seaii del dominio de Espana. y del Archipielago 
Filijiino propiainente dicho, <> sea euipezando por el Norte, de las Islas 
Batanes, Babuyanes, Luzon, Visayas y todas las demas (jue siguen al 
Sur hastael mar de Jolo, reservjindose Plspafia al Sur de este mar las 
Islas de Mindanao y Job), que nunca ban formado parte del Arclii- 
pielago Filipino propiamente diebo. 

"Los r^stados Unidos en compensaciou de las islas sobredicbas, del 
derecbo de amarre del cable y de las obras publicas ejecutadas por 
Esi^afia en aquellas islas durante su dominaciim, abonaran a Espana 
la eantidad de cincuenta millones de dollars (.$50,000,000)." 

C. — " Espana renuncia a su soberania en Cnba y cede gratuitameute 
a los Estados Unidos el Archipiidago Filii)ino propiainente dicbo, ade- 
mas de Puerto Kico y deuias .Vntillas y la Isla de Guam que cede en 
conipeiisacion de los gastos de guerra e indemnizaciones deciudadanos 
americanos por danos sufridos desde el priucii^io de la ultima insurrec- 
cion cubana: 

"Los Estados Unidos y Espaiia someteran a un tribunal arbitral 
cuales son las deudas y obligaciones de caracter colonial, que debau 
pasar con las islas cuya soberania Espana renuncia y cede." 

liuego a Yd. que esa Comision se sirva deliberar sobre cada una de 
estas proposiciones por si considera acceptable cualquiera de ellas, 
Gomiinicjiudomelo si lo tiene a bien antes del lunes proximo 28 del cor- 
riente o teniendo formado ya su juicio para dicbo dfa (que es el tijado 
en la I'ltima proposici^n de esa Comision), en ([ue jiodran reunirse ambas 
en pleno a la bora acostumbrada de lasdos de la tarde, yen cuya sesion 
esta Comisi(')n espanola dara su delinitiva contestacion, de (jue, segi'in 
la de la amerieana, habrj'i de dependerla continuacion 6 terminacicni de 
estas conferencias. 

Queda de Vd. con la mayor consideracion atento servidor q. 1. b. 1. m. 

E. MoNTERo Bios 
Paris, 23 de Noviembre de 1898. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 221 

[Translation.] 

Annex 3 to Protocol No. 16. 
commission for the negotiation of peace with the united 

STATES. 

Hod. William E. Day, 

President of the American Commission for Peace icith Spam. 
My dear and esteemed Sir, Iu order to push to the utmost the 
work which has been entrusted by the two Governments to one and 
the other Commission and which now requires a prompt termination, 
I beg you, in the name of this Commission, to be pleased to propose to 
that worthily headed by you whether it is willing to accept, by way of 
compromise in re the sovereignty of the Philippine Archipelago, any 
of the three propositions following: 

A. " Kelinqnishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and 
cession of Porto Eico and other Antilles, Island of Guam in the 
Ladrones and the Phili])pine Archipelago, including Mindanao and 
Snlu, to the United States, the latter paying to Spain the sum of one 
hundred million (.$10(),0()0,0()0) dollars as compensation for her sover- 
eignty in the Archipelago and the works of public utility she has exe- 
cuted during her rule in all the islands of the East and West the 
sovereignty over which she relinquishes and cedes.'' 

B. " Cession to the United States of the Island of Cusaye in the 
Carolines, of the right to land a cable on any of these or of the Marianas, 
while they remain under Spanish rule, and [cesion) of the Philippine 
Archipelago proper, that is, beginning on the North, the Islands of 
Batanes, Babuyanes, Luzon, Visayas, and all the others following to the 
south as far as the Sulu Sea, Spain reserving to the south of this sea the 
Islands of Mindanao and Sulu which have never formed a part of the 
Philippine Archipelago proper. 

"The United States, as compensation for said islands, for the right 
to land cables and for the public works executed by Spain in said islands 
during her rule, will pay to Spain the sum of fifty million ($50,000,000) 
dollars." 

C. " Spain relinquishes her sovereignty over Cuba and gratuitously 
cedes to the United States the Philipi)ine Archipelago proper, besides 
Porto Eico, the other West Indies and the Island of Guam, which she 
cedes as compensation for the expenses of the war and as indemnity to 
American citizens for injuries sufiered since the beginning of the last 
Cuban insurrection. 

" The United States and Spain will submit to an arbitral tribunal 
what are the debts and obligations of a colonial character which should 
pass with the islands the sovereignty over which Spain relinquishes and 
cedes." 

I beg you that said Commission be pleased to deliberate over each of 
these propositions so" that, should it consider anyone of them acceptable, 
it may be communicated to me, should you be so disposed, before Mon- 
day next, the l*8th instant, or your mind being already made up, on that 
day (which is the one set in the last proposition of the said Commission) 
when the two Commissions may meet jointly at the usual hour of two, 
p. m., at which session this, the Spanish Commission, will give its final 
reply, upon which, according to the answer of the American, must 
depend the continuation or termination of these conferences. 

I remain, with the greatest consideration, your obedient servant. 

Signed: E. Montero Eios. 

Paris, November 23, 1898. 



222 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Annex 4 to Protocol No. 10. 

United States and Spanish Peace Commission. 

United States Commissioners. 

I'aris. November 26, 1898. 

My dear Sir, Your letter dated the 2;'>rd instant, in whicli yoa 
pr()l)Ose, by way of compromise, the adoption of one of three alternative 
jn-opositions, in place of the proposition submitted by the American 
Commissioners at oar last conference, was not received by me till the 
evening- of the 24th. 

I at once had it carefully translated, and, in compliance with your 
request, laid it before my associates. 

We maturely considered it, and, although our last proposition, which 
was submitted under instructions, was expre>sly declared to be final, 
we decided, in view of the importance of the subject, to communicate 
your proposals to our Government. 

Its answer has just been received; and, as we anticipated, it instructs 
us to adhere to the tinal pro])osition which we have already submitted. 

It is proper to say that my associates and myself, during the long 
course of the negotiations, have, in accordance with the wishes of our 
Government, given the most deliberate attention to everything in the 
way of argument or of suggestion that has been brought to our notice, 
in the hope that some basis of nuitual agreement might be found. But, 
unfortunately, our discussions seemed to divide us, rather than to bring 
us together, and no progress was made towards a common accord. 

Under these circumstances the American Commissioners, acting 
upon explicit instructions, offered at once, for the sake of peace, all 
the concessions which their Government was able to make concerning 
the particular matters embraced in the proposition the acceptance of 
which was made a condition of further negotiations. 

As I stated in my letter of the 23rd instant, if that proposition should 
be accepted, the matters referred to iii the concluding paragraph of 
the paper submitted by the American Commissioners at the last ses- 
sion, would become the subject of negotiations, and, in regard to them, 
I should hope for a mutualiy satisfactory arrangement. 

The American Commissioners expect to be present at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs on Monday next for the purpose of receiving the 
answer to their final proposition. 

I remain, with the highest consideration, your obedient servant, 

Signed: William R. Day. 

Senor Don E. MoNTERO Rios, etc., etc., etc. 



Protocol No. 17. Protocolo No. 17. 

Conferencia del 30 de Noviemhre de 

Conference of November 30, 1898. 1898. 

Present: On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los Esta- 

United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, dos Unidos de Am<'-rica. los Seno- 

Frye, Gray, Peid, Moore, Fergus- res Day, Davis, Frye, (4ray, Eeid, 

son, Moore, Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: Por parte de Espana los Seno- 
Montero Pios, Abarzuza, Garnica, res Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Gar- 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. uica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



223 



The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the American 
Commission presented a draft of 
articles with reference to the con- 
clnsion of a detinitive treaty, in the 
first part of which draft were in- 
cluded the articles agreed upon by 
the two Secretaries for subniissioji 
to the Joint (Jomniission, in rela- 
tion to, the matters comprised in 
the proposition accepted by the 
Spanish Commissioners at the last 
session. 

The Joint Commission then pro- 
ceeded to the consideration of the 
draft, article by article, and, after 
discussing some of the articdes, de- 
cided to adjourn the session, and 
to continue the discussion at the 
next conference, which was fixed 
for Thursday, the 1st of December, 
at three o'clock, p. m. 

William K. Dat 

CusHMAN K. Davis 

Wm P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Keid. 

John B. Moore. 



Fur leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

El Presidente de la Coinisicm 
Americana presenta un proyecto de 
articulos para hi concdusion de un 
tratado de paz defiititivo, en cuya 
parte primera est;in incluidos los 
que fneron acordados entre los Sec- 
retarios de ambas Comisiones para 
ser sometidos a la Comisiou en 
pleno, relatives a las materias com- 
prendidas en la proposicion acep- 
tada por los Coniisarios Espaholes 
en la ultima sesion. 

La Comisiou en pleno procedio 
entonces al examen de los articulos 
uno por uno y despues de discutir 
algunos de ellos, decidio levantar 
la sesion y contiuuar la discusiou 
en la proxima Conferencia, que se 
fijo para el Jueves 1" de Diciembre 
alas L>P. M. 

E. MONTERO Rios 
B. DE AbARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA 

W. R. DE Villa-Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 18. 



Protocolo No 18. 



Conference of December 3, 1S9S. Conferencia del 2 Diciembre de 1898. 



The session which was to have 
been held yesterday having been 
postponed by mutual agreement, 
owing to a lack of time to exam- 
ine the modifications and addi- 
tions proposed by the Spanish 
Commissioners to the draft of a 
treaty presented by the American 
Commissioners at the session of 
November 30, the two Commis- 
sions met to-day at two p. m., 
there being 

Present On the part of the 
United States: Messrs: Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garuica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 



Aplazada de comun acuerdo la 
conferencia que debio celebrarse 
ayer por falta de tierapo para ex- 
aminar las moditicaciones y adi- 
ciones propuestas por los Comisa- 
rios Espaholes al i»royecto de Trat- 
ado presentado por los Comisarios 
Americanos en hi sesion del 30 de 
Noviembre, reunicronse hoy a las 
2 p. m. ambas Comisiones hallan- 
dose 

Presentes Por parte de los 
Estados Unidos de America: los 
Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espaha : los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 



224 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The protocol of the preceding- 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the American 
Commission observed that at the 
last session he had presented a 
draft of articles for a tinal treaty, 
and asked the Spanish Commis 
sioners if they had examined it, 
and were ready to give their reply. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission answered that lie had 
consulted his Government, and 
that he could not reply until he had 
received its instructions; but that, 
in any case, the Spanish Commis- 
sion was not inclined to treat of 
subsidiary points as the American 
Commission desired, without hav- 
ing lirst disi)Osed of all the points 
essential to the treaty of peace. 

The President of the American 
Commission asked the President of 
the Spanish Commission whether 
he could state when he would re- 
ceive the instructions; and the 
latter replied that he would proba- 
bly receive them to-day or to mor- 
row. 

The American Commissioners 
proposed that the Commission pro- 
ceed to the reading and discussion 
of the articles presented by them 
that were not taken up at the last 
session. The President of the 
Spanish Commission observed that 
as those articles were divided into 
two parts, one comiuising the lirst 
eight articles examined and ap- 
proved at the last session with the 
exception of four points, three of 
which the Americans were to ex- 
amine and the fourth of which was 
to be submitted by the Spaniards 
to their (lovernment, and as the 
other part also was dependent 
upon instructions from that Gov- 
ernment, he deemed it useless to 
examine and discuss the latter 
I)art. And, on the other liand, he 
stated that the Secretary (leneral 
of the Spanish Commission had 
delivered to the Secretary (jcneral 
of the American Commission a 
draft of other articles which must 
necessarily form part of the treaty 



Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesiou anterior. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana recuerda queen la ulti- 
ma sesion presento un ])royecto de 
articulos para un tratado definitivo 
y pregunta si los Comisarios Es[)a- 
iioles si lo han examinado y estan 
dispuestos a dar una contestacion 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola manitiesta que ha con- 
sul tado a su Gobierno y no puede 
contestar hasta haber recibido sus 
iiistincciones; pero de todos modos 
no estii dispuesta la Comision 
Esi)ariolaa tratar de los puntos ac- 
cessorios (pie desea la Americana 
sin ([ue antes se liaya concluido 
con todo lo relativo a lo que con- 
stituye esencialmente el Tratado de 
paz. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana pregunta aide la Espa- 
nola si puede decirle cuando reci- 
bira dichas instrucciones, y el 
Presidente de la Comision Espanola 
con testa que probabtemente las 
recibira de hoy a mafiana. 

Proponen los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos que se ijroceda a la lectura 
y discusion de los articulos por 
ellos propuestos que no fueron ex- 
aminados en la sesion anterior y 
el Presidente de la Comisiiin Es- 
panola hace observar que dividien- 
dose dichos articulos en dos par- 
tes: una compuesta de los ocho 
primeros articulos ya examinada y 
aprobada en la ultima sesion salvo 
cuatro ijuntos tres de los cuales 
quedaron los Americanos en estu- 
diar y el 4° cjuedaron los Espaholes 
en consultar a su Gobierno, y la 
otra i)endiente tambien de instruc- 
ciones de su Gobierno, cree iniitil 
examinar y discutir esta ultima. 
En cambio hace x^resente que el 
Secretario General de la Comision 
Espanola ha entregado al de la 
Americana el proyecto de los demas 
articulos que dcbcn formar parte 
necesariamente del Tratado de paz 
y sobre los cuales hasta el i)resente 
momento la Coinision Americana 
nada ha contestado y ademas que 



TREATY OP' PEACE. 



225 



of peace and with respect to which 
the American Commissioners had 
not as yet given an answer; and 
further that the American Com- 
mission was to have consulted its 
Government and to yive an answer 
to-day on the three points above 
mentioned as forming a part ot 
some of the eight articles already 
approved, which answer was nec- 
essary in order that the agreement 
previously reaclietl upon these ar- 
ticles might l)e enlarged ; and that, 
therefore, with a view to preserve 
iu the discussion the natural order, 
he considered it requisite that the 
articles that were indispensable to 
such treaty should be (■om})leted 
by the answer of the American 
Commissioners before passing on 
to the discussion of points of minor 
interest which did not affect the 
condudiug of peace, though this 
did not imply that the Spanish 
Commissioners did not entertain 
the desire to take thein up at the 
proper time. 

The American Commissioners 
insisted that these subsidiary 
points be taken up, or all discus- 
sion be postponed until the Span- 
ish Commissioners shall have 
received instructions to treat upon 
all tlie points which have been 
submitted to them. 

The President of the Si)anish 
Commission held to his oi)inion, 
insisting that even after the in- 
structions of his Government with 
respect to the subsidiary points 
were received, the Spanish Com- 
mission would not discuss them 
until after the terininatiou of the 
discussion of the articles which it 
had presented, and which related 
to /the treaty of ])eace proper. The 
American Commission having in 
quired as to what were the three 
points to which the President of 
the Spanish Commission had above 
referred, which the American Com- 
missioners were to examine, he re- 
plied that they were as follows: 
The extending to Cuba and Porto 
Eico of the commercial treatment 
granted to Spain in the Philip- 
T p 15 



la Comision Americana qued(3 en 
consultar a su Gobierno y en dar 
hoy contestaciou sobre dichos tres 
indicados puntos relativos a al- 
gunos de los ocho articulos apro- 
bados que faltabau para ampliar 
sobre dichos puntos el acuerdo ya 
tomado sobre aquellos y (pie por 
tanto, con objeto de guardar en la 
discusion el orden natural, con- 
sidera necesario que se completen 
estos articulos indispensables de 
di(;ho Tratado con la contestaciou de 
los Comisarios Americanos, antes 
de pasar a discutir puntos demenor 
interes que no afecton a la conclu- 
sion de la paz, lo cual no quiere 
decir que los Comisarios Espafioles 
no tengan el deseo de tratar opor- 
tunamente de ellos. 



Insisten los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos en que deben ser examina- 
dos estos puntos subsidiaries 6 
renunciarse a toda discusion hasta 
que los Comisarios Espanoles ha- 
yau recibido iustrucciones para 
tratar sobre todos los puntos que 
les hayan sido sometidos. 

Mantiene el Presidente de la 
Comisi('>n Espahola su opinion in- 
sistiendos en que aim despues de 
recibidas las iustrucciones de su 
Gobierno sobre tales puntos acces- 
orios la Comision Espanola no eu- 
trara a discutirlos sino despues 
que se hay a terminado la discusion 
de los articulos (jue tiene present- 
ado y (|ue son relativos al Tratado 
de paz propriamento dicho, y hab- 
iendole preguntado la Comision 
Americana cualeseran los tres pun- 
tos a que se referia el Presidente 
de la Comision Espanola y que de- 
biau ser examinados por la Com- 
ision Americana, contesta que son 
tres, a saber: ampliaciou a Cuba y 
Puerto Rico del trato comercial 
concedido a Espana en Filipinas; 
repatriacion por cuenta de ambas' 



226 



TREATY OF PEA(^E. 



pines; the repati'intion at the ex- 
pense of both nations of the pris- 
oners taken, and the return to 
Spain of the war material in Onba 
and Porto Rico with respect to 
which the evacuation coniniissions 
had not come to a decision, since 
such material in the I'hilippines, 
he understood, belonged to Spain. 
He added that the Spanish Com- 
mission had promised to consult its 
Government re.uarding the main- 
teiuxnce of public order in the Phil- 
ippines, and that if the American 
Commissioners were ready to enter 
upon the discussion to which they 
were invited, he would, without 
having received instructions, un- 
dertake to give a categorical an- 
swer upon this poijit, which answer 
he was confident his Government 
would ratify. 

The discussion continued, the 
American Commission insisting on 
its proposal to discuss the whole of 
its draft, or to postpone all discus- 
sion until the Spanish Commission 
should have instructions upon all 
points. The Spanish Commission, 
holding to its opinion that it was 
duly authorized to treat upon 
everything essential to the treaty 
of peace, and therefore ready to 
sign its articles at once, but deter- 
mined not first to treat of those 
points which are not essential to 
the treaty, asked that its readiness 
to discuss in the natural order what- 
ever related directly tothetreaty of 
peace, be spread upon the minutes. 

The arguments on both sides 
having been rei)eated, the Presi- 
dent of the American Commission 
stated that he as well as his col- 
leagues hoped that the relations 
of the two countries might not be 
limited to the strict terms of a 
treaty of peace, but rather that 
an agreenu^nt might be reached 
for mutual concessions which 
Avould be beneficial to both Gov- 
ernments and promote the cordial- 
ity in their relations. The Presi- 
dent of the Spanish Commission 
stated that this was also the desire 



naciones de los prisioneros hechos, 
y devoiftci<')n a Espahadel material 
de guerra en Cuba y Puerto Kico 
de que ya no hubieran dispuesto 
las Comisiones de evacuacion, i)or- 
que en cuanto al existente eu Fili- 
pinas entiende el Presidente que 
pertenecia a Espana. Ahade (pie 
por su ])arte la Comision Espanola 
se comprometi(') a consultar acerca 
del mantenimiento del orden pub- 
lico en Filii)inas y que si losComisa- 
rios Americanos estan dispuestos 
a aceptar la discnsion a que les in- 
vita, <'l se compromete sin haber 
recibido instrucciones a dar sobre 
este i)unto una respuesta catego- 
rica que su Gobierno confia en (|ue 
ratificara. 



Continuo la discnsion nmntenieu- 
do la Comision Americana su pro- 
posito de discutirel conjuntode su 
proyecto 6 de aplazar toda dis- 
cusion hasta que la Espanola teuga 
instrucciones sobre todos sus extre- 
mos, y sosteniendo la Espanola su 
criterio de que estan debidatuente 
autorizados a tratarde cuanto cons- 
tituye el Tratado de paz esencial- 
mente dicho,y dispuestos por tanto 
a firmar sus cliiusulas al punto; 
pero resueltos a no tratar antes 
aquellos puntos que no son esen- 
ciales a dichotratado,desean conste 
en el acta su disposici(')n a seguir 
discutiendo por suorden natural 
cuanto a dicho Tratado de paz di- 
rectamente se refiere. 

l\e])itense los argumentos por 
una y otra ])arte y habiendo mani- 
festado el Presidente de la Comi- 
si(')n Americana que tanto el como 
sus colegas esperaban que no se 
limitarian las relaciones de ambos 
l)aises a las condiciones estrictas 
de un Tratado de paz, sino que 
podria llegarse a uu acaierdo sobre 
mntuas concesiones beneficiosas 
l)ara ambos (iobiernos y que fo- 
mentarian la cordialidad en sus 
relaciones, el Presidente de la Co- 
mision EspaPiola manifest(') que 
tales eran tambien los deseos de 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



227 



of the Spanish Coinmissioners, 
but that to his iiiiud it woiihl be 
easier to reach an uuderstaiiding 
upon the less important jwiuts if 
the decisions arrived at on the 
necessary articles of the treaty of 
peace were satisfactory. 

The American Commissioners 
proposed to adjourn the session in 
order that the instructions awaited 
by the Spanish Commissioners 
might arrive, and to examine the 
articles presented by the latter. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
agreed to this, and the session was 
adjourned till Saturday, the 3rd 
instant, at two p. m. 

William E. Day 

CusHMAN K. Davis 

Wm P P^rye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Reid. 

John B. Moore. 



los Comisarios Espailoles pero que 
en su sentir cuanto mas satisfac- 
torias fnesen las soluciones dadas 
a los articulos indispensables del 
Tratado de paz nuis se facilitaria 
la inteligencia a que podrfa llegarse 
respecto de los demas puutos 
menos importantes. 

Los Comisarios Americanos pro- 
pusieron aplazar la sesion a fin de 
dar lugar a (|ue llegasen las ins- 
trucciones que aguardaban los 
Comisarios Espafioles y a estudiar 
los articulos por estos preseutados. 

Acordado asi por la Comision 
Espanola se aplazo la sesion para 
el sabado 3 del corriente a las 2, 
p. m. 

E. MojMTEro Eios 
E. DE Abarzuza 

J. DE GARNICA 

W E DE Villa Uerutia 

EAI AEL CERERO 

Emilio de O.ieda 



Protocol No. 19 



Protocolo No. 19. 



Conference of December 5, 1898. Confcrencia del 5 Biciemhre del808. 



At the request of the American 
Commissioners the session which 
was to have been held on Satur- 
day the 3rd instant was postponed 
until today at three p. m., when 
there were 

Present On the part of the 
United States: Messrs: IMy, 
Davis, Frye, (xray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, OJeda. 

The protocol of the ])rece(ling 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the American 
Commission asked the President 
of the Spanish Commission whether 
he had received instructions from 
his Government touching the 
points on which the American 
Coinmissioners desired to treat. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that he had in 



A peticion de los Comisarios 
Americanos la sesi(')n que debio 
celebrarse el Sabado 3 del corriente 
fue aplazada })ara hoy a las 3, hal- 
landose en dichos dia y hora 

Presentes Por parte de los 
Estados Unidos de America: los 
Senores Day Davis Frye Gray 
Eeid Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana . los Senores 
Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, OJeda. 

Fut' leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Pregunta el Presidente de la 
Comision Americana al Presidente 
de la Comision Espanola si ha reci- 
bido instrucciones de su Gobierno 
relativas a los puntos que la Comi- 
sion americana deseaba tratar, y el 
Presidente de la Comision Espanola 
contesta que en efecto las ha reci-^ 
bido pero que reitera su proposito 



22S 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



fact received tliem; but be reiter- 
ated his purpose not to take up 
those i»oiiits until the matters in- 
herent in and essential to the treaty 
ot peace ])roper should be discussed 
and linaily ai)proved. 

It was agreed that the Commis- 
sions should comnumu'ate to each 
other the answers of their respec- 
tive Goveruujeiits to the questions 
previously subnntted to them. 
The President of the American 
(Joinmission stated, in the first 
place, that his Government was 
uot willing- to grant and embody 
in the treaty of i)eace the cxteu- 
sion to Porto Kico and Cuba of 
the commercial treatment otfered 
to Spain in the l*hilii)i)iues for ten 
jears; but that, recognizing the 
advisability of concluding a com- 
mercial agreement between the 
countries, the subject might be 
treated of in a general commercial 
convention. 

With respei't to the return and 
transportation at the expense of 
each nation of the prisoners taken 
by it, it was agreed, as an addi 
tion to Article Vill, that Spain 
and the United States should 
transi)ort them at their expense 
to the nearest port of their resi)ec- 
tive countries, but that the trans- 
portation of prisoners of war taken 
in the Philippines should not in- 
clude native soldiers but only 
Peninsular Spaniards in the army. 
The Secretaries-General of the two 
Commissions were charged with 
the franjing of this addition to 
Arthle VIIL 

With regard to the return of the 
war material in Cuba and Porto 
Kico not disi)osed of by the evac- 
uation commissions, the American 
Commissioners declared that they 
were not authoi'ized to treat, 

AVitli res])e(;t to the war material 
in the IMiilippines, the Anu-rican 
Commissioners stated that it should 
be goveined by the same C(»ndi- 
tions as were agreed to by the 
evacuation commissions in the 
West Indies. 



de no tratar dichos puutos hasta 
que se hayan discutido y aprobado 
detinitivamente ]osasuntos(|ueson 
inherentes y esenciales al Tratado 
de paz i)ro]»ianiente diclio. 

Se convino en comenzar por 
comunicarse andtas Comisiones las 
contestaciones respectivas de sus 
Gobieruos a los puntos que les 
fueron sometidos anteriormente y 
manitiesta el Presidente de la 
Comision Americana en primer 
lugar, que su (lobierno no esta 
dispuesto a conceder y consiguar 
en este Tratado de paz la extension 
;1 Puerto liico y ii Cuba del trato 
comercial ofrecido ;i Espana du- 
rante diez anos en Filipiuas; pero 
que reconociendo la coveniencia 
de ([ue se pacte un acuerdo comer- 
cial entre ambospaises, podria tra- 
tarse este asunto en uu tratado de 
comereio. 

Eesi)ecto de la devolucicJn y tras- 
porte por cuenta de una y otra 
jS'aciihi de los i)risioneros hechos 
por cada una de ellas, se acuerda 
como adicidn al Articulo VII I, 
que Espana y los Estados Unidos 
los trasportar.in a su costa al 
puerto mas cercano de sus paises 
respectivos, pero que el tras[)orte 
de los prisioneros de guerra hechos 
en Filipinas, no se extendera a los 
soldados indigenas sino a los indi- 
viduos i)eninsulares de aquel ejcr- 
cito. Los Secretarios Generales de 
ambas Comisiones (juedan encarga- 
dos de la redaccionde esta adiciim 
al Articulo VlII. 

En lo relativo a la devolucion del 
material de guerra en Cuba y Puer- 
■ to Kico de que no hayan dispuesto 
las Comisiones de evacuacion, la 
Comision Americana se declarain- 
competcnte ])ara tratar. 

Ilespecto del material de guerra 
existente en Filipiuas, los Comisa- 
rios Americanos maiufestaron que 
debia ajustarse ii lasmismas condi- 
ciones acordadas por las Comisio- 
nes de evacuacion en las Antillas. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



229 



The President of the Spauish 
Commission and his colleagues 
maintained that the cession of the 
archipelago did not carry and could 
not carry with it anything except 
what was of a tixed nature; they 
explained the character of the 
siege artillery and heavy ordnance 
which the Americans claimed for 
themselves, and after some dis- 
cussion to the end of determining 
precisely what each Commission 
understood as portable and iixed 
material, it was agreed that stands 
of colors, uncaptured war vessels, 
small arms, guns of all calibres, 
with their carriages and accesso- 
ries, powder, ammunition, live 
stock, and materials and supplies 
of all kinds belonging to the laud 
and naval forces shall remain the 
property of Spain; that pieces of 
heavy ordnance, exclusive of held 
artillery, in the fortifications, shall 
remain in their emplacements for 
the term of six months to be reck- 
oned from the ratitication of the 
treaty; and that the United Stntes 
might, in the mean time, purchase 
such material from Spain, if a sat- 
isfactory agreement between the 
two (jiovernments on the subject 
should be reached. 

It was agreed that the Secreta- 
ries-General of the two Commis- 
sions should be entrnsted with the 
framing of such an article. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission, having agreed at the 
last session to consult his Govern- 
ment regarding the proposal of the 
American Commissioners that tlie 
United States should maintain 
public order over the whole Philip- 
pine Archipelago, pending the ex- 
change of ratifications of the treaty 
of peace, stated that the answer 
of his Government was that the 
authorities of each of the two 
nations should be charged with the 
maintenance of order in the places 
where they might be established, 
those authorities agreeing among 
themselves to this end whenever 
they might deem it necessary. 



El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola y sus colegas manifesta- 
ron que la cesion de dicho Arclii- 
pi?lago no llevaba ni podia llevar 
consigo siiio lo que es de caracter 
inmueble, explicaron las condi- 
ciones de la artilleria de plaza y 
de sitio que reclamaban para si 
los Americanos, y despues de al- 
guna discusi(')n al efecto de deter- 
minar con precision lo que una y 
otra Comision eutendian por mate- 
rial portatil y material tijo, se con- 
viene en que seran propiedad de 
Espafia banderas y estandartes, 
buques de guerra no apresados, 
arm as porta tiles, cafiones de todos 
calibres con sus montajes y acce- 
sorios, polvoras, municiones, ga- 
nado, material y efectos de toda 
clase pertenecientes a los ej«''rcitos 
de mar y tierra; que las piezas de 
grueso calibre, que no scan artil- 
leria de canipana, colocadas en las 
fortificaciones y en las costas, (jne- 
daran en sus emplazamientos i^or 
el plazo de seis ineses a partir del 
canje de ratificaciones del tratado; 
y que los Estados Unidos podran, 
dur;i:ite este tiein[K), comprar . 4 
Espaila dicho material si ambos 
Gobiernos llegan a un acuerdo 
satisfactorio sobre el particular. 

Se acuerda que los Secretarios 
Generales de ambas Comisiones 
queden encargados de redactar 
dicho articulo. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola habieudo ([uedado en la 
sesion anterior en consultar ;i su 
Gobierno, respecto la i)roposici6n 
de los Comisarios Americanos por 
la dial los Estados Unidos man- 
tendriau el orden en todo el Archi- 
piclago lilipino, mientras se ratifi- 
caba el Tratado de paz, manifiesta 
que la contestacion de su Gobierno 
es que las Autoridades de cada una 
de ambas naciones cuiden de con- 
servar el orden en las regiones en 
que se hallen establecidas y po- 
nirudose con este objeto de acuer- 
do Unas y otras cuando lo estimen 
necesario. 



230 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



In view of tliis reply tlie Ameri- 
can Commissioners did not insist 
that their proposal should be incor- 
porated in the treaty. 

The readin*;in English and Span- 
ish of the articles of the treaty 
from the first to the eighth inclu- 
sive was then proceeded with, and 
they were approved by both Com- 
missions, which declared them to 
be tinal save as to mere modifica- 
tions of form, upon which the Sec- 
retai'ies General might endeavor to 
agree. 

The President of the American 
Commission, desiring that the dis- 
cussion of the matters presented 
by that Commission should next be 
taken ui),the Presidentof the Span 
isli Commission maintained the 
opinion which he had expressed at 
the last session, and at the begin- 
ningof this, to the effect timt the ex- 
amination of those matters should 
not be entered upon until the Com- 
missions had discussed what was 
essential to the treaty of i)eace. and 
that therefore the articles ])ro- 
iwsed by the Spanish Commission 
as additional to the first eight, 
should be taken up. 

It was agreed that in view of the 
lateness of the hour the session 
should be adjourned until tomor- 
row, Tuesday, the <)th instant, at 
two, p. m. 

William 1*. Day 

CusHMAN K. Davis 

Wm P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Eeid. 

John B. Moore. 



En vista de esta contestacion, 
los CoHHSarios Americanos no in- 
sistieron en que formase su jiropo- 
sicion ])arte del Tratado. 

Se procede en seguida a la lec- 
tura en espanol y en ingles de los 
articulos del tratado desde el pri- 
mero al ocho inclusive y son apro- 
bados por ambas Comisiones que 
los declaran definitivos salvas cu- 
alquieramoditicacionderaera forma 
sobre las cuales tratarian de ])o- 
uerse de acuerdo los Secretarios 
Generales. 

Deseando entonces el Presidente 
de la Comision Americana que se 
pasase a la discusi('»n de los puntos 
presentados por su Comision, y 
manteniendo el Presidente de la 
Comision Espahola el criterio que 
habfa sostenido en la sesion ante- 
rior y al principio de esta, de que 
no poilia pasarse al examen de 
dichos puntos sin haber antes di- 
scutido cuanto era esencial al tra- 
tado de ])az y tomando por tanto 
en consideracion los articulos adi- 
ciorrales a los ocho ])rimeros, pro- 
puestos por la Comisit'»n Espanola, 
acordose que en vista de lo avan- 
zado de la hora se aplazasela sesion 
hasta ma'lana martes del corri- 
ente a las dos, p. m. 



EUGENIO ]Montero Eios 
B. DE Aearzuza 

J, DE GARNICA 

W K DE Villa Urrutia 

I'AFAEL CERBRO 

Emilio De O.teda 



Annex to Protocol No. 19, 
the eight articles as discussed in the conference. 



ri!K.\Min,E. 



The United States of America 
and Her Majesty the Queen Re- 
gent of Spain, in the name of her 
An gust Son Don Alfonso Xlll, 



rUKAMIULO. 



. M. la Keina Kegente de Es- 
pana, en nombre de Su Augusto 
Hijo Don Alfonso Xlll, y los Es- 
tados ITnidos de America, dese- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



231 



desiring to end the state of war 
now existing between the two 
countries, have for that purpose 
appointed as Plenipotentiaries : 

The President of the United 
States, William R. Day, lately 
Secretary of State 5 Cushman K. 
Davis, a Senator of the United 
States; William P. Frye,a Senator 
of the United States: George Grray, 
a Senator of the United States; 
and Whitelaw lieid, lately Minis- 
ter Plenii)otentiary of the United 
States to France; 

And Her Majesty the Queen 
Eegent of Spain, (here insert 
names and titles). 

Who, having assembled in Paris, 
and having exchanged their fall 
powers, which were found to be 
in due and proper form, have, after 
discussion of the matters before 
them, agreed upon the following 
articles: 



ando poner te'rmino al estado de 
guerra hoy existente entre ambas 
Naciones, han nombrado con este 
objeto por sus Plenipotenciarios, a 
saber : 

S. M. la Reina Regente de Es- 
paha a (aqui se insertan los nom- 
bres) y el Presidente de los Estados 
Uuidos de America a (aqui se in- 
sertan los nombres). 



Los cuales reunidos en Paris, 
despues de habersecomunicado sus 
plenipotencias respectivas, habien- 
dolas hallado en bueua y debida 
forma, previa la discusion de las 
materias pendientes. han conve- 
nido en los articulos siguientes: 



Article I. 



Articulo 1''. 



Spain hereby relinquishes all 
claim of sovereignty over and title 
to Cuba. 

And as the island is, upon its 
evacuation by S])ain, to be occu- 
pied by the United States, the 
United States will, so long as such 
occupation shall last, assume and 
discharge the obligations that 
may under international law at- 
tach to its character as occupant, 
for the protection of life and prop- 
erty. 

« Article II. 

Spain hereby cedes lo the United 
States the Island of Porto Rico 
and other islands now under Span- 
ish sovereignty in the West Indies, 
and the Island of Guam in the 
Ladrones or Marianas. 



Espana por el presente renuncia 
todo derecho de Soberauia y pro- 
piedad sobre la Isla de Cuba. 

En atencion a (lue dicha Isla esta 
apuuto de ser evacuada por Espafui 
y ocupada por los Estados Unidos, 
los Estados Unidos mientras dure 
su ocu])acion, tomaran sobre si y 
cumpliriin las obligaciones que el 
derecho internacional impone a un 
caracter de ocupantes, para la pro- 
tecciou de vidas y haciendas. 

Articulo 2". 

EspaQa por el presente Tratado 
cede a los Estados Unidos la Isla 
de Puerto Rico y las demas que 
estan ahora bajo su soberauia en 
las Indias Occidentales, y la Isla 
de Guam en el Archipielago de las 
Marianas 6 Ladrones. 



Article III. 

Spain hereby cedes to the United 
States the archipelago known as 



Articulo 3°. 

Cede tambien Espana a los Esta- 
dos Unidos el Archipielago cono 



232 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



the Philippine Ishxnds, and coin- 
preheiuliiig the islands lying within 
the following line: 

A line rnnning tVoni west to east 
along or near tiie twentieth par- 
allel of north latitnde, and throngh 
theiniddleof thenavigablechannel 
of Bachi, from the one hundredand 
eighteenth (LlSth) to the one hun- 
dred and twenty seventh (lUTth) 
degree meridian of longitude east 
of Greenwich, thence along the 
one hundred and twenty-seventh 
(127th) degree meridian of longi- 
tude east of Greenwich to the par- 
allel of four degrees and forty live 
minntes (4^ 45') north latitude, 
thence along the parallel of four 
degrees and forty live minutes 
(4° 45') north latitude to its inter- 
section with the meridian of longi- 
tude one hundred and nineteen 
degrees and thirty-live minutes 
(119°35')east of Greenwich, thence 
along the meridian of longitude one 
hundred and nineteen degrees and 
thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east 
of Greenwich to the parallel of lati- 
tude seven degrees and forty min- 
utes (7° 40') north, thence along 
the i)arallel of latitude of seven 
degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') 
north to its intersection with the 
one hundred and sixteenth (IHJth) 
degree meridian of longitude east 
of Greenwich, thence by a direct 
line to the intersection of the tenth 
(10th) degree i)arallel of north lat- 
itude with the one hundred and 
eighteenth (listh) degree meridian 
of longitude east of Greenwich, and 
thence along the one hundred and 
eighteenth ( 1 18th) degree !neri<lian 
of longitude east of (ireenwich to 
the point of beginning. 

The Tnited States will ])ay to 
Spain the sum of twentv million 
dollars (.s20,000,000) within tliree 
months after the exchange of the 
ratifications of the present treaty. 



cido por Islas Fiiipinas, situado 
dentro de las lineas siguientes: 

Una linea que corre de Oeste a 
Kste, cercadel 20^ [)aralelodelati- 
tud Xorte, a trav<''S de la mitad del 
canal navegable de Bachi, desde 
el 118° al 127^ grados de longitud 
Este de Greenwich; de aqui a lo 
largo del ciento veintisiete (127) 
grado meridiauo de longitud Este 
de Greenwich al paralelo cuatro 
grados cuarenta y cinco minutos 
(4° 45') de latitud Norte; de a([ui 
sguendo el paralelo de cuatro gra- 
dos cuarenta y cinco minutos de 
latitud Xorte (4° 45') hasta su in- 
terseccion con el meridiauo de 
longitud ciento diez y nueve grados 
y treinta y cinco minutos (119° 
35') Este de Greenwich; de aqui 
siguiendo el meridiauo de longitud 
ciento diez y nueve grados y trienta 
y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de 
Greenwich al paralelo de latitude 
siete grado cuarenta minutos (7° 
40') Xorte, de aqui siguiendo el 
paralelo de latitud siete grados 
cuarenta minutos (7° 40') Xorte 4 
su interseccion con el ciento diez y 
seis (110°) grado meridiauo de 
longitud Este de Greenwich, de 
aqui por una linea recta a la inter- 
seccion del di'cimo grado paralelo 
de latitud Xorte, con el ciento diez 
y oclio (118°) grado meridiauo de 
longitud Este de Greenwich, y de 
aqui siguiendo el ciento diez y oclio 
grado (118°) meridiauo de longitud 
Este de Greenwich al puntoen que 
cojuienza esta demarcacion. 



Los Estados Unidos pagaran a 
Es])aria la suma de veinte millones 
de dollars (s20,000,000) dentro de 
tres meses desj^ues del canje de 
ratificaciones del presente tratado. 



Article IV. 



Artioulo 4". 



The Tnited States will, upon the 
signature of the present treaty, 
send back to Spain, at its own cost, 



Los Estados Unidos al ser fir- 
niadoel presente tratado trasi)orta- 
ran a Espafia li su costa los soldados 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



233 



the Si»aiiisli soldiers taken as pris- 
oners of war on the capture of Ma- 
nila by the American forces. The 
arms of the soldiers in question 
shall be restored to them. 

Spain will, upon the exchange of 
the ratifications of the present 
treaty proceed to evacuate the 
Philippines, as well as the Island 
of (ruam, on terms similar to those 
agreed upon by the Commissioners 
appointed to arrange for the evac- 
uation of Porto Rico and other 
islands in the West Indies, under 
the Protocol of August 12 1898, 
which is to continue in force till its 
provisions are completely executed. 
The time within which the evacua- 
tion of the Philippines and of the 
Island of Guam shall be completed 
shall be fixed by the two Govern- 
ments. 



espauoles que hicieron prisioneros 
de gnerra las fnerzas Americanas 
al ser capturada Manila. Las 
armas de estos soldados les seran 
devueltas. 

Bspaua al ratificarse el presente 
tratado, procedeni a evacnar las 
IslasFilipinas,asicomo lade Guam, 
en coudiciones semejantes a las 
acordadas por las comisiones nom- 
bradas para concertar la e vacuacion 
de Puerto Rico y otras Islas en las 
Indias Occidentales, segun el Pro- 
tocolo de 1- de Agosto de 1898, (jue 
continuara en vigor hasta que scan 
completamente cnmplidas sus dis- 
posiciones. El termino dentro del 
cual sera corapletada la evacuacion 
de las Islas Filipinas y de la de 
(luam, sera fljada por ainbos Go- 
biernos. 



Article V. 

In conformity with the provisions 
of Articles I, II and III of this 
treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, 
and cedes in Porto Rico and other 
Islands in the West Indies, in the 
Island of Guam, and in the Philip- 
pine Archipelago, all the buildings, 
wharves, barracks, forts, struc- 
tures, public highways and other 
immovable property which in con- 
formity with law belong to the pub- 
lic domain, and as such belong to 
the Crown of Spain. 

And it is hereby declared that 
the relinquishment or cession, as 
the case may be, to which the pre- 
ceding paragraph refers, cannot in 
any respect im])air the property or 
rights which by law belong to the 
peaceful possession of ]iroperty of 
all kinds, of provinces, municipal- 
ities, public or private establish- 
ments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, 
or any other associations having 
legal capacity to acquire and pos- 
sess property in the aforesaid ter- 
ritories renounced or ceded, or of 
private individuals, of whatsoever 
nationality such individuals may 
be. 



Articulo 5". 

En cumplimiento de lo coiwenido 
en los articulos P, L*" y 3° de este 
tratado, Espana renuncia en Cuba 
y cede en Puerto Rico y en las otras 
Islas de las Indias Occidentales y 
en la Isla de Guam, en las Islas 
Filipinas, todos ios edificios, muel- 
les, cuarteles, fortalezas, estableci- 
mientos, vias publicas y deraas 
bienes inmuebles, (pie con arreglo 
a derecho son del dominio publico 
y como tal corresponden a la 
Corona de I'spana. 

Queda por lo tan to declarado que 
esta renuncia 6 cesion, segun el 
caso, i\ que se refiere el i);trrafo an- 
terior, en nada ])uede niermar la 
propiedad 6 los derechos que cor- 
respondan con arreglo a las leyes 
al poseedor pacifico, de los bienes 
de todas clases de las provincias, 
municipios, establecimieutos pub- 
licos 6 privados,cori)oraciones civi- 
les 6eclesii'isticas,6 de cualesquiera 
otras colectividades que tienen per- 
soualidad jurfdica i)<ira adquirir y 
poseer bienes en los mencionados 
territorios renunciados 6 cedidos, 
y losde los individuos particulares 
cualquieraque sea su nacionalidad.^ 



234 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The aforesaid reliaquishineiit or 
cession, as the case may be, iu- 
chides all dociiiueuts exchisively 
referring to the sovereii»nty reliu- 
quislied or ceded that may exist 
in tlie archives of the Peuiiisiila. 
Where any do^uiiuent in such 
archives only in part relates to 
such sovereijinty, a copy of such 
part will be furnished whenever it 
shall be requested. Like rules 
shall be re!'ii)ro('ally observed in 
favor of Spain in respect of docu- 
ments in the archives of the islands 
abo\'e referred to. 

In the aforesaid relinquishment 
or cession, as the case may be, are 
also included such rights as the 
Crown of lS[)ain and its authorities 
possess in respect of the ofti(;ial ar- 
chives and records, executive as 
wellas judicial, in theislandsabove 
referred to, which relate to said 
islands or the rights and property 
oftheirinhabitants. Such archives 
and records shall be carefully pre- 
served, and private persons shall 
without distinction have the right 
to requin-, in accordance with law, 
authenticated copies of the con- 
tra(;ts, wills and other instruments 
foruiing' part of notarial protocols 
or liles, or which may be contained 
in the executiveor judicial archives, 
be the latter in Spain or in the isl- 
ands atbresaid. 



Article VI. 

The United States and Spain, in 
consideration of the provisions of 
this treaty, hereby mutually relin- 
quish all claims for indenmity, na- 
tional and individual, of every 
kind, (including all claims for in- 
demnity for the cost of the war,) 
of either Government, or of its cit- 
izens or subjects, against the other 
Government, tliat may have arisen 
since the beginning of the late in- 
surrection in Cuba and prior to the 
ratilication of the present treaty. 



Dicha renuncia 6 cesion, segun 
el caso^ iuclnye todos los docu- 
meutos que se retierau exclusiva- 
meute a di(dia Soberania renun- 
ciada (') cedida que existau en los 
Archivos de la Peninsula. Cuaudo 
estos docuuientos existentes en 
dichos Archivos, solo en i^artecor- 
respondau a dicha Soberania, se 
fai'ilitaran copias de dicha parte, 
siempre que sean solicitadas. 
Kegias analogas habran reciproca- 
mente de observarse en favor de 
Espana respecto de los documentos 
existentes en los Archivos de las 
Islas antes mencionadas. 

En las autescitadas renuncia 6 
cesion, segun el caso, se hallan com- 
prendidos aquellos derechos de la 
Corona de Espana y de sus Autori- 
dades sobre los Archivos y Kegis- 
tros Oticiales, asi administrativos 
como judiciales de diclias Islas ([ue 
se retierau a ellas o a los derechos 
y propiedades de sus habitantes. 
Dichos archivos, registros, etc., 
deberan ser cuidadosamente con- 
servados y los particulares sin 
excepcion, tendraii derecho a sacar 
con arreglo a las Leyes, las copias 
autorizadas de los contratos, testa- 
nientos y demas documentos que 
fornien parte de los ])rotocolos 
uotariales o que se custodien en 
los archivos administrativos 6 
judiciales, bien estos se hallen en 
Esi)aria, o bien en las Islas de que 
se hace mencion anteriormente. 

Articulo 0°. 

Espana y los Estados Unidos de 
America en atencion a lo estable- 
cido por este tratado, renunciau 
mutuamente por el presente a toda 
reclamacion de indemnizacion na- 
cional o privada de cualquier 
gcnero (incluyendo toda reclama- 
cion por indemuizaciones por el 
coste de la guerra), de un Gobi- 
erno contra el otro, o de sus sub- 
ditos o ciudadanos contra el otro 
Gobierno, (pie ])uedan haber sur- 
gido desde el comienzo de la ulti- 
ma insurieccion en Cuba y anter- 
ior a la ratihcacion del presente 
tratado. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



235 



Article YII. 

The United States will, for the 
term of teu years from the date of 
tlie exchange of the ratiticatious 
of the ])resent treaty, admit Span- 
ish ships and merchandise to the 
ports of tlie Fhili])pine Islands on 
the same terms as ships and mer- 
cliandise of the United States. 



Article YIII. 

Spain will, u])on the signature of 
the present treaty, release all per- 
sons held by her as ]n-isoners, mili- 
tary or political, in connection with 
the insurrections in Cuba and the 
Philippines, and the war with the 
United States. 

Reciprocally, the United States 
-will release all ])ersons make pris- 
oners of war by the American 
forces, and will undertake to ob- 
tain the release of all Spanish pris- 
oners in the hands of the insur- 
gents in Cuba and the Philippines. 



Articulo 7°. 

Los Estados Unidos durante el 
termino de diez anos a contar desde 
el canje de la ratiflcacion del pre- 
sente tratado, admitiran en los 
puertos de las Islas Filipinas los 
buques y las mercancias espanoles, 
bajo las mismas condiciones (jue 
los buques y las mercancias de los 
Estados Unidos. 

Articulo 8*>. 

Espana al ser lirmado el pre- 
sente tratado, pondra en libertad 
ii todos los detenidosen calidad de 
prisioneros de guerra 6 por delitos 
politicos, a consecuencia de las in- 
surrecciones en Cuba, y en Filipi- 
nas, y de la gnerra con los Estados 
Unidos. Keciprocamentelos Esta- 
dos Unidos pondran en libertad a 
todos los i)risioneros de guerra he- 
chos por las fuerzas Americanas y 
gestionar.in la libertad de todos los 
prisioneros espanoles en poder de 
los insurrectos de Cuba y de Fili- 
pinas. 



Protocol No. 20. 



Confer ence of December 6\ 1808. 



Present — On the part of the 
United States Messrs. Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, 
Fegusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, G arnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding- 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the American 
Commission, referring to the dis- 
cussion that had taken place at the 
two preceding sessions on the sub- 
ject of procedure, stated that he 
recognized the force of the position 
of the President of the Spanish 
Commission that the articles re- 
lating to the necessary part of the 
treaty should first be taken up; 



Protocolo No. 20. 

Conferencia del G de Diciembre de 

1898. 

Presentes. Por i^arte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de America: los 
Sehores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid, Moore, Fergussou. 

Por parte de Espana: los Seno- 
res Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Gar- 
iiica. Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

El acta de la sesion anterior fue 
leida y aprobada. 

El Presidente de la Comisidn 
Americana, refiricndose a la discu- 
sion habida en las dos anteriores 
sesiones respecto al orden de tra- 
bajos, declare reconocer la razdn 
que tenia el Presidente de laComi- 
sion Espanola para discutir en pri- 
mer termino los articulos relatives 
a la i»arte necesaria del tratado; 
pero que, en opinion de los Comi- 



236 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



but tliat, ill the opinion of the 
American Coininissioneis, nothiiiii' 
was more strictly i)ertinent to a 
treaty of peace than a (;lause for 
the revival of treaties, which the 
war had suspended or terminated, 
such, for examjile, as the extradi- 
tion treaty between the two coun- 
tries; and he therefore proposed 
that the Joint Commission should 
take u]), lirst, the article proposed 
by the American Commissioners 
for the revival of former treaties, 
then the articles proposed by the 
Spanish Commissioners, and then 
the rest of the articles proposed 
by the American Commissioners. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that he felt 
comi)elled to insist upon the con- 
tention of that Commission on the 
subject of procedure, and that he 
begged to differ as to the order in 
which the article for the revival of 
treaties should be discussed ; while 
such an article might be relevant 
to a treaty of peace, yet it was 
usually the last article of all, and 
should therefore be the last con- 
sidered. 

The President of the American 
Commission observed that, while 
the American Commissioners felt 
that their view was reasonable and 
proper, they desired to proceed 
with the business of the Joint Com- 
mission ; and he inquired whether, 
if the articles proposed by the 
Spanish Commission were taken 
up and considered, all the articles 
]>roposed by the American Com- 
mission would then in like manner 
be taken up and considered. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission answered in theaftirui- 
arive, adding that he had not ])ro- 
posed to take up the articles of the 
Spanish Commission because they 
were its articles, but because they 
were sjiecially appropriate to a 
treaty of peace. 

The President of the American 
Commission then took up the sub- 
ject of iKitionality, in regard to 



sarios Americanos, nada habia miis 
estrictamente pertinente a un tra- 
tado de ])az que la renovacion de 
los tratados sus])endidos <» termi- 
iiados por la guerra, tales como, 
por ejemplo, el tratado de extradi- 
cion entre los dos paises; i)or lo 
cual proponia que la Coniisi('>n en 
pleno se ocupara en primer tcrmino 
del articulo propuesto por los Comi- 
sarios Americanos para renovar los 
anteriores tratados", siguiendo con 
los articulos i)ropuestos i)or los 
Comisarios Espanoles y acabando 
con los demas articulos propuestos 
por los Comisarios Americanos. 

El Presidente de la Comisioii 
Espanohi replico que debia insistir 
en el pun to de vista adoptado por 
esta Couiision respecto al procedi- 
miento, sintiendo no estar de 
acuerdo respecto al orden en (pie 
se habia de discutir el articulo 
relativo a la renovacion de los tra- 
tados, pues si bien es verdad que 
este articulo suele insertarse en 
los tratados de paz, ordiuaria- 
mente es el ultimo de todos, y debe 
por lo tanto ser el ultimo de los 
que se estudiau. 

El Presidente de la Comisi(')u 
Americana replic<'> (pie. aunque los 
Comisarios Americanos entendian 
que su punto de vista era razou- 
able y adecuado, deseaben sin 
embargo adelantar los trabajos de 
la Comision mixta, ypreguut('> que 
si los articulos propuestos por la 
Comisi(ni Espahola eran discutidos 
y examiuados, seriaii a su vez 
todos los articulos propuestos por 
la Comisi(5n Americana de igual 
maiiera discutidos y examiuados 

El Presidente de la Couiision Es- 
])anola contesto ailimativamente, 
anadiendo que no habia propuesto 
discutir los articulos dela Comisiim 
Espauola por(iue fuesen los suyos 
propios, siiu) poique eran especial- 
inente propios de un Tratado de 
paz. 

El Presidente de la. C()misi(')n 
Americana empez('> ocupandose de 
nacionalidad, resjiecto a la cual la 



TREATY OF PEAC^E. 



237 



wliich the American Commission 
originally presented the following- 
article : 

''Akticle VI. Spanish subjects 
residing in the territory over which 
Spain by tlie present treaty relin- 
quishes or cedes her sovereignty 
may remain in such territory, or 
may remove therefrom, retaining, 
in either event, all their rights of 
property: and, in case they remain, 
they may preserve their allegiance 
to the Crown of S])ain, by making, 
before a court of record, within a 
year from the date of the signature 
of this treaty, a declaration of their 
decision to reserve sucli allegiance, 
in default of which declaiation they 
shall be held to have renounced it 
and to have adopted the national- 
ity of the territory in Avhicli they 
may reside. Except as i»rovided 
in this treaty, the civil rights and 
political status of the inhabitants 
of the territories hereby ceded to 
the United States shall be deter- 
mined by the Congress." 



To this article the Spanish Com- 
missioners proposed on the 30th of 
^November the amendments con- 
tained in the two following articles : 

" XATIOXALITY. 

"Article — . Spanish subjects 
now or hereafter residing or domi- 
ciled in the territory the sover- 
eignty over wliich Spain relin- 
quishes or cedes by the present 
treaty may live in or withdraw 
from said territory, acquiring and 
retaining in either case every kind 
of property, or, alienatingand freely 
disposing thereof or of its value or 
proceeds; practice, with the free- 
dom they noweii.joy, industry, com- 
merce, and other mechanical or lib- 
eral professions, and enjoy their 
personal status, without being sub- 
ject to any exception prejudicial to 
the rights secured to them by this 
treaty. If they remain in the ter- 
ritory they shall be allowed to pre- 
serve their nationality by making 
before the proper officer a declara- 



Comision Americana jiresento eu 
un jirincipio el articulo que sigue: 

"Artioulo VI. Los subditos 
espanoles qne residan en el terri- 
torio cuya Soberania Espafia ha 
reuunciado 6 cedido por el presente 
tratado, podran permauecer en 
dicho territorio, 6 podran salir de 
el, conservando en ambos casos 
todos sus derechos de propiedad, 
y eu el caso de qne permanecieran 
en el, podran conservar su naciou- 
alidad esitanola haciendo ante una 
Oflcina de registro, dentro del ano 
de la fecha de la hrma de este 
tratado, una declaraci()n de su 
proposito de conservar dicha na- 
cionalidad; a falta de esta decla- 
racion, se considcrara (jue hau 
reniinciado su nacionalidad y 
aceptado la del territorio en que 
residen. A excepcion de lo dis- 
puesto por este tratado, los dere- 
chos civiles y la capacidad poli- 
tica de los habitautes de los 
territorios aqni cedidos a los 
Estados Unidos, seran definidos 
por el Congreso.''" 

En 30 de Noviembre, los (,'omi- 
sarios Espanoles propusieron que 
este Articulo se enmendara por 
medio de los dos articulos sigui- 
entes: 

"nacionalidad. 

"Articulo — . Los subditos es- 
panoles residentes 6 domiciliados al 
l»resente o en lo futuro en el terri- 
torio cuya soberania Espana re- 
uuncia o cede por el presente tra- 
tado, podran vivir en dicho terri- 
torio 6 retirarse de cl, adquiriendo 
y conservando en uno n otro caso, 
toda clase de propiedad 6 realizan- 
dola y disponiendo libremente de 
ella o de su valor o producto, ejer- 
cer (*on la libei tad que actualmente 
tienen, la industria, el comercio y 
denuis ])rofesiones mecanicas 6 
liberales y gozar de su estatuto 
personal; sin qne puedau ser some- 
tidos a ningun rc^gimen de excep- 
ci(ui en perjuicio de los derechos 
que en este tratado se les recono- 
cen. Si permanecen en el territo*- 
rio, podran conservar su nacionali- 



238 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



tiou of such intention, within the 
term of one year, to be reckoned 
from the date of the exchan<>;e of 
ratifications of tliis treaty or the 
talcingupof their residence therein. 



" Faihire to comi)ly Avith tliis re- 
([uirenuMit shall be considered as a 
renunciation of their nationality, 
and tlie adoption of that of the ter- 
ritory in which they may reside. 
Save in the cases covered by this 
treaty, tlie civil rights and [)olitical 
condition of the Spaniards living 
in ceded territories shall be gov- 
erned by the laws applicable to all 
other foreigners in the territory of 
their residence. 

''AiiTiCLE — . All the other in- 
habitants of the territories ceded 
shall have the right to choose the 
Spanish nationality within the 
period of one year to be reckoned 
from the date of the exchange of 
the ratifications of this treaty, the' 
choice to be made in the manner 
provided for in the preceding arti- 
cle. Notice thereof shall be given 
immediately to the Spanish Gov- 
ernment, or to its consular officers, 
and without which reijuisite the 
nationality thus chosen shall not 
be ;it any time recognized." 

The American Commissioners 
proposed, at this meeting, as a sub- 
stitute for the foregoing articles, 
the following article: 

"Article YI. Spanish sub- 
jects, natives of the Peninsula, re- 
siding in the territorj' over which 
Spain by the present treaty relin- 
quishes or cedes her sovereignty 
may remain in such territory or may 
renn)ve therefrom, retaining in 
eitlier event all their rights of prop- 
erty, including the right to sell or 
dispose of such ])roperty or of its 
proceeds; and they shall also have 
the right to carry on their Indus 
try, commerce and professions, 
being subject in respect thereof to 
such laws as are applicable to 



dad haciendo ante una oficina 
publica-de registro unadeclaracion 
de su propusito deconservar dicha 
nacioiialidad, dentro del tc'rmino 
de uu ano. ([ue se contara desde la 
fecha del canje de ratihcaciones de 
este tratado, o desde (pie aquellos 
tijen alii su residencia. 

'•Si faltasen ii este requisito, se 
les considerar;i como si la hubiesen 
renunciado y adoptado la nacioii- 
alidad del territorio en (jue residan. 
Excepto en cuanto previene este 
tratado, los derechos civiles y con- 
dicion politica de los espailoles 
habitantes en los territorios cedi- 
dos, seregiran porlasleyescomunes 
ii todos los demas extrangeros en 
el territorio de su residencia." 

"Articulo — . Los dennis habi- 
tantes de los territorios cedidos 
iwdri'm optar por la nacionalidad 
espafiola en el tcrmino de un ano, 
a contar desde el cambio de ratifi- 
caciones de este tratado, habiendo 
de hacer esta opcion en la forma 
prescrita en el articulo anterior y , 
ponerla inmediatamente ademas I 
en conocimiento del Gobierno Es- 
l^auol (> de sus agentes consulares, 
sin cuyo requisito no les sera re- 
conocida en ningun tiempo la na- 
cionalidad de su opci('>n." 

Los Comisarios Americanos pro- 
ponen en esta sesion, que los ante- 
I'iores articulos scan snstituidos 
por el siguiente: 

"Articulo YI. Los subditos 
espanoles naturales de la Penin- 
sula, que residan en el territorio 
cuya soberania Es])aha renuncia 6 
cede i)or el ])resente tratado, po- 
dran i)ermanecer en dicho territo- 
rio o marcharse de cl, conservando 
en uno li otro caso todos sus dere- 
chos de pro])icdad, con inclusion 
del derecho dc vender 6 disponer 
de tal propiedadode susproductos; 
y ademas tcndran el derecho de 
ajercer su industria, commercio 6 
l)rofesi6n, sujetandose a este re- 
specto ii las leyes (pie sean appli- 



trp:aty of peace. 



239 



other foreigners. In case they re- 
main in the territor}^ they may pre- 
serve their allegiance to the Grown 
of Spain by making, before a court 
of record, within a year from the 
date of the exchange of ratitica- 
tions of this treaty a declaration of 
their decision to preserve such alle- 
giance; in detault of which decla- 
ration they shall be held to have 
renounced it and to have adopted 
the nationality of the territory in 
which they may reside. 

"The civil rights and political 
status of the native inhabitants of 
the territories hereby ceded to the 
United States shall be determined 
by the Congress.'' 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission objected to this article, 
as it was read, on various grounds; 
and, after some discussion, the 
President of the American Com- 
mission stated that with respect to 
the article in question, as well as 
the other articles which the Ameri- 
can Commissioners might a(loi)t, 
they would require, as a necessary 
condition of their adoption, the in- 
sertion in each article that was to 
run for a length of time of a clause 
limiting the obligation of the 
United States thereunder, in re- 
spect of Cuba, to the time of its 
occupation of the island, or else 
the insertion in the treaty of a gen- 
eral clause to this effect, as follows : 

" It is understood that any obliga- 
tion assumed by the United States 
with respect to Cuba is limited to 
the time of its occupancy thereof." 

No conclusion having been 
reached on the articles in question; 
it was agreed tliat the rest of the 
articles should be read and then 
handed to the Spanish Commis- 
sioners in order that they might 
con sider them and give their answer 
to the counter - proposals of the 
United States at the next confer- 
ence, and that all the articles 
should be inserted in the protocol 
i of today's conference. 



cables a los dennis extrangeros. 
En el caso de que permanezcan en 
en el territorio, podran conservar 
su uacionalidad Espanolahaciendo 
ante una oflcina de registro, dentro 
de uu ano despues del cambio de 
rati ticac ion es de esta tratado, una 
declaracion de su proposito de con- 
servar dicha uacionalidad; a falta 
de esta declaracion, se cousiderara 
que han renunciado dicha uaciona- 
lidad y adoptado la del territorio 
en el cual pueden residir. 

"Los derechos civiles y la con- 
diciou politica de losnaturales que 
habitan los territorios aqui cedidos 
a los Estados Unidos se determi- 
naran por el Congreso." 

El l^residente de la Comision 
Espanolapresentovariasobjecioues 
al texto de este articulo, y despues 
de alguna discusion, el Presidente 
de la Comision Americana declaro 
que con respecto al articulo en 
cuesti<>u, como a los demas (|ue 
los Comisarios Americanos puedan 
aceptar, pediran que, como con- 
dicion necesaria de su adopcion, 
se inserte en todos los articulos 
que deban estar en vigor durante 
cierto tiempo, una clausula limi- 
tando la obligacion cjue de ellos se 
derive para los Estados Unidos, 
con respecto a Cuba, al tiempo de 
su ocupacion de la Isla, 6 en otro 
caso (|ue se inscriba en el tratado 
una clausula general que diga: 

" Se entiende que cualquier obli- 
gacion asumida por los Estados 
Unidos con respecto a Cuba, se 
limita al tiempo que ocupen a 
esta." 

No habien dose adoptado acuerdo 
alguno sobre este articulo, se con- 
vino en que se leyeran los dem;'is y 
se entregarau a los Comisarios 
Espaholes, para que pudieran ex- 
aminarlos y contestar a las contra- 
pro])osiciones de los Estados Uni- 
dos en la sesi(m proxima, decidien- 
dose ademiis que, todos los articulos 
se iusertarau en el protocolo de la 
conferencia de hoy. 



240 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Pursuant to this agreemeut, the 

following articles offered by the 
Spanish Coiuinissiou were read: 



"GI:AXTS and CONTllACTS FOR PUULIC 
WORKS AND SERVICKS. 

''Article — . 

"All grants and contracts for 
public works and services in the 
islands of Cuba, Porto Rico, the 
Philippines and other ceded terri- 
tory shall be maintained in force 
until their expiration, in accord- 
ance with the terms thereof, the 
new (Jovernment assuming all the 
rights and obligations thereby at- 
taching up to the present time to 
the Spanish Government. 



" PUULIC CONTRACTS. 

"Article — . 

" Contracts formally entered into 
by the Spanish Government or its 
authorities for the public service 
of tlie islands of Cuba, and Porto 
Rico, the Philippines and others 
ceded by this treatj% and which 
contracts are still unperformed, 
shall cimtinue in force until their 
expiration pursuant to the terms 
thereof. Such contracts as also 
cover the service peculiar to Spain 
or any of her other colonies, the 
new Government of the above 
mentioned islaiuls shall not be 
called upon to carry out, save only 
in so far as the terms of said con- 
tracts relate to the particular serv- 
ice or treasury of such islands. 
The new Government will there- 
fore, as regards the said contracts, 
be holden to all tlie rights ami 
obligations therein attaching to 
the Spanish Government. 



"Tiist of Pending (Contracts for 
Public Works and Services. 

"Mail and Transpoitation (;on- 
tract with the Compania 'i'ransat- 
lantica. 



En cumplimieuto de este acuerdo, 
fueron leidos los siguientes articu- 
los que habian sido propuestos por 
la Comision Espaiiola: 



CONCESIONES DK OBRAS 
PUHLICOS. 



Y SER\'ICIOS 



"Articulo — . 

Continuardn observandose igu- 
almente todas las concesiones de 
obras y servicios publicos en las 
islas de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Fili- 
pinas y demas territorios cedidos, 
hasta su cancelaci(m, con arreglo 
a las clausulas con rpie hubieseu 
sido otorgadas, subrogandose el 
nuevo Gobierno en los derechos y 
en las obligaciones (jue por dichos 
contratos correspondieron hasta 
ahora al Gobierno Espanol." 

"concesiones de OURAS Y SERVICIOS 
PUBLICOS 

"Articulo— 

Los contratos regularmente cel- 
ebrados por el Gobierno Espanol 6 
por sus Autoridades para el servi- 
cio publico de las Islas de Cuba, 
Filipinas, Puerto Rico y demas que 
se ceden ])or este tratado, y cuyos 
contratos esten pendientes de cum- 
plimieuto, contiuuaran observan- 
dose hasta su terniinacion, con ar- 
reglo a sus clausulas. 

"En aquellos en que tambien 
estuviese interesado el servicio pe- 
culiar de Espaha o de cualquiera 
de sus demas colonias, el nuevo 
(robierno de las islas sobredichas, 
no coucurrini a su cumplimieuto, 
sino en la parte que, con arreglo al 
contrato mismo, corresponda a su 
servicio yTesoro esi)ecial. 

" Quedara por lo tan to el nuevo 
Gobierno subrogado en lugar del 
Espanol, en todos los derechos y ob- 
ligaciones que de los menciouados 
contratos pudieran resultar en favor 
6 en contra de aquel. 

"Lista de contratos pendientes 
])or obras y seivicios publicos. 

"CJontrato i)ara correos y tras- 
l)ortes con la Compania Trasatlan- 
tica." 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



24] 



''Contract with English Com- 
l»any(' Cuba Submarine') for the ca- 
ble on the south of Cuba. 

"Cable contract, Manila to Hong 
Kong, with another English Com- 
pany ('The Eastern'). 

"Railroad coucesssion from Ma- 
nila to Dagupan. 

"All other concessions for rail- 
roads now in operation or under 
construction in Cuba or Porto Rico. 

"The above are all the contracts 
at present recalled, although it can- 
not be stated that there are not 
others relative to public works and 
services. None of recent date. 

"December 1, 1898." 

The Preside^it of the American 
Commission stated that the Ameri- 
can Commissioners were con- 
strained to reject these articles. 
The United States did not propose 
to repudiate any contract ibund 
upon investigation to be binding 
under International Law; but no 
such clauses as now pro])osed had 
been inserted in treaties heretofore 
made by the United States with 
Spain, France, Mexico and Russia, 
for the acquisition of territory ; and 
it might be assumed that the United 
States would deal justly and equita- 
bly in respect of contracts that were 
binding under the principles of In- 
ternational Law. 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commission, was 
then read : 



" Contrata de la Compaiiia Ingle- 
sa (Cuba Submarine) para el cable 
en el Sur de Cuba. 

"Conti-ato del cable de Manila a 
Hong Kong con otra Compania 
Inglesa (The Eastern). 

"Concesion del feirocaril de Ma- 
nila a Dagupan. 

" Todas las demas concesiones de 
ferro-carriles en explotacion 6 en 
construccion en Cuba y Puerto 
Rico. 

'"Estos son los contratos que 
ahora se recuerdan, auuque no 
puede decirse si hay otros relatives 
•A obras y servicios publicos, ningu- 
no de ellos de fecha reciente. 

"1° de Diciembre de 1898." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana declare que los Comisa- 
rios Americanos se veian obligados 
a rechazar estos Articulos. Los 
Estados Unidos no se i^roponen re- 
pudiar ningiin contrato que, al ser 
examiuado, se encuentreque obliga 
segiin la ley internacional; pero 
clausulas parecidas a la que ahora 
se i)ropone no se han insertado en 
tratados anteriormente celebrados 
porlos Estados Unidos con Espana, 
Erancia, Mexico y Rusia por ad- 
quisicion de territorios; y x'otlia 
adiriitirse que los Estados Unidos 
obraran con justicia y equidad en 
los contratos que los obliguen con 
areglo a los x^rincipios del derecho 
internacional. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por la Comision Espanola: 



"RELKaON. 

"Article - 



"religion. 



"Articulo — . 



The Roman Catholic Apostolic 
Religion, its institutions and minis- 
ters, shall continue to enjoy in all 
the territories which are the sub- 
ject of this treaty the liberty and 
the rights in the undisturbed pos- 
session of which they are at 
present. 

"The members of this Church, 
whatever their nationality, shall 
T p 16 



La Religion Catolica Apostolica 
Romana y sus instituciones y min- 
istros contiuuaran gozando en 
todos los territorios que son objeto 
de este tratado, de la libertad y 
prerogativas en cuya posesion 
pacifica se hallan. 

"Los tieles de esta Inglesia,cual- 
quiera que sea su nacionalidad,. 



242 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



continuo to eujoy the saiue liberty 
they now enjoy with respect to the 
profession of tlieir religion and the 
exercise of their form of worship." 
The President of the American 
Commission stated that the United 
States could make no distinction 
as to religion, ami proposed the 
following article: 

"RELICIOX. 



continnaran asimismo gozando de 
la libeit-ad ({ue hoy tien^i ])ara la 
profesion de su religion y el ejerci- 
cio de su culto." 

El Pri'sideute de la Comisi(ki 
Americana declara que los Estados 
Unidos no pueden hacer distinciou 
eutre las religioiies, y propone el 
articulo siguieute: 

"RELIGION. 



''The inhabitants of the terri- 
tory over which Spain reliminishes 
or cedes her sovereignty shall be 
secured in the free exercise of their 
religion.*' 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commission, was 
read : 

"The 'Maine.' 

'•'■Draft of additional articles to the 
Treati] of Peace with the United 
tStatek 



ARTICULO — . 

" Los habitantes del territorio, 
cuya Soberania Espana renuucia <> 
cede, tendrj'iu asegurado el libre 
ejercicio de su religion." 

Se ley*') el siguiente articulo ])ro- 
puesto ])or la Comision Espanola: 



"El Maine. 

'^Proyecto de artitulos a'dicionales al 
Tratado de paz con los Estados 
Unidos. 



"'MAINE.' 

"Article — . 

"At the request of the Spanish 
Government, the two High Con- 
tracting Parties agree to appoint 
an Interuatioual Commission to 
be entrusted with investigating the 
causes of and responsibility for 
the 'Maine' catastrophe which 
occurred in the harbor of Havana 
on February 1."), I8jt8. This Inter- 
national Commission shall be com- 
posed of seven exj)erts to be ap- 
pointed as follows: 

"Three by the Spanish Govern- 
ment — one to be a Spanish subject, 
another a British subject, and a 
third a French subject. 



"Three by the United States 
Government — one to be a citizen of 
the United States, another a Brit- 
ish subject, and a third a French 
subject. 



"MAINE 

"Articulo — . 

A peticion del Gobierno Espa- 
uol. las dos Altas Partes Contra- 
tantes convienen en nombrar una 
Comisi()n interuacional encargada 
de depurar las causas y respousa- 
bilidades de la cata strc >fe del Maine, 
ocurrida en el puerto de la Habana 
el 15 de Febrero de 1S98. Esta 
Comision interuacional, se compon- 
dra de siete tecnicos nombrados de 
la manera siguiente: 

" Tres por el Gobierno Espanol, 
cuyos nombramientoshan derecaer 
precisameute uno en un subdito 
espanol, otro en un subdito brita- 
uico y el tercero en un subdito 
francc^s. 

" Tres por el Gobierno Norte 
Americano cuyos nombramientos 
habran de recaer, uno en un ciu- 
dadano de los Estados Unidos,otro 
en un subdito brit;inico y el tercero 
en un subdito frances. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



243 



"The Commission to be presided 
over, with a deciding vote, by a 
German expert, chosen by mutual 
agreement by tlie Spanish and 
American Governments. 

''Should no agreement be 
reached hereon, the Spanish Gov- 
ernment shall designate one per- 
son and the United States Gov- 
ernment another, both persons to 
be experts and of Gernmn nation- 
ality, the choice for President to 
be decided by lot and the drawing 
to take place at the Department of 
State at Washington. 

"The expenses of this Commis- 
sion are to be borne in equal moie- 
ties by the two Governments, the 
Commission to meet in Havana at 
the earliest possible moment after 
the consent of the Governments of 
Germany, France and Great Brit- 
ain is secured. 

"In the event of the Spanish 
Government being found responsi- 
ble, it shall pay to the United 
States its share of the expenses of 
'heComnnssion. Further, a Span- 
sh warship must go to IsTew York 
Mid salute the flag of the United 
States. 

" If, on the contrary, the Commis- 
ion shall decide that Spain is not 
■esponsible, attributing the catas- 
;rophe to an accident inside the 
/^essel or other fortuitous cause, the 
government of the United States 
hall pay to Spain its share of the 
expenses of the Commission. 

"Moreover, the President of the 
Jnited States shall report the ar- 
>itral award to the Congress of the 
Jnited States, setting forth in the 
'Ihcial message the righteous 
ourse of the Spanish nation." 

This article was rejected by the 
imerican Commissioners, who 
tated that they considered the 
ase as closed. 

The President of the Spanish 
lommission stated that he was 
nable to consider it as closed, 
ince the President of the United 
tates had referred to it in his 



" Presidira la Comision con voto 
decisivo untecnico Aleman,e]egido 
de comun acuerdo por los Gobier- 
nos Espafiol y Americano. Caso de 
no llegarse a un a(;uerdo, el Go- 
bierno Es])ariol designara un indi- 
viduo y el Norte Americano otro, 
debiendo ser tecnicos y de nacion- 
alidad Alemana, y en el .Ministero 
de Negocios Extrangeros de 
AVashington sedicidira por suerte 
el que liaya de ser Presidente. 



"Los dos Gobiernos sufragaran 
por mitad los gastos de esta Co- 
mi si('»n que debera reunirse en la 
Ilabana ;i labrevedad posible, pre- 
vio el asentimiento de los Gobiernos 
de Alemania, Francia y Gran Bre- 
taha. 

"Caso de aparecer responsable 
el Gobierno Espanol, tendra que 
abonar la parte de gastos corre- 
spondientes por esta Comision a 
los Estados Unidos. Ademas, un 
barco de guerra espanol tendra que 
ir a Nueva York a saludar el pa- 
beUon de los Estados Unidos. 

"Si, por el contrario, decidiera 
la Comision la irrespoiisabilidad de 
Espana, atribuyendo la catastrofe 
a un accidente en el interior del 
buque, o caso fortuito, el Gobierno 
de los Estados Unidos tendra que 
abonar la parte de gastos corre- 
spondiente por esta Comisithi 4 
Espana. 

"Ademas, el Presidente de los 
Estados Unidos debera dar cuenta 
de la sentencia arbitral a las Ca- 
maras N^orte-Americanas, haciendo 
constar en el Mensage Oficial la 
lealtad de proceder de la Nacion 
Espanola." 

Este articulo fue rechazado por 
los Comisarios Americanos, quienes 
declararon que consideraban ter- 
minado el asunto. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola declare que no podia con- 
siderarlo como terminado, desde 
(|ue el Presidente de los Estados 
Unidos se habia referido a 61 en su 



244 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



message to Congress ou Monday 
last. 

The President of the American 
Commission stated that the Amer- 
ican Commissioners had not re- 
ceived a copy of the message and 
therefore had not read it. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that he had in 
his possession an extract from it, 
■^hieh he could produce. 

The President of the American 
Commission answered that the 
American Commissioners did not 
care to continue the discussion of 
the subject on the present occasion. 

The following article ])roposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners was 
read : 



Men sage al Congreso el Lunes 
iiltimo.' 

El presidente de la Comision 
Americana declare') que los Comi- 
sarios Americanos no habian reci- 
bido copia del Mensage, y per lo 
tanto no lo habian lefdo. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Esj)auola coutesto que tenia en su 
poder un extracto del misrao, que 
podia preseutar. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana replico que los Comisa- 
rios Americanos no estaban dis- 
puestos a continuar la discusion de 
este asunto en la ocasion ]3reseute. 

Se ley;'> el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espa- 
iioles : 



" PEXSIOX TO THE DUKE OF VERAGUA. "CARGA DE 



JUSTIOA DEL 
VERAGUA. 



DUQUE DE 



"Akticle — . 

" The United States will con- 
tinue paying to the descendants of 
the Great Discoverer of America, 
Christopher Columbus, the portion 
still payable of the pension they 
have been collecting since the time 
of their illustrious predecessor, as 
a proof of the gratitude of modern 
civilization which Spain has been 
paying. 

"This pension, since tlie Eoyal 
Order of JS^ovember 11, 1829, has 
been reduced to the two sums fol- 
lowing: 

83,400 (hard dollars) annually, 
chargeable to the treasury of Porto 
Rico and $4,000 (like dollars) to 
the treasury of Manila. 

*'Tlie United States and the 
said descendants by mutual agree- 
ment may fix the principal repre- 
sented by these pensions and liq- 
uidate the latter by delivering 
over the principal thus agreed on, 
if deemed mutually advisable."' 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they rejected this 
article. 

The following article, proi)osed 
by the Spanish Commissioners, 
was read : 



"Articulo — . 

Los Estados Unidos continu- 
aran satisfaciendo a los descen- 
dientes del Gran descubridor de 
America, Cristobal Colon, la parte ^ 
de pension todavia subsisteute que 
han venido cobrando, desde los) 
tiempos de su ilustre progenitor,' 
come una prueba de gratitud de 
la civilizacion moderna, que venial 
satisfaciendo E span a. 

"Esta i)ensioii viene reducida 
desde Peal Orden de 11 de Novi 
emln^e de 1829, a las dos cantidades 
siguientes: 

"$3,400 (pesos fuertes anuales, 
consignada sobre el Tesoro de 
Puerto Pico y 4,000 (idem) sobre 
el Tesoro de Manila. 

"Los Estados Unidos y dichosJt 
descendientes de comiin acuerdoi 
podran capitalizar estas pensiones^ 
y extinguirlas por la entrega dell 
capital que lijen, si asi respectiva- 
mente lotuvierau por conveniente." 

Los Comisarios Americanos de- 
claran que rechazan este articulo. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espa- 
noles : 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



245 



" DEPOSITS AND liOXDS. 

"Article — . 

"Moneys received by Govein- 
ment offices and estal3lisliments 
in the aforesaid territories from 
Spanish citizens in the way of de- 
j)osits, consignments, loans and 
security of all kinds shall be re- 
turned to the lawfnl owners, 
wlieiiever pro])er, either because 
of the expiration of the time for 
which they were made, or because 
of the fnllilment of the principal 
obligations by them guaranteed. 
This restitution shall be made by 
the Head of the Office where the 
sums of money were deposited, 
consigned, loaned, or given as se- 
curity; and in default tliereof by 
whoever is rcsjionsible for such 
sums under the law." 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they rejected tliis arti- 
cle. 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners, 
was then read : 

'•CONSULS. 

"Article — . 

"Spain shall have the power to 
establish Consular officers in the 
ports and places of the territories, 
the sovereignty over which has 
been either relinquished or ceded 
by the present treaty." 

This article the American Com- 
missioners accepted. 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Conjniissioners,was 
then read : 

"jurisdiction of courts. 

"Article — . 

The Spaniards residing in the 
said territories sliall be subject in 
matters civil as well as criminal to 
the Jurisdiction of the Courts of 
the country wherein they reside, 
pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- 



"depositos y fianzas. 

" Articulo — . 

Serein devueltos los depositos, 
consignaciones, prestamos y fian- 
zas detodas clases constituidas ])or 
ciudadanos espafioles en los estab- 
lecimientos y oflcinas del Estado, 
existentes en los territorios so- 
bredichos, a sus legitimos ducfios 
cuando fuere pro<edente su devo- 
lucion por haber vencido los plazos 
por (jue se hubiesen hecho 6 por 
haberse ya cumplido las obligacio- 
ues principales a (pie sirvieron de 
garantia. Esta devolucion se liara 
por el Jefe de la Oiicina eu que se 
hubieren entregado las cantidades 
depositadas, consignadas, presta- 
das o dadas en fianza, 6 en sn de- 
fecto |)or quien de dicha devolu- 
cion deba responder con arreglo Ji 
las leyes." 

Los Comisarios Americanos de- 
claran (pie rechazan este articulo. 

Se leyo el sigiiiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espano- 
les: 

" agkntes consularks. 

"Articulo — . 

Ea])ar!a podra festablecer Agen- 
tes consnlares en los puertos y 
]>lazas de los territorios (aiyaren- 
uncia y cesion es objeto de este 
tratado." 

Los Comisarios Americanos acep- 
tan este articulo. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, ])ro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espailo- 
les: 

".TURisnicciox civil, y criminal. 

"Articulo — . 

Los espafioles residentes en los 
mencionados territfuios estaran 
sometidos eu lo civil y en lo crim- 
inal a los Tribuuales del pais en 
que residan con arreglo a las leyes.^ 
coraunes que reguleu sucompeten- 



246 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



eruiiig the same; and they -shall 
have tlie rig-ht to appear before 
said Courts, and to pursue the 
same course as (iitizi^ns of the 
country to which the Courts be 
lonji'." 

This article the American Com- 
missioners accepted. 

The fidlowiuj^' article, proposed 
by the Spanish (Jommissiouers, 
was read: 



cia, pudiendo comparecer ante los 
mismos en la misma forma y em- 
pleaudiTlos mismos procedimientos 
que deban observ^ar los ciudada- 
nos del pais a (|ue perteiiezca el 
Tribunal." 

Los Comisarios Americanos acep- 
tan este articulo. 

Se ley<')el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espaiio- 
les: 



*' JUKISDICTIOX OF COURTS. 

''Article — . 

Civil and criminal actions and 
suits against the Covernnient that 
may be pending at the time of the 
exchange of the ratitications of 
this treaty, to which the citizens 
of the countries the sovereignty 
over which has been relincjuished 
or ceded are a party and who pur 
suant to such treaty cease to be 
S})auiards shall be tried and deter- 
mined subject to the following 
rules : 

''First. Judgments rendered 
either in civil or criminal matters, 
before the date aforesaid, and with 
respect to which there is no re- 
course, under the Spanisli law, 
shall be deemed to be final, and 
shall be executed in due form by 
competent authority in the terri- 
tory within which such judgments 
should be carried out. 

"Second. Personal actions and 
cases against the Government 
which may be pending before the 
Courts of the Peninsula or the 
islands adjacent thereto, Avherein 
a citizen of the said territories who 
by this ti'eaty ceases to be a S})an- 
iard is the ])laintiff, shall, if the de- 
fendant is a Spaniard, continue to 
be tried in due form before the said 
Courts to the rendition of the tinal 
judgment. Personal actions where- 
in the defendant is an inhabitant 
of the said territories whicli by 
this treaty cease to be Spanish, 
shall be tried by the com]>eteMt 
Court of the domicile of the de- 



"comi'i:texcia i>e trihunales. 

"Articulo — . 

Los i)leitos civiles y adminis- 
trativos y las causas criminales 
l)endiei)tes al hacerse el canje de 
ratiticaciones de este tratado, en 
que scan parte los ciudadanos resi- 
dentes en los territories reuunciado 
y cedidos (pie con arreglo a aquel 
dejeii de ser espanoles concluiran 
de sustanciarse ;i tenor de las re- 
glas siguieutes: 



'■'■Prlmera: Las sentencias dic- 
tadas antes de la fecha menciouada 
asi en lo civil como en lo criminal, 
y contra las cuales no haya recursos 
que iuterponer con arreglo a la ley 
espauola, tendran el caracter de 
ejecutorias y deberan ser cumpli- 
das ]^or los tra mites legales por la 
autoridad competente en el terri- 
torio en que proceda su cumpli- 
miento. 

">SVY/»;/f/a. Los pleitos civiles 
l^or accion personal, ylos adminis- 
trativos ])endientes ante los Tri- 
bunales de la Peninsula (' Islas 
adyacentes, en (pie fuese deman- 
dante un ciudadano de dichos ter- 
litorios, que por este tratado deje 
de ser espanol, continuaran sus- 
tanciandose por los Tribunales 
ante <iuienes penden, hasta ([ue 
recaiga sentencia ejecutoria, si 
fuese espanol el demaudado, Los 
tambi<''n i)or accion personal en 
que sea demandado un habitaute 
de los sobredichos territorios que 
por este tratado i)ierdala naciona- 
lidad espanola, pasaniu al conoci- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



247 



feiidaut. Actions in rem or mixed 
actions, when the immovable prop- 
erty in litigation is situate in tlie 
Peninsula or adjacent islands, sliall 
be pursued to final judgment and 
until the same is executed before 
the Courts having cognizance 
thereof. 



"Third. Criminal actions pend- 
ing on said date before the Su- 
preme Court of Spain against citi- 
zens of the territory relin([uished 
and ceded, which ceases to be Span- 
ish by this treaty, shall continue 
under its jurisdiction until final 
judgment; but this having been 
once rendered, the cases shall pass 
for execution to tlie juiisdiction of 
the comijeteut Court at the place 
where the same should be carried 
out." 

The American Commissioners 
proposed, in place of the foregoing 
article, the following: 

"jurisdiction of courts. 

"Article — . 

Judii'ial proceedings pending at 
at the time of the exchange of rati- 
fications of this treaty in the territo- 
ries over which Spain relin(|uishes 
or cedes her sovereignty shall be 
determined according to the fol- 
lowing rules: 

"1. Judgments rendered either 
in civil suits between private indi- 
viduals, or in criminal matters, be- 
fore the date mentioned, and with 
respect to wliicli there is no re- 
course or right of review under the 
Spanish law, shall be deemed to 
be final, and shall be executed in 
due form by competent authority 
in the territory within which such 
judgments should be carried out. 

"2. Civil suits between private 
individuals which may on tlie date 
mentioned be untletermined shall 
be prosecuted to judgment before 
the Court in which they may then 
be pending, or in the Court that 
may be substituted therefor. 



raiento del Juez 6 Tribunal del 
domicilio del demandado que fuese 
competente. A(iuellos eu que se 
ejercite una acciou real 6 mixta si 
el iumueble que fuese su objeto 
radicase en la Peninsnla. c Islas 
adyaceutes, contiuuaran hasta (jue 
en ellos recaiga ejecutoria y esta 
sea cumplida ante los Tribunales 
que de ella estuvieran conociendo. 

'■'Ten-era. Las causas criminales 
pendientes en la sobredicha fecha 
ante el Tribunal Supremo de Es- 
pana, contra los ciudadanos de los 
territorios renunciado y cedidos, 
que dejeu de ser espanoles por este 
tratado, contiuuaran sometidas a 
su jui'isdiccion hasta que recaiga 
sentencia; \)Q.vo una vez que esta 
fuese dictada, pasaran para su cum- 
plimiento (i lajurisdiccion delJuez 
que sea com])etente en el lugar en 
que aquella deba ser cumplida." 

Los Comisarios Americanos pro- 
ponen que el anterior articulo se 
substituya por el siguiente: 

"jURISniCCIOX DE LOS TRIHUXALKS. 

"Articulo — . 

Los procedimientos judiciales 
pendientes al canjearse las ratifl- 
caciones de este tratado, en los 
territorios sobre los cuales Espana 
renuncia 6 cede su soberania, se 
determinaran con arreglo a las 
reglas siguientes: 

"1. Las seutencias dictadas en 
causas civiles entre particulares, 6 
en una nmteria criminal, antes de 
la fecha mencionada, y contra las 
cuales no haya apelaciiui o derecho 
di.^ revisi(')n, con arreglo a las leyes 
espafiolas, se consideranin como 
firmes, y seran ejecutadas en de- 
bida forma por la Autoridad com- 
petente en el territorio dentro del 
cual dichas sentencias deban cum- 
plirse. 

"2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- 
ticulares q ue en le fecha mencionada 
no hayan sido juzgados, contiuu- 
arji n su tramitacion ante el Tribunal 
en que se halle el proceso, 6 ante 
aquel que lo sustituya. 



248 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



"3. Criminal actions pendiug ou 
the date mentioned before the Sii- 
l)reme Court of Spain a<i,ainst citi- 
zens of the territory wliich by this 
treaty ceases to l)e S|>anish sliall 
contiinie under its Jurisdiction until 
flnaljn(l<^ment; bnt,snclijud<;"ment 
having' been rendered, the execu- 
tion thereof shall be committed to 
the competent authority of the 
place in M'hich the case arose." 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners, 
was read: 

"COYPRK.m'S AND PATp;XTS. 

''Article — . 

The rights of projierty secured 
by copyi'ights and patents ac(]uired 
by Spaniards in the islands of 
Cuba, and Porto Kico, the Philip- 
pines, and all other territories 
ceded, at the time of the exchange 
of the ratifications of this treaty, 
shall continue to be respected. 
Spanish scientific, literary and ar- 
tistic works, not subversixeof pub- 
licorder in the said territories, shall 
continnetobe admitted free of duty 
in the said territories, for twenty- 
five (1*5) years, to be reckoned from 
the date of the exchange of the 
ratifications of this treaty, and the 
pro] )rietary rights of their authors 
shall be protected for a like]>eriod."' 

The American Commissioners 
proposed, as a substitute, the fol- 
lowing article: 



"3. Las acciones en materia cri- 
minal peudieutes en la fecha meu- 
cioiuida ante el Tribunal Supremo 
de Esi)aria contra ciudadanos del 
territorio (jue segun este tratado 
deja de ser espahol, continuarau 
bajo su jurisdic(;idn hasta (jue re- 
caiga la sentencia defiuitiva; pero 
una vez dictada esa sentencia, su 
ejecucibn sera encomendada ji la 
Autoridad comiietente del lugar 
en que la acciou se suscito.*' 

Se leyo el siguiente artieulo, pro- 
l)uesto por los Comisarios Ivspa- 
noles: 

" TROPIEDAD IJTEHARIA £ INDrSTIM AL. 

" AllTICULO — 

(,'Ontiuuaran respetaiidose los 
derechos de proi)iedad literaria, 
artistica c industrial ad(iiiiriridos 
por Espaholes en las Islas de ( -uba, 
Puerto liico, Filipinas y demas 
territorios cedidos, al hacerse el 
canje de ratificaciones de este 
tratado. Las obras espanolas 
cieutificas, literarias y artisticas, , 
que no sean peligrosas para el 
orden publico en dichos territorios, 
continuarau entrando en los mis- , 
mos con fran<[uicia de tododerecho ' 
de Aduana durante veinte y cinco ! 
(25) anos, a contar desde el cauje i 
de ratificaciones de este tratado, y i 
durante el mismo tcrmino sera ; 
protegida la ])ropiedad de sus 
autores." j 

Los Comisarios Americanos pro- 
pusieron (jue se susrituyese este 
artieulo por el siguiente: 



"COPYUIGIIT AM> PATENTS. 

"Article — . 

The rights of property secured 
by copyrights and patents acquired 
by Spaniards in the island of 
Cuba, and in Porto Ivico, the Phil- 
ippines, and other ceded territo- 
ries, at the time of the exchange 
of the ratifications of this treaty, 
shall (U)ntinue to be res])ect(Ml. 
Spanish s(;ientilic, literary and ar- 



"PKOPKCEDAU LITEIIAUIA E IXDUSTKIAL. 

'' Articulo — . 

Los derechos de propiedad lite- 
raria c industrial reconocidos a los 
EspaiToles i)or medio de registros 
y patentes en las Islas de Cuba, 
Puerto Pico, Filipinas yotros terri- 
t(ui()s cedidos, al canjcarse las rati- 
ficaciones de este tratado, contin- 
uarau siendor<'s])etados. Lasobras 
espafiolas cientihcas, literarias y 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



249 



tistic works, not subversive of pub- 
lic order in the territories in ques- 
tion sliall continue to be admitted 
free of duty into such territories, 
for tbe period of ten years, to be 
reckoned from tlie date of tbe ex- 
change of the ratifications of this 
treaty.'" 

The reading of the articles pro- 
posed by the Spanish Commis- 
sioners Laving been completed, 
the President of the American 
Commission stated that it was his 
understanding that the articles 
proposed by the American Com- 
missioners wouhl be accepted or 
rejected by the Spanish Commis- 
sioners at the next meeting. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission rejjlied that the Span- 
ish Comn:issioners woidd jjursue 
the same course with respect to 
the American articles as the Amer- 
ican Commissioners had pursued 
with reference to the Spanish arti- 
cles. 

On motion of tlie American Com- 
missioners tlie conference was ad- 
journed till to morrow, Wednesday, 
the 7th of December, without preij- 
udics to the right of the Si)anish 
Cfnnmissioners to request a post- 
ponement. 

William E. Day 

CusHMAN K. Davis 

Wm P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Reid. 

John B. Moore. 



artisticas, que no scan subversivas 
contra elosden publico en los terri- 
torios referidos, continuaran siendo 
admitidas libres de derechos en los 
mismos, durante diez anos a contar 
desde el canje de las ratificaciones 
de este tratado." 

Habiendose terminado la lectura 
de los articulos i)ropuestos por los 
Comisarios Espafioles, el Presi- 
dente de la Comisi('>n Americana 
declare) (]ue entendia que los arti- 
culos propuestos ])or los Comisarios 
Americanos serian aceptados 6 
rechazados i^or los Comisarios 
Espafioles en la sesit)n proxima. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Esisafiola contesto que los Comi- 
sarios Espafioles seguiran respecto 
}i los articulos Americanos el mismo 
procedimiento que los Comisarios 
Americanos habian seguido con 
referencia a los articulos espafioles. 



A propuesta de los Comisarios 
Americanos, se levanto la sesion, 
acordando reunirse nuinana, Mi r- 
coles 7 de Diciembre, sin peijuicio 
del derecho de los Comisarios Es- 
pafioles para pedir un aplazami- 
ento. 

EUGENIO MONTERO IvIOS 
B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE G ARNICA 

W R DE Villa Ukruiia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol jSTo. 21 



Protocolo No. 21. 



Conference of December 8, 1898. 



Gonferencia del 8 de diciembre de 

1898. 



The session which was to have 
been held on yesterday having 
been postponed at the request of 
the S])anish Commissioners, the 
Joint Commission met today at 
two o'clock, p. m., there being 



Aplazada, a propuesta de los 
Comisarios Espafioles, lasesi<')n que 
debi(') haber tenido lugar el dia de 
ayer, se reunieron el dia de hoy a 
las dos de la tarde, hallandose 



250 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Present on thepartoftlie United 
States: Messrs: Day, Davis, Frye, 
Gray, IJeid, Moore, Fergussou. 

On the i)art of Si)ain: Messrs: 
Montero Kios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero. 

Mr. Ojeda was unable to be pres- 
ent, owing to ilhiess, and Mr. Villa- 
T'rrutia i)ert'ori!)e(l liis duties as 
Secretary. 

Tlie protocol of tlie preceding 
session was read and ai)proved. 

Tlie Spanish Commissioners pro- 
posed tluit the American Commis- 
sioners modify the clause presented 
by tlieni and mentioned in the pro- 
tocol of the last session rehiting to 
the limiting of the obligations of 
the Fnited States in Cuba to the 
time of its occupation thereof. 

The American Commissioners 
took this proposition under con- 
sideration and submitted to the 
Confereuce a new wording of the 
clause which was approved and 
whicli is as follows: 

•'It is understood that any obli- 
gations assumed in this treaty by 
the I'nited States with respect to 
Cuba are limited to the time of 
their occui»ancy thereof; but they 
wir, upon the termination of such 
occupancy, advise any Govern- 
ment established in the island to 
assume the same obligations." 

The Spanish Commissioners ob- 
served that although tlie American 
Commissioners had reiect<Hl at the 
last session the article juesented 
by the Spanish Commissioners re- 
lating to the '' Maine,'" they consid- 
ered it their duty to insist upon 
this (juestion being subjnitted to 
arbitration. 

The American Commissioners 
answered, referi'ing to the observa- 
tions nmde by tliem ou this subject 
at the last session. 

The S))anish Commissioners re- 
plied that since this new i)roposal 
for iirbitratiou was also rejected, 
they would ask the American Com- 
missioners to be ])Ieased to i)roi)ose 
Souk; nu'thod of clearing up the 
matter of the "Maine," and the re- 



Presentes por parte de los Esta- 
dos Unidos de America, los Seno- 
res Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, 
Moore Fergussou. 

Por parte de Espana los Serio- 
res Montero Kios, Abarzuza, Gar- 
uica, Villa-Urrutia Cerero 

J*()r hallarse enfermo no pudo 
asistir el Sr OJeda, diizo sus veces 
como Secretario el Sr Villa-Urru- 
tia. 

Fu«'' leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesi<')n anterior. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pro- 
ponen(|ue los de los Estados Unidos 
moditi(iuen la clausula por ellos 
presentada y que se menciona en 
el acta de la sesion ultima, relativa 
a la limitaci(')n de las obligaciones 
de los Estados Unidos en Cuba al 
tiempo que dure su ocupaeion. 

Los Conusarios Americanos to- 
man en consideracion esta ])roposi- 
cion y someten a la couferencia una 
redaccion de dicha clausula que es 
aceptado y dice asi : 

"Queda enteudido que qal- 
quier obligaci<m aceptada en este 
Tratadopor los Estados Unidos con 
respccto a Cuba esta limitada al 
tiemi)o que dure su ocupaeion en 
esta Isla, pero al terminar dicha 
ocupaci<')u,aconseJaran al Gobierno 
que se establezca en la Isla, tpie 
acepte las mismas ol)ligaciones."' 

Los Comisarios Espanoles mani- 
festan <jue aujuiue la Comision 
Americana habia rechazado en la 
sesi('>n ultima el articulo presentado 
por la Comision Espanola sobre el 
''Maine", consideraban sin embar- 
go su deber insistir en que esta 
cuestion se sometiese a un arbi- 
trage. 

Los Comisarios Americanos con- 
testaron que se referian a las mani- 
i'estaciones (pie hicierou en la 
sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles re- 
plican (jue puesto que esta nueva 
proposicion de arbitrage era tam- 
bi'n rechazada, se sirvieran los 
Senores Cyomisarios Americanos 
proponer cualquier medio de ex- 
clarecer este asuuto del ''Maine" 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



251 



spoiisibility growing out of it, so 
tliat the unjust prejudice against 
Spain shown in the United States 
by reason of an incomplete inves- 
tigation might (lisappeai-, and the 
resentment of Spain, because the 
uprightness of her authorities or 
subjects, and the capacity of her 
administration to guarantee the 
safety in her ports of vessels of 
a nation with which she was at 
peace, had been placed in doubt, 
might also be blotted out. 



The American Commissioners 
replied that they had no method 
to propose. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission, pursuant to the rules, 
presented a memorandum, which 
is hereto annexed, in support of 
the propositions rejected by the 
American Commissioners at the 
last session. 

The American Interpreter pro- 
ceeded to translate the Memoran- 
dum and to read it in English. 

The President of the American 
Commission reserved the right to 
reply in writing to the memoran- 
dum at the next session. 

After explanations interchanged 
by the Presidents of the two Com- 
missions, sucli articles presented by 
the Spanish Commissioners as were 
accepted or modified by the Amer- 
ican Commissioners were ap- 
proved. 

The reading of the articles pre- 
sented by the American Commis- 
sion was then entered upon. 

The articles were read, one by 
one, in the order in which they 
stood. 

The lirst was as follows: 



y las respousabilidades consi- 
guieutes, demanera que pudiesen 
desaparecer las injustas preven- 
ciones que se habiau mauifestado 
en los Estados Unidos <;outra Es- 
pana por causa de una iiiformaciou 
incompleta, y se borrase tambicn 
el resentimiento de Espafia por 
haberse puesto en duda la lealtad 
de sus Autoridades <> de sus na- 
cionales y la capacidad de su ad- 
ministraci(m para garantizar por 
su parte la seguridad en sus puer- 
tos a los barcos de una Nacion con 
quieu estaba en ijaz. 

Los Comisarios Americanos con- 
testaron que no tenian niugun me- 
dio que proponer. 

El Presideute de la Comision 
Espahola, con arreglo al reglamen- 
to, presento un Memorandum, que 
va anejxo al Acta, en a])oyo de las 
proposiciones rechazadas por la 
Comision Americana en la sesiou 
iiltima. 

El Interprete Americano i)roce- 
dio a la lectura en ingles de diclio 
■Memorandum. 

El Presidente de la Comisicm 
Americana se reserva el derecho de 
contestar por escrito a dicho Mem- 
orandum en la sesi(')n i)r6xima. 

Despuas de las explicaciones que 
mediaron entre los Presidentes de 
Ambas Comisiones quedo entendi- 
do que se aprobaban los arti'culos 
presentados por la Comision Espa- 
hola, tales como habmn sido acep- 
tados (> modificados por la Comi- 
sion Americana. 

Procediose entonces a la lectura 
de los articulos presentados por la 
Comision Americana. 

Los articulos fueron leidos uno 
por uno, en el orden en que fueron 
presentados. 

El 1" fue el siguiente : 



"Article 



"Articulo. 



" Spain hereby cedes to the 
United States the island variously 
known as Kusaie, Ualan, or Strong- 
Island, in the Carolines; and also 
concedes to the United States the 
right to laud telegraph cables in 



"Espana cede por el piesente a 
los Estados Cnidos la Isladiversa- 
mente llamada Kusaie, L^alan 6 
Strong Island en las Carolinas: y 
ademas concede a los Estados Uni- 
dos el derecho de amarrar cables 



252 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



the Canary Islands, or on any ter- 
ritory owned by Spain on tlie coast 
of Africa, or in tlie I'eninsnla. 

"In consideration of wliat is set 
forth in tliis article, the United 
Stales will pay to Spain the sum 
of one million dollars, (sl,0(K),0()()) 
within three months from the 
exchange of the ratilications of the 
present treaty." 

The President of the Spanish 
Connuission declared that even in 
the event of an agreement being- 
reached npon this article, it would 
have to iigure elsewhere than in 
the treaty, as it was foreign there- 
to; but that he was compelled to 
reject it, because the Spanish Gov- 
ernment at this time neither enter- 
tained the idea of disjiosing of one 
of the Caroline Islands, nor could 
it do so for want of Constitutional 
authority, previous authorization 
of tl'.e Cortes being necessary in 
the premises. Neither could wha^t 
related to cal)le landings be accept- 
ed, becanse if stii)ulated in a treaty 
it might imply an easement on 
the national territory which the 
Spanish (xovernment was not em- 
l^owered to create, and because any 
American Company might request 
through the executive channel as 
other alien companies have done, 
such a concession, which was for 
eign to an international treaty. 

The following article was then 
read : 



telegraficos en las Islas Canarias 6 
en cualguier territorio espailol de 
la costa de Africa 6 en la Penin- 
sula, 

" En consideracion de losestable- 
cido en este articulo, los Bstados 
Cnidos pagaran a Espiifia la suma 
deun millon de dollars (si, 000,000) 
dentro de los tres meses del canje 
de ratilicaciones del i)resente 
tratado." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espafiola declaro que aun en caso 
de que hubiera habido acuerdo 
sobre este articulo tendria que 
flgurar aparte del tratado, por ser 
ageno al mismo; pero (jue se veia 
obligado a rechazarlo, por que si 
entraba en el animo del Gobierno 
Espanol, en este moniento. el anage- 
nar una de las Islas Carolinas, ni 
podia tampoco hacerlo por carecer 
de facultades constitucionales, ne- 
cesitando para ello estar previa- 
mente antorisado \)0y las Cortes. 
Tampoco podia aceptarse lo rela- 
tivo al amarre de cables, por que 
estipulad<j en un tratado podria 
significar una servidunibre sobre 
territorio uacional, que el Gobierno 
Espanol no estaba autorizado a 
constituir, y porque cualqniera 
Compania Americana podria solici- 
tar por la via adndnistrativa y 
como lo hanhechootras Companias 
Extrangeras, una concesi<'>n agena 
a un tratado internacional. 

Se leyo luego el articulo signiente : 



"Article 



"Articulo 



"In conformity witli the under- 
standing established by an ex- 
change of notes in the year ]8<S(), 
Spain agrees that American mis- 
sions and missionaries shall be 
allowed to resume and hereafter 
freely to carry on their work in 
the r'aroline Islands that remain 
under S])anish sovereignty. 

The President of the Si)anish 
Commission observed that it was 
not known that any claim was 
I)ending- in the premises, and that 
as the Constitution of the State 



"De conformidad con el acuerdo 
establecido por un canje de not as, 
en el ano 18S;I, Espafia conviene en 
que las misiones Americanas y los 
Misioneros ])odran rcanudar y des- 
pues llevar libremente a efecto sus 
trabajos en las Islas Carolinas (^ue 
quedan bajo la Soberania de Es- 
pafia." 

I^'l Presidente de la Comision 
Espafiola manitlesta que no consta 
este pendiente ninguna rcvlama- 
ci('»a sobre el particular, y «jue 
como la constitucion del I^stado 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



253 



laid down the rijilits of private 
individuals in religious matters, 
there was nothing in this regard 
to insert in the treaty. 

The following article was then 
read : 

"Article 

"The United States and Spain 
will reciprocally accord to the ships 
of each other, in their respective 
ports, most favored nation treat- 
ment, in respect of all port charges, 
including entrance and clearance 
dues, light dues and tonnage 
duties. 

"It is further agreed that the 
two Governments will enter into 
negotiations with a view to the 
conclusion of a commercial con- 
vention." 

In place of the first paragraph, 
the American Commissioners now 
propose the following: 

" Spain will in her ports accord 
to vessels of the United States the 
same treatment in respect of all 
XDort charges, including entrance 
and clearance dues, light dues, 
and tonnage duties, as is accorded 
to Spanish vessels in tlie ports of 
the United States." 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission objected to the second 
paragraph of the article as unneces- 
sary; and suggested that the first 
paragraph be amended so that it 
should be reciprocal in its provi- 
sions and be limited as to its 
duration. 

After discussion, the following 
article was drawn up: 

"TheCxovernment of each coun- 
try will, for the term of ten years, 
accord to the merchant vessels of 
the other country the same treat- 
ment in respect of all port charges, 
including entrance dues, light dues 
and tonnage duties, as it accords 
to its own merchant vessels not 
engaged in the coastwise trade. 
This article may at any time be 
terminated on six months' notice 
given by either Government to the 
other." 



marca los derechos de los particu- 
lares en materias religiosas, nada 
hay que insertar ii este respecto en 
el tratado. 

Se leyo luego el articulo 
siguiente : 

Articulo. 

"Los Estados Unidos y Espaiia 
concederan reciprocamente a los 
buques de cada uno de ellos, en sus 
respectivos pnertos, el trato de la 
nacion mas favorecida respecto a 
todos los derechos de ]merto, inclu- 
yendo los deentrada y salida, faros 
y ton el age. 

"Se conviene ademas en que los 
dos Gobiernos empecaran las nego- 
ciaciones para concluir un convenio 
comercial." 

En lugar del primer parrafo ])ro- 
ponen ahora los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos el siguiente : 

" Es])aria concedera en sus puer- 
tos, a los buques de los Estados 
Unidos, el mismo trato con respecto 
a todos los derechos de puerto, in- 
cluyendo derechos de entrada y 
salida, de faro y tonelage, que se 
concede ;i los buques espafioles en 
los puertos de los Estados Unidos." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Es])ariolamaniiiest('t que el segundo 
parrafo del articulo era innecesario, 
y pidi('> que se modi fi case el primer 
parrafo de manera que fuese recip- 
roca la estipulacion y limitado el 
tiempo de su duracion. 

Despu'S de discutido se aprobo 
el articulo en la forma siguiente: 

"El Gobierno de cada pais con- 
cedera i>or el termino de diez anos, 
a los buques mercantes del otro el 
mismo trato en cuanto 4 todos los 
derechos de puerto, incluyendo los 
de entrado y salida, de faro y tone- 
lage, que concede a sus propios 
buques mercantes no empleados en 
el comercio de cabotage. Este arti- 
culo puede ser denunciado en cual- 
quier tiempo dando noticia previa 
de ello cualquiera de los dos Gobi- 
ernos al otro con seis meses de an.' 
ticipacion." 



2o4 



TREATY OF PEACE, 



The following article was tlieu Weleyoluegoelarticulosiguieute: 
read : 



"Article 

" The following treaty stipula- 
tions heretofore entered into by 
the United States and Spain shall 
be held to continue in force: 

"Treaty of October 27, 1795, so 
far as it is contirmed by Article 
XII of the Treaty of February 
22, 1819; 

"Treaty of February 22, 1819, so 
far as its provisions have not been 
executed or become obsolete; 

"Convention of February 17, 
1834, for the settlement of claims; 

"Agreement of February 11-12, 
1871, for the settlement of claims, 
Article YII ; 

"Convention of January 5, 1877, 
and the supplementary convention 
of August 7, 1882, for the extradi 
tion of criminals; 

"Protocol of January 7, 1877, 
concerning Judicial procedure; 

"Convention of June 19, 1882, 
concerning trade-marks; and the 
agreement between the two coun- 
tries in relation to international 
copyright. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission stated that the Span- 
ish Commissioners were unable to 
accept this article. Some of the 
treaties to which it referred were 
obsolete or related to conditions 
which no longer existed, and it 
would involve a more extended 
examination than the Joint Com- 
mission was in a i^osition to give. 
But this did not imply that the two 
Governments might not take up 
the subject themselves. 

The American Commissioners 
inquired whetlier the objection of 
the President of the Spanish Com- 
mission applied to the extradition 
treaties. 



AllTlCULO. 

"Los signientes tratados, antes 
celel)rad()s entre los Fstados Uni- 
dos y Espafia, continuaran en 
vigor: 

"Tratado de 27 Octubre de 1795, 
en sn parte conlirmada por el arti- 
culo XII del Tratado de 22 de Fe- 
brero de 1819. 

" Tratado de 22 de Febrero de 
1819, eii sus dis]>osiciones que no 
han sido ejecutadas o que no han 
caido en desuso. 

"Convenio de 17 de Febrero de 
1834 para el arregio de reclama- 
ciones. 

"Acuerdo de 11-12 de Febrero de 
1871, para el arregio de reclama- 
ciones (Articulo Yll) 

"Convenio de 5 de Enero de 
1877, y convenio supletorio de 7 de 
Agosto de 1882, para la exrradi- 
cion de criminales. 

"Protocolo de 7 de Enero de 
1877, sobre procedimientos jndi- 
ciales. 

"Convenio de 19 de Juuio de 
1882, respectos a las m areas de 
fabrica: y el acuerdo entre los dos 
pauses, con relaciim a la j)roi)iedad 
literaria interiuicional." 

Manifesto el Presidente de la 
Comision Bspafiola que no i)odfa 
aceptar dicho articulo, por que al 
gunos de los Tratados a que el mismo 
se refer! a estaban ya en desuso <> 
se referian a condiciones que ya no 
existiau, por lo cual eni preciso 
hacer uu estudio de cada uno de 
ellos m;is detenido que el que podia 
hacer esta Comision. Pero que esto 
no significaba que ambos Gobier- 
nos no pudierau entendervse direc- 
tamente sobre este asunto. 

Los Comisarios Americanos pre- 
guutaron si las observaciones del 
Presidente de la Comision Espaiio- 
la se aplicaban a los tratados de 
extradicion. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



255 



The Presideut of the Spanisb 
Conimission replied that it did, as 
those treaties needed revision. 

The American Commissioners 
urged the revival of the extradi- 
tion treaties, the convention con- 
cerning trade marks, and the 
agreement in relation to interna- 
tional coi)yright; and proposed 
that, in view of the immediate im- 
portance of the subjects to which 
they related, they should, if the 
Spanish Commissioners were not 
prepared to revive them fully, be 
revided temporarily as a vkxIhs 
Vivendi y for a period of a year or 
even for six months, so as to enable 
the two Governjuents to consider 
the question of their renewal. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission adhered to the views 
which he had expressed, and the 
article was rejected. 

The following article was then 
read: 

"Article 

"The present treaty shall be rati- 
fied by the President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate thereof, and 
by Her Majesty the Queen Kegeut 
of Spain; and the ratifications 
shall be exchanged at Washington 
within six months from the date 
hereol', or earlier if possible. 

"In faith whereof, we, the re- 
spective Plenipotentiaries, have 
signed this treaty, and have here- 
unto aflixed our seals. 

"Done in duplicate at Paris, the 

— day of in the year of Our 

Lord, one thousand eight hundred 
and ninety eight." 

This article was accepted. 

The conference was then ad- 
iourned, with the understanding 
itliat the Joint Commission should 
'reassemble for the ])urpose of sign- 
ing the treaty, whenever it should 
be ready for signature; and that, 



El Presidente de la Comision Es- 
pafiola respondio que si, por que 
estos tratados necesitaban ser co- 
rregidos. 

Los Comisarios Americanos pi- 
dieron lareuovacion de los tratados 
de extradicion, marcas de fabrica y 
pro[)iedad literaria y in**pu«i6ron 
que en vista de la importancia in- 
mediata de los asuntos a que se 
referian fuesen renovado tempo- 
ralmente como uu modus vivendi, 
por un plazo de un ano 6 de seis 
meses, si los Comisarios Es|)arioles 
veian inconveniente en su renova- 
cion absoluta, ii fin de permitir a. 
ambos Gobiernos el estudiar la 
cuestioii de su renovacion. 



El Presidente de la Comision 
Esi)anola mantuvo su anterior opi- 
nion, y el articulo fu('' rechazado. 

Se leyo luego el articulo sigui- 
ente : 



"Articulo 

"Elpresente Tratado sera rati- 
ficado per Su jMajestad la Keina 
Pegente de Espana y por el Presi- 
dente de los Estados Unidos, de 
acuerdo y con la aprobacion del 
Senado; y las ratificaciones se can- 
gearan en Washington dentro del 
plazo de seis meses desdeestafecha, 
d antes si posible fuese. 

" En fe de lo cual, los respectivos 
Pleinpotenciarios tirman y sellan 
este Tratado. 

Hecho por duplicado en Paris 
a diez de Diciembre del ailo mil 
ochocientos noventa y ocho. 

Se aprobo este articulo. 

Se levanto la sesion en la inteli- 
gencia de que la Comision en pleno 
se reuniria con objeto de tirmar el 
tratado, cuando estuviese en dis- 
posicion de ser flrmado, y que entre 
tanto ambas Comisiones podrian 
comunicarse cualquier Memoran- 



256 TREATY OF PEACE. 

in the mean time, each Commission dum que con arreglo al reglamento 

mi.t;ht communicate to the other deseasen presentar. 
any memoran(hi which it should Eu^tENio Montero Kios 

desire to tile under the rules. B. de Abarzuza 

V\"iLLiAM K. Day J. DE Garnica 

CusHMAN K. Davis W. K. de Villa-Urrutia 

Wm P Frye Eafael Cerero 

Geo. Gray Emilio de Ojeda 

Whitelaw Eeid. 
John B. Moore. 



Annex to Protocol No. 21. 

Meiiioranduiii. 

La Comision Espailola propuso a la Americana el proyecto de varios 
Articulos, para el tratado de paz, que esta rechaza. 

Se niega (i recouocer :i los habitantes de los paises cedidos y renun- 
ciados por Espana, el derecho de oi)tar por la ciudadania que hasta 
ahora gozaron. Y sin embargo, este derecho de opciou, que es uno de 
los mas sagrados de la persoualidad humaua, ha sido constantemeute 
respectado desde que se emancipo el hombre de la servidumbre de la 
tierra, rindit'udose a este sagrado derecho tributo en los Tratados que 
sobre cesion territorial se celabraron en el mundo moderuo. 

Se niegau a estipular el respecto quemerecen los contratos celebrados 
por un Soberano legitimo para obras y servicios publicos, contratos que 
afectan sustancialmente a la propiedad privada de particulares y que 
fueron respetados en el Tratado de Campo Formio de 1797, en el de 
Paris de 1814, en el de Zurich de 1859, en el de Paris de 18()(), en los de 
Viena de 1864 y 18GG, y (jue resi)et6 tambien Alemania al termiuar su 
guerra con la Francia por el tratado de Frankfort de 1871. 

I^a Comision Americana alega como uuica razon para no estipular este 
respecto el que los Estados Unidos, en sus tratados, nunca lo han re- 
conocido. Como si los Estados Unidos fueran la nnica Potencia i^osee- 
doradel criterio de justicia (jue debe iuspirar las conveuciones y los actos 
de las Naciones. 

Se niegan a que scan devueltos ii sus legitimes y particulares duefios, 
l)or quieues, scan lunciouarios espanoles 6 americauos, esteii obligados 
segun justicia a esta devolucion, las cautidades quehubiesen entregado 
en las Cajas publicas en los territorios que dejan de pertenecer a Espafia 
en concei^to de consignaciones depositos 6 liaiizas de contratos li obli- 
gaciones, despues que estos hayau sido cumplidos y la fianza. por lo 
tanto, deba ser caucelada. Y sin embargo a esta devolucion se rindio 
homeuage por B('lgi(;a, los Paises Bajos, Austria, Francia, Cerdefia 
Diiiamarca, Prusia, Italia y Alemania eu los Tratados que eutre si 
celebraron en 1839, 1859, 1804, 1800 y 1871. 

Se niegan ;i rcconocer cl caracter permanente de lasobligacioues(|ue 
por este Tratado contraen los l^^stados Qnidos respecto a cosas y per- 
sonas en Cuba, limitando su duracion al tiempo de la ocupacion militnr 
de la (xiande Antilla ])or las troi)as americanas, sin tener ])resente (jne 
las obligaciones corielativas <|ue Es])ana contrae exige la Comision 
Americana (pie scan ])ennanentes y (pie i)or consiguiente (pieda de es;i 
manera violada la justicia al violarse el principio de reciprocidad (jne 



I 



TREATY OF PEACE. 257 

inforiua siempre los derecbos y las obligaciones de las partes coiitra- 
taiites. 

La Comision Americana se presta en la sesion de Loy (D^'"' 87) a 
aconsejar los EE. UU. la observancia de este Tratado al Gobierno 
iudepeudiente de Cuba quaudo llegue a constituirse. La C E. vista 
esta manifestacion, atempera cuantx) acaba de decir sobre este puuto 
hasta que quede en Larmouia con las manit'estaciones en esta sesiou 
de la Comision Americana. 

Nada tiene que decir la Connsion Espauola sobre la negativa de la 
Americana a tomar a cargo de los Estados Unidos la pension de 
gratitud que Espaua viene pagando a los descendientes del inmortal 
descubridor de America. Espafia se reserva este asunto para resolverlo 
como entienda m.'is conforme a la justicia sin olvidar la causa de la 
civilisaciou moderna de la misma America. 

Espafia lia podido sacriticar y sacritica sus intereses todos coloniales en 
el altar de lapazyparaevitar larenovacion deuna guerraquees evidente 
que no puede sostenercoii nnauaci('»n incomjjarablemente maspoderosa 
y de mayoresrecursos. Ha sostenido sus derechos en estas Conferencias 
con toda la energia que correspondia k la rectitud de su conciencia. 
Cnando a su Comision le fuc impuesta como ultimatum la proposieion 
con que concluye el Memorandum Americano presentado en la sesion de 
21 de Noviembre ultimo, sin abaudonarsu derecbo y solo por via de trans- 
accion, inspiri'indose en su amor a la i)az, bi/.o proposiciones en que sus 
intereses erau sacrificados; los Estados Unidos las recbazaron todas. 

Sobre las dos importantes cuestiones de derecbo dependientes de la 
interpretaciou que se diera al Protocolo de Wasbington, propuso a la 
Comision Americana el arbitrage. Fue tambien recbazado. 

Al ultimatum que acaba de citarse de 21 de Xoviembre sucede el 
que en la ultima sesion va envuelto en los Articulos que propone la 
Comision Americana. La Espafiola que cumpliendo las instrucciones 
de su Gobierno se sometio al 1", se sometera tambien a este. 

Se conforma, pues, con que los Estados Unidos incluyan en el Tratado 
los Articulos a que este Memorandum se refiere. 

Pero la Comisi(3n Americana recbaza tambien otro que es jjara 
Espana, si cabe, de mayor importancia que los demas Articulos que la 
Espafiola babia propuesto; porque a diferencia de estos, ac^uel afecta 
a su propia dignidad. La catastrofe del "Maine," di ocasion en los 
Estados Unidos -a que una parte muy caracterizada y senalada de su 
prensa, cubriese de ultrages el bonor inmaculable del pueblo espafiol. 

Parecia que el tiempo iba baciendo su obra de templanza de las 
pasiones y de olvido de los agravios. cuando la Comision Americana, en 
su citado Memoiandum de 21 de Xoviembre ultimo, renov(3 tan lamen- 
table incidente acusaudo de descuido e incapacidad a Espana para 
garantir en sus puertos la seguridad de los buques de una Kacion amiga. 
El derecbo mas sagrado que a Espafia no podia dejar de reconocersele 
por que se le reconoce al mas desgraciado de los seres bumanos en la 
tierra, era el de defenderse de una imputacion, que en tan tristes con- 
diciones la dejaba ante las demas Xaciones. Por esto presento su 
Comision el 1" de este mes los Articulos proponiendo el nombramiento 
de una tf'cnica interuacional, nombrada con todas las garantias imagi- 
nables para asegurar su imparcialidad, a tin de ([ue procediese -A inves- 
tigar las causas de la catastrofe y si en ella cabia, siquiera fuera por 
negligencia, alguna responsabilidad a Espafia. 

Cuando esta proposieion estaba sometida a la Comision Americana, el 
Sefior Presidente de los Estados ITnidos en su Mensage de 5 del mismo mes 
dirigido a las Camaras Americauas volvio (i ocuparse de un asunto que 
T p — 17 



258 TREATY OF PEACE. 

110 podia menos de remover las pasioiies de los dos pueblos eiitre 
qiiieues sus Comisiona dos estaban elaboraiiclo el restableeimieiito de la 
paz. Oaliflco la cat;istrofe de sosjieehosa, aliniio (]ue su causa habia sido 
externa y auadio que solanienle por falt<( de una pnirha j^o.sitira la 
CoiuisitHi Americaiiii, (lue habia inforiuado sobre ella, babia dejado de 
consiiinar a (luien eorrcspoiidia lu respoiiHahUldad de dicha aecion. 

■ Conio era posible iinapnar que al siguieiite dia de prouunciadas estas 
frases en Washington la Comisi(')n Americaua eu Paris liabia de iiegar 
a Espana a(iuel sa<>rado derecho de defensa cuyo respeto redamaba"? 

Xo puede, pues, laComision Esijanola resignarse a tal negativa y cou- 
signa solemneuieute su protesta contra ella, haeiendo constar que en lo 
futuro no sera licito jamas a los que se opouen a que se depuren las 
oausas de aquella horrible catastrofe, imputar abierta 6 embozadamente 
respousabilidades de ningun genero por ella A la noble Xacion Espahola 
V a sus Autoridades. 



[Ti'aiislatiuu.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 21. 

Memorandum. 

The Spanish Commission proposed to the American Commission the 
draft of several articles for the treaty of peace, which the latter has 
rejected. 

The American Commission refuses to acknowledge the right of the 
inhabitants of the countries ceded or relinquished by Spain to choose 
the citizensliip with which up to the present they have been clothed. 
And nevertheless this right of choosing, which is one of the most 
sacred rights of human beings, has been constantly respected since the 
day in which man was emancii)ated from serfdom. This sacred right 
has been respected in treaties of territorial cession concluded in mod- 
ern times. 

It refuses also to stipulate anything in relation to the respect due 
the contracts entered into by a legitimate sovereign for public works 
and services, — contracts which materially aftect the rights of property 
of private individuals, which were respected in the treaties of Campo 
Formio of 1797, of Paris of 1814, of Zurich of 1859, of Paris of 1800, of 
Vienna of 1864 and 180(1, and which Germany respected also when 
ending the war with France b}^ the treaty of Frankfort of 1871. The 
American Commission alleged as its only reason for this refusal that 
the United States in its treaties has never recognized these contracts 
as though the United States were the only power controlling the 
standard of justice whicli must govern the conventions and the acts of 
nations. 

It refuses to provide for the restitution to their lawful and private 
owners by whoever, be he a Spanish or an American ofticial, is bound 
rightfully to do it, of the sums of money they may have paid into the 
public treasuries of the territory which ceases to belong to Spain, in 
the way of consignments, deposits, or security for contracts or obliga- 
tions, after they iiave been executed or performed, and whicli security 
should be returned. And nevertheless homage was paid to such return 
by lielgium, Netherlands, Austria, France, Sardinia, Denmark, Prussia, 
Italy and Germany in the treaties concluded between them in 1839, 
1859, 18(54, 18()G and 1871. 



I 



TREATY OF PEACE. 259 

The American Commission refuses to recognize tlie permanent char- 
acter of the obligations contracted by the United States in this treaty 
with respect to persons and things in Cuba, limiting the duration thereof 
to the time of the military occupation of the Greater Antille by the 
American troops, without bearing in mind that the American Commis- 
sion demands that the corresponding obligations contracted by Spain 
shall be permanent, and that justice is thus violated in attacking the 
principle of reciprocity which always governs the rights and obligations 
of contracting parties. 

In today's session (December 8), the American Commission consents 
to the United States advising the independent government of Cuba 
whenever it shall be constituted, to observe this treaty. In view of 
this statement, the Spanisli Commission moderates what it has just 
said upon this point in so far as it is necessary to make it harmonize 
with the statements of the American Commission made in this session. 

The Spanish Commission has nothing to say to the refusal of the 
American Commission to assume for the United States the pension of 
gratitude which Spain has been paying to the descendants of the 
immortal discoverer of America. Spain reserves this matter to settle 
it as she understands shall best befit justice, without forgetting the 
cause of modern civilization and America itself. 

Spain has been able to sacrifice, and does sacrifice, all her colonial 
interests upon the altar of peace, and in order to prevent the renewal 
of a war which it is evident she cannot sustain with a nation incompar- 
ably more powerful and with gi eater resources. 

She has upheld her rights in these conferences with all the energy 
the rectitude of her conscience demanded. When there was imposed 
upon her Commission as nn ultimatum the proposition which closes the 
American memorandum ])resented at the session of November 21 last, 
without waving its rights, and solely by way of compromise, inspired 
by its love for x)eace, it made propositions wherein her interests were 
sacrificed. The United States rejected them all. 

Upon the two important questions of law, depending upon the inter- 
pretation to be given the Protocol of Washington, it proposed arbitra- 
tion to the American Commission. This i)roposition was also rejected. 

The ultimatum of Xovember I'l. which has just been cited, is suc- 
ceeded by that which at the last session is involved in the articles the 
American Commission proposes. The S])anish Commission which, (;om- 
plying witli the instructions of its Government, submitted to the first, 
will also bow to this. 

It assents, then, to the United States including in the treaty the 
articles to which this memorandum refers. 

But the American Commission also rejects another article which is 
to Spain, if possible, of greater importance than the other articles the 
Spanish Commission had proposed; because, differing from these, the 
former affects her own dignity. The Maine disaster gave occasion for 
a very respectable and prominent part of the press in the United States 
to cover with insults the unstainable honor of the Spanish people. It 
seems that time was doing its work of tempering passions and casting 
into oblivion the wrongs, when the American Commission, in its said 
memorandum of November I'l, again brought up so lamentable an inci- 
dent, accusing Spain of negligence and incapacity to guarantee security 
to vessels of a friendly nation in her ports. The most sacred right, 
which could not fail to be recognized as attaching to Spain, as it is 
vouchsafed to the most wretched of human beings, was that of defend- 
ing herself from an imputation which left her in so sorry a plight before 



260 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



tlie Other uatioi)«. For this reason her Commission, on the first of this 
month, presented the articles proposing- the appointment of an Inter- 
national Expert Commission, to be named with all imaginable guaran- 
tees to assure its impaxtiality, in order that it might ])roceed to inves- 
tigate the cause of the disaster, and whether any responsibility were 
attachable to fSpain, even were it through negligence. 

When this ])roposition was under submission to the American Coin- 
mission, the President of the United iStates, in his message to the 
American Congress of the ~»th of the said month, again took up a sub- 
ject which could not but rekindle the passions of the two peoples whose 
Commissioners w(ne working over the restoration of peace. He char- 
acteri/,€d the disaster as su,spicious; he aftirmed that its cause was 
external; and added that only,/o>- tvimt of positive proof the American 
Board of Inquiry which had reported thereon had failed to fix the 
r€sj:>on.sihiUtyfor the act on anyone. 

How could it be imagined that on the day following that upon which 
these words were pronounced in Washington, the American Commis- 
sioners in Paris could refuse to Spain that sacred right of defense, the 
respecthig of which she demanded ? 

The Spanish Commission, therefore, cannot yield to such a refusal, 
and solemnly records its i)rotest against it, setting forth that in the 
future it shall never be lawful for those who oppose the investigating 
of the cause of that horrible disaster, to impute, oi>enly or covertly, 
responsibility of any kind therefor to the noble Spanish nation, or its 
authorities. 

True coi^y : 

Emilio de O.teda. 



Protocol No. 22. 



Protocolo 'No. 22. 



Conference of IJeeemher 10, 1898. 



Confer encia del 10 de Diciembre de 

1898. 



Present: on the part of the 
United States: Messrs: Bay, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Itios, Abarzuza, (iarnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The i)rotocol of the preceding- 
session was read and approved. 

The American Commissioners 
presented a written reply to the 
memorandum of the Spanish Com- 
missioners read at the last session. 
The re])ly is hereto annexed (An- 
nex No. 1.). 

The Treaty of Peace (Annex No. 
2.) was read and approved and was 
signed by Plenipotentiaries of the 
two lligii C/ontracting Parties. 

The President of the Si)anish 
Commission expressed his thanks 



Presentes : Por parte delosEsta- 
dos Unidos de AnK'rica: los Seno- 
res : Day, Davis, Frye, Cray, Reid, 
Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana : los SePio- 
res: MonLero Rios, Abarzuza, Gar- 
nica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios Americanos pre- 
sentaron su contestacion escrita al 
Memorandum de los Comisarios 
Esi)arioles lefdo en la sesi('»n ultima, 
(|ue va anexo al ])rotocolo (anexo 
No. 1). 

Se leyo y aprobo el Tratado de 
Paz (Anexo No. 2) y se procedio a 
su firmai>orlos Plenipotenciariosde 
las dos Altas Partes Contratantes. 

El Senor Presidente de la Co- 
misibn Esi)anola manitiestasuagra- 



TKEATY OF PEACE. 



261 



to the American Commissioners 
for the kind plirases with which 
their last memorandum concluded. 
Be had mnch pleasure in acknowl- 
edging- also the courtesy and con- 
sideration which had been shown 
by them in their personal inter- 
course during- the continuance of 
the negotiations, which, however 
painful to the Spanish Commis- 
sioners, would leave with them the 
personal remembrance of the at- 
tentions which had been bestowed 
upon them by the worthy members 
of the American Commission. 

The President of the American 
Commission replied that the words 
to which the President of the Span- 
nish Commission referred were but 
the s])ontaneous expression of the 
true feelings of the American Com- 
missioners toward the Spanish 
Commissioners, for whom they en- 
tertained sentiments of the highest 
esteem and regard. 

The protocol of this session was 
read and approved, and the Joint 
Commission ended its labors. 

William R. Day 

CusH^rAiv K. Davis 

W" P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Keid 

John B. Moore. 



decimiento a los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos por las atentas frases con 
que terminaron su ultimo INIemo- 
randum y se com])lace en reconocer 
asimismo la cortesia y la prudencia 
que en sus relacioues ])ersouales 
han demostrtulo durante el curso 
de una negociacion que aunque 
dolorosa para los Comisarios Es]m- 
fioles dejavii en ellos el recuerdo 
j)er};onal de las atenciones que han 
merecido lilos dignos miembros de 
la Comisidn Americana. 



El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana coutesto que las pala- 
bras a que aludio el Presidente 
de la Comision Espanola erau la 
expontanea exi)resi6u de los ver- 
daderos sentimientos de los Comi- 
sarios Americanos hacia los Comi- 
sarios Espanoles, por quienes te- 
nian la mayor estimacion y aprecio. 

Se leyo y aprobo el Protocol© de 
esta sesion, acabando sus trabajos 
la Comision en pleno. 

EUGENIO MONTERO ElOS 

B. De Ararzuza 

J. i:)E Gabnica 

W R De V^tlla Uerutia 

Rafael Cerero 

Emilio De O.jeda 



Annex 1 to Protocol No. 22. 



MEMORANDUM OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS IX REPLY TO THAT 
OF THE SPANISH COMAnSSIONERS SUBMITTED AT THE MEETING OF 
DECEMBER S, 1898. 

In the memorandum submitted at the last meeting by the Spanish 
Commissioners, the statement is broadly made, "The American Com- 
mission refuses to acknowledge the right of the inhabitants of the 
countries ceded or relinquished by Spain to choose the citizenship with 
which up to the present time they have been clothed." 

The American Commissioners do not so understand the article upon 
the subject of citizenship submitted by them as a substitute for the 
article proposed by the Spanish Commissioners. An analysis of this 
article will show that Spanish subjects, natives of Spain, are allowed 
a year's time in which, by the simple process of stating in a court of 
record their intention so to do, they may preserve their allegiance to 
Spain. 

Such persons have the fullest right to dispose of their property and 



"202 TREATY OF PEACE. 

remove from the territory, or remaining to continue to be Si)anish 
subjects or elect the nationality of the new territory. 

As to natives, their status and civil rights ai-e left to Congress, which 
will enact laws to govern the ceded territory. This is no more than 
the assertion of the right of the governing power to control these 
important relations to the new government. The Congress of a coun- 
try which never has enacted laws to oppress or abridge the rights of 
residents within its domain, and whose laws permit the largest liberty 
consistent with the preservation of order and the protection ot prop- 
erty may safely be trusted not to depart from its well settled practice 
in dealing with the inhabitants of these islands. 

It is true that the Spaiiisli Commissioners proposed an article upon 
the subject of nationality supplementing the one oflered by them as to 
uationahty of Spanish subjects, which provides that all inhabitants of 
the ceded territory other than Spanish subjects shall have the right to 
choose the Spanish nationality within one year after the exchange of 
ratifications of the treaty. This would i)ermit all the uncivilized tribes 
which have not come under the jurisdiction of Spain, as well as foreign 
residents of the islands, to elect to create for themselves a nationality 
other than the one in control of the territory, while enjoying the benefits 
and protection of the laws of the local sovereignty. This would create 
an anamolous condition of affairs leading to complications and discord 
important to avoid. 

The American Commission felt constrained to reject the articles 
tendered by the Spanish Commissioners in respect to contracts entered 
into for i>ublic works and services. It took this step because the nature, 
extent and binding obligation of these contracts are unknown to the 
American Commissioners, and they again disclaim any purpose of their 
Government to disregard the obligations of international law in respect 
to such contracts as investigation may show to be valid and binding 
upon the United. States as snccessor in sovereignty in the ceded territory. 

The American Commissioners also rejected the article ])ro]>osed by 
the Spanish Commissioners upon the subject of " Deposits and Bonds.'' 
In the form tendered, the American Commissioners understand this 
article to obligate the United States to return moneys " received by 
Government Oliices and Establishments from Spanish citizens'' for 
the purposes specified, although the same never came into the posses- 
sion of the authorities of the United States in said territories, Nothing 
can be further from the intention of that Government than to keep from 
the lawful owners such sums as come under its control which should 
be restored after the fulfilment of contracts or obligations intended to 
be secured thereby. Certainly tlie United States hns no intention to 
indnlge in such confiscation of property which becomes subject to its 
control, and may safely rely in such matters upon the confidence war- 
ranted by it;S consistent record. 

Eespecting the observation in the memorandum of the Spanish Com- 
mission upon the last message of the President of the United States, 
wherein lie refers to tlie disaster to the battlesliip Maine, the American 
Commissioners feel obliged to decline to enter upon any discussion of 
the same, in obedience to well established precedents and practice in 
the history of their countr3\ 

The xVmericau Commissioners cannot close this final memorandum 
without expressing tlieir sense of the thoroughness, learning, and 
devoted ability, no less than the uniform courtesy with which the 
Spanish Commissioners have condu(;ted the negotiations about to 
terminate. 

True copy: John B. Moore. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



263 



Annex 2 to Protocol No. 22. 



The United States of Amer- 
ica AND Her Majesty the 
Queen Kegent of Spain, in 
THE Name of Her Aigust Son 
Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to 
end the state of war now existing 
between tiie two conn tries, have 
for that purpose appointed as 
Plenipotentiaries : 

The President of the 
United States, 

VVillia:\i E. Day^, Cushman K. 
Davis, William P. Frye, 
George Gray, and Whitelaw 
Eeid, citizens of the United 
States; 

And Her Majesty the Queen 
Regent of Spain, 

Don Eugenic Montero Eios, 
President of the Senate, Don 
Buenaventura de Abarzuza, 
Senator of the Kingdom and ex- 
Minister of the Crown, Don Jose 
DE Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes 
and Associate Justice of the Su- 
preme Court; Don Wenceslao 
Eamirez de Villa-Urkutia, 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and 
Don Eafael Cerero, General 
of Division; 

Who, having assembled in Paris, 
and having exchanged their full 
powers, which were found to be in 
due and proper form, have, after 
discussion of the matters before 
them, agreed upon the following 
articles : 

Article I. 

Spain relinquishes all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 

And as the island is, upon its 
evacuation by Spain, to be occu- 



Los EsTADOS Unidos de Ame- 
rica Y S. M. LA Eeina Eegente 
de espana, en nombre de su 
Augusto Hijo Don Alfonso 
XIII, deseando poner termino al 
estado de guerra hoy existente 
entre ambas Xaciones, hau nom- 
brado con este objeto por sus Ple- 
ni])otenciaros a saber: 

El Presidente de los Esta- 
Dos Unidos de America A : 

William E. Day, Cushman K. 
Davis, William P. Frye, 
George Gray, y Whitelaw 
Eeid, ciudadanos de los Estados 
Unidos ; 

Y SU Majestad la Eeina Ee- 
gente DE ESPANA, A 

Don Eugekio Montero Eios, 
Presidente del Sen ado. Don 
Buenaventura de Abarzuza 
Senador del Eeino, Ministro que 
ha sido de la Corona, Don Josii: 
DE Garnica, Diputado a Cortes, 
Magistrado del Tribunal supremo. 
Don Wenceslao Eamirez de 
Villa-Urrutia, Enviado Extra- 
ordinario y Ministro pleuipoten- 
ciairo en Bruselas, y Don Eafael 
Cerero, General de division; 

Los cuales reunidos en Paris, 
despues de haberse comunicado 
sus plenos poderes que fueron ha- 
ll ados en buena y debida forma, y 
previa la discussion de las materias 
peudientes, ha convenido en los 
siguientes articulos : 

Articulo I. 

Espana renuncia todo derecho 
de soberania y propiedad sobre 
Cuba. 

En atencion a que dicha isla, 
cuando sua evacuada por Espa&a, 



2()4 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



pied by the Ignited States, the 
United States will, so long as sucli 
occupation shall last, assume and 
dist'liarge the obligations that may 
under international law result from 
the fact of its o('CUi>ation, for the 
protection of life and proi)erty. 

Article 11. 

Spain cedes to the United States 
the island of Porto Kico and other 
islands now under Si)anish sov- 
ereignty in the West Indies, and 
the island of (ruam in the Marianas 
or Ladrones. 

Article 111. 

Si)aiu cedes to the United States 
tbe archipelago known as the Phil- 
ippine Islands, and comprehending 
the islands lying within the follow- 
ing line: 

A line running from west to east 
along or near the twentieth paral- 
lel of north latitude, and through 
the middle of the navigable chan- 
nel of Bachi, from the one hundred 
and eighteenth (118th) to the one 
h u n d r e d and twenty - seventh 
(iL'Tth) degree meridian of longi- 
tude east of Greenwich, thence 
along the one hundred and twenty- 
seventh (127th) degree meridian of 
longitude east of Greenwich to 
the parallel of four degrees and 
forty- five minutes (4'^ 45') north 
latitude, thence along the parallel 
of four degrees and forty five 
minutes (4° 45') north latitude to 
its intersection with the meridian 
of longitude one hundred and nine- 
teen degrees and thirty-five min- 
utes (11!)'^ 35') east of Greenwich, 
thence along the meridian of longi- 
tude one hundred and nineteen 
degrees and thirtj^-tive minutes 
(11 IP 35') east of Greeuwi(;h to the 
imrallel of latitude seven degrees 
and forty minutes (7° 40') north, 
thence along the parallel of lati- 
tude seven degrees and forty min 
utes(7'^ 41)') north to its intersection 
with the one hundred and six- 
teenth (llOth) degree meridian of 



va a ser ocupada per los Estados 
Unidos, los Estados Unidos mien- 
tras dure su ocupacion, tomarau 
sobre si y cumplir;in las obliga- 
ciones<jue por el hechode ocuparla, 
lesimponeel Derecho Internacion- 
al, para la proteccion de vidas y 
haciendas. 

Articulo II. 

Espana cede a los Estados Uni- 
dos la Isla de Puerto Eico y las 
demas (jue estan ahora bnjo su vso- 
beraniaenlas Indias Occidentales, 
y la Isla de Guam en el Archipie- 
lago de las Marianas 6 Ladrones. 

Articulo 111. 

Espana cede a los Estados Uni- 
dos el archiepiclago conocido por 
Islas Filipinas, que comprende las 
islas situadas dentro de las lineas 
siguientes: 

Una linea que corre de Oeste a 
Este, (;erca del 20^ paralelo de la- 
titud Xorte, a travf'S de la mitad 
del canal navegable de Bachi, 
desde el 118° al 127° grades de 
longitud Este de Greenwich; de 
aqui a lo largo del ciento veintisiete 
(127) grado meridiano de longitud 
Este de Greenwich al paralelo cua- 
tro grados cuareuta y cinco minu- 
tos (4^^ 45') de latitud Norte; de 
aqui siguiendo el paralelo de cua- 
tro grados cuarenta y cinco minutos 
de latitud Norte (4'^ 45') hasta su 
interseccion con el meridiano de 
longitud ciento diez y nueve grados 
y treinta y cmco minutos (119° 35') 
Este de (ireenwich; de a(iui si- 
guiendo el meridiano de longitud 
ciento diez y nueve grados y treinta 
y cinco minutos (119° 35') P^ste de 
Greenwich, al ])aralelo de latitud 
siete grados cuarenta minutos (7° 
40') Norte; de a(iui siguiendo 
el paralelo de latitud siete 
grados cuaranta minutos (7° 40') 
Norte, ii su interseccion con el 
ciento diez y seis (11(>°) grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, de acjui por una linea recta, a 
la interseccion del dccimo grado 
paralelo de latitud Norte, con el 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



265 



longitude east of Greenwicli, thence 
by a direct line to the intersection 
of the tenth (10th) degree parallel 
of north latitude with the one hun- 
dred and eighteenth (118th) degree 
meridian of longitude eastof Green- 
wich, and thence along the one 
hundred and eighteenth (118th) 
degree meridian of longitude east 
of Greenwich to the i>oint of 
beginning. 

The United States will pay to 
Spain the sum of twenty million 
dollars ($20,000,000) within three 
months after the excliange of the 
ratifications of the present treaty. 

Article IV. 

The United States will, for the 
term of ten years from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications 
of the present treaty, admit Span- 
ish ships and merchandise to the 
ports of the Philippine Islands on 
the same terms as ships and mer- 
chandise of the United States. 

Article V. 

The United States will, upon the 
signature of the present treaty, 
send back to Spain, at its own cost, 
the Spanish soldiers taken as pris- 
oners of war on the capture of 
Manila by tlie American forces. 
The armsof the soldiers in question 
shall be restored to them. 

Spain will, upon the exchange of 
the ratifications of the present 
treaty, proceed to evacuate the 
Philippines, as well as the island 
of Guam, on terms similar to those 
agreed upon by the Commissioners 
appointed to arrange for the evacu- 
ation of Porto Rico and other is- 
lands in the West Indies, under 
the Protocol of August 12, 1898, 
which is to continue in force till its 
provisions are completely executed. 

The time within which the evacu- 
ation of the Philippine Islands 
and Guam shall be comi^leted shall 
be fixed by the two Governments. 



ciento diez y ocho (118°) grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, y de aqui siguiendo el ciento 
diez y ocho grado (118°) meridiano 
de longitud Este de Greenwich, al 
punto en que comienza esta de- 
marcacion. 



Los Estados Unidos pagaran ^ 
Espana la suma de veinte milliones 
de dollars ($20,000,000) dentro de 
tres meses despues del canje de 
ratificaciones del presente tratado. 

Articulo IV. 

Los Estados Unidos durante el 
termiuo de diez anos a contar desde 
el canje de la ratificacion del pre- 
sente tratado admitiran en los puer- 
tos de las Islas Eilipinas los buques 
y las mercancias esparioles,bajo las 
misnias condiciones que los buques 
y las mercancias de los Estados 
Unidos. 

Articulo V. 

Los Estados Unidos, al ser fir- 
mado el presente tratado, traspor- 
taran a Espaiia, 5i su costa, los 
soldados espanoles que hicieron 
prisioneros de guerra las fuerzas 
Americanas al ser capturada Ma- 
nila. Las armas de estos soldados 
les seran devueltas. 

Espana, al caujearse las ratifica- 
ciones del presente tratado, proce- 
dera a evacuar las Lslas Filipinas, 
asi como la de Guam, en condi- 
ciones semejantes a las acordadas 
por las Comisiones nombradas para 
concertar la evacuacion de Puerto 
Rico y otras Islas en las Antillas 
Occidentales, segun el Protocol© 
de 12 de Agosto de 1898, que cou- 
tinuara en vigor hasta que sean 
coHipletamente cumplidas sus 
disposiciones. 

El tcrmino dentro del cual sera 
completada la evacuacion de las 
Islas Filipinas y la de Guam, sera, 
tij ado por ambos Gobieruos. Seran 



266 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Stands of colors, uiicaptnred war 
vessels, small arms, guns of all 
calibres, with their carriages and 
accessories, powder, ammunition, 
livestock, and materials and sup- 
plies of all kinds, belonging to the 
land and naval forces of Spain in 
the Philippines and Guam, remain 
the property of Spain. Pieces of 
heavy ordnance, exclusive of field 
artillery, in the fortifications and 
coast defences, shall remain in 
their emplacements for the term 
of six months, to be reckoned from 
the exchange of ratifications of 
the treaty; and the United States 
may, in the mean time, purchase 
such material from Spain, if a sat- 
isfactory agreement between the 
two Governments on the subject 
shall be reached. 

Article VI. 



propiedad de Espana banderas y 
estandai'tes, buques de guerra no 
apresados, armas portatiles, cano- 
ues de todos calibres con sus mon 
tajes y accesorios, polvoras, muiii- 
ciones, ganado, material y efectos 
de toda clase pertenecientes a los 
ejercitos de mar y tierra de Espana 
en las Filipas y Guam. Las piezas 
de grueso calibre, que no sean ar- 
tilleria de campana, colocadas eii 
las fortificaciones y en las costas, 
quedanin en sus emplazamentos 
por elplazodeseismeses a partirdcl 
canje de ratlficaciones del ])resente 
tratado, y los Estados Unidos 
podran, durante ese tiempo, coni- 
prar a Espana dicho material, si 
ambos Gobiernos llegan a un 
acuerdo satisfactorio sobre el par- 
ticular. 

Articulo VI. 



Spain will, upon the signature 
of the present treaty, release all 
prisoners of war, and all persons 
detained or imprisoned for politi- 
cal offences, in connectiou with the 
insurrections in Cuba and the 
Philipi)ines and the war with the 
United States. 

Keciprocally the United States 
will release all persons made xnis- 
oners of war by the American 
forces, and will undertake to ob- 
tain the release of all Spanish 
prisoners in tlie hands of the in- 
surgents in Cuba and tlie Philip- 
pines. 

The Government of the United 
States will at its own cost return 
to Spain and the Government of 
Spain will at its own cost return 
to the United States, Cuba, Porto- 
Pico, and the Philippines, accord- 
ing to the situation of their re- 
spective homes, prisoners released 
or caused to be released by them, 
respectively, under this article. 

Article VII. 



Espana, alser firmadoel presente 
tratado, pondni en libertad a todos 
los prisioneros de guerra y a todos 
los detenidos 6 presos por deiitos 
politicos a consecuencia de las in- 
surrercioiiesen Cuba y en Filipinas 
y de la guerra con los Estados 
Unidos. 

Peciprocamente, los Estados Uni - 
dos pondranen libertad a todos los 
prisioneros de guerra heehos por 
las fuerzas Americanas, y gestiona- 
ran la libertad de todos los prisi- 
oneros espafioles en poder de los 
insuri-ectos de Cuba y Filipinas. 

El Gobierno de los Estados Uni- 
dos trasportara, por su cuenta a 
Espaila, y el (iobierno de Espafiai 
trasportara por su cuenta a los 
Estados Unidos, Cuba, Puerto Rico 
y Filipinas, con arreglo a la situis- 
ci(m de sus respectivos hogares, los 
prisioneros que |jongan 6 ( i ue haga 1 1 
poner en libertad respectivamentc, 
en virtud de este Articulo. 

Articulo VII. 



The United States and Spain 
mutually relincjuish all claims for 
indemnity, national and individ- 
ual, of every kind, of either Gov- 



Espana y los Estados Unidos de 
Am(''ri(;a. renuncian mutuamentc, 
por el i)resente tratado, a toda re- 
clamacion de iudemuizacion na- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



267 



ernment, or of its citizens or sub- 
jects, against the other Govern- 
ment, that may have arisen since 
the beginning of the hite insurrec- 
tion in Cuba and prior to the ex- 
change of ratifications of the pres- 
ent treaty, including all claims for 
indemnity for the cost of the war. 



The United States will adjudi- 
cate and settle the claims of its 
citizens against Spain relinquished 
in this article. 

Article VIII. 

In conformity witli the ]>ro visions 
of Articles 1, U, and III of tliis 
treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, 
and cedes in Porto Eico and other 
islands in the West Indies, in the 
island ot Guam, and in the i'hilip- 
pine Archipelago, all the buildings, 
wharves, barracks, forts, struc- 
tures, public highways and other 
immovable property which, in con- 
formity with law, belong to the 
public domain, and as such belong- 
to the Crown of Si)ain. 

And it is hereby declared that 
the relinquishment or cession, as 
the case may be, to which the pre- 
ceding paragraph refers, cannot in 
any respect impair the ])roperty or 
rights which by law belong to the 
peaceful possession of property of 
all kinds, of provinces, municii)al- 
ities, public or ])rivate establish- 
ments, ecclesiastical or civic bod- 
ies, or any other associations hav- 
ing legal capacity to accjuire and 
possess property in the aforesaid 
territories renounced or ceded, or 
of private individuals, of whatso- 
ever nationality such individuals 
may be. 

The aforesaid relinquishment or 
cession, as thecase may be,includes 
all documents ex(;lusively referring 
to the sovereignty relinquished or 
ceded that may exist in the ar- 
chives of the Peninsula. Where 
any document in such archives only 
in part relates to said sovereignty, 
a copy of such part will be furnished 



clonal 6 privada de cualquier 
genero de un Gobieruo contra el 
otro, 6 de sus siibditos 6 ciudada^ 
nos contra el otro Gobierno, que 
inieda haber surgido desde el co- 
mien zo de la ultima insurreccion en 
Cuba y sea anterior al canje de 
ratificaciones del presente tratado, 
asi como a toda inderanizaciou en 
concepto de gastos ocasionados por 
la guerra. 

Los Estados Unidos juzgaran y 
resolveran las reclamaciones de sus 
ciudadanos contra Espafia, a que 
renuucia en este Articulo. 

Articulo VIII. 

En cumplimiento de lo convenido 
en los Articulos I, II y III de este 
tratado, Espafia renuncia en Cuba 
y cede en Puerto Rico y en las otras 
Islas delas Indias Occidentales, en 
la Isla de Guam y en el Archipie- 
lago de las Filii)iuas, todos los edi- 
ficios, nmelles, cuarteles, fortalezas, 
establecimientos, vias publicas y 
demas bienes iumuebles que con 
arreglo a dereeho son del dominio 
piiblico y como tal corresponden a. 
la Corona de Espana. 

Queda por lo tanto declarado que 
esta renuncia 6 (;esi6n, segun el 
caso, ii que se refiere el ])arrafo an- 
terior, en nada pnede mermar la 
propiedad, 6 los derechos que co- 
rrespondan, con arreglo a las leyes, 
al poseedor pacifico, de los bienes 
de tod as clases de las provincias, 
municipios, establecimientos publi- 
cos 6 i)ri vados, corporaciones civiles 
6 eclesiasticas, 6 de cualesquiera 
otras colectividades que tienen per- 
sonalidad juridica para adquirir y 
poseer bienes en los meucionados 
territorios renunciado 6 cedidos, y 
los de los individuos particulares, 
cualquiera que sea su nacionalidad. 

Dicha renuncia 6 cesion, segun el 
caso, incluye todos los documentos 
que se refieran exclusivamente a 
dicha Soberania renunciada 6 ce- 
dida, que existau en los Archives 
de la Peninsula. 

Cuando estos documentos esis- 
tentes en dichos Archivos, solo en-. 
parte correspondau a dicha Sobe- 



268 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



whenever it shall be requested. 
Like rules shall be reciprocally 
observed in favor of Spain in re- 
spect of documents in the archives 
of the islands above referred to. 



In the aforesaid relinquishment 
or cession, as the case may l)e, are 
also included such rights as the 
crown of Spain and its authorities 
possess in respect of the olhcial 
archives and re(^ords. executive as 
well as judicial, in the islandsabove 
referred to, which relate to said 
islands or the rights and pro])erty 
of theii inhabitants. Such archives 
and records sliall be carefully pre- 
served, and private persons shall 
without distinction have the right 
to recpiire, in accordance with law, 
authenticated copies of the con- 
tracts, wills and other instruments 
forming' part of notarial protocols 
or files, or which may be contained 
in the executive or judicial ar- 
chives, be tlie latter in Spain or in 
the islands aforesaid. 



Article IX. 

Spanish subjects, natives of the 
Peninsula, residing- in the territory 
over which Spain by the present 
treaty relinquishes or cedes her 
sovereignty, may remain in such 
territory or may remove therefrom, 
retaining- in either event all their 
rights of property, including the 
right to sell or dispose of such prop- 
erty or of its ])roceeds; and they 
shall also have tlie right to carry on 
their industry, commerce and pro- 
fessions, being subject in respect 
thereof to such laws as are appli- 
cable to other foreigners. In case 
they remain in the territory they 
may preserve their allegiance to the 
Crown of Spain by niiiking, before 
a court of record, within a year from 
the date of the exchange of ratifi- 
cations of this treaty, a declaration 
of their deinsion to preserve such 
allegiance; in default of which dec- 



rania, se facilitariin copias de dichj 
parte j^iempre que scan solicitadas; 
Kegias analogos habrau recq)rocal 
mente de observarse en favor dii 
Espana, respecto de los doeumenj 
tos existentes en los Archivos d«j 
las Islas antes mencionades. 

En las antecitadas renuncia ( 
cesion, segnn el caso, se hallail 
comprendidos aquellos derechos d«| 
la ( 'Orona de Espana y de sus Au' 
toridades sobre los Archivos y 
llegistros oficiales, asi administra 
tivos como judiciales de dichas, 
islas, que se refieran a ellas y a loj, 
derechos y propiedades de siis ha, 
bitantes. Dichos Archivos y Ke 
gistros deberan ser cuidadosa 
mente conservados, y los ])articu 
lares sin excepcnchi, tendran derechc 
a sacar, con arreglo a las Leyes 
las coiiias autorizadas de los con 
tratos, testamentos y demas docn 
mentos que formen parte de loj 
protocolos uotariales 6 que se ens 
todieu en los Archivos administra 
tivos 6 judiciales, bien estos st 
hallen en Espaila, 6 bien en las 
Islas de que se hace mencita 
anteriormente. 

Akticulo IX. 

Los subditos espafioles, naturales 
de la Peninsula, residentes en el te 
rritorio cuya soberania EspaTi£ 
renuncia 6 cede por el presente tra 
tado, podnin permanecer en dicho 
territorioo marcharse de el,conser 
vando en uno u otro caso todos sus 
derechos de propiedad, con inclu' 
sion del derecho de vender ('» dis 
poner de tal propiedad o de sus 
productos; y ademas tendran e. 
derecho de ejercer su industria, 
comercio 6 piofesicm, sujetandose 
a este respecto a las leyes que seaB 
aplicables a los deinas extrangeros- 
En el caso de que permanezcan er 
el territorio, pod ran conservar sn 
nacionalidad espaiiola hnciendc 
ante una Oficina de registro, den 
tro de un ano des])ues del cambic 
de ratificaciones de este tratado, 
una declaracion de su pro])6sitc 
de conservar dicha nacionalidad: 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Jaration tbey sball be held to bave 
reiioviBced it and to have adopted 
the nationality of the territory in 
which they may reside. 

The civil rights and political 
staiusiof the native inhabitants of 
the territories hereby ceded to the 
United States shall be determined 
by the GongreBS, 

Article X. 

The inhabitants of the territories 
over which Spain relinquishes or 
cedes her sovereignty shall be se- 
cured in the free exercise of their 
religion. 

Article XI. 

The Spaniards residing in the 
territories ov«r which Spain by 
this treaty cedes or relinquishes 
her sovereignty shall be subject in 
matters civil us well as criminal to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the country wherein they reside, 
pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- 
erning the same; and they shall 
have the right to api)ear before 
such courts, and to pursue the 
same course as citizens of the 
country to which the courts belong. 

Article XII. 

Judicial ])roceedings j)ending at 
the time of the exchange of ratifi- 
cations of this treaty in the terri- 
tories over whicli Spain relin- 
quishes or cedes her sovereignty 
shall be determined according to 
the following rules: 

1. Judgments rendered either in 
civil suits between private individ- 
uals, or in criminal matters, before 
the date mentioned, and with re- 
spect to which there is no recourse 
or right of review under the Span- 
ish law, shall be duemed to be final, 
and shall be executed in due form 
by competent authoiity in the ter- 
ritory within whieh such judgments 
should be carried out. 

li. Civil suits between private in- 
dividuals which may on the date 



a falta de esta declaracion, se con- 
siderar.i que han renunciado dicha 
nacionalidad y adoptado la del te- 
rritorio en el cual i)ueden residir. 

Los derechos civiles y la coudi- 
ci(')n ijolitica de los habitantes 
natural es de los territorios aqui 
cedidos a los Estados Unidos se 
determinaran por el Congreso. 

Articulo X. 

Los habitantes de los territorios 
cuya soberania Espaila renuncia 6 
cede, tendran asegurado el libre 
ejercicio de su religion. 



Articulo XI. 

Los espaiioles residentes en los 
territorios cuya soberania cede 6 
renuncia Espana por este tratado, 
estaran sometidos en lo civil y en 
lo criminal a les tribuuales del pais 
en (ine residan con arreglo a la« 
leyes communes que reguleu su 
competencia, pudiendo comparecer 
ante aquellos, en la misma forma 
y ampleaudo los mismos procedi- 
mientos que deban observar los 
ciudadanos del pais a que perte- 
nezca el tribunal. 

Articulo XII. 

Los piocedimientos judiciales 
pendientes al canjearse las ratifi- 
caciones de este tratado, en los 
territorios sobre los cuales Espana 
renuncia 6 cede su Soberania, se 
determinaran con arreglo a las 
reglas siguientes : 

1. Las senteucias dictadas en 
causas civiles entre particulares 6 
en nmteria criminal antes de la 
fecha mencionada, y contra las cua- 
les no haya apelacion 6 casacion 
con arreglo a las leyes espafiolas, 
secousideraran como tirmes, y seran 
ejecutadas en debida forma por la 
Autoridad comjjetente en el terri- 
torio dentro del cual dichas senten- 
cias deban cumplirse. 

2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- 
ticulares que en la fecha mencio-* 



270 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



mentioned be undetermined sliall 
be prosecuted to judgment before 
the court in wbicli they may then 
be pending or in tbe court tbat 
may be substituted tberefor. 

o. Criminal actions pending on 
the date mentioned before the Su- 
preme Court of Spain against citi- 
zens of the territory which by this 
treaty ceases to be Spanish shall 
continue under its jnrisdiction un- 
til final judgment; but, such judg- 
ment having been rendered, the 
execution thereof shall be commit- 
ted to the competent authority of 
the place in which the case arose. 



Article XIII. 

The rights of property secured 
by co])yrights and patents acquired 
by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba, 
and in Porto Rico, the Philipi>ines 
and other ceded territories, at the 
time of the exchange of the ratifi- 
cations of this tre;ity, shall con- 
tinue to be respected. Spanish sci- 
entific, literary and artistic works, 
not subversive of public order in 
the territories in question, shall 
continue to be admitted free of 
duty into such territories, for the 
period of ten years, to be recl^oned 
from the date of the exchange of 
the ratifications of this treaty. 

Aktk'LE XIV, 

Spain shall have the power to 
establish consular officers in the 
ports and places of the territories, 
the sovereigMty over which has 
been either relinquished or ceded 
by the present treaty 

Article XV. 

The Covernmentof each country 
will, for the term of ten j^^ars, ac- 
■cord to the merchant vessels of tlie 
other country the same treatment 
in respect of all i)ort charges, in- 
cluding entrance and clearance 
•dues, light dues, and tonnage 



nada no hayan sido juzgados, con 
tinuaPcin su tramitacion ante e 
Tribunal en que se halle el proceso 
6 ante a(juel que lo sustituya. 

3. Las acciones en materia crimi 
nal pendientes en la fecha menciO' 
nada ante el Tribunal Su})remo de 
Espan a contra ciudadauos del terri 
torio que segiin este tratado deja d€ 
ser espanol, continuaran bajo su ju 
risdiccion hasta que recaiga la seni 
tencia definitiva; pero una vez die 
tada esa sentencia, su ejecucionl 
sera encomendada a la Autoridad 
competente del lugar en que lai 
accion se suscito. 

Articulo XIII. 

Continuaran respetaudose losde 
rechos de propiedad literaria, ar 
tistica (' industrial, ad((uiridos por 
espaholes en las Tslas de Cuba y em 
las de Puerto Rico, Filipinas y de 
mas territorios cedidos, al hacerse 
el can je de las ratificaciones de est© 
tratado. Lasobras espanolas cien- 
tificas,literarias y art!sticas,<jue no 
sean peligrosas para el orden pu 
blico en dichos territorios, continu- 
aran eutrando en los mismos, cou 
franquicia de todo derechodeadua 
na i)or un plazo de diez anos a con 
tar desde el canje de ratificaciones 
de este tratado. 

Articulo XIV. 

Espana podra establecer Agen 
tes Consulares en los puertos y 
plazas de los territorios cuya re 
nuncia y cesion es objeto de este 
tratado. 



Articulo XV. 

El Cobierno de cada pais conce- 
dera.por el tiTmino de diez anos, 
a los buques mercantes del otro el 
mismo trato en cuanto a todos los 
derechos de puerto, inclnyendolos 
de entrada y salida, de faro y 
tonelaje, que concede a sus propios 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



271 



duties, as it accords to its own 
merchant vessels, not engaged in 
the coastwise trade. 

This article may at any time be 
terminated on six months notice 
given by either Government to the 
other. 



Article XYI. 

It is understood that any obli- 
gations assumed in this treaty by 
the United States with respect to 
Cuba are limited to the time of its 
occupancy thereof; but it will 
upon the termination of such occu- 
pancy, advise any Government 
established in theislanid to assume 
the same obligations. 

Article XVII 

The present treaty shall be rati- 
fied by the President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate thereof, and 
by Her Majesty the (^)ueen Eegent 
of Spain; and the ratifications 
shall be exchanged at Washington 
within six months from the date 
hereof, or earlier if possible. 

In faith whereof, we, the respec- 
tive Plenipotentiaries, have signed 
this treaty and have hereunto 
affixed onr seals. 

Done in duplicate at Paris, the 
tenth day of December, in the year 
of Our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and ninety eight. 



SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 



William R. Day 
CX'SHMAN K. Davis 
William P. Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 



buques mercantes no emj)leados en 
el coniercio de cabotaje. 

Este articulo puede ser denun- 
ciado en cualquier tiempo dando 
noticia previa de ello cualquiera de 
los dos Gobiernos al otro con seis 
meses de anticipacion. 

Articulo XVI. 

(»)ueda entendido que cualquiera 
obligacion aceptada enestetratado 
por los Estados Unidos con respecto 
a Cuba, esta limitada al tiempo que 
dure su ocupacion en esta isla, 
pero al terminar dicha ocupacion, 
aconseiar<4n al Gobierno que se es- 
tablezca en la isla que acepte las 
mismas obligaciones. 

ARTICULO XVII. 

EI presente tratado sera ratifi- 
cado por el Presidente de los P]sta- 
dos Unidos, de acuerdo y con la apro- 
baci(')n del Senado, y por Su Majes- 
tad la Reina Regente de P^spana; y 
las ratiticaciones se canjearan en 
Washington dentro del plazo de 
seis meses desde esta fecha, 6 antes 
si posible fuese. 

En f(' de lo cual, los respectivos 
Plenipotenciarios firman y sellan 
este tratado. 

Hecho por duplicado in Paris 4 
diez de Diciembre del ano mil ocho- 
cientos noventa y ocho. 

[seal] Eugenio Montero Rigs 
[seal] B. de Abarzuza 

[seal] J. DE GARNICA 

[seal] W R de Villa Urrutia 
[seal] Rafael Cerero 



PEACE PROTOCOL OF AUGUST 12. 1898, AND CORRESPONDENCE. 



MESSAGE 



GOVERNMENT OF H. M. THE QUEEN REGENT OF SPAIN, 
SUBMITTED BY H. EXC. MR. J. CAMBON, AMBASSADOR 
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, TO WILLIAM McKINLEY, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



Madrid, July 22^ 1898. 
Mr. President : 

Since three months the American people and the Spanish nation are 
at war because Spain did not consent to grant independence to Cuba 
and to withdraw her troops therefrom. 

Spain faced with resignation such uneven strife, and only endeavored 
to defend her possessions with no other hope than to oppose, in the 
measure of her strength, the undertaking of the United States, and to 
protect her honor. 

Neitlier the trials which adversity has made us endure nor the 
realization that but faint hope is left us could deter us from struggling 
till the exhaustion of our very last resources. This stout purpose, how- 
ever, does not blind us, and we are fully aware of the responsibilities 
which would weigh upon both nations in the eyes of the civilized 
world were this war to be continued. 

This war not only inflicts upon the two peoples who wage it the 
hardships inseparable from all armed conflict, but also dooms to use- 
less suffering and unjust sacrifices the inhabitants of a territory to 
which Spain is bound by secular ties that can be forgotten by no 
nation either of the old or of the new world. 

To end calamities already so great and to avert evils still greater, our 
countries might mutually endeavor to And upon which conditions the 
preserit struggle could be terminated otherwise than by force of arms. 

Spain believes this understanding possible, and hopes that this view 
is also harbored by the Government of the United States. All true 
friends of both nations share no doubt the same hope. 

Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she 
carried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object: the 
vindication of her prestige, her honor, her name. During the war ol 
insurrection it was her desire to spare the great island from the dangers 
of ])rematuie ind("i)endence; in the present war she has Ijeen actuated 
by sentiments inspired rath(>r by ties of blood than by her interests and 
by the rights belonging to her as mother country. 
272 



TREATY OF PEACE. 273 

Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors 
of war if the United States are, on their part, likewise disposed. 

The President of the United States and the American people may 
now learn from tliis message the true thought, desire, and intention of 
the Spanish nation. 

And so do we wish to learn from the President of the United States 
upon which basis might be established a political status in Cuba and 
might be terminated a strife which would continue without reason 
should both Governments agree upon the means of pacifying the 
island. 

In the name of the Government of H. M. the Queen Pegent I have 
the honor to address this message to your excelleucy, with the expres- 
sion of my highest consideration. 

Due d'Almodovar del Pio, 

Ministre (VEtat. 



Department oe State, 

Washington, Jvly oO, 18!>8. 
Excellency: 

The President received on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 2Gth instant, 
from the hand of his excellency the ambassador of France, representing 
for this purpose tlie Government of Spain, the message signed by your 
excellency as minister of state in behalf of the Government of Pier 
Majesty the (^leen Pegent of Spain, and dated the 22d instant, as to 
the possibility of terminating the war now existing between the United 
States and Spain. 

The President received with satisfaction the suggestion that the two 
countries might mutually endeavor to ascertain the conditions on which 
the pending struggle may be brought to an end, as well as the expres- 
sion of Spain's belief that an understanding on the subject is possible. 

During the protracted negotiations that preceded the outbreak of 
hostilities the President earnestly labored to avert a conflict, in the 
hope that Spain, in consideration of her own interests, as well as those 
of the Spanish Antilles and the United States, would find a way of 
removing the conditions which had, for half a century, constantly dis- 
turbed the peace of the Western Hemisphere and on numerous occa- 
sions brought the two nations to the verge of war. 

The President witnessed with profound disappointment the frustra- 
tion of his peaceful efforts by events which forced upon the people of 
the United States the unalterable conviction that nothing short of the 
relinquishment by Spain of a claim of sovereignty over Cuba which 
she was unable to enforce would relieve a situation that had become 
unendurable. 

For years the Government of the United States, out of regard for 
the susceptibilities of Spain, had by the exercise of its power and the 
expenditure of its treasure preserved the obligations of neutrality. 
But a point was at length reached at which, as Spain had often been 
forewarned, this attitude could no longer be maintained. The specta- 
cle at our very doors of a fertile territory wasted by fire and sword, 
and given over to desolation and famine, was one to which our people 
could not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to the demands of human- 
ity, they determined to remove the causes in the effects of whicli they 
had become so deeply involved. 

To this end the President, with the authority of Congress, presented 
to Spain a demand for the withdrawal of her land and naval forces 
T r 18 



274 TREATY OF PEACE. 

from Cuba, in order tLat the people of the island might be enabled to 
form a ooveriMiient of their own. To this demand Spain replied by 
seveviii,^- dijiloinatic relations with the UnitedT States, and by declaring 
that she considered the action of this Government as creating a state 
of war between the two countries. 

The President could not but feel sincere regret that the local ques- 
tion as to the peace and good government of Cuba should thus have 
been transformed an<l enlarged into a general contlict of arms between 
two great peoples. Nevertheless, having accepted the issue with all 
tlie hazards wliich it involved, he has, in the exercise of his duty, and 
of tlie rights which the state of war confers, prosecuted hostilities by 
land and sea, in order to secure at the earliest possible moment an 
honorable peace. In so doing he has been conjpelled to avail himself 
nnsj);iringly of the lives and fortunes which his countrymen have 
l^laced at his command; and untold burdens and sacrifices, far tran- 
s;<Miding any material estimation, have been imposed upon them. 

That as the result of the patriotic exertions of the people of the 
I'nited States the strife has, as your excellency observes, proved 
unequal, inclines the President to otfer a brave adversary generous 
terms of peace. 

The President therefore responding to j^our excellency's request, will 
state the terms of peace which will be accepted by him at the present 
time, subject to the approval of the Senate of the United States 
herealter. 

Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that 
Spain has desired to spare the island tlie dangers of premature inde- 
l^eudence. The Government of the United States has not shared the 
apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that 
in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, aid and guid- 
ance will be necessary, and these it is prepared to give. 

The United States will require: 

First. The relinijuishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over 
or title to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island. 

Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will 
not now put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Neverthe- 
less ho can not be insensible to the losses and exjKinses of the United 
States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens for injuries 
to their persons and j^roperty during the late insurrection in Cuba. He 
must, therefore, recjuire the cession to the United States and the imme- 
diate evacuation by S])ain of the island of Porto Kico and other islands 
now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the 
cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United 
States. 

Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy 
ami will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclu- 
sion of a treaty of peace w hich shall determine the control, disposition, 
and government of the Philippines. 

If the terms hereby otlered are accepted in their entirety commis- 
sioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly author- 
ized commissioners on the part of Spain for the ])urpose oi' settling- the 
details of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the 
terms al>ove indicated. 

1 avail myself ol" this occasion to ofler to your excellency the assur- 
ances of my highest consideration. 

William E. Day. 

His Excellency the Duke ov Almodovar del Ilio, 

Minister of State, etc. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 275 



MESSAGE OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE DUKE OF ALMO- 
DOYAE DEL KIO, MINISTER OF STATE OF SPAIN, 
SUBMITTED BY HIS EXCELLENCY Mil. J. CAM BON, 
AMBASSADOR OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, TO HON- 
ORABLE WILLIAM R. DAY, SECRETARY OF STATE OF 
THE UNITED STATES. 

[Translation.] 

Madrid, August 7th, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State: 

The French ambassador at Washingtou, whose good offices have 
enabled the Spanish Government to address a message to the Presi- 
dent of the United States, has forwarded by cable yonr excellency's 
rei)ly to this document. 

In examining the arguments used as a preamble to the specification 
of the terms upon which peace maybe restored between Sj)ain and the 
United States, it behooves the Spanish Government to deduct from 
the order of events that the severance of diplomatic relations with the 
United States had no other purpose than to decline the acceptance of 
an ultimatum which Spain could only consider as an attempt against 
her rightful sovereignty over Cuba. 

Spain did not declare war; she met it because it was the only means 
of defending her rights in the Greater Antilles. Thus did the Qneen 
and the United States see fit to transform and enlarge the purely local 
question of Cuba. 

From this fact your excellency draws the conclusion that the ques- 
tion at stake is no longer only the one which relates to the territory of 
Cuba, but also that the losses of American lives and fortunes incident 
to the war should in some manner be compensated. 

As to the first condition, relating to the future of Cuba, the two Gov- 
ernments reach similar conclusions in regard to the natural inability of 
its people to establish an independent government; be it by reason of 
inadequate develojyment, as we believe, or on account of the present 
distracted and jjrostrate condition of the island, as your excellency 
states, the fact remains that Cuba needs guidance. The American 
people are willing to assume the responsibility of giving this guidance 
by substituting themselves to the Spanish nation, whose right to keep 
the island is indisputable; to this intimation we have nothing to oppose. 
The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being impera- 
tive, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory 
shall not have fully reached the conditions reipiired to take rank among 
other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and 
protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban 
natives still loyal to the mother country. 

In the name of the nation the Spanish Government hereby relin- 
quishes all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to 
the irremeable evacuation of the island, subject to the approval of the 
Cortes — a reserve which we likewise make with regard to the other 
proffered terms — -just as these terms will have to be ultimately approved 
by the Senate of the United States. 

The United States require, as an indemnity for or an equivalent to 
the sacrifices they have borne during this short war, the cession of 
Porto Rico and of the other islands now under the sovereignty of 
Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the 
Ladrones, to be selected by the Federal Government. 



'27(1 Tin:Ai'Y (^f Pi:.\fi:. 

This deiiKuirt strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, 
and expels us at once from the i)ros])t'rous Jsland of Porto Eico and 
from the "Western Hemisphere, which became peojiled and civilized 
through the proud deeds of our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have 
been possible to compensate by some other cession for tlie injuries 
sustained by the United States. However, the intlexibility of the 
demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the Island of Porto Rico 
and tlie other islands belonging to the Crown of Spain in the West 
indies, together with one of the islands of the archipehigo of the 
Ladrones, to be selected by the American Government. 

The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our uiulerstanding, to 
be (piite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United 
States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and 
the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, can uot 
be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by 
the Ameiicau tleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native 
supj)orted and provided for by tlie American admiral, Manila still 
hoUls its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On 
the other hand, the whole archipelago of the Philippines is in the power 
and under the sovereignty of Spain. Iherefore the Government of 
Si)ain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should consti- 
tute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine 
the control, dis))ositiou, and government of the Philippines; but as the 
intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, 
therefore the Si)anisli Government must declare that, while accepting 
the third condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of 
Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to 
such reforms which the condition of these ])ossessions ami the level of 
culture of their natives may render desirable. 

The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with the 
above-mentioned declarations. 

Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish Gov- 
ernment has the honor to submit in reply to your excellency's com- 
munication. They accept the ])rofl'ered terms, subject to the ap])roval 
of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties. 

The agreement between the two Governments implies the irremeable 
suspension of hostilities and the designation of commissioners for the 
purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, 
under the terms above indicated. 

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excellency the assur- 
ances of my highest consideration, , 

Almoduvar del Rio. 



Department of State, 

Washington, August 10, 1S98. 
ExCELLENf'Y: Although it is your understanding that the note of 
the Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday 
afternoon, is intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish Govern- 
ment of tlie terms set forth in my note of the 3()th ultimo as the basis 
on whi<-h the President would appoint commissioners to negotiate and 
conclude with commissioners on the part of Spain a treaty of jieace, I 
understand that we concur in the opinion that tlie Duke's note, doubt- 
less owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 27''' 

course of its circuitous transmission by telegrapli and in cipher, is not, 
in the form in wbicbi it has reached the hands of the President, entirely- 
explicit. 

Under these circumstances it is thought that the most direct and 
certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a protocol, 
to be signed by us as tlie representatives, respectively, of the United 
States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to 
be undertaken. 

1 therefore inclose herewith a draft of such a protocol, in which you 
will find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in 
my note of the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for 
the appointment of commissioners to arrange the details of the imme- 
diate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Eico, and other islands under Spanish 
sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as for the appointment of com- 
missioners to treat of peace. 

Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considera- 
tion. 

William R. Day. 

His Excellency M. Jules Cambon, etc. 



PROTOCOL. 

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His 
Excellency Jules Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotenti- 
ary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing 
for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United 
States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the 
following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments 
have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in 
view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to 
say: 

Article 1. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over or 
title to Cuba. 

Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the Island of Porto 
Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West 
Indies, and also an island in the Ladroues, to be selected by the United 
States. 

Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, 
and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace 
which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the 
Phili])pines. 

Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and 
other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to 
this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of 
this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so 
appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, 
meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the 
details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish 
islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing 
of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within 
thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in 
Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details 
of the aforesaid eva(;uation of Porto Rico and other islands under 
Spanish sovereignty m the West Indies. 



278 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Article 5. The United States and Spain will eacli appoint not nioie 
tlian live coiiiniissiouers to treat of peace, and the commissiouers so 
appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and pro- 
ceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty 
shall be subject to ratitication according to the respective constitutional 
forms of the two countries. 

Article 0. Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostili- 
ties betwei'n the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that 
eft'ect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the 
commanders of its military and naval forces. 



Department of State, 

Washington, August 10, 1898. 
Excellency: 

I have the honor to say, as I assured you orally this morning, that 
upon the suspension of hostilities between the United States and 
Spain, as the result of the signing and sealing of the protocol upon 
the terms of which we have agreed, it is the purpose of this Govern- 
ment to take prompt and efUcient means to aid the introduction of food 
su])plies into the ports of Cuba. 

Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considera- 
tion. 

William R. Day. 

His Excellency Mr. Jules Cambon, etc. 



William R. Day, 

Secretary of State : 
You are hereby authorized to sign, on the part of the United States, 
the protocol of this date embodying the terms on which the United 
States and Spain have agreed to treat of peace. 

William McKinley. 
Executive Mansion, 

Washington, August 12, 1898. 



[Translation.] 



Embassy of the French Republic 

IN the United States, 

Washington, August 12, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I 
have just received, through the intermediation of the department of 
foreign alfairs at l*aris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which 
th(i Duke of Alniodovar del Kio announ(;es to me that, by order of Her 
Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish (iovernnient confers upon me 
full ])()\vers in order that 1 may sign, without other fornuility and with- 
out delay, the i)rotocol whereof the terms have been drawn ui) by com 
mon accord between you and me. The instrument destined to make 
regular the powers which are thus given to me by telegraph will be 
Bubsec^uently addressed to me by the x)ost. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 279 

His excellency the minister of state adds tliat in accepting this pro- 
tocol, and by reason of the sus[)ension of hostilities which will be the 
immediate consequence of that acceptance, the Spanish Government 
has pleasure in hoping that the Government of the United States will 
take the necessary measures with a view to restrain (empecher) all 
aggression on the part of the Cuban se])aratist forces. 

The Government of the Republic having, on the other hand, author- 
ized me to acce])t the powers which are conferred upon nie by the 
Spanish Government, I shall hold myself at your disposition to sign 
the protocol at the hour you may be pleased to designate. 

Congratulating myself upon thus cooperating with you toward the 
restoration of peace between two nations, both friends of France, I beg 
you to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very 
high consideration. 

Jules Cambon. 

Hon. William E. Day, 

Secretary of State of the United States, etc., Washington. 



]!^o94.1 Department of State, 

"* Wushington, August 15, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to make formal acknowledgment of 
the note you addressed to me, under date of the 12th instant, informing 
me of your receipt, through the medium of the department of foreign 
affairs at Paris, of a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the 
Duke of Almodovar del Ivio, minister of state of Spain, by order of 
Her Majesty the Queen Eegent, conferred upon you full powers to sign, 
without other fornuility and without delay, the protocol already drawn 
up by you and me, leaving the documentary confirmation of your said 
full powers to follow by mail; and adding that, the Government of the 
Eepublic having authorized you to accept the powers so conferred upon 
you by the Spanish Government, you were ready to sign the protocol 
at such time as 1 might designate. 

The signing of the protocol on the afternoon of the 12th iuslant by 
you and me, in the presence of the President, followed by the imme- 
diate action of the President in issuing his proclamation suspending 
hostilities, in accordance with the appropriate stii)ulation of that pro- 
tocol, testified in a most gratifying manner the full recognition by this 
Government of the powers conferred upon you, and, I am glad to believe, 
marked the first and most effective step toward the happy restoration 
of peace between the United States and Spain. It is especially grati- 
fying to the President and to this Government that you, as the honored 
representative of the French Eepublic, allied to our American Common- 
wealth by the unbroken ties of more than a century of close friendship 
and to the Kingdom of Spain by propinquity and intimate association, 
should have been thus instrumental in contributing to this auspicious 
result. 

Eeierring to the observation contained in your note relative to tlie 
internal order of Cuba during the suspension of hostilities, I may remark 
that the forces of the United States, in proportion as they occupy Cuban 
territory in tiie course of the evacuation thereof by Spain and its deliv- 
ery to the arms of the United States under the terms of the protocol, 
will, it is believed, be adequate to preserve peace and order, and no 
doubt is entertained of their ability to restrain any possible injury. to 



280 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the inhabitants of the island in the country wliich shall bj' de.ij^rees come 
under their control. 

Be pleased, Mr. Ambassador, to accept the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

AViLLiAM 11. Day. 



[Translation.] 



The French ambassador, referring to his communication of the 12th 
instant, has the honor to inform the Secretary of State of the United 
States, that he lias just received, through the department of foreign 
affairs at Paris, the full i)owers \\"hich had been conferred upon him, in 
the name of the King of Spain, by Her Majesty the Queen liegent, to 
enable him to sign the iH'climinary protocol of the negotiations for the 
reestablishment of peace between Spain and the United States. 

Mr. J. Oanibon requests the Hon. William E. Day to please to find 
inclosed the said document, and avails himself of the occasion to renew 
the assurances of his highest consideration. 

Washington, Atigmt .30, 1898. 

Hon. Wm. R. Day, 

Secretary of State of the United States, etc., Washiiu/ton. 



DON ALFONSO XIII 

POR LA GTJAOTA DK BIOS Y LA CONSTITUCION KEY DE ESPANA Y EN 
SU NOMERE Y DURANTE ST MENOR ED AD 

DONA MARIA CRISTINA 

REINA REGENTE DEL REINO. 

For cuilnto ha llegado el caso de negociar y firmar en Washington un 
Protocolo en que se pacten los preliminares de pa/ eiitre Espana y los 
Estados Uuidos de America y siendo preciso que para ello autorice 
Yo una persona en quien coucurran las circunstancias necesarias: For 
tanto He venido en elegir, obtenido al efecto el asentimiento de Su 
Excelencia el Fresidente de la Repiiblica Francesa, a Yos Don Julio 
Cambon, Embajador Extraordinario y Flenipotenciario de la Repiiblica 
Francesa en los Estados Unidos de America, conio por la i^resente Os 
elijo y nombro para que revestido del canicter de Mi Flenii)oteuciario 
procedais a negociar y firmar, con el Flenipotenciario que al efecto 
designe Su Excelencia el Fresidente de los Estados Unidos de America, 
el i)recitado Frotocolo. Y todo lo que convengais, negocieis y firmeis, 
en cumplimiento de este encargo, lo doy desde ah.ora [)or grato y rato, 
lo observarc y cumplire y lo liar*' observar y cumplir como si por Mi 
misiiia lo luibiera efectuado, i»ara lo cual Os doy todo jVIi pleiiopoder en 
la m;is a!ii])lia forma (jue en derecho se require. Y en fe de ello He 
hecho expedir la presente firnuula de Mi mano, debidamente sellada y 
refrendada el infrascrito Mi Ministro de Estado. Dado en el Palacio de 
Madrid ii once de Agosto de mil ochientos noventa y ocho. 

[SEAL] Maria Cristina. 

El Ministro de Estado 

Juan Manuel Sanchez y Gutierrez de Castro. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 281 

[Translation.] 

DON ALFONSO XIII 

BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, 
AND IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY, 

DONA MARIA CKISTINA, 

QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM, 

Whereas it lias become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington 
a protocol in wliicb the ])reliniinaries of peace between Spain and the 
United States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me 
to empower for that purpose a person i>ossessing the requisite qualifica- 
tions : Therefore, I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of 
His Excellency the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio 
Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the French 
Republic in the United States of America, as I do, by these iiresents, 
select and appoint you to proceed, invested with the character of my 
plenipotentiary to negotiate and sign witli the plenipotentiary M'hom 
His Excellency the President of the United States of America may 
designate for that purpose the aforesaid protocol. And I declare, from 
the present moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate, and sign 
in the execution of this commission accei)table and valid, and I will 
observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and executed 
as if it had been done by myself, for which I give you my whole full 
powers in the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I 
have caused these presents to be issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed 
and countersigned by the undersigned, my minister of state. Given in 
the palace at Madrid, August 11, 181)8. 

[l. s.] Maria Cristina. 

Juan Man l el Sanchez y Gutierrez de Castro, 

Minister of State. 



PEOTOCOL OF AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 



Signed at Washington, August 13, 1898. 



PROTOCOL. 

William R. Day, Secretary of 
State of the Uuited States, and 
His Excellency Jules Cambon, 
Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic 
of France at Washington, respec- 
tively possessing for this purpose 
full authority from the Govern- 
ment of the United States and the 
Government of Spain, have con- 
cluded and signed the following 
articles, embodying the terms on 
which the two Governments have 
agreed in respect to the matters 
hereinafter set forth, having in 
view the establishment of peace 
between the two countries, that is 
to say: 

Article I. 

Spain will relinquish all claim 
of sovereignty over and title to 
Cuba. 

Article II. 

Spain will cede to the United 
States the island of Porto Uico 
and other islands now umler Sj^an- 
ish sovereignty in the West Indies, 
and also an island in theLadrones 
to be selected by the United States. 



282 



PROTOCOLE. 

William R. Day, Secretaire 
d'Etat des Etats-Unis, et Son 
Excellence M, Jules Cambon, 
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et 
Plenipotentiaire de la Republique 
Francaise a Washington, ayant 
respectivement reyu a cet effet 
pleine autorisation du Gouverne- 
ment des Etats-Unis et du Gou- 
vernement d'Espagne, ont couclu 
et signe les articles suivants qui 
precisent les termes sur lesquels 
les deux Gouveruements se sont 
mis d'accord en ce qui concerne les 
questions ci-apres designees et 
ayant pour objet I'etablissement de 
la paix entre les deux pays, savoir : 



Article I. 

L'Espague renoncera a toute 
pretention a sa souverainete et a 
tout droit sur Cuba. 

Article II. 

L'Espagne ccdera aux P^tats- 
Unis Tile de Porto-Rico et les 
autres iles actuellement sous la 
souverainetd Esi)agnole dans les 
Indes Occidentales, ainsi qu'une 
lie dans les Ladrones qui sera 
choisie par les Etats-unis. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



283 



Akticle III. 

Tlie United States will occupy 
aud hold the city, bay and harbor 
of Mauila, pending the conclusion 
of a treaty of peace which shall 
determine the control, dis])osition 
aud government of the Philippines. 



Article IV. 

Spain will immediately evacuate 
Cuba, Porto Pico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in 
the West Indies; and to this end 
each Government will, within ten 
days after the signing of this pro- 
tocol, appoint Commissioners, and 
the Commissioners so appointed 
shall, within thirty days after the 
signing of this protocol, meet at 
Havana for the purjjose of arrang- 
ing and carrying out the details of 
the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba 
and the adjacent Spanish islands; 
and each Government will, within 
ten days after the signing of this 
protocol, also appoint other Com- 
missioners, who shall, within thirty 
days after the signing of this pro- 
tocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto 
Rico, for the purpose of arranging 
and carrying out the details of the 
aforesaid evacuation of Porto-Pico 
and other islands now under Span- 
ish sovereignty in the West Indies. 



Article V. 

The United States and Spain 
will each appoint not more than 
five commissioners to treat of 
peace, and the commissioners so 
appointed shall meet at Paris not 
later than October 1, 1898, and pro- 
ceed to the negotiation and con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace, which 
treaty shall be subject to ratifica- 
tion according to the respective 
constitutional forms of the two 
countries. 



Aiiticle III. 

Les Etats-Unis oceuperont et 
tiendront laville, la bale et le port 
de Manille en attendant la conclu- 
sion d'un traite de paix qui devra 
determiner le controle, la disposi- 
tion et le Gouvernemeut des Phil- 
ipj)ines. 

Article IV. 

L'Espagne evacuera immediate- 
ment Cuba, Porto Rico et les autres 
iles actuellement sous la souve- 
rainete Espaguole dans les Tndes 
Occidentales; a cet effet chacun 
des deux Gouvernements nom- 
mera, dans les dix jours qui sui- 
vront la signature de ce protocole, 
des commissaires, et les commis- 
saires ainsi nommes devront, dans 
les trente jours qui suivront la 
signature de ce protocole, se ren- 
contrer a la Havane afin d'arranger 
et d'ex('^cuter les details de I'eva- 
cuation sus mentiouee de Cuba et 
des iles Espagnoles adjacentes; et 
chacun des deux Gouvernements 
nommera ('galenient, dans les dix 
jours qui suivront la signature de 
ce ])rotocole, d'autres commissaires 
qui devront, dans les trente jours 
de la signature de ce protocole, se 
rencontrer a San Juafi de Porto- 
Rico afin d'arranger et d'executer 
les details de I'evacuation sus- 
mentionnee de Porto-Rico et des 
autres iles actuellement sous la 
souverainete Espagnole dans les 
Indes Occidentales. 

Article V. 

Les Etats-Unis et I'Espagne 
nommeront, pour traiter de la 
paix, cinij commissaires an plus 
pour chaque pays; les commis- 
saires ainsi uouimes devront se 
rencontrer a Paris, le 1*^' Octobre 
1898, au plus tard, et proceder a 
la nt'gociatiou et a la conclusion 
d'un traitti de paix; ce traite sera 
sujet a ratification, selon les formes 
constitutionnelles de chacun des 
deux pays. 



284 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Article vi. 

Upon the (•oiiclusioii ami signing 
of this protocol, liostilities between 
the two countries shall be sus- 
pended, and notice to thai eflect 
shall be given as soon as possible 
by each (iovernmcnt to the com- 
manders of its military and naval 
tbrces. 



Article V^I. 

A la conclusion et a la signature 
de ce protocole, les hostilites entre 
les deux pays devront etre sus- 
l)endues, et des ordres a cet eflfet 
devront etre donues aussitnt que 
])ossible par chacun des deux 
Gouvernemeuts aux commandants 
de ses forces de terre et de mer. 



Done at Washington in dupli- 
cate, in English and in French, by 
the Undersigned, who have here- 
unto set their hands and seals, the 
12th day of August 1898. 
]SEAL.j William E. Day 
[SEAL.] Jules Cameon 



Fait ii Washington, en double 
exemplaire, anglais et francais, par 
les Soussigncs ([ui y ont appose 
leur signature et leur sceau. le 12 
Aofit 1S98. 
[SEAL.] William K. Day 
[seal.] Jules Cambon 



CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND 
THE EMBASSY OF FRANCE, AT WASHINGTON, AS REPRESENT- 
ING THE INTERESTS OF SPAIN. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Sherman. 

Ll'ranslation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, Ajyril 22, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to inform you that 
before leaving Washington, and in faltillmeut of the instructions of his 
Government, Mr. Polo de Beniabe confided to me and at the same time 
to the minister of Austria-Hungary the protection of Spanish subjects 
and interests in the United States. 

With a view to simplifying in practice the accomplishment of the 
mission which our respective Governments have accepted, the minister 
of Austria-Hungary and I have made in common accord the following 
arrangements : 

First, The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain 
stored in the legation of Austria-Hungary. 

Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of 
Spanish interests will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria- 
Hungary in New York and Chicago and to the consulates of France in 
New Orleans, San Francisco, and Philadelphia. 

Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a 
representative he will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in 
those places where the two countries are only represented by consular 
agents such protection will be exercised by the French agent. 

Fourth. Questions the adjustment of which may necessitate repre- 
sentations to the Department of State will be dealt with either by the 
minister of Austria- Hungary or by me, accordingly as the Austrian or 
the French consul shall have had the initiative therein. 

Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself alone with the steps 
to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States. 

I to-day send instructions in this sense to the French consuls, and I 
will be grateful to you to be pleased to invite the competent authorities 
to extend to them, the case arising, all the needful facilities. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

Jules Cambon. 



A[r. SherDtan to Mr. Cainbon. 

No. 12.] Department of State, Ajyril 25, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 22d instant, whereby you inform ine that Mr. Polo de 
Bernabe, before leaving Washington, and in fulfillment of the instruc- 
tions of his Government, intrusted to you, and at the same time to 
the Austro-Hungarian minister, the protection of Spanish subjects and 
interests in the United States. To the end of simplifying in practice 
the accomplishment of this commission, which your respective Govern- 
ments have accepted, you and the Austro-Hungarian minister have, 

285 



286 TREATY OF PEACE. 

afjreed upon certnin conveiiioitt arrangements, which yon are pleased 
to couimuuicate to me, as tbllo^Ys: 

'' First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain stored in 
the legation of Austria-Hungary. 

Second. The cai-e of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish interests 
will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria-Hungary in New York and 
t'hicago. and to the consulates of France in New Orleans, San Francisco, and 
Philadelphia. 

Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a representa- 
tive, he will assume tht; protection of Spanish interests; in those places where the 
two countries are only represented by consular agents, such protection will be exer- 
cised by the French agent. 

Fourth. Questions the adjuBtment of which may necessitate representations to the 
Department of State will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria-Hungary 
or by me [the French Ambassador], accordingly as the Austrian or the French consul 
shall have had the initiative therein. 

Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself [the French Ambassador] alone with 
the steps to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States. " 

In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United 
States admits your friendly action in assuming charge of the pro- 
tection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States, and 
that the scheme vrhieh you and the Austro-Uungarian minister have 
devised for the practical division of the charge you have simultane- 
ously assumed is provisionally accepted so long as experience shall 
show its convenience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in con- 
formity' with the international usage which obtains in circumstances 
like the present, that the arrangement contemplates only the friendly 
offices of yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as well as of the con- 
sular representatives of your respective nations, should occasion there- 
for arise, with regard to Spanish subjects and their interests actually 
within the jurisiliction of the United States, and embraces no repre- 
sentative otiice by either of you on behalf of the Government of Spain, 
between which and the Government of the United States a condition 
of war unhai)pily exists. 

I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of the notes 
thus addressed to me by yourself and the Austro-Hungarian minister, 
to the end that they may give all due heed to such representations as 
the agents of either country may feel called upon to make in behalf of 
Si>anish subjects and interests in fulfilment of the friendly office of pro- 
tection thus assumed and admitted. In order, however, that no con- 
fusion may exist as to the distribution of protective functions among 
the respective consulates, I beg that you will favor me with a list of the 
French consular officers who have been designated to act in the manner 
stated in your note. 

Be pleased to accept, etc. John Sherman. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Emeassv of the French Eepup.lic, 
Washington, April ^'(J, JS9S. (Eeceived April I'C, 8 p. m.) 
Mr. Secretary of State : In your acknowledgment, dated April 
25, of a note which I had the honor to address to you on tlie 22d of 
the same month, in regard to the ste])s which I had taken, in concert 
with tlie minister of Austria-Hungary, for the pur])ose of insuring the 
protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 287 

<vliicli onr Governments have simnltaneonsly assumed, you were good 
enough to express to me the desire to receive the list of French consuls 
and consular agents designated to exercise such jn'otection, under the 
conditions indicated in my above-mentioned note. 

In order to comply with your request, I hasten to transmit to you, 
as an inclosure, the list of these agents, and I avail myself of this occasion 
to thank you for the instructions intended to facilitate their mission 
which you propose to issue to the competent authorities. 
Pray accept, etc., 

Jules Cambon. 



[InclosTire in the Frencli ambassador's note of April 26, 1898.] 
List of French consxdar posts charged with tlie protection of Spanish interests. 

Consulates. — New Orleans, Sau Francisco. 

Vice-consulates. — Pbiladelpliia, Galveston. 

Consular agencies. — Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, Louisville, St. Louis, St. Paul, 
Brownsville, Dallas, El Paso, San Antonio, Baltimore, Boston, Charleston, S. C, 
Norfolk, Portland, Me., Apalafbicola, Baton Rou.^e, Birmingham, Mobile, Peusacola, 
Savannah, Los Angeles, Portland, Oreg., San Jose. 



Mr. Thiebaut to Mr. Adee. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of France in the United States, 

Washington, April 27, 1898. 
Dear Mr. Adee : Referring to our conversation of day before yester- 
day, I have the honor to transmit to you herewith for your information 
copy of a telegram which the Ambassador has received from the agent of 
the steamer Bvena Ventura, recently captured by the Federal squadron 
in the Gulf of ]\Iexico : 

LiVERrooL, A2}ril 24, 1S98. 
Not being able to communicate with our Buena Ventura, notwithstanding all eiForts 
made, we beg you to be pleased to indicate to us in what way we can do so. Families 
anxious. 

Larranaga. 

The Ambassador would be especially obliged to you if you could ena- 
ble him to answer this telegram, ISTews of the crew of this vessel might 
doubtless be obtained either from the Department of the IsTavy or the 
Treasury. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Thiebaut. 



Mr. Adee to Mr. Thiehaut. 

Department of State, April 28, 1898. 
My Dear Mr. Thiebaut: Iu further acknowledgment of your per- 
sonal note of yesterday, requesting permission, on behalf of the fam- 
ilies and friends of the officers and crew of the steamer Buena Ventura^ 
recently captured by the Federal squadron, to communicate with th^ 



288 TREATY OF PEACE. 

said officers and crew, I beg to inform you that I am now in receipt of a 
reply to my letter to the Attorney-General on the subject. Mr. Griggs 
states that the persons seized on the various'vessels recently captured 
as prizes of war are now being harbored and protected at Key West 
Biirracks, and that they are therefore at present in the custody and 
control of the War Department, but that he has directed the United 
States attorney for the southern district of Florida to cooperate with 
the ofiicers of the War De])artment in permitting all proper communi- 
cations from the resjieetive families or friends to reach the ofticers and 
crew of the vessel in (juestion. 

In ordei- to save ;<ny possible delay, I Lave, however, written the 
Secretary of War, requesting that the privilege you ask for the families 
and friends of the crew be granted, although I have little doubt that 
the instructions of the Attorney-General above referred to will have 
aecomplished already the desired result. 

J will again communicate with you on receiving any further informa- 
tion in the matter. 

1 am, etc., Alvey A. Adee. 



Mr. Tliit'baut to Mr. Adee. 

Washington, April 28, 1898. 

My Deat? ]\Ir. Adee: I hasten to acknowledge receipt of your per- 
sonal note of today in which you inform me that the persons seized on 
the Spanish vessels recently captured by the Federal Heet are now in 
the custody and control of the War Department, at Key West bar- 
racks, but that upon instructions of the Attorney-General, the United 
States attorney for the southern district of Florida will cooperate with 
military authorities ifi permitting all proper communications from fami- 
lies or friends to reach the ofticers and crew of the steamer Bucna 
Ventura. 

I have at once transmitted this information to the agent of the vessel 
in question at Liverpool. 

1 am directed by the ambassador to convey to you his thanks for 
your so courteous action in the matter, and I beg you to believe me, 
mv dear Mr. Adee, 

Most sincerely, yours, Thiebaut. 



Memorandum from French Embassy. 

Could the Department of State inform the French ambassador 
whether the Spanish schooner Sofia is among the number of vessels 
captured by the Federal tleet? 

Washington, Ajrril 29, 1898. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. (Jatubon. 

Ko. 15.] Department of State, Ajrril 29, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 2(;th instant, transmitting a list of the French officers who 
have been intrusted with the protection of Spanish subjects and inter- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 289 

ests in the United States, and to inclose herewith for your information 
and use six printed copies of the correspondence which has passed 
between your Embassy, the Austro- Hungarian legation, and this 
Department on the subject. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary. 



[Inclosure.] 



CORRESPONDBNCE CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF SPANISH SUBJECTS AND INTER- 
ESTS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS OF 
FRANCE AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

The French ambassador to the Secretary of State. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic in the United States, 

Washington, April 22, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to inform you that before leaving 
Washington, and in fulfillment of the instructions of his Government, Mr. Polo y 
Bernabo confided to me and at the same time to tl»j minister of Austria-Hungary 
the ])rotection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States. 

With a view to simplify in practice the accomplishment of the mission which our 
respective Governments have acce])ted, the minister of Austria- Hungary and I have 
made in common accord the following arrangements: 

First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain stored in 
the legation of Austria-Hungary. 

Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish interests 
will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria-Hungary in New York and Chi- 
cago and the consulates of France in N(;w Orleans, San Francisco, and Philadelphia. 

Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a representa- 
tive, he will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places where the 
two countries are only represented by consular ageuts, such protection will be exer- 
cised by the French agent. 

Fourth. Questions the adjustment of which may- necessitate representations to the 
Department of State will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria- Hungary 
or by me, accordingly as the Austrian or French consul shall have had the initiative 
therein. 

Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself alofte with the steps to be taken 
■with respect to the Government of the United States. 

I to-day send instruttions in this sense to the French consuls, and I will be grate- 
ful to you to be pleased to invite the competent authorities to extend to them, the 
case arising, all the needful facilities. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



The Avstro-Hiindarian minister to the Secretary of State. 

[Translation.] 

No. 1143.] Imperial Royal Austro-Hungarian Legation, 

J fash ill //I on, April 22, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor, Mr. Secretary of State, to inform 
you that Mr. Polo y Bernabe, in carrying out the directions of his Government with 
respect to his departure from Washington, has simultaneously intrusted to the 
French amljassador and myself the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in 
the United States. 

In order to simplify in practice the carrying out of this commission, which our 
Governments have accepted, the French ambassador and I have agreed in common 
upon the following rules: 

1. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will be left on deposit in 
the Austro-Hungarian legation. 

T P 19 



290 TKEATY OF PEACE. 

2. The custody of the archives and the protection of Spanish interests in Ne-W 
York and Chicaoo ^vill he intrusted to the local Aiistro-Huno-iaian consu]s-f,^eneral, 
and in New Orleans, Philadelphia, and San Francisco to the French consulates. 

3. In those places wheie only one of the two coiinti4es has a representative, the 
latter will assume tlie protection of Spanish interests; in those jdaces where both 
are represented only by consular agents, such protection will be exercised through 
the French ajj;i iits. 

4. (^)ue8tions the settlement of which may call for representations to the Depart- 
ment of State will be acted upon either by the French ambassador or by nie, accord- 
inf;ly as the initiative thereof shall have been taken through a French or an 
Anstro- 11 unitarian consul. 

5. In all other cases the French ambassador will take exclusive charge of the pro- 
ceedinus with the Goveruiuent of the Fnion. 

I to-iiay send the appropriate instructions to the Anstro-Hungarian consulates, 
and I will be very grateful to you, Mr. Secretary of State, if yon will be pleased to 
invite the competent authorities to extend to them, the case arising, the necessary 
assistance. 

Accept, etc., Hengelmuller. 

The Secretary of State to the Frencli ambassador. 

No. 12.] Department of State, 

Washington, April 25, 189S. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 
22d instant, whereby you inform me that Mr. Polo de Bernabe, before leaving Wash- 
ington and in fulliliiiient of the instructions of his Government, intrusted to yon, 
and at the same time to the Anstro-Hnngarian minister, the ]n-otection of Spanish 
subjects and interests in. the United States. To the end of simplifying in practice 
the' accomplishmi-nt of this commission, which your respective governments have 
accepted, you and the Austro-IIungarian minister have agreed upon certain con^en- 
ient arrangements, which you are pleased to communicate to me, as follows: 

"First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington Avill remain stored in 
the le<;ation of Austria-Hungary. 

" Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish interests 
will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria-Hungary in New York and Chi- 
cago, and to the consulates of France in New Orleans, San Francisco, and Phila- 
delphia. 

"Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a representa- 
tive, he will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places where the 
two countries are only represented by consular agents, such protection Avill be exer- 
cised by the French agent. 

"Fourth. Questions, the adjustment of which may necessitate representations to 
the Department of State, will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria-Hun- 
gary or by me [the French ambassador], accordingly as the Austrian or the French 
consul shall have had the initiative therein. 

"Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself [the French ambassador] alone 
with the steps to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States." 

In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States admits your 
friendly action in assuming charge of the protection of Spanish subjects and inter- 
ests in the United States, and that the scheme which you and the Austro-Hungariau 
minister have devised for the practical division of the charge you have simulta- 
neously assumed is provisionally acccjited so long as exiierience shall show its con- 
venience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in conlbrmity with the international 
usage which o))tains in circumstances like the present, that the arrangement con- 
templates only the friendly offices of yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as well 
as of the cons'ular representatives of your respective nations, should occasion there- 
for arise, with regard to Spanish subjects and their interests actually within hhe 
jurisdiction of the United States, and embraces no representative olHce by either of 
you on behalf of the Government of Spain, between which and the Government of 
the United States a condition of war unhappily exists. 

I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of the notes thus addressed 
to me by yourself and the Austro-IIungarian minister, to the end that they may give 
all due heed to such rei)resentatioii8 as the agents of either country may feel called 
U])oii to make in behalf of S])anish subjects and interest^ in fulfillment of the friendly 
oilice of protection thus assumed and admitted. In order, however, that no confu- 
sion may exist as to the distribution of protective functions among the respective 
consulates, I beg that you will favor me with a list of the French consular oflicers 
who have been designated to act in the manner stated in your note. 
lie pleased to acceiit, etc., 

JouN Sherman. 



I 



TREATY OF PEACE. 291 

Hie Secretary of State to the Austro-Hungarian Minister. 

No. 218.] Department of State, 

Washington, April 25, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 22(1 instant, 
whereby you inform me that Mr. Polo de Bernabe, before leaving Washington and 
in fulfillmentof the instructions of his Government, intrusted to you. and at the same 
time to the French ambassador, the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in 
the United States. To the end of simplifying in practice the accomplishment of this 
commission, which your respective Governments have accepted, you and the French 
ambassador have agreed upon certain convenient arrangements which you are pleased 
to communicate to me, as follows : 

"First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will be left on deposit 
in the Austro-Hungarian legation. 

"Second. The custody of the archives and the protection of Spanish interests in 
New York aud Chicago will be intrusted to the local Austro-Hungarian consuls- 
general, and in New Orleans, Philadelphia, and San Francisco to the French 
consulates. 

"Third. In those places where only one of the two countries has a representative, 
the latter will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places where 
both are represented only by consular agents, such protection will be exercised 
through the French agents. 

"Fourth. Questious, the settlement of which may call for representations to the 
Department of State, will be acted upon either by the French ambassador or by me 
[the Austro-Hungarian minister], accordingly as the initiative thereof shall have 
been taken through a French or an Austro-Hungarian consul. 

"Fifth. In all other cases the French ambassador will take exclusive charge of 
the proceedings with the Government of the Union." 

In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States admits 
your friendly action in assuming charge of the protection of Spanish subjects and 
interests in the United States, and that the scheme which you and the French 
ambassador have devised for the practical division of the charge you have simul- 
taneously assumed is provisionally accepted so long as experience shall show its 
convenience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in conformity with the inter- 
national usage which obtains in circumstances like the present, that the arrangement 
contemplates only the friendly offices of yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as 
well as of the consular representatives of your respective nations, should occasion 
therefor arise, with regard to Spanish subjects and their interests actually within 
the jurisdiction of the United States, and embraces no representative office by 
either of you on behalf of the Government of Spain, between which and the Gov- 
ernment of the United States a condition of war unhappily exists. 

I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of notes thus addressed 
to me by yourself aud the French ambassador, to the end that they may give all due 
heed to such representations as the agents of either country may feel called upon to 
make in behalf of Spanish subjects and interests, in fulfillment of the friendly office 
of protection thus assumed and admitted. In order, however, that no confusion 
may exist as to the distribution of protective functions among the respective consu- 
lates, I beg that you will favor me with a list of the Austro-Hungarian consular 
officers who have been designated to act in the manner stated in your note. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

John Sherman. 



The French Amhassador to the Secretary of State. 
[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic in the United States, 

Washington, April 26, 1S98. 

Mr. Secretary of State : In your acknowledgment, dated April 25, of a note 
which I bad the honor to address to you on the 22d of the same month, in regard to 
the steps which I had taken, in concert with the minister of Austria-Hungary, for 
the purpose of insuring the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United 
States, which our Governments have simultaneously assumed, you were good enough 
to express to me the desire to receive the list of French consuls and consular agents 
designated to exercise such protection, under the conditions indicated in my above- 
mentioned note. 

In order to comply with your request, I hasten to transmit to you, as an inclosure. 
the list of these agents, and I avail myself of this occasion to thank you for the!- 



292 TREATY OF P^CE. 

instrnctions intended to facilitate tlieir mission which you propose to issue to the 
competent autliorities. 

Pray accept, etc., _^ Jules Cambon. 



[Inclosure.] 
List of French cotisnlar posts charged tcith the protection of Spanish interests. 

Consulates. — New Orleans, San Francisco. 

rice-rOHSH/rt/es. —Philadelphia, Galveston. 

Consular a(/e»(C(V'.s.— Cincinnati. Detroit, Kansas City, Louisville, St. 'Louis, St. Paul, 
Brownsville. Dallas, El I'aso, San Antonio, Baltimore, Boston; Charleston, S. C. ; 
Norfolk ; Portland, Me. ; Apalachicola, Baton Rouge, Birmingham, Mohile, Pensacola, 
Savannah, Los Angeles; Portland, Oreg. ; San Jos6. 



The Austro- Hungarian minister to the Secretary of State. 

[Translation.] 

No, 1185.] Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Legation, 

Washington, April 26, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note No. 218, of April 25 instant, and in compliance with the desire expressed 
therein to advise you, Mr. Secretary of State, that, in addition to the Austro-Hunga- 
rian consulates-general in New York and Chicago, the imperial and royal consulates 
at Pittsburg, Pa., and Richmond, Va., at which places the French Government 
maintains no consular representation, have been intrusted with the protection of 
Spanish subjects. 

The list tf names of the Austro-Hungarian officers thus called to the exercise of 
this friendly protection is: 

New York, Consnl-General Franz Stockinger; 

Chicago, Consul Max von Proskowetz ; 

Pittsburg, Consul Thomas von Dessewlfy; 

Richmond, Consul Christof. Borchers. 

Accept, etc., Hengelmuller. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

Ko. 16.] Department of State, May 3, 1898. 

Excellency: I bave tlie honor to communicate to you for your 
information copies of notes just exchanged with the Mexican minister 
at this capital in relation to extending, at the request of the Spanish 
minister in Mexico, friendly protection in case of need to Spanish inter- 
ests at Laredo, Tex., and Nogales, Ariz., through the Mexican consuls 
in those cities. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., 

J. B, Moore, Acting Secretary. 



[Inclosure.— Translation.] 

Mr. Romero to Mr. Moore. 

Mexican Legation, 
Washington, Mai/ ,.', 1898. 
Mr. Acting Secretary: I have the honor to inform you that the Government of 
Mexico has advised me by telegraph that at the request of the Spanish minister in 
Mexico, and for the reason that there is no other than .-i Mexican consul in Laredo, 
Tex., and Nogales, Ariz., those consuls have been authorized to protect Spanish 
interests. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 293 

The Mexican Government accordingly gives me instructions to communicate this 
fact to you, and in so doing I have the honor to state to you that I have spoken in 
regard to the matter with the ambassador of France in Washington, who I under- 
stand has charge of the protection of Spanisli interests in the United States, and if 
the case arises I shall proceed in accord with him. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

M. EOMERO. 



[Inclosure 2.] 
Mr. Moore to Mr. Romero, 

No. 333.] Washington, Maxj 3, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 2d instant 
relative to the authorization given by the Mexican Government to the Mexican 
consuls at Laredo, Tex., and Nogales, Ariz., to protect Spanish interests in their 
respective localities, this step having been taken at the instance of the Spanish 
minister in Mexico, inasmuch as there are in those places no consuls of any other 
nation. 

You state that you have spoken in regard to this matter with the French ambas- 
sador, who, you understand, is charged with the protection of Spanish interests in 
the United States and will proceed in accord with him should a case arise. As you 
will perceive by the inclosed copy of recent cdrrespondence with the representatives 
of France and Austria-Hungary in this capital, you are right as to Mr. Cambon's 
announcement that in all cases other than those originating through a French or 
Austro-Hungarian consulate he will charge himself alone with any matters of 
Spanish protection involving representations to the Government of the United 
States. 

I presume you will have arranged with Mr. Cambon so that any question affecting 
Spanish interests in the United States which may arise at Laredo or Nogales may, if 
the case require, take the regular course so agreed upon. 

The State and Treasury authorities at those two points will be advised of the per- 
mission which your Government has given to the Mexican consuls there. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary, 

(Inclosure: Printed correspondence as above.) 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Moore, 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, May 4, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State : In reply to your communication of the 
3d. of this month, I have the honor to inform you that the Mexican 
minister has made known to me that his Government has, at the request 
of the cabinet of Madrid, consented to commit to the Mexican consuls 
the protection of Spanish subjects and interests at Nogales (Arizona) 
and at Laredo (Texas), where neither France nor Austria are repre- 
sented. 

For the purpose of preserving the arrangement which the minister of 
Austria- Hungary and I have adopted for the protection of the Spanish 
interests in the United States, and with which our communications 
dated 22d of April last acquainted your honorable predecessor, it has 
been agreed between Mr. Romero and myself that such correspondence 
relative to Spanish affairs as he might receive from the Mexican con- 
suls at Nogales and Laredo would be turned over by him to me, and I 
would give them such action as might be expedient. 
Accept, Mr. Secretary, etc., 

Jules Cambon.-. 



294 TREATY OF PEACE. 

[Personal.] 

Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon.^ 

Department of State, 3fay 4, 1898. 
My Dear Mr, Tiiiebaut : Referring to previous correspondence rela- 
tive to measures for jierniitting all proper communications from families 
or friends to reach the officers and crew of the steamer Buena Ventura^ 
I beg to inform you that the Department has received a letter from the 
Secretary of War stating that the proper military officers will be directed 
to cooperate with the United States attorney for the southern district 
of Florida in permitting all proper communications from families and 
friends to reach the officers and crew of the vessel in question, subject 
to such restrictions as it may be deemed proper to impose. 
I am, etc., 

J. B. Moore. 



Mr. Day. to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 19.] Department of State, May 7, 1898. 

Excellency : Eeferring to the memorandum left at this Department 
on the 29th ultimo by the secretary of the French embassy on your 
behalf, inquiring whether the Spanish schooner Sofia was among the 
number of the vessels captured by the Federal fleet, I have the honor 
to inform you that I am advised by the Secretary of the Navy that the 
Sojia was captured by the United States torpedo boat Porter ofl" the 
northern coast of Cuba on the morning of April 24. 
Accept, etc., 

William R. Day. 



[Personal.] 

Mr. Adee to Mr. Thiebaut. 

Department of State, May 7, 1898. 
My Dear Mr. Thiebaut: With further reference to your personal 
note to me of the 27th ultimo, I beg to inform you that if the owners 
of the captured steamer Buena Vintura desire to correspond with her 
officers and crew the Secretary of the Navy suggests that if communi- 
cations, open for inspection, be sent to the commandant of the United 
States naval station at Key West there would probably be no objec- 
tion to their delivery, provided the contents of the communications do 
not render such action inadvisable. 

Very truly, yours, Alvey A. Adee. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 22.] Department of State, 3[ay 10. 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to previous correspondence relative to the 
protection of Si)aiiish subjects and interests by the Mexican consuls at 
Laredo, Tex., and Nogales, Ariz., 1 have the honor to acknowledge the 



TliEATY OF PEACE. 295 

receipt of your note of the 4th instant, stating that the Mexican minister 
at this capital has agreed with you to let the French embassy act upon 
such correspondence of the said Mexican consuls as may bear on the 
subject. 

Accept, etc., William E. Day. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, May 17, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: The wife of Commander Guevedo, cap- 
tain of the Spanish packet boat Panama, captured by the Federal fleet 
and now actually detained at Key West, solicits my Government to 
obtain for her authority to correspond with her husband, about whom 
she is without news. 

Likewise, the minister of colonies informs me of the desire, which has 
been expressed to him by interested families, to have news of the health 
and situation of the crew of this boat. I should be greatly obliged to 
you to be able to authorize the commander to address to his family and 
to receive from it, through the medium of this embassy, open corre- 
spondence, and to be able to accord the same favors which were extended 
to the crew of the Buena Ventura. 

I recommend likewise to the kind consideration of the Department 
of State the request of the families of the crew and of the passengers 
of the Panama, begging it to put me, if j)ossible, in a situation to reply 
to the proper requests made by them. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Oambon. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 27.] Washington, May 18, 1898. 

Excellency: Acknowledging the receipt of your note of yester- 
day's date, asking that permission be accorded the captain and crew of 
the Spanish vessel Panama to correspond, through the medium of your 
embassy, with their families, who are anxious to learn of their welfare, 
I have the honor to state that copy of your note was at once communi- 
cated to the proper departments of this Government, with the request 
that, if possible, the permission you ask be granted. Upon being 
informed of the decision reached in the matter I shall be pleased to 
immediately advise you. 

William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 31.] Washington, May 31, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to the inquiries as to the situation of 
the master and crew of the captured Spanish steamer Panama, I have 
the honor to inform you that instructions have been sent to the author- 
ities of the United States at Key West to transmit to the projier 



296 TREATY OF PEACE. 

authorities of the United States in this capital any open letters 
addressed by the oihcers and crew of the steamer in (jnestion to their 
families, to the end that such letters may be Ibrwarded to their destin- 
ation through your embassy. 

Accept, etc., William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 33,] DepaPvTMENT of State, June 9, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to your inquiries in relation to the 
S])anish subject, Mr. Jiniinez Zapatero, who is reported in Madrid to be 
held in the United States as a spy, I have the honor to inform you that 
I am advised by the Navy Department that a prisoner captured on the 
Panama, and supposed to be the person to whom your excellency's 
inquiries refer, has been sent north on the U. S, S. Cincinnati and is now 
at Fort Monroe. It appears that when the Panama was captured he had 
in his possession a lot of coast charts, which he threw overboard; that 
he had in his trunk epaulets and a sword, and that he admitted having 
been some years ago an officer in the Spanish navy. The evidence 
therefore indicated that he was a military person; and he was sent to 
Fort Monroe merely as a prisoner of war, and not as a spy. Orders 
were given to furnish him with accommodations and to treat him accord- 
ing to the rank that he should claim. On his arrival at Fort Monroe 
he gave the name of F. J. Jiminez, but refused to make any further 
statement. In consequence he is now held as a private. 
Accept, etc., 

William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

No, 34,] Department of State, June 20, 1898. 

Excellency: T have just received a communication from my col- 
league the Attoruey-Cxeneral, in which he asks for information as to 
the consular officers to whom Spanish subjects at Key West who have 
been seized on prizes, or who have been paroled as prisoners of war, 
should be delivered, 

I shall be greatly obliged to your excellency if you will be so good 
as to enable me to answer the inquiry of the Attorney-General, 
Accept, etc. 

William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 37.] Department of State, June 24, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to my note of the 20th instant, in 
relation to the dis])osition of certain Spanish subjects taken on vessels 
captured as ])rize8, 1 have the honor to inform you that the Depart- 
ment has just received from the Attorney- General a further communi- 
cation on the subject. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 297 

By this communication it appears that it is the intention of the 
United States authorities at Key West to send the prisoners in ques- 
tion on the steamers Catalina and Jover to Spain, if those steamers 
shall return to that countrj^; but that, if appeal bonds should not be 
given, the steamers would then be sent to New York, and carry the 
prisoners to that port. It is stated that at least one hundred of them 
have families in Cuba and do not wish to go to Spain, and that some- 
thing- must be done to provide for them if they are detained beyond 
the sailing of the vessels on the I27th of the present month. 

In view of these circumstances it seems desirable that some definite 
arrangement should immediately be made for the transportation of the 
prisoners in question from the United States. 

With reference to the question raised as to the safety of the prisoners 
on their way to any place of embarkation, the Attorney-General states 
that he will give suitable instructions for their subsistence and protec- 
tion on their way to or in charge of any consular officer to a place of 
departure. 

Accept, etc., William E. Day. 



3fr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

Embassy of the French Eeptjblic, 

Washington, June 25, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : In reply to the note which you did me 
the honor to address to me on the 24th instant, relative to the repatria- 
tion of the Spaniards who have been taken prisoners on board of the 
vessels captured as prizes since the beginning of the war, I have the 
honor to inform you that I think, as you do, that it is desirable that 
a final arrangement should be concluded as speedily as possible. 

But before taking the measures necessary to this end, allow me to 
call your attention to the fact that the information which you were 
pleased to communicate to me by your aforesaid note is still incomplete. 
You state that a certain number of prisoners whose families are in 
Cuba do not desire to be sent back to Spain, but you do not give the 
number of those who are to be sent to Europe on board of the steamers 
Catalina and Jover, or taken to New York by said vessels. Now, this 
number is indispensable to enable me to ask of the Spanish Govern- 
ment an approiiriation sufficient for the repatriation of these prisoners. 

I have, moreover, reason to infer from your note that the steamers 
Catalina and Jover will sail direct from Key West to Spain, if security 
is given in case an appeal should be taken from the decision which has 
released them, and that, in the contrary case, they will not take the 
prisoners farther than New York. No decision can therefore be 
reached until it is known whether this security has been furnished, 
and yet you likewise inform me that these vessels are to sail on the 
27th instant — that is to say, day after to-morrow — which would, indeed, 
allow us too little time to settle these diflerent questions. 

1 feel that I must thank you and the Attorney- General for all the 
measures that you have taken, and that you will be pleased to take here- 
after, in order to secure the subsistence and safety of these prisoneis. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

Jules Cambon, 



298 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

1^0. 40.] Department of State, 

Washington, June 27. 1898. 
Excellency: Witli reference to your note of the 25th instant, in 
relation to the return of the crews of Spanish ships captured as prizes, 
1 have tlie honor to inclose herewith a copy of a telegram received by 
the Attorney-deneral from the United States marshal at Key West, 
giving the names of the persons composing the crews in question. 

The Department has transmitted to the Attorney-General the request 
made in your note of the 25th instant, for more definite information as 
to the destination of the persons who are to be sent away. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting /Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon, 

Department of State, June 29, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to previous correspondence in relation 
to the removal from the United States of the crews of the Spanish 
prize vessels at Key West, I have the honor to say that I am just 
advised by the Attorney-General that the vessels (Jatali)ia and Miguel 
Jorer are to remain in the custody of the United States marshal pend- 
ing an appeal which has been taken to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and that it will conse(]uently be necessary to iirovide 
for the transportation of the Spanish subjects in question by some 
other means. 

The Attorney-General is advised by the United States marshal at Key 
West that 284 of the men desire to be sent to Spain, 22 to the Canary 
Islands, 52 either to Cuba or to Mexico, and 21 to England. There are 
11 as to whose wishes no information has been obtained. 

The Attorney-General desires to be advised as to whether the infor- 
mation which he has now been able to furnish will be sufticient for the 
purpose of making arrangements for the transportion of the men in 
question. 

Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 42.] Department of State, June 30, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to previous correspondence as to the 
disposition of the crews of prizes at Key West, I now have the honor 
to say that this Government will attend to their transportation from 
Key West to New York, and that it is hoped that you may be able soon 
to arrange for their transportation from the United States at that point. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore. 



TKEATY OP PEACE. 299 

Mr. Cambon to Mr, Day. 

[Tranalation.] 

French Embassy, 
WasMngton, July 1, 1898. (Received July 2, 3.38 p. in.) 

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of your letters dated the 27th, 29th, and 30th of last month, rela- 
tive to the prisoners coming from Spanish captured vessels and whom 
the Federal Government has decided to send away from the territory 
of the Union. 

I have hastened to inform my Government that the Federal authority 
will take charge of transporting these 400 men from Key West to New 
York, whence they will be dispatched to their respective destinations 
through the care of the consul-general of Austria-Hungary, to whom the 
protection of Spanish interests in that port is intrusted. I have, at the 
same time, begged the minister for foreign afiairs to ask the Madrid 
cabinet to send with urgency to the consul-general of Austria the 
necessary instructions and funds. 

Be pleased to accept, etc. Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 
No. 46.] Washington, July 8, 1898. 

Excellency : With reference to previous correspondence on the sub- 
ject of the transportation from this country of Spanish subjects taken on 
board of prizes of war, I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of 
a letter of the 30th ultimo from Messrs. C. B. Richard & Co., of New 
York, to the Assistant Secretary of War, in which it is stated that the 
steamer Trojan Prince, which is to sail from New York on the 12th, 
will stop at Gibraltar if a sufficient number of Spanish passengers 
should be obtained to warrant her stopping at that port. I transmit to 
you a copy of the letter simply with the view that the suggestions 
which it contains possibly may facilitate the making of arrangements 
for the transportation of the Spanish subjects in question. 
Accept, etc., 

William E. Day. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, July 9, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State: Referring to your previous correspond- 
ence upon the same subject, you have been good enough by letter of 
the 8th of this month to inform me that the steamship Trojan Prince, 
which will leave New York the 12th of July for Naples, will be able to 
receive the officers and crews of the Spanish boats which have been 
cai^tured and to land them at Gibraltar at the price of $55 for cabin 
accommodation and $22 for steerage. 



300 TREATY OF PEACE. 

I have the honor to inform yon that I have at once forwarded this 
information to the minister of foreign affairs at Paris with the request 
that he shoukl make it known to tlie cabfnet of Madrid, to the end 
that a proper credit shouhl be immediately opened for the consul- 
general of Austria at New York. 
Be pleased to accei^fc, etc., 

Cambon. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day, 

[Translatiou.] 

Embassy of the French Repttblio, 

WasMngton, July 12, 1898. 

The Ambassador of France has the honor to inform the Secretary of 
State of the LTnited States that he received yesterday, through the 
War Department at Washington, a telegram from Havana, whereby 
Captain-General Blanco expresses a desire to receive a detailed official 
list of the Spanish officers who were taken prisoners after the naval 
battle which was fought off Santiago de Cuba between Admiral Cer- 
vera's squadron and the Federal squadron. 

Furthermore, at the request of the Sj^anish Government, the depart- 
ment of foreign affairs at Paris has requested the Ambassador of France 
to send it a list of the dead, wounded, and survivors of Admiral Cer- 
vera's squadron. As the crew lists were probably lost with the vessels, 
it is to be i)resumed that an exact list of the dead can not be prepared 
here; that of the survivors will, however, doubtless suihce to enable 
the Spanish authorities to prepare a list of those who have disappeared. 

This information being intended for the families of the persons con- 
cerned, who are naturally anxious to be informed as to their fate, the 
Ambassador of France will be grateful to the Secretary of State if he 
will have the kindness to send him, as speedily as possible, a list of the 
Spanish officers, noncommissioned officers, and seamen who have been 
made prisoners, together with a statement of the vessels to which they 
resi)ectively belonged, and also one of the localities where they are held 
or of the hospitals where they are being treated. 

Mr. Jules Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. 
W. K. Day the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

Embassy of the French Republic 

Washington, July 12, 1898. 

The Ambassador of France has the honor, by order of his Govern- 
ment, to inform the Secretary of State of the United States that the 
famihes of the Spanish officers and seamen who have been made pris- 
oners desire to send them some money. As the interested parties are 
unable to do this by means of postal money orders, owing to the sus- 
pension of the postal service between the United States and Spain, the 
Ambassador of France would be glad to know how, in the opinion of 
the Federal authorities, money may be sent to the officers and seamen 
in (juestion. 

Mr. J. Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. W. R. 
Day the assurances of his highest consideration. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 301 

Mr. Pay to Mr. Gambon, 

Department of State, 

Washingt07i, July 13, 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States has the honor to acknowl- 
edge the receipt of the note of the Ambassador of France of the 12th 
instant, in which inqniry is made as to the means by which the families 
of Spanish officers and seamen who have been made prisoners of war 
may be enabled to send them money. The Secretary of State ventures 
to suggest that perhaps the best way of dealing with the matter would 
be to have the money sent to Paris, and from Paris to the Ambassador 
of France in Washington, by whom it might be delivered to this 
Department and sent to its proper destination. 

Mr. Wm. E. Day avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. J. 
Cambon the assurances of his highest cousideration. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washi7igton, July 13, 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States, with reference to the 
request of the Ambassador of France of the 12th instant for infor- 
mation as to the Spanish officers who were taken prisoners by the 
United States deet off Santiago de Cuba, and as to the Spanish dead 
and wounded in that engagement, has the honor to inclose herewith a 
copy which he has just received of a list of the Spanish prisoners 
brought north on board the U. S. S. ^S'^. Louis. This list of survivors 
contains all the information which the Navy Department is at the 
moment able to afibrd as to the officers and crews of the Spanish ships 
in question. The Department will take pleasure in communicating to 
the Ambassador of France any other information that may be obtained 
on the subject. 

Mr, W. R. Day avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. J. 
Cambon the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, July 13, 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States has the honor to inclose 
herewith to the Ambassador of France a copy of a letter of the 9th 
instant, addressed by Admiral Cervera to Captain Goodrich, of the 
U. S, S. Saint Louis, as to the treatment of the Spanish prisoners on 
board of that ship. 

Mr. W. R. Day has the honor to renew to Mr. J. Cambon the assur- 
ances of his highest consideration. 



Capt. Casi'er F. Goodrich, 

U. S. M. S. St. Louis. 
My Dear Sir : I have the greatest pleasure in acknowledging by the present, in 
my own name and also in that of all captains and officers actually on board this 
ship, that we consider ourselves under the greatest obligation to you for the man^ 



302 TREATY OF PEACE. 

kindness and excellent treatment wbicli you and all the officers under yonr command 
have shown to us duiiii<i- this passage. I must also mention the careful and most 
valuable medical assistance whicli lias been given to our wounded and sick men; 
your kind feelings are gone as far in ibis respect as to order them to be put in one 
of Ihe saloons of the ship, in order to provide more elfeetually to their comfort. 

I know nothing w icii does not agree with what I have ju.st written; the case of 
1). Knricjue Capriles being wholly unknown to me, since neither you nor him have 
spoken me about. 

I thank you again for the delicate and manifold acts of kindness through which 
you have endeavored to alleviate the sore burden of our great misfortune. I assure 
you that I shall never forget them, and I am, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, Pascual Cervera. 

At Sea, Jidy 9, 189S. 



Mr. Camion to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, 
Washington, July 14, 1898. 

The Ambassador of France has the honor to inform the Secretary of 
State of the United States that he has been requested to furnish news 
of the Spanish second lieutenant ("renseigue de vaisseau") Arderius, 
aid-de-camp of Commodore Villamil, who was wounded during the 
naval combat of Santiago, and who is reported to be at present under 
treatment upon the hospital ship ISoJace. The Ambassador of France 
would be pleased were the competent Federal authorities invited to 
supply to this ofiicer the money of which he may stand in need. These 
advances will be immediately reimbursed by the " Credit Lyonnais," 
which has given the necessary orders to this end to its agent at Xew 
York. 

Mr. Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. Day the 
assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

Department of State, 
No. 54.] Washington, Jnly 19, 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to your note of the 14th instant, requesting 
that any sum of money needed by the Spanish second lieutenant 
Arderius, aid de-camp of Admiral Villamil, now under treatment on 
board the U. S. S. ISolace, be advanced to him by the United States 
authorities, I have the honor to inform you that the Department has 
received a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy stating that 
instructions have been given to the commanding ofiicer of the Solace 
to comply with your request. 
Accept, etc., 

William E. Day. 



3Ir. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 55.] Department of State, Jnly QO, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to previous correspondence in relation 
to the case of Mr. Jiminez Zapatero, the Spanish subject who was cap- 
tured on the steamer Vanama while having in his possession the evi- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 303 

dences of his being in the military service of Spain, I have the honor 
to inform you that I am advised by tlie Secretary of War that it has 
been decided, after a full investigation, that the Spanish subject in 
question is properly held as a prisoner of war. 

He will receive during his detention the consideration and treatment 
due to an officer. 

Accept, etc., William R. Day. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Gamhon. 

Department of State, 
No. 58.] Washington, July 33, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy, furnished 
by the Secretary of the Navy, of the muster roll of the Spanish prisoners 
of war brought from Cuba to the United States by the U. S. S. Harvard. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. MooEE, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Gamhon. 

No. 59.] Department of State, July 23, 1898. 

Excellency : I have the honor to inclose herewith, at the request 
of the Secretary of the Navy, an original report made by Rear- Admiral 
Cervera to the minister of marine at Madrid concerning the battle of 
July 3, off Santiago de Cuba. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Gamhon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, July 25, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : I am informed that the Spanish sailing 
vessel Amapala, on her way to Mexico from Havana, had, by reason of 
bad weather, to take shelter at Tampa, where she was held as a prize. 

The situation of the passengers landed at Tampa will attract the 
attention of the Federal Government, which will undoubtedly be of 
opinion that they must be transported to Mexico by some means similar 
to those previously adopted in the case of the crews and passengers of 
vessels caiJtured by the Navy of the United States. 

However, in view of the vis major circumstances which led the 
Amapala to seek a shelter in the harbor of Tampa, I am fain to believe 
that the Federal Government will not consider that vessel as a prize 
taken in consequence of an act of war, but will allow her to proceed on 
her voyage, as other governments have generously decided under simi- 
lar circumstances. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



304 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 
No. 65.] Washington, July 37, 1898. 

Excellency: Eeferring to your note of the 14tli instant, requesting 
that any sum of money needed by Lieutenant Arderius, aide-de-camj) 
of Admiral Villamil, be advanced to him by the United States author- 
ities, the Credit Lyonnais having given the necessary instructions to 
its agent at New York to reimburse the Government, I have now the 
honor to inform you that the Secretary of the Navy, to whom I com- 
municated a copy of your note, has received its return from the naval 
hospital at Norfolk, Va., where Lieutenant Arderius is now having 
medical attention, with the following indorsement: 

Lieuteuant Arderius thanks the Ambassador of France and begs to say that he 
does not require any money at present, as his funds are suliicieut lor all purposes. 

C. J. Cleborne, 
Medical Director, U. S. N, 

Accept, etc., 

William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 66.] Department of State, July 28, 1898. 

Excellency : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 25 th instant, relative to the case of the Spanish sailing ves- 
sel Amapala, said to be held as a prize at Tampa, and to inform you in 
reply that the matter in question is receiving the attention of this 
Government. 

Accept, etc., Wm. E. Day. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

Embassy of the French Eepublic, 

Washington, July 28, 1898. 
Mr, Secretary of State : The consul of France at San Juan de 
Porto Eico telegraphs me that at the joint request of the consuls the 
captain general has recognized, in writing, the neutrality of a point 
selected outside of the city where the foreigners have taken refuge. 

Our consul adds that as soon the Federal vanguard shall make its 
appearance he intends to notify the general commanding the American 
army of this humane arrangement. 

1 have the honor to bring this fact to your knowledge in order that 
you may be able to send General Miles such instructions as you may 
think proper. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 68.] Department of State, July 30, 1898. 

Excellency: As I had the honor to inform you by my note of the 
2Sth instant, I communicated on that day to the Attorney-General a 
coi»y of yours of July 25, in relation to the Spanish sailing vessel 
Ama^ala. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 305 

I ain now advised by the Acting Attorney-General tliiit the United 
States attorney for the southern district of Florida has been instructed 
to forward to his Department the prize master's report, together with 
the facts and circumstances attendiug the capture and detention of the 
vessel, and to furnish his opinion as to the propriety of pursuing the 
course indicated by you. 

Accept, etc., J. B. Mooke. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

Ko. 69.] Department of &tatb, Augiist j2, 1898. 

Excellency : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the -Sth ultimo by which you advise me that the consul of 
France at San Juan, Porto Rico, has telegraphed you that at the joint 
request of the consuls, the Caj^tain-General has recognized in writing 
the neutrality of a place outside the city where foreigners have taken 
refuge, and that as soon as the United States forces make their appear- 
ance a notification of this humane arrangement will be given to the 
general in commnnd. This fact you state you bring to ray knowledge 
in order that such instructions may be sent to General Miles as may be 
thought proper. 

1 have accordingly communicated a coi)y of your note to the Secre- 
tary of War. 

Accept, etc., William li. Day. 



Mr. Day to 31r. Camhon. 

No. 74.] Department of State, August 4, 1898. 

Excellency : With further reference to your note of the 25th ultimo, 
in relation to the Spanish brig Amapala, I have the honor to inform 
you that I am just in receipt of a letter from my colleague, the Attor- 
ney-General, inclosing a copy of a report of the United States district 
attorney at Jacksonville, Fla., on the case in question. 

By the report of the district attorney it appears that the statement 
made to your excellency by the parties in interest that the Amapala 
was compelled by bad weather to seek shelter at Tampa, is wholly 
incorrect. The evidence taken in preparatorio discloses the fact that 
the brig was captured oli* Havana while tlying the colors of the liepub- 
lic of Honduras and attempting to run the blockade. The brig has 
accordingly been condemned and ordered to be sold. 

It appears that there is no desire on the part of the authorities of the 
United States to detain the passengers who were on board of the brig 
at the time of the capture. It is thought, however, that this Govern- 
isie'it is not under ?k\\j obligation to provide them with the means of 
transportation, especially as the devices resorted to by the brig for the 
pur^iose of escaping lawful capture must have been known to tliose on 
board. 

Accept, etc., Willia3i il. Day. 

TP 20 



306 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Day to Mr. Gambon. 

Ko. 81.] Department of-^State, August 6, 1S98. 

Excellency: Referriug- to your note of tlie 28tb ultimo advisiug me 
that at the request of the cousuls the captain-general of Porto Rico had 
recognized, in writing, the neutrality of a point outside the city of San 
Juan lor tlie refuge of foreigners, I have the honor to inform you that 
the Secretary of War has telegraphed General Miles so far as practica- 
ble to recognize this arrangement. 

Accept, etc., William R. Day. 



[On August 12, 1898, there was signed by the Secretary of State on 
behalf of the United States and by the Ambassador of France at Wash- 
ington on behalf of Spain a Protocol of Agreement preliminary to the 
final establishment of peace between the United States and Spain.] 



Memorandum left at the Department of State. 

Ambassade de France, August 15, 1898. 

May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished between 
Spain and Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines"? 

Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send supplies in Spanish 
bottoms to Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines? 

Will Spanish tank steamer Cadagna, chartered by French merchants 
and now lying in Havre, be permitted to proceed to Philadelphia to 
take mineral oil for industrial purposes"? 

The French Embassy has been unofficially requested by the Spanish 
Government to learn the names, rank, number of American commis- 
sioners for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico, for the peace negotia- 
tion at Paris, as it is the desire of the Spanish Government to appoint 
commissioners of same rank, etc. 

In which delay should a claimant appeal from a decision of United 
States prize court to the United States Supreme Court? 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Gamhon. 

Department of State, August 16, 1898. 

Dear Mr. Cambon: In response to one of tlie inquiries left at the 
Department yesterday in behalf of the embassy by Mr. Thiebaut, I 
have the x>leasure to inform you, by direction of the President, that the 
American commissioners for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico 
are as follows : 

For Cuba: Major-General Wade, Admiral Sampson, Major-General 
lUitler. 

For Porto Eico : Major-General Brooke, Admiral Schley, Brigadier- 
General Gordon. 

Believe me, etc., J. B. Moore. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 307 

Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 96.] Department of State, August 16, 1898. 

Excellency: This Government is advised that the Eastern Tele- 
graph Company will at once proceed to restore cable communication 
between Hongkong and Manila if the United States and Spain will 
consent to that measure. 

This Government desires such communication to be reopened and, 
as we have restored Spain to full telegraphic communication with Cuba, 
it is not supposed that she will object to the reestablishment of cable 
communication between Hongkong and Manila. 

The Department will be greatly obliged to your excellency if you will 
be so good as to communicate with the Spanish Government on the 
subject. 

Accept, etc., J. B. Mooee, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, 
Washington, August 17, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: The Spanish Government, not wishing 
to make use any longer of the good offices which the Government of the 
Republic has rendered it in its diplomatic communications with the 
Federal Government, wishes to send to Washington one of its consuls 
in Canada, who would be authorized to attend to all the questions of 
detail, the settlement of which the cessation of hostilities will, of course, 
permit or necessitate. 

By order of my Government, I have the honor to notify you of this 
wish of the cabinet of Madrid, and I would be much obliged to you ii 
you would inform me whether the Federal Government is disposed to 
permit such consul to be sent to Washington in the cajjacity of an 
unofficial agent. 

Accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 98.] Department of State, August 17, 1898. 

Excellency: In a memorandum left at the Department on the 15th 
instant, in behalf of your Embassy, I note the following inquiries: 

1. May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished 
between Spain and Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines? 

2. Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send supplies in Spanish 
bottoms to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines'? 

3. Will the Spanish tank steamer Cadagna, tshartered by French 
merchants and now lying in Havre, be permitted to proceed to Phila- 
delphia to take mineral oil for industrial purposes? 

It is understood that these inquiries are made with reference to the 
fact that, although a suspension of hostilities between the United 
States and Spain has been proclaimed, the state of war between the 



308 TREATY OF PEACE. 

two eouiitiies still contiiiues, aud that intercourse between them not 
having- been tbrnially restored must, so far as it is allowed, be the sub- 
ject of S]>ecial understanding. 

AVitli tills observation, I proceed to answer your inquiries in the 
order in which the,\ liave been stated. 

1. Tliis (lovernnient will interpose no obstacle to the reest;iblishment 
of the ])Ostal service by iSpanish steaaiers between Spain on the one 
side and Cuba, Porto Kico, and the Philipi)ines on the other. 

2. The United States will not object to the importation of supplies 
in Spanish bottoms to Cuba and the Philii)pincs, but it has been decided 
to reserve the importation of supplies from the United States to Porto 
liico to American vessels. 

3. The Spanish tank steamer Cadafj)ia, chartered by Frencli mer- 
chants and now lying at Havre, will be permitted to proceed to Phila- 
delphia and to take mineral oil for industrial purposes, provided such 
oil is not to be transijorted to Porto Rico. 

The concessions contained in these answers are made upon the under- 
standing that American vessels will not for the time being be excluded 
from Spanish ports, as well as upon the understanding that, if hostili- 
ties should at any time be renewed, American vessels that might hap- 
pen to be in Spanish ports would be allowed thirty days in which to 
load and depart with noncontraband cargo, and that any American 
vessel which, prior to the renewal of hostilities, should have sailed for 
any Spanish i)ort or place would be permitted to enter such port or 
pliice and discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart 
without molestation, and, if met at sea by any Spanish ship, to continue 
her voyage to any port or place not blockaded. These rules were 
observed by the United States at the outbreak of the war and would 
again be observed by this Government in the event of a renewal of 
hostilities. 

Accept, etc. J. B. Moore, 

Actiny Secretary, 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. 

Xo. 09.] 1)EPARTME^'T OF STATE, Aiiyust 19, 1S98. 

ExcioLLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 17th instant, in which you state that the Spanish Govern- 
ment, not wishing to make use any longer of the good oitices which the 
Government of France has rendered it in its diplomatic communications 
with the United States, wishes to send to Washington one of its consuls 
from Canada, who would be authorized to attend to all the (juestions of 
detail, the settlement of Avhich the cessation of hostilities will naturally 
]>ermit or necessitate. You therefore inquire, by order of your Go\ern- 
ment, whether the Government of the United States is disposed to 
])ermit such a consul to be sent to Washington in the capacity of an 
unolticial agent. 

The general terras in which the Spanish Government has caused its 
suggestion to be conveyed leave the Department in some doubt as to 
the precise object with which it is made or as to the precise capacity in 
which the proposed unoflicial agent is to act; but the statement that 
the Spanish (ioveinment docs not wish any longer to make use of the 
good (jflices whi<;h ycmr Government has rendered it in its dij^lomatic- 
communications with the United States indicates that such agent, who, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 309 

altliough a consul accredited to another Government, would have no 
official standing- with reference to this Goverjiment, would be expected 
to discharge in some sense diplomatic functions. 

To such a measure there are, it is conceived, two objections. In the 
first place, although hostilities have been suspended, the state of war 
between the United States and Spain still continues. 

In the second place, the Department is not informed as to the ques- 
tions of detail to which the suggestion of the Spanish Government 
refers. Arrangements have already been made for the treatment of 
the particular matters with reference to which the suspension of hos- 
tilities was proclaimed. The immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Kico, 
and other Spanish islands in the West Indies is to be carried out by 
commissioners specially appointed for that purpose, and the question 
of peace is to be treated of by specially ai^pointed commissioners who 
are to meet in Paris. 

Under these circumstances, it seems to this Government to be desir- 
able that diplomatic communications between the United States and 
Spain, in relation to any questions other than those above mentioned, 
should for the present continue to be conducted through the very accept- 
able channel through which they have heretofore been made since the 
beginning of the war. 

Accept, etc., J. B. Moore, Actitig Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. 

[Personal.] Department of St at^, August 19, 1898. 

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: Eeferring to your oral request, I have 
now the pleasure to transmit herewith, for the files of your embassy, a 
typewritten copy in English of the peace protocol signed August 12, 
181)S, of the President's order directing the Secretary of State to sign 
that instrument, and of the President's proclamation. 
I am, etc., 

J. B. Moore. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Eepuelic, 

Washington, August 20, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State: In resj^onse to the wish which I had 
the lionor to express to you verbally, you did me the favor, on the 19th 
of this month, to transmit to me, for the archives of my embassy, a 
copy of the protocol signed on the 12th of August, of the powers con- 
ferred upon the Secretary of State to sign this instrument, and of the 
proclamation suspending hostilities issued by the President of the 
United States on the same day. 

I have the honor to thank you for the transmission of these docu- 
ments, and I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you, Mr. Secre- 
tary of State, the assurances of my very high consideration. 

Jules Cambon. 



310 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Camhni io Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Wash ill [/ton, Aii(/nst 20, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : In a coninmniciition under date of the 
lOtli of this month you made known to me the objections which would 
be entertained by the Federal Government to the sending: to Washing- 
ton of a Spanish consul under the conditions indicated in my note of 
the 17th of Au«iust. You add that the settlement of the principal ques- 
tions to whicli the suspension of hostilities gives rise having been 
intrusted to special commissions designated to meet, respectively, in 
Cuba, Porto Rico, and at Paris, it seems to you desirable that diplo- 
nuitic communications relative to other questions should continue for 
the present to be exchanged between the Cabinets of Washington and 
Madrid by the same intermediary through which they have passed 
since the commencement of the war. 

T have the honor to inform you that I have communicated this infor- 
mation to the Spanish Government, and 1 avail myself of this occasion 
to renew to you, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my very high 
consideration. 

Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Cambon to 31r. Day. 

fTraiislation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washinaton, August 20, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : 1 have the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of your communication, under date of the 17th of this montb, in 
which you inform me, in response to the inquiries contained in my note 
of the loth, that — 

First. The Federal Government will oppose no obstacle to the 
reestablishment of the royal mail postal service between Spain, Cuba, 
Porto Rico, and the Philippines. 

Second. That it will permit Spanish merchants to transport, under 
the Spanish Hag, lU'ovisions destined for Cuba and the Philippine*, but 
that the importation into Porto Rico of provisions from the United 
States will be reserved to American vessels. 

Third. That the Spanish reservoir ship Cadar/na, freighted by French 
merchants, may proceed to I'hiladelphia and there receive on board a 
cargo of distilled petroleum for indnstrial purposes, on the condition 
that this cargo is not taken to Porto Rico. 

You add tliat, the suspension of hostilities allowing a state of war to 
subsist between the two countries, the above concessions are granted 
with the following reservations: 

First. During the present period access to Spanish ports shall not be 
denied to American vessels. 

Second. Should hostilities be resnmed, American vessels shall enjoy 
the inununities accorded to Si)anish vessels by articles 4 and 5 of the 
President's proclamation of April 20 last. 

1 have hastened to comnumicate the foregoing information to the 
Spanish Government. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



TiiEATY OF PEACE. 311 

Mr. Camhon to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Eepublic, 

Washinf/ton, Augtist 22, 1898. 

The telegram by which the French Ambassador communicated to the 
Spanish Government the objections stated by the Secretary of State of 
the United States, in his letter of August 19, with regard to the pro- 
posed dispatch to Washington of a Spanish cousul, crossed a dispatch 
from the Madrid cabinet, proposing, for the execution of that unofficial 
mission, M. Torroja, ex-consul of Spain at Philadelphia, who speaks 
English very well, and who is said to have left a very good impression 
in the United States. 

The French ambassador would be thankful to the Secretary of State 
if he would inform him as speedily as possible whether there appears 
to be any prospect that this new proposition of the Madrid cabinet 
will be favorably entertained by the Federal Government. 

M. J. Cambon avails himself, etc. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, 

Washington, August 22, 1898. 

At the request of the Spanish Government, the French Ambassador 
has the honor to inform the Secretary of State of the United States 
that the royal commissioners who have been designated to arrange 
the details of the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles are: 

For Cuba: The General of Division Gonzales Parrado, Rear- Admiral 
Pastor y Landero, and xMarquis de jNIontoro. 

For Porto Rico: General of Division Ortega y Diaz, N^aval Captain 
of the First Class Vallarino y Oarasco, and Auditor of Division (military 
judge) Sanchez del Aguila y Leon. 

Mr. J. Cambon takes advantage of this opportunity, etc. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

Depaetiuent of State, 
No. 102.] Washington, August 23, 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to your inquiry of the inth instant, I have 
the honor to inform you that by the statutes of the United States an 
appeal may be taken' to the Supreme Court from all linal decrees of any 
district court in prize cases where the matter in dispute, exclusive oi 
costs, exceeds the sum or value of $2,000; and that an appeal is allowed 
in such cases, without reference to the value of the matter in dispute, 
on a certincate of the district judge that the adjudication involves a 
question of general importance. The law requires that the Supreme 
Court shall receive, hear, and determine such appeals, and shall always 
be open for the entry tliereof. Power is vested in the Supreme Court 
also, if, in its judgment, the purposes of justice require it, to allow any 
amendment either in form or substance of any appeal in prize causes. 



312 TREATY OF PEACE. 

It is provided that appeals in such causes shall be made within thirty 
days after the rendering of the decree appealed from, unless the court 
previously extends the time for cause show-*i in the particular case. 
The Su])reine Court is empowered if, in its judgment, the purposes of 
justice reijuire it, to allow an appeal in any prize case if it appears that 
any notice of appeal or of intention to appeal was filed with the clerk 
of the district court within thirty days after the rendition of the final 
decree therein. 

This answer to your inquiry is based in substance upon sections G95, 
lOOG, ami KMH) of the Kevised Statutes of the United States. 
Accept, etc., 

William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Comhon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, August 24., 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States has had the honor to 
receive the communication of the French ambassador of the 22d instant, 
in which it is stated that the Spanish Government, in pursuance of its 
previous proposal to send a consul to Washington to conduct in an 
unofficial capacity diplomatic correspondence with this Government, 
has designated for that function Mr. Torroja, ex-consul of Spain at 
Philadelphia, who speaks English, and wiio is said to have left a good 
impression in the United States. 

In view of the fact tliatthe telegraphic dispatch of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment, conveying- this designation, is understood to have crossed the 
telegram of the French embassy conveying our objectioiis, as stated in 
our note of the 39th instant, to the original proposal, it does not appear 
to be necessary for the Department now to do more than refer to that 
note as having answered by anticipation the present communication. 

Mr. William R. Day avails himself of this opportunity to renew to 
M. Camboii the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, Angust 24, 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States has the honor to inform 
the Embassy of the He|)ublic of France that it is expected tliat the 
comnussioners appointed on the part of the United States for the T>ur- 
pose of arranging and executing the details of the evacuation of Cuba 
by Si)ain will soon depart for Havana in a public ship. It is deemed 
proper to give notice of tliis intention in order that the mines in the 
harboroi' Havana may now be removed, if, indeed, this has not already 
been done. 

Tlie Secretary of State will be greatly obliged if the Embassy will 
cause the substance of tliis communication to be conveyed by telegraph 
to the Spanish (iovernnient, and advise him of that Government's 
reply, in order that preparations may immediately be made for the 
departure of the United States commissioners. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 313 

Mr. Camhon to Mr, Day, 

[Trauslation.] 

Embassy of the French Eepublic, 

Washington, August 24, 1898. 

In order to comply with the wish expressed by the Secretary of State 
of the United States in his uote of August 24, the Embassy of France 
this day informed the Spanish Government, by cable, that the United 
States commissioners charged with the arrangements to be made for 
the evacuation of Cuba were shortly to proceed to Havana, and asked 
that orders be issued for the removal of mines from that harbor, in the 
event of this not having already been done. 

The Embassy of Fi ance will have the honor of communicating to the 
Department of State the reply of the Spanish Government as soon as 
it receives it. 



Mr. Bay to Mr, Camhon. 

Department of State, 

August 26, 1898. 
The Secretary of State of the United States has the honor to inform 
the French Embassy that an inquiry has been made by a firm of ship 
brokers in the city of New York as to whether an American schooner 
would be received at Las Palmas, Canary Islands, if cleared for that 
port. In view of the position taken by this Government in reply to 
certain inquiries of the Government of Spain as to the reception of 
Spanish ships in the ports of this country, it is supposed that the 
schooner in question would be received at Las Palmas if cleared from 
the United States during tlie suspension of hostilities. The shippers, 
however, are unwilling to clear the schooner without a positive assur- 

( ance to that effect, and as the Dei)artment has not as yet received from 
the Spanish Government a response to its note to the French embassy 
of the 17th instant, the Secretary of State ventures to express the hope 
that the French embassy will cause an inquiry to be made of the Span- 
ish Government as to whether the schooner in question will be received 

I at Las Palmas if she should clear for that port pending the suspension 
of hostilities. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. 

Department of State, 

Washingtott, August 36, 1898. 

The Secretary of State has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
the note of the ambassador of France of the 22d instant, advising him 
of the composition of the commission designated on the part of Spain 
to arrange the dt tails of the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles, and 
to say in reply that translations thereof have been communicated to 
the Secretaries of War and the Navy. 

Mr. William R. Day has the honor to renew to Mr. Jules Cambon the 
assurances of his highest consideration. 



314 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] " 

French Emeassy, Washington, August 29, 1898. 

Eeferrinj^ to a coininunication from tlie lioiiorable Secretaiy of State 
of the United States, dated August 24, coiieeniing the approaching- 
departure of the American commissioners charged with settling the 
details of the evacuation of Cuba, the French embassy has the honor 
to state that the Spanish Government has given orders to the Havana 
authorities for the removal of any mines which may still be in that 
harbor. 

In this connection the Madrid cabinet has expressed a wish to know 
in what kind of vessel the American commission will take passage. It 
would prefer that it should not be a Federal war vessel, the presence of 
which, in Havana haibor might, by calling up the recollection of the 
Maim, give rise to demonstrations which it would not be easy to pre- 
vent, and which both parties would evidently be interested in avoiding. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, Washington, Augvst 39, 1898. 

The French embassy has just receiAcd a telegram from Havana in 
which Captain General Blanco expresses the wish to know whether the 
Federal Government would see any objection to ofiicers of the Spanish 
army returning singly to Spain by way of the United States. 

The French "embassy would be much obliged to the Department of 
State if it would enable it to reply to this question by telegram. 



3Ir. Camhon to Mr. Day, 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, Washington, Avgnst 59, 1898. 

According to news received at Madrid from the Philippines, the 
insurrection is spreading more and more in the archipelago. By the 
help of five vessels at their disposal, the insurgents are said to be 
threatening various points where the Spanish forts are not able to 
oppose a successlul resistance, and the peaceable population is thus 
exposed, without defense, to the barbarous treatment of the rebel bands. 

The Jioyal Government, whose duty it is to provide for the protection 
of the life and i)roperty of the Spanish subjects in the Philippines, lias 
expressed the wish that the Federal Government be informed of the 
lears which this situation canses it, and which might be advantageously 
leinedied in the following manner: 

Tlie S])anisli troops whom the capitulation of the city of Manila lum 
reduced to inaction might be ])laccd at once at the disposal of Spam, 
who would use them for the defense of the islands against the insu»' 
gents. 

The minister of state at Madrid thinks that if the United States 
Government sees any objections to this arrangen.ent. it will, at least, 
have no reason to oppose the dispatch of troops directly from the 
I)eninsala to the Philippines. 



TEEATY OF PEACE. 315 

Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day, 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, August 29, 1898, 

The French Embassy has been requested to inform the Federal Gov- 
ernment that the families of the officers of the garrison of the archi- 
pelago of the Ladrones are in a state of entire destitution. 

The Spanish Government is confident that as soon as the attention 
of the Department of State has been called to this painful situation the 
United States will act in accordance with the feelings of humanity and 
the responsibility which it has assumed in sending those officers to 
Manila, and will take the necessary steps to have their families sent to 
Cavite. 



Mr, Moore to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 103.] Depaetment of State, 

Washington, August 30, 1898. 
Excellency: Referring to previous correspondence concerning Mr. 
Jimenez Zapatero, I have the honor to advise you that he has been 
released from confinement as a prisoner of war at Fortress Monroe, but 
that he still remains at the post because of lack of funds. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. MooKE, Acting Secretary, 



Department of State, September 1, 1898. 
The Department of State, replying to the inquiry of the French em- 
bassy of the 29th ultimo, has the honor to say that this Government 
does not, under the present circumstances, object to officers of the Span- 
ish army returning singly to Spain by way of the United States. 



Mr. Thiebaut to Mr. Moore, 

[Personal.] 

French Embassy^, Washington, September 3, 1898. 

Dear Mr. Moore: In reference with the informal note of this 
Embassy, dated August 29, and with our conversation of this morning, 
I have the honor to call your attention to the following statements: 

From advices received at Madrid, negotiations are said to be caiTied 
on by the Federal authorities for the purpose of chartering at Hong- 
kong sliips for the transportation to Spain of the Spanish troops 
surrendered at Manila. 

These troops or part thereof are needed by Spain to protect the 
Philippine Islands in her possession against the insurgents. 

A ship with some 700 insurgents on boaid is said to have left Manila 
with a view of attacking some of the islands in Spain's possession. 



316 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Similar ex])oditioiis are said to be preparing in Luzon and starting 
tlierefrora with tlie same pur[)Ose; these vessels are Hying a Hag which 
has not been recognized by the maritime ^lowers, and are therefore 
liable of being denounced as ])irates. 

These expeditions can hardly be carried on without the knowledge 
of the (!omniander of the American forces in the bay of Manila: as 
yjtain is scrui)ulously observing the dispositions of the protocol, it is 
believed by the Spanish (lovernment that the Government of the 
United States will, on the other hand, cause the hostilities, from what- 
ever quarter, to be suspended in the Philippines i)euding the peace 
negotiations. 

Yours, most sincerely, Thiebaut. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Thiebaut. 

[Personal.] 

French Embassy, Washington, September 5, 1898. 

Dear Mr. Thiebaut: Since the receipt of your informal note of 
the 29th ultimo and your personal letter of the 3d instant consideration 
has been given to the matters therein referred to, and pertinent advices 
have been received from our military and naval commanders in the 
Philippines. 

As the result of our investigations it appears that some of the reports 
which you have brought to our attention in behalf of the Government 
at Madrid have no solid foundation, while others relate to matters that 
occurred before the signing of the protocol of August lU. 

The rumor that the authorities of this Government are carrying on 
negotiations for the purpose of chartering at Hongkong ships for the 
transj^ortation to Spain of the Spanish troops that surrender at IManila 
appears to be wholly groundless. Ko such negotiations have to our 
knowledge been undertaken. None have been authorized. 

In our conversation of the 3d instant you disclaimed any intention 
on the part of the Spanish Government to impute to the commanders 
of the American forces at Manila connivance with any recent hostile 
proceedings of the insurgents. I am now able to say that they have 
no knowledge of the incidents referred to as having lately taken place 
at Manila. 

As to the rumor that a ship with 700 insurgents on board has lately 
left Manila with a view to attack some of the islands in the Philippines, 
we are advised that no insurgent vessel having troops on board has 
recently left either Manila or Manila Bay. It is stated, however, that 
about August 10, before the i^rotocol was signed, two vessels with from 
one to two hundred troops left Manila Bay, destination unknown. 

The report that similar expeditions are preparing in Luzon with a 
hostile purpose against other islands appears also to be inexact. Our 
advices are to the effect that the insurgents have three or four snmll 
vessels, oidy two of which have guns, and that the largest of these 
vessels will not carry more than 250 men. 

In your informal note of the 2()th ultimo it is stated that the Spanish 
Government suggests that, for the purpose of checking insurgent hos- 
tilities, the Spanish troops now held as piisoners of war by the Aiiieii- 
can forces may be placed at the disposal of Spain, to be used against 
the insurgents; or, if this be objected to, that the Spanish Government 



TREATY OF PEACE. 317 

may be allowed to seud troops from the peninsula to the Philippines. 
It can scarcely be expected that this Government would even consider 
the question of adopting the first alternative, in view of the fact that 
for sometime before the surrender of Manila theSi)anish forces in that 
city were besieged by the insurgents by land while the port was block- 
aded by the forces of the United States by sea. As to the second 
alternative, it will be a matter for regret if it should be adopted on the 
strength of rumors, some of which have been shown to be groundless, 
while others yet are unconlirmed. The Government of the United States 
will, through its military and naval commanders in the Philippines, 
exert its influence for the purpose of restraining insurgent hostilities 
pending the suspension of hostilities between the United States and 
Spain. 

It would be unfortunate if any act should be done by either Govern- 
ment which might, in certain aspects, be inconsistent with the suspen- 
sion of hostilities between the two nations, and which might necessi- 
tate the adoption of corresponding measures of precaution by the other 
Government. 

Very sincerely, yours, J. B. Mookb. 



Mr. Ciutibon to Mr. Moore 

[Translation, i 

Embassy of the French Eepublic, 

Washinfiton, Septemher 6, 1898. 

The Ambassador of France has the honor to inform the Secretary of 
State of the United States that the Spanish Government has accepted, 
by Avay of reciprocity, the proposition for a modus riretidi, as regards 
navigation, which formed the subject of the communication of the 
Department of State of the 17th ultimo. 

In consecpience of this acceptance, and in order to reply to the 
inquiry made by the Department of State in its note of August 20, the 
Eoyal Government has given to the competent authorities in the Canary 
Islands the necessary orders to the end that the American schooner 
which the ship brokers in jSTeV York ])ropose to send to Las Palmas 
maj'^ be at perfect liberty to enter that port. 

Mr. Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Hon. 
J. B. Moore the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. ' 

Department of State, 

Wmhington, ^September 6', 1898. 
By a note of the 29tli ultimo, the French embassy communicated 
to the Department of State a report received from the Spanish Govern- 
ment to the eliect that the families of the officers of the garrison of the 
archipelago of the Ladrones were in a state of destitution; and the 
embassy was so good as to say that the Spanish Government was con- 
fident that as soon as the attention of the Department was called to 
the painful situation, the United States would act in accordance with 



318 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the feelings of humanity and the responsibility it had assumed in send- 
ing those otlicers to Manila, and would take the necessary steps to have 
their families sent to Cavite. 

Immediately upon the receipt of the note of the embassy, the Depart- 
meni, desirous of heeding everj^ dictate of humanity, caused inquiries 
to be made as to the situation of the families in question. A reply to 
those iiKjuiries has just been received, in the form of a telegram from 
Admiral Uewey, dated at JManila on the 5th instant. Admiral Dewey 
states that the families of the Spanish officers are still at Guam, and 
that, according to the testimony of all the United States naval officers 
who have visited the island, the reports of their destitution are wholly 
groundless. 

The Spanish governor informed Captain Glass that all the families 
were provided for before leaving. When the Monterey and Monadnocli 
were there they found no signs of destitution and heard no complaints. 
Spanish officers now held as prisoners at Manila received letters from 
Guam by both vessels, and in these letters no mention was made of 
any destitution. It further appears that Spanish officers at Guam are 
still collecting taxes, and are able to relieve any want. 

Mr. J. B. Moore takes this occasion to renew to his excellency, Mr. 
Jules Cambon, the assurances of his highest consideratiou. 



CONSULAR REPORTS ON PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS. 



AFFAIRS IN THE PHILIPPINES. 

Mr. Williams to Mr. Cridler. 

No. 8.] Consulate of the United States, 

Manila^ Philippine Islands, February 31, 1898. 
Sir : I have tlie lionor to inform you that during the year 1897 the 
record of arrivals and departures of vessels of all flags from Manila, 
Iloilo, and Cebu, the open ports of the Philippine Islands, is as follows: 





Arrivals. 


Total. 


Departures. 




Flag. 


Steam- 
ships. 


Ships. 


Barks. 


Steam- 
ships. 


Ships. 


Barks. 


Total. 


United States 


1 
150 

28 
47 
10 
19 
2 


15 

20 
1 


8 

22 

2 


24 

192 

31 

47 

10 

21 

2 

3 

1 

1 


1 
149 

28 
47 
10 
18 

2 


13 
23 


8 
18 

1 


22 




190 




29 






47 


T 










10 




1 


1 




1 


19 






2 






3 

1 




i 

1 


1 












1 




1 




1 




1 














Total 






332 








322 






i 











Certain defects as to tonnage, etc., exist in the records supplied me. 
These I hope to have remedied for the current year, so that my 1898 
report may be nearer complete. 

I have the honor, etc., Oscar F. Williams, 

United States Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Cridler. 

liTo. 9.] * Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Pliilippine Islands, February 22, 1898. 

Sir: Without specific instructions it seems my duty at this critical 
period to inform the Washington Government somewhat as to political 
conditions here. But as I have been here less than a month vigilance 
has not overcome all difficulties, and the rigid censorship of the press 
in general and the suppression of such publications as uttered the truth 
have made news gathering onerous. 

I have before me a lengthy dispatch giving dates of many warlike 
and ])olitical matters, with rumors, observations, and conclusions, but 
deem it wise to write more briefl^y to-day, to bide events and wait 
specific instructions from you. 

Peace was proclaimed, and since my coming festivities therefor were 
held; but there is no peace, and has been none for about two years. 
Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles 
are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, 

319 



320 TKEATY OF PEACE. 

and hospitals are full. Prisoners are bronglit here and shot without 
trial, and Manila is under martial law. 

The Crown (brces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within 
10 miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there 
fought and 5 dead left on the field. Much of such information is found 
in my longer dispatch, referred to, ami which is at your command. 

The (iovernor-General, who is amiable and popular, having resigned, 
Avishes credit for paciticatiou, and certain rebel leaders were given a 
cash bribe of $ 1 ,G.">0,0()0 to consent to public deportation to ( Uiina. This 
bribe and de})ortation only multiplied claimants and fanned the tires 
oC discontent. 

insurgents dennind fewer exactions from church and state, a half 
of public offices, and fewer church holidays, which seriously retard 
business. 

A republic is organized here, as in Cuba. Insurgents are being 
armed and drilled: are rapidly increasing in numbers and efliciency, 
and all agree that a general uprising will come as soon as the governor- 
general embarks for Spain, which is fixed for ]\larch. 

While some combatant regiments have recently been returned to 
S[)ain, it was for appearance only, and all authorities now agree that 
uidess the Crown largely reinforces its army here it will lose possession. 

Command me for any desired information. 
Your obedient servant, 

Oscar F. Williams, Consul. 



Mr. WiUiains to Mr. Cn'dler. 

Xo. 2, special.] Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, I'hlUppinc Islands, March 19, 1898. 

SiR: Alatters are in a serious state here. I have daily communica- 
tion by cable and letter with Commodore Dewey, but we pass letters 
by British and other shipmasters and by private parties, because cables 
and letters are tam])ered with. 

Insurrection is rampant; many killed, wounded, and made i)risoners 
on both sides. A battle ship, the l>on Juan de Austria, sent this week 
to the northern i)art of Luzon to cooperate with a land force of 2,000 
disi^atched to succor local forces, overwhelmed by rebels. 

Last night special stpiads of mounted police were scattered at danger 
points to save Maniln. 

I (•an! ion Amerit-ans against bearing arms in violation of local law, 
although thieats Imvc been made by Spaniards that all Americans 
would soon have their throats cut. Certain ones are so frightened as 
to fre(piently come to my consulate and hotel, and spies watch all my 
movements. 

Yesterday I examined stO(;k of an American who had been threat- 
ened and abstracted his ledger. To-day his inventory and accounts 
were placed in my safe. To-day two others came to me to send their 
effects to some American ship lying in the bay, and I have so planned. 

1 have no instructions from you as to these delicate complications, 
l)ut so far have gotten on well. 1 tly our (lag all the time, give double 
hours to the consulate, and have notilied Americans that they can find 
nu! all the time at the consulate, or at my hotel, or on the path between. 
We have many holidays, but I keep oi)en consulate every day, including 
Sundays, so Americans may find me. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 321 

Eebellion never more threatening to Spain. Eebels getting arms, 
money, and friends, and tliey outnumber the Spaniards, resident and 
soldiery, probably a hundred to one. 

Eeport says that Holy Week the insurgents plan to burn and cap- 
ture Manila. But, if so, you will learn it by wire before you receive 
this dispatch. 

My March quarterly reports may be delayed or captured. If no 
trouble thwarts my work, all reports from here will be sent by first 
mail after March 31, but my consular agents at Cebu and Iloilo are 
both absent, and hence I may not receive their reports for transmission 
as early as I send my own. 

All news comes direct from Washington. I hear nothing as to rela- 
tions between United States and Spain, and, depending upon unofficial 
reports, I must act as if peace reigned. I can only assure you of vig- 
ilance and loyalty, await your instructions, and remain, 
Your most obedient servant, 

Oscar F. Williams, Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Cridler. 

Special.] Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, March 27, 1898. 

Sir: Because of having given daily information to Commodore 
Dewey as to disturbances here I have assumed that he informed the 
Washington Government, and I have written little on war matters. 

Cuban conditions exist here possibly in aggravated form. Spanish 
soldiers are killed and wounded daily, despite claimed pacification, and 
the hospitals are kept full. 

The majority of casualties are reported from the ranks of the native 
insurgents, and the cruelties and horrors of war are daily repeated. 

Cavite is the naval port of Luzon, situated about S miles across the 
bay from Manila, and about twenty miles distant by way of bay shore 
and public highway, and last Thursday, March 24, a Crown regiment of 
natives, the Seventy-fourth, stationed there was ordered to advance 
against native insurgents near by. The regiment refused to obey 
orders, and ,8 corporals were called out and shot to death in presence 
of the regiment, wiiich was again ordered to advance and threat made 
that a retusal would be death to all. All did refuse and were sent to 
barracks to await sentence. On the morning of the following Friday, 
March 25, the entire regiment, with arms and equi))ment, marched out 
of the barracks and deserted in a body to the insurgents, saying they 
were willing to fight the foreign enemies of Spain, but would not fight 
their friends. 

Since beginning this dispatch I learn of the desertion to the insur- 
gents of another entire regiment. These are said to be the severest 
set-backs received by Spain during the two years' insurrection here. 

On Friday morning, March 25, a church holiday, a meeting of 
natives was being held near my consulate in Manila, the natives being 
unarmed. Tlie building was surrounded by police and military, the 
meeting broken up, twelve natives wantonly shot to death, several 
wounded, and sixty-two taken prisoners. Saturday morning, March 26, 
the sixty-two prisoners were marched in a body to the cemetery and 
shot to death, although it was shown that several were (;hance i)assers-by 
or employees in ships adjoining, not being in attendance at the meeting, 
T r 21 



322 TREATY OF PEACE. 

It was cold comfort to the widows and orphans of innocent men to 
have Si)anish officers present them the mangled corpses of husbands 
and tatliers. 

Such horrors, but usually on a smaller scale, but at times attended 
by greater disregard for modern rules of war, occur almost daily, and 
the piteous cry goes uj), "Will it ever stop?" 

The Crown forces are now building a cordon of small forts on city's 
outskirts for defense against provincial natives, who are expected to 
soon attack Manila. In fact, two detectives and one messenger have 
come to me this evening with information that attack was to be made 
to-night, and everybody is anxious, as 8,000 native insurgent soldiers 
are encamped only live miles away. 

The insurgents seem to lack arms and organization, but, so far as I 
can learn, outnumber the Spanish forces and inhabitants twenty to one. 
Arms are being obtained and organization slowly effected, and all 
classes fear the near future. It is said that the only reason why 
Manila has not been taken and burned is because a vast maijority of 
its population is in perfect accord with the insurgents. 

Because of anxiety among Americans and my wish to keep in reach 
of all demands, I keep the consulate open double hours and on all holi- 
days and Sundays, with biggest flag flying, so any needing a refuge 
may find it. 

Barbarities are reported as daily practiced, such as placing prisoners 
and susjiects in black-hole dungeons in the walls of old Manila, so 
placed that with rise of tide prisoners are drowned; several hundred 
reported to have so perished. 

Cruelties too horrid for an otticial report are detailed to me every 
day, and it seems that the cry of outraged humanity would soon com- 
pel Spain to abolish Middle Age methods of warfare. 

Christian nations are such only in name when such atrocities as 
daily blacken the calendar are known to be perpetrated here and no 
eftbrt made to pi^otect the weak. 

There is to-day no Christian nation — policy and mock diplomacy 
govern all ; the vilest cruelties of war are added to the mangling of old 
men, women, and children to make full the measure of iniquity. 

Tbe American Indians would not permit one of their tribes to prac- 
tice such barbarities. Why should so-called Christian nations decline 
to call a halt upon Spanish outrages'? 

All information as to defenses of Manila has been sent to Commodore 
George Dewey at Hongkong. 

For fear of confiscation this dispatch and other mail go by messen- 
ger to Hongkong, to be there mailed. 

Cable is cut in three ijlaces. I keep copies of dispatches, etc., but 
at present, for reasons, they are not copied on the register at consulate. 
I remain, etc., 

Oscar F. Williams, 
United States Consul, Manila. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

United States Consulate, 
Manila, Philippine Islands, March 31, 1898. 
Honored Sir: My returns and accounts for March quarter to both 
your l)e])artment and the Treasury having been perfected and mailed, 
1 turn with reluctance, but from a sense of duty, to somewhat inform 



i\ 



TREATS OF PEACE. 323 

you, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of the insurrection wliich for about 
two years has devastated these marvelously lair islands, "covered 
them with blood, often of the innocent, and has bereft thousands of 
homes of the husbands and sons who were the sole breadwinners.*' 

Last week Thursday, March 24, at Cavite, near here, the Seventy- 
fourth Spanish Regiment, recruited among the natives of the southern 
islands of this group, refused to obey orders and attack the native 
insurrectionists. Eight corporals were called out and shot to death in 
presence of the regiment. Again orders to advance were given and 
disobeyed, when death to all was threatened. The regiment expressed 
a willingness to fight the foreign enemies of Spain, but said they would 
all be shot rather than fight their friends. All were senb to barracks 
to be punished later, but the next morning all took arms and deserted 
to the insurgents. 

On Friday, March 25, a church and legal holiday, unarmed natives 
were holding a meeting near my consulate. The building was sur- 
rounded by police and the suspicious military, the meeting broken up, 
twelve natives shot to death, several wounded, and sixty- two j^risoners 
taken, certain of whom were mere passers-by, not having attended the 
meeting. The next morning these sixty-two prisoners, without form of 
trial, were marched in a body to the cemetery and all shot to death. 

Hardly a day passes witliout such scenes of middle-age treachery 
and barbarity. A recent uprising at Cape Bolinao, on the nortiiwest 
coast of this island (Luzon), about 300 miles from Manila, was cruslied 
by united action of two regiments of infantry aided by the battle ship 
1)071 Juan de Austria. A British shipmaster there at the time reports 
about forty killed and forty wounded. After surrender, the Spaniards 
put dead and wounded together in a house and by burning it cremated all. 

In the old walls of " Walled Manila," built about 300 years ago, are 
said to be several "black hole" dungeon prisons, in which incarceration 
is almost sure death. Two of these, both of which I have seen, with 
apertures at summit of wall, have floors below low tide, so two or three feet 
of slime, mud, and water floor the dungeons. In these hundreds ol' so- 
called insurgents have lately been placed, and all drowned by the rising 
tide. No judge, no jury — simply hate, suspicion, treachery. Of this 
several reports have been made to me, one that above two hundred 
victims were counted in one of these prisons. No reliance can be 
placed upon the public press. Censorship is rigid, and the oldest daily 
there. El Diario de Manila, and another, have been susj)ended by 
public order because truth was told. 

Months ago pacification was claimed by the Governor-General. It 
was false. A truce had been bought with $1,650,000, during which the 
Governor-General hoped to embark for Spain, but all was a hollow farce. 

The Madrid Government seems now to understand all, and the 
Governor-General has been ordered to remain, and his appointed suc- 
cessor sent to one of the provinces. 

Now 5,000 armed rebels, which for days have been encamped near 
Manila and have been reenforced from the mountains, plan to attack 
the city tonight. All is excitement and life uncertain. 

News came this afternoon of the wounding of a governor of one of 
the southern provinces and the defeat of the Crown forces under his 
command. 

The only church permitted here is the Eoman Catholic, and its inter- 
ference with the Government, its intolerance, immorality, and despotism 
are perhaps the greatest bar to progress in these islands. 



324 TREATY OF PEACE. 

From consensus of opinion received from men of several nationalties, 
from oiliest foreie^n residents, from natives, Chinese, and a few Spaniards, 
J believe that of the Philippine people, estimated at fifteen millions, 
not five per cent are loyal to Spain. 

Jjut oliieials and priests, the leeches of the people, are in authority, 
have money, influence, and cunning', so that the natives and half-breeds 
(C'liinese and European) are more or less controlled. 

Durino- tlie j)eriod when war between the United States and Spain was 
expected, which seems happily now to be disappearing, I daily heard 
the assurauce that the natives, half-breeds, Chinese merchants, and 
such Spaniards as were in business were all ready to welcome our fleet, 
light with it to hoist over these islands the United States flag, and 
swear allegiance to it; and once done, all interests here would thrive, 
be settled and happy. 

I have daily felt it a duty to inform you, but for nearly the entire 
period of my incumbency every odd hour of day and many of evenings 
have been given to inspection of forts, arsenals, and battle ships in 
ordei' to fully inform Commodore Dewey at Hongkong. 

And because his means of communication with Washington were 
better than my own, I have trusted all to him. Another fact, I have 
not had money to cable Commodore Dewey as asked, but needed to 
borrow for it. 

Fortunately I have been well every hour, so that by double hours at 
the consulate, and by keeping it open, with flag flying on holidays and 
Sundays, the Americans have felt sure of a refuge if trouble came, and 
threats were freely made that all Americans would have their throats 
cut. I have not dared to fully trust the post-office or telegraph com- 
pany, as letters and cables have been freely tampered with, and hence 
have, until to-day, sent much mail by jirivate messengers to Hongkong, 
and have received mail the same way. 

To-day's mail being returns and accounts, etc., and having no chance 
to send to Hongkong, all was mailed here. This will be sent by mes- 
senger to China. 

Now bubonic plague exists at Hongkong, and quarantine here delays 
ships, and Governor-General hasorderetl that ships take no passengers 
from these islands. 

By discoveries here and by a plan devised, I have saved the United 
States Treasury in two months nearly double the amount of my salary, 
and each year hereafter it will be saved $200 from one item alone. 

My hotel room has been searched, and, I believe, my consulate also, 
and friends have daily called to advise me to seek safety in hiding or 
in flight; but I have not shared their fears sufficiently to leave a post 
at wliich you had expectations that I would remain and perform every 
loyal duty to j^our Department and to our Government. 

All officials have treated me well except one underling, whose head 
I threatened to smash, and with a return of cordiality between nations 
I shall make all official calls anew, as I have but just received my exe- 
quatur from Madrid. 

]\Iy work for the commodore now lighter, I shall prepare reports on 
Philippine tariff, import wants, products, and institutions for the de- 
partments at Washington. 

1 do not copy this on the records of the consulate, because it may 
be there read any night by spies, and if so, my usefulness as well as 
my ])ersonaI comfort would be impaired. I dare not even intrust my 
cipher cables and code to the old otlice safe, but carry all in my pockets. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 325 

I regret to burden you with a report so unfavorable, and hope ere 
long- to be able to write of better conditions; but being your antipodes, 
the news is old before it passes between us. 

For economy's sike I have not used the cable to United States, but 
have, as said, intrusted Commodore Dewey to inform you. 

Believing that before you receive this you will have succeeded the 
venerable Mr. Sherman as premier, I beg you to accept congratula- 
tions, a moiety of which go to our country and its good President and 
a moiety to you, with the hope that your career as a national servant 
may be as long, as honored, and as beueticial as has been that of your 
illustrious predecessor. 

I am, etc., Oscar F. Williams, 

United states Consul, Manila, Philippuie Islands. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, 

Consulate of the United States, 
Bay of Manila, PMlipirine Islands, May 4, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to brietly report to you concerning the battle 
of Manila Bay, fought on I\Iay 1, 1898. 

Heeding your mandate, and by repeated request of Commodore 
George Dewey, of the United States Asiatic Squadron, I left Manila 
on Saturday, April 23, and on Wednesday, April 27, at about 1 o'clock 
p. m., boarded the flagship Olympia in Mirs Bay, near Hongkong. 
After meeting the commodore and his captains and commanders in 
council, the commodore at once ordered his fleet to start at 2 p. m. for 
Manila Bay. 

On Saturday, April 30, Subig Bay was reconnoitered because of 
reported hiding of Spanish fleet in its inner harbor, but no fleet being 
there found, the commodore proceeded at once to the south channel 
entrance to Manila Bay, and while by many reports mines, torpedoes, 
and land defenses obstructed entrance, yet the flagship led the van, 
and between 10 p. m., April 30, and 2 a. m , May 1, our fleet of six war 
ships, one dispatch boat, and two coal-laden transports passed all 
channel dangers nnliarmed, despite shots from forts, and at 2 a. m. were 
all safe on the broad expanse of Manila Bay. 

After my dei)arture, April 23, and by drawing Are to save Manila if 
possible, all Spanish war ships went to their strongly fortified naval 
station at Cavite, where the inner harbor gave refuge and wht'ie poten- 
tial support could be had from several forts and well-equipped batteries 
which extended several miles right and left from Port Cavite. 

At about 5.30 a. m., Sunday, May 1, the Spanish guns opened fire at 
both the Manila breakwater battery and at Cavite from fleet and forts. 

With magnificent coolness and order, but with greatest promptness, 
our fleet, in battle array, headed by the flagship, answered the Spanish 
attack, and for about two and a half hours a most terrifir fire ensued. 

The method of our operations could not have shown greater system, 
our guns greater eflectiveness, or our officers and crews greater bravery. 
And while Spanish resistance was stubborn and the bravery of Spanish 
forces such as to challenge admiration, yet they were outclassed, weighed 
in the balance of war against the methods, training, aim, and bravery 
shown on our decks, and after less than three hours' perilous and intense 



326 TREATY OF PEACE. 

combat one of Spain's war ships was sinkin,q", two otliers burning, and 
all others with land defenses had severely suffered when our squadron, 
with no harm done its ships, retiied I'or breaLfast, At about 10 o'cloik 
a. ni. ('ommodore Dewey renewed the battle and with effects most fatal 
with each evolution. 

No better evidence of Sj)anish bravery need be sought than that, after 
the cMstigation of our first engagement, her ships and forts should again 
answer our tire. But Spanish eftbrts were futile. Ship after ship and. 
battery after battery went to destruction belbre the onslaught of Ameri- 
can energy and training, and an hour and a half of our second engage- 
ment wrought the annihilation of the Spanish fleet and forts with several 
hundred Spaniards killed and wounded and millions in value of their 
(Tovernment property destroyed. While amazing, almost unbelievable 
as it seems, not a ship or guu of our fleet had been disabled, and, except 
on the Baltimore, not a man had been hurt. 

One of the crew of the BnlUmore had had a leg fractured by slipping 
and another hurt in the ankle in a similar manner, while four received 
slight flesh wounds from splinters thrown by a 6-inch i)rojectile which 
pierced the starboard side of the cruiser. 

But in the battle of Manila Bay the United States squadron of six 
war ships totally destroyed the Spanish fleet of eight war ships, many 
forts and batteries, and accomplished this work without the loss of a 
man. 

History has only contrasts. There is no couplet to form a compari- 
son. The only finish fight between the modern war ships of civilized 
nations has proven the prowess of American naval men and methods, 
and the glory is a legacy for the whole people. Our crews were all 
hoarse from cheering, and while we suffer for cough drops and throat 
doctors we have no use for liniment or surgeons. 

To every ship, otilcer, aiul crew all praise be given. As Victoria was 
answered years ago, "Your ]\Iaiesty, there is no second," so may I report 
to your Department as to our war ships conquering the Spanish fleet 
in the battle of Manila Bay: There is no first; there is no second. The 
cool bravery and efticiency of the commodore was echoed by every 
captain and commander and down through the lines by every oflicer 
and man, and naval history of the dawning century will be rich if it 
furnishes to the world so glorious a display ot intelligent command and 
successful service as must be placed to the credit of the United States 
Asiatic Squadron umler date of May 1, 1898. 

It was my lot to stand on the bridge of the Baltimore by the side of 
Captain Deyer during the first engagement, and to be called to the 
flagship Olympia by the commodore, at whose side, on the bridge, I 
stood during the second engagement. And when the clouds roll by, 
and I have again a settled habitation, it will be my honor and pleasure 
to transmit a report showing service somewhat in detail, and for which 
commanders promise data. 

^leanwhile our commodore will officially inform you of events which 
will rival in American history the exploits of Paul Jones. 
I have, etc., 

Oscar F. Williams, 
United States Consul, Manila^ Fhilipjjine Islands. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 327 

Mr. Williams to Jfr. Bay. 

Special.] Cruiser Baltimore, 

Consulate of the United States, 

Manila Bay, Opposite Cavite, 
Manila, FhiUppine Islands, May 12, 1898. 

Sir : To aid you, if possible, permit me to give assurance of the friend- 
liness of the Philippine natives to our country and to me as its 
representative. 

During the period of my residence in Manila, every week was a his- 
tory of barbarities by Spaniards, and of eftbrts, often futile, of the 
natives to obtain rights and protect their homes. 

Scores of times I have heard hopes expressed that either United 
States or Great Britain would acquire these islands. In all this foreign 
residents, other than Spanisli, concurred; and all such classes are 
most friendly to me. 

In the struggle between Spain and the insurgents, the deaths have 
been many and greater among the natives. First,because the Spaniards 
have been much better armed. Second, because the Spaniards killed 
many noncombatants, old men, women, and children, while the natives 
refrained from such barbarities. 

From consensus of opinions of many reliable people, I estimate 
Spanish forces here about as follows : 

First. Naval force, in ships annihilated in the notable battle of 
Manila Bay, in which ten Spanish war ships were burned and sunk- 
two auxiliary gunboats, ditto— and about thirty steamers, schooners, 

Secondl About 4,000 Spanish infantry, nearly a half of whom are in 
hospitals. 

Third. About 0,000 native troops under Spanish officers, but if such 
officers were deported their soldiers would eagerly follow our flag. 

An insurgent leader, Major Gonzales, reported to me last week on 
the Olympia, that they had 37,000 troops under arms, good and bad, 
surrounding Manila, endeavoring to cooi)erate with us. In tlie main 
they are very poorly armed, but have about 0,600 ritles taken from the 
Spaniards. They have captured the entire railroad line and the River 
Pasig, thus cutting oft" supply lines, while we by cutting oft" supply by 
bay and sea can soon starve Manila into surrender. 

These natives are eager to be organized and led by United States 
officers, and the members of their cabinet visited me and gave assur- 
ance that all would swear allegiance to and cheerfully follow our flag. 
They are brave, submissive, and cheaply provided for. 

To show their friendliness for me as our nation's only representative 
in this part of the world, I last week went on shore at Cavite with 
British consul, in his launch, to show the destruction wrought by our 
fleet. As soon as natives found me out, they crowded around me, hats 
off, shouting "Viva los Americanos," thronged about me by hundreds 
to shake either hand, even several at a time, men, women, and children 
striving to get even a finger to shake. So I moved half a mile, shak- 
ing continuously with both hands. The British consul, a smiling 
spectator, said he never before saw such an evidence of friendship. 
Two thousand escorted me to the launch amid huriabs of good feeling 
for our nation, hence I must conclude: 

First. Our squadron can force surrender in a day. Spaniards are all 
cooped up in Manila. 



328 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Second. Spanish ofHcers of native regiments away, these (5,000, 
togetlier with sck^ctions from the 37,000 insurgents, can give us ample 
laud fonte, and can be well armed with ritles of Spanish soldiers and 
from barracks and arsenals. 

Third. Few United States troops will be needed for conquest and 
fewer still for occupancy. Expulsion of Spaniards, naval, civil, mili- 
tary, and clerics, will remove all discord and danger, and civil govern- 
ment, crude in the beginning but better than the present, will be easy 
and be well received, while native priests, of which there are many, 
can fully and with perfect acceptability meet all religious requirements 
so far as present established religion is concerned. 

All natives, all foreig'ners other than Si)anish, and certain Spaniards 
in mercantile and retired life will aid us to every extent. The people 
crave a change of flag. Hence I believe ample assurances are at hand 
that civil government by us will be easy of organization and gratefully 
received by the people. 

31y communications to your Department are, these war days, suijra 
consular, but on other lines I endeavor to serve our fleet and thus serve 
our nation. 

All rejoice over the merited promotion of our commodore to the rank 
of rear-admiral, but every man of the fleet proved a hero, and it seems 
as if the shield of Providence warded ofl' the enemy's shot, leaving our 
men unharmed, our ships and guns intact, and gave us the most impor- 
tant and unique victory of history. 

The student of the next century will read with pride that the right 
arm of Spain was broken at the battle of "Manila Bay," and from this 
must come the acquisition of these islands, many times more extensive, 
more populous, and more valuable than Cuba, or else their capture will 
force Spain to conditions of peace on basis of honor, so much sought 
by our nation. 

I have, etc., Oscar F. Williams, 

United JStates Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay. 

Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, 

Consulate of the United States, 

Manila Bay, off Cavite, 
Manila, Philippine Islands, May 34, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to report successful efforts on the part of the 
insurgents of these islands in preparation for more successful war 
against Spain. 

Officers have visited me during the darkness of night to inform the 
fleet and me of their operations, and to report increase of strength. 

At a conference with General Aguinaldo, the head of the movement, 
I was told that they had now above 4,500 Mauser rifles taken from the 
Spaniards, and had also abundant ammunition. Until the present they 
have been fatally cri])])led in these respects. 

Last week Major (ionzales captured two buffalo cart loads of rifle 
ammunition froin the Spaniai'ds. To day I executed a power of attor- 
ney whereby General Aguinaldo releases to his attorneys in fact 
$400,000, now in bank in Hongkong, so that money therefrom can pay 
for 3,000 stand of arms bought there and exi)ected here to-morrow. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 329 

The same sources informed me that about 37,000 insurgents stand 
ready to aid United States forces, and General Aguinaldo's headquar- 
ters were this a. m. at 7 o'clock surrounded by 500 to 1,000 men eager 
to enlist. I was there at that hour and saw the men. 

My relations with all are cordial, and I manage to keep them so pro 
bono publico. 

AVlien General Merritt arrives be will find large auxiliary land forces 
adapted to his service and used to this climate. 
I am, sir, 

Oscar F. Williams, 

United States Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, 

Consulate of the United States, 
Manila, Philippine Islands, June 16, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that since our squadron destroyed 
the Spanish fleet on May 1, the insurgent forces have been most active 
and almost uniformly successful in their many encounters with the 
crown forces of Spain. General Emilio Aguiualdo, the insurgent chief, 
who was deported late in 1897, returned recently to Cavite and resumed 
direction of insurgent forces. He is uot permitted by his people to 
personally lead in battle, but from headquarters governs all military 
movements. He told me today that, since his return, his forces had 
captured nearly 5,000 prisoners, nearly 4,000 of whom were Spaniards, 
and all of whom had rifles when taken. General Aguiualdo has now 
about 10,500 rifles and 8 fieldpieces, with 8,000 more rifles, 2 Maxim 
guns and a dynamite gun bought in China and now in transit. The 
insurgents have defeated tbe Spaniards at all points except at fort 
near Matate, and hold not only North Luzon to the suburbs of Manila, 
but Batanyes Province also and the bay coast entire, save the city of 
Manila. 

While the Spaniards cruelly and barbarously slaughter Filipinos 
taken in arms, and often noncombatants, women, and children, the 
insurgent victors, following American examj)le, spare life, protect the 
helpless, and nurse, feed, and care for Spaniards taken prisoners and 
for Spanish wounded as kindly as they care for the wounded fallen from 
their own ranks. 

For future advantage I am maintaining cordial relations with General 
Aguiualdo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces when treat- 
ing for their return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council to 
form provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought best 
to decline. A form of government was adopted, but General Agui- 
ualdo told me to-day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines 
would be held as a colony of United States of America. 

It has been my eflbrt to maintain harmony with insurgents in order 
to exercise greater influence hereafter when we reorganize government. 

Manila is hemmed in; foreigners other than Spaniards have, by kind- 
ness of Rear- Admiral Dewey, been allowed to leave the beleaguered city 
and are cared for on merchant ships in the bay. 

The Baltimore leaves early to-morrow to meet the troop ships north- 
east of Luzon, and incidentally to reconnoiter Dagupan Bay, the north- 
ern terminus of the Manila railroad, for Spanish cruisers and merchant 
ships. 



330 TREATY OF PEACE. 

We are impatient, made doubly so by tlie miraculous battle of May 
l,whicli after inspectiou of w;iteis and wrecks proved to be more signal 
than detailed in my dispatch on that subject. ' 

The Spanish tleet, comprised of the followinji' vessels, was annihilated 
so iar as Spain is concerned, viz: Cruiser (flagship) Rcina Christina, 
cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa, cruiser Don Juan de Austria, cruiser 
Isle de Cuba, cruiser Isle de Luzon, gunboat General Lezo, gunboat 
Alarqucs del Buero, gunboat Velasco, gunboat Argos, and armed trans- 
port Isle de Mindanao. 

The above destroyed and sunk; the armed transport Manila was 
captured and soon appears as a United States cruiser, and the cruiser 
Gallao has since been captured and augments our fleet. 

The superb cruisers Isle de Cuba and Isle de Luzon were almost 
uninjured when sunk, by scuttling, to defeat capture. These are 
rich prizes which, later on, I hope to see flying our flag. We have 
had neither death nor serious sickness since we came. Manila is at the 
mercy of our fleet, and I believe its capture may be effected, so far as 
the fleet's part is concerned, without the loss of a man or the disabling 
of a vessel. Kear- Admiral Dewey only awaits troops to insure order 
and good government once we are in possession. We fear the city 
may fall too soon. For this reason Admiral Dewey asked me to remain 
here, where he could command such service as I may be able to render 
in event of his taking the city. 

I exi)ect that on July 4 we will celebrate in Manila under the folds 
of "Old Glory," and write in living letters a page of history that this 
magnificent insular empire has become a part and parcel of the United 
States of America. 

I have the honor, etc., Oscar F. Williams, 

United States Consul. 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Williams. 

No. 18.] Washington, August 4, 1898. 

Sir : I have to acknowledge the receipt of your special dispatch of 
the 16th of J une last, copy of which has been sent to the Secretary of 
War and the Secretary of the Navy. Your course, while maintaining 
amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from any partici- 
pation in the adoption of their so-called provisional government, is 
approved. 

Respectfully, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant Secretary, 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay. 

Si)ccial.] U. S. S. Baltimore, Manila Bay, 

Manila, Philijypine Islands, July 2, 1898. 

Str: I have the honor to report the arrival here on June 30 of 2,500 
United States troops under command of General Anderson, the flotilla 
being convoyed by the Charleston. 

To General Anderson and all I am rendering every possible assist- 
ance, and have been asked by him to treat with General Aguinaldo as 
to American interests. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 331 

We await second flotilla, and also Monterey, but may take Manila 
to-morrow. 

The health of men, naval and military, is excellent; all eager for 
great results, Cavite and navy-yard have been put in excellent sani- 
tary condition and soldiers are most comfortably quartered. 

Weather is superb for the latitude — mercury hovering about 80° to 
85° in the shade during day, with cooler nights. Frequent rains make 
air pure and climate healthful. 

En route the Charleston made conquest of the Ladrone group of the 
Philippine Islands by taking Guam and bringing away its government 
ofhcials and Spanish residents as prisoners of war. 

If long occupation or possession on the part of our Government be 
considered, I believe early and strenuous efforts should be made to 
bring here from the United States men and women of many occupa- 
tions — mechanics, teachers, ministers, shipbuilders, merchants, elec- 
tricians, plumbers, druggists, doctors, dentists, carriage and harness 
makers, stenographers, typewriters, photographers, tailors, blacksmiths, 
and agents for exporting — and to introduce American products, natural 
and artificial, of many classes. To all such I pledge every aid, and now 
is the time to start. Good government will be easier the greater the 
influx of Americans. 

My dispatches have referred to our present percentage of export 
trade. If now our exports come here as interstate duty free, we have 
practical control of Philipinne trade, which now amounts to many mil- 
lions, and because of ingrafting of American energy and methods upon 
the fabulous natural and productive wealth of these islands can and 
probably will be multiplied by twenty during the coming twenty years. 
All this increment should come to our nation, not go to any other. 
Those who come early will reap great rewards and serve patriotic pur- 
pose at the same time, while their prompt and successful work will fur- 
nish outlet for the glut of United States products. Each American 
concern in each of the hundred ports and populous towns of the Phil- 
ippines will be a commercial center and school for tractable natives 
conducive to good government on United States lines. Spanish or 
native language not essential. With Spaniards expelled, it should 
apply that our language be adopted at once in court, public office, 
school, and in newly organized churches, and let natives learn English. 

I hope for an influx this year of 10,000 ambitious Americans, and all 
can live well, become enriched, and patriotically assist your represent- 
atives in the establishment and maintenance of republican government 
on these rich islands so extensive in area as to form an insular empire. 

I hope in your own good way my idea may be effectively placed 
before the American peo}>le. 

I have the honor, etc., O. F. Williams, Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, 

[Special.] 

Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, 
U. 8. S. Baltimore^ Manila Bay, August 4, 1898. 
Sir : It has been my study to keep on pleasant terms with General 
A^guinaldo for ultimate objects. By so doing I have avoided certain 
troubles and aided our forces. Admiral Dewey says I have planted 
the seeds of cordial cooperation. 



332 TREATY OF PEACE. 

My argument with General Aguinaldo lias been that the conditions 
of goveriinieiit by U. S. A. in the Pliilip])iue Islands would be vastly 
better lor him and his j)eople in honor, advancement, and i^rofits than 
could exist under any plan iixed by himself aud Filipinos. 1 have 
traversed the entire ground of government, with him in council, and he 
has called his officials from liftecn provinces to meet me for their dis- 
cussion, all stated as friendly but unofficial on my part. Our relations 
are coidial. while certain antagonisms have arisen between the general 
a^d certain other Americans. 
I hope to bring about harmony and cooperation for mutual good, 
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, 

Oscar F, Williams, 
United States Consul, Manila, Fhili])inne Islands. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay. 

[Special.] 

Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, 
U. 8. S. Baltimore, Manila Bay, Aiajust 5, 1898. 

Sib : Because of my isolation and of your many duties I have left 
to representatives of our Navy and Army much of the duty of corre- 
spondence. 

Presumably when Manila falls and the Philippine Islands become by 
cou(piest a part of our national douiain. my duties as consul will end. 
In view of such probabilities I seek your appointive favor, and with 
pride recall to your mind the report of the then Commodore Dewey, 
made to Secretary Long and by him transmitted to you — this under date 
of April 18 — says of me : "His assistance has been invaluable." This 
report was made before I ever saw tbe admiral, and made without my 
knowledge, and I know that my services to our Navy, Army, citizens, 
and nation have since been much greater than before. 

Your commendations of my sei vice have been most gratifying to me, 
and because of narrow resources I hope to have honorable iuid proti table 
station here or elsewhere in the United States public service. Could I 
be appointed general commissionerof customs of the Philippine Islands, 
light-house insjiector, or general commissioner of agriculture, I should 
be honored and pleased. For many years I have made special study of 
tariffs and economic questions; have translated the Philippine tariff, 
and so have a measure of fitness. Th( n I was reared a farjuer, and my 
business interests having always been along such lines, I have ke])t 
fully abreast with agricultural matters. Am a graduate of Cornell 
University, and for above twenty years was a teacher, lecturer, and 
author, and might well serve as superintendent of public instruction. 

I need your recognition, aud hope by cable or otherwise to have relief 
from present anxieties. 

1 have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, 

OscAK F. Williams, 
United States Consul, Manila, rhilij)pine Islands. 



TREATY OF PEACE, 333 

Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay, 

[Telegram.] 

Manila, September 5, 1898, (Eeceived 10.20 a. m.) 
To-clay delegation from 4,000 Viscayan soldiers, also representing 
southern business interests, came to me pledging loyalty to annexation. 
Several insurgent leaders likewise. Spain can not control; if we evac- 
uate, anarchy rules. 

Williams. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Day. 

No. 19.] Hongkong, November 3, 1897. 

Sir: Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called upon several 
times by Mr. F. Agon cilia, foreign agent and high commissioner, etc., of 
the new republic of the Philippines. 

Mr. Agoncilla holds a commission, signed by the president, members 
of cabinet, and general in chief of the republic of Philippines, empow- 
ering him absolutely with power to conclude treaties with foreign 
governments. 

Mr. Agoncilla offers on behalf of his government alliance offensive 
and defensive with the United States when the United States declares 
war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon. 
In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some port in 
the Philipi)ines 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition 
for the use of his government, to be paid for on the recognition of his 
government by the United States. He pledges as security two 
I)rovinces and the custom-house at Manila. 

He is not particular about the price — is willing the United States 
should make 25 per cent or 30 i)er cent profit. 

He is a very earnest and attentive dijjlomat and a great admirer of 
the United States. 

On his last visit he surprised me with the information that he had 
written his government that he had hopes of inducing the United 
States to supply the much-needed guns, etc. 

In case Senor Agoucilla's dispatch should fall into the hands of an 
unfriendly power and find its way into the newspapers, I have thought 
it wise to apprise the State Department of the nature of the high com- 
missioner's proposals. 

Seiior Agoncilla informs me by late mail that he will proceed at once 
to Washington to conclude the proposed treaty, if I advise. 

I shall not advise said step until so instructed by the State Depart- 
ment. 

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 

ROUNSEVILLE WiLDMAN, ConsU . 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Wildman. 

No. 23.] Washington, December 15, 1897. 

Siu : I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 19 of 
November 3, 1897, in which you announce the arrival at your post of 
Mr. F. Agoncilla, whom you describe as foreign agent and high ctyn- 



33-4 TREATY OF PEACE. 

missioner of the new republic of the Philippines, and who holds full 
power to negotiate and conclude treaties with foreign powers. Mr. 
Agoncilla offers an alliance ''ofiensive and defensive with the United 
States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. 
Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon," and suggests that 20,000 
stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition be supplied to his 
government by that of the United States. 

You may brieriy advise Mr. Agoncilla, in case he should call upon 
you, that the Government of the United States does not negotiate such 
treaties and that it is not possible to forward the desired arms and 
ammunition. 

You should not encourage any advances on the part of Mr. Agoncilla, 
and shoulil courteously decline to communicate with the Department 
further regarding his alleged mission. 
Kespectfully, yours, 

Thos. W. Cridlee, 
Third Assistant Secretary. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Day. 

No. 42.] Consulate of the United States, 

HongTcong, May 6, 1898. 

Sir: Supplementary to my cable of this date, I have the honor to 
inclose, by request, statement of Don Dorotes Cortes, Don Maximo 
Cortes, and Dona Eustaquia, wife of Don Maximo; also like statement 
of Arcadio Kosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and Don Jose Maria Basa, all very 
wealthy landholders, bankers, and advocates of Manila. 

They desire to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of their 
powerful families in Manila to the United States. They have instructed 
all their connections to render every aid to our forces in Manila. 

The letters to the President, inclosed, explain themselves. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

EOUNSEVILLE WiLDMAN, Consul. 



Mr. Gridler to Mr. Wildman. 

No. 42.] June 16, 1898. 

Sir: The Department has received your dispatch No. 42, of the 6th 
ultimo, reporting that a number of intluential families of Manila desire 
to tender their allegiance to the United States. 

In reply I have to inform you that a copy has been sent to the War 
Department, with the suggestion that the information be conveyed to 
General Merritt. 

Respectfully, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant Secretary. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Bay. 

No. 43.] Consulate of the United States, 

Hongkong, May 14, 1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to inclose, by request, the statements of 
Severino Kotea, Claudio Jjopez, A. H. Marti, and Eugenia Plona, all 
wealthy and prominent landholders of the Philippine Islands. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 335 

They desire to submit tbeir allegiance and the allegiance of their 
families in the Philippine Islands to the United States. 
The letters to the President inclosed explain themselves. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

ROUKSEVILLE WiLDMAN, 

C'Onsul. 



To the President of the United States of North America : 

Severino Rotea and Lopez, proprietor and farmer, native of Negros 
Oriental (Visayas), Philippine Islands, with great consideration exposes: 
Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal and 
rightful nation of the United States, he willingly adheres to the Gov- 
ernment in annexing his country, and it will be for him a great honor 
to be joined it as soon as an additional star to the victorious tiag of the 
United States of America and considered him as one of its citizens. 
Hongkong, May 11, 1898. 

(Signed) Severino Eotea. 

To the President of the United States of America : 

Claudio Lopez, merchant and proi)rietor and vice-consul of Portugal 
at Iloilo, native of the Philippine Islands, emigrant to this colony of 
Hongkong for political causes, exposes with great consideration: 

Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal and 
rightful nation of the United States of America, he, for the present, 
adheres to the Government in annexing his country, and considers that 
it will be for him a great honor to join his country as an additional star 
to the always victorious flag of the United States of America and 
to count him as one of its citizens. 

Hongkong, 9th May, 1898. 

(Signed) Claudio Lopez. 



To the President of the United States of America : 

We, the subscribers, natives of the Philippine Islands, emigrants to 
this colony, for political causes, with great cousideration expose: 

Having known the history and the Constitution of the noble, liberal, 
and rightful nation of the United States of America, for the present, 
they adhere to the Government, considering that it will be for them a 
great honor to join their country as an additional star to the always 
victorious flag of the United States of America and considered them 
as its citizens. 

(Signed) A. H. Marti. 



To the President of the United States of North America: 

Eugenia Plona and Padillo, proprietor and farmer, native of Negros 
Occidental (Visayas), Philipj)ine Islands, and emigrant to this colony 
for political causes, with great consideration, exposes: 

Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal 
and rightful nation of United States, he willingly adheres to the Gov- 
ernment in annexing his country, and it will be for him a great honor 
to be joined it as an additional star to the always victorious flag of the 
United States of North America and considered him as one of its 
citizens. 

Hongkong, May 10, 1898. 

(Signed) Eugenia Plona. 



336 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Wildman to Mr. Bay. 

[Telegram received in cipher.y 

Hongkong, May 19, 1898. (Keceived 19tli — 4.55 a. m.) 
Day, WasJiingtoit : 

This answers Long's cable to Dewey. From best information obtain- 
able Dewey can not reply under week. Twenty-one thousand Spanish 
troops, of which 4,000 native, L>,000 volunteers. All but 1,000 at Manila. 
They have ten mountain guns; no large held artillery; proven last 
rebellion not practicable, l^lenty good ponies, 12 hands high. iSTo food 
Philippines but rice. Large supply of ritles should be taken for insur- 
gent allies. 

Wildman. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore. 

No. G3.] Consulate of the LTnited States, 

EonglwHf/, July 18, 1898. 

Sir: I am taking the liberty of calling your attention to the continu- 
ous repetition of telegraphic intbruiatiou reacliing this port that it is 
the policy of the United States Government to allow the Philippine 
Islands to return to Spain on the conclusion of the war. 

Without placing any reliance in these statements, 1 desire to use 
them as a text upon which to respectfully submit the result of my 
experience with the leaders of the present Philippine insurgents, aud 
to suggest the utter impossibility of Spain, even with the aid of the 
United States, ever regaining a foothold on these islands. 

1 have lived among the Malays of the Straits Settlements and have 
been an honored guest of the different sultanates. I have watched 
their system of government aud have admired their intelligence, and I 
rank them high among the semicivilized nations of the earth. The 
natives of the Philippine islands belong to the Malay race, and while 
there are very few pure Malays among tbeir leaders, I think their stock 
has rather been improved than debased by admixture. I consider the 
forty or fifty Philippine leaders, with whose fortunes I have been very 
closely connected, both the sui)eriors of the Malays aud the Cubaus. 
Aguinaldo, Agoncilla, and Saudico are all men who would all be lead- 
ers in their separate departments in any country, while among the 
wealthy Manila men, who live in Hongkong and who are spending 
their money liberally for the overthrow of the Spaniards and the annex- 
ation to tiie United States, men like the Cortes family and the Basa 
family, would hold their own among bankers and lawyers anywhere. 

1 believe I know tlie sentiments of the political leaders and of the 
moneyed men anion g tlie insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to 
the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United 
States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States decides 
to decline the sovereignty of the islands. lu fact I have had the most 
prominent leaders call on me aud say they would not raise one finger 
unless 1 couhl assure them that the United States intended to give them 
United States citizenship if they wished it. In my opinion, S])ain with 
the aid of the entire world can never i-eestablish licrself, outside of a 
few of the large cities. An attempt at reconquest would reduce the 
islands to a state of anarchy, and reduce them to a level of Acheeu. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 337 

There has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Agui- 
naldo and his cabinet, on account of the questionable terms of their 
surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month. It has been said 
that they sold their country for gold, but this has been conclusively 
disproved, not only by their own statements but bj^ the speech of the 
late Governor-General Eivera in the 8i)anish Senate June 11, 1898. 
He said that Aguinaldo undertook to submit if the Spanish Govern- 
ment would give a certain sum to the widows and orphans of the 
insurgents. He then adndts that only a tenth part of this sum was 
ever given to Aguinaldo, and that the other promises made he did not 
find it expedient to keep. 

1 was in Hongkong Sei)tember, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders 
arrived under contract with the Spanish Government. They waited 
until the 1st of November for the payment of the promised money and 
the fultillment of the promised reforms. Only 8400,000, Mexican, was 
ever placed to their credit in the banks, and on the 3d of November Mr. 
F. Agoncilla, late minister of foreign aft'airs in Aguinaldo's cabinet, 
called upon me and made a i)roposal which I transmitted to the State 
Depai tment in my dispatch No. 19, dated November o, 1897. In reply 
the State Hepartment instructed me '• to c(»urteously decline to com- 
municate with the Department further regarding the alleged mission." 
I obeyed these instructions to the letter until the breaking out of the 
war when, alter consultation with Admiral Uewey, I received a dele- 
gation from the insurgent Junta, and they bound themselves to obey 
all laws of civili/ed warfare and to place themselves absolutely under 
the orders of x\dmiral Dewey if they were permitted to retnrn to Manila. 
At this time their ])resideut, Aguinaldo, was in Singapore negotiating 
through Consul General Pratt with Admiral Dewey for his return. 

On April -!7, in company with Consul O. F. Williams, we received 
another delegation, composed of Senor Sandigo, Jose Maria Basa,Tomas 
Mascardo, Lorenzo L. Zialcita, Andres E. de Garchitoiena, Manuel 
Malvar, Mariano Llanza, Salvatore Estrella. We agreed on behalf of 
Dewey to allow two of their number to accompany the fleet to Manila, 
consequently on the same day I took in the tug luotie Alizandrino and 
Garchitorena, accompanied by Mr. Sandico, to the OJympia in Mir's 
Kay. On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediatelj'^ 
called on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from 
Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States ship 
jMcCnlloch, and I put him aboard in the night so as to save any compli- 
cations with the local Government. Immediately on the arrival of 
Aguumldo at Cavite he issued a proclamation, which I had outlined for 
him before he left, forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offense 
to maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of which 
he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he hoped to maintain 
control over the natives, and from that date until the present time he 
has been uninterruptedly successful in the held and dignified and just 
as the head of his government. According to his own statements to 
nu^ by letter, iie has been approached by both the Spaniards and the 
Germans, and has had tempting offers made him by the Catholic 
(Jhnrch. He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Con- 
sul W^illiams, and his own junta here in Hongkong, and nothing of 
moment has occurred which would lead any one to believe that he was 
not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in this consulate. 

The insurgents are fighting for freedom from the Spanish rule, and 
rely upon the well known sense of justice that controls all the actions 
of our Government as to their future. 

T P 22 



338 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In conclusion, I wish to put myself on record as stating that the 
insurgent government of the Philippine Islands can not be dealt with 
as though they were jS^orth American Indians, willing to be removed 
from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the 
United States decides not to retain the Philippine Islands, its 10,000,000 
people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign 
nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the 
same spirit with which they fought the Spaniards. 
1 have the honor, etc., 

EOUNSEVELLE WiLDMAN, 

Consul- General. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Wildman. 



[Telegram sent.] 



Department of State, 

Washington^ August 6", 1898. 
Wildman, Consul, Hongkong: 

If you wrote Aguinaldo, as reported by Hongkong correspondent 
Daily Mail, your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make 
pledges or discuss policy. 

Moore. 



[Telegram received in cipher.] 

Hongkong, August 8, 1898. (Received 9.10 a. m.) 
Moore, Woshington : 

Never made pledges or discussed policy of America with Aguinaldo 
further than to try and hold him to promises made before Dewey took 
him (to) Cavite, believing it my duty, it being understood that my 
influence is good. If report contrary, I disavow it. Wildman. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore. 

No. 6G.J Consulate of the United States, 

Hongkong, August 9, 1898. 
Sir : On August 7 I received the following cablegram : 

Washington, August 7, 189S. 
Wildman, Consul, Hongkong : 

If j'^ou wrote Aguinaldo as reported by Hongkong correspondent Daily Mail, your 
action is disapi^roved, and you are forbidden to make pledges or discuss policj'. 

Moore. 
To which I replied on August 8, 1898 : 

MooRK, Waslnuglon : 

Never made jtlcdges or discussed policy of America with Aguinaldo further than 
to try and hold liinito promises made before Dewey took him (to) Cavite, believing 
it my duty, it being understood that my influence is good. If report contrary, I 
disavow. 

Wildman. 

I feel it only justice to myself to make some explanation regarding 
the numerous newspaper rei)orts that go from this city, and to the 
many opinions that are x>ut into my mouth regarding the conduct of 



TREATY OF PEACE. 339 

the war by my friends of the press. I have never so far taken occasion 
to deny any of them, knowing that the Department woukl realize that, 
through the accidents of war and the geographical situation of Hong- 
kong, I have been placed in a position, through no desire of my own, 
which has made me a mark for the representatives of all the big news- 
papers of the world. 

In my dispatch, Xo. 63, of July 18, 1898, 1 tried to briefly outline the 
position Consul Williams and myself have taken toward the insur- 
gents. We believed that they were a necessary evil, and that if Agui- 
iialdo was placed in command, and was acceptable to the insurgents as 
their leader, that Admiral Dewey or General Merritt would have some 
one whom they could hold responsible for any excesses. The other 
alternative was to allow the entire islands to be overrun by small 
bands bent only on revenge and looting. We considered that Agui- 
naldo had more qualifications for leadership than any of his rivals. We 
made him no pledges and extriicted from him but two, viz, to obey 
unquestioningly the commander of the United States forces in the Phil- 
ippine Islands, and to conduct his warfare on civilized lines. He was 
in and out of the consulate for nearly a month, and I believe I have 
taken his measure and that I acquired some influence with him. I 
have striven to retain his influence and have used it in conjunction 
with and with the full knowledge of both Admiral Dewey and Consul 
Williams. 

Aguiualdo has written me by every opportunity, and I believe that he 
has been frank with me regarding both his actions and his motives. I 
do not donbt but that he would like to be President of the Philippine 
Kepublic, and there may be a small coterie of his native advisers who 
entertain a like ambition, but I am perfectly certain that the great 
majority of his followers, and all the wealthy educated Filipinos have 
but the one desire — to become citizens of the United States of America. 
As for the ui<iss of uneducated natives they would be content under any 
rule save that of the friars. My correspondence with Aguinaldo has 
been strictly of a personal nature, and I have missed no opportunity to 
remind him of his antebellum promises. His letters are childish, and 
he is far more interested in the kind of cane he will carry or the breast- 
plate he will wear than in the figure he will make in history. The 
demands that he and his junta here have made upon my time is excess- 
ive and most tiresome. He is a man of petty moods, and I have repeat- 
edly had letters from Consul Williams requesting me to write to 
Aguinaldo a friendly letter congratulating him on his success, and 
reminding him of his obligations. I do not care to quote Admiral 
Dewey, as his letters are all of a strictly personal nature, but I feel 
perfectly free to refer you to him as to my attitude and actions. I do 
not say this because I feel that I need to make any defense, but because 
I believe that the Daily Mail to which you refer in the above telegram 
has misconstrued my attitude, and placed me in a false position. 

I find on investigation that the letter you refer to as published in the 
LoTidon Mail was a personal one, written by me on July 25 at the request 
of Consul Williams, and on lines with which we have been working with 
Aguiualdo from the first. Aguinaldo had for some weeks been getting 
what Admiral Dewey called a ''big head," and writing me sulky, 
childish letters. In consequence I wrote him in part as follows : 

" Tf you stand shoulder to shoulder with our forces, and do not allow any small dif- 
ferences of opinioti and fancied slights to keep you from the one set purpose of 
freeing your island from the cruelties under which you claim it has been groaning 
for so many hundred years, your name in history will be a glorious one. There are 



340 TREATY OF PEACE. 

greater prizes in the world than being the mere chief of a revolution. Do not forget 
that the I'uited States undertook this war for the sole jmrpose of rolie\iug the Cubans 
from the cruelties under which they were sufleriug, and not for the love of com)uest 
or the hope of gain. Whatever the final dispositioiTof the conquered territory may 
be yon c:iu trust to the llnited States that justice and honor will control all their 
dealings Avith you. The first thin<;- is to throw off the Spanish yoke. Do not let 
anything interfere with this." 

If the newspapers can make anything out of this personal letter that 
looks like a i)le(l,i'e or aTii assumption on my ])art of powers that are not 
vested iu me, 1 must decline to accept their interpretation, and inso- 
much as Aguinaldo himself does not so construe it, i trust the Depart- 
ment will not coTisider that I have exceeded the bounds of discretion 
or embarrassed the Department in any way. 
1 have the honor, etc., 

EOUNSEVELLE WiLDMAN, 

Consul- General. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore. 



[Telegram received.] 



Hongkong, August 15, 1898. (Eeceived 3.20 a. m.) 
MoOEE, Washington: 

Spanish consnl received dispatch Sunday ordering surrender Manila. 
Shall I offer to deliver personally aiid save more delay? Believe can 
be of service to Dewey should Aguinaldo make trouble, 

Wildman. 



The above telegram from Wildman was answered by the Secretary 
thus: 

'^ Spanish consul should deliver dispatch in his own way. Take no 
action respecting Aguinaldo without specific directions from this 
Department." 



June 22, 1898. 
For the JSeoretary: 

Here are two dispatches from Mr. Pratt, consul-general at Singapore, 
respectively numbered 214 and 217. 

No. 214 incloses a copy of Mr. Pratt's confidential No. 212, to which 
you have already replied. 

It also incloses a copy of his No. 213, narrating his parting interview 
with General Aguinaldo. Mr. Pratt states that in this interview he 
enjoined upon General Aguinaldo the necessity, under Commodore 
Dewey's direction, of assuming absolute control over his lorces iu the 
PhilipY)ines, since no excesses on their part would bo tolerated by the 
United States, the President h.aving declared that the present hostili- 
ties with Si)ain were to be carried on in strict contormitj^ witli the prin- 
ciples of civilized warfare. IMr. Pratt states that to this injunction 
General Aguinaldo gave his full assent, assuring him that he intended, 
and was able, when in the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, 
in check and lead them on "as our commander should direcit.''' Gen- 
eral Aguinaldo, as Mr. Pratt reports, "further stated that he hoped 
the United States would assume protection of the Phili[)piues tor at 
least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government 
of their own, iu the organization of which he would desire American 



TREATY OF PEACE. 341 

advice and assistance." "These questions," says Mr. Pratt, "I told 
him I had no authority to discuss." This confirms Mr. Pratt's state- 
ment, in his recent telegram, that he confined his action to bringing 
General Aguiualdo and Commodore Dewey together. 

In his No. 217. of the 5th of May, he incloses an article from the Singa- 
pore Free Press containing an account of his conferences with General 
Aguiualdo. The statements in this article Mr. Pratt pronounces to he 
substantially correct, and it seems to be the source of the article which 
was published in the New York Herald the other day from Vancouver. 

These dispatches of Mr. Pratt seem to be covered by the instruction 
already sent him, which stated that it was proper for him to obtain the 
unconditional personal assistance of General Aguiualdo, but not to make 

any political pledges. t -d ht 

J. Jt3. M, 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

No. 214.1 Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore,- May 1, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to submit the inclosed copies of my reports, 
Nos. 212 and 213, of the 28th and 30th ultimo, respectively, regarding 
my action in arranging for the cooperation with the American forces of 
General Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the insurrectionary movement in 
the Philippines, and departure of the latter to join Commodore Dewey. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. 

[Confidential.] 

No. 212.1 Consulate-General of the United States, 

Si)i(japore, April 28, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th instant, 
and confirmed in my dispatch No. 211 of that date, a telegram, which 
decii)hered read as follows : 

Skcretary of Statk, Washington : 

General Aguiualdo gone my iust.auce Hougkong arrange with Dewey cooperation 

insurgents Manila. „ 

Pratt. 

The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday the 23d instant, I 
was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme 
leader of the Philippine insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. 
H. W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who. after fifteen 
years' residence as a merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been 
compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish 
misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom 1 had 
previously obtained much valuable information for Commodore Dewey 
regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the 
islands. 

Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the 
insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over 
them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once 



342 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to see bini, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly 
arranged for the following morning, Siinday^the 24tli, in which, besides 
General xVguinahlo, were only present the General's trusted advisers 
and JMr, Bray, who acted as interjjreter. 

At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of 
and object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary move- 
ment, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, 
I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to 
speak for the Government, to point out the danger of continuing inde- 
pendent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expe- 
diency of cooperating with our Heet, then at Hongkong, and obtained 
the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with 
Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I tele- 
graphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our consul- 
general at Hongkong: 

Aguiualdo, iusuryeiit leuiler, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commo- 
dore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph. 

Pratt. 

The Commodore's reply reading thus: 

Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. 

Dewey. 

I received it late that night, and at once communicated to General 
Aguinaldo, who, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, all under 
assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer 
Malacca., which left here on Tuesday the 2()th. 

Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview with 
(Jeneral Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you by next 
mail. 

The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and cour- 
age, and worthy the confidence that had been placed in him. 

I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the com- 
mander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of action and 
facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines. 

If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval, as I 
trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I con- 
sider there is due some special recognition for most valuable services 
rendered. 

How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide. 
I have, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United IStates Consul- General. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

No. 213.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

iSlnoajJore, April 30, 1898. 
Sir: Iteferring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, I have 
the honor to report that in the second and last interview I had with 
Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong, I 
enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, 
of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no 
excesses o\\ their part would be tolerated by the American Govern- 
ment, the President having declared that the present hostilities with 
Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles of 
civilized warfare. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 343 

To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he 
intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, 
the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should 
direct. 

The general further stated that he hoped the United States would 
assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow 
the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organi- 
zation of which he would desire American advice and assistance. 
These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss. 
I have, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General, 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

Kg. 217.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, May 5, 1898. 

Sir: I regret to have to report that the circumstances attending the 
dei)arture from here of General Emilio Aguinaldo to join Commodore 
Dewey, which I had endeavored so hard to prevent being disclosed, 
were, in substance, made public in yesterday's edition of the Singa- 
pore Free Press, from the inclosed cojiy of which you will note, by 
reference to my reports Nos. 212 and 213 of the 28th and 30th ultimo, 
respectively, that though the facts are, in the main, correctly given, 
the dates are not quite accurate and a certain amount of conjecture 
has been indulged in as regards my action in the matter and that of 
the commodore. 

Almost immediately after the occurrence the editor of the above 
journal told me that he had been informed, but declined to say by 
whom. 

I endeavored to get him to promise to keep the whole afiair quiet, 
but, though he would not agree to this, he gave me his word not to 
mention it until after sufficient time should have elapsed to admit of 
General Aguinaldo's reaching Hongkong, which he must already have 
done. 

Hence no harm can come of the disclosure, and, though it is annoy- 
ing, I suppose I should rather congratulate myself that the secret pos- 
sessed by such a number was kept so long. 
I have, -etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



[Inclosure.*— The Singapore Free Press, Weduesday, May 4, 1893.] 

THE WAR— IMPORTANT rOITTICAL ARRANGEMENT— AGUINALDO IN SINGAPORE — AN 
INCOGNITO VISIT — HE JOINS ADMIRAL DEWEY — PLAN CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN 
CONSUL-GENERAL. 

.Just before the actual outbreak of liostilities between Spain and the United States 
Singapore has been the scene of a secret political arrangement by which Gen. Emilio 
Aguinaldo y Fami, the supreme head of the revolutionary movement in the Philip- 
pines, has entered into direct relations with Admiral Dewey, commander of the 
American squadron in China waters, while that officer was still at Hongkong. 

In order to understand and appreciate this interesting historical incident pro]'erly, 
it will be necessary to allude to the causes leading to the second ajipearance of the 
rebeliion iu the Philipjiines, which was almost coincident with, though not instigated 
by, the strnined relations between Spain and the United States. 

In December last General Primo de Rivera, who above all other Spanish geneTUi-ls 
has an intimate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, found the position 



344 TREATY OF PEACE. 

untenable for both parties. Neither of these had the remotest chance of terminat- 
ing the rebellion dfcisively, the rebels secure iu their mountain fastnesses, the 
Spaniards holding tlic chief towns and villages on tlie const. Primo de Rivera 
therclbre sent two wel)-known J'hilippine natives, occupying high positions in 
Manila, to jiiopose terms of peace to (Jeueral Aguinahlo in Biac-na-Bato. A coun- 
cil of the rcNolutionary government w;is hehl, in w hich it was agreed to lay down 
arms (»n condition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal of these 
were : 

1. The expulsion, or at least secularization, of the leligions orders, and the inhi- 
bition of tliese or<lers irom all oiliciai vetoes in civil ndministration. 

2. A general amnesty for all rebels, and guarantees for their jjcrsona! security and 
from ihe vengeance of the fViars and parish juiosts after rctur:iiiig to their homes. 

'A. u'adical reforms to curtail tlie glaring al)uscs in public administration. 

4. Freedom of the ))ress to denounce oliicial corruption and blackmailing. 

5. Kepresentatiou in the Spanish Parliament. 

6. Abolition of the iniquitous system of secret deportation of political suspects, etc. 

I'rimo de Rivera agreed to these reforms in sum and suljstance, but made it a con- 
dition that the principal rebel leaders must leave the country during His Majesty's 
])b^asure. As these had lost all their property or had had it confiscated and plun- 
dered, the Government agreed to provide them with funds to live iu a becoming 
manner on foreign soil. 

The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently secured, but no sooner 
had they done so and returned to their houses than the iutrausigeant religious orders 
comuuiiiced at once to again persecute them and trump up imaginary charges to pro- 
cure th(Mr rearrest. The .Spanish Government, on its side, imagining itself secure, 
desisted from carrying out the promised reforms, thinking anotiier trick like that 
played on the Cubans after tlie peace of Zanjon. arranged by Martinez Campos, might 
succeed. The Philij)pinos, however, with this business before them, refused to be 
made dupes of, and have taken up arms again, not aloue in the immediate districts 
round Manila but throughout the Archijielago, which merely awaits the signal from 
General Aguiualdo to rise en masse^ no doubt carrying with them the native troops 
hitherto l(»yal, and for which loy;il service they have received no thanks but only 
ingratitiule. 

Gen. Emilio Aguiualdo, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Col. Marcelo H. del 
Pilar, aiul his private secretary, Mr. J. l.cyba, arrived incognito in Singapore from 
Saigon on April 21, 1898. In Saigon, where Aguiualdo had remained for one 
week, he had interviews with one or two old Philippino friends now resident there. 
The special purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to consult other friends 
here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray, an old and intimate English friend, for fif- 
teen years resident in the Philippines, about the state of affairs in the islands gen- 
erally — ])articularly as to the possibility of war between the United States and Spain, 
and whether, in such an event, the United States would cventiuilly recognize the inde- 
pendence of the Philippines, provided he lent his cooperation to the Americans in 
the con([uest of the country. The situation of the moment was this, that the condi- 
tions of the honorable peace concluded on December 14, 1897, between President 
Aguiualdo, on behalf of the Philiii])iue rebels, and H. E. Governor-General Primo 
de Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out, although their immediate 
execution had been vouched for in that agrecjueut. 

These reforms would have provided protection to the peo))le against the organized 
oppressi(m ami rapacity of the rcligittus fraternities, woubl have secured improved 
civil and criminal procedure in ciuirts, and have guaranteed, in many ways, improve- 
ments in the fiscal and social conditions of the people. The repudiation by the Span- 
ish Government of these conditions, made by General Primo di Rivera, now left the 
rebel lc;id<'rs, who had for the most part gone to Hongkong, free to act. And it was 
in pursuance of that freedom of action that Aguiualdo again sought counsel of his 
friends in Saigon and Singapore, with a view to tlie immediate resumption of opera- 
tions in the Philippines. 

Meantime Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on matters connected with 
the Philip]tines has Ijeen very considerable, as our readers will ha\ e seen, was intro- 
duced by the editor of the Singapore Free Press to Mr. Spencer Pratt, consul-general 
of the United States, who was anxious, in view of contingencies, to leary as much 
as possible about the real condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after 
this that Aguiualdo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once met his friends, 
including Mr. Bray. 

Affairs now becoming more warlik«;, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. 
Spencer Pratt, eventually arranged an interview ])etween that gentleman and General 
Aguiualdo, which took place late on the evening of Sunday, the 24th April, at " The 
Mansion," River Valli y road. There were present on that occasion Gen. Emilio 
Aguinaldo y Fami, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general United States of America: 
Mr. Howard W. Bray: Aguinaldo's private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba; Col. M. H. del 
Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino Santos. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 345 

Dnriug this couferenoe. at which Mr. Bray acted as interpreter, General Aguinaldo 
.explained to the American cousul-^eneral, Mr. Pratt, the incidents and objects of 
the late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of the country. General 
Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail the nature of the cooperation he could give, in 
which he, in the event of the American forces from the squadron landing and taking 
possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order and discipline amongst the 
native troops ami inhabitants in the same humane way in which he had hitherto 
conducted the war, and prevent them from connnittiug outrages on defenseless 
Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and hoiforalde warfnre. He further declared 
his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles, and 
would be willing to accei)t the same terms for the country as the United States intend 
giving to Cuba. 

The consul-general of the United .States, coinciding with the general views 
expressed during the discussion, placed himself at (jnce in telegra])hic communica- 
tion with Admiral Dewey at Hongkong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent 
interchange of telegrams conse(iuently took place. 

As a result another private interview was arranjied at the American consular 
residence at the Raffles Hotel between General Aguinaldo, Mr. Spencer Pratt, Mr. 
Howard Bray, and Mr. Leylia, private secretary to General Aguinaldo. 

As a sequel to this interview, and in response to the urgent request of Admiral 
Dewey, General Agnintildo left Singapore for Hongkong by the first available 
steamer, the Peninsular and ()rient:«l Malacca, on Tuesday, the 26t.li April, at noon, 
accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private 
secretary. 

The only interview or conversation with any strangers that (General Aguinaldo 
had during his stay in Singapore other than the above interviews was during a 
visit paid by General Aguinaldo to Mr. W. G. St. Clair, editor of the Singapore Free 
Press, at the office of this journal. On that occasion General Aguinaldo was 
accompanied by Mr. Bray and Mr. Leyba. 

Throughout the whole stay of General Aguinaldo in Singapore the editor was kept 
fully informed dniiy of the progress of affairs. Naturally, however, all statement 
of what occurred has heen withheld by us until what has been deemed the lifting 
moment has arrived. 

The substance of the whole incident in its relations to the recent course of affairs 
in the Philip])ines has been very fully telegraphed by the editor both to New York 
and LondoH. 

The influence of the incident on the future of the Philippines may prove to be of 
a far-reaching historical character. 

AGUINALDO'S POLICY. 

General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose 
internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. Amer- 
ican protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which 
might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free 
to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese 
aliens who would compete with the industrial population of the country. There 
would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judicature of the country under 
exfterienced European law officers. Entire freedom of the press would be estab- 
lished, as well as the right of })ublic meeting. There would be general religious 
toleration, and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of the tyran- 
nical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil 
administration. Full provision would be given for the exploitation of the natural 
resources and wealth of the country by roads and railways, and by the removal of 
hindrances to enterprise and investment of capital. Spanish officials would be 
removed to a place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The 
preservation of public safety and order, and the checking of reprisals against Span- 
iards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the government in the new state of 
things. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. 

No. 223.] Consulate-GtENeral of the United States, 

Singapore^ May 20, 1898. 
Sir: I liave the honor to submit for your consideration a jiroclama- 
tion in Spanish, issued prior to the departure of our lieet for Manila 
by the insiirt^ent leaders in Hongkong', calling upon the Filipinos not to 
obey the appeal of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to rally 
in support of these, as they came as their friends and liberators. 



346 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Three copies of the English translation of the above I also inclose 
for han(liii<i' to the press, should that, in your opinion, seem advisable. 
I have the honor to be, 

E. Spencer Pratt, 

United Statea Consul- General. 



[Iiiclosure.] 
AMERICA'S ALLIKS — THE MANIFESTO OF THE FILIPINOS. 

The followiiij;- is a translation from the Spanish of a proclamation of the rebel 
leaiiers in Hongkong, sent over to the Philiijpines in advance of the American 
sqnailron : 

CoMi));itriots: Divine Providence is abont to ])lace independence within our reach, 
and in a, way the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for. 

The iinericans, not Irom mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and 
the lauicntations ot so many persecuted ]>eop]e, have considered it opportune to 
extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country, npw that they have been 
obliged to sever relations witli Spaiu, owing to the tyranny this nation is exercising 
in Cuba, causing enormous injury to the Americans, who have such large commercial 
and other interests there. 

At the preseut moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philip- 
pines. 

Wc, your brothers, are very much afraid that you may be induced to fire on the 
Americans. iS'o, brothers, never make this mistake. Rather blow your own brains 
out iliati tire a shot or treat as enemies those who are yonr liberators. 

Your natural enemies, your executioners, the authors of your misery and unhappi- 
ne-s, arc the Spaniards whogovern you. Ag;;inst these you must raise your weai)ons 
and odium ; understand well, against the Spaniards and never against the Americans. 

Take no notice of the decree of the Governor-General calling you to arms, although 
it may cost you your lives. Rather die than be ungrateful to our American liberators. 

The Governor-General calls you to arms. What for? To defend your Spanish 
tyrants .' To defend those that have des])ised you. and even in public speeches asked 
for .\ our extermination — those that have treated you little better than savages! No ! 
No! A thousand times no! 

Give a glance at history and you will see that all Spain's wars in Oceania have 
sacrificed Philippine blood. We have been put to light in Cochin-China to assist the 
French in an art'air tliat in no way concerned the Philippines. We were compelled 
to spill our blood by Simon do Anda against the English, who in any case would have 
made better rulers than the Spaniards. Every year our children are taken away to 
be sacriiiced in Mindanao and Sulu, on the jiretense of making us believe these 
people are our enemies, when in reality they are our brothers, like us fighting for 
tiieir independence. 

After having sacritlced our blood against the English, against the Annamites, 
against the people of Jlindauao, etc., what recompense or thanks have we received 
from the Spanish Government f Obscurity, poverty, the butchery of those dear to 
us. Enough, brothers, of this Spanish tutelage. 

Take note, the Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reenforcements 
coming from Si)ain : therefore we insurgents must attack by land. Probably you 
will have more than sufticient arms, because the Americans have arms and will find 
means to assist us. 

There, where you see tlie American Hag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our 
redeemers. 

Our unworthy names are as nothing, but one and all of us invoke the name of the 
greatest patriot our country has seen, in the sure and certain hope that his spirit will 
be with us in these moments and guide us to victory — our immortal .Jose Kizal. 



Mr. I'nitt to Mr. Day. 

No. 225.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

)Sin(/((pore, June ^, 1898. 
Sir: I have the lionor to subnut inclosed a t('h\t;iaiu from Honokong 
of the 2r)th ultimo, on the situation in the riiilippines, published in 
Singapore yesterday atteruoou, tlie 1st instant. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 347 

Considering the enthusiastic manner General Aguinaldo has been 
received by the natives and the confidence with which he already 
appears to have inspired Admiral Dewey, it will be admitted, I think, 
that 1 did not overrate his importance and that I have materially 
assisted the cause of the United btates in the Philippines in securing 
his cooperation. 

Wliy this cooperation should not have been secured to us during the 
months General Aguinaldo remained awaiting events in Hongkong, 
and that he was allowed to leave there witliout having been approached 
in the interest of our Government, 1 can not understand. 

No close observer of Avhat had transpired in the Philippines during 
the past four years could liave failed to recognize that General Agui- 
naldo enjoyed above all others the confidence of the Filipi»ino insur- 
gents and the respect alike of Spaniards and foreigners in the islands, 
all of whom vouched for his high sense of justice and honor. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



[Inclosure in dispatch No. 125.] 
[The Singapore Free Press. Wednesday, Jwne 1, 1898. Hongkong Telegraph, 25th.] 

THE WAR — THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES. 

The Japanese cruiser AMtsushlma arrived here yesterday from Manila, and the fol- 
lowing is the latest news: 

General Agninaldo arrived hy the McCitJloch on the 19th instant, and was received 
with great enthusiasm by the natives. 

Admiral Dewey was very much pleased with him, and has turned over to him two 
modern field pieces and 300 rifles, with plenty of ammunition. 

General Aguinaldo is now organizing an attack on the Spanish I^nd forces, and a 
decisive battle may be expected soon. 

The Manila papers are publishing sensational articles hourly, among which is that 
the U. S. S. Baltimore^ is so used up in the late engagement that the American admiral 
decided to scuttle her. 

The archbishop has assured the people that four Spanish battle ships are on their 
way out, and that God has informed him that in the next engagement the armies of 
the most Christian Spain will be victorious. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

No. 228.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, June 8, 1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to submit an article from the London Spec- 
tator, which was reproduced in the Singapore Free Press of yesterday, 
and a reply thereto, published to-day in the same paper, which last, 
I think, is deserving of special consideration as being the expression of 
opinion of Mr. H. W. Bray, one of the best authorities on the Philip- 
pines and the Filipinos. 

I have the honor to be, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General, 



348 TREATY OF PEACE. 

[Inclo8urol. — Singapore Free Preas, June 7, 1898.] 
THE KATE OF THE PHIMl'PIiHCS. 

We take it to be certain, iu s])ito of inteiTuption.s iu the teleftrapliic service, that 
Manila lias surrendered; that the Taj;al population will hold the larger Philippine 
Islands, subject to liuidanie Ironi leaders recognized by the Americans; and that the 
latter will never, whatever the ultimate issue ol' the war, hand the colony back to 
Spain, ihey are nioie governed by moral considerations than their enemies choose 
to think, and a conviction that Si)ani;!rds are incurably cruel, are, in fact, born 
in(|ni8itors, has sunk deeply into their minds. To an American the Spaniard, it 
should be remembered, is not tlie man of the Peninsular war, but the man who con- 
ciuered the Americas and so misgoverned them that his own people rose upon him 
in untiuenchable lury. The Americans will have, therefore, at the close of the war, 
to decide how their newly acquired ])roperty shall be disposed of, and already fierce 
jealousies and lar-reacliing ambitions have been awakened througliout Europe. 

America, it is said, will not keep the islands; and if they are to be sold, either for 
money or for territory, to Avhom are they to gof Their jiossesaion might disturb 
"the balance of pf)wer" in the far East. England, it is said, must not have them, 
because she has already too much; (jermany, because her designs upon China would 
thereby be facilitated ; Russia, because she would be too near Australia ; and France, 
because she may choose in the next war to act as Russia's obedient ally. .Japan, as 
a pagan power, is out of the question when two and a half millions of Christians 
have to be disposed of; and it is very doubtful whether Holland would undertake 
the laborious task of reducing the Philippines to order. She succeeds in Java after 
a fashion, and might make a heavy bid for a second tropical estate, but the attempt 
to form a eoli>nial army seems beyond her strength. She has been tiying through a 
whole generation to conquer Acheen, and the tiei-oe little Malay State holds her 
successfully a't bay. These arguments ;tnd many like them will be urged on the 
Americans by the chancelleries of Europe, which are already twittering with excite- 
ment and putting out little leelers, and looking at Manila like children at a cake 
which they want badly but think it decorous n(it to ask for or see. 

We think the Americans will keep the Philii)pines; we hope they will, most heart- 
ily, and we can show that they have the means of «loing so with little trouble to 
themselves. We think they will keep them l)ecause we think that the Auwricans 
will emerge from this war with new ideas and larger ambitions. They will have 
defeated a se(ou(b<>lass European State, and will feel acutely that as matters stand 
they would have l)een defeated by a tirst-class one. They could not have lought 
France, to say nothing of Great Britain, without sutfering great defeats at sea and 
enormous losses by land. That is not a position which suits the American temper, 
and Washington will therefore set itself to construct a tirst-class iron ilvct. They 
can do that at home with twice the rapidity of the .Japanese, because they have a 
hundred times the .Japanese command of money, and they can man the fleet when 
constructed by sweeping all the shiftless boys of the Union, as they are doing already, 
into great naval schools, one for each State. That licet once built, tlie desire for a 
position in the world equal to their position among nations, for islands as coaling 
stations, for posts of vantage if Europe threatens them, will induce, or, indeed, com- 
pel them to give np their idea of noninterventiou. which already, as we see, has 
given way the moment their deeper enH)tion8 are stirred. 

Already, before the war has well begun, they are threatening Culta, Porto Rico, 
Hawaii, and the Philippines, and as soon as it isover and thelleet built they will open 
the Nii!aragua Canal, claiming right of free passage through it for their battle ships, 
and change their Monroe doctrine into a direct and effective prote(;torate of the two 
Americas. They will, we believe, from the tirst hesitate to give up, the Philippines, 
partly because the islands provide admiral stations for their fleet, l)ut chiefly because 
they are determined that China, which is their liiggest natuial foreign market, shall 
not be (closed to tin^ir trade. They must be ready to strike, if need be, on the Chinese 
coast, and to strike hard; and seeing that, they will not give up islands which otter 
them impregnable defenses for their dockyards, tiuir coal vaults, and their arsenals. 
To retain them is, of course, to give up their traditional policy of noninterference iu 
the ]iolitics of the world; but we confess Ave have not much faith in self-denying 
jiolitics of that kind. To shakedown an ancient European throne is surely inter- 
ference with Europe of a delinite kind, and they are doing that already. The people 
of the United States have not realized their new y)ositi<>n yet, but when they do, we 
shall hear, we leel conlident, much less of nonintervention. 

We think Am<-rica will kec]) the I'hilippines ami we heartily hope it. She will 
govern them w(dl enough, much better than any power except ourselves, and we 
have more of the world's siirface than we can well manage. It is true that the posi- 
tion in the Pacific would be nuignilicent: that we can create a civil service by a 
mere advertisement iu the Gazette, the educated middle class thirsting for more 



TREATY OF PEACE. 349 

careers," and that we could garrison the islands with Sikhs and Afridis, to the 
delight of both, without risking a single bone of "Tommy Atkins," but we can not 
undertake to govern the whole dark world. The envy we excite is already too great, 
and tiie strain upon the mental power of those who govern is already excessive, so 
excessive thnt we fear there is alrcndy a faltering at the center of aflairs, produced 
not by timidity, but by a, just sense that for England to do anytliing anywhere is to 
stir the water which envelops the world and drive a wave upon some coast it is not 
intended to attack. 

It would be a relief if another English-speaking power would take up a portion 
of our task, and in taking it perform the duty of rejiaying something to the world 
which yields her such advantages. The "-weary Titan,"' in fact, needs an ally while 
traversing "the too vast orb othis fate," and the only ally whose aspirations, ideas, 
and language are like his own is the great Americ;in jteople. The Frenchnian is too 
tickle, the kussian too full of guile, and the C4erman too harsh in his treatment of all 
who do not think that to be drilled is the tirst, if not the only duty of man. 

We ho])e the Americans will keej) the Thilipinnes, and that they can keep them we 
have no doubt whr.tcver. Eurojic, to jjut the truth in its most brutal form, can not 
attack them without our ])erinission, and the constitntiunal ditticulty is all rubbish, 
as Congress can make laws for territories, or declare the islands to be held, like 
Bosnia, as lands "in temporary military occupation" of the United States. The 
Americans are not governing Manila to-day through the universal sulirage of the 
Tagals, and need not therefore govern it to-morrow, while as to the means of hold- 
ing the islands they have a resource of which no one has spoken hitherto, but to 
which, as an instrument of power, there is hardly a limit. No one doubts that the 
States can produce and train any amount of oflicers, and they have, like ourselves, 
the means of enlisting a large and effective Sepoy army. 

They have already 4,()0U or .5,000 negro troops who have distinguished themselves 
in the Indian wars, and who are now about to be dispatched to Cuba because they 
are "immune" from yellow fever. Nothing stops the Americans from raising the 
negro force to 20,000 men— there are now it, 000,000 of colored people under the Stars 
and Stripes— and with them holding the Philippines, Hawaii, and Porto Kico, pay- 
ing them out of local revenues. With such a garrison those islands would be as 
safe as drawing-rooms and as full of business as Broadway or the Strand. There is 
really no obstacle, for the prejudice of color, as tierce as it is in the States, would 
not operate against a colonial army, more especially if that army were a good one. 
And it would be a good one. The bravery of the trained negro is never questioned, 
he is accustomed not only to obey, but to respect white ofticers, and the tropical 
regions in which he would be stationed exactly snit not only his constitution, but 
his notion of that which constitutes happiness in life. Instead of remaining a source 
of weakness to the Union, he can he turned by wise and lenient management into an 
instrument of empire. 

We do not, be it observed, give way for one moment. to the theory that white men 
can not retain their energy in the tropics— nearly the whole of Brazil is within 
their limit; but if white Americans dislike service in lands so warm they have mil- 
lions of dark Americans who do not, and who are as proud of the greatness of the 
Republic, and, if deceutly treated, as faithful to its Hag, as any of their lighter 
brethren. The Americans are waking up to a perception of the value of this instru- 
ment of force, and when once they have fully realized it we shall hear little of their 
difficulty in garrisoning distant possessions inhabited by dark tribes. The Tagals 
will not feel insulted because the garrison which keeps their villages safe is only 
white at the top. 



[Inclosure 2— Singapore Free Press, June 8, 1898.] 
THE FATE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 

The author of the Spectator article quoted in your yesterday's issiie under the 
above heading has put forward one sensible proposition. His theories on other 
points may be all right, but I am afraid he has reckoned without his host. America 
has not yet conquered the Philippines— not by a long way — but will occupy them 
with the assistance and goodwill of the Filipinos. The possession of Manila no 
more means the possession of the Philippines than the possession of New York 
means the possession of America, and without this good will and assistance of the 
inhabitants I must beg leave to state that neither the United States nor any other 
nation could ever hope to take the Philippines, except with an army of 200,000 men 
or more, if even then, no matter what theorists may say to the contrary. The solu- 
tions which the European papers have been kind enough to put forward re the dis- 
posal of the Philippines may he dismissed with the words of General Augustin's 



350 TREATY OF PEACE. 

proclamation: "Vain designs, ridiculous boasts!" When the time comes I am 
iiulintd to think the inhabitants themselves are going to have the biggest say in 
this (iiiestiou, especially after the events of May 30 to June I last. 

S])aiii, with an army of 35,000 men fully armed, has Ireen able to do nothing against 
an aniiy of im])(rf'ectly organized Filipinos, who liave never disposed to more than 
600 rith'S. Yet nol)ody <aii taunt the Spanish soldier with want of valor, whilst his 
patient endurance of hardsiiips and privations, indifi'erent food, and entire absence 
of personal comforts give him the advantage over other Euroi)ean soldiers, who 
require an eflicient commissariat and transport department. In a country like the 
Pliili])])int's a soldier to be elective must be able to skip from crag to craglike a goat, 
■withont liindrancc or ]iaraphernalia, to be evenly matched with the inhabitants. 

'file I'agals will feel very much insulted if they try to garrison their villages by 
troops of the type proposed by the writer of the article under review. It would be 
a dangerous experiment. I would not advise the Americans or any one else to try. 
Such crass ignorance on the state of tlie Philippines and its inhaldtants exists on 
every side, that it is almost useless to try and explain to outsiders that the Philip- 
pines are as dilferent from British India, Ceylon, Pnrma, the West Indies, etc., as 
light is from darkness. The people are the most enlightened and vigorous branch 
of tlie Malay race, and have been Christians for centuries, in fact longer than the 
principles of the Keformation were established in Great Britain, and are the nearest 
akin to Europeans of any alien race, and it is simply ridiculous to imagine that 
eight to ten millions of such people can be bought and sold as an article of com- 
merce without first obtaining their consent. Let all those who are greedy for a slice 
of tlie archipelago ponder well over this before burning their fingers. 

To put them on a level with Sikhs and Afridis is simple nonsense. The nmch over- 
estimated Sikh would find his match pretty soon with the sturdy Philijipine native, 
and those who think difiereutly had better read what no less an authority than 
General Gordon says of his Philippine troops in the Taiping rebellion. 

Ko decent or respectable Filipino will tolerate any social relations with the pagan 
Chinese. 

The only possible solution of the Philippine question is an independent govern- 
ment, under Anjerican protection, and this is the policy I recommended General 
Aguinaldo and his compatriots to accept, and which will, no doubt, be carried out. 
Time w ill show. 

H. W. Bkay. 

Singapore, 8th June, 1898. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. 

No. 229.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singaporej June 9, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that this afternoon, on the occasion 
of the receipt of thenews of General Aguinaldo's recent successes near 
Manila, I was waited upon by the Pliilippine residents in Singapore aud 
presented an address which, though written in Spanish, was delivered 
in French, and which I accordingly replied to in that language. 

The reports of the proceedings sent me by the editors of the Singapore 
Free Press and Straits Times, both of whom were present, I submit 
herewith, with duplicates for the press should you consider their publi- 
cation desirable. 

The original address in Spanish was not left with me, but I am prom- 
ised it as soon as pro]ierly written out, and will then forward it. 

My reply, however, I can not forward, as it was not written, but extem- 
poraneous, and has been correcttly rendered from the French into English 
in the within reports, from which you will note that I avoided touching 
upon the question of our future policy re the Philippines. 
1 have the honor, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 351 

[Inclosnres.— The Straits Times, June 9.] 

MR. SPENCER PRATT SERENADED — MEETING OF FILIPINO REFUGEES AT THE UNITED 
STATES CONSULATE — THEY PRESENT AN ADDRESS TO MR. SPENCER PRATT AND DRINK 
TO AAIKRICA, ENGLAND, AND ADMIRAL DEWEY. 

The Ignited States consulate at Singapore was yesterday afternoon in an nnnsual 
state of bustle. That buhtle extended itself to Raflies Hotel, of wbicli the consulate 
forms an ontlyinn- part. From a period shortly prior to 5 o'clock, afternoon, the 
natives of the Philippines resident in Singapore began to assemble at the consulate. 
Their object was partly to present an address to Hon. Spencer Pratt, United 
States consul-general, and partly to serenade him, for which purpose some twenty- 
tive or thirty of the Filipinos came equipped with musical instruments. Ciradu- 
ally the crowd gathered in the vicinity of the United States consulate, and, alter a 
little quiet preliminary music. Dr. Santos, as representing the Philippine community 
in Singapore, proceeded to read the following address, which was originally drafted in 
Spanish and then transhited into French. The address was read in French, and the 
following is an English translation : 

THE ADDRESS. 

"To the Hon. Edivard Spencer Pratt, consul-general of the United States of North America, 

Singapore : 

"Sir: The Philipiiine colony resident in this port, composed of representatives of 
all social classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate repre- 
sentative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our 
eternal gratitude for the moral and material protection extended by Admiral Dewey 
to our trusted leader (len. Emilio Aguiualdo, who has been driven to take up arms 
in the name of 8,000,000 Filipinos, in defense of those very principles of justice and 
liberty of which your country is the foremost champion. Our countrymen at home, 
and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our 
beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its 
humane policy will etticaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, 
and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independ- 
ence under the protection of the Uuited States. Our warmest thanks are especially 
due to you, sir, personally, for having been the tirst to cultivate relations with 
General Aguinaldo, and arrange for the cooperation with Admiral Dewey, thus sup- 
porting our aspirations which time and sulisequent actions have developed and 
caused to meet with the applause and approbation of your nation. Finally, we 
request yon to convey to your illustrious President and the American people, and to 
Admiral Dewey, our sentiments of sincere gratittide and our most fervent wishes 
for their prosperity. 

"Singapore, June 8, 1898." 

Dr. Santos, having presented the above address to Mr. Spencer Pratt, proceeded, 
speaking in French, to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were 
now proving themselves fit for self government. While it would be very desirable 
that such a government should be under American jjrotection, yet it would be found 
that the brave Filipinos, who were now driving the Spanish troops before them, 
were quite tit also to till offices of civil administration. Referring to certain news 
which had been telegraphed from Europe, Dr. Santos deprecated the transfer of the 
Philippines from Spain to any power. He was quite confident that the sympathy of 
the American people would be with a nation who were struggling to be free. 

THE UNITED STATES CONSUL-GENERAL REPLIES. 

After listening to the address the United States consul-general, also speaking in 
French, said: 

"(ieutlemen, the honor you haver conferred upon me is so unexpected that I can 
not find api>ropriate words with which to thank you and with which to reply to the 
eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, though, that I fully under- 
stand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action 
and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated 
to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people — from whom I am 
sure that they will meet with full and generous resjionse. A little over a month ago 
the world resounded with the praises of Admiral Dewey and his fellow-ofiticers and 
men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic Squadron in the Bay of 
Manila. Now we have news of the brilliant achievements of your own distin- 
guished leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Americans at 



352 TIIEATY OF PEACE. 

sea. Yon have just reason to be proud of what has beea and is being accomplisliea 
by General Agninaldo and your fellow-couutrynieu under his command. When, six 
weeks ago. I learned that General Agninaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I 
immediately sought him out. An hour's interview-r.onvinced me that he was the 
man for the occasion ; and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly 
arranged for him to join the latter, which he did, at Cavite. The rest you know" ' 

'•1 am tliankl'ul to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of 
bringing about the arrangement between (ieneral Aguiualdo and Admiral Dewey, 
whifli has resulted so happily. I can only hojjc that the eventful outcome will be all 
that can be desired for the hap])iness and welfare of the Filipinos. My parting words 
to (ii iicral Agninaldo were, -Cicueral, when you have proved yourself great, prove 
yourself magnanimous,' and I'rom the treatment accorded to the recent Spanish pris- 
oneis it would ap]iear that he had done so.-' [A])plau8e.j 

At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech refreshments were served, and as the Fili- 
pinos, being Christians, drink alcoh(d, there was no difficulty in arranging as to 
refresliments. ''Long life and prosi)erity'' were drunk to Mr. Consul-Gcneral Spencer 
Pratt. Then the American Republic was cheered. Then ('ommodore Dewej- was 
cheered for his gallant victory. Then England was cheered for sheltering the Fili- 
pino refugees. 

PRESENTING A ILAG. 

Then Dr. Santos, as the spokesman of the Filipino refugees, again addressed the 
audience with many complimentary remarks on the gallantry of Admiral Dewey 
and the skill and foresight of United States Consul-Gencral Pratt, and with glow- 
ing forecasts of the prosperity that awaited the PJiilippine Islands under the new 
regime. He expressed a desire to have an American Hag as a reminiscence of the 
days proceedings. Mr. Spencer Pratt, again speaking in French, replied, saying: 

"This Hag was borne in battle, and is the emblem of that very liberty that you 
are seeking to attain. Its red stripes represent the blood that was shed for the 
cause; the white represents the ])urity of the motive; the blue tield stands for the 
azure of the sky ; the stars are the free and independent States of the Union. Take 
thi' Hag and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion." 

At tire conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, he handed anAmerican flag to Dr. Santos, 
who received it reverently, and waved it exultantly amidst the cheers ot the assem- 
bled Filii)inos. The Hag would, said Dr. Santos, be preserved so that future gen- 
eratious might look at it with pride. 



[Singaijore Free Press, June 9, 1898.] 

MK. SPENCEK PRATT AND THE FILIPINOS OF SINGAPORE— AN ADDRESS OF 

C< )NGI!ATULATI()N. 

A little after .5 p. m. last evening a numerous deputation, consisting of all the 
Filipinos resident in Singapore, waited upon the American consul-general, Mr. 
Spencer Pratt, at his residence, and presented him with an address congratulatory 
of the American successes in the present war, and exi)ressive of the thanks of the 
Filipino community here for the aid now being given by the United States to the 
aspirations of the Fili])iuo people for national freedom.' There were also present 
Mf. W. G. St. Clair, editor of tht- Singapore Free Press; ilr. A. Keid, editor of the 
Straits Times, and Mr. Howard W. Bray, w^hose active symi)athics Avith the Fili- 
pino nation are so well Jcnown as to entitle him to be styled "Aguinaldo's English- 
man." Mv. Spencer Pratt and Mr. Bray both wore the badge of the Liga Filipina, 
])resented to them by General Agninaldo during his incognito visit to Singapore. 

Aiter Mr. Bray had performed the ceremony of introducing the deputation to 
Consul-General Spencer Pratt, Dr. Santos, the chief Filipino refugee here, who 
has been educated at Barcelona and Paris, delivered the address of which the follow- 
ing is a translation : 

"To the Hon. Edward Spencer Pratt, 

" Consitl-General of the United Stales of North America, Shujapore. 

"Siu: The Filipino colony resident in this port, composed of representatives of 
all so ial classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate repre- 
sentative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our 
eternal gratitude for the moral and material ])rotection extended by Admiral Dewey 
to our trusted leader (Jen. Fmiilio Agninaldo, who has been driven to take up arms 
in the name of 8,(100,000 Fillipinos in defense of those very principles of justice and 
liberty, of which your country is the foremost champion. 

Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish 
misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your 
nation, iierseveriug in its humane policy, will eflicaciously second the programme 



TREATY OF PEACE. 353 

arranged between yoii, sir, and General Agninaldo in this port of Singapore, and 
secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States. 

Our wannest thanks are especially due to you, sir, personally, for having fceen the 
first to cultivate relations with General Aguiualdo and arrange for his cooperation 
with Admiral Dewey, thus supporting our aspirations which time and subsequent 
actions have developed and caused to meet with tlie applause and approbation of 
your nation. 

'• Finally we request you to convey to your illustrious President and the American 
people, and to Admiral Dewey, our sentiments of sincere gratitude and our most 
fervent -wishes for their prosperity. 

"SiNGAPOKE, Junes, 1S98." 

The address, which was written in Spanish, and read in French by Doctor Santos, 
the spokesman, was replied to in P>euch by Mr. Spencer Pratt, to the following 
effect : 

"(ientlemen, the honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I can 
not find appropriate words with which to thank yon, with which to reply to the 
eloquent address you have just read to me. Kest assured, however, that I fully 
understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present 
action, and that your words, vrliich have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully 
repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, ajid to the American people, from 
whom. I am sure, they will meet with full and generous response. A little over 
a month ago the world resounded with the praise of Admiral Dewey and his fellow 
officers and men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic Squadron in the 
bay of Manila. To-day we have the news of the brilliant achievements of yonr own 
distinguished leader, Gen. Fmilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Ameri- 
cans at sea. You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is Ijcing accom- 
plished by General Agninaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. 
When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in 
SingajKjre, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced nie that 
he was the man for the occasion, and having communicated with Adndral Dewey, 
I acc.irdingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest 
you know. 

"I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of 
bringing about the arrangement between General Agninaldo and Admiral Dewey, 
which has resulted 8oha])pily. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be 
all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos. My part- 
ing words to General Agninaldo were, 'General, when you havi- i)roved yourself 
great, prove yourself magnanimous,' and from the generous treatment that we under- 
stand he has accorded to the Spanish prisoners taken in the recent fight he has done 
so." [Applause.] 

Dr. Santos then addressing his fellow-countrymen (Paysanos), called for suc- 
cessive vivas lor the President of the United States, for Admiral Dewey, and for 
Consul-General Pratt; for England, the "nation hospitaliere," and for the editors of 
the Singapore Free Press and Straits Times. Consul-General Pratt called for "vivas" 
for General Aguinaldo and the Filipino people. 

Mr. Spencer Pratt subseiinently presented an American flag to Dr. Santos, f )r the 
Filipino deputation. This fiag, he said, was borne in battle, and is the emblem of 
that very liberty that you are seeking t<> attain. Its red stripes represent the blood 
that was shed for the cause, the white the purity of the motive, the blue field the 
azure of the sky, the stars the free and independent States of the Union. Take it 
and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion. 

On receiving the flag from the consul's hands Dr. Santos called for three cheers for 
the American nation, waving the flag on high, and stating that the Filipinos would 
always cherish this emblem, which would be preserved for future generations to 
look upon with pride. 

A band of Filipino musicians was in attendance and played a selection of music, 
including some very pretty melodies of their native land. 

This interesting ceremony terminated about 6 p. m. 



Hr. Bay to Mr. Pratt. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, June 16, 1898. 
Two hundred twelve received aud answered. Avoid unauthorized 
negotiations with Philippine insurgents. 

r£ p 23 Day, 



354 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Day to 21r. Pratt. 

No. 78.] Department of State, 

Washingto7i, June 16, 1898. 

Sir: I have to acknowlfdy'O receipt of yoar coutidential dispatch 
No. L'l-. of the l*8th of A])ril last, in which you rei)0i't your proeeediiigs 
in briiigin.i>' together the insurgent general Eniiiio Aguiiiaklo and 
Admiral J3e\vey, belbre the hitter's departure for Manila. It appears 
tiuiD your iiicetiiig- with General Aguinaldo was brought about through 
the grx'd ottices of Mr. H. W. Bray, a l-ritish subject, who had been 
coinpelled by the disturbed condition of things in the Philippines to 
abandon his property and business there, and that, after an interview 
witli (leneral Aguinaldo, you telegraphed to Admiral ^)ewey that the 
insurgent leader would come to Hongkong" to arrange for a general 
cooperation of the insurgents, if this should be desired. The admiral 
telegraphed in reply: ''Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.'' As 
a consequence General Aguinaldo. with his aid-decamp and private 
secretary, left Singapore for Hongkong on the 26tl< of April for the 
pnri)ose of joining Admiral Dewey. You promise the Department a 
fuller account of your interview with General Aguinaldo by the next 
mail, and say that in arranging for his "direct cooperation'' with the 
commander of the United States forces you have prevented a ])ossible 
contlict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administer- 
ing the Philippines. 

The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo that 
you had no authority to speak for the United States; and, in the 
absence of the fuller report which you promise, it is assumed that you 
did not attempt to commit this (loverument to any alliance with the 
Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance 
of (Jeneral Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so 
doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practi- 
cable to gratify. This Government has known the Philii»pine insurgents 
only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is uot 
acquainted with their purposes. While their contest with that power 
has been a matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor 
received fiom this Government any recognition. The United States, in 
entering u])on the oc<;npation of the islands, as the result of its military 
operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of the rights which 
the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without 
regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that 
obedience which will be lawfully due from them. 

If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you 
acted upon the assumption that this Government would cooperate with 
him lor the furtherance of any ))lan of his own, or that, in accepting his 
cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political 
claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and 
can not be api)roved. 

liespectfully yours, William K. Day. 



TREATY OF PEA^fi. 355 

31r. Pratt to Mr. Moore. 

No. 235,1 Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore^ June 20, 1898. 
Sir : I have the honor to report that I have received the Depart- 
meiit's cipher telegram reading thus : 

Washington, June 17. 
Pkatt, Cousul-General, 

iSimjapore : 
Two laundred and twelve received and answered. void unauthorized negotia- 
tions with Philippine iusuroents. 

Day. 

and that I have sent the Department the following cipher telegram in 
reply : 

Singapore, June 19. 

Secketary of Statk, 

]\ anhington: 
No intention negotiate. Left that Dewey who desired Aguinaldo come. 

Pratt. 

which means that I neither have nor had any intention to negotiate 
witlithe Philippine insurgents, and, in the case of General Aguinaldo, 
was especially careful to leave such negotiations to Commodore Dewey. 

My action in the matter was indeed limited to obtaining the assurance 
of General Aguinaldo's willingness to cooperate with our forces, com- 
municating this to Commodore Dewej^, and, upon the latter's express- 
ing the desire that he should come on as soon as possible, arranging 
for the general to do so. 

1 shall anxiously await the instruction your telegram refers to for the 
Department's opinion of my above course, but can scarcely believe, in 
view of the motives which prompted it and the excellent results which 
have ensued, tliat it can be altogether disapproved. 
I have, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Moore. 

No. 236.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

/Singapore, June 21, 1898. 

Sir: In continuation of my dispatch No. 235, of the 20th instant, I 
beg to state that if, in regard to General Aguinaldo, I arranged directly 
with Commodore Dewey witliont obtaining the Department's previous 
authorization it was because of the little time there was in which to 
act and the practical impossibility of explaining by cable to the Depart- 
ment the valne of the general's cooperation, of which I felt the com- 
modore would already be in a position to judge from what he must have 
learned of the situatiou while at Hongkong. 

f beg further to state that it was not only on acconnt of the material 
aid 1 was conUdent he could lend us that I regarded the cooperation 
of General Aguinaldo as so desirable, but also because, as the recog- 
nized leader of the insurgents, he was, I considered, the one best able 
to direct and influence them, and therefore the one most important for 
our commander to have under immediate control, both as concerned 
the present and future policy of our Government in the Philippines, 
whatever that policy might be. 



356 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Had it not been arranged for General Agiiinaldo tlius to cooperate 
with us it is more than probable that he would have returned to the 
islands of his own accord and undertaken iiidei)endeut operations, 
which niiftht, I fear, liave caused us serious embarrassment. I am not 
having", nor do i propose to have, any further dcaliufjs here with tlie 
Philipjiine insnrgenis, 

1 have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, 

United /States Consul- General. 



Mr. Cr idler to Mr. Pratt. 

No. 82.] Department of State, 

Wasliinfjton, June 25, 1898. 
Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches, Nos. 214 
(May 1) and 217 (May 5, 1898), in regard to arrangements made with 
Aguinaldo for cooperation with our Xavy. 

In rei)ly 1 have to inform yon tliat the IJepartment is pleased to learn 
that you did not make any political pledges to Aguinaldo. 
iiespectfully, yours, 

Thos. W. Crtdler, 

Third Assistant /Secretary. 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Pratt. 

IS'o. 84,] Depautmext of State, 

Wasiiington, July 9, 1S98. 
Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 222 bis 
of May 18 last, in regard to the expenses incurred in relieving the Amer- 
ican refugee from the Philippines. 

You will please ascertain and report the amount necessarily expended 
in this matter by the British vice consul at Cebu. 

The <}jo0 expended by you in sending ^Ir. Dorr to Hougkong is cov- 
ered by tlie Department's telegram to relieve immediate necessities, 
iiespecttully, yours, 

Thos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant /Secretary, 



Mr. Day to Mr. Pratt. 

No. 87.] Department of State, 

]Vashin(/ton, July 20, 1898. 

Sir: Your No. 229 of the 9th ultimo, im-losing i)rinted copies of a 
report from tiie Straits Times of the same day, entitled "Mr. Spencer 
Pratt's Serenade," with a view to its communication to the press, has 
been received and considered. 

By Department's telegram of the 17th of June you were instructed 
to avoid unauthorized negotiations with the PhilipjDine insurgents. 



TREATY OF PEACE. .^?>7 

The reasons for this instruction were conveyed to yoii in my No. 78 of 
the 10th of June, by which the President's views on the subject of your 
relations with General Aguinaldo were fully expressed. 

The extract now communicated by you from the Straits Times of the 
9th of June has occasioned a feelino^ of disquietude and a doubt as to 
whether some of your acts may not have borne a significance and pro- 
<luced an impression which this Government would be compelled to 
reji'ret. 

The address presented to you by the twenty-five or thirty Filipinos who 
gathered about the cousulate discloses an understanding- on their part 
tiiat the object of Admiral Dewey was to support the cause of General 
Aguinaldo, and that the ultimate object of our action is to secure the 
in<le])endence of the Pliilippines " under the protection of the United 
States." 

Your address does not repel this implication, and it moreover repre- 
sents that General Aguinaldo was '* sought out by yon," whereas it had 
been the understanding of the Department that you received him only 
upon the request of a iiritish subject named Bray, who formerly lived 
in the Philippines. Your further reference to General Aguinaldo as 
" the man for the occasion," and to your " bringing about" the "arrange- 
ment" between "General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey which has 
resulted so happily," also rei)reseuts the matter in a light which causes 
apprehension lest your action may have laid the ground of future mis- 
understandings and complications. 

For these reasons the Department has not caused the article to be 
given to the press, lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction to 
views the expression of which it had not authorized. 
Eespectfully, yours, 

William R. Day. 



[Confidential.] 

Mr. Pratt to Mr. Moore. 

No. 240.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

kSingapore., July i*, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that I have learned from reliable 
private sources that the Sultan of Suiu, who, on his return home from 
Mecca, stopped over in Singapore, where he still remains, has nego- 
tiated or is in the way of negol iating for the transfer of the protectorate 
of his territory in tlie Philipi)ines from Spain to British North Borneo, 
to which, as will be seen by the map, it is adjacent. 

This would seem to have special significance at the present juncture, 
and I have considered that you might deem it of sufltlcient importance 
to demand investigation. 

After the Sulu war of 1876, it will be remembered, S]>ain's suzerainty, 
hitherto disputed, was formally admitted by the Suitan and recognized 
by both England and Germany in the protocol signed by the powers on 
the 11th of March, 1877. 

I have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, 

United States Consul- General. 



358 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Pratt to Afr. Bay. 

[Confidential.] 

No. 250.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

IShif/apore, July ^-'^', 1898. 

Sir : I have tlie honor to acknowledge the receipt of your instruction 
No. 78, of the 10th ultimo, in reply to my dispatch No. 112. of the 28th 
of Ai)ril last, reporting- my i)roceedings in bringing together the insni- 
gent leader, Gen. Emilio xVguinaldo, and Admiral Dewey before the 
latters departure for Manila. • 

I have carefully considered your observations upon my action in this 
matter and beg to repeat what I have stated in my later dispatches on 
the same subject, that I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo 
the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to 
the Philippines, that I he!d out no hoi)es to him of any kind, committed 
the Government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confi- 
dences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would 
cooperate with him — General Aguinaldo — for the furtherance of any 
plan of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation, it would 
consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he 
might j)ut forward. 

I have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, 

United States Consul- General. 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Pratt. 

No. 90.] Department of State, 

Washington, August 5, 1898. 
Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 235 and No. 236 
of June 20 and 21, 1898, concerning the Philijjpine insurgents and your 
action regarding them. 

In this connection reference is made to the Department's instruc- 
tions No. 78 of June 16 and No. 87 of July 20, 1898, as well as to the 
concluding paragraph of your No. 236, wherein you say that you are 
not having nor do you propose to have any further dealings with the 
Philippine insurgents. 

Kespectfuily, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant Secretary. 



Mr. Johnson to Mr. Moore. 

No. 26.] Consulate of the ITnited States, 

Amoy, China, July 8, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to submit a few facts and comments on con- 
ditions prevailing here which are suggested by the supposition that our 
Government contemjdates taking charge of the Philippines, either tem- 
porarily or permanently. If the information I offer is already in your 
possession, then this dispatch can be of no service. 

There is a large Chinese i)opuUition in the Philippines, who constitute 
the most intelligent chiss of common laborers, as well as many wealthy 
mercliants. It is estimated that over 90 ])er cent of these are from 
Amoy and si)eiik tlie Amoy dialect. There is a regular line of steamers 
between Amoy and Manila, and the traffic both in passengers and 
freight is an important industry. 

The S[)anish Government maintains a consulate at Amoy for the sole 
purpose of looking after this trade with the Philippines, and it is 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



359 



given out here, I am informed, tliat tlie consulate will be closed and 
the afi'airs turned over to a merchant as soon as the islands pass from 
Spanish control. 

The largest British firms here inform me that Amoy is the most 
important'Chinese port, so far as the Phili])pines are concerned, and 
that should we retain them the business in this consulate will increase 
many fold. 

It would under such comlitions be inimical to our interests for any 
other nation to secure any exclusive rights in this province, especially 
in the vicinity of Amoy. It is reported in the press tluit Japan is now 
endeavoring- to secure the exclusive right to develop tlie mines of this 
province. These include large coal fields near Amoy, as well as exten- 
sive deposits of lead, iron, and precious minerals. These coal fields 
are not yet worked. The Japanese recently secured a concession on the 
island of Amoy, which is to be developed in the interest of her Formosa 
trade. She has within a year let the contracts for buildings to the 
extent of 70,000 yen, and many moves which have attracted my atten- 
tion confirm the rumor that she has in view a monopoly of the coal aud 
iron and lead of the surrounding mountains. 

Amoy has probably the finest harbor in southern China, which is 
also taken into consideration. 

The leading British merchant here, Mr. Francis Cass, who during the 
past twenty years has frequently acted as American vice-consul, and 
whose knowledge is extensive and judgment good, thinks these are 
facts which should be considered in the event America retains the Philip- 
pines. 

Amoy's trade with the United States leads that of all other China 
ports, and is chietiy in the hands of the British. The entire community 
is iubilaut over tlie pro.si)ect of the Manila trade i)assing under our 
control. So enthusiastic are they that every possible demonstration 
of good will has been resorted to. On July 4 every American flag 
which they could secure was hoisted over their commercial houses dur- 
ing the entire day, and every firm called at the consulate to express 
congratulations. The German firms were scarcely less cordial in their 
congratulations. They have suli'ered in their extensive trade with the 
Philippines because of certain annoying regulations, and realize that 
if put upon a similar fair basis to that now prevailing with the United 
States great good will result. 

Xot knowing whether these facts are known in the Department or 
not, I refrain from further details until I know your pleasure. 
I have the honor, etc., 

A. BURLINGAME JOHNSON, 

United States Consul. 



Singapore, June 30, 1896. 
To His Excellency the President of the United States of America. 

Your Excellency: Confirming my letter of 20th instant, I liave 
now the honor to inclose a cover just received from General Aguinaldo, 
the Philippine insurgent leader, with instructions to forward it by first 
mail to Your Excellency. 

In the letter which General Aguinaldo writes me he states that he 
incloses a telegram which he desires me to transmit to Your Excellency, 
but both this and other documents I regret to say have been extracted 
from the cover during transit. 

The envelope arrived here with the side torn away and a note written 
on the same by your consul-general in Hongkong, through whom it W'as 



OUU TREATY OF PEACE. 

forwarded, that it had been received in bad condition from H. M. S. 
Linnet. 

I have taken steps to tind the ndssiug doi^unient, which will be for- 
warded to Yonr l'j.\(;ellency if tlie search proves successtul, 
I have the honor, etc., 

JJoWARD \V, Bray. 



[Traiislatiou. 



Cavite, Jnue 10, 1898. 
To the President of the Repuhlic of the 

Great North American Nation. 

Dear and Honored Sir: I come to greet you with the most tender 
eft'nsion of my soul, and to express to yon my dee[) and sincere grati- 
tude, in the name of tlie unfortunaic Philippine people, for the etticient 
and disinterested protection which you have decided to give it, to shake 
oft' the yoke of the cruel and corrupt Spanish doniination, as you are 
doing to the e(jnally unfortunate Cuba, which Spain wishes to see anni- 
hilated rather than free and independent, giving her, to (juiet her and 
to cicatrize the deep wounds made in her heart by the iniipiities com- 
mitted upon her children, a false autonomy, of which one bold blow of 
the Governor General may dei)rive her immediately, as she has no 
colonial army to serve as a counterpoise to the almost sovereign powers 
of that supreme authority. 

At the same time, as 1 am always frank and open, I must express to 
you the great sorrow which all of us Filipinos felt on reading in the 
Times, a newspni)er of the greatest circulation and rejiutation in the 
whole world, in its issue of the .Jth of last mouth, the astounding state- 
ment that you, sir, will retain these islands until the end of the war, 
and, if Spain fails to pay the indemnity, Avill sell them to a Enro[)ean 
power, i)referably Great Britain; but we found a palliative to our sor- 
row in the im})rol)ability and suddenness of that statement, as common 
sense refuses to believe that so sensible a public man as you would 
venture to make an assertion so contrary to common sense, beiore events 
are entirely consumujated, as you well know that if God iavors the 
triumph of your arms to-day, to-morrow He may defeat them and give 
the vi(*tory to Sjtain, and because such an assertion is not consistent 
wivh the i)rotectiou of which you make a boast toward this unlortuuate 
l)v'ople, which has been groaning for more than three centuries in the 
clutches of a nation which has for its shield (emblem) the lion, one of 
the ferocious animals, although she displays it as a symbol of nobility, 
which she certi'.inly does not possess, besides the fact that it is opposed 
to yonr noble and generous sentiments to wish to sell these islands to 
a Kuiopean j)Ower sucli as England, thereby making us pass under the 
domination of that nation, which, although it has a truly liberal gov- 
ernment, partakes none the less of the nature of a tyranny as it is 
monarchical. 

Oh, sir, you are greatly in.juied by this statement, which ought to be 
regarded inerely as a diplomatic trick inventeil by the friends of Spain 
to induce us to help her by using this vile slander whicdi has been 
hurled against you to arouse our hostdity to that powerful nation over 
whose <lestinies you hapj)ily preside. 

The Philippine peo])le, however, have not given credit to that awk- 
wardly invented fable, and have seen in your nation, ever since your 
Heit destroyed in a nu)ment the Spanish tleet which was here, in spite 
of its being assisted by tlie guns of their two forts, the angel who is 
the harbinger of their libert\ ; and they rose like a single wave when, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 361 

as soon as I trod these shores, I addressed them to gain them over; 
and they captured, within the period of ten days, nearly the whole 
garrison of this Province of Cavite, in whose port I have ray govern- 
ment — by the consent of the admiral of your triumphant ileet — as well 
as the garrison of the adjoining Province of Bataan, together with the 
governors and officials of both provinces; and my valiant hosts are 
now besieging Manila, the capital, on the south and east, while my 
forces in the Province of Bulacan, which adjoins this province on the 
north, and the cliief town of which is likewise being besieged by them, 
nearly surround Manila on the north. 

Such is the astonishing triumph which this suft'ering people has 
gained in a few days over the conquering race whose traditional valor, 
of which it is continually bragging, has been humbled on these battle- 
fields and has been succeeded by a great terror; and a people of such 
warlike qualities, which is, moreover, thoroughly civilized, as nearly 
two thirds of them can read and write, and as they have in their midst 
many men of high attainments in the sciences and arts, shonld not be 
sold as if it were a lamb to be sacrificed and exploited for the greed of 
another nation. 

I close by protesting once and a thousand times, in the name of this 
peoi»le, which knows how to fight for its honor by means of its impro- 
vised warriors and artillery men, against the statement published by 
the Times, mainly for the purpose of casting a blot in history upon its 
glorious name; a people which trusts bhndly in j^ou not to abandon it 
to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and independent, even if 
you make pc^ace with Spain, and I offer fervent ])rayers for the ever- 
iiicrf asing ])rosperity of your powerful nation, to wliich and to yon I 
shall show unbounded gratitude, and shall repay with interest that great 
obligation. 

Your humble servant, 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



Consulate-General of the United States, 

Howjloiuj, Aiifiust i, 1898. 

Sir: By request I have the honor to confirm the following telegram 
sent you on the '2d instant: 

Cortes family, representing wcaltliy edncated families Manila, implore you tlirnnjili 
Coiisul-General Wildman, in name luimanity and Christianity, not to desert them, 
and aid to obtain annexation Philippines to America. Please see the President. 

I may add in explanation of this telegram that there is a large 
colony of "wfalthy Filip-iuos who have been driven out of Manila, and 
the bulk of whose fortunes have been confiscated, resident hejc. They 
are people of education as well as wealth, and tliey are intensely loyal 
to the United States. The Cortes family are particularly so. and they 
have contributed umney liberally to aid Aguinaldo on the understand- 
ing that he was fighting for annexation of the Philippines to the United 
States. Naturally I sympathize with them in their desire to become a 
part of the United States, and have advised them that you would give 
their cablegram your kindly consideration. 

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 

Rounsevelle Wildman, 

Consul- General. 
Hon. Marcus Hanna, 

United States Setiate, Washington. 



STATEMENT OF MAX GEN. WESLEY MERRITT, U. S. A., OCTOBER 4, 
1898, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION ATi 
PARIS, AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS. 



Commissioners of the United States, 

Pm-is, October ^, 1898. 

Geu. Wesley Merritt appeared before the Commission. 

The first matter offered was a communication from Gen. F. V 
Greene, U. S. Y., which Avas read by tlie secretary. 

Mr. Day. What have you to say. General, as to the qualifications, , 
knoAvledge, and ability of General Greene to speak on this subject? 

General Merritt. This communication was written without ai 
knowledge on his part that it would be laid before the Commission, , 
so he probably expresses himself a little more strongly than he would I 
if he knew he was talking to you gentlemen having this matter im 
charge. I consider his views exceedingly good, and they are sup- 
ported by the views of the others who have reported on the different j 
subjects mentioned there, and I can say that generall}' tliey are alllj 
men of ability and men whose views would have a great deal of weight} 
with me. 

Mr. Frye. What experience has General Greene had? 

General Merritt. In what direction? 

Mr. Frye. In any direction as an investigator? He was in Russia i 
a while? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir ; and ^Ni'ote the best and most authentic — - 
the best received — book on the Russian-Turkish war published yet., 
He is a man who reads a great deal, quite a student, a verj- bright! 
man. 

Mr. Davis. Is he a Regular Army officer? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; graduated from the Academy, I think 
in 18G7, and has since that time been instructor of engineering at thei| 
Academy and was when I knew him — while I commanded at the 
Academy, about five years. 

Mr. Reid. What opportunities has he had for observation in the 
Philippines? 

General Merritt. He went at the same time I did and left at thej 
same time. He was out on the lines all the time, and took a great! 
deal of interest in investigating with the citizens and soldiers. He) 
knew some of the ranking officers, although he did not know Agui-- 
naldo nor have anything to do with him. It was part of my policy 
that we should keep ourselves aloof from AguinahU) as mucli as pos- 
sible, because we knew trouble would occur from liis wanting to go to) 
Manila at the time of its surrender. 

]Mr. Frye. He is a gentleman on whose judgment you would have) 
a great deal of reliance? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 
862 



TREATY OF PEACE. 3G3 

The Chairman. When did General Greene get to the Philippine 
Islands? 

General Merritt. lie got there about the middle of July. 

The Chairman. And left about what time? 

General Merritt. The latter part of August. 

The Chairman. Your army occupied Cavite and vicinity? 

General Merritt. When General Greene got there he was put at once 
beyond Aguinaldo's headquarters at Bacu, on tlie beach and opposite 
Manila, where he established his lines. When I got there I found the 
insurgents were holding the lines in front of him, and I directed him, 
peaceably if he could and if not by force, to get his lines in front, so 
there would he no mixture of troops. It was rather an anomalous 
condition, and the general in command there agreed to take part of 
the lines 

The Chairman. The insurgent general? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. General Greene saw a great deal of 
them in moving around his lines and prospecting in other directions 
to learn the cliaracter of the countrj^ 

The Chairman. Was he in the interior of the country? 

General Merritt. No, sir. 

The Chairman. How long in Manila? 

General Merritt. About two weeks; from the 13th of August to 
the 29th of August. . 

The Chairman. What do j^ou regard as the principal means of 
information as to the character and needs of the people? 

General Merritt. His means of information ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

General Merritt. Merely the contact that would naturally occur 
from an active man moving around and seeing more or less of them 
and hearing them talk. 

The Chairman. Principally with the insurgents? 

General Merritt. As well as the British and other foreign residents 
and some few Spaniards. 
. The Chairman. After jou occupied Manila? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. Before that, of course, it was mainly 
the insurgents and such English as came out to visit us. 

After the reading of General Greene's statement General Merritt 
made the following statement: 

General Merritt. I would add to my remarks in regard to General 
Greene's report that immediately upon the occupation of Manila I 
appointed General Greene chief of the bureaus of collection. He 
occupied a position in Manila which was analogous to the position of 
the Secretary of the Treasurj^ in the United States, and in that way 
he got a good deal of information, which came to him from different 
sources. 

In that connection it might be remarked that Augustino, the Gov- 
ernor-General up to the 5th of August, borrowed from the Philippino 
Bank in Manila $2,000,000, and they have nothing to show for it nor 
no place to be repaid from. We had to bolster up the bank in order 
to keep it from going to pieces. There would have been a run on it 
at once ; but the other banks, the Hongkong and EngHsh banks — all 
managed by Englishmen — stepped in and said they would guaranty 
the payment of bills by this Filipino bank up to a certain amount, 
I think $200,000, and we transacted business with them through the 
custom-house the same as the other banks. Of course when they 
arrive at that limit we will have to have additional security or thje 



364 TREATY OF PEACE. 

bank will have to be closed. For a while we protected*it by closing 
it and jiutting a guard over it. 

The statement of Major (and Dr.) Bournes was read bj' the sec- 
retary. 

Mr. Frye. Please make a statement about him, General. 

General Merritt. He was at Atlanta, Ga., when the expedition 
started. I liad an interview — he came to me at Governors Island — 
and I was so Avell satisfied that he knew more than anyone else who 
had applied to go as interpreter that I got the War Department to 
appoint liim a surgeon in the service, and I sent him ahead with Gen- 
eral Greene. He was a man wlio had been there three or more j^ears — 
I was under the impression that he had been there longer than the 
date he gives in his report — is a man of great intelligence, knows 
the different languages of the islanders, talks with tliem fluently, 
knows Spanish and English of course ; and his views, while modestly • 
put, are entitled to a great deal of credit. 

The Chairman. Are we to understand that he had a three years' 
residence in the islands — the Philippine Islands'? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; he had been there as a naturalist or 
something of tliat kind. 

The Chairman. Had been on the other islands from Luzon"? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; Iloilo and Mindanao, and some others; 
perliaps. Major Bournes is a very intelligent and ver}' honest man. 
I place more weiglit to his views than any other man I know of, 
because he lias had a better oi)j)ortunity to judge, and he states his 
views mildly. 

Mr. Reid. He has had longer exjjerience than others? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

The statement of Maj. J. L. Bell, major of engineers, was then, read 
by the secretary. 

General Merritt. Major Bell was an officer on my staff, and went 
out there before I did, conducted the secret service, and was very 
active. He moved around in the insurgent lines, and, to a certain 
extent, in the Spanish lines, though I forbade his being disguised or 
anything of that kind. All the risk he tooli was as an officer of the 
army. He knows the army and navy officers from Aguinaldo down, 
and had frequent conferences with him and his officers. His report 
relates more particularlj" to the situation as regards the Filipino 
armj^ 

Major Bell got his information before I arrived there and at the 
time I was there. I think he exaggerates the number of troops and 
arms they have for the service. The largest estimate outside of his 
has been 15,000 guns — small arms. I doubt very much whether the 
Insurgents have that many. The Spaniards, who are supposed to 
have lost quite a number of arms because of the desertion of the 
natives whom they armed, have more arms than troops there. They 
surrendered 22,000 stands of arms of the latest patterns and millions 
of cartridges. 

Mr. Reid. Mausers'? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and others, 

Mr. Frye. To us'? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and thej' claimed to surrender 14,000 
soldiers, but up to the time I left we could not count more than eight 
or ten tliousand, and that is probably about the number. 

Mr. Gray. Spanish soldiers'? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; except two regiments, who were natives. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 365 

They wanted to dismiss the natives and send them off, but I objected 
to that and said they had armed them and must treat the natives as 
the Spaniards. 

The Chairman. Where are those soldiers? 

General Merritt. In the city's different convents. We made them 
vacate the barracks and used them for our own troops. They are in 
the public squares, churches, convents, etc. 

The Chairman. In and about Manila? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and in the suburbs. 

Mr. Gray, lender guard? 

General Merritt. No, sir. 

Mr. Gray. Under parole? 

General Merritt. No, sir; they would not take parole. I believe 
there is something in the Spanish military regulations that makes it 
capital punishment for the Spanish soldiers to take parole. 

Mr. Davis. Under any circumstances? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; so they told me. They consider it a 
breach of honor, and they are liable to trial by court-martial, and the 
officers sul),]ect to capital' punishment if they did it. I, however, made 
them promise for themselves and their men, and sign a roll, that they 
would not take up arms during this war against us; but that was 
scarcely necessary, for there was not a possibility of their doing so. 
They surrendered all their arms except the side arms of the officers. 

Mr. Reid. Are they well behaved? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; the officers were a little bumptious at 
first. They would march around the streets with their side arms, and 
it created some little friction, and I had a letter written to General 
Arderius, and said that it would look better if they discarded their 
arms and did not parade the streets so much, and that had the desired 
effect, and there has been no trouble since. I did not exact it in the 
note, but I would have done so if necessary. 

Tlie next statement was that of Admiral Dewey, dated August 29, 
1898, which was read by the Secretary. 

During the reading: 

Mr. Frye. Is there anything more recent from Admiral Dewey than 
that? 

General Merritt. Not to my knowledge. This is a copy of a dis- 
patcli sent by him in reply to a question propounded from Washington. 

Mr. Gray. Is not 3,000,000 an overestimate of the population of 
the Island of Luzon? 

General Merritt. I think not; they generally put it larger. 

The Chairman. It was first stated by Admiral Dewey at 825,000. 
Do you know liow he got that estimate? 

General Merritt. I do not. 

After the reading of Admiral Dewey's statement: 

The Chairman. I would like to ask about Admiral Dewey's views. 
He selects the Island of Luzon as the one to be obtained. Do you 
understand that that is Admiral Dewej'-'s view? 

General Merritt. I understand the question was asked from Wash- 
ington, " If we took but one island, which is the best to seize upon?" 

The Chairman. Do you know, aside from that question, what 
Admiral Dewey's view is as to taking one island, or all the islands? 

General Merritt. I do not. I am inclined to believe, however, 
that he is in favor of taking tlie entire archipelago; but I would not 
so state it. 

The Chairman. You never heard him say so? 



366 TREATY OF PEACE. 

General Merritt. We have talked the matter over many times, 
l)ut T would not state that he expressed himself in this way, as I might 
talk to this commission. 

Mr. Reid. This statement was made in reply to a question asking 
which island would be best to retain if only one was kept? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and he naturally selects the largest and 
most populous. I did not have a chance to talk with him after read- 
ing this dispatch, or I would have asked him to express himself in 
that regard. lie told me that reply was to a question from Wash- 
ington asking. If we retained only one island, wliich is the better one 
to retain? 

Tlie Chairman. That was tlie question in June? 

General Merritt. I think he said his telegram in June referred to 
the capacity of the natives to govern themselves as compared withi 
the Cubans. 

The next statement was that of Lieut. Col. Charles L. Jewett, , 
judge-advocate, U. S. V. 

Before it was read General Merritt said : 

I think you will not find much in what Colonel Jewett says. He' 
was a gentleman highly recommended to me from 'Indiana as judge- - 
advocate, and I appointed him, although he did not know enough i 
about the business to give him charge of the whole business; and I[ 
gave him something to occupy him. He was very anxious to come 
iiere, and wanted me to ask Washington to send him, but he does not 
know very much, and his views are not worth much. He intinuites 
he knosvs'a good deal, but does not give it in his statement. 

The statement was then read by the secretary. 

The next statement was that of Mr. Andre, Belgian consul at 
Manila. 

Before it was read : 

General Merritt. That is rather important. Tlie man is an intel- 
ligent man. He expresses himself very poorly in English, and I have 
tried to have his report corrected to an extent, but I think a good deal 
of reliance can he placed upon it. He is very earnest in hoping that 
the Spanish will be excluded and the Filipinos not allowed to govern 
themselves, but some government established there which will protect 
the merchants and business men. It might be remarked that he is 
largely interested in business matters, and has been there, I think, 
for about fourteen years; is quite a wealthy man, and gives his views 
from tliat standpoint. 

The statement was then read by the secretary, 
iNlr. Frye. How old a man is he? 

General Merritt. He is quite a young man. He tells me he has 
been there fourteen years. He states liis case entirely from tlie point 
of view of a rich merchant. He does not sign himself as the Belgian 
consul, because he said he could not do so, but he gives liis statement 
as his personal opinion. He seems to think the United States is 
engaged in a crusade for the benefit of the oppressed of all lands. 
Mr. Gray. Where is this Belgian consul resident? 
General Merritt. In Manila. 

The next paper consisted of correspondence between General Ander- 
son and General Aguinaklo. 
Before it was read : 

Genei-al Merritt. 1 do not know tliat- tlie Commission will be inter- 
ested in that. It is correspondence betw(HMi General Anderson and 
Aguiiialdo, and i-eljites largely to Aguinaldo's growing views. Tlit 



TREATY OF PEACE. 367 

whole correspondence was deprecated by Admiral Dewey before I got 
there, and I suppressed the whole thing after I arrived, because it was 
not the wish of the Government to make any promises to the insurgents 
or act in any way with them. 

The correspondence was read by the secretary. 

Mr. Frye. In obtaining supplies in wliat money did you pay? 

General Merritt. The money of the country. 

Mr. Frye. Mexican silver? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. With reference to the last letter read, 
that letter and one other letter received from Aguinaldo, which has 
been mislaid and which I can not reproduce, I made no reply to, except 
to tell him he must withdraw his forces outside those limits. 

The commission he refers to was brought to me by General Ander- 
son. He asked me if I would talk to them, and I said I would. It 
was a few days after the surrender, and I received them at my head- 
quarters in Manila, and they agreed the insurgents should withdraw 
outside any lines I might designate. I detailed two officers. General 
Greene and General MacArthur, to designate a line in red pencil, and 
gave it to them on a map, and told them I should insist on the with- 
drawal of his troops. It took in part of the lines Aguinaldo's troops 
had occupied previous to our getting there, but it was necessary to 
enforce a proper status between the insurgents and our own forces and 
to keep them out of Manila. . 

Before that time, rather early after my arrival there at Manila, I 
had telegraphed to the War Department of the possible trouble that 
might arise with the insurgents, and asked for instructions as to 
[whether I should consider them as enemies and treat them accordingly 
in such case. To that request I had no reply, and the consequence 
was I had to mix diplomacy with force in order to avoid a tilt with 
tliem. I knew, if bloodshed was once had, that would be the eiid of 
an aniical)le status there, and to tliat end I was careful only to enforce 
that which was proper and wliich I conceived must be executed in 
order to have my troops fully occupy the ground we had taken. In 
his letters to General Anderson he speaks of concessions they made 
there in the occupation of lines. They did. I told General Greene- 
gave him tlie instructions — to try to get these positions by an amicable 
arrangement if possible, but, if necessary, to report the fact to me, 
and I should use 'force to secure them. At the time I went there I 
found we had no lines, no base upon which to approach Manila. The 
insurgents had their pickets to the front of ours, and our main guard 
was in the rear of their main guard, and I gave General Greene orders 
to change that status, which he did, and purely by arrangement with 
tliat general of M'liom Major Bell speaks as being a very sensible fel- 
low and a good fellow. It appears, when the request was made of 
him, he corresponded with Aguinaldo, and the latter agreed to it. 

Mr. Reid. Do you tliink any danger of conflict is now reasonably 
remote? 

General Merritt. I think there is no danger of conflict as long as 
these people think the United States is going to tRke possession there. 
If they imagine, or liear from any source, that the Spaniards are to 
be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent. 

Mr. Davis. What do you mean by " there " ? 

General Merritt. I mean at Manila ; in the military lines ; in the 
positions they held. 

The Chairman. Suppose the United States should acquire even the 



368 TREATY OP PEACE. 1 

island of Luzon and set up there its own government, do you tliink). 
Agninaldo and liis followers would subniit^to it? 
General Merritt. On the island of Luzon alone? 
The Chairman. Yes; taking that now under consideration only. 
Genei-al ^Ierritt. Only with the understanding- that eventually it 
should be restored to the' Filipinos, in the event of the United States' 
vacating. 

Mr. Davis. Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with j 
Spain, should take Luzon, all the Philippines, or a part, by virtue of I 
a treaty, paying no attention to the insurgents, how would that be 
taken by Aguinaldo? 

General Merritt. I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following j 
would resist it, but whether he could resist to any extent I do noti 
know, because his forces are divided. I believe that as matters go 
on Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there. This oppo- 
sition he speaks of in the last letter read on the part of his chiefs- 
arises principally from this fellow Pelo (?), who is an insurgent andai 
freebooter and a very bad man, and he is only favorable to Aguinaldo 
as long as Aguinaldo heads a war party against all comers. 
Mr. Davis. He is in for booty? 
General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. If the United States should say that we shall take 
this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would 
submit to it? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman. Even Aguinaldo? 

General Merritt. Aguinaldo without his party would not amount! 
to anything. 

Mv. Frye. Suppose, by treaty, we take Luzon alone and establish 
our Government there, raise our flag there, give to the people the 
freedom from taxation and other burdens, froin slavery, etc., t^iat 
we give to our own people, how long, in your opinion, would it be before 
there would be insurrections in all these other islands we have 
returned to Spain or that Spain retains? 

General Merritt. These other islands, as Dr. Bournes and this 
Andre point out, are scarcely in revolt against Spain now. Whether, 
resulting from example in Luzon, they would be. incited to insur- 
rection IS a question. Aguinaldo is the head and front of the 
insurrection so far as it extends. 

Mr. Frye. Suppose we had the possession as I suggest, "with a good 
government as I suggest, the knowledge of which would be in time 
conveyed to these other islands, that these people in Luzon were so 
much l)etterofE than they were, do you think the natives of Luzon 
would abstain from sending fiUbusteriiig expeditions and inciting 
rebellion in these other islands? 

General Merritt. I think, as Major IJell has pointed out, there are 
a good many of these insurrectionists who like the business because 
they have nothing to lose and something to gain in the way of booty. 
Mr. Fry^e. Do you not think, if we retain Luzon, and the other 
islands remain under the sovereignty of Spain, we should be in con- 
tinual dangei- of a conflict with Spain? 

General Merritt. I think so, unquestionably. 

Mr. Davis. I did not understand the General to answer clearly the 
first (iuestion, which was that if we should set up a government in 
Luzon which, by its fairness, would invite comparison with that of 
Spain, what would those other islands do about it? 



TREATY OF PEACE. 369 

General Merritt. I do not know enough about those other islands 
to give an opinion. 

Mr. Gray. Are they intelligent enough to appreciate the difference? 

General Merritt. I doubt if they are, because they are not much 
on the seacoast, and they do not know much about it. As Senator 
Frye suggests, filibustering expeditions might be raised at Luzon. 

Mr. Gray. Suppose, by final treaty with Spain, we should abandon 
I/Lizon and all the Philippines, exacting such terms and conditions 
and guaranties as we should think necessarj^, and abandon them 
entirely, reserving onlj^ a coaling station, perhaps; what do you think 
they would do about it? 

General Merritt. I think in the island of Luzon they would fight 
to the bitter end. I have talked with a number of them, intelligent 
men, who said their lives were nothing to them as compared with the 
freedom of the country, getting rid of Spanish government. 

Mr. Davis. Do you think Spain would be able to reduce them? 

General Merritt. No, sir. 

Mr. Gray. Do you think, in the event of such an abandonment, it 
would be ijossible for them to set up a self-government? 

General Merritt. It would take time to do it. They would have 
to be educated ui? to it. They want a protectorate, but they do not 
exactly understand what that means. Their idea is that they should 
collect the revenues and keep them in their treasury, and that we 
should be at the exi)ense of maintaining an army and a navy there 
for their protection, which is tlie kind of a protectorate they would 
like very much. 

Mr. Frye. I suppose their idea of government is practically derived 
from the Spaniards? 
. General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

The C'hairman. What they desire is a government for their benefit, 
maintained and paid for by us? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Davis. Do you understand that condition of slavery prevails 
which is described in tliat letter read? 
-General Merritt. Yes, sir; entirely as described by Mr. Andre. 

Mr. Gray. If Admiral Dewey had sailed awaj^ after accomplishing 
that naval achievement and left this people as he found them, except 
for the destruction of the Spanish fleet, what, in your opinion, would 
have been the condition of tlie island as to Spanish supremacy and 
their ability to supj)ress the rebellion? 

General MERRITT. If»the Spaniards had replaced their fleet with 
another, I do not believe the revolutionists could have taken Manila. 
Along th(; bay it is 30 miles, 17 by water, and the coast shows the 
evidences of where the Spaniards have used the guns of their fleets, 
riddled the houses with shells, and prevented the insurgents from 
approaching the town; and the insurgents would have been driven to 
approach the town from the interior, where the Spanish troops were 
concentrated against tliem. It was only after the destruction by 
Dewey of the fleet and his occupation of the bay that these people 
surrounded the place and held their positions and took possession of 
the waterworks, which they held for some two or three months. For 
two months, perhaps three months, the water had been cut off from 
the town. 

Mr. Reid. What is the nature of that supply? 

General Merritt. Very good. 

T p 24 % 



370 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Reid. Good aqueducts, and from a stream? 

(General Merritt. Yes, sir; fresh watej" from a stream in the 
mountains. 

Mr. Davis. How many troops, in j'our opinion, will ])e necessary to 
administer the government of this island — to secui-e the administra- 
tion of our Government there? . 

General Merritt. From 20,()()() to 25,000 would be necessary at first. 

Mr. Davis. And after that? 

General Merritt. After that they might be very materially reduced, 
because yon could get natives into the occupying forces there who 
would make perfectly good soldiers. 

Mr. Frye. I was going to inquire whether it would not be possible 
to get natives to enlist, and whether Aguinaldo could not be given a 
command? 

General Merritt. Perfectly so, perfectly. 



PAPERS TO ACCOMPANY THE STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WESLEY 
MERRITT, U. S. A., OCTOBER 4, 1898, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES 
PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. 



INDEX. 

OPINIONS ON PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 

Page. 

Greene. Bvig. Gen. F. V 374 

Bourns. Frank S. . major and chief surgeon 375 

Bell. J. F. . major of Engineers 379 

Dewey, Rear- Admiral George - - 383 

Jewett, Charles L. , lientenant-colonel, judge-advocate 385 

Belgian consul at Manila . 386 

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL AGUINALDO. 

Anderson. Gen. T. M. (Jnly 4) Advises commanding general Philippine 
forces of the entire sympathy with the United States of the native 
peoi)le of the islands. Desires amicable rehvtions witii the people and 
their cooperation. It will be necessary to occupy the town of Cavite 
as a base of operations, biit no interference will be made with the func- 
tions or privileges of General Aguinaldo or the other native citizens. 
Asks that the officers of the insurgent forces be instructed not to inter- 
fere with United States officers in the performance of their diities in 
Cavite : 390 

Aguinaldo. General. (July 5) Expresses gratitude to General Anderson for 
the sympathy of the United States. Has already ordered noninterfer- 
ence with United States officers. Asks that he be informed of any mis- 
conduct of any of his people 390 

Anderson, General. (July 6) Acknowledges letter of 5th instant from 
Sefior Aguinaldo. commanding Philippine forces, and says he is anxious 
to come to a definite understanding. Expects large addition to his 
forces, and will need more camping room. Is anxioiis to avoid any con- 
flict of authority, but miist have place for landing of supplies and storing 
of same 391 

Jones. Major and Quartermaster. (July 17) Informs General Aguinaldo 
that the second expedition of United States troops (five to seven thousand 
men) will encamp in vicinity of Paranaque. Certain assistance Avill be 
required in the way of horses, etc. Payment will be made forthis. Sup- 
plies must be had even if it is necessary to seize them. Request made 
by General Anderson's direction 391 

Memorandum. (July 17) General Aguinaldo and secretary called upon 
General Andei'son to say that two Americans assuming to be officers had 
called and presented a letter, as to which he requested a statement 
whether it was authorized 392 

Anderson. General. (Jxilj 19) Acknowledges letter of General Aguinaldo 
of the 18th instant, and returns thanks for the offer of assistance. Says 
there will be no confiscation of property, and that a fair compensation 
will be given for all supplies 393 

Anderson. General. (July 19) Introdiices to General Aguinaldo Maj. J. F. 
Bell, and asks that he be afforded every facility for obtaining informa- 
tion 393 

371 



372 TREATY OF PEACE. 



Paae. 



Anderson. G-eneral. (July 21) Asks passes and snch other assistance as 
practicable be given Lieut. E. J. Bryan and party for reconnoitering tlie 
country 393 

Anderson. General. (July 22) Replies to letter of General Aguinaldo in 
regard to property of Don Antonio Osorio. The property in question will 
be held subject to investigation. Has no authority to recognize the 
assumption of dictatorship by Aguinaldo 393 

Anderson. General. (July 28) Advises General Aguinaldo of his request 
of three weeks ago as to the necessity of means of transportation for the 
American army, and to which he has hitherto received no response. j 

Makes requisition for 500 horses, 50 oxen, and ox carts. If Aguinaldo j 

can not secure these, requisition will have to be made directly upon the 
people .- 394 ' 

Aguinaldo. General. (July 24) Replies to General Anderson's strictures 
as to seizure of a storehouse of Antonio Osorio in Cavite. Says he came 
from Hongkong to prevent his countrymen from making common cause 
wdth the Spanish against the United States. He then x^roclaimed himself 
dictator and established a revolutionary government, which exists to-day. 
While such government has not been recognized by foreign powers, he 
expects the United States will look uix)n it with greater benevolence than 
any other nation. Considers it inadvisable for United States troops to 
be landed in places conquered by Filipinos from the Spanish withoiit 
previous notice to him. Such act might be misunderstood by the people. 
Is well aware of what he and his people owe to Admiral Dewey, biit 
very anxious to prevent foreign intervention prejudicial to the United 
States as well as to the native population of the Philippines 394 

Aguinaldo. General (July 24). States that he misunderstood the desires of 
the United States forces before, but now he will assist in supplying all 
requisitions for transportation necessities if given reasonable notice 395 

Anderson. General. Refers to letter of 24th instant of Sefior Aguinaldo, 
touching the property of Don Antonio Osorio. Advises him that same 
has been referred to General Merritt (July 27) 396 : 

Anderson, General. Aclniowledges General Aguinaldo"s letter of 26th as 
to the cattle, horses, etc. Regrets misunderstanding, but was informed 
that nothing coiild be supplied except by order of Aguinaldo. The United 
States quartermaster will establish a depot near the American camp and 
will receive and pay for all supplied. This communication bears date 
July 24 . 3961 

Anderson. General (July 27) . Transmits last letter he received from insur- 
gent chief, dated Bacood, July 24. Also submits entire correspondence 
of insurgent chief 397 i 

Anderson, General (Jiily 27). With a view to obtain information as to 
approaches to Manila, reqiiests Aguinaldo to give the officers making 
reconnoissance all possible assistance 397 i 

Aguinaldo. General (August 1). Informs Consul Williams that he is 
impressed by the note of July 8, and thanks him for kind words therein. I 

Thinks the islands will be in eflt'ect one of the richest and pleasantest 
coimtries of the globe if the capital and industry of North Americans 
come to develop the soil. In reference to annexation, does not think his 
people can be made to believe this. Makes suggestions as to the expecta- 
tions of his people and desires that Mr. Williams inform Washington that 
tlie Filii)inos have al)and( )ned savagery, etc 3Q7i, 

Aguinaldo. General (August 14) to General Anderson with regard to his 
being allowed to enter Manila, and the desirability of preventing conflict 
between the two forces 399 

Aguinaldo. General (August 13) to General Anderson in reference to diffi- 
culties between Filipino forces and American forces, and the strict orders 
lie gave his chiefs to jireserve great respect for American forces 399 

Merritt. General. With regard to a memorandum from General Aguinaldo 
addressed to General Anderson which purports to contain a. statement of 
certain desires on the part of the Filipinos. Sets forth concessions which 
will be granted Filipinos after certain conditions are complied with. 
Dated August 20 400 

Aguinald( J . General. ( August 21 . ) Agrees to withdraw his forces from the 
suburbs to the line indicated by General Merritt if the within promises 
and conditions are agreed to. 400 



TREATY OF PEACE. 373 

Page. 

Agiiinaldo. Genei'al. (Aiignst 24.) Telegram to General Merritt in regard 
to the death of an American soldier at Cavite. Promises full investiga- 
tion, bnt is of the opinion that his people are not responsible for the 
trouble 401 

Merritt, General. Letter to Agiiinaldo acknowledging communication of 
21st instant. Refers him to Admiral Dewey in regard to larotection of 
American sqiiadron. Promises good will of American peox)le 401 

Merritt. General. (August 25.) Reply to telegram from Aguinaldo dated 
August 24. Thanks him for notifying him so promptly and trusts that 
harmony will prevail 402 

Aguinaldo. General. (August 27. ) Is surprised that the General thinks his 
commissioners committed themselves in regard to the withdrawal of 
troops outside the line designated. Is disposed to sacrifice to friendship 
everytliing not prejiidicial to the rights of the Philippine"s city. Compre- 
hends inconvenience of a double occupation of the city. Asks that the 
aid of the Filipinos be not made light of and promises to withdraw his 
troops to certain lines. Does not believe that the acceptance of the con- 
ditions proposed would be prejudicial to the rights of the city. Is forced 
to insist upon the said conditions to qiiiet the grumblings of his chiefs 
and soldiers, who have already sacrificed much 402 



MEMORANDUM CONCERNIXd THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 

/ [Made August 27, 18il8.1 

By Gen. F. V. Greene. U. S. V. 

If tlu' X^'iiilcd Slates evacnate tliese islands, anarchy and civil war 
will ininiediately ensne and lead to foreii>n intervention. The insnr- 
uents were furnished arms and the moral support of the Xavy prior 
to our arrival, and we can not ignore obligations, either .to the insur- 
gents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed uj^on us. 
The Spanish (lovernment is completely demoralized, and Spanish 
jKiwer is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain would be 
unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. Spaniards 
indi\'idualiy stand in great fear of the insurgents. The Spanish Gov- 
ernment is disorganized and their treasury bankrupt, with a large 
floating debt. The loss of property has been great. On the other 
hand, the Filipinos can not govern the country without the support 
of some strong nation. They acknowledge^ tliis themselves, and say 
their desire is for indeijendence under American protection; but thej^ 
have only vague ideas as to what our relative positions would be — 
wliat part we should take in collecting and expending the revenue 
and administering the government. 

The hatred between the Spanish and natives is very intense and 
can not be eradicated. The natives are all Roman Catholics and 
devoted to the church, but have bitter hatred for monastic orders — 
Dominican, Franciscan, and Recollects. They insist that these be sent 
out of the country or they will murder them. Tliese friars own the 
greater ])art of tlie land, and have grown rich by oppressing the native 
husbandmen. Agtnnaldo's army numbers 10,000 to 15,000 men in 
vicinity of ]Manila, who have arms and ammunition, but no regular 
organization. They receive n(5 pay, and are held together by hope of 
booty when they enter jNFanila. They are composed largely of young 
men and boys from surrounding country, who have no property and 
nothing to lose in a civil war. Aguinaldo has two or three ships, and 
is sending armed men to the noi'thern portions of Luzon and to other 
ishiiids. TheSpaniards there, being cut off from communication with 
jNIanila and Spain, can not be reenforced. 

I'he result will be an extension of the civil war and further destruc- 
tion of property. There are in Manila itself nearly 200,000 native 
Filipinos, among whom are large numbers with more or less Spanish 
and Chinese blood who are men of character, education, ability, and 
wealth. They hate the Spanish, are unfriendly toward other nations, 
and look only to America for assistance. They are not altogether 
in s.\'inpathy with Aguinaldo, fearing the entry of his army into 
jNIaiiila almost as much as the Spaniards fear it. They say Aguinaldo 
is not fit1e<l either by ability or experience to be the head of a native 
govei-nnuMit, an(i doul)t if he would be elected President in an honest 
election. Principrd foreign interests here are British, and their feel- 
374 



TREATY OF PEACE. 375 

ing- is uuaniinous in favor of American occupation. They have 
already forwarded a memorial to their Government asking for it as 
the only way to protect life and property. 

Altogether the situation here is somewhat similar to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1878, and Egypt in 1882, and the only practicable 
solution seems to be on lines somewhat similar to those adopted in 
those cases. The length of our, occupation would depend on circum- 
stances as developed in the future, but should be determined solely 
in our discretion without obligation to or consultation with other 
powers. This plan can only be worked out by careful study by the 
Paris Commission, and they should have advice and full information 
from some one who has been liere during our occupation and thor- 
oughly understands the situation. It is not understood in America, 
and unless properly dealt with at Paris will inevitably lead to future 
complications and possibly war. 

The currency of the country is silver. The Mexican dollar is pre- 
ferred, and worth about 47 cents gold, but the gold dollar will not 
buy in lalwr or merchandise any more than the Mexican dollar, and 
any attempt to establish a gold basis for currency would ruin any 
business in the islands. 

The total revenue is about $17,000,000 Mexican, derived about 35 
per cent froni customs, 50 per cent from internal taxes, and 15 per 
cent from state lottery and sale of monopolies. More than two-thirds 
of the internal revenue comes from poll tax or cedula, which is very 
unpopular. The country was self-supporting and free of debt until the 
insurrection broke out about two years ago, but the expenses of the 
civil war-have disorganized finances. There is a bonded debt, Series A, 
$15,000,000 Mexican, held in Spain, for which the colony never received 
any consideration, and another debt, Series B, same amount, which 
was forced on the pi^ople here, and the validity of which is open to 
question. Both debts are secured by lirst liens on custom-house 
receipts, but this does not appear to liave been respected. 



Manila, Philippine Islands, August W, 1898. 

Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., 

Manila, PliUijypine Islands. 

Sir: In obedience to your request I have the honor to submit the 
follow ing : 

Although the Island of Luzon is the largest of the Philippine group, 
and likewise the most important, there are others of great importance, 
especially from the commercial view-point. The most important of 
these are known as the Visayas, and include the islands of Panay, 
Negros, Zebu, Sanmr, Leyte, Masbate, Romblon, Taljlas, and 
Cibuyan. 

The Island of Zebu, on which the City of Cebu is situated, is almost 
entirely under cultivation, there being but little of the original for- 
ests to be found. Here are cultivated sugar, to a limited extent 
hemp, Indian corn, and other products. Here, likewise, are found 
mines of coal and deposits of petroleum, both as yet undeveloped. 

Panay, on which the city of Hollo, the second port in commercial 
importance in the islands, is situated, is also well under cultivation, 
there being but few places in the northwest and west still covered 
with forests. Both of these islands are inhabited by the Visayan race, 



376 TREATY OF PEACE. 

all of \\iu)m have adopted Cliristianity and all of Avhoin are under 
ti-il)ute to Spain. -: 

The island of Xegros, situated between these two islands, is also of 
great importanee from an agricultural view-point. There still exists 
in the interior of this island a great amount of forests, and some of 
the tribes in the interior have never l)een made tributory to Spain. 
It is a great sugar-producing ishmd, almost all of the lowlands near 
the coast l)eing under cultivation. 

Samar and I.eyte, to the east, are not so well developed, but a great 
deal of hemp of the best quality is produced there, the most of which 
liuds its way to nuirkets by way of Manila, although some is shipped 
from Cebu. Most of the sugar produced in the tliree islands lii-st 
mentioned is marketed at Iloilo. 

The snuiller islands mentioned — Masbate, Rond)lon, Tablos, and 
C'ibuyan — are of more importance as supi)orting large herds of cattle, 
the island of Masbate being especially noteworthy for this. The 
products of the islands just mentioned are marketed abnost entirely 
in Manila. All of the people in these islands, with the exception of 
the few mentioned in the interior of Negros, are docile, well disposed, 
and easily nuiiuiged. They are somewhat less energetic than the 
Tagologs of Luzon, and have never been involved in the insurrections 
occui'ring in these islands, to my knowledge, except in Cebu in 180G, 
and then through the influence of Tagologs sent there for the jjurpose 
of stirring up the insurrection. 

Mindanao, Basilan, and the Sulu gi'oup are inhabited for the most 
part by Malay tribes belonging to the Mohammedan faith. The inte- 
rior of the great island of Mindanao has never been conquered by the 
Spaniards. The important Spanish towns on this island are located 
on the seacoast and are inhabited largely l)y the emigrants from the 
other islands. 

The Sulu group has recently been brought under partial control of , 
Spanish authority, but as yet the inhabitants do not pay tribute to j 
Spain, or at least they did not up to the year of 1893. 

The island of Palawan, on the west, is almost entirely undeveloped, 
there being perhaps a half dozen small Sjianish towns along the sea- 
coast on either side. The most important settlement is at Puerto 
Princesa, where there is a fine harbor. The most of the inhabitants 
are known as Tageannas, a Malay tribe just being brought under the - 
influence of Spanish methods. 

The Caliaimanes, northeast of Palawan, are inhabited by the same 
ti'ibe, but more emigrants are found here than in T*alawan. Cattle 
are shipped fi'om here to ^Manila, grazing being the principal industry. 

The large island of ^Nlindoi'o, just south and west of Luzon, is almost 
entii'ely undevelopcnl, there l)eing but a few Spanish towns along the 
coast. ' The fcAvagricultui-al ])i'oducts of this island are almost entirely 
consumed hy the inhabitants themselves, the principal exports being 
jungle produi'ts, such as rattan and woods. The sago palm grows 
abundantly tliroughout this island, and sago flour is the principal 
l)i-ea(is1uff of tile uncivilized tribes of the interior. This island is 
sup])osed to contain large deposits of coal, and T myself at one time 
lound outci'oppings indicating a coal dejjosit at a place within easy 
communication of the, seacoast. 

In i-egard to the island of Luzon T do not deem it necessary to say 
much, as it is the l)est-known island of the group. Large areas are 
under cultivation aiul lai'ge areas are still covered with the primeval 
forests. 'I'lie majority of the ])e()j)le have been chi-ist ianized and are 



TREATY OF PEACE. 377 

under the control of Spain, but manj' tribes in the forests and moun- 
tains have never l)een, influenced by the Spanish Government. Tlie 
l^roducts of the island are, as known varied — sugar, hemp, tobacco, 
chocolate, and coffee being- the important ones. 

As is i)rol)al)ly well known to you, the forests of the Philippines 
produce most valuable woods in almost unlimited quantities. These 
have never been properly cared for or developed, owing to the restric- 
tions and hindrances of the Spanish law. This same applies to all 
industries in the Philippines. 

In regard to the people of the entire archipelago and the feasibility 
of bringing them uiider our control, I see no reason to change tlie 
opinion I gave to you before we left the United States. I believe that 
the masses of tlie people will accept our government as soon as tliey 
understand the form of government that we would offer. The people 
are for the most part easily controlled by proper methods, the essence 
of which can be expressed in two words — justice and firmness. 

It has been my observation, and this is l^acked by tlie statements of 
many intelligent natives and half-casts with whom I have talked, that 
the Philippine native will accept merited punishment without com- 
plaint and without the feeling of injury having been done him. 

I still believe that if a few of the ambitious chieftains now in 
control of the insurgent army could be disposed of, the masses of 
the people could be handled without difficulty. At the present it is 
my opinion that these chieftains find themselves in a difficult posi- 
tion on account of the promises made to their followers in regard to 
looting Manila, said prcmiises being so far unfulfilled. Their troops 
have been serving up to the jiresent time almost without remunera- 
tion, promises being made that their reward would come when Manila 
capitulated. 

Since nij^ arrival I have availed myself of every opportunity to talk 
with natives and half-castes, both in the insurgent territory and in 
Manila. I find that many of them would be perfectly willing to accept 
an American government, and many of them are very anxious that 
we should take full possession of the islands. Many others hold to 
the desire of the insurgent chiefs for a Philij)pine government under 
the protection of the United States. These ]3eoj)le express themselves 
as being confident of their own ability to govern the islands. Many 
of these would not be satisfied until the experiment had been tried, 
but I do not believe that such a government would be a success, and 
that the United States would ultimately have to take hold of the gov- 
ernment. This for several reasons: First, because the only example 
of government ever seen by these people is that given by Spain, and 
they would naturally follow quite closely the methods heretofore pur- 
sued; second, lack of unity, not only among the impoi'tant men here 
in the island of Luz(jn, l)ut likewise on account of lack of union and 
full understanding with the various other races of the archipelago, 
such, for instance, as the Visayas of the central islands; third, 
because of the three other elements in the islands — the uncivilized hill 
tribes, the Mohammedans of the south, and the Chinese residents 
found in all parts of the islands. 

The feeling existing l)etween the Filipinos and the Chinese resi- 
dents can be seen any day, by anyone who will take the trouble to 
notice it, in the streets of Manila. The Chinese, being naturally more 
industrious and more thrifty than the Filipinos, usually succeed bet- 
ter, the result being a feeling of extreme jealousy on the part of the 
Filipinos. I know from observation that this racial feeling woMd 



378 TREATY OF PEACE. 

be very havd to overcome, as between the Catholic Filipinos and 
the MohanniKMlans of the south questions would constantly arise 
dilhcult of ad.juslineut by any but a third and stronger party. 

In regard to the hill tril>es, or what are called savage tribes, I have 
observed in various parts of the island that they are illtreated, 
imposed upon in every way, and generally considered to be of a very 
inlVrior race, to be treated without consi<lerat ion l)y the Catholic 
natives. 

Another reason for supposing that difficulty would arise in case 
of self-government is the jealousy among the chieftains themselves. 
These observations have been made since my arrival here, and are 
substantiated by conversations with many natives and half-castes. 
They themselves state that as soon as a Filipino is appointed to olhce, 
such as lieutenant or captain, or to a higher rank, he immediately 
considei-s himself 'far above his fellow-Filipinos, treats them with 
severity and disdain, and, in short, attempts to imitate as closely as 
possible the methods pursued by Spanish officials in their treatment 
of the natives. I have definite information also that at least three or 
four of the leading men of tlie provinces to the north and east of 
Manila are not at all in harmony with those in authority around 
Manila. All of these conditions would, in my opinion, sooji bring 
about a distressing condition. 

The only point on which all the natives and half-castes I have 
talked with agree is that they will never, so long as they have arms, 
ammunition, or men, submit again to Spanish authority. Their bit- 
terness of feeling against the Spaniards can scarcely be exaggerated. 
This fact I have had abundant opportunity to know. 

The feeling against the monastic orders is, as you know, not against 
the church itself, as they are all good Catholics and wish well toward 
the Catholic Church. The bitterness is directed against all the mem- 
bers of the monastic orders, with the exception of the Jesuits, v.iiose 
only work here is missionary, scientific, and educational. Even the 
most rabid among them have expressed to me their api^reciation of 
the work being done by the Jesuits. 

Taken as a whole, the Philippine Islands are as rich and productive 
islands, with as good climate and as good natural advantages, as are 
to- be found anywhere in the tropics. 

In conclusion, I wish to state that these opinions are only my per- 
sonal ()i)inions, founded upon extensive observations in these islands 
and comparison with other tropical regions which I have visited. I 
give them to you in obedience to your request, and whether the}^ prove 
to be right or wrong I can only assure you that tliey are my honest 
con\ictions, and founded only upon personal observations made dur- 
ing a three years and a half residence in these islands. 

From a personal interest in such nuxtters I have always talked freely 
with the peojde of whatever place I have visited, not expecting tiiat 
my views would be needed in any such emergency. I do believe, how- 
ever, that in the nuiin they are fairly accurate, and that my estinude 
of the pe()[)le and of the islands and their resources is not far amiss. 
I am, sir, very respectfullj', 

Frank S. Bourns, 
Major and (^hief Surgeon, U. S. Volunteers. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 379 

[Headquarters United States Expeditionary Forces and Department of the Pacific— Office of 

Military Information.] 

Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 1898. 
Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, F. S. A., 

Manila, Phniiypine Islands. 

Sir: I'ursiiant to your verbal instructions, I have the honor to 
report the following facts and opinions : 

In the city of Santa Cruz, the capital of La Laguna, about (>00 
Spaniards are besieged by insurgents. 

Albay, held by a detachment of Spanisli forces, number not known, 
is also besieged by insurgents. 

All the Spanish in the Province of Tayabas have just been captured 
by insurgents, together with a considerable amount of money and 
other J)ropert3^ 

The Spanish still hold Daet, the capital of Camarines Norte, and 
Nueva Caceres, the capital of Camarines Sur, but both places are 
besieged by insurgents. 

The four provinces, Llocos Sur, Llocos Norte, Isabella, and Cagayan 
are still in the possession of the Spanish, but 400 insurgents have 
been dispatched to attack the Spanish in these provinces. 

About 250 Si)aniards hold jVIoron.g, the capital of the province of 
the same name. 

There is one company of Sjjanish infantry in Yap, the capital of 
Ponape, one of the Caroline Islands. 

There are also a considerable number of Spanish troops in Cebu, 
Iloilo, Leyte, and Mindanao. 

The island of Mindoro and the provinces of Batangas, Pampangas, 
Pangasenan, Bulacan, La Fnion, Tayabas, Bataan, Zanbales, Tarlac, 
and Cavite (all in the island of Luzon) are under tlie control of insur- 
gents. 

Concerning the insurgents now under arms and about the city, it is 
practically impossible to count or estimate tlieir number for several 
reasons: First, they ai-e being continually sent away to other prov- 
inces; second, many of them have laid aside their arms temporarily 
to raise crops for their families. As the organization is very loose, no 
captain knows the exact number of his following. No reports have 
ever been made to General Aguinaldo. The closest estimate that can 
be made of the available armed insurgent force is based upon the 
number of arms recently captured from the Spanish militia, from the 
arsenal at Cavite, from Spaniards captured in battle, and bought from 
Jackson and Evans. Together with the number it is fair to estimate 
were in the hands of Filipinos, who got them in jjrevious insurrection, 
this foots up about 40,000, as follows: 

From militia. 12, 000 

From arsenal 2, 500 

From Jackson and Evans. - . 2. 000 

From Spanish 8. 000 

In hands of Filipinos (about) lo, 000 

Total 39,500 

From this number there should proliably l)e deducted several thou- 
sand guns recaptured by the Spanish and turned in under the pro- 
visions of a proclamation offering $50 and amnesty to each insurgent 
who would come in and give himself and his rifle up to the Spaniards. 

It is assumed that every Filipino who has a gun is ready material 



380 TREATY OF PEACE. 

for ail armed insuiTeetionist, providinji' sutfieient provocation exists 
to ai)i)eal to the resentment of all. 

Aiiiiinaldo's followin<>-, however, is not so great, nor can all of those 
who are nnder arms be considered eqiial in loyalty to their chief. 
Gi'eat differences of opinion exist among- them, and General Agninaldo 
is just now experiencing considerable difficulty in maintaining con- 
trol over his loosely organized forces. He has <'ertain men among his 
leaders who are dishonest and unworthy, and are now guilty of con- 
duct which seriously reflects upon the character of the insurgent. 
'I'll is is well known to General Aguinaldo, but he is powerless to pre- 
vent it, because he realizes that an effort to do so would be an end of 
theii- subordination to him. 

Goncerning the capacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves, I 
regret to say that I see no reason to change the opinion previously 
expressed, that they are unfit. I wish my opinion might be other- 
wise, foi- I prefer to l)elieve them capable of self-government. There 
are a number of Filipinos whom I have met, among them General 
^Vguinaldo and a few of his leaders, whom I believe thoroughly trust- 
worthy and fully capable of self-government, and the main reliance 
for small official positions and many larger ones Avould be upon people 
who know no standard of government other than that the Spaniards 
have furnished. Their sense of equity and justice seems not fully 
developed, and their readiness to coerce those who come under their 
power has been strongly illustrated in this cit}^ since our occupation. 
A regularly organized system of blackmail has been instituted under 
the guise of making subscriptions to the insurgent cause. None of 
this money ever reaches the treasury of the so-called Filipino govern- 
ment, but is doubtless divided among the petty chiefs who assume to 
authorize subordinates to collect it. 

The Filij)inos themselves, living in the outskirts of the city, are 
daily terrorized and interfered with by small bands of marauding 
insurgents, who molest them for no other purpose but the accumula- 
tion of booty. 

Aguinaldo has in Hongkong about $300,000 and in Bacoor about 
$220,000 of public funds. lie has commissioned an agent to purchase 
all the nitrate of soda to be found in Manila, and a lot more in China 
and Japan. He has a cartridge factory at Imus capable of working 
400 people. He i)roposes soon to move his headquarters to Malolos, 
on the railroad, north of Manila and only about thirty minutes' ride 
from the city. 

There is not a jiarticle of doubt but what .Vguinaldo and his leaders 
will resist any attempt of any government to reoi-ganize a colonial 
government here. They are especially bitter toward the Spaniards, 
but e([ually determined not to sul)mit any longer to being a colony of 
any other government. What they would like best of all would be a 
Filipino repul)lic with an American protectorate, for none realize their 
inability more clearly than they to maintain a republic without \)n)- 
tection of some stronger ])ower. Though they would prefer protec- 
tion fi'om America, they would accept it from any government save 
the Spanish. 

Aguinaldo has not a universal following among the Filipinos. 
'i'lKjugii he is undoul)tedly the most popular leader there is at present 
among the Filipinos, there are many of the wealthiest, most promi- 
nent, and most influential Filipino citizens who do not follow him and 
would not \()1(' lor him as president of their own free will and 



TREATY OF PEACE. 381 

accord. The native population of Manila are generally opposed to 
insurrectionists. 

A number of the rich and prominent Filipino citizens have told me 
that if the United States would govern this country for one year Agui- 
naldo's following would so dwindle that he would have no army left. 

All the people except the Spaniards, foreign residents and natives 
alike, feel that a native government would be better than the contin- 
uation of Siaanish rule; and I guess it would, for nothing could possi- 
bly be worse than the Spanish regime as it has long existed here. 
There is a very respectable and considerable number of Spaniards 
who openly condemn the corruption that has existed under Spanish 
dominion, and doubtless many more would so exj)ress themselves if 
they dared. 

Aguinaldo has recently sent all of his adjutants (eight in number) 
into the cit}' and assigned them regular districts, in which they are 
expected to observe for the purpose of preventing interference with 
citizens by members of the insurrectionary forces. He is anxious to 
maintain the best appearance and credit for his Avaning cause. 

It is openly asserted by manj" of his sympathizers that some of his 
agents are collecting subscriptions with a view of running away into 
the mountains with sufficient cash to maintain themselves in ease. 
No one is better aware of all these facts than Aguinaldo himself, and 
realizing that he was losing instead of gaining ground he has recently 
called into counsel a number of prominent and wealthy Filipinos, Avho 
have never allied themselves with his cause and at least one of whom 
has fought in the trenches against him witliin the past month. From 
among these men he has organized a committee to take charge in the 
city of Manila of all aft'airs affecting his cause and the good of the 
people. Few of these men are reallj' favorable to a Filipino gov- 
ernment, and all those who have much property at stake are praying 
that the Americans will continue in the country; so are all the for- 
eign residents, except tlie Spanish. 

In an effort to catalogue and describe the principal leaders among 
Aguinaldo\s following I have arrived at the following conclusions, 
which are believed to be practically correct: 

Aguinaldo. — Honest, sincere, and poor, not well educated, but a 
natural leader of men, with considerable shrewdness and ability; has 
the j)Ower of creating among the people confidence in himself, and is 
undoubtedly a very i)opular nmn, higlily respected by all; but there 
are many better educated and richer natives who do not think he has 
sufficient education or experience to l)e a suitable president. He was 
a "little governor" of a small town 'in one of the provinces. It is also 
said that he was a school teacher, but I have been unable to verify 
this assertion. 

There is no secretary of state, the place being kept open for one 
Cayetano S. Arellano, a prominent native citizen who is said to be the 
best lawyer and best man among the native prominent men. He is 
now in Pagsanjan, and has been repeatedly sent for but does not 
return, stating as an excuse that he can not get through Santa Cruz, 
which is held by the Spanish. He is an avowed annexationist, and 
does not believe the Filipino people sufficiently advanced in the arts 
and laws of civilization to govern themselves. 

Baldomero Aguinaldo, a flrst cousin of Don Emilio, is secretary of 
war, and is a swelled dunce, and was once a schoolmaster. 

Mariano Trias, an educated, honest man of mediocre capacity, is 
secretary of the treasury. He was the vice-president of a former revo- 



382 TREATY OF PEACE. 

lulioii, and of all the insin'i>vn1 leaders he stands next to Agninaldo 
in jjopulaiily witli the pe()i)le. -: 

Leandro V. 15a n-n, a h-nvyer and uood, honest man, is secretary of 
tlie interior. 

One Estefan de la Rama, a rich and educated man, wlio speaks 
Kn.ulish, is comma ndante de marina, or commander in chief of the 
navy. He is reported honest and capable. 

Aiiuinaldo's interpreter and secretary is one Escamilla, a i^ood lin- 
guist, s|)eakin.u- Latin, Fremdi, Si)anisli, and English — Spanish fluently 
and English well, to my personal knowledge. He was a teacher of 
the piano in Hongkong, and is one of the best interpreters I have 
ever seen. 

One jNIalabini, a student of law and notary pnblic, honest, but not 
especially talented, is one of his councilors. There is a prominent 
and wealthy citizen of this city who is also a conncilor, but I prefer 
not to mention his name. He is an avowed annexationist, and sincerely 
hopes the Americans may remain here. 

Don Felipe Agoncillo is a highly respected hiAvyer, and has for some 
1 ime been the Filipino agent in Hongkong. I undei'stand it is he who 
has been designated l)y Agninaldo to go to Paris and America to repre- 
sent the insurgent cause. 

C. Sandico, a skilled and well-educated machinist, who speaks 
English ([uite well, is a prominent man, and coadjutor of Agninaldo. 
His present commission is to appear on behalf of political prison^M-s 
before the officer charged with investigating such cases. He has 
been generall}^ useful to Agninaldo as a delegate and negotiator with 
Americans. 

Lieut. Gen. Emiliano Riego De Dios, the military governor of C'avite, 
is said to be an lionest man, but with little education. 

Major-General Ricati, in command of operations along the southern 
zone of trenches, appears and is said to be a well-meaning, honest 
man, with a fair education. 

Maj. Gen. Panteleon Garcia, in command of operations along the 
northern zone, is not educated very well, l)ut is an able, honest, polite, 
and agreeable man, who has been a schoolmaster of the primary 
grade. 

J5rig. Gen. Pio Del Pilar, a vicious, uneducated ignoramus and 
liighway i-obber. 

General Estrella, commanding the military forces in Cavite, has the 
credit of being an honest man with little education. 

Brigadier-General Mascardo, fairly educated and honest, but pos- 
sesses little ability. 

Gen. Gregorio Del Pilar is young, well educated, and honest, but 
with little experience. He belongs to a wealthy family of Nueva 
Ecija. 

Genei-alNoriel, an honest, fairly educated, w^ell-nieaning, reasonable, 
and agreeable fellow, who lias done good service and gained the repu- 
tation of a good soldier. 

Colonel Montenegro, a very conciliatory fellow to meet. Voung, 
small, and well educated. Speaks French, English, and Spanish, the 
lattei" fluently; the others very well. He is a considerable of a "talk 
a heap." Is "kinder" hon(;st and was a clerk in Lalla's hotel, where 
he received his lessons in honesty. 

Thei'c are other leadei-s of lesser grade who iti is hardly necessai-y 
to mention here. Agninaldo has many adjutants, most of whom ai*e 
young, smart, and w^ell educated. In fact nearly all of the adjutants 



TREATY OF PEACE. 383 

of all the generals belong to the jeiinersse doree Filipino, in Avhoni 
insni-rectioneiy ideas seem to breed spontaneously. Tliey are all 
bright, ambitious, active, and ^^'ell educated. Among them is one 
Captain Arevela, Noriel's adjutant, who is a dentist, having learned his 
profession from an American, who also taught him very good English. 
He has always possessed great partiality for Americans and it is 
thought has impressed this partiality upon his chief, Noriel, who on 
this account has been not only perfectly willing but strongly desirous 
of doing anything the Americans wished. 

In conclusion, 1 might add that I have met no one cognizant of the 
conditions now existing in these islands and in Spain who believes 
tliat Spain can ever again bring the Philippine Islands under subjec- 
tion to its Government. 

Very respectfully, J. F. Bell, 

Major of Engineers, in Charge. 



U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, 

Flagship Baltimore, 
Manila, Plulippine Islands, August 29, 1898. 

Sir: Referring to the Department's telegram of the 28th instant, I 

'have the honor to transmit by the hand of Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, 

U. S. v., the following views and information upon the subject of the 

Philippines. A copy of this communication is also given to Major- 

General Merritr. 

The most important islands of the Philippines are Luzon, Panay, 
Cebu, Negros, Leyte, and Mindanao. The others, owing either to the 
characte]- of tlie inhabitants, the limited amount of civilization, or the 
almost entire absence of cultivated land, WMxy be neglected in nwy con- 
sideration of the relative importance or desirability of these islands, 
especially those of the southern group, which are almost wholly given 
over to savages. 

Luzon is in almost all respects the most desirable of these islands, 
and therefore the one to retain. In it is situated Manila, the most 
important commercial as well as the most j)opulous port of all the 
islands — a port that in our hands would soon become one of the first 
ports of the world. Not only is tobncco produced in large quantities, 
but all the tobacco of fine quality grown in the Philippines comes 
from the northern provinces of this island. The interior has as yet 
not been developed. 

There is but one short railroad, from Manila to Dagupan, and no 
highway's, so that almost all the commerce is carried on by water. 
Were railroads and highways built — and labor is very cheap — there 
is little doubt that this island would rapidly increase in iDroductive- 
ness and wealth. The population of Luzon is reported to be some- 
thing over 3,000,000, mostly natives. These are gentle, docile, and, 
under just laws and with the benefits of popular education, would 
soon make good citizens. 

In a telegram sent to the Department on June 23 I expressed the 
opinion that "these people are far superior in their intelligence and 
more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am 
familiar with both races." Further intercourse with them has 
confirmed me in this opinion. 

As Luzon is the farthest north of the large islands, its climate is 
naturally the most temperate. In this connection it may be men'- 



384 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tioned lliat out of a force of over 2,000 on the ships of my squadron 
the number of men on the sick list at any time has not exceeded forty, 
nor lias there been any considerable sickiTess among our troops on 
shor^», thou'^h they were much exposed for thi-ee weeks in the trenches 
during the r<iiny season. As a matter of fact, Manila is far from 
being an uniiealthy cit}^ and the climate is as fine as that of any place 
in the troi)i('S. 

Al)out GO miles from Manila and to tlie northward and westward 
is Subig Bay, decidedly the best harbor in the Philippines, liaving no 
equal as a coaling station or naval and military base. 

The entrances are narroAV, the shores bold, the water deep, the bay 
landlocked, easily defended from attack by sea or land, and the 
fresh-water supply ample. As it is just off the trade route between 
Manila and China and Japan, it strategically commands Manila. It 
is there that the Spanish Government had planned to place its prin- 
cipal naval arsenal in the East. Already a great deal of money has 
been expended, many buildings erected, and much work done. A 
contract has been made with an English company to construct a float- 
ing dock of 12,000 tons capacity; some of the material has been 
delivered and payments made. The arsenal is on the south side of the 
hai'bor, at the village of Olongapo. It is expected that a connection 
will be made with the railroad from Manila to Dagupan, thus putting 
Subig in easy reach of Manila. 

The principal naval station in the Philippines is now at Cavite, in 
Manila Bay. It has very fair workshops for light work and ways 
for vessels of less than 1,000 tons. But it is capable of little expan- 
sion, and the small depth of water precludes the building of dry 
docks for large ships, or even the use of floating docks of much 
capacity. 

Luzon has other decided advantages both in a commercial and mili- 
tar}^ sense. It is nearest the great centers of trade in the far East, 
such as Hongkong, Canton, Shanghai, Pekin, Nagasaki, and Yoko- 
hama, and nearest the trade routes from the United States and Hono- 
lidu to those centers; consequently its influence would be greater if 
held by us. It also commands San Bernadine Strait, the principal 
water route through the Philippines from east to west. 

Fi'om all the above facts it seems patent that Luzon is by far the 
most valuable island in the group, whether considered from a com- 
mercial or military standpoint. 

Panay, Cel)u, Negros, and Leyte are very thickly populated and 
well cultivated. In these islands the natives are conceded to be the 
' best educated and furthest advanced in civilization. 

In Panay is situated Iloilo, the second commercial port of the Phil- 
ippines and the center of the sugar trade. It has a good harbor, with 
two entrances, and one that has great strategic importance. 

Cebu, the third commercial port, in the island of the same name, 
has a harbor much like that of Iloilo. 

From the best information obtainable it appears that the Philip- 
pines contain \aried and valuable mineral resources, as well as admi- 
rable timber. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

Geokce Dewey, 
Rear-Admiral, United States Navi/, 
Commanding United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station. 

The Secretary of the Navy, 

WdsliiiKjIon, D. C. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 385 

Headquarters Department of the Pacific, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 1898. 
Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S, A., 

Military Governor, Manila, Philippine Islands. 

Sir: In compliance with your order of to-daj^ I submit the following 
report : 

June 1, in comj)liance with Special Orders, No. 119, AVar Depart- 
ment, I reported to you in i^erson at San Francisco, and was verbally 
notified that you would not assign me to duty with any of the troops 
at that place, and that when j^ou arrived in the Philippines I would 
act as youi' legal adviser. That meanwhile I was to make such prep- 
aration as I could to properly discharge such duty. 

June 13 I was verbally directed by you to accompany the second 
detachment of the Philippine expeditionary forces, and on said day 
received the following letter: 

[Headquarters United States Expeditionary Forces and Department of the Pacific] 

San Francisco, Cal., June 13, 1898. 
Lieut. Col. Charles L. Jewett, 

Judge- Advocate, United States Volunteers. Sa)i Francisco, Cal. 
Sir: The Commanding General directs you to accompany the commanding gen- 
eral of the forces en route to the Philippine Islands in the capacity of legal adviser, 
and requests you to be governed by verbal instructions heretofore given you. 
Very respectfully, 

J. B. Babcock, Adjutant- General. 

I arrived at Cavite, Luzon, Jul}^ IG, 1898, and remained there, niak- 
'ing my headquarters in the house of the commandante of Cavite 
Arsenal, which had been reserved for your headquarters ashore, until 
the surrender of Manila. Upon your arrival I reported orallj^ to you 
on the steamer Newport, and by your direction remained in Cavite, 
pursuing the line of work marked out in your original instructions in 
San Francisco. 

Four weeks were thus employed in the investigation of the political 
and social condition of the people of that territory, which, until the 
surrender of Manila, was accessible. Since the surrender of Manila 
I have continued to prosecute the investigation among the leading 
jbusiness and financial residents of Manila, principally Europeans. 

SOURCES FROM WHICH INFORMATION WAS SOUGHT. 

First. From Rear-Admiral Dewey, who cheerfullj' afforded full 
information as to his own relations to the people of the adjacent ter- 
ritory, and his own transactions with and treatment of them since the 
day he destroyed the Siianish fleet. 

Second. Information furnished by General Anderson in the shape 
of letters, documents, proclamations, and communications from the 
insurgent leaders, and interviews with them. 

Third. Daily association with the native people, and almost daily 
association and contact with officers and leaders of the insurgent forces 
in their barracks, official headquarters in Cavite, and through social 
•intercourse in the homes of some of them. I was frequently at the 
house of Don Felipe Beuncamino, near Cavite, where I met a number 
of persons selected for militarj^ or civil j)ositions under the proposed 
government which Aguinaldo claimed to have established. One of 
ithe most intelligent and satisfactory of these was Seiior Ibari, selected 
by Aguinaldo's alleged government as minister of the interior. 
T p 25 



386 TREATY OF PEACE. 



I 



Fonrtli. Observation, conversation with, and investigation of cases 
of the prisoners lield by the insurgents for alleged political offenses, 
and also military prisonei's held by the same or our own forces in 
Cavite. 

Fifth. Daily communication with the native people engaged in busi- 
ness or in service, investigating their habits, customs, and questioning, 
through an interpreter, as to the reason of the dissatisfaction of the 
native people and jMestizos witli the Spanish Government. 

Sixth. General observation, as above stated, intercourse, inquiry, 
and investigation among the European residents of Manila since the 
surrender. 

From the foregoing investigation I have reached the following con- 
clusions : 

1. The mass of the people are docile and well disposed, and would 
cheerfully submit to any government that without insolence or oppres- 
sion would firmly control and intelligently direct them. 

2. The rebellion against the authorities of Spain was originally only 
an outbreak against the abuses and irritations, the agents and instru- 
ments of that government, and did not include any well-defined notion 
of independent national existence. 

3. The i^eople are not now fitted for local self-government or citizen- 
ship as those terms are used and understood iu the United States. 

4. Spain can not anywhere in the near future discharge the duty 
of government toward life and i^ropertj^ in the island of Luzon. 

5. The insurrectionary government, so called, could not sustain 
itself, even in this island. 

6. The form of government maintained in the Territories of the 
United States, prior to their being admitted as States of the Union, is 
not Israeli cable here at the present time. 

Very respectfully, 

Charles L. Jewett, 

Lieutenant- Colonel, Judge- Advocate, Eighth Army Corps. 



Manila, August 29, 1898. 

The future of the Philippine Islands is an eager and most interest- 
ing question; and if the United States does not take these islands 
under their protection, the country will be utterly ruined and all the 
foreign merchants will leave these islands. 

The retention of the island of Luzon only is not enough, and only 
a half measure, and the United States must take all or nothing. If 
the south of the Philippines remains in the hands of Spain, the insur- 
gents will attack these islands and they will be in a constant revolt, 
exactly as happened in Cuba, and the United States will have a sec- 
ond edition of wiiat has happened already, and will prepare a sec-, 
war for the same reasons. ^M i 

Spain will always remain as she is now. She will even be exactly 
tlie same under any form of government. The numerous empleados 
(officeholders) will always be the plague of all the ministers and 
always want lucrative posts with a high pay. They will never admit 
that it would be better for them and their country to work. As the 
positions of these empleados (officeholders) are very uncertain, their 
only object is, as soon as they occupy their posts, to make as much 
money as they can. Even tliose who occupy the very higliest posts in 
tlie Pliilip])ines only attend to their own ffu-tune and hardly pay atten- 
tion 1o public affairs. As they give the example of a most corrupt 



TREATY OF PEACE. 387 

administration, they are unable to i)revent their subordinates to do 
the same. The justice is lilvewise mismanaged, and wlien the accused 
does not bribe the judges tliey will leave them in jail for years with- 
out pajdng the slightest attention to these unfortunates, and some of 
these prisoners have been in jail more than ten years. 

The monks, more united, have always taken advantage of the 
troubled state of affairs and offered their protection to those who con- 
sented in allowing the money of the government to go in their hands. 
They exacted all the money that thej^ could of the Indians, and tlie 
Spanish governors protected openly these extortions. Such state of 
things exasperated the Filipinos, and those wlio suffered the most 
began the rebellion with a furj^ that astonished everybody. 

The rebellion broke out from the lower classes, and they still pre- 
dominate in the actual rebellion. Even the chiefs are ancient tenants 
of the monks. The rebellion has no committee or representatives in 
the United States, as the Cubans. This proves that those who revolted 
only act as mechanics and not as an intellectual people. Those who 
are in Hongkong, and represent there the revolution, Avent there as 
fugitives to escape from Manila, and later on they formed a meet- 
ing, and no serious man will admit that they are leading men of the 
revolution. Their names are not even known in Manila. 

The Indians are good soldiers, and suffer very little of the war. 
They can stay for days in the swamps, or can make a long march in 
this hot climate without injury. White men can not stand it, and it 
must be recognized tliat if the Indians are very jjoor leaders in poli- 
tics thej^ are good enough soldiers to be taken in good consideration. 

Since the Americans arrived in the Philippines a new period seems 
to take place, and many members of the upper classes of the Mestizos 
appeared amongst the rebels, and since then it has been i^ossible to 
discuss some matters and to demonstrate to them that if they wanted 
to be taken into consideration that they must act as civilized people, 
and not retain as prisoners private citizens, women, and children, and 
di'op many abuses that they commit exactly as the Spaniards have 
done and taught them. During the blockade of Manila manj^ liromi- 
nent families of Mestizos preferred to take refuge amongst the insur- 
gents rather than stay at the mQi'cy of the Spanish authorities in 
Manila, whose arbitrar}^ acts are too well known. 

There is actuallj^ in Europe and Paris an important colony of Fili- 
pinos belonging to the leading families of Manila, and these appear 
to be actually the representatives of the rebels. The principal of 
them pretended, however, that he never rebelled, and claimed his 
l^roperties seized by the Spanish Government. He bribed the judges, 
and they publicly recognized that he never was a rebel, and restored 
his proi^erties. Now he is the chief representative of the rebels. 
His name is P. P. Roxas. This duplicity is not much in his favor, 
but it reveals the character of the Indians or Mestizos, and in all 
their acts it will be remarked that they never are sincere. 

Monej^ is what misses the most to the rebellion, and this leads tlie 
rebels to many unlawful acts. Until the present time most all the 
money has been raised from the lower classes. The higher classes 
gave very little, and these are very unwilling to facilitate funds. This 
class is composed entirely of usurers and pawnees. All the pawn- 
shops and gambling houses belong to the j)rincipal Mestizos families! 
There is not one family free of that stigma. This proves enough 
the morality of them, and what can be expected of them. They 
surely will not risk their capital in the rebellion, because they ave 



388 TREATY OF PEACE. 

not sure enough that they will be repaid with interest. They do not 
care a snap foi' the country, and many told me that they would be 
glad to see the United States take these ishrnds under their protection 
and i)ut an end to the constant appeal of funds from the rebels. 
This was said to me by I>emito Legarda, a rich Mestizo, who was with 
Aguinaldo in Bacoor and acted as counsel, and this deceived him. 

In llic plantations belonging to the rich families of Mestizos or 
Indians, tlic workmen are treated very inhumanly. If they do not 
work (piick enough they treat them exactly as slaves were treated in 
Soutli ^Vmerica. The most common punisliment is to lash their backs 
with a thin bamboo; 25 lashes is tlie most ordinary punishment. I 
saw some receive 100 lashes in Negros Island, in the estate of Aniceto 
Lacson, an Indian. One hundred and twenty-five lashes were given 
to a man in Albay (south of Luzon) by the Indian mayor of Albay. The 
same man threatened to give 100 laslies to one of my workmen, but his 
wife warned me and I stopped it. Since then I stopped always this treat- 
ment when I happened to know it, and more than once had rows about 
it with the Spanish governor of the province, Mr. Valdes. This was 
in 1892. He told me that he would put me in i^rison if I interfered 
with the authorities. The custom all over the Philippines is to 
engage men and to pay for tliem their personal papers. This is the 
beginning of a del)t that will make a shive of a man for each dollar 
advanced; an interest of 5 cerrts is added. At the slightest fault the 
man is fined and his debt grows. Whenever he needs monej^ to 
baptize a baby or burj^ a parent the planter pays the fees direct to 
the curate, and always adds to the snuill sum advanced two or three 
dollars and the 5 cents for interest. This last way is the most heavy 
yoke. At the end of the year he owes his master $50 or $00, and as 
long as he does not pay his debt he is considered as a slave, and if he 
runs away he will be arrested and returned to his master and is 
awfully lashed. 

When an estate is sold, nearly always the pai^ers are accompanied 
with a list of the debtors. The buyer makes a bargain and buys tlie 
debts, and those who owe the money become his slaves. This is 
about the same as buying tlie slaves with a plantation. Now the 
Mestizos and Indians are tlie hardest masters, and if ever the}' dom- 
inate they will be most despotical to the Indians. The Spanish Gov- 
ernment alwa^'s tolerated this, and even protected those who used to 
treat the men as slaves and allowed the pirates to abuse the poor 
Indians. Therefore it is easy to show the Indian that it would be 
much better for him to be ruled by Americans than by his own coun- 
trymen. Whatever may be the education of the Mestizos they always 
will behave just the same as the Indians, from whom tlie^^ descend. 
They will eat witli their hands, go barefooted, and sit on the ground. 
There is an enormous difference between them and a white man. 

In the assemblies of the chiefs of the rebels and of the Mestizos of 
Manila, even when very serious matters were discussed, they used to 
joke one with the other and give his neighbor a nip and a laugh and 
behave as monkeys would do. This happened the 21st of June in the 
house of P. Paterno in Manila, and in Cavite in the house of Ozorio 
on tlie 3d of August. 

The Chinese Mestizos join the sordidness of the Indian to the craft- 
iness of the Cliinaman, and give the type of the rapacious Pawnee, 
llie Spanish Mestizo joins the presumption of the Spaniard with the 
duplicity of the Indian, and give the type of the . 

This is enough, 1 believe, to give a very slight idea of what the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 389" 

* 

Filipinos are and to demonstrate that tliey belong to an inferior race, 
unfitted to rule a country, and with such individuals distinguished 
rules must not be expected. 

Of course the education and example given by the monks and Span- 
iards is the principal cause, but even then they are worse than their 
masters, and that proves tlieir inferiority, and therefore it is more 
than time that the United States should have pity on these people and 
show them better. 

The Spaniards, with their accustomed carelessness, are unable to 
manage properly the Philippines, and these rich islands, which con- 
tain gold, iron, coal, etc., and on which splendid forests are aban- 
doned, there is only one very little railway, hardly some good bridges, 
and no harbors. Nothing has been done with the S^l 5, 000, 000 that 
these islands give annually. 

The foreign merchants in Manila are constantly robbed by the 
custom-honse officers, and no protection is given to them. If a mer- 
chant makes a claim, he will be bothered all the year round. The 
United States can assure a steady government in these islands, and 
in their hands the country will increase in wealth, and will, in a short 
time, be able to return to'^the United States the money laid out; and 
it would be certainly much cheaper and more humane to take the 
entire Philippines than to keep only part of it and to run the risk of 
a second war with Spain for the very same reason that provoked tlie 
present conflict. It is a duty of the United States to do so and to pro- 
tect the entire country. Everybody in the Philippines begs them for 
protection; even the Spanish merchants. Now, it is to be hoped that 
the United States will not deceive those who anxiously await the result 
of the meeting in Paris. 

The Indians do not desire independence. They know that they are 
not strong enough. They trust the United States, and they know that 
they will be treated rightly. The present rel)ellion only represents a 
half per cent of the inhabitants, and it would not be right to oblige 
6,000,000 inhabitants to submit to 30,000 rebels. Lnzon is only partly 
held by them, and it is not to be expected that a civilized nation will 
make them present with the rest of -the island, which is hostile to the 
tagals of Luzon. The Spanish officers refuse to fight for the sake of 
the priests, and if the Spanish Government sliould retain the Philip- 
pines their soldiers will all fall prisoners in the hands of the Indians 
in the same way as they did already, and this is becanse the army is 
sick of war witliout result, and only to put the country at the mercy of 
ithe rapacious empleados and luxurious monks. 

1 The monks know that they are no more wanted in the Philippines, 
and they asked me to help them to go away as soon as possible, and it 
is principally for them that I asked for the transports to the United 
iStates Government, and to send them to Hongkong. The Indians 
will be delighted to see them go, and will be grateful to the United 
States. 

If some chiefs of the rebellion will be a little disappointed in their 
personal pride, they will be convinced t)iat it is better for them to 
submit in any case, for most of these chiefs prefer American authority, 
and they are very anxious to know the result of the meeting of Paris. 
If the United States keeps the islands, they will remain quiet, but if 
the Spanish authority is restored in the islands, or part of them, they 
will attack the Spaniards and be in a constant revolt. This has been 
told to me by Aguinaldo, Landico, Ziroma, Mabim, and other principal 
chiefs, and repeated on Sunday, 28th of August. 

Very respectfully, Andre. 



390 treaty of peace. 

Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, Juhj i, 1898. 
Sefior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Conimanding Philijjpine Forces, Cavite, Luzon. 

General: I have the honor to inform you that the United States 
of America, whose bind forces I have the honor to command in this 
vicinity, being at war with tlie Kingdom of Spain, has entire sjanj^a- 
thy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philip- 
X)ine Islands. 

For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with 
you, and to have you and 3'our people cooperate with us in military 
operations against the Spanish forces. 

In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town 
of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this, I do not wish to 
interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and 
other native citizens of all functions and pi-ivileges not inconsistent 
Avilh military rule. 

1 would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of sol- 
diers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to 
maintain order, and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesj^, and 
kindness. 

I have therefore the honor to ask j^our excellency to instruct your 
officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their 
duties and not to assume that they can not visit Cavite without per- 
mission. 

Assuring you again of my most friendly sentiment and distinguished 
consideration, I am, with all respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Comrnandimj. 



Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, 

Comma ndiiuj the United States Volunteers. 

General: Interpi-eting the sentiments of the Philip})ine people, I 
liave the honor to express to your excellency my most pi-o found grate- 
fulness for the sympath}^ and amicable sentiments wliich the natives 
of these islands inspire the great North American nation and your 
excellency. 

I also thank most profoundly your desii'e of having fiiendly rela- 
tions with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, 
which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satis- 
faction whenever occasion represents. 

I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with 
your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their 
being unfulfilled; hoping that you will infoi'm me of wdiatever mis- 
conduct that-nuiy be done by those in my command, so as to repri- 
mand tliem and correspond with your wishes. 

I beg of youi" excellency to accept in retui'n the assurance of juy 
mosli i-espectable considei-ation. 

I remain, respectfully, Emilio Aguinaldo. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 391 

Headquarteks First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Ph'dippine Islands, July 6, 1898. 
Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, 

Cominanding Plulippine Forces. 
General: I am encouraged by the friendly sentiments expressed 
by your excellency in your Avelcome letter received on the 5th instant 
to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be 
advantageous to both. 

Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be 
aj)parent to you as a military officer that we will require much more 
room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For 
this I would like to have your excellency's advice and cooi)eration, 
as you are best acquainted with the resources of this countr^^ 

It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here 
inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemj'; but for 
a short time we must organize and land supplies and also retain a 
place for storing them near our fleet and transports. 

I am solicitous to avoid an}' conflict of authority which may result 
from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the 
same place. 

I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precautions. 
Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections 
with mine and fear epidemic disease, if the vicinity is not made clean. 
Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the 
advice of the surgeons? 

I again renew my assurances of distinguished consideration. 
I am, with great respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-.General, U. S. Volunteers, Coinmanding. 



Headquarters Expeditionary Forces 

TO THE Philippine Islands, 
Chief Quartermaster's Office, 
Cavite, Plulippine Islands, July 17, 1898. 
Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Addressed. 
Sir : General Anderson wishes me to say that the second expedition 
having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Paranaque 
from 5,Ui)0 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter, 
it will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neigh- 
borhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transporta- 
tion, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are 
willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the 
native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly 
as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we 
will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We 
would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the 
Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces 
here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the 
whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. 

General Anderson wishes you to inform your peo]jle that we are 
here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and 
material at the current market prices. 



392 TREATY OF PEACE, 

We are prepared to purchase 500 horses at a fair price, but can not 
undertake to bargain for horses with eacli individual man. 

I rei,a'et very much that I am unable to se'e you personally, as it is 
of the utmost importance tluit tlu'se arrangements should be made as 
soon as possible. 

I will a wail your reply. 

Sam R. Jones, 
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers, 
Chief Quartermaster. 



At 3.30 p. m. July 17, General Aguinaldo and secretary called to 
say that two Americans assuming to be officers had called and pre- 
sented a letter as to which he requested a statement whether it was 
authorized. 

The following indorsement was put upon it — 



[First indorsement.] 

Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 17, 1898. 
The request herein made by Major Jones, chief quartermaster, was 
made by my direction. 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine IshuuJs, July 19, 1898. 
Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Coinmanding General, PhUippine Forces. 
General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your let- 
ter of the 18th instant. Your offer of assistance is appreciated and 
your assurances of good will are most gratifjing. 

The difticulty of collecting supplies, referred to by you, is appre- 
hended, and will be considered in hxing compensation. 

As a medium of communication with your people, we will be pleased 
to have you assure them that there will be no confiscation of their 
property, that our requisitions will be reasonable, and that a fair 
compensation will always be given. 

I remain. General, with all respect, your obedient servant, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. 8. Volunteers, Commanding. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 393 

Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 19, 1898. 

Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding General, Philippine Forces. 
General: The bearer, Maj. J. F. Bell, U. S. A., was sent by Maj. 
Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., to collect for him, by the time of 
his personal arrival, certain information concerning the strength and 
positions of the enemy and concerning the topography of the country 
surrounding Manila. 

I would be obliged if you would permit him to see your maps and 
place at his disposal any information you may have on the above 
subjects, and also give him a letter or pass addressed to your subor- 
dinates which will" authorize them to furnish him any information 
they can on these subjects, and to facilitate his passage along the 
lines upon a reconnoissance around Manila on which I propose to 
send him. 

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters, First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary P'orces, 

Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898. 

Seiior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding General, Philippine Forces. 
General: I have the honor to request that passes and such other 
assistance as practicable be given to the bearer, Lieut. E. J. Bryan, 
and party, who are making a reconnoissance of the surrounding 
country. 

Thanking you for assistance given on previous occasions, 
I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavile Arsenal, Jidy 22, 1898. 
Seiior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding General Philippine Forces. 
General: Repljdng to your excellency's letter in relation to the 
property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have tlie honor to state that if he 
transferred the property to you i)ersonally, before the capture of 
Cavite by our forces, it will give me great pleasure to transfer the 
property in question to you. If, however, the property was not 
transferred to your excellency until after the capture of Cavite, the 
property would appear to have been public Spanish property or con- 
traband of war and subject to capture. 

This property will be held subject to investigation, but Don Osorio 
must make his claim and offer his proof to the commanding officer of 
the American Army. 



394 TREATY OF PEACE, 

I observe that your excellency lias announced yourself as a dictator 
and proclaimed martial law. As I am here suuply in a military capac- 
ity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders 
from mj" Government on the subject; and so far as I can ascertain 
your independent status lias not been recognized b}^ any foreign 
power. Your fine intellect must ijerceive that, happy as I am to see 
you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy, I 
can not, without orders, recognize your civil authority. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Yohndeers, Cotninanding. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 

United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 23, 1898. 

Senor Don Emilo Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Fhilippine Forces. 
General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your 
excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of trans- 
portation for the American army, as it was to fight in the cause of 
your i^eople. So far we have received no response. 

As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requi- 
sition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts. 

If you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make 
requisition directly on the people. 

I beg leave to request an answer at jowv earliest convenience. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Comnumding. 



[Translation.] 

I5AC00R, July :U, 1S98. 
Senor Don Thomas M. Anderson, 

Brigadier- General, Commanding 

Expeditionary Forces of the United St(des. 

General: In answer to the letter of your excellency, dated the 22d 
of the current month, I have the honor to manifest to you the fol- 
lowing: 

That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of 
Don Antonio Osorio were suliject to captui-e, when I established 
myself in the plaza (town) of Kavite, Admiral Dewey authorized me 
to dispose of everything I might find in the same, including the arms 
which the Spanish left in the arsenal. But T was aware that the said 
effects belonged to the pei'sonal property of a Filipino, who traded 
in theni by virtue of the payment of a contribution to the Spanish 
Government. I would not have touched them if the owner had not 
l)laced them at my disposition for the purposes of the war. 

I came from Hongkong to prevent m}' countrymen from making 
common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledg- 
ing before my word to Admii-a! Dewey to not give place [to allow] 
to any internal discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had 



TREATY OF PEACE. 395 

the strong convictions that I woukl sncceed in both objects, establish- 
ing a government according to their desires. 

Thus it is that in tlie beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and 
afterwards when some of the j)rovinces had already liberated them- 
selves from Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary gov- 
ernment that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and x>opnlar char- 
acter as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order 
that they [the provinces] might be justly represented, and adminis- 
tered to their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not 
been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected 
that the great North American nation, whicli struggled first for its 
independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now 
actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it 
with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we 
have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude. 

•Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors 
we have received througli Admiral Dewey, and (being) more desirous 
than anj' other person of preventing any conflict which Avould have as 
a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, 
not alone to my nation but also to that of your excellency, I consider 
it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North 
American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the 
Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no 
formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine 
people might consider the occupation of its territories by North 
American troops as a violation of its rights. 

I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron 
the Philii^pine revoluti(^n would not have advanced so rai^idly. Be- 
cause of this I take tlie libert}' of indicating to your excellency the 
necessity that, before diseml)arking, you should communicate in Avrit- 
ing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the 
object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form 
and [thus] prevent the commission of any transgression against friend- 
ship. ' 

I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident 
proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not 
answer for that which anotlier nation whose friendship is not well 
guaranteed might inspire in it [the people] ; and it is certain that I do 
this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere 
friendship which I have always professed for the North American 
people, in the complete security that it will find itself completely 
dentified witli our cause of liberty. 

With the greatest respect and consideration, 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



[Translation.] 

Bacood, July '2Jt, 1S98. 
Senor Don Thomas M. Anderson, 

Brigadier- General, Commander of the 

Expeditionary Forces of the United States. 

General: Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor 

to manifest to your excellency that I am surprised bej^ond measure 

at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreceipt of any 

response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked of me In 



396 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I replied in a precise 
manner, througli the bearer, tliat I was disclosed to give convenient 
orders whenever yon advised ine of the number of these witli due 
anticipation (notice). 

I have circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in 
the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I can not 
assure your excellency that we have the number of 500 that is needed, 
because horses are not abundant in these vicinities, owing to deaths 
caused by epizootic diseases in January' and jNIarch last. 

Whenever we have them united (or collected), I shall have the pleas- 
ure to advise your excellency. 

I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall 
place at your disposition whenever necessarj', always (premising) that 
you afford me a i)revious advice of four days in anticipation. 
Remaining, with great respect, 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, PhUippine Islands, July 27, 1898. 

Seiior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Conmianding Philippine Forces. 
General: Referring to your letter of the 24th instant, relative to 
the alleged property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to inform 
you that it has been forwarded to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, com- 
manding United States ICxpeditionar}" Forces, for his action. 
Very respectfully, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding . 



Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cainte Arsenal, Philippine Islands, Julg 2J^, 1898. 
Seiior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Philippine Forces. 
General: Your favor of the 2Gth ultimo in relation to requisitions 
for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory. I regret that there should 
have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we 
applied even for the hiring of caramates, etc., told our people that 
they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am 
pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their j^art. 

We are not so unreasonal)le as to suppose that all we want can be 
supplied at once or from one place. We may even have to send to 
other islands. Our quartermaster will establish a depot near the 
American camp, where he will receive and pay for supplies, and 
from which he will send out parties to whatever places your excel- 
lency will indicate to transact business with your people. 
With great regard, your obedient servant, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



treaty of peace. 397 

Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, PliiUppine Islands, July 27, 1898. 

Adjutant-General, 

United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Manila Bay, Philippine Islands. 
Sir: I have the honor to transmit to you the last letter I received 
from the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, dated Bacood, July 24, 1898. 
This letter has not been ansAvered by me. 

My whole correspondence witli him is also inclosed. 
Very respectfully, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, Jidy Ih, 1898. 

Seiior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Phdippine Forces. 
General: Wishing to get complete information of the approaches 
to Manila in every direction, I therefore have the honor to request 
that you give my officers all possible assistance in making recon- 
noissance to the lines and approaches, and that you favor them with 
your advice. Officers coming from me will have a note to that effect. 
With great respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- Genercd, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



August 1, 1898. 
Mr. Williams. 

Dear Sir and Distinguished Friend: Impressed by the note of 
July 8 past, I can only confess that the people of North America have 
excited, and now excite, the universal admiration not only for the 
grade of progress and culture to which they have arrived in a very 
short time, but also for their political constitution, so admirable and 
inimitable, and for the generosity, honesty, and industry of the men 
of the Government who'have so far ruled the destinies of that great 
Ijeople without an equal in history. 

Above all, I thank you sincerely for the kind words which you 
express in your note quoted above, and I congratulate you with all 
sincerity on the acuteness and ingenuity which you have displayed 
in it in painting in an admirable manner the benefits which, especially 
for me and my leaders, and, in general, for all my compatriots, would 
be secured by the union of these islands with the United States of 
America. Ah! that picture, so happy and so finished, is capable of 
fascinating not only the dreamy imagination of the impressionable 
Oriental, but also the cold and calculating thoughts of the sons of the 
North. 

This is not saying that I am not of your opinion. I am fully per- 
suaded that the Filipinos will arrive at the height of happiness and 
glory if in future they can show mth raised heads the rights which- to- 



398 TREATY OF PEACE. 

day are shown by the free citizens of North America. These islands 
will be in effect one of the richest and pleasantest countries of the 
globe if the capital and industry of North Americans come to develop 
the soil. 

You say all tliis and yet more will result from annexing ourselves to 
your peoi)le, and I also believe the same since you are my friend and 
the friend of the Filipinos and have said it. But wh}^ should we say 
it? Will my people believe itV 

I, with true knowledge of the character and habits of these people, 
do not dare assure you of it, since I have only wished to establish a 
government in order that none of those powers which you call ambi- 
tious should be able to take advantage of our good faith, as has been 
done in the past b}' the Spaniards. I have done what they desire, 
establishing a government in order that nothing important may be 
done without consulting fully their sovereign will, not onl}^ because 
it was mj^ duty, but also because acting in any other manner they 
would fail to recognize me as the interpreter of their aspirations and 
Avould punish me as a traitor, replacing me bj' another more careful 
of his own honor and dignity. 

I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the right 
of the Noi'tli Amei'icans to our gratitude, for we do not forget for a 
moment the favors which we have received and are now receiving, 
but however great those favors may be it is not possible for me to 
remove the distrust of my compatriots. 

These say that if the object of the United States is to annex these 
islands, yvhj not recognize the government established in them in 
order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexationV 

Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the 
Filipino generals and, uniting the forces, render the end more decisive? 

Is it intended, indeed, to carry out annexation against the wish of 
these people, distorting the legal sense of that Avord? If the revolu- 
tionary government is the genuine representative by right and deed 
of the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is it 
wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and friendship? 

It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the favors received 
through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up to the present the 
American forces have shown not an active, only a j^assive cooperation, 
from which they suppose that the intention of these forces are not for 
the best. They assert, besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was 
brought from Hongkong to assure those forces bj' my presence that 
the Filipinos would not make common cause M'ith the Spaniards, and 
that tliey have delivered to the Filii^inos the arms abandoned b}' the 
former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save themselves much labor, 
fatigue, blood, and treasure that a war with Spain would cost. 

But T do not believe these unworthy suspicions. ' I have full confi- 
dence in the generosity and philanthropy which shine in characters 
of gold in the history of the privileged people of the United States, 
and for that reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me 
and the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly, as 
also the distinguished generals who represent your country in these 
islands, that you entreat the Government at Wasliington to recognize 
the revolutionary government of the Filipinos, and I, for my i)art, 
will labor with all my power with my i)eople that the United States 
shall not repeut their sentiments of humanity in coming to tlie aid of 
an oi^pressed people. 

Say to the Government at Washington that the Filii)ino i)eople 



TREATY OF PEACE. 399 

abominate savagery, that in the midst of their i3ast misfortunes they 
have learned to love libertj', order, justice, and civil life, and that 
they are not able to lay aside their own wishes when their future lot 
and histor}^ are under discussion. Say also that I and my leaders 
know what we owe to our unfortunate country, that we know how to 
admire and are ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, 
and the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands 
preeminent the immortal General Washington. 

You and I both love the Filipinos; both see their progress, their 
prosperit}^ and their greatness. For this we should avoid any con- 
flict which would be fatal to the interests of both peoples, who should 
always be brothers. In this you will acquire a name in the history of 
humanity and an ineradicable affection in the hearts of the Filipino 
people. (From General Aguinaldo to Mr. Williams, United States 
consul. ) 



August 13 and 14. 
General Andeeson: 

My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always 
been jjromised that the}' could appear in it, as you know and can not 
deny, and for this reason and on account of the many sacrifices made 
of money and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the 
contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, 
I hope that you will allow the troops to enter, because we have given 
proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our x)ositions at Paranaque, 
Pasay, Cingalon, and Mytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, 
and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and 
avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I Avill 
commission Don Filipe Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out 
from our lines to hold a conference with you, and that they will be 
safe during the conference. 

E. A. Aguinaldo. 



[Most urgent. ] 

President of revolutionary government to General Anderson, Ermita. 

Pineda (received from Baceoor 10.50 a. m. 13th). 
General Anderson, Ermita: 

I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite; in consequence 
of this I have not answered till now. My troops are forced by j^ours, 
by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is 
necessary, to avoid conflicts, which I should lament, that you order 
your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have 
conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. 

I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict 
respect to American forces and to aid them in case they are attacked 
by a common enemy. I do not doubt that the good relations and 
friendshij) which unite us will be continued if j'our soldiers correspond 
to the conduct imposed upon mine. (Communication received by 
General Anderson from Aguinaldo the day of the attack on Manila.) 



Bakor, August 21, 1898. 

Commanding-General of the American Forces of the Pacific. 

Sir: The cominaiuliiig-general of the Philippine foi-ces has been 

favored Ijy a letter from your excellency, dated the 2()th of the ])resent 

montli, Avhich contains the conditions to be accepted by the Filipinos, 



400 ^ TREATY of PEACE. 

Headquarters Department of the Pacific 

AND Eighth Army Corps, 
Manila, Pliilippiue Islands, August 20, 1898. 
The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces. 

Sir: The commanding general of American forces has received a 
meniorandnm addressed to General Anderson, wliieh pnrports to con- 
tain a statement of certain desires on the part of the Filipinos. As 
most of them seem to be reasonable, ic gives him mnch pleasure to say 
that he agrees to the following: 

The forces of the Filipinos are to withdraw entirely beyond the 
jurisdiction of the old municipal limits, or walled citj^ and its 
suburbs — Binondo, Tondo, Santa Ci'uz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, 
Concepcion, Ei-mita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando dilo. The 
Filipinos will repair at once whatever may be needed, in order that 
the water may be turned on to the city, and the expenses of the repairs 
and the current expenses of the works will be paid hy the cit3^ The 
commander of the Filipinos agrees to be responsible for order and | 
secvirit}' at the pumi3ing station. 

Permission for the free navigation of the Patria to entrance and 
exit of the port and river Pasig, and that country products for sale 
be admitted free of duty is granted. 

Free entrance and departure from the city for all Filipinos with- 
out arms is granted. Chiefs and officers of the Filipino army may, 
as a matter of courtesy, wear their side arms, though this is deprecated 
as possibly leading to the disturbance of the quiet of the city. No 
j)istols should be carried. 

The major-general having taken, for his own use, the palace at 
Malacanan, the request that it be turned over to the Filipinos can 
not be granted, and the convents at Malate, Ermita, and Paco can not 
be turned over and must be evacuated. The civil offices at Manila 
are being filled as rapidly as possible by Americans, and the com- 
manding general will be glad to receive recommendations for appoint- 
ments to offices of such Filipinos as maj' be considered fitted for the 
duties of subordinate offices. 

American soldiers without arms are to be allowed to pass through 
the Filipinos' positions outside of the city, just as the Filipinos with- 
out arms are permitted to enter the city. 

The return of the arms of the hundred and fifty men will be granted 
by the general in immediate comnmnd. 

The opening of the waterworks at once and the retirement of your 
soldiers from the positions now occupied within the municipal juris- 
diction will be sufficient notice on your part that everj'thing is satis- 
factorily arranged on the terms of this letter. With the sincere hope 
that it may be speedilj' accomplished. 
I am, ver}^ respectfully, 

Wesley^ Merritt, 
Major- General Commanding. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 401 

namely, that they should evacuate the places which they now hold 
within the suburbs of Manila. 

The before-mentioned letter speaks of the free navigation of the 
Patria, and as no boat of this name is counted by the Filipinos, he 
who subscribes would be pleased to have this point made more clear. 
It is understood that the Filipinos desire the protection of the Amer- 
ican squadron, that they may have free navigation for all their boats, 
and free entrance to and departure from all ports which may be in pos- 
session of the same (squadron); but besides, in substitution of the 
proposed conditions, which the said letter does not mention, the Fili- 
pinos desire to continue in the occupation of that part of the suburbs 
of San Fernando de Dilao, or Paco, which is nearest the east of the 
bridge and stream of the same name, he who subscribes assuming 
responsibility for foreign interests which exist at said point. Equally 
I they desire that in consequence of a treaty of peace which maybe 
signed between the United States of America and Spain, the Philip- 
i pines should continue in possession of the last named, that the Ameri- 
can forces should turn ov^er to the Filipinos all of the suburbs in con- 
sideration of the cooperation given by them in the taking of the Plaza 
of Manila. With these conditions and the others which are accepted 
\ in said letter, he who subscribes promises, in the name of the Filipi- 
i nos, to evacuate the places which they now hold in the suliurb; and 
I the acceptation of tlie same by your excellency will be a further proof 
i that he holds in consideration the innumerable lives sacrificed by the 
! siege of Manila, and that he appreciates the newlj^ arisen friendship 
i which will be preserved at all cost. 

Very respectfully, Emilio Aguinaldo. 



[Copy of telegram from General Aguinaldo to Major-General Merritt.] 

August 24, 1898. 

I have received notice of the death of 1 American soldier and 3 
wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. T\\ej 
fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among them- 
selves. 

General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on 
account of which I have ordered investigation to ascertain tlie truth 
and demonstrate that the Filipinos tiy to be in harmony with the 
Americans. If I shall find any one of my peoj)le guilty, I shall order 
severe punishment. 

Yours, respectfully, Aguinaldo. 



Office of the Military Governor, 
Headquarters Department of the Pacific, 

Manila, August 21^., 1898. 
Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Bakor, Philippine Islands. 
Sir: The commanding general of the American land forces has the 
honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 
21, and in reply to inform you as follows: • 

The error you speak of which needs clearing up as to the naviga- 
tion of the Patria seems to have arisen from a request on your part 
T P 26 



[Telegram.— Reply to telegram from General Aguinaldo, dated August 24.] 

Malac'ANAN, August -id, 1898 — 8.06 a. m. 
General Aguinaldo, 

Commanding PliiJippine Forces, Bakor: 
Thank you for your teles^raiu. Am glad to learn of your intention 
to investigate fully. I am desirous with you that harmon}' sliould 
prevail, and request j'ou alwaj's in event of trouble to communicate 
directly with me, as you have so wisely done this time. 

Merritt. 



Bakoor, August 27, 1898. 
(T<'n. Wesley Merritt, Manita. 

^\y Dear Sir: Though informed by j-our letter of the 24th of the 
current mouth, I can not the less express my surprise at learning that 
you have formed the opinion that mj'^ commissioners committed them- 



402 TREATY OF PEACE. 

that the Filipinos of the eounti-y should be permitted to tiade freely 
and navigate without obstruction the streams and bay surrounding 
.■Manila. So far as the products of the couiftryare concerned this has 
been acceded to, and there will be no obstruction placed by the Ameri- 
can laud forces between llie residents of the island and the city of 
^lanila. 

Tlie pi-otection that you ask from the .Vmerican siiuadron rests with 
Keai--A<imiral Dewey, and it is for him to determine whether it can 
be granted or not. 

A commissiou of your appointment, whicli had an interview with 
the undersigned about the loth instant, agreed that if a line were 
designated by a proper commission on m^' part, the armed Filipinos 
should retire beyond it. While this has been done in some instances, 
it has been neglected in others, and it is now desired to call your 
attention to the fact that the occupation of the suburbs of Manila, or 
any part of them, can not be acceded to by tlie undersigned. It has 
already been pointed out to you that a dual occupation of Manila was 
impossible in the interests of either party; and as the troops of the 
United States are in possession of .Alanila, I must insist upon the . 
carrying out of the original agreement between your commission and 
myself. I am the more insistent in this particular because recent i 
instructions from my home Government contemplate this course. 

So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a 
conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain is con- 
cerned, it is utterly impossible for me, as the military representative 
only of the United States, to make any promises such as you request. 
As you have alreadj^ been informed you may depend upon the good 
Avill of .Vmericans out here and the Government of which you already 
know the beneficence to determine these matters in the future. 

This answer to j^oiir communication has been delaj'ed by a press of 
business which could not veiw well be neglected. 

I thank you in the name of my country for the good will expressed 
toward it, and feel assured that nothing Avill occur to mar the friendly 
feeling that now exists. It is for the interests of all that the good 
feeling which now exists between us should be carefully fostered and 
maintained. 

Very respectfully^, Wesley Merritt. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 403 

selves at the conference of the loth to the witlidrawal of my troops 
outside the line that you designate. I hold it is agreed and under- 
stood, as do the coniniissioners, that the evacuation by my troops of 
the places that they to-day occupy in the outskirts was to take place 
as the proposed conditions v\"ere accepted by you. Among them was 
one putting this agreement in wi-iting, for this reason, as you had 
not accepted any of the proposals nor those which had been put in 
their place in my foDner communications. I do not believe that I 
have up to this time contravened the said obligations. 

Since I have permitted the use of water before the formal declara- 
tion of the treaty, you can easily see that I am disposed to sacrifice 
to friendship everything not greatlj^ prejudicial to the rights of the 
I*hilipi)ine city. 

I comprehend, like yourself, the inconvenience of a double occu- 
pation of the city of Manila and its environs, considering the condi- 
tions of the capitulation with the Spaniards, but you must also under- 
stand that without the wide blockade maintained b}' my forces you 
Avould have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never 
the surrender of the Spanish forces, who would have been al^le to retire 
to the interior towns. 

Now, do not make light of the aid formerly given by us to secure the 
capitulation mentioneil. Greatly though justice may suffer, and risk- 
ing well-founded fears in regard to mj cit^', I do not insist upon the 
retention of all the positions conquered by my foi'ces within the 
environs at the cost of much bloodvShed, unspeakable fatigue, and 
much money, I promise to withdraw them to the following line: 

In Malate the continuation of the highway (calzada of Singalong) 
as far as the bridge that unites it with this highway, from this bridge 
in a straight line to that of the Paco, and leaving outside the district 
of Zanque as far as the River Pasig; following this river and enter- 
ing the estuary which runs to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge, 
following the highway of tlie same name and that of Santa Mesa, 
which are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the town of Pau- 
dacan, to the limits of the jurisdiction of the outskirts of Sampaloc, 
Turzo, and Tando. But before making this withdrawal I beg that 
you obtain from Admiral Dewej protection for the free navigation of 
our boats, and grant me permission to at least insist upon the restitu- 
tion of the positions that we are going to give up if in the treaty of 
peace which is being an-anged between Spain and the United States 
the recognition of the dominion of the former in the Philippines shall 
follow. I also hope that you will order the entrance into the cit}^ of 
the American forces which are outside the line traced, as has been 
already agreed. 

I do not believe that the acceptance of the conditions proposed will 
be prejudicial in the smallest degree to the rights of the city, since it 
means only the recognition of the rights of a friendlj^ town. I am 
forced to insist upon the said conditions to quiet the grumblings of 
my chiefs and soldiers, Avho have exposed their lives and given of their 
interests during the siege of Manila. 

I hope that this time a spirit of justice will be manifest which is 
worthy of a free and admirably constituted government such as that 
of the United States of America. 
Yours, very respectfully, 



MEMORANDA CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 
ON AUGUST 30, 1898, BY F. V. GREENE, MAJOR-GENERAL, VOLUN- 
TEERS, AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS. 

[Wasbington, September 30, 1898.] 



indp:x. 

1. The Philippine Islands: Page. 

(a) Areii and ^mpulation 404 

(h] Climate 406 

(c) Mineral wealth 406 

( (1) A.nricnltnre 406 

(f) Commerce and transportation 407 

(/) Kevt'une and expenses 409 

2. Spanish troops 413 

3. SiJauisli navy 414 

4. Spanish civil administration 414 

5. Insnr.iicnt troops 419 

6. Insnrgent civil administration 421 

7. United States troops 425 

8. United States Navy 425 

9. United States civil administration 425 

10. The future of the islands 425 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 

{a) Area and population. — These islands, inclading the Ladrones, 
Carolines, aud Palaos, which are all under the government of Manila, 
are variously estimated at from 1,200 to 1,800 in number. The greater 
portion of these are small and are of no more value than the islands off 
the coast of Alaska. The important islands are less than a dozen in 
number, and 90 per cent of the Christian population live on Luzon and 
the live principal islands of the Visayas groui). 

The total population is somewhere between 7,000,000 and 9,000,000. 
This includes the wild tribes of the mountains of Luzon and of the 
islands in the extreme south. The last census taken by the Spanish 
Government was on December 31, 1887, and this stated the Christian 
population to be 0,000,000 (in round numbers). This is distributed as 
follows : 





Area. 


Population. 


Per 
square 
mile. 




44, 400 
4,700 
2,400 
■i, 800 
1,300 
3,300 


3, 426, 000 

735, OUO 
.504, 000 
270, 000 
245, 000 
242, 000 


79 
155 


Pauay 




210 
71 
188 


Levte ... . 


Boliol 


Kefiros 


73 








59, 800 


5, 422, 000 


91 



404 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



405 



The density of population in these six islands is nearly 50 per cent 
greater than in Illinois and Indiana (census of 1890), greater than in 
Spain, about one-half as great as in France, and one third as great as 
in Japan and China; the exact figures being as follows: 




Suain . ' 197,670: 17,565,632 

France i 204,092 38,517,975 

Japau 147,655 | 42,270 620 

(jhiua 1,312,328 j 383, 253, t'29 



The next most important islands in the order of population are ; 





Area. 


Population. 


Per 

mile. 




34. 000 

4,800 

4, 000 

600 

1,400 


209, 000 
186. 000 
67, 000 
35, 000 
21,000 


6 




38 




17 




58 




15 








44, 800 


518, 000 


11 



Various smaller islands, including the Carolines, Ladrones, and 
Palaos, carry the total area and Christian population to, area, 140,000; 
population, (3,000,000; per mile, 43. 

This is considerably greater than the density of population in the 
States east of the Rocky Mountains. Owing to the existence of moun- 
tain ranges in all the islands, and lack of communications in the inte- 
rior, only a small part of the surface is inliabited. In many provinces 
the density of population exceeds 200 per square mile, or greater than 
that of any of the United States, except Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island. The total area of the Philippines is about the same as that of 
Japan, but its civilized population is only one-seventh. 

In addition to the Christian population, it is estimated (in the Official 
Guide) that the islands contain the following: 

Chinese (priucipally in Manila) 75, 000 

Moors or Mohamiuedans in Paragan and Jolo 100, 000 

Moors or Moliamniedans in Mindanao and Basalau 209, 000 

Heathens in the Philippines 830, 000 

Heathens in the Carolines and Palaos 50, 000 

Total 1,261,000 

The Official Guide gives a list of more than thirty different races, 
each speaking a different dialect, but five-sixths of the Christian popu- 
lation are either Tagalos or Visayas. All the races are of the Malay 
type. Around Manila there has been some mixture of Chinese and 
Spanish blood with that of the natives, resulting in the Mestizos or 
half-breeds, but the number of these is not very great. 

As seen in the provinces of Cavite and Manila, the natives (Tagalos) 
are of small stature, averaging probably 5 feet 4 inches in height and 



406 TREATY OF PEACE. 

120 pounds ill weight for the women. Their skin is coppery brown, 
somewhat darker than that of a muhitto. Tliey seem to be industrious 
and hard-working, although less so than the Chinese. 

By the Spaniards they are considered indolent, crafty, untruthful, 
treacherous, cowardly, and cruel, but the hatred between the Spaniards 
and the native races is so intense and bitter that the Spanish opinion 
of the natives is of little or no value. To us they seemed industrious 
and docile, but there were occasional evidences of deceit and untruth- 
fulness in their dealings with us. The bulk of the population is engaged 
in agriculture, and there were hardly any evidences of manufactures, 
arts, or mining. The greater number seemed to be able to read and 
write, but I have been unable to obtain any exact figures on this 
subject. They are all devout Roman Catholics, although they hate the 
monastic orders. 

In ^lanila (and doubtless also in Cebu and lloilo) are many thousands 
of educated natives, who are merchants, lawyers, doctors, and priests. 
They are well informed and have accumulated property. They have 
not traveled much, but there is said to be quite a numerous colony of 
rich Pliilippinos in Madrid, as well as in Paris and London. The bib- 
liography of the rhilippines is said to number -i,.')UO volumes, the greater 
part of which have been written by Spanish priests and missionaries. 
The number of books on the subject in the English language is probably 
less than a dozen. 

{b) Climate. — The cliinate is one of the best known in the Tropics. 
The islands extend from ^o to 21° north latitude, and Manila is in 14° 
35'. The thermometer during July and August rarely went below 79° 
or above 85^. The extreme ranges in a year are said to be 01° and 97°, 
and the annual mean 81°. There are three well-marked seasons, 
temperate and dry from November to February, hot and dry from 
March to May, and temperate and wet from June to October. The 
rainy season reaches its maximum in July and August, when the rains 
are constant and very heavy. The total rainfall has been as high as 
114 inches in one year. 

Yellow fever appears to be unknown. The diseases most fatal 
among the natives aire cholera and smallpox, both of which are brought 
from China. Low malarial fever is brought on by sleeping on the 
ground or being chilled by remaining without exercise in wet clothes; 
and diarrhea is produced by drinking bad water or eating excessive 
quantities of fruit. Almost all of these diseases are pi'eventable by 
proper precautions even by troops in campaign. The sickness in our 
troops was very small, much less than in the cold fogs at camp in San 
Francisco. 

(c) Mineral ivealth. — Very little is known concerning the. mineral 
wealth of the islands. It is stated that there are deposits of coal, 
petroleum, iron, lead, sulphur, copper, and gold in the various islands, 
but little or nothing has been done to develoj) r^hem. A few concessions 
have been granted for working mines, but the output is not large. The 
gold is reported on Luzon, coal and petroleum on Cebu and lloilo, and 
sulphur on Leyte. The imports of coal in 1894 (the latest year for 
which statistics have been printed) were 91,511 tons, and it came prin- 
cii>ally from Australia and Japan. In the same year the imports of 
iron of all kinds were 9,6.'52 tons. 

If tlie Cebu coal proves to be of gocnl quality, there is a large market 
for it in competition with coal from Japan and Australia. 

(<i) Agriculture. — Although agriculture is the chief occupation of the 
IMiilippines, yet only one-ninth of the surface is under cultivation. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 407 

The soil is very fertile, and even after deducting tlie mountainous 
areas it is probable that the area of cultivation can be very largely 
extended and that the islands can support a population equal to that 
of Japan (42,000,000). 

The chief ])roducts are rice, corn, hemp, sugar, tobacco, cocoanuts, 
and cacao. Coftee and cotton were formerly produced in large quan- 
tities — the former for export and the latter for home consumption; but 
the coffee plant has been almost exterminated by insects and the home- 
made cotton cloths have been driven out by the competition of those 
imported from England. The rice and corn are principally produced 
in Luzon and Mindero and are consumed in the islands. The rice crop 
is about 705,000 tons. It is iiisutticieut for the demand, and 45,000 
tons of rice were imported in 1894, the greater portion from Saigon 
and the rest from Hongkong and Singapore; also 8,G09 tons (say 00,000 
barrels) of flour, of which more than two-thirds came from China and 
less than one-third from the United States, 

The cacao is raised in the southern islands, the best quality of it at 
Mindanao. The production amounts only to 150 tons, and it is all 
made into chocolate and consumed in the islands. 

The sugar cane is raised in the Visayas. The crop yielded in 1894 
about 235,000 tons of raw sugar, of which one-tenth was consumed in 
the islands, and the balance, or 210,000 tons, valued at $11,000,000, was 
exported, tlie greater part to China, Great Britain, and Australia. 

The hemp is produced in southern Luzon, Mindoro, the Visayas, and 
Mindanao. It is nearly all exported in bales. In 1894 the amount was 
96,000 tons, valued at $12,000,000. 

Tobacco is raised in all the islands, but the best quality and greatest 
amount in Luzon. A large amount is consumed in the islands, smoking 
being universal among women as well as the men, but the best quality 
is exported. The amount in 1894 was 7,000 tons of leaf tobacco, valued 
at $1,750,000. Spain takes 80 per cent aiul Kgypt 10 per cent of the 
leaf tobacco. Of the manufactured tobacco 70 per cent goes to China 
and Singapore, 10 per cent to England, and 5 per cent to Spain. 

Cocoanuts are grown in southern Luzon and are used in various 
ways. The products are largely consumed in the islands, but the 
exports in 18".I4 were valued at $2,400,000. 

Cattle, goats, and sheep have been introduced from Spain, but they 
are not numerous. Domestic pigs and chickens are seen around every- 
where in the farming districts. 

The principal beast of burden is the carabao, or water buffalo, which 
is used for plowing rice tields as well as drawing heavy loads on 
sledges or on carts. 

Large horses are almost unknown, but there are great numbers of 
native ponies from 9 to 12 hands high, possessing strength and 
endurance far beyond their size. 

(c) Commerce and transportaiion. — The internal commerce between 
Manila and the different islands is quite large, but I was unable to 
find any official records giving exact figures concerning it. It is carried 
on almost entirely by water, in steamers of 500 to 1,000 tons. There are 
regular mail steamers once in two weeks on four routes, viz: North- 
ern Luzon, southern Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao; also a steamer 
every two months to the Carolines and Ladrones, and daily steamers 
on i\Ianila Bay. These lines are all subsidized. To facilitate this 
navigation extensive harbor works have been in progress at Manila 
for several years, and a plan for lighting the coasts has been made, 



408 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



calling for 43 principal lights, of wbich 17 have already been con- 
structed in the most substantial manner, besides 16 lights of secondary- 
importance. 

Tliere is only one line of railway, built bj- English capital, running 
from Manila north to JJagu])an, a distance of about l-!0 miles. The 
roads in the immediate vicinity of Manila are macadamized and in 
fairly good order; elsewhere they are narrow paths of soft black soil, 
which become almost impassable in the rainy season. Transportation 
is then eftected by sledges drawn through the mud by carabaos. There 
are telegraph lines connecting most of the provinces of Luzon with 
Manila, and cables to the Yisayas and southern islands and thence to 
Borneo and Singapore, as well as a direct cable from Manila to Hong- 
kong. The laud telegraph lines are owned by the Govei nment, and the 
cables all belong to an English comi)any, w^hich receives a large sub- 
sidy. In Manila there is a narrow-gauge street railway, operated by 
horsepower, about 11 miles in total length; also, a telephone system 
and electric lights. 

Communications with Europe are maintained by the Spanish Trans- 
Atlantic Company (subsidized), which sends a steamer every four weeks 
from Manila and IJarcelona, making the trip in about twenty-seven days; 
the same conii)any also sends an intermediate steamer from Manihi to 
Singapore, meeting the French Messageric steamer each way. There 
is also a noiisubsidi/ed line running from Manila to Hongkong every 
two weeks, and connecting there with the English, French, and German 
mails for Europe, and with the Pacific Mail and Canadian Pacific 
steamers for Japan and America. 

There has been no considerable development of manufacturing indus- 
tries in the Phili])pines. The only factories are those connected with 
the preparation of rice, tobacco, and sugar. Of the manufactures and 
arts in which Japan so excels there is no evidence. 

The foreign commerce amounted, in 1894, to 823,058,552 in imports 
and $33,149,984 in exports, 80 per cent of which goes through ^Manila. 
About CO per cent of the trade is carried in British vessels, 20 per cent 
in Spanish, and 10 -per cent in German. 

The value of the commerce with other countries in 1894 was as follows : 



[In luillioiis of dollars (silver).] 





Imports. 


Exports. 




10.5 
7.1 

4.6 

1.9 

.9 

.7 
.7 
.4 
.2 
.1 
1.5 


2 9 




8.7 


China 


6 8 


Gerniiinv 








United State.s 


7.4 




1 2 




1 7 




] 2 


Australia 


2.6 


other countries 


.6 






Total 


28.6 


33 1 







It is interesting to note that next to Great Britain we are the largest 
consumers of the Philii)pines, and that they exi)ort to us nearly three 
times as much as to Spain. On the other hand, Spain sells to the 
Phili])pines tifteen times as much as we do. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



409 



The articles of import aud their vahie in 1894 were as follows; 

[In millions of dollars (silver).] 



Cotton goods.. 
Cotton yarns . 

Wines 

Mineral oils ... 

Iron 

Rice 

Plour 

Sweetmeats ... 

Paper 

Linen goods... 

Hats 

other articles . 

Total 



Spain. 



3.9 
1.2 

1.8 



Great i 
Britain 



4.0 
.9 



China. 



Ger- 
many. 



.2 

'i.'o 



United 
States. 



.1 

i.T 



.1 

2.0 



4.6 



other I 
countries. 



.7 
.1 
.1 
0.8 
.1 
.1 



.3.8 



Total. 



9.3 
2.5 
1.9 
1.4 
1.2 
1.1 



.b 

7.6 



28.0 



a Russia. 



The articles of export and their values were as follows : 

[In millions of dollars (silver).] 





Spain. 


Great 
Britain. 


China. 


United 
State.s. 


Aus- 
tralia. 

.6 


Other 
countries. 

a 1.1 
'.3 


Total. 




5. 3 .9 

2.7 ! 4.0 
.1 j .7 


6.6 


14.5 


Sugar 


.4 
.2 
1.1 


.7 


1.9 

.1 


11.0 
1.8 




1.4 


Coffee . .3 




.1 
1 






.4 




.6 


1 


.7 


Other articles 

Total 


.9 


1. 


.1 1.3 


3.3 


2.9 


8.7 


6.8 


7.4 1 2.6 j 4.7 


33.16 



a Principally to Singapore. 



6 Principally to Japan. 



With these islands in our possession and the construction of railroads 
in the interior of Luzon, it is prol»al)le that an enormous extension 
could be given to this commerce, nearlj^ all of which would come to the 
United States. Manila cigars of the best quality are unknown in 
America; they are but little inferior to the best of Cuba and cost only 
one-third as much. The coffee industry can be revived and the sugar 
industry extended, mainly for consumption in the far East. The min- 
eral resources can be explored with American energy, and there is every 
reason to believe that when this is done the deposits of coal, iron, gold, 
and lead will be found very valuable. On the other hand, we ought to 
be able to secure the greater part of the trade which now goes to Spain 
in textile fabrics, aud a considerable portion of that with England in 
the same goods and in iron. 

(/) Revenue and expenses. — The budget for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1897, was as follows: 

INCOME. 

(1) Direct taxes $8, 496, 170 

(2) Indirect taxes (customs) 6, 200,550 

(3) Proceeds of mouopolies 1,-22, 000 

(4) Lottery 1, 000, 000 

(5) lucoiue of Government property 257, 000 

(6) Sundry receipts .' 298,300 

Total 17, 474,'020 



410 TREATY OF PEACE. 

EXPENSES. 

(1) General exi)enses, pensions, and interest „ $1, 506, 686 

(2) Diplomatic and consular service 74, 000 

CS) ('ler<>-v and conrts 1, 876, 740 

(4) War departuieut 6, 035, 316 

(5) Treasury department 1, 392, 414 

(6) Navy dc])artment 3, 562, 716 

(7) C;ivil administration 2, 195, 378 

(8) Kdueation 614, 895 

Total 17,258,145 

The direct taxes were as follows: 

(1) Keal estate, 5 per eent on income $140, 280 

(2) Indnstrv and couinierce 1, 400, 700 

(3) Cedulas (pidl tax) 5,600,000 

(4) Chinese poll tax 510, 190 

(5) Tribute from sultan of Jolo 20, 000 

(6) Railroads, 10 per cent of passenger receipts 32, 000 

(7) Income tax, 10 per cent on public salaries 730, 000 

(8) Sundry taxes 63,000 

Total 8,496,170 

Indirect taxes were as follows : 

(1) Imjiorts $3, 600, 000 

(2) Exports 1, i?92, 550 

(3) r.oadino- tax 410,000 

(4) Unloading tax 570,000 

(5) Fines and penalties 27, 000 

(6) Special tax on liquors, beer, vegetables, tlour, salt, and mineral oils.. 301, 000 

6, 200. 550 

Monoi)olies: 

(1) Oi)iuui contract 576, 000 

(2) Stamped itaper and stamps 646, 000 

Total J 1,222,000 

Lottery : 

(1) Sale of tickets, less cost of prizes 964, 000 

(2) Unclaimed prizes 30, 000 

(3) Sundry receipts 6,000 

Total 1,000,000 

Income of Government property: 

(1) Foresty privileges '. 170,000 

(2) Sale and rent of i)ublicland and buildings 85, 000 

(3) Mineral privileges 2,000 

Total 257,000 

Sundry I'eceipts: 

(1) Mint (seigniorage) 200,000 

(2) Sundries 98,300 

Total 298,300 

The largest source of income is tlie cedula or poll tax. Every man 
and woman a])Ove 18 years of age, residing in the i*hilippines, whether 
Spanish subject or foreigner, is re(|uired to have in his or her posses- 
sion a paper stating name, age, and occupation, and other facts of per- 
sonal identity. Failure to produce and exhibit this when called upon 
renders anyone liable to arrest and imprisonment. This paper is 



TREAIT OP PEACE. 411 

obtained from the internal-revenue office annually, on payment of a 
certain sum, varying-, according to the occupation and income of the 
l)erson, from 75 cents to $20, and averaging about $3 for each adult. 
An extra sum of 2 per cent is paid for expenses of collection. The tax 
is collected at the tribunal in each pueblo, and 20 per cent is retained 
for expenses of local administration and 80 per cent paid to the gen- 
eral treasury. This tax falls heavily on the poor and lightly on the 
rich. The tax on industry and commerce is similarly graded according 
to the volume of business transacted by each merchant or mercantile 
corporation. The tax on real estate is absurdly low and is levied only 
on municipal property and on the rent, not the value. 

The tax on imports is specific and not ad valorem; it amounts to 
about 13 i)er cent of estimated values. The free list is very small, 
nearly everything of commercial value which is imported being subject 
to duty. The revenue from imports has increased fron) $566,143 in 
18G5 to $3,695,446 in 1894. It was about the same in 1897. On the 
other hand, the export tax, which was nothing in 1892, the loading tax, 
which was nothing in 1893, and the unloading tax, which was nothing 
in 1894, have all been increased in the last few years in order to meet 
the expenses of su])pressing the insurrection. These three items yielded 
nearly $2,700,000 in 1897. 

The monopoly of imi)orting and selling opium is sold by auction to 
the highest bidder for a term of three years. The present contract runs 
until 1899, and yields $48,000 per month. 

Every legal document must be drawn uj) on paper containing a 
revenue stami) engraved and printed in Spain, and every note, check, 
draft, bill of exchange, receipt, or similar document must bear a revenue 
stamp in order to be valid. These stami)s and stamped paper yielded 
a revenue of $646,000 in 1897. 

The lottery is conducted by the Government, the monthly drawings 
taking place in the treasury (hacienda) de]>artMient. The sale of tickets 
yielded $1,000,000 over and above the prizes in 1897. 

In a report to General Merritton August 20, 1 recommended that the 
opium contract be canceled and the lottery abandoned during ouroccu- 
l^ation of Manila; and as the poll tax and tax on industry and com- 
merce had been paid for the most part in the early part of the year, 
our chief sources of revenue were from the custom house, the sale of 
stamps and stami)ed ])ai)er, and the sale of such licenses as the law 
allowed (amusements, liquor saloons, etc.). for the beuetit of the city of 
Manila as distinguished from the general revenues. I estimated the 
total at about $500,000 per month. 

The expenses of administering the military government of occupation 
(ajjart from the expenses of the army) will consist of the current 
expenses of the office at the provost-marshal-general's office and its 
various bureaus; at the custom house, internal-revenue office, and other 
offices; and the salaries of interpreters and minor employees, who are 
anxious to resume work as soon as they dare do so. An estimate of 
these expenses was being prepared at the time I left, but was not com- 
pleted. It can hardly exceed $200,000 per month, and may be much 
less. This should leave $300,000 (silver) excess of income per month 
to go toward the military expenses of occupation. 

As soon as it is decided that we are to retain the islands it will be 
necessary to make a careful study of the sources of revenue and items 
of expense for all the islands, with a view to thoroughly understanding 
the subject, before introducing the extensive changes which will be 
necessary. 



412 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Currency. — The standard of value has always, until witbin a few 
years, beeu the Mexican milled dollar. The Spanish dollar contains a 
little less silver, and in order to introduce it and profit by the coinage 
the Spaniards jjrohibited the ini])ortation of Mexican dollars a few years 
since. Large numbers of Mexican dollars remained in the country, 
however, and others were smuggled in. The two dollars circulated at 
equal values. 

All valuations of goods and labor are based on the silver dollar, and 
a change to tlie gold standard would result in great financial distress 
and numy failures among the banks and mercantile houses in Manila. 
Their argument is that w^hile an American 10-dollar gold piece will bring 
21 silver dollars at any bank or liouse having foreign connections, yet 
it will not buy any more labor or any more hemp and sugar from the 
original producer than 10 silver dollars. The products of the country 
are almost entirely agricultural, and the agricultural class, whether it 
sells its labor or its {)roducts, would refuse to accept any less than the 
accustomed wages or ])rices on account of being ])aid in the more 
valuable coin. The result of this change would be that the merchant 
and emi)loyee would have to pay double for what they buy, and would 
receive no increase for what they sell. While trade would eventually 
adjust itself to the change, yet many merchants would be ruined in 
the process and would drag some banks down with them. 

The Mexican dollar is the standard also in Hongkong and China, and 
the whole trade of the Far East has for generations been conducted on 
a silver basis. Japan has within the last year broken away from this 
and established the gold standard, but in doing so the relative value of 
silver and gold was fixed at :Vlh to 1, or about the market rate. 

Public debt. — 1 was unable to obtain any precise information in regard 
to the colonial debt. The last book on statistics of imports and exports 
was for the fiscal year 1894; and the last printed budget was for 
181>(;-97, which was approved by the Queen Kegent in August, 1896. 
Subsequent to this date, according to the statements made to us by 
foreign bankers, the Cortes authorized two colonial loans of 114,000,000 
(silver) cash, known as Series A and Series B. The proceeds were to 
be used in suppressing- the insurrection. Both were to be secured by a 
first lien on the receipts of the jNIanila custom-house. 

Series A is said to have been sold in Spain and the proceeds to have 
been paid in to the colonial office, but no ])art of them has ever 
reached the Philippines. Possibly a portion of it was used in sending 
out the 2r>,000 troops which came from Spain to the Philippines in the 
autumn of 18!Ki. 

Series B was ottered for sale in ^Manila, but was not taken. An 
effort was then made to obtain subscribers in the provinces, but with 
little or no success. The Government then notified the depositors in the 
Public Savings iJank (a branch of the treasuiy de])artment similar to 
tlie postal savings bureaus in other countries) that their deposits 
would no longer be redeemed in cash but only in Series B bonds. 
Some depositors were frightened and took bonds, others declined to do 
so. Then came the blockade of Manila, and all business was practically 
suspended. 

No printed report has been made concerning the debt, and I was 
unable to obtain any satisfactory statement of the matter from the 
Treasury olficials. The exact tiUits in regard to the Series A bonds can 
be learned in Madrid, but it will be difticult to learn how much of Series 
B was issued and what consideration was received for them. As 
already stated, both series of bonds rest for security on the receipts of 
the Manila custom-house. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 413 

SPANISH TROOPS. 

Tlie Spanish prisoners of war number about 13,000, including about 
400 officers. The infantry arms are about 22,000, the greater part 
Mauser, model 1895, caliber .28, and the others Kemingtons, model 1889, 
caliber .43. The ammunition is about 22,000,000 rounds. The field 
artillery consists of about 12 breech loading steel guns, caliber 3.5 inches, 
and 10 breech-loading mountain guns, caliber 3.2 inches. There are 
six horses (ponies) for each gun, but the harness is in bad order. 
Ammunition, about CO rounds per gun, with possibly more in the 
arsenals. There are abont 500 cavalry ponies, larger than the average 
horses, with saddles and equipments complete. There is also a bat- 
talion of engineers. The fortifications of the walled city are a fine 
sample of the Vauban type, on which military engineers expended so 
much ingenuity 150 years ago, and of which Spain possessed so many 
in her Flemish dominions. 

The first walls of Manila were built about 15i)0, but the present 
fortifications date from a short time after the capture and occupation of 
the place by the English, in 1762-1704. They consist of bastions and 
curtains, deep set ditch, covered way, lunettes, demilunes, hornworks, 
and all the scientific accessories of that day. They are in a good state 
of preservation, and mount several hundred ancient guns, but they are 
chiefly of interest to the anti^iuarian. On the glacis facing the bay, and 
also on the open space just south of the walls, are mounted 9-inch 
breechloaders, four in all,' made at Houtoria, Spain, in 1884. They are 
well mounted between high traverses, in which are bomb ])roof maga- 
zines. These guns are practically uninjured, and Admiral Dewey has 
the breechblocks. While not as powerful as the guns of the present 
day of the same caliber, they are capable of effective service. Their 
location, however, is very faulty, as they are on the shore of the bay, 
with all the churches, public buildings, and most valuable property 
immediately behind them. 

On the day after the naval battle Admiral Dewey sent word to the 
Governor-General that if these guns fired a shot at any of his vessels 
he would immediately reply with his whole squadron. Owing to their 
location this meant a bombardment of the city. This threat was effect- 
ive; these guns were never afterwards fired, not even during the great 
attack of August 13; and iu return the navy did not fire on them, but 
directed all their shells at the forts and trenches occupied by the troops 
outside of the suburbs of the city. 

Within the walled city are the cathedral and numerous churches, 
convents, and niouasteries, the ])ublic offices, civil and nnlitary, military 
workshops and arsenals; barracks for artillery, cavalry, and engineers; 
storehouses, and a few dwellings and shops. 

The infantry barracks are outside of the walls, four in number, viz, 
Neysig, Portin, Oalzada, ami Ermita. They are modern and well con- 
structed and will accommodate about 4,000 men. They are now occu- 
pied by United States troops. 

Under the terms of the armistice the arms laid down by the Spanish 
troops on August 14 are to be returned to them whenever they evacuate 
the city or the American Army evacuates it. All other public property, 
including horses, artillery, public funds, munitions, etc., is surrendered 
to the United States unconditionally. 

The question of sending back the troops to Spain is left absolutely 
to the decision of the authorities in Washington. They are all within 
the walled city, but as the public buildings are insufficient to accom- 



414 TREATY OF PEACE. 

modate them they are quartered in the churches and convents. These 
buildinos are nof adapted for this purpose: they have no sinks, lava- 
tories, kitchens, or sleeping- apartments, and there is great danger of 
an epidemic of sickness if the troops are not soon removed. 

Peiuling their removal they are being fed with rations furnished by 
the Inited States Commissary Department, and the ofticers receive 
from tlie United States sufticient money for their support. 

SPANISH NAVY. 

At the outbreak of the war the naval force in the Philippines con- 
sisted of 10 cruisers, 19 gunboats, 1 armed launches, 3 transports, .,'- 
survey boat. 

( )f these Admiral Dewey destroyed on May 1, 10 cruisers and 1 trans- 
port, and he has sin(-e captured 2 gunboats. The Spaniards have sunk 
2 transports and 2 or 3 gunboats in the Pasig Piver. Tliere remain 
13 or 14 gunboats, which are scattered among the islands. They are of 
iron, from 140 to I'OO tons each, are armed with 1 breech loading rifle, 
caliber 3.()-inch, and 2 to 4 machine guns each, caliber .41 to 1 inch. 
One of the ca))tured boats, the Cfdiao, under command of Lieutenant 
Tappan, U. S. N., and a crew of 18 men, rendered very eflicient service 
in the attack of August 13. These boats would all be useful in the 
naval police of the islands. They will, however, probably be scuttled 
by the Spaniards before the islands are surrendered. 

The navy yard at Cavite has barracks for about 1,500 men (now occu- 
pied by United States troops), and has shops and ways for light work 
and vessels of less than 1,000 tons. Many of the gunboats above men- 
tioned were built there. The shallow dejtth of water in Canacoa or 
Cavite Bay would prevent the enlargement of this naval station to 
accommodate large vessels, and the plan of the Spaniards was to 
create a large mival station in Subig P.ay, on which considerable 
money has already been spent. 

SPANISH CIVIL ADxMINISTEATION. 

The government of the Philippine Islands, including the Ladrones, 
Carolines, and Palaos, is vested in the Governor-General, who, in the 
language of the Spanish Official Guide or lUue Book, "is the sole and 
legitimate representative in these islands of the supreme power of the 
Government of the King of Spain, and as such is the sui)reme head of 
all branches of the public service and has authority to inspect and 
supervise the same, not excepting the courts of justice." The office is 
held by a lieutenant-general in the Spanish army; and he is also vice- 
royal patron of the Indies, exercising in these islands the ecclesias- 
tical functions conferred on the King of Spain by various bulls of the 
Popes of Rome, captain-general in chief of the army of the Philippines, 
inspector-general of all branches of the service, commander in chief of 
the naval forces, and ])resldent of all corporations and societies which 
partake of an oflicial character. 

What corresponds to his cabinet or ministry of {<i) the archbishop 
oi" Manila and four bishops, who administer ecclesiastical afiairs in the 
live dioceses into which the islands are divided for this i)urpose; the 
appointment of parish priests and curates, however, is vested in the 
governor-general. The various religious orders which exercise so 
large an influence in the politics and business of the islands, viz, 
Agustinians, Dominicans, Re(;ollects, Franciscans, Capuchins, Benedic- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 415 

tines, and Jesuits, are all under the management of the bishops, sub- 
ject to the supervision of the I'ope and the prerogatives of the King- as 
royal patron, which prerogatives are exercised by the Governor- 
General as viceroy. 

{b) The high court of justice in Manila, which is the court of appeals 
in civil and governmental cases for all the islands; there are two prin- 
cipal criminal courts, in Cebu and Vigan (northern Luzon), and appeal 
iu criminal cases lies to these courts or to the high court of Manila; in 
every province there is a court of primary jurisdiction iu both civil and 
criminal cases. 

(c) The general second in command, who is a general of division in 
the Spanish army. He is the subinspector of all branches of the mili- 
tary service, is military governor of the province and city of Manila 
and commands all the troops stationed therein, and in the absence or 
sickness of the captain-general he commands all the military forces in 
the islands. 

(//) The general commandant of dockyards and squadron. This post 
is tilled by a vice-admiral in the Spanish navy, and he commands the 
naval forces, ships, and establishments iu the islands. 

(e) The minister of finance, or intendente general de hacienda, who is 
charged with the collection of customs and internal taxes, the expend- 
itures of public money, and the audit and control of public accounts, 

{f} The minister of the interior, or director-general of civil adminis- 
tration, who is charged with all public business relating to public 
instractioii, charities, health, public works, forests, mines, agriculture, 
industry and commerce, posts and telegraphs, and meteorology. 

For the puri)Ose of local administration the islands are divided into 
provinces and districts, classified as follows: V.) civil governments, 
24 political-military governments, 23 political-military commands, 15 
military commands. 

The most important of the provinces are Manila, with a population of 
400,238 (of which 10 per cent are Chinese), and Cebu, with 504,076; 
and the least important districts are Balabas and Corregidor, with 420 
and 320, resjjectively. 

The governor or commandant has supreme control within his province 
or district of every branch of the public service, including the courts of 
justice, and each reports direct to the Governor-General. The guardla 
civil, or gendarmerie, is subject only to his orders, and for arrests and 
imprisonment for political offenses he is responsible, not to the law, 
but to the Governor-General and the King. 

The civil governments are governed by civil governors of the rank 
in the Spanish civil service of chiefs of administration of the second 
class. The political military governments and commands are in charge 
of military and naval oflScers of various grades, according to their size 
and importance, ranging from general of division at Mindanao, brig- 
adier-generals at Cebu and Iloilo, captain in the navy at Paraguay, 
down to lieutenant at Balabas and Corregidor. 

The civil or military governor is assisted by a secretary, a judge, an 
administrator of finances, a postmaster, and a captain of })olice. 

The affairs of cities are managed by a council (ayuntamiento) con- 
sisting of a presidente, a recorder (sindico), one or more mayors 
(alcalde), six to ten aldermen (regidores), and a secretary. 

Outside of the cities each province or district is divided into a num- 
ber of villages or parishes (pueblos). The total number of these is 
1,055. In each there is a parish priest, a municipal captain, a justice 
of the peace, a schoolmaster, and schoolmistress. The number of cities 



41 <! TREATY OP PEACE. 

is very small, luid the social life of the community depends almost 
wholly on the form of government of the pueblos or villages. In 1893 
this was reorganized with the alleged intention of giving local self- 
government. The scheme is complicated and curious, and only an out- 
line of it can be given here. It is contained in full in the royal decree 
of iMay ID, 18'.)3, a long document supplemented by still longer regula- 
tions for carrying the same into effect. 

In brief, every pueblo in which there are jjaid more than 1,000 cedulas 
(poll tax) shall have a nuinicipal tribunal, consisting of live members, 
by whom its local affairs and funds shall be managed. The members 
are a municipal captain, senior lieutenant, lieutenant of police, lieuten- 
ant of agriculture, lieutenant of cattle; and the village priest is 
recjuired to attend all the important meetings. 

The captain holds ofidce for four years and is eligible for indefinite 
reelection; the lieutenants hold oihce for four years also, <me half of 
them going out of office every two years, and they are ineligible for 
reelection until two years after the expiration of their term. Both 
captains and lieutenants are elected on a day designated by the gov- 
ernor, and in the i>resence of the village priest and the outgoing cap- 
tain, by the principalia or body of principal men of the village. The 
village is subdivided into barangayes or group of about 100 families 
each, and for each barangay there is a chief or headman (cabeza), who 
is appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the municipal 
tribunal. The principalia is made up of former municipal captains, 
former municipal lieutenants, former gobernadorcillos, chiefs of baran- 
gayes. 

All inhabitants paying more than $50 annually in taxes. The prin- 
cipalia choose the 13 electors, as follows: Six from the chiefs of baran- 
gayes, 3 from former municipal captains, and 3 from the largest tax- 
payers. 

The electors hold office for six years, and one-third go out of office 
every two years. 

The nuinicipal captain must be a resident of the village, more than 
25 years of age, read and speak Spanish, and be a chief of a barangay. 
While the municipal tribunal nominally controls the local affairs, yet 
the captain has the right to suspend all its acts which he considers 
against the public welfare, and report the matter to the provincial 
governor, who has power to rescind them. The captain appoints all 
village employees and removes them at will. He can also tine and 
punish them for petty offenses. He issues orders to the police and col- 
lects the taxes. He holds a commission as delegate or representative 
of the Governor-General, and, in fact, he exercises within his little 
bailiwick the same supreme i)ower that the governor exercises in the 
province and the Governor-General in the whole archipelago. 

In each province there is a Junta or council, whose membership con- 
sists of the administrator of finance, two vicars, the public physician, 
four members. 

The latter four members must be residents of the capital of the 
province, and they are elected by the nuinicipal captains, from a list 
of names subndtted to them by the junta, with the ai)proval of the 
governor. 

The functions of this junta or council are solely those of inspection 
ami advice. It watches over the affairs of the municipal tribunals, and 
reports to the governor its advice and recommendations concerning 
them. The manicii)al captain is obliged to deposit the taxes in the 
provincial treasury, the keys of which are held by three members of 



TREATY OF PEACE. 417 

tlie coimci]. He draws out the mouey in accordance with a municipal 
budget, and his accounts must be approved by his lieutenants, coun- 
tersigned by the village priest, passed upon by the provincial council, 
and finally approved by the governor. 

The governor has power to suspend the municipal captain or any of 
his colleagues for a period of three months, and the governor general 
can remove one or all of thetn from office at will, and -'in extraordi- 
nary cases or for reasons of public tranquillity the governor shall have 
power to decree, without any legal prowess, the abolition of the muni- 
cipal tribunals." (Article 45.) 

In December, 18!>0, General Polavija issued a decree suspending the 
elections which were to take ])lace that month for one-third of the 
municipal electors, and directed the governors of provinces to send in 
names of persons suitable for appointment, together with the recom- 
mendations of the village priest in each case. 

An examination of this unique scheme of village government shows 
that one-half of the electors are to be chosen from persons holding a 
subordinate ofitice and appointed by the governor; that the village 
'priest must be present at all elections and important meetings; that 
the captain has all the responsibility and he must also be of the class 
holding a subordinate office by appointment of the governor; that the 
acts of the municipal tribunal can be suspended by the captain and 
rescinded by the governor, and finally, if the municipal tribunal is 
offensive to the Governor General he can either remove its members 
and appoint others in their place or can abolish it altogether. 

Such is the Spanish idea of self government. The minister of the 
colonies in submitting the decree to the Queen Eegent, expatiated on 
its merits in giving the natives such full control of their local affairs, 
and expressed the confident belief that it would prove "most beneficent 
to those people whom Providence has confided to the generous sover- 
eignty of the Spanish monarchs." 

This scheme of government by municipal tribunals was highly 
approved by the natives, except that feature of it which placed so 
much power in the hands of the governor and Governor General. This, 
however, was the essence of the matter from the Spanish standpoint, 
and these portions of the decree were the ones most fully carried out. 
The natives complained, on the one hand, of the delay in putting the 
decree into operation, and, on the other hand, that so much of it as was 
established was practically nullified by the action of the governors. 
Seeing that the tribunals had really no power, the members soon turned 
their sessions (which the decree required to be secret) into political 
meetings in favor of the insurrection. So the whole project is thus far 
a failure, and the local administration is in considerable disorder, apart 
from that caused by the insurgents. In point of fact, self-government 
and representation are unknown in these islands. 

The archbishop and the four bishops are appointed by the Pope. 
The Governor-General, military and naval officers, and all officials with 
a salary exceeding about $2,000 (silver) are appointed by the King or the 
minister of the colonies. Yet all the expenses are paid from the Philip- 
pine treasury. The salaries of all officials— military, naval, civil, and 
ecclesiastical— the expenses and pensions of the army, navy, and church, 
the cost of the diplomatic and consular service in Japan, China, and 
Singapore, even a portion of the expenses of the" colonial office at 
Madrid and of pensions paid to the descendants of Columbus, all come 
out of the taxes raised in the islands. The natives have no place in 
T P 27 



418 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tlie government, except clerks in the public offices at Manila and the 
petty positions in the villayes and the ayuiiJ;emientos of cities, where 
Iheir i)o\vers and responsibilities, as we have seen, are at all times 
limited and subject to revocation whenever disapproved by the governor. 

Though the population of the islands is 40 per cent of that of Spain, 
they have no representation in the Cortes. 

There is a widespread report, almost universally believed by native 
rilii)inos and by foreign merchants, and even aciuio pledged by many 
Spaniards, that pecuniary dishonesty and corruption exist throughout 
the whole body of Spanish ofticeholders, from the highest to the low- 
est. Forced contributions are said to be levied on the salaries of miuor 
officials, the regimental paymasters and commissaries are said to have 
sold part of the regimental stores for their own profit, the collector of 
customs and the minister of finance to have imposed or remitted fines 
at the customhouse and internal-revenue office according to payment 
or nonpayment of presents by merchants, the judges and court officials 
to have ''borrowed" from attorneys large sums which are never paid, 
and even the Governor General is reported to have organized a regular 
system of smuggling in Mexican dollars, the importation of which was 
prohibited by law, on a fixed scale of payment to himself. The current 
report is that Weyler carried away over $1,000,000 as his savings dur- 
ing the three years, from 1888 to 1891, that he held the office of 
Governor-Geueral, on a salary of $40,000 a year. Of the proof of these 
reports I have naturally no personal knowledge, but they are matters 
of common talk and belief, and they have been stated to me by responsi- 
ble persons who have long resided in the islands. 

As above stated, the Governor-General is supreme head of every 
branch of the public service, not excepting the courts of justice. How 
this i)ower was exercised is shown in the hundreds of executions for 
alleged political offenses which took place during the years 1805, 1896, 
and 1897, by the thousands deported to ^Mindanao and Fernando Po, 
and by the number of political ]>risouers in jail at the time of our entry 
into IManila. On the first examination which General Mac Arthur, as 
military governoi', nurde of the jail, about August 22, he released over 
60 prisoners confined for alleged i)olitical offenses. One of them was a 
woman who had been imprisoned for eleven years, by order of the 
Governor-General, but without any charges ever having been presented 
against her; another was a woman who had been in jail for three years 
on a vague charge, never formulated, of having carried a basket of 
cartridges to an insurgent. 

The day of reckoning for three centuries of this sort of government 
came when Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish squadron on May 1, 
1898. An insurrection had been in progress from August, 1890, to 
December, 1897. Unable to suppress it, the Government made a 
written treaty with the insurgent leaders, paying them a large sum of 
money and promising to introduce various reforms on condition that 
they would leave the country. Hardly had the Spanish officials 
recovered from this when the appalling disaster of the destruction of 
their fleet occurred under their very eyes. 

Then followed in rapid succession the naval blockade, the arrival of 
the insurgent leaders from Hongkong, the raising of an insurgent 
army, which blockaded i\lanila on the land side, and finally the Ameri- 
can troops. At the end of 104 days after the destruction of the Spanish 
fleet the city surrendered to a combined land and naval attack of the 
American forces. On the day after the capitulation the American 
commander in chief issued his proclamation establishing a military 



TREATY OF PEACE. 419 

government, appointed a military governor, a minister of finance, a 
collector of customs, collector of internal revenue, postmaster, and 
judge of the provost court; took possession of all public funds (about 
$900,000) and all public offices, and as rapidly as possible put this 
government in operation. 

The machinery of the Spanish Government was thoroughly disorgan- 
ized when we entered Manila. The courts of justice, except the inferior 
criminal courts, had not been in session since early in May; the officials 
had been cut off from communication with the other islands and with 
Spain for over three months; there had been no customs to collect, and 
owing to the entire suspension of business, but little internal revenue; 
a forced loan of $2,000,000 for military purposes had been extracted 
from the Spanish-Philippine Bank, and yet the troops were several 
mouths in arrears of pay; all Government officers outside the walled 
city had been moved to temporary quarters within the walls, and their 
records had been lost or thrown into confusion; the officials, seeing the 
inevitable end in sight, were intent only on planning for their return to 
Spain. 

This disorganization was completed when the American military offi- 
cers toi)k charge of the government and every Spanish official without 
exception refused absolutely to continue in service. They were immedi- 
ately dismissed and dispersed. 

The situation thus created is without precedent in American history. 
When Scott captured the City of Mexico it was acknowledged on both 
sides that his occupation was only to be temporary, and there were no 
insurgents to deal with. When the Americans entered California 
they found only a scanty population, who were soon outnumbered by 
theAmerican immigrants. But in the Philippine Islands there is a 
population of more than 7,000,000, governed by an alien race whose 
representatives present in the islands, including military and naval 
forces, clergy, and civil employees, do not exceed 30,000 in number. 
Against this government an insurrection is in progress which claims 
to have been successful in provinces containing a population of about 
2,000,000. The city and province of Manila, with a population of 
400,000 more, have been captured and occupied by a foreign army, but 
whether its occupation is to be temporary or permanent has not yet 
been decided. 

Finally the Government officials of all classes refuse to perform 
their functions. The desire of the most of them is to escape to Spain. 
It was stipulated in the capitulation that they should have the right 
to do so at tl\eir own expense, and numbers of them, as well as friars, 
have already taken their departure. The Spanish officials have intense 
fear of the insurgents; and the latter hate them, as well as the friars, 
with a virulence that can hardly be described. They have fought them 
with success and almost without interru])tion for two years, and they 
will continue to fight them with increased vigor and still greater pros- 
pects of success if any attempt is made to restore the Spanish 
government. In its present disorganized condition the Spanish Gov- 
ernment could not successfully cope with them ; on the other hand, it 
would not surrender to them. The result, therefore, of an attempted 
restoration of Spanish power in any of the islands would simply be 
civil war and anarchy, leading inevitably and speedily to intervention 
by foreign nations whose subjects have property in the islands which 
they would not allow to be destroyed. 

Insurgent troops. — It is very difficult to give exact figures for the 
numbers of insurgent troops. In his message to foreign governments 



420 TKEATY OF PEACE. fl 

of Aujiust G, asking for recognition of belligerency and independence, 
Aguiiialdo claims to have a force of 30,000 men, organized into a regular 
army. This included the force in the provinces of Luzon outside of 
Manila. What was in evidence around Manila varied from 10,000 to 
15,000. They were composed of young men and boys, some as young 
as 15 years of age, recruited in the rural districts, having no i)r()perty 
and nothing to lose in a civil war. They have received no pay, and 
althougli Aguinaldo speaks in his proclamation of his intention and 
ability to maintain order wlierever his forces penetrate, yet the feeling 
is practically universal among the rank and tile that they are to 
be compensated for their time and services and hardships by looting 
Manila. 

Their e(piipment consists of a gun, bayonet, and cartridge box; their 
uniform of a straw hat, gingham shirt, and trousers ami bare feet; 
their transportation of a few ponies and carts, impressed for a day or a 
week at a time: for quarters they have taken the public building in 
each village or pueblo, locally known as the Tribunal, and the churches 
and convents; from these, details are sent out to man the trenches. 
Their food while on duty consists of rice and banana leaves, cooked at 
the (juarters and sent out to the trenches. After a few days or a week 
of active service they return to their homes to feed up or to work on 
their farms, their places being taken by others, to whom they turn over 
their guns and cartridges. 

Their arms have been obtained from vaiious sources — from purchases 
in Hongkong; from the supply which Admiral Uewey found in the 
arsenal at Cavite; from capture made from the Spaniards. They are 
partly Mausers and partly Jtemiugtous, Their ammunition was ob- 
tained in the same way. They have used it freely, and the supply is 
now rather short. To replenish it they have established a cartridge 
factory at the village of Jnuis, about 10 miles south of Cavite, where 
they have 400 ])e()ple engaged in reloading cartridges with powder and 
lead found at Cavite or purclsased abroad. They have no artillery, 
excejjt a few antitpie columbiads obtained from Cavite, and no cavalry. 
Their ^nethod of warfare is to dig a trench in front of the Spanish posi- 
tion, cover it with mats as a protection against the sun and rain, and 
during the night put their guns on to]> of the trench above their heads 
and lire in the general direction of the enemy. When their ammuni- 
tion is exhausted, they go off in a body to get a fresh supply in baskets, 
and then return to the trenches. 

The men are of small stature, from 5 feet to 5 feet (5 inches in height, 
and weigh from 110 to 130 pounds. Compared with them, our men 
from Colorado and California seemed like a race of giants. One after- 
noon,. just after we entered Manila, a battalion of the insurgents tired 
upon the outposts of the Colorado regiment, mistaking them, as they 
claimed, for S])aniards. The outpost retreated to their support and 
the I'MIipinos followed; they easily fell into an ambush, and the sup- 
port, numbering about 80 m'en, surrounded the 250 Filipinos, wrenched 
the guns out of their hands, and nmrched them off as unarmed ])ris- 
oners, all in the space of a few minutes. Such a force can hardly 
be called an army, and yet the service whi(;h it has rendered should 
not be underestimated. "^Between 2,000 and 3,000 Spanish native troops 
surremlered to it during the months of June an<l July; it constantly 
annoyed and harassed tiie Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up 
at night and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila 
early in July so completely that all supplies were cut otf and the 
inhabitants, as well as the Spanish troops, w^ere forced to live on horse 



TREATY OF PEACE. 421 

and buffalo meat, and tlie Chinese population on cats and dogs. It 
captured the waterworks of Manila and cut off' the water supply, and if 
it had been in the dry season would have inflicted great suffering on 
the inhabitants for lack of water. 

These results, it is true, wei'e obtained against a dispirited army con- 
taining a considerable number of nati\'e troops of doubtful loyalty. 
Yet from August, 181)6, to April, 1897, they fought 2o,(>(jO of the best 
regular troops sent out from Spain, inflicting on them a loss of over 
150 officers and 2,5Ui) men killed and wounded, and they suffered still 
greater losses themselves. Nevertheless, from daily contact with them 
for six weeks, I am very confident that no such results could have 
been obtained against an American army, which would liave driven 
them back to the hills and reduced them to a petty guerrilla warfare. 
If they attack the American army this will certainly be the result; 
and while these gnerrilla bands might give son;e trouble so long as 
their ammunition lasted, yet with our navy guarding the coasts and 
our army pursuing them on land, it would not be long before they were 
reduced to subjection. 

lanmient civil adviinistration.—ln August, 180(5, an insurrection 
broke olit in Cavite under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a!id 
soon spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued 
with varying successes on both sides, and the trial and execution of 
numerous insurgents, until December, 1897, when the Governor General, 
Primo de Eivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo, the 
substance of the document, which is iu possession of Senor Felii)e 
Agoncillo, who accompanies me to Washington, being attached hereto 
and marked A. In brief, it required that Aguinaldo and the other 
insurgent leaders should leave the country, the Government agreeing to 
pay (hem $8()(>,000 in silver and promising to iiitroduce namerons re- 
forms, including representation in the S])ai!ish Cortes, freedom of the 
press, general amnesty for all insurgents, and the expulsion or secular- 
ization of the monastic orders, 

Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A 
portion of the n^.oney, S400,0(H), was deposited in banks at Hongkong, 
and a lawsuit soon arose between Agninaldo and one of his subordi- 
nate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very 
honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division 
of the nmney among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo 
claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to renniin on deposit 
until it was seen wliether the Si)aniaids would carry out their prom- 
ised reforms, and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the 
expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by 
paying Artacho $5,000, 

No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms, more than 2,000 
insurgents, who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places, 
are stdl in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to 
carry on the oi)erations of the present insurrection. 

On the 21th day of April Aguinaldo met the United Stares consul 
and others at Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in con- 
junction with the operations of the United States Navy at Manila. 
This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey, and by his consent, or at his 
request, Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong on A])ril 2f3; and 
when the McGulloch went to Hongkong early in Ivlay to carry the news 
of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other 
revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila Bay. They 
soon after landed at Cavite. and the Admiral allowed them to take such 



422 TREATY OF PEACE. 

ftuns, nmniLiuition, ;nid stores as lie did not require for himself. With 
these, and some other arms \yhich he had brought from Hongkong, 
Agniiialdo armed his followers, who rapidly assembled at Cavite, and 
in a few weeks he began moving against the Spaniards. Part of them 
surrendered, giving him more arms, and the others retreated to Manila. 

Soon afterwards two ships which were the j)rivat6 property of Senor 
Agoncillo and other insurgent syxnpathizers were converted into cruis- 
ers and sent with insurgent troops to Subig 13ay and other places to 
cai)ture provinces outside of ]Manila. They were very successful, the 
native militia in Spanish service (capitulating with their arms in nearly 
every case without serious resistance. On the 18th of June Aguiualdo 
issued a proclamation from Cavite establishing a dictatorial government, 
with liimself as dictator. In each village or pueblo a chief (jefe) was 
to be elected, and in each ward a headman (cabeza) ; also in each pueblo 
three delegates — one of police, one of justice, and one of taxes. These 
were to constitute the junta or assembly, and after consulting the junta 
the chiefs of pueblos were to elect a chief of province and three coun- 
cilors — one of police, one of justice, and one of taxes. They were also 
to elect one or more representatives from each province to form the 
revolutionary congress. 

This was followed on June 20 by a decree giving more detailed 
instructicnis in regard to the elections. On June 23 another decree fol- 
lowed changing the title of the government from dictatorial to revo- 
lutionary, and of the chief officer from dictator to president ; announcing 
a cabinet, with a minister of foreign affairs, marine, and commerce, 
anotlier of war and i)ublic works, ai'other of police and internal order, 
justice, instruction, and hygiene, and another of taxes, agriculture, and 
numufactures ; the powers of the ]n'esident and congress were defined, 
and a code of military justice was formulated. 

On the same date a liianifesto was issued to the w^oild explaining the 
reasons and purposes of the revolution. On June 21 another decree 
was issued containing instructions in regisrd to elections. On August 
an address was issued to foreign governments stating that the revolu- 
tionary government was in operation and control in IT) provinces, and 
that in response to the petition of the duly elected chiefs of these 
l)rovinces an appeal is made for recognition of belligeriaicy and inde- 
pendence. Translations of these various documents are all apjjcnded, 
marked B, C, I), E, F, O, and II. 

The scheme of government is set fortii in the decree ol June I'o, 
marked D. An examination of this document shows tliat it provides 
a dictatorship of the familiar South American type, xlll power is cen- 
tered in the.])resident, and he is not responsible to anyone for his acts. 
He is declared to be "the personification of tlie Philippine public, and 
in this view can not be held responsible while he holds office. His term 
will last until the revolution triumphs.'' He appoints not only the heads 
of <le])nrtments, but all tiieir subordinates, and without reference to 
congress. This body is composed of a single chamber of representa- 
tives from each jnovince. The election is to be conducted by an agent 
of the ])resident, ami the (lualilications of electors are "those iidiabit- 
ants most distinguished for high character, social position, and honor- 
able conduct.'' 

H" any i)roviiice is still under Sjtanish rule its representative is to be 
appointed by the ])resident. Congress is to deliberate on "all grave 
and transcendental ((uestions whose decision admits of delay ami 
adjournment, but the president may decide questions of urgent charac- 
ter, giving the reasons for his decision in a message to congress." The 



TREATY OF PEACE. 423 

acts of congress are not binding nntil apijroved by tlie president, and 
lie lias power of absolute veto. 

Congress was to hold its first session at Malolos about September 20. 

While this scheme of goveiniuent is a pure despotism, yet it claims 
to be only temporary, and intended to "prepare the country so that a 
true republic may be established." It also provides a rude form of 
governmental machinery for managing the affairs of the provinces. To 
what extent it has actually gone into operation it is difficult to say. 
Aguinaldo claims in his address of August that it is in force in fifteen 
provinces whose aggregate population is about 2,000,000. Tliey include 
the island of Mindoro and about one-half of Luzon. Xone of these 
(except Cavite) have yet been visited by Americans, and all communi- 
cation with them by the Spanish Government at Mauila has been cut 
off' since May 1. 

In the Province of Cavite and that portion of the Province of Manila 
outside of the city and its suburbs which was occupied by the insur- 
gent troops, as well as those of the United States, their military forces, 
military headquarters, etc., were very much in evidence, occupying the 
principal houses and churches in every village and hamlet, but there 
were no signs of civil government or administration. It was reported, 
however, that Aguiualdo's agents were levying taxes or forced contri- 
butions not only in the outside villages, but (after we entered Manila) 
by means of secret agents in the market places of the city itself. At 
Aguiualdo's headquarters, in Bacoor, there were signs of activity and 
business, and it was reported that his cabinet officers were in constant 
session there. Aguinaldo himself never failed to claim all the preroga- 
tives due to his alleged position as the de facto ruler of the country. 

The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communica- 
tion with him was General Anderson. He did much to thwart this 
officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for 
his troops, and he went so far in a letter of July 23 (copy herewith 
marked J) as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops 
on Phili[)pine soil without his consent — a notice which it is hardly 
necessary to say was ignored. The day before the attack on Manila 
he sent staff' officers to the same general asking for our plans of attack 
so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same re(juest had 
previously been made to me by one of his brigade commanders, to 
which 1 rei)lied that 1 was not authorized to give the information desir«^d. 

Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt on his arrival, and this 
enabled the latter to avoid any comnumication with him, either direct 
or indirect, until after Manila had been taken. General Merritt then re- 
ceived one of Aguiualdo's staff' officers in his office as nulitary governor. 
The interview lasted more than an hour, (general Merritt referred to 
his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American 
troops had come to Mauila and the nature of the military government 
which would be maintained until further orders from Washington. He 
agreed upou the lines outside of the city of Manila up to which the 
insurgent troojjs could come, but no farther, with arms in their hands; 
he asked for possession of the waterworks, which was given; and while 
expressing our friendship and sympathy for the Philippine ])eople, he 
stated very positively that the United States Government had placed 
at his disposal an am])le force for carrying out his instructions, and 
even if the services of Aguiualdo's forces had been -needed as allies he 
should not have felt at liberty to accept them. 

The problem of how to deal with Aguiualdo's government and troops 
will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment and difficulty, and 



424 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Tvill require much tact and skill iu its solutiou. The United States 
Governnieiit. throujih its naval commander, hiis to some extent made 
use of them for a distinct military i)urpose, viz, to harass and annoj' the 
Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila 
on the land side, and to do as niucli damage as possible to the Spanish 
Government prior to the arrival of our trooi)s; and for this purpose the 
adn)iral allowed thein to tiike arms and munitions which he had cap- 
tured at Cavite and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Buy in 
their expeditions against other provinces. But the admiral has been 
very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurances of recognition and no 
pledges or i)romises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo 
and his adherents rendered iu preparing the way for attack on Manila 
are certainly entitled to consideration ; but, after all, they were small in 
comparison Avith what was done by our own tleet and army. 

There is no reason to believe that Aguinaldo's government has any 
elements of stability. In the first place, Aguinaldo is a young man of 
28 years: prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been a schoolmaster 
and afterwards gobernadorcillo and municipal captain in one of the 
pueblos of the Province of Oavite. He is not devoid of ability, and he 
is surrounded by clever writers. But the educated and intelligent 
Filipinos of Manila say that not only is he lacking in ability to be 
at the head of alfairs, but if an election for president was held he 
would not even be a candidate. He is a successful leader of insurgents, 
has the confidence of young men in the country districts, prides him- 
self on his military aT)ility, and if a republic could be established the 
post he would probably choose for himself would be general-in-chief of 
the army. 

In the next place, Aguinaldo's government, or any entirely inde- 
pendent government, docs not command the hearty supi)ort of the 
large body of the Filipinos, both iu IVlanila and outside, who have 
property, education, and intelligence. Their liatred of Spanish rule is 
very keen, and they will cooperate with Aguinaldo or anyone else to 
destroy it. But after that is done they fully realize that they must 
have the support of some strong nation tor niauy years before they 
will be in a position to manage their own alTaiis alone. The nation to 
which they all turn is America, and their ideal is a Philippine republic 
under American iirotection, such as they have heard is to be granted 
to Cuba. But when it comes to defining their ideas of protection and 
the respective rights and duties of each under it — what portion of the 
government is to be administered by them and what portion by us; 
how the revenues are to be collected, and in what proi)ortiou the ex- 
penses aie to be divided — they have no clearly defined ideas at all; nor 
is it to be expected that they should have, after generations of Spanish 
rule, without any experience in self government. The sentiment of this 
class — the educated natives with property at stake — looks u])on the 
prospect of Aguinaldo's governnient and forces entering .Manila wiUi 
almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Si)aniards 
themselves. 

Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo insurrec- 
tion. Tliere are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines, each speak- 
ing a dilfcrent diale(;t; but five-sixths of the entire Christian i)oi)ulation 
is composed of the Tagalos and Visayas. The former live iu Mindoro 
and the southern half of Luzon, and the latter iu Cebu, lloilo, and 
other islands in the center of the group. The Tagalos are m.ore numer- 
ous than the \'isayas, but both races are about e(|ual in civilization, 
intelligence, and wealth. It is claimed by Aguinaldo's ])artisaus that 



TREATY OF PEACE. 425 

the Visayas are in sympathy with his insurrection and intend to send 
representatives to the congress. Bnt it is a fact that tbe Visayas have 
taken no active part in the present insurrection, nor in that of 1806; 
that the Spanish Government is still in full control at Cebn and Iloilo 
and in tbe Visayas' islands, and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no 
efibrt to attack them. The Visayas number nearly li,()()0,0(iO, or about 
as many as the population of all the Tagalo provinces which Aguinaldo 
claims to have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will 
support his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that, on account 
of racial prejudices and jealonsies and other causes, they will o^jpose him. 

Upon one i)oint all are agreed, excei)t possibly Aguinaldo and his 
immediate adherents, and that is that no native government can main- 
tain itself without the active support and ])rotection of a strong for- 
eign government. This being admitted, it is diftlcult to see how any 
foreign government can give this protection without taking sucli an 
active part in the management of affairs as is practically equivalent to 
governing in its own name and for its own account. 

United /States troops and navi/. — I assume tluit the reports received at 
the War and Xavy Departments give all the desirecl information in 
regard to the military forces of the United States. 

At the time I left (August 30) the Eighth Corps consisted of two 
divisions, numbering in all about 1-J,00U men, with 1(3 field guns and 6 
mountain guns. No wagons or animals had then nrrived. 

One regiment was stationed within the walled city guarding its gates 
and the captured guns and ammunition; a small force was at Oavite, 
and the bulk of the troops were in Manila outside of the walled city. 
They were quartered in the Spanish barracks, which were all in good 
condition, and in convents and ])rivate houses. The health of the 
troo])s was excellent, notwithstanding the extraordinary hardships to 
which they had been subjected in the trendies before Manila. 

Admiral Dewey had under his command the Charleston, Monterey, 
and MoiiadnocJ:, which arrived in July and August; the CaUao and 
Leyte, which had been captured from the Spaniards, and the ships 
whicii were in the battle of I\Iay 1, viz, the OlympUi, Boston, Ualtimorej 
Raleigh, Concord, Petrel, and MeCnlloch. The health of the squadron 
was excellent. The Olympia and Concord were being docked and 
cleaned at Hongkong. Permission to use the docks at Nagasaki during 
the suspension of hostilities had been declined. 

United States civil adniinistration. — We entered ^lauila on the after- 
noon of August 13. On the 14th the capitulation was signed, and the 
same day General Merritt issued his i»roclaination establishing a mili- 
tary government. On the 15th General McArthur was appointed mili- 
tary commandant of the walled city and provost-marshal-general of 
the city of Manila and its suburbs, and on the 17th I was appointed 
to take charge of the duties performed by the intendente general de 
hacienda, or minister of finance, and all fiscal afi'airs. Eepresentatives 
of the Post-Oftlce Department had arrived on the steamsiiip China in 
July, and they immediately took charge of the Manila })ost-oftlce, 
which was opened for business on the 16th. The custom-house was 
opened on the ISth with Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier as collector, and 
the internal-revenue office with Major Dement as collector, on the 2Ud. 
Captain (xlass, of the Navy, was appointed captain of the port, or 
naval ofhcer, and took charge of the ottice on August 19. 

The collections of customs during the first ten days exceeded 
$100,000. The collection of internal revenue was small, owing to the 
difticulty and delay in ascertaining what persons had or had not paid 



426 TREATY OF PEACE. 

their taxes for the curreut year. The adiuinistration of waterworks 
was put iu cliarye of Lieutenant Connor, of the Engineers, on August 
25. The provost court, with Lieutenant-Cohmel Jewett, judge-advocate, 
United States \'olunteers, sitting as judge, was appointed and held its 
tirst session on August 23. 

The provost-inarshalgeneral lias charge of the police, fire, health, 
and street-cleaning de})artnients and tlie issuing of licenses. The 
guardia ci\il, or gendarmerie, of the city proving indifferent and inefti- 
cient, they were disarmed and disbanded. The Thirteenth Minnesota 
Regiment was detailed for i)olice duty, and one or more companies 
stationed in each police station, from which patrolmen were sent out 
on the streets to take the place of the sentries who had constantly 
patrolled them from the hour of entering the city. 

The sliops were all closed when we entered on Saturday afternoon, 
the 13th. On Monday morning some of them opened, and by Wednes- 
day the banks had resumed business, the newspapers were published, 
the merchants were ready to declare goods at the custom house, the 
tramcars were running, and the retail shops were all open and doing a 
large business. There was no disorder or pillage of any kind in the 
city. The conduct of the troops was simply admirable, and left no 
ground for criticism. It was noted and commented upon by the for- 
eign naval officers in the most favorable terms, and it so surprised the 
Spanish soldiers tliat a considerable number of them applied for per- 
mission to enlist in our service. 

At the time I left General Mc Arthur had fully established his office 
as provost-marshal-general, and was organizing one by one the various 
bureaus connected with it, all with United States military officers in 
charge; the provost court was in daily session, sentencing gamblers 
and persons guilty of petty disturbances, and a military commission 
had just been ordered to try a Chinaman accused of burglary. 

At the various public offices I collected the following Spanish funds: 

At the general treasury $795, 517. 71 

At the mint '. 62, 856. 08 

At the internal-revenue office 24, 077. 60 

882,451.:3i) 
Of this amount there was — 

Gold coin $4, 200. 00 

Gold bar.s .3. 806. 08 

Silver coin IHO. 634. 81 

C'opuer coin 297, 800. 00 

Spanish bank not es 216, '.M)~>. 00 

Accepted check.s 170, 205. 50 

882,451.39 

The money was counted by a l)oard of officers and turned over to 
Maj. ( '. 11. Whipple, paymaster, United States Army, as custodian of 
Spanish public funds. A few thousand dollars in other public offices 
were still to b(^ collected. 

The money re(;cived at the custom-house and other offices is turned 
in daily, at the close of business, to Major Whipi)lc. Money for current 
expenses is furn.ishrd to heads of departments on their re(iuisition, by 
warrant drawn by the intendente-general on the custodian ot Spanisii 
public funds. The heads of departments are to submit their vouchers 
and accounts monthly to an auditing department, which was being- 
organized when I left. 

All these public offices and I'uiids were surrendered to me only on 



TREATY OF PEACE. 427 

threat of using force and on granting permission to tile a formal pro- 
test. JS^one of these had been received at the time I left, but the ground 
of verbal protest was that theolficials recognized no authority in these 
islands but the Governor-General appointed by the King of Spain, and 
without his order they were unwilling to surrender them. On the other 
baud, J recognized no authority of the Spaiush Governor-General, who 
was merely a pi-isoner of war; I acted under the orders of General 
Merritt, as the United States inilitary governor, and in accordance with 
the terras of capitulation. The claim will probably be made by the 
Spanish officials that as we captured Manila a few hours after the 
peace protocol had been signed at Wasliington, this property still 
belongs to the Spaniards. But I believe that the law lu such cases 
was clearly defined in decisions made by the Cnited States Supreme 
Court in 1<S15. We captured Manila, and the capitulation (under which 
these funds became United States property) was signed by both parties 
before either had received notice of the protocol or suspension of hos- 
tilities. 

On the o})ening of the custom-house several important questions arose 
for imn.ediate decision. The first was in regard to Mexican dollars. 
The importation of these has for several years been prohibited, with a 
view to forcing tlie Spanish coinage (which contains less silver) into cir- 
culation. The large lilnglish banks represented that there was a 
scarcity of currency, owing to the amount which had been hoarded and 
sent away during the siege, and they agreed, in consideration of being 
allowed to import Mexican dollars free of duty, to guarantee the notes 
and accepted checks of the Spanish bank which should be received by 
us in payment of customs up to $200,000 at any onetime. The Spanish 
bank was in difficulty, owing to the enormous amount which the Gov- 
ernment had taken from it under the form of a forced loan, and any 
discrimination on our ])art against it would result in its failure, entailing 
widespread financial disturbance. As there seemed no reason against 
allowing the importation of Mexican dollars, and many in favor of it, I 
recommended that the custom house continne to receive the notes and 
checks of this bank in i)ayment of (customs (for which we were amply 
protected by the guaranty of the strong lilnglish banks), and, with 
General Merritfs ai)pvoval, wrote to those banks authorizing them to 
import Mexican dollars free of duty until further notice. 

The next question was in regard to the rate of duties on imports and 
exports. 

After a careful examination of the matter I recommended that the 
taritf be not changeil until the question had been fully studied and 
ample notice giveTi. General Merritt approved this, and the customs 
are being collected on the Spanish tariff. 

About a week after the custom-house was opoied certain parties 
came to me representing that (Jonsul-Geueral, Wildman, of Hongkong, 
had informed tiiem that United States goods would be admitted free of 
duty in Manila; that acting on this they had purchased a cargo of 
American illuminating oil in Hongkong, and that the payment of the 
heavy duty on it ($30 per ton, or about S cents per gallon) would ruin 
them. On consulting Lieutenant Colonel Crowder, judge advocate of 
the Eighth Army Corps, he pointed out the language of paragraph 5 
of General Merritfs proclamation, which followed literally the instruc- 
tions of the President, viz : 

The port of Manila ** * " will be open while our military occupation may con- 
tinne, to the commerce of all neutral nati )n.s as well as our own, in articles not con- 
traband of war, and Hj)oni)aiiment of the prescribed rates of duty which may he in force 
at the time of the importation. '' 



428 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Under this there was clearly no authority for discriminating in favor 
of American <;()0(ls, either coming- direct from a United States i^rt or I 
by tiansshipment at Hongkong. ' 

The collector of customs was directed to act accordingly. \ 

Another question was in regard to the importation of Cliinamen into I 
INIauila. The c<msul at Hongkong telegraphed to know if they would | 
be admitted. As there had been no time for examining the treaties and 
laws iti force on this subject, I replied, with Cxeneral Merritt's a])proval, 
that for the present it was not practicable to admit Chinese laborers 
into Manila. 

Another very important question M'hich arose was in regard to trade 
with the other IMiilippine Islands. Nearly all the hem]) and the greater 
])art of the sugar is grown in the Visayas. The hemp is bought by 
foreign merciiants in Alanila, who bring it there from the other islands 
and export it, paying large duties to tlie Manila custom-house. These 
merchants were anxious to bring up their stock, of which a large 
amount had accunuilated during the war, and ship it abroad. Tlie 
ships engaged in this island trade were idle in the Pasig. They 
belonged to a Spanish corporation owned entirely by Scotch ca])ital, 
and had a Spanish register. The owners were ready to translei- them 
to the American tlag. Could these vessels be allowed to clear for the 
ports of Cebu and Iloilo, which were in Spanish possession? The 
judge advocate advised me that they could not without the express 
authority of the Piesideut. 1 so notilied the owners of the ships and 
the hem}) merchants. 

The day before I left Manila, however. Admiral Dewey received a . 
cable from the Navy Department, stating that Spanisii ships had been | 
granted the privilege of trading to Ameiican ports during the suspeu- ' 
sion of hostilities, and that Aiiierican ships (;ould be granted a similar 
privilege for Spanish ports. I understood that on the strength of this 
cable General Otis intended 'to allow the United States consul at 
Manila to grant these vessels an American register, and then allow 
them to clear for the other islands. I do not know what arrangement, 
if any, was made in regard to the payment of export duties at Iloilo. 
Clearly the hemp can not pay export duties at both Iloilo and Manila, 
and the Spaniards are not likely to allow it to leave Iloilo free while we 
collect an exp.ort duty on it at Manila. Incidentally this illustrates 
the complications and losses that will arise if tlie islands ;ire subdivided, j 
The principal merchants for all the islands are at Manila, and .SO per | 
cent of the duties on imports and exjiorts are collected at its custom- 
house. A large ])art of the imports are redistributed through the . 
islands, and all the hemp and sugar, whicli form the principal exports, i 
come toiManila from other islands. If, then, we retain Luzon, and give j 
the other islands back to Spain, or some other nation, that nation will i 
impose import and export duties on everything coming from or to j 
Manila. The foreign trade of that city will be lost, and its prosperity i 
will be destroyed; moreover, the Government revenue from that trade 
will be lost. 

In view of the fact that Spanish ofticials declined to cooperate or 
assist in any way in the American government of Manila, the ease and 
rapidity with wliich order was maintained, the machinery of govern- 
ment put in operation, and l)usiness reestablished after our entry into 
JVIanila, is very remarkable. For every ])()siti()n in the (Jovernmeut 
service — legal, administrative,tinancial, mechanical, clerical — men could 
be found in our volunteer ranks who were exi)erience(l in just that 
class of work at home, and they took charge of their Spanish positions 
with pronqttness and coniidence. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 429 

Even ill tUe matter of language no serious difficulty was encountered, 
for no less than 30 good interpreters were found in the California and 
Colorado regiments. 

The military government as now organized and administered fulfills 
all the requirements of preserving order and collecting the public 
revenue. 

The civil courts, however, have yet to be organized, and their organ- 
ization will present many difficulties. 



PAPERS ACCOMPANYING GENERAL GREENE'S MEMORANDA. 

Appendix A. 

Notes by Senor Felipe Agoucillo coDcerning — _ Page. 

(a) Kelatious betweeu Admiral Dewey and Seuor Aguiiialdo 429 

(/)) Terms of peace made by Spauish goveruor-geueral with insurgents, 

December, 1897 430 

(e) Lawsuit between Agninaklo and Artacho 431 

{(l) Aguinaldo's proclamation of May 24, 1898 431 



BRIEF NOTES BY SENOR AGONCILLO. 

Skptembek 15, 1898. 
On the same day tliat Adiniial Dewey arrived at Hongkong Seuor Aguinaldo was 
iu Singapore, whither he had gone from Hongkcjug, and Mr. Pratt, United States 
consul-general, under instructions from the said Admiral, held a conference with him, 
iu which it was agreed that Senor Aguinaldo and other revolutionary chiefs, in 
cooperation Avith the American sfjuadrou, should return to take up arms against the 
Spanish goverumeut of the Philippines, the sole and most laudable desire of the 
Washington Government l)eii!g to concede to the Philippine ])eople al>8olute inde- 
pendence, as soon as the victory against the Spanish aims should be obtained. By 
virtue of this agreement Senor Aguinaldo proceeded by the lirst steamer to Hong- 
kong for the express purpose of embarking on the Ohimpia and going to Manila; 
but this intention of his was not realiz>-d, because the American squadron lelt Hong- 
kong the day previous to his arrival, Admiral Dewey having received from his Gov- 
ernment an order to proceed immediately to .Manila. This is what Mr. Wildman, 
United States consnl-gencral iu Hongkong, said to Seuor Aguinaldo in the inter- 
view which took place between them. 

A few days after the Spanish squadron had been totally destroyed iu the Bay of 
Manila by the American squadron, the latter obtaining a most glorious triumph, 
which deserved the fullest congratulations and praise of the Philippine public, the 
McCuUoch arrived at Hongkong, and her conmiander said to Senor Aguinaldo that 
Admiral Dewey needed him (le necesitaba) iu Manila and that he brought an order 
to take him cm Ijoard said transport, as well as other revolutionary chiefs, whose 
nnmber should be determined by Senor Aguinaldo; and iu fact he and seventeen 
chiefs went to Cavite on the McCiiUoch. 

Seuor Aguinaldo began his campaign against the Spaniards the very day he 
received the 1,902 Mauser guns and 200,000 cartridges which came from Hongkong. 

The first victory which he obtained from the Spaniards was the surrender or capitu- 
lation of the Spanish general Seuor Pena, who was the military governor of Cavite, 
had his head([uarter8 in the town of San Francisco de Malabon, and his force was 
composed of 1,500 soldiers, including volunteers. 

The revolutionary army, in six days' operations, succeeded in getting possession 
of the Spanish detachments stationed in the villages of Bacoor, Imus, Benakayan, 
Noveleta, Santa Cruz de Malab(m, Rosario, and Cavite Viejo. 

On the 9th of June last the whole Province of Cavite was under the control of the 
provisional revolutionary government, including many Spanish inisoners and friars, 
7,000 guns, great quantities of ammunition, and some cannon. 

At the same time that the Province of Cavite was being conquered, other revolution- 
ary chiefs were carrying on campaigns in the Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas, NuQ,va 



430 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Eciza, r.ulacan, 15atangas Pampauga, and Morong, which were under control of the 
revolutionary army by the 12th of Juue; and sncli projiress was made by the Phil- 
ippine revolution in the few days of campaign agaiit^t the Spaniards that by the 3d 
of Angnst last it held under conipiest lifteen inii)ortant ])rovinces of the island of 
Luzon. These i)rovinces are being governed by laws enumating from the provi- 
sional revolutionary government, and in all of them perfect order and complete tran- 
quility reign. 

It is to be noted that the '-]>anish Government has sent to Sefior Aguinaldo various 
emissaries, who invited him to make common cause with Spain against the Tnited 
States, jiromising him that the (ioveriiment of the Spanish nation would concede to 
him anything he might ask for th(! Philippine people. But Souor Aguimildo has 
invariably replied to those emissaries that it was too late, and that he could not 
consider any ju-oposition from the Spanish Government, however beneficial it might 
be to the Pliilippines, because he had already jjledged his word of honor in favor of 
certain representatives of the Government at Washington. 

In view of this positive resolution of Sehor Aguinaldo there began forthwith the 
intrigues of the Spanish enemy, directed against the life of Sehor Aguinaldo. 

PEACE CONVENTION (DECEMBER, 1897). 

Seuor Aguinaldo, in his own name and in that of the other chiefs and subordi- 
nates, obligated himself to lay down their arms, which, according to au inventory, 
were to be turned over to the Spanish Government, thus terminating the revolution. 
His excellency the (iovernor and Captnin-(Teneral, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, 
as the representative of His Majesty's '^iovernment in the Philippines, obligated 
himself, on his side: (1) to grant a general amnestj' to all those under charges or 
sentenced for the crime of rebellion and sedition and other crimes of that category; 
(2,1 to introduce into the Philippines all reforms necessary for correcting in an effect- 
ive and absolute manner the evils which for so many years had oppressed the coun- 
try in political and administrative affairs; and (STau indemnity of $800,000, paya- 
ble at the following dates: A letter of credit of the Spanish P'ilipine Bank for 
$400,000 against the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, in Hongkong, was to be delivered 
to Seuor Aguinaldo on the same day that he should leave Biak-va-Bato, where he had 
established his head(|uarters, and should embark on the steamer furnished by the 
Spanish Government, 'i'his letter of credit was, in point of fact, delivered; $200,000 
was to be i>aid to the said Sefior Aguinaldo as soon as the revolutionary general, 
Seuor Ric.irte, should receive his telegram ordering him to give up his arms, with au 
inventory thereof, to the commissioner designated by his excellency the Governor 
and Captain-General, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera; and the remaining $200,000 
should be due and payable when the peace should be a fact, and it should be under- ' 
stood that peace was a fact when the Te Deum should be sung by order of his excel- 
lency the Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines. 

Senor Aguinaldo complied in every respect, so far as he was concerned, with the 
peace agreement. But the Spanish Government did not observe a similar conduct, 
and this has been deplored and still is deeply deplored by the Philippine people. 

The general amnesty which was promised has remained completely a dead letter. 
Many Philippinos are still to be found in Fernando Po and in various military prisons 
in Spain sufteiing the grievous consequences of the punishment indicted upon them 
unjustly and the inclemencies of the climate to which they are not accustomed. 
Some of these unfortunates who succeeded in getting out of those prisons and that 
exile are living in beggary in Sjiain without the Government furnishing them the 
necessary means to enable them to return to the Philiiij^ines. 

In vain has the l^hilippine ])ublic waited for the reforms also promised. After the 
celebration of the comjjact of June and the disposition of the arms of the revolution- 
ists, the (jovernor-General began again to inliict on the defenseless natives of the 
country arbitrary arrest and execution without Judicial ])roceedings solely on the 
grouuil that rhey were merely susjiected of being secessionists; proceedings which 
indisputably do not conform to the law and Christian sentiments. 

In the matter of reforms, \hv r(digious orders again began to obtain from the 
Spanish Go\ crument their former and alisolutt^ power. 

Thus Spam pa.\ s so dearly for her fatal errors in her own destiny. 

In exchange for the loftiness of mind with which Seuor Aguinaldo has rigidly 
carried out the terms of the peace agreement, (general Primo de Rivera had the 
cynicism to state in the Congress of his nation that he had promised no reform to 
Sefior Aguinaldo and his army, but that he had only given them a piece of bread in 
order that they might be able to maintain themselves abroad. This was reechoed in 
the foreign ])rc>s, and Seuor Aguinaldo was accused of having allowed himself to be 
bought with a handful of gold, selling out his country at the same time. There were 
pu))lished moreover in those Sjianish iieriodicals caricatures of Seuor Aguinaldo, 
which profoundly wounded his honor and his patriotism. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 431 

SeFior Agiiiiiaklo and the other revolutionists who reside iu Hongkong agreed 
bot to take out one cent of the $400,000 deposited in the Chartered Bank and the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the only amount which Senor Agninaldo received 
from the Spanish Government on account of the stii)ulated indemnity, but to use it 
for arms in order to carry on another revolution in the Philippines in case the 
Spanish Government should tail to carry out the jteace agreement, at least in so far 
as it refers to general amnesty and reforms. All the above-named revolutionists, 
Senor Aguinaldo setting the example, re8(dved to deny themselves every kind of 
comfort during their stay in Hongkong, living in the most modest style, for the 
purpose of preventing a reduction by one single cent of the above-named .sum of 
$400,000 'vhich they set aside exclusively for the benefit of their country. 

LAWSUIT IJETWEEN DON J. ARTACHO AND DON E. AGUINALDO. 

Senor Artacho, induced by the father solicitor of the Dominicans and the consul- 
general of Spain, filed in the courts of that ccdony a summons against Don E. 
Aguinaldo, asking for a division of the above-mentioned $400,000 "between those 
revolutionary chiefs who refeided iu Hongkong; Artacho and three others who joined 
the revolution in its last days and rendered little service to it were tlie only ones who 
desired a division of thismoney, whereas forty-seven revolutionaries, many of whom 
were most distinguished chiefs, were opposed to it, supporting the resolution which 
Senor Aguinaldo had previously taken in regard to it. Senor Aguinaldo, in order to 
avoid all scandal, did everything possible to avoid appearing in court answering the 
summons of Artacho, who, realizing that by his conduct he had made himself hated 
l)y all Filipinos, agreed in a friendly arrangement to withdraw liis suit, recei^■iug 
in exchange $5,000. In this way were frustrated the intrigues of the solicitor of the 
Dominican order and of the Spanish consul, who endeavored at any cost to destroy 
the $400,000 by dividing it up. 

Artacho is now on trial before a judicial court on charges preferred by various 
revolutionists for offenses which can be proved; he has no influence iu the revolu- 
tionary party. 

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL AGUINALDO, MAT 24, 1898. 

Filipinos: The great nation North America, cradle of true liberty, and friendly 
on that account to the liberty of our people, oppressed and subjugated by the tyr- 
anny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here 
a protection which is decisive as well as disinterested toward us, considering us 
endowed with sutiticient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy land. 
To maintain this so lofty idea, which we deserve from the now very powerful nation 
North America, it is our duty to detest all those acts which belie such an idea as 
pillage, robbery, and every class of injury to persons as well as to things. With a 
view to avoiding international conflicts during the period of our campaign, I order 
as follows : 

Aktic'le I. The lives and property of all foreigners, including Chinese and all 
Spaniards, who either directly or indiiectlj' have joined in taking arms against us, 
are to be respected. 

Art. II. The lives and property of those who lay down their arms are also to be 
respected. 

Art. III. Also are to be respected all sanitary establishments and ambulances, and 
likewise the persons and things which may be found in either one or the other, 
including the assistants in this service, unless they show hostility. 

Art. IV. Those who disobey what is prescribccl iu the preceding articles will be 
tried by summary court and put to death, if such disobedience shall cause assassina- 
tion, fire, robbery, and violation. 

Given at Cavite the 24th of May, 1808. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



Appendix— Continued, 

aguinaldo's proclamations. 

Page. 

B. — June 18, 1898, establishing dictatorial government 432 

C. — June 20, 1898, instructions for elections, etc 433 

D. — June 23, 1898, establishing revolutionary government 433 

E. — Jime 27, 1898, instructions concerning details 437 

F. — June 23, 1898, message to foreign powers 437 

G. — August 6, 18M8, message to foreign powers asking recognition 438 

H. — August 1, 1898, resolutions of revolutionary chiefs asking for recognition .. 438 

J. — July 23, 1898, letter from Senor Aguinaldo to General Anderson 440 



432 TREATY OF PEACE. 



AGUINALDO'S Plt( KJLAMATIOX OFJrXE 18, 1898, ESTABLISHING THE DICTATORIAL i.| 

No. 1. ij 

2'y the riiiU2)piv« Public: 

Circiimstiinces have providentially ])laced me iu a i)ositioii lor whicli I can not lail !: 
to rcc()<;nize that 1 am not pro])erly iinalilicd; but since I can not violate the laws J 
ol" rro\ idence nor dceliue the ohli^ations wliich lionor and patriotism impose upon j, 
nie, 1 now salute yon, Oh my Beloved I'eople. ' 

1 have proclaimed in the face of the whole world that the asjjiration of my whole) 
lile, the iinal object of all my eliorts and strength, is nothing else but your inde- ) 
pendeiiee, for 1 am (umly convinced that that constitutes your constant desire, and ' 
that independence signiiies for us redemption from slavery and tyranny, regaining ; 
our liberty, and entrance into the concert of ei\ilized nations. j 

1 understand, on the other hand, that the tirst duty of every government is to | 
interpret faithfully popular aspirations; with this motive, although the abnormal j 
circumstances of the war have coni))elled me to institute this dictatorial govern- ' 
nient which assumes full powers, both civil and military, my constant desire is to 
surround myself with the most distinguished persons of each province, those that by 
their ennduct deserve the confideuee of their province, to tlie end th.it, the true 
neci'ssities of eacii being known by them, measures may 1)6 adojjte I to meet those 
necessities and ajjply the remedies iu accordance with the desires of all. 

I understand, moreover, the urgent necessity of establishing iu each town a solid 
and robust organization, the strongest bulwark of public security an<l the sole means 
of securing that union and discipline which are indispensable for the establishment 
of the Kepuhlic, that is, government of the people for the {leople, and warding off 
the international couliivts which may arise. 

Following out the foregoing considerations, I decree as follows: 

Akticle I. The inhabitants of every town where the forces of the Spanish Govern- 
ment still remain will decide upon the most elHcacious measures to combat and 
destroy ihem, according to the resources and means at their dis))osaJ, according to 
prisoners of war the treatment most conformable to humanitarian sentiments and to 
the customs oliserved l)y civilized nations. 

Art. II. As soon as the town is freed from Spanish domination the inhabitants 
most distinguished for high character, social position, and honorable conduct, both 
in the center of the conmiunity and in the suburbs, will come together iu a large 
meeting, iu which they will ])roceed to elect by a majority of votes the chief of the 
town and a headman for each suburb, considering as suburbs not only those hitherto 
known as such, V)ut also the center of tlie community. 

All those inhabitants who fulfill the conditions aljove named will have the right 
to take part in this meeting and to be elected, provided always that they are friendly 
to the Philippine independence and are JJO years of age. 

Art. III. In this meeting shall also be elected by a majority of votes three dele- 
gates, one of police and internal order, another of justice and civil registry, and 
another of taxes and property. 

Tiie delegate of justice and civil registry will aid the chief in the formation of 
courts and in keeping of books of registry of births, deaths, aud marriage contracts 
and of the ceusus. 

The deli'gate of taxes aud property will aid the chief in the collection of taxes 
and administration of jiublic funds, the opening of books of registry of cattle and 
real jtroperty, and in all work relating to encouragement of every class of industry. 

Art. iV. The chief, as president, with the hea<lman and the above-mentioned 
delegates will constitute the popular assemblies, who will supervise the exact fultill- 
ment of the laws in I'orce and the jiarticular interests of each town. 

The head man of the center of the community will be the vice-president of the 
assembly and the delegate of justice its secretary. 

The head men will be delegates of the chief within their respective boundaries. 

Art. \'. The diiefs of each town after cousulting the opinion of their respective 
assemblies will meet and elect by majority of votes the chief of the province aud 
three councilors for the throe branches above-mentioned. 

The chief of the province as president, the chief of the town which is the capital 
of the province as vice-itresident, and the above-named councilors will constitute 
the provincial council, which will supervise the carrying out of the instructions of 
this government in the territory of the province and for the general interest of the 
])rovince, and will proi)iise for this government the measures which should be 
adopted for the gen<!ial welfare. 

Art. \T. The above-named chiei's will also elect by a majority of votes three rep- 
resentatives for each one of the pi'ovinces of Manila aud Cavite, two for each one of 



TREATY OF PEACE. 433 

the provinces classified as terminal in Spanish Legislation, and one for each one of the 
other provinces and politico-military commands of the Philippine Archipelago. 

The above-named representatives will guard the general interests of the archi- 
pelago and the particular interests of their respective provinces, and will constitute 
the revolutionary congress which will propose to this Government the measures con- 
cerning the preservation of internal order and external security of these Islands, and 
will be heard by this Government on all questions of grave importance, the decision 
of which will admit of delay or adjournment. 

Art. VII. Persons elected to any office whatsoever in the form prescribed in the 
preceding article can not perform the same without the previous confirmation by 
this Government, which will give it in accordance with the certificates of election 

Representatives will establish their identity by exhibiting the above-named cer- 
tificates. 

Art. VIII. The military chiefs named by this Government in each province will 
not intervene in the government and administration of the province, but will con- 
tine themselves to requesting of the chiefs of provinces and of the towns the aid 
which may be necessary, both in men and resources, which are not to be refused in 
case of actual necessity. 

Nevertheless, when the province is threatened or occupied by the enemy, in whole 
or in part, the military chief of highest rank therein may assume the powers of the 
chief of the province until the danger has disappeared. 

Art. IX. The government will name for each province a commissioner specially 
charged with establishing therein the organization prescribed in this decree in 
accordance witli instructions which this government will communicate to him. 
Those military chiefs who liberate the towns from the Spanish domination are com- 
missioners by virtue of their office. 

The above-named commissioners will preside over the first meetings held in each 
town and in each province. 

Art. X. As soon as the organization provided in the decree has been established 
all previous appointments to any civil office whatsoever, no matter what their origin 
or source, shall be null and void, and all instructions in conflict with the foregoing 
are hereby annulled. 

Given at Cavite the 18th day of June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



C. 

No. : 



For the execution and proper carrying out of what is prescribed in the decree of 
this government concerning the management of the provinces and towns of the 
Philippine Archipelago I decree as follows : 

INSTRUCTIONS 

concerning the management of the provinces and towns. 

(Then follow 45 rales concerning the elections, formation of the police, the courts, 
and the laving and collection of taxes.) 

Given at Cavite the L'Oth of June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



D. 

AGUINALDO'S PKOCLAMATION OF JUNE 23, ESTABLISHING THE REVOLUTIONARY 

GOVERNMENT. 

No. 3. 

Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, president of the revolutionary government of the 
Philippines and general in chief of its army. 

This Government desiring to demonstrate to the Philippine people that one of its 
ends is to combat with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the Spanish administra- 
tion, substituting for personal luxury and that pompous ostentation which have made 
it a mere matter of routine, cumbrous and slow in its movements, another adminie- 

*T P 28 



434 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tration more modest, simple, ;md i>roiiipt iu performing tlie public service, I decree 
as folloAvs : 

CiiAi'Ti:i; I. — (>/ tile rei'ohtt'KDiary-i/ovcDinnnt. 

Article I. The dictatorial government will be entitled liereatter the revolution- 
ary governmeut, whose object is to struggle for the indepeudeuee of the Philipidnes 
until all nations, including the Spanish, shall exjiressly recognize it, and to prei»are 
the country so that a true rei)ublic may be established. 

The dictator will be entitled hereafter president of the revolutionary governmeut. 

AUT. II. Four secretaryships of government ai-e created — one of ibreign affairs, 
navy, and commerce; another of war and public works; another of police iiud inter- 
nal order, Justice, education, and hygiene; and another of tinance, agriculture, and 
manufacturing industiy. 

The governmeut may increase this number of secretaryships when it shall find in 
practice that this distribution is not sufHcient for the multiplied and complicated 
necessities of the public service. 

Akt. III. Each seeretaryship shall aid the president in the administration of ([ues- 
tions concerning the different branches which it comprises. 

At the head of each one shall be a secretary, who shall not be responsible for the 
decrees of the presidency, l)ut shall sign them wdth the president to give them 
authority. 

]5ut if it shall appear that the decree has been promulgated on the proposition of 
the secretary of the department the latter shall be responsible conjointly with the 
president. 

Art. ly. The secretaryship of foreign affairs will be divided into three bureaus — 
one of diplomacy, another of navy, and another of commerce. 

The first bureau will study and dispose of all questions pertaining to management 
of diplonuitic negotiations with other powers and the correspondence of the govern- 
ment with them; the second will study all questions relating to the formation and 
organization of our navy, and the fitting out of such expeditions as the necessities' 
of the revolution nuiy require; and the third will have charge of everything relat- 
ing to the internal and external connnerce, and the preliminary work which maybe 
necessary for making treaties of commerce with other nations. 

Art. V. The secretaryship of war will be divided into two bureaus; one of war, 
properly speaking, and the other of ])ublic works. 

The first bureau will be subdivided into four sections — one of campaigns, another 
of military justice, another of military administration, and another of military 
health. 

The section of campaigns will have charge of the appointment and formation of 
the certificates of enlistment and service of all who serve in the revolutionary mili- 
tia; of the direction of campaigns; the preparation of plans, works of fortitication, 
and ]>rei)aring reports of battles; of the study of military tactics for the army and 
the organization of the general staff, artillery, and cavalry; and, finally, of the 
determination of all the other (juestions concerning the business of campaigns and 
military operations. 

The section of military justice will have charge of everything relating to courts 
of war and military tribunals, the appointment of judges and counsel, and the 
determination of all questions of military justice. The section of military adminis- 
tration will be charged with the furnishing of food and other supplies necessary for 
the use of the army, and the section of military healtli will have charge of every- 
thing relating to the hygiene and healthfulness of the militia. 

Akt. VI. The other secretaryships will be divided into such luireaus as their 
branches may require, and each bureau will be subdivided into sections according 
to the nature and importance of the work it has to do. 

Art. VII. The secn^tary will inspect and supervise all the work of his secretary- | 
ship and will determine all questions with the president of the government. 

At the head of each bureau will be a director, and in each section an officer ]ior- 1 
vided with such nnmbei' of assistants and clerks as may be specified. i 

Art. \1II. The president will ap])oint the secretaries of his own free choice, and | 
in concert with them will appoint all the subordinate otbcials of each secretaryship. ! 

In order that in the choice of persons it may be possible to avoid favoritism it j 
must be fully understood th;it the good name of the country and the triumph of the | 
revolution re(|uir(; the ser\ices of persons truly capable. j 

Art. IX. Th(! secretaries may he ]ir<'senl at the revolutionary congress, iu order ' 
that they may make any motion in the name of the president or may be interpo- ; 
lated publicly by any one of the rei)resentative8; but when the (|uestion which is j 
the o]>jei'f of the motion shall be put to vote, or after the interpolation is ended, I 
they shall iea\e and shall not take i)art in the vote. 

Alii'. X. The president of the goxeniment is the person ifi cation of the Phili])i)ine 
])eople and in accordance with this idea it shall not bepossible to h(dd him resi)onsi 
ble while he tills the ofiSce. 



i 



TREATY OF PEACE. 435 

His term of office shall last until the revolution triumphs, unless under extraor- 
dinary circumstances he shall fed obliged to otter his resignation to ccmgress, in 
which case congress will elect whomsoever it considers most fit. 

Chapter II. — Of the revoJuiionari/ congress. 

Art. XI. The revolutionary congress is the body of representatives of the prov- 
inces of the Philippine Archipelago elected in the manner prescribed in the decrees 
of the 18th of the present month. 

Nevertheless, if any province shall not be able as yet to elect representatives 
because the greater part of its towns shall have not yet T)een able to liberate them- 
selves from Spanish domination, tlie government shall have power to appoint as 
provisional representatives for this province those persons who are most distinguished 
for high character and social position in such numbers as areprescrilied by the above- 
named decree, provided always that they are natives of the province which they 
represent or have resided therein for a long time. 

Art. XII. The representatives having met at the town which is the seat of the 
revolutionary government, and in the building which may be designated, will pro- 
ceed to its preliminary labors, designating by plurality of votes a commission com- 
posed of live individuals charged with examining documents accrediting each rep- 
resentative, and another commission composed of three individuals who will examine 
the documents which the five of the former commission exhibit. 

Ai!T. XIII. On the following day the above-named representatives will meet again, 
and the two commissions Avill read their respective reports concerning the legality 
of the said documents, deciding by an absolute majority of votes on the character of 
those which appear doubtful. 

This business comi)leted, it will proceed to designate, also by absolute majority, a 
president, a vice-president, and two secretaries, who shall be chosen from among 
the representatives, whereupon the congress shall be considered organized and shall 
notify the government of the result of the election. 

Art. XIV. The place where congress deliberates is sacred and inviolable, and no 
armed force shall enter therein unless the president thereof shall ask therefor in 
order to establish internal order disturbed by those who can neither honor them- 
selves nor its august functions. 

Akt. XV. The powers of congress are: To watch over the general interest of the 
Philippine people and the carrying out of the revolutionary laws; to discuss and 
vote upon said laws; to discuss" and approve prior to their ratification treaties and 
loans; to examine and approve the accounts presented annually by the secretary of 
finance as well as extraordinary and other taxes which may hereafter be imposed. 

Art. XVI. Congress shall also be consulted in all grave and important questions 
the determination of which admit of delay or adjournment; but the president of 
the government shall have power to decide questions of urgent character, but in 
that case he shall give account by message to said body of the decision which he 
has adopted. 

Art. XVII. Every representative shall have power to present to congress any" pro- 
ject of a law, and every secretary on the order of the president of the government 
shall have similar power. 

Art. XVIII. Tlie sessions of congress shall be public, and only in cases which 
require reserve shall it have power to hold a secret session. 

Art. XIX. In the order of its deliberations as well as in the internal government 
of tlie body the instructions Avhich shall be formulated by the congress itself shall 
be observed. 

The president shall direct the deliljerations and shall hot vote except in case of a 
tie, when he shall have the casting vote. 

Art. XX. The president of the government shall not have power to interrupt in 
any manner the meetings of congress nor embarrass its sessions. 

Aur. XXI. The congress shall designate a permanent commission of justice, which 
shall be presided over by the auxiliary vice-president or each of the secretaries, and 
shall be composed of those persons and seven members elected by plurality of votes 
from auKUig the representatives. This commission shall judge on appeal the crimi- 
nal cases tried bv the provincial courts, and shall take cognizance of and have orig- 
inal jurisdiction' in all cases against the secretaries of the government, the chiefs of 
provinces and towns, and the provincial judges. 

Art. XXII. In the ofUce of the secretary of congress shall be kept a book of honor, 
wherein shall be recorded special services rendered the country and considered as 
such by said body. Every Filipino, whether in the military or civil service, may 
petition congress for notation in said book, presenting duly accredited documents 
describing the service rendered by him on behalf of the country since the beginning 
of the present revolution. For extraordinary services which maybe rendered here- 
after the government will propose said notation, accompanying the proposal with 
the necessary documents justifying it. 



436 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Art. XXIII. Tlie cougress will ;(leo o;raiit on the proposal of the government 
Tewards in money, which rnn be given only once, to the families of those who were 
victims of their tluty and patriotism as a result of extraordinary acts of heroism. 

Aur. XXIV. The acts of congress shall not take cflect nntil the president of the 
gnvernmeut orders their fnltillment and execution. Whenever the said president 
sLall be of the opinion that any act is nnsni table or against public policy or ])er- 
nscions. he shall explain to congress the reasons against its execution, and if the 
latter shall insist on its passage the president shall have power to oppose his veto 
ujjdijr his most rigid responsibility. 

Chapter III. — Of military courts and Justice. 

Art. XX\'. When the chiefs of military detachments have notice that any sol- 
dier has committed or has perpetrated any act of those commonly considered ms 
military crimes, he shall bring it to the knowledge of the commandant of the Zone, 
who shall appoint a. judge and a secretary who shall begin suit in the form pre- 
scribed in the instructions tinted the 20th of the jjresent month. If the accused 
shall be of the graih' of lieutenant or higher, the said commandant shall himself be 
the judge, and if the latter shall be the accused the senior conunandant of the Prov- 
ince shall name as judge an oflicer wlio holds a higher giade, unless tln^ same senior 
«ounuamlant shall liimstdf have brought the suit. The judge shall always belong to 
the class of chiefs. 

Akt. XXVI. On the conclusion of the pi'eliminary hearing the senior commandant 
«hall designate three officers of equal or higher rank to the judge, and the military 
-court shall consist of the said officers, the judge, the councilor, and the [jresident. 
The latter shall bts the commandant of the zone if the accused be of the ^raile of 
lieutenant or higlu-r. This court shall conduct the trial in the form customary in 
the provincial courts, but the judgment shall be appealalde to the higher courts 
flf war. 

AiiV. XXVII. The superior court shall be composed of six members, who shall hold 
rank not less than brigadier- generals, and the judge-advocate. If the number of 
generals present in the capital of the levolutionary government shall not l)e suffi- 
cient, the deficiency shall be snytplietl by representatives designated and commis- 
sioned by congress, 'i'he piesident of the court shall be the general having the 
iiiighcst rank of all, and should there be more than one having equal rank the presi- 
dent shall be el cted from among them by absolute majority of votes. 

AiiT. XXVIII. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting the 
higher commaudanrs, the conmiandants of zones and all officers of the rank of major 
aud higher. 

AiiT. XXIX. Commit military crimes: First, those who fail to grant the necessary 
protection to foreigners, both in their persons and projx-rty, and those who similarly 
fail to afford protection to hospitals and ambulances, including persons and effects 
which may be found in possession of one or the other, and those engaged in the serv- 
ice of the same, provided always they commit no hostile act : second, those who fail in 
the respect due to the lives, money, and jewels of enemies who lay down their arms, 
and of prisoners of war; third, Filipinos who place themselves in the servii'e of the 
euemy, acting as spies or disclosing to them secicts of war and the plans of the revo- 
lutionary positions and fortifications, and those who present themselves under a flag 
4>f truce without justifying properly their office and their personality; and fourth, 
those who fail to recognize a flag of truce duly accredited in the form ])rescribed by 
iiiternatioual law. 

Will commit also military crimes: Those who conspire against the unity of the 
r<*volutionists, provoking rivalry between chif^fs. and forming divisions and armed 
bands: second, those who solicit contributions without authority of the govern- 
■ment and misappropriate the public funds; thiril, those who desert to the enemy, or 
are guilty of cowardice in the presence of the enemy, Ixnng armed ; and fourth, those 
who seize the ])roperty of any person who has done no harm to the revolution, vio- 
late women, and assassinate or inflict serious wounds on unarmed persons, and who 
commit robberies and aisou. 

AuT. ,\,\X. I'hose who commit the crimes enumerated will he considered as de- 
clared enemies of the revolution, and will incur the penalties prescribed in the 
Spanish Penal Code, and in the highest grade. 

If the crime shall not be found in tiio said code, the offender shall be imjirisoued 
until the revolution triumjihs, unless the result of this shall be an irreparal)le dam- 
age which, in tlie judgment of the tribunal, shall be a sufficient cause for imposing 
the penalty of death. 

ADDITIONAL CLAUSES. 

The government will establish .abroad a revolutioimry committe<^ conqiosed of a 
Jiumber, not yet fletermined, of persons most coni2)eteut in the Phili])i)ine Archipel- 
Jigo. 'I'his committee will Ije divided into three delegations: One of diplomacy, 
another of the navy, and another of the army. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 43T 

The delegation of diplomacy will arrange and condnct negotiations witli foreign 
cabiuets with a view to the recognition of the belligerency and independence of 
the Philippines. 

The delegation of the navy will be charged with the studying and organizing of 
the Philip]>ine navy and preparing the expenditures wliich the necessities of the- 
revolution may require. 

The delegation of the army will study military tactics and the best form of organi- 
zation for the general staff, artillery, and engineers, and whatever else may be nec- 
essary in order to lit out the Philippine army under the conditions reqnired by 
niodcrn progress. 

AuT. XXXII. The government will issue the necessary instructions for the proper 
execution of the present decree. 

AiiT. XXXIII. All the decrees of the dictatorial government in conflict with the 
foregoing are hereby annulled. 

(Jiven at Cavite the 23d of .June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo- 



E. 

INSTRUCTIONS. 

Desiring to bring about a proper executi<m of the decree dated the 23d of the 
present month, and to provide that the administrative measures shall not resnlt 
hereafter in the jjaralysis of public. business, but that on the contrary it shall con- 
stitute the best guaranty of the regularity, promptitude, and fltness in the trans- 
action of public business, I give the following instructions and decree: 

(Then follow ten rules concerning the details of installing the government.) 

Cavite, the 27th of .June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION. 

If it is true, as it is true, that political revolutions properly understood are the 
violent means which people employ to recover the sovereignty which naturally belongs 
to them, usurped and trampled upon by a tyrannical and arbitrary governjuent. no 
revolution can be more rigliteous than that of the Philippines, because the people 
have had recourse to it after having exhausted all the pacific means which reason 
and experience could suggest. 

The ancient kings of Castile felt obliged to consider the Philippines as a brother 
people, united to the Spanish in a perfect participation of aim^ and interests, Hf> 
much so that when the constitution of 1812 was promnlgated at Cadiz, on account of 
the Avar of Sjianish independence, these islands were represented in the Spanish 
Cortes; but the interests of the monastic corporations, which have always found 
unconditional support in the Spanish Covernuient, overcame this sacred duty and 
the Philippines remained excluded from the Spanish constitution and the people at 
the mercy of the discretionary or arbitrary powers of the (iov^ernor-GeneraJ. 

In this condition the peojile claimed justice, begged of the metro])olis the recog- 
nition and lestitution of their secular rights by means of reforms which should 
assimilate in a gradual and progressive manner tlie Philippines to the Spaniards; 
but their voice was ([uickly throttled and their sons received as the reward of their 
self-deuial deportation, martyrdom, and death. The religious corporations with 
whose interests, always opposed to those of the Philippine people, the Si^anish 
Government has been identified, scoffed at those pretensious and answered with the 
knowledge of that Government that Spanish liberties had cost blood. 

What other recourse then remained to the people for insisting as in duty bound 
on regaining its former rights^ No alternative remained except force, and con- 
vinced of that it has had recourse and revolution. 

And now it is not limited to asking assimilation to the Spanish political constitn- 
tion, but it asks a definite separation I'rom it. It struggles for its independence in 
the firm belief that the time has arrived in which it can and ought to govern itself. 

There has been established a revolutionary government under wise and just laws, 
suited to the abnormal circumstances through which it is passing, and which in 
proper time will prepare it for a true re]UTljlic. Thus taking as a sole model for rte 



438 TREATY OF PEACE. 

acts reason, for its sole end justice, ami for its sole means honorable labor, it calls 
all l'ili]>inos its sons without distinction of class and invites them to unite firmly, 
with the ohject of forming- a nohle society, not based upon blood nor ])om))ous titles, 
but upon the work aud personal nu'rit ol' each one; a free society, where exists 
neither egotism iu)r personal polities, which annihilate and crush; neither envy 
nor favoritism, which debase; neither fanfaronade nor charlatanism, which are 
ridiculous. 

And it could not be otherwise. A people which has given proofs of sufiering aud 
valor in tribulation and in danger aud of hard work aud study in peace is not des- 
tined to slavei;y ; this people is called to be great, to be one of the strongest arms of 
Providence in ruling the destinies of mankind. This people has resources and energy 
sut'licieut to liberate itself from the ruin and extinction into which the Spanish Gov- 
ernment has plunged it, and to claim a modest but worthy place in the concert of 
free nations. 

Given at Cavite the 2Sd of June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



G. 

To Foreif/ii Govcnvnetiis: 

The revolutionary government of the Philippines on its establishment explained 
through the message dated the 2od of .June last the true causes of the Philippine 
revolution, showing according to the evidence that this popular movement is the 
result of the laws which regulate the life of a peojile which aspire to progress aud 
to ]ierfe(tiou hy the sole road of liberty. 

The said revolution now rules in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, 
Tayabas, Laguua, Morong, Bulacau, Bataau, Pampanga, Nuova-Eeija, Tarlac, Pan- 
gasinan, Union, Infanta, and Zambales. and it holds besieged the cajjital of Manila. 

In these provinces complete order and perfect tramjuillity reign, administered by 
the authorities elected by the provinces in accortlance with the organic decrees 
dated 18th aud 23d of .lune last. 

The revolution holds moreover about !t,000 prisoners of war, who are treated in 
accordance with the customs of war between civilized nations and humane senti- 
ments, and at the end of the war it has more than 30,000 combatants organized in 
the form of a regular army. 

In this situation the chiefs of the towns, comprised in the aljove-mentioned prov- 
inces, interpreting the sentiments which animate those who have elected them, have 
proclaimed the iudepeudeuce of the Philippines, ]>etitioning the revolutionary gov- 
ernment that it will entreat aud obtain from foreign governments recognition of its 
belligerency and its independence in the lirm belief that the Philippine people have 
already arrived .at that state in which they can and ought to govern themselves. 

This is set forth in the accompanying documents subscribed by the above-named 
chiefs. 

Wherefore the uudeisigued, by virtue of the powers which belong to him as 
])resideut of the revolutionary government of the l'hili])pine8 and in the name and 
re))resentation of the I'hilippine i)eople, asks the snpjjort of all the powers of the 
civilized world and eainestly entreats them to proceed to the formal recognition of 
the belligerency of the revolution and the indei>eudence of the l'hili]ipine8, since 
they are the means designated by Providence to maintain the (equilibrium between 
peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining the strong, to the end that by these 
means shall shine Ibrth and be realized the most complete justice in the indetinite 
I)rogress ol' humanity. 

Given at Bacoor, in the Province of Cavite, the Gth day of August, 1898. 

The president of the revolutionary government. 

E.MiLio Aguinaldo. 



SlAIKMKXr. 

The undersigned chiefs of towns c()ni])ri.sing the jjrovinces hereinafter named, 
elected as such in the manner )nescribod l)y the decrei' of the 18th and the instruc- 
tions dated the 20th of .lune last, after having been confirmed in their respective 
ofilices by the ])iesident of the government and having taken the i)rescribed oath 
belbre him, have niet^ in full assembly jueviously called for that ])iiri)ose, for the 
pur))ose of discussing the solemn proclamation of i'hilii)i)ine iudepeudeuce. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 439 

The discussion took place with the prudence and at the length which so important 
a question demands, and aiter suitable deliberation the following declarations were 
unanimously adopted: 

The Philippine revolution records, on the one hand, brilliant feats of arms realized 
with singular courage by an improvised army almost without arms, and, on the other, 
the no less notable fact that the people after the combat have not entered upon great 
excesses nor pursued the enemy further, but have treated him on the contrary with 
generosity and humanity, returning at once to their ordinary and tranquil life. 

Such deeds demonstrate in an indisputable manner that the Philippine people was 
not created, as all believed, for the sole purpose of dragging the chains of servitude, 
but that it has a perfect idea of order and justice, shuns a savage life, and loves a 
civilizeil life. 

But what is most surprising in this people is that it goes on giving proofs that it 
knows how to frame laws commensurate with the progress of the age, to respect 
them and obey them, demonstrating that its national customs are not repugnant to 
this progress:" that it is not ambitious for power, nor honors, nor riches, aside from 
the rational and just aspirations for a free and independent life and inspired by the 
most loftv idea of patriotism and national honor; and that in the service of this 
idea and for the realization of that aspiration it has not hesitated in the sacriiice of 
life and fortune. 

These admirable— and more than admirable, these wonderful— deeds necessarily 
engender the most tirm and ineradicable convictions of the necessity of leaving the 
Philippines free and independent, not only because they desire it, but because they 
are prepared to defend to the death their future and their history. 

Filipinos are fully convinced that if individuals have need of material, moral, 
and intellectual perfection in order to contribute to the welfare of their fellows, 
peoples require to have fullness of life; they need liberty and independence in order 
to contribute to the indefinite progress of mankind. It has struggled and will 
struggle with decision and Constance, without ever turning back or retrograding 
before the obstacles which may arise in its path, and with unshakable faith that it 
■will obtain justice and fulfill the laws of Providence. 

And neither will it be turned aside from the course it has hitherto followed by the 
nnjustifiable iuiprisonuient, tortures, assassinaticms, and the other vandal acts com- 
mitted by the Spaniards against the persons of peaceful and defenseless Filipinos. 
The Spaniards believe theiuselves released from every legal obligation toward the 
Filipinos fur the sole reason that the belligerency of the revolution has not been 
recognized, t;;king no account of the fact that over and above every law, whether 
written or prescriptive, ai'e placed with imprescriptible cliaracters culture, national 
honor, and huuumity. No, the Filipinos have no need ever to make use of reprisals, 
because they seek independence with culture, liberty with unconditional respect 
for the law as the organ of justice, and a name purified in the crucible of hunuan 
sentiments. 

In virtue of the foregoing considerations the undersigned, giving voice to the 
unanimous aspiration of the people whom they represent and performing the offices 
received from them and the duties pertaining to the powers with which they are 
invested — 

Proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the independence of the Phil- 
ippines ; 

Kecognize and respect Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as president of the 
revolutionaiv government organized in the manner prescribed by decree of the 23d 
and instructions of the 27th of June last, and beg the said president that he will 
ask and obtain from tbreign governments the recognition of its belligerency and 
independence, not only because this act constitutes a duty of justice, but also 
because to no one is it permitted to contravene natural laws nor stifie the legitimate 
aspiration of a people for its amelioration and dignification. 

Given in the Province of Cavite the 1st day of August of the year of our Lord 1898, 
and the first year of Philippine independence. 

Follow the signatures of the h)cal presidents of the provinces, of Cavite and many 
others. 

The undersigned, secretary of the interior, certifies: That the present document is 
a literal copy of the original, which is deposited in the secretary.ship under his 
charge, in proof of which he signs it with the approval of the president of the revo- 
lutionary government in Bacoor the 6th day of August, 1898. 
V. B. 

El Presidente del G. R. 
Emilio Aguinaldo. 
El Secretario del Interior, 
Leandro Ibarra. 



440 TREATY OF PEACE. 



i.ettkr from senor aguinaldo to gekeral anderson. 

July 23, 1898. 
Biig. (ici). T. M. Anderson, U.S.A. etc., 

('(trite: 

In answer to the letter of yonr excellency diited the 22(1 of the present month, I 
have the honor to manifest to yon the following: 

That even snpposing that the effects existing in the storehonse of Don Antonio 
Osorio Avere snhject to capture, when I established myself in the ])laza (town) of 
Cavite Admiral Dewey authorized me to dispose of everything that I might tind in 
the same, including the arms wliich the .Spanish left in the arsenal. But as he was 
aware that said effects belonged to the personal i>roperty [ownership] of a Filii)ino, 
who traded with them by virtue of a contribution to the Siianish (Tovernment, I 
would not have touched them had not the owner i)laced them at my disposition for 
the purposes of the war. 

I came from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from niaking common cause 
with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral 
Dewey to not give place to [to allow] any internal discord, because [being] a judge 
of their desires I had the strong conviction that I would succeed in both objects, 
establishing a goverimient according to their desires. 

Thus it is that at the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards, 
when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from Spanish domina- 
tion, I established a revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a demo- 
cratic and popular character as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, 
in order that they (the provinces) might be justly represented and administered to 
their satisfaction. 

It is true that ray government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign 
powers; but we expect that the great North American nation, which struggled first 
forits indei)endence and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually 
struggling for the indeiiendence of Cuba, wonbl look upon it with greater benevo- 
lence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the 
right of preference to our gratitude. 

Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans and to the favors which we have 
received through Admiral Dewey, and being more desirous than any other of pre- 
venting any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must 
be extremely prejudicial not alone to my nation, but also to that of your excellency, 
I consider it my duty to advise you of the uudesirability of disembarking North 
American troops in the ])laces conquered l)y the Filipinos from the Spanish, with- 
out previous notice to this government, because, as no formal agreement yet exists 
between the two nations, the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its 
territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights. 

I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Phillip- 
pine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the 
liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that l)efbre diseml)arkiug 
troops you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to 
be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may ])e advised 
in due form, and (thus; prevent the commission of .any transgressions against friend- 
ship. I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of 
their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not answer for that which 
another nation, whose friendship is not well guaranteed, might inspire in it (the peo- 
ple); and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the 
true and sincere friendship which I have always professed to the North American 
people in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with 
our cause of liberty. 

I am, with respect, your obedient servant, 

Emii.io Aguinaldo. 



STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN FOREMAN, OCTOBER 8, 1898, BEFORE 
THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. 



Examinatiou by the Chairman : 

Q. Where do yoii live? — A. No. 1, Dodge place, Eegent's Barracks, 
London. 

Q. You are the author of a book published about 1891 on the Philip- 
pine Islands"? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How long- have you lived in the Philip])ine Islands'? — A. Sum- 
ming up the different times of being there, eleven years. 

Q. Covering what period of time? — A. Thirteen years and a half, 
off and on; altogether, eighteen years. 

Q. About what years were you there? — A. I was there from Septem- 
ber, 1880, to the niiddle of 1885, 

Q. That would be about hve years'? — A. Yes, sir. Then I was away 
six months; I made a voyage around the world, and I returned to the 
islands and remained there another four years, until the end of April, 
[ 1889. 

! Q. That would make nine years'? — A. Yes, sir. Then I went to 
China; was there two years, and then I went out in 1893; and was 
[there, really, in the islands about six months. 

i Q. Six months in 1893? — A. Yes, sir; and then again in 1894 about 
[six months. In 1895 I was again fully six months, a little over per- 
haps, and in 1890 again six months — (luite six months — nearer seven, 
perhaps. 

Q. Then you have been there as late as 1896? — A. Oh, yes. I left 
the islands in 189(i — the last week of November — and the rebellion broke 
out on the 20th of August that year. 

Q. The last insurrection was in progress, then, when you left? — A. 
It was; yes, sir: about three months when I left. 

Q. In which of the islands have you hved? — A. I had my tixed resi- 
dence in Manila, but, of course, I traveled all over the islands. I have 
been practically all over the island of Luzon, of course: several times 
over in a number of years; I have been everywhere in Negros; I have 
been all over Panay; I have been in the Island of Zelu or Jolo, and 
was a guest of the Sultan. I have been in three-fourths of the places 
occupied by the Spaniards in Mindanao. 1 went on foot from Zam- 
boanga, right through the Province of Zamboanga, up to Misamis on 
the north. 

Q. What was your business or occupation while thus in the islands? — 
A. I had an interest in a firm in the city of London of engineers, princi- 
pally for sugar machinery, but everything in the line of machinery for 
the development of colonies. I had an interest in the concern, and I 
practically did all the foreign work connected with it. 

Q. Did you also make some explorations and examinations with a 
view to writing the book you afterwards wrote? — A. Yes, sir. I visited 
a great many parts of the islands with the intention of recording my 

441 



442 TREATY OF PEACE. 

observations. My position was independent, you may say. Of course, 
I was working for my own account, that of tlie firm, and of course I 
was (juite at liberty to take any course I chose. 

Q. You became interested m the ishmds? — A, Yes, sir; I became 
extremely interested. No book had been written which rightly repre- 
sents the islands, or pretends to, before this since the year 1859, when 
a (leriiian named, 1 think, .Jago wrote one. 

(^>. \N'liat, from this acquaintance with the islands, do you say as to 
the {;haraeter of the iidiabitants, and if there are differences among the 
people give us an idea of them? — A. The most plastic nature, that 
which can be most easily molded and attracted, and drawn to accom- 
modate themselves to and accei)t a new system which might be estab- 
lished for their future government, would be certainly the inhabitants 
of the Island of Luzon. The central islands, known as the Vizcayas 
Islands 

Q. Please point out the names of those islands? — A. That is Luzon, 
and these here are the Vizcayas, Panay, and Negros, and Cebu and 
Bojol and Leyte and Samar. That is Tagal. Those islands there and 
there and there [indicating on map] are known as Vizcayas. Mindanao 
is spoken of separately. 

Q. Is Mindora spoken of with them? — A. No; that is spoken of 
separately. 

Q. Name the Vizcayas Islands? — A. Panay Island, Negros Island, 
Cebu, J>o)ol, Leyte, Samar, and JNlasbate. They are considered the 
Vizcayas Islands. 
xMr. Reid : 

Q. Will youkindly point out theSulu Archipelago at the same time ? — 
A. There is the Island of Zulu, called by the Spaniards Jolo, the Sultan 
of which resides in a place called IMaybun. 

The Chairman : 

Q. How far does his jurisdiction extend"? — A. Of coarse the Span- 
iards have tried to reduce it to his own island, but the inhabitants of 
this island of Mindanao give allegiance to him and acknowledge him as 
their chief, and also the Batnos tribes on the island of Palawan, and 
the islands running down to the island of Bilbaoc there, upon which 
faces the Si)anish settlements of this coast, including those on the island 
of Bilbaoc. This island is, in my opinion, worthless. 

Q. What island? — A. Palawan. Because the whole west coast can 
not be approached to within less than three miles, except by very care- 
ful navigation. Here and there there are a few shoals, but such ex- 
tremely careful navigation is re(iuired that it is practically useless. 
The island of Palawan produces very little. I have been across the 
island. I went with bearers and walked across it. 

Q. You would divide the group into Tagals, who inhabit Luzon and 
Mindora — the tribes who occupy the central islands you have named; 
and the tribes in the island of Mindanao and the Zulu group as another 
groui) and class of inhabitants? — A. Y'es, sir. 

Mr. Davis: , 
Q. How are they made? — A. They have no special denomination. 
In Spanish they speak of them always as the Moros or IMoors. because 
they are Mussulmans, and therefore follow the same religion as the 
inhabitants of Morocco. They are also spoken of as Moros from the 
dominion of the Moors in Spain, which lasted nearly eight centuries. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 443 

Mr. Day : 

Q. Will you take up the three classes and give, briefly, the charac- 
teristics of each 1 — A. The Tagals are of a very easy, plastic uature — 
willing- in their nature, I should say, to accommodate themselves and 
take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, 
and I think they would fall into any new system ado])tecl. The inhab- 
itants of the central islands, or Yiscayas, are more uncouth, decidedly 
less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations 
with outsiders tlian theTagals — those of Luzon — but I think they would 
easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would 
have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of 
the iron hand used than in Luzon. 

There is a very ])eculiar class in the island of Panay, in the neighbor- 
hood of Iloilo and in the Province of lloilo. They are Chinese half- 
castes, the issue of Chinese men and Vizcayas women, and they hold 
the trade, as far as it is in native hands outside the foreign houses, with 
Iloilo. They are called Chinese mestizos or half-castes. They are very 
abrupt and not very sociable, but have no power, can not organize 
themselves, could not do anything, and, of course, would have to 
knuckle under to anything that might be established. You would 
probal)ly tind them rather cantankerous at first. They are perfectly 
civilized so far as the civilization of the Philippines goes; thej^ are the 
cream of the civilization of the island of Panay, and they trade there 
and deal with the foreign houses. They are the middlemen, and they 
practically inhabit two towns near Iloilo, viz, Molo and Jaro. In the 
island of Negros there are very few persons of im])ortance or who have 
much to say in their ruling matters, because they do not care to live in 
that island more than they can help. They look upon it as a planting 
land and do not care to live there. 

Many of the planters who own estates in Negros live in these towns 
of Molo and Jaro. ]Sfegros Island is the richest island in the archi- 
l^elago for the production of sugar. It was regarded as a terra incog- 
nito certainly up to the year 30 of this century. It seemed to be a 
sort of refuge for those who ran away from Justice, or injustice, or perse- 
cution. But about the year IS.")!; or 1S53 steam navigation was first 
introduced into the archipelago. It was the first time they had running 
the interisland steamers, and the jdanters, therefore, being able to 
chase away the Mussulmen from the south, who constantly raided 
Negros, they really made life more possible for settlers on this island, 
and things quieted down. They appointed a governor, and he had his 
residence at <^)uilo Milan. The governor was murdered because he was 
going to make raids into the interior of the island and brush it up gen- 
erally, and build roads, etc., and as he was to do this so as to cost 
nothing to the state, he seized people on the pretext of being criminals 
and on all sorts of pretexts to get large gangs of men to utilize them 
for the purpose of making these roads. Of course the most of them 
were not criminals, and they saw that they were going to have a hard 
time, and so they dispatched the governor. Another governor was 
selected, and when he heard what had been done there he did not want 
to go. 

Q. And he did not go there ? — A. No, sir; and so he removed the seat 
of government to Baquil. 

Q. What are the characteristics of the inhabitants of Mindanao 
and the Zulu Archipelago? — A. From the beginning of the occupation 
of the islands by the Spaniards in 1751 they used to make periodical 
piratical raids upon the other islands. They did not interfere with 



444 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Spanish doiniuion, because the Spaniards had never liitlierto pretended 
to trouble themselves much about theVizcayas or central <ii<)up. But 
tlie Spaniards thonjiiit it would be an easy matter to wi}»e out these 
people in a little while, in an easy campaign, but they found they had 
oi»t'iied u}) a hornet's nest. They weut down to attack these peo])le, 
known as the .Moros, and ever since that time these people have made 
a dead set ui)on them. They never left them any peace. One time 
they came with their cralt, known as vinitos, right up the Bay of 
Manila, though they have never touched the city, and from that time 
until year before last there has been constant trouble with these people. 
They have been determined that they would not be subjected by the 
Spaniards at least. 

The last little war — and it became quite a custom, a thing understood, 
that almost every (iovernor-General should win an honor, a decoration, 
a medal, or something of that sort in his career by making war in 
Mindanao — the last war was known as the canipaign of Maraout in the 
north of Mindanao. That was year before last, and so it would prob- 
ably have been the custom forever. They will not acknowledge the 
Spaniards; they positively refuse their dominion. The S])aniards kill a 
few and break uj) some of their strongholds, and then the thing goes on 
as before; they never will ad nut the Si)aniards there. For other foreign- 
ers it is very different. 1 Icnow there are Germans there. There is 
one, whose name I think is Schultz, who, some years ago, was seized 
by the Spaniards for having introduced commodities and arms, etc., 
into the island. He was taken prisoner, and escaped into the interior 
and ingratiated himself with the natives so well that he received in 
marriage a Zulu wife, and I have seen his two nephews down there 
at 

Q. flow far is Mindanao and the Zulu groui) under Spanish con- 
trol t — A. The Spaniards hold Zulu or Jolo town itself in Zulu Island. 
Freijuently there are raids made into the town. When I was there once, 
just a few days before they had made a swoop on the town and killed 
two or three officers who were sitting outside a catV", a drinking shop 
or shanty; and this used to go on all the time. Fre([uently it was so. 
They really do not hold on the island of Zulu more than the town 
itself. 

Q. How on the island of Mindanao? — A. They hold several little 
posts here — Zamboango,Cottabato,Butuwan, Misamis,T)avao, Uapitan, 
etc. The latter is a small i)lace where they can go. Davao is on the 
Surigao coasts, and they have one or two missions along there. In the 
interior, nothing whatever. 

Q. Who controls the interior? — A. il^o one. It is in quite a primitive 
state. 

Q. Inhabited by these tribes? — A. Yes, sir. 

(}. They are not subject to the Spaniards at all? — A. No, sir; they 
are really independent. I never heard that a Spaniard ever crossed 
tlie ishmd from one side to the other. 

(j. ^'ou know the city of ^Manila pretty well? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How many peojjle are there there? — A. I estinmte about 400,000, 
including, of course, all the inhabitants, including (>0,0()0 Chinese. The 
Chinese hold entire streets, and esi)ecially there is one street, the Calle 
del Kosalio, which is nine tenths Chinese. 

Q. How wonld you divide the i)opulation, brietly, into classes — you 
]ia\-c said there are ()0,00(> Chinese.' — A. Yes, sir. I siiould say that, 
in normal times, there would be (J.OOO Spaniards. There would be 
about L'50 English; 2o0 to 300 Germans — 1 think they are rather in 



TREATY OF PEACE. 445 

excess of the EnoKsb. There inig-lit be 300 British Indians, probably 
I 5,000 Chinese half castes born in Manila, and perhaps 50,000 Spanish 
half-castes. 

Q. By Spanish half-castes you mean the descendants of Spaniards 
who have married native women? — A. Yes, sir. And a sprinkling; of 
other foreigners, and the balance Tagal natives; of course, here and 
there, a few of all nations, Italians and others. The Tagal natives are 
extremely hospitable. It is a notable feature that there is no such 
thing as a hotel in the whole of the island of Luzon outside of Manila. 
It is an extraordinary thing — they are so hospitable that the extent 
can not be realized by anyone who has not been there. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Then there is no difficulty in obtaining hospitality anywhere? — 
A. Oh, no; for anyone not a Spaniard, and even a Spaniard, can find 
means to get a lodging. Anyone not a Spaniard can receive hospitality 
anywhere except among the hostile tribes. 

Mr. Eeid : 
Q. Can they tell a Spaniard any way except by the language? — A. 
Oh, yes. 

The Chairman : 

Q. How many people are there on the island of Luzon? — A. I think 
the island of Luzon is thinner populated than is generally considered. 
I do not consider that there are more than a million and a quarter. 

Q. How many natives on the islands ? — A. Subjected natives who 
have accepted the dominion of Spain and are nominally IJoman Cath- 
olics, about 5,000,000. Those who have not accepted the dominion, who 
have never been subjected, and who are supposed to be the aborigines, 
and uuconquered tribes, iucluding the Mussulmen of Mindanao, 
another million — G,000,000 total. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. 11,000,000 ?— A. Oh, no; 5,000,000 Roman Catholics, subjected, 
and 1,000,000 more; 6,000,000 in all. 

The Chairman : 

Q. Will you explain what are the relations of the church and the 
ecclesiastical orders to the peoi)le and the government? — A. The island 
was hrst discovere<l in 1520 by Magellanes, who died there lighting the 
battles of the new vassal of the King of Spain. The islands were 
then abandoned for about fifty years. They were (!a] led the Philippine 
Islands in honor of Prince Philip, son of the King. Fifty years passed 

and a priest called , who resided in the city of Mexico, pressed 

the matter of the annexation of the islands for the saving of souls 
upon the King very forcibly. At last the King gave way, and orders 
were issued for an expedition to leave Mexico for that purpose. The 
man appointed to lead the expedition was 

Q. What we wish to know is the present relations rather than the 
history. VVhat is the relation of the church to day to land titles, to the 
people, and to the government ? — A. There are four orders of monks, the 
Augostinos, or Augustinian friars, the Dominican friars, the EecoUetto 
friars, and the Franciscan friars. These are the monks who are alleged 
to have usurped the incumbencies and are vicars of i^arishes. In addi- 
tion to tliem are the Jesuits, who now, for some years past, have had 
nothing whatever to do but to take care of the education of the peojjle. 
There is not anything like the same animosity against them that there 



14G TREATY OF PEACE. 

is to the others, and I am inclined to think that the people look upon 
them very well. They do not interfere with the personal liberty of the 
people. 

Mr. Eeid. 

Q. The morality of the Jesuits is better, also, is it not? — A. Yes, sir; 
it is very good. There is nothing- to be said against them now. The 
head of the church is the arclibishop. The archbishoi) is usually, but 
it is not absolutely necessary that he should be, an individual of one of 
these orders. The immediate chief of each of these orders is called a 
provincial. The provincial is the business num of the order, and these 
provincials are not very much subjected — they are nominally, but not 
very much really — to the archbishop. In fact, they sometimes, it is 
well known, have shown insolence and insubordination to the arch- 
bishop. The present archbishop seems to have very little hold upon 
them; what the provincials wanted to do they did. The case against 
the friars is this, and it showed itself in a little outbreak, called the 
rebellion of Cavite, in 1872. The secular clergy — these monks are the 
regular ordained clergy — claimed, under the conditions of the Council 
of Trent, that these monks, as missionaries, were not entitled to hold 
the incumbencies; that by a ])apal bull which settled this matter when 
it was raised these monks were allowed to be only missionaries, and 
could only open and establish missions, but that when these missions 
became parishes and when the i)eople around them adopted the Catholic 
faith, they should then retire from these parishes and the incumbency 
should be taken by the secular (;lergy. 

Q. What do you mean by "incumbency"? — A. The position occupied 
by the parish priest — the incumbency of the parish. 

Q. The titles to lands are usually in the hands of these monks? — A. 
Yes, sir; they hold large tracts. 

Q. How did they get these lands'? — A. Usually they simply took 
possession — appropriated it. They have in their orders what are called 
" brothers." There are " fathers " of the orders and " brothers." "Broth- 
ers" are simply persons who have taken certain vows, but who are not 
allowed to celebrate mass — simply workmen — and they put these in 
charge to take possession of the land. 

Q. Thej" took possession. I^id they have no decree from the Spanish 
Government, or the (Tovernor-deiieral, authorizing them to take posses- 
sion of the land ? — A. Not at first. Subsetiuently they received decrees, 
but never could they get title deeds, owing to the opposition of the 
natives. The lands taken were not devoid of settlers, but most of them 
were simjdy squatters, and in some instances they passed several gener- 
ations of s(]uatters. 

(^. I^-actically, were they not all of that class? — A. Practically they 
were, as there was no one to give title deeds. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Tliey do have title deeds? — A. Yes; but it was such a long, pon- 
derous matter that they liave given up the idea. 

Q. These titles w(U'e not recorded? — A. No, sir. 

Q. How did it work or was it oi)eratedl — A. They let the land out 
in i)arcels for rent, called canons. The man to whom they were rented 
held them generally for three years — that is, usually, 1 think — over all 
these estates three years' holdings. No guaranty of any kind passed. 
At the end of the three years all improvements made by the man in 



TREATY OF PEACE. 447 

I possession, the tenant, were capitalized by the corporation, and they 
! say that they regard the land is of so much more capital value, on 
' which they base the rent, and require a higher rental. So really they 
steal the fruits of the labor of the tenant, and they charge a new rent 
on the new valuation, and this new valuation has come from the work 
of the tenant. The natives kick very much at this: it is a very sore 
point with them. 

In the Province of Laguna, where the Dominican corporation had 
their lands, they even pretended so far as to say that cane mills and 
machinery for crushing the cane should be left on the estate if you go 
out at the end of your three years and do not renew the lease — that 
you should leave them the machinery. A very great question arose, 
and then there appeared a certain man called Dr. Rizal, who was exe- 
cuted in the first week of last November or the week previous, and he 
went down to his native town and raised this question as to title 
straightway with the Dominican order, and he said, " Show us your 
title deeds; it will satisfy me and the people around here and it will 
be better for yourselves, because it will restore peace and order and it 
will not do you any barm;" and they could not show their title deeds. 

Q. Are all these lands held in this way, or do the natives have some 
holdings of their own ? — A. Oh, yes ; here and there some of the natives 
have holdings of their own. 

Q. What proportion are held in this way? — A. It does not amount 
to very much ; 3 per cent probably. 

Mr. Reid : 

Q. Three per cent of all the lands in Luzon constitute the whole 
holdings of these corporations? — A. Yes, sir; it would not amount to 
more than a thirtieth, I think. 

Q. What per cent of the cultivated or valuable land"? — A. I am 
speaking of the cultivated, valuable land; 3 per cent, not more than 
that. 

The Chairman : 
Q. The rest held by natives? — A. Yes, sir; and by Spaniards, and I 
suppose there are possibly six estates held by foreigners not Spaniards. 

Mr. Reid : 
Q. What is the size of these estates in English acreage? — A. Not 
large. What is called a large estate there would be about 3,000 acres. 
That would be considered a large estate. 

The Chairman : 
Q. What do you know of the moral character of these friars; how 
do they conduct themselves in that respect? — A. A very large per- 
centage of them lead loose lives. They encroach upon the virtue of 
the women. In the towns, for that purpose, the.y get up what they call 
a "Cofradia." They will call a thing a "Cofradia of St. Paul" or "St. 
Joseph," and they get women to join, and these women really become 
the servants of the priests. They do not, of course, say that it is that, 
but that is what it really amounts to, and they are called upon every 
once in a while for a "Cofradia," and I knew a place in Negros where 
they taught the women to consider it quite an honor to clean out the 
parish priest's house, and in this way they have the women at their 
call, and there are a great many, a very great many of the sons and 
daughters of the priests throughout the islands. There is no secrecy 
about this; they do not tell it in whispers, and the natives allow their 



448 TREATY OF PEA.CE. 

daugliters to marry the sons of these priests freely. They do not seem 
to mind it much. I remember one notable case. I was staying with a 
friend of mine down in Laguimaiice 

Q. In the island of Luzon ? — A. Yes, sir. My friend's name is Henry 
George Brown. He lives now at Saffron -Walden in Essex, England. 
I have known liim about seventeen years, and I was staying at his 
place, and a letter came from the corporation, saying that Father 
8o-and -So is going to pass through your town on his way to Tamina, 
due north of tliis ])lace, and will you please take charge of his goods 
and parcels, and see that they are sent on to Tamana. 1 was there at 
the time the small steamer came in, and a drenching rain came down, 
and simply drenched the things, and Brown said tliat it would be a 
good act to o])en tliese things and dry them, and so we had the cases 
opened and the things si^read out to dry, and he called to me and said, 
"Just look here; is this not astonishing 1'" and he showed me some 
tiltliy prints, photographic slides for a sort of kaleidoscope arrange- 
ment, slides and ])rints of a most filthy nature. He said: "I show you 
this because it does not seem possible that, coming in the package of a 
priest, these things could be possible." He said it was no business of 
ours, but that he showed them to me for their moral effect, and 1 men- 
tioned it in my book. And that is the nmn who was to take charge of 
the souls of the parish he was appointed to. That man had been 
turned out of the parish he had because he was so obnoxious; he was 
simply a human beast. 

There was another case. When 1 first went to Manila there was 
quite a hubbub about a certain priest called Pierre, who held a parish 
in Pampanga I'rovince, and he had beaten a boy to death, so he was 
taken away from there and sent farther north to a town called Sau 
Miguel de Mayamo. I had occasion to go to that town and they told 
me about it — it was notorious. A woman came to see him, ami he 
kicked her in the abdomen and she fell down badly hurt, and died. 
This became too notorious, and they removed him from there. It was 
talked about freely, what a scandal it was, etc. That was when I 
arrived, seventeen years ago, and they said, "Is it possible we are 
going to have these priests free from justice, and that they can do as 
they like with usf so he was taken away and sent down to the prov- 
ince of Cavite. and tliere the rebels caught him in this last rebellion, 
and, more to ridicule him than anything else, I think, they made him 
their bishop. They said, " Mind what you do. You can be our bishop 
and take charge of our clergy, but don't you attempt anything behind 
our backs." He thought he was quite safe, and he was found taking- 
sketches and notes of their strongholds. He had already made arrange- 
ments with the monks for their delivery. They caught liim, and they 
said it was treachery — he had nnide negotiations with the Augustine 
monks in ^Manila — and after proper trial he was condemned to death. 
He was tied to a post, without a hat and without water, and died of 
sunstroke, fever, and hunger, and that was his end. And no one 
regrets it. 

Q. How much intiuence on the civil government and the administra- 
tion of the courts do these orders have? — A. The priests can not be 
summoned to an ordinary court, nor can they pui'sue others in court; 
they can not ai)])ear in court at all, but when a ])riest makes'a declara- 
tion it is ac<'e]>ted as a fact, and no ])roor is necessary. It is quite suf- 
ficient that Father So-and so signs it. The administration of Manila 
maybe regarded as ])urelyan(l sim])ly the executive of the i)riests. which 
are the ruling order there. Over and over again (lOvernors-General 



TREATY OF PEACE. 449 

have been sent away on the recommeiulatioii of the monastic orders in 
re(;ent times. At the end of 1892 I was in !Si)ain, and the son of Gen- 
eral Despnjols came to visit me, knowiiiQ- that 1 was well ac(juainted 
with the country, and he told me that his father was going' out as 
Govenor-General of the islands and he would like to have a chat with 
me I asked him how his father stood with the priests. He said lie 
stood very well, that lie would try to recognize their power and staiid 
in harmony with them, and I said that if he did that he was all right. 

General J^espujols went out, and I went out there in IS93, and he 
had just left. He had been eight months in power. Api>ointed for 
three years, at the end of eight months he had been obliged to clear 
out, from the influence of the monastic i)0wer. The main points 
against him were these: This man. Dr. Rizal, who went down and 
raised the point of the deeds, etc., with the monks, had been to Europe 
and had studied in Germany. He was a very clever man, quite an 
exception to the general rule, and had i)u!)lished three books against 
the priests — one called Xoli me Tangere, another Filibustero, and 
another was a rei)roduction of a book written by a priest years ago, 
who was also an exception. For this he was looked down upon by the 
priests as a disturbing element. He came to Hongkong, and from 
there he was cajoled to Manila on the promise that he would not be 
molested. He went there to the Governor-General, but they detained 
his baggage and pretended that he carried incendiary leaflets for the 
purpose of raising a rebellion. 

The priests required that he should be executed, but the governor- 
general refused to allow it; said that it was utterly inqwssible that he 
should be executed for what he had written, and refused. All they 
could get out out of the governor was, "Very well, you are banished 
to the island of Mindanao.'' This is the place to which he was ban- 
ished, and where he remained for four years, Dapitan. I saw his little 
hut there on the bay, and visited him there. That displeased the 
priests very much. They had strife and questions between them and 
the governor general, and the latter said, "I am going to see how you 
are working,'' and, all of a sudden, he had a raid made upon the resi- 
dences of the Augustino monks in a place north of Manila, and had 
the place suddenly seized and raided, and it is very well known that he 
found a printing press printing these same incendiary leaflets, and the 
priest who was employed in doing so was perfectly well known to 
everyone in Mailaban, to Americans and English, where there is a big 
sugar-refining establishment owned by Americans and English, the 
English resident in Manila and the Americans in Hongkong, and 
known personally to them. The man disappeared and was never seen 
again. I can not say where he went. These leaflets were seized, and 
from that moment the governor-general was a condemned man, and 
he left. I went out in 1893 and he was not there. 

Q. You regard these orders as the dominating power? — A. Yes, sir. 
General Blanco was out there in Manila, where I saw him nearly every 
day. He was there at the beginning of this insurrection in 189G. The 
archbishop is the most bloodthirsty man there. I knew him perfectly 
well. I used to meet the priests and hear what they had to say, and 
they said that what Blanco had done did not please them at all; did 
not suit their view of it, though, of course, I had very little to say — 
nothing to say, in fact. But their comydaints were that General Blanco 
was not sufficiently bloodthirsty for them, and that is the reason he 
w.ent away from there. Their idea was that he should take the few 
T P 29 



450 TREATY OF PEACE. 

troops he bad aud spread fire and sword broadcast among all the islands. 
And Blanco was practically exiled from there becanse he was not 
sntlicieiitly bloodthirsty to satisfy the ]iriestsr 

Q. What can you tell us about thecdimate? — A. Of course, everyone 
must act on certain lines in all tropical countries, but 1 consider the 
climate excellent for a tropical country. 

Q. Wliite men live there in comfort? — A. Perfectly. I never had 
any sickness there; 1 never knew what fever was; I had only one little 
experience of it there, for a few days. 

Mr. Reid : 

Q. Are there any prevalent fevers there? — A, People do get fever, 
but very seldom. 

Q. Is it a pernicious fever, such as they have in Cuba? — A, Oh. no; 
very light, indeed; and the natives will get a fever more often than 
Europeans; it is owing to their mode of living. 

Q. Is it a malarial fever? — A. No, sir; I consider malarial fever to 
be that whi( h comes from the opening of new ground. 

Q. Would it be with chills ? — A. Xot malarial fevers, as I understand 
them. I was once at A'era Cruz, and 1 saw that there was a lot of fine 
land back of the city which was not used at all, and I asked why it was 
not utilized, and t)iey explained to me that the minute they turned the 
sod the people were attacked by the fever and dropped down with it, 
and <lied within eight hours after. 1 never knew or heard of men being 
troubled from the opening of new ground in Manila or the Philippines. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Which is the best and farthest advanced of these islands? — A. 
Luzon 1 consider the most advanced, owing, of course, to the close asso- 
ciation with the Europeans. 

Q. More insurrections break out there. — A. Yes; and it is just 
because they are able to see other things. What they ask is perfectly 
just. Their insurrection is not from a love of quarreling or opposition 
to white men at all. There is no such thing as any hostility to white 
men; such a thing does not exist. 

i). AVhat are the causes, briefly, of insurrections'? — A. Very broadly 
speaking, the main cause is the i)ersecution of the priests, their inter- 
ference in the little petty details of a man's life, his wife, his daughter, 
the constant persecutiim, the petty revenge. These parish priests 
interfere in a man's own home and household, in the interior Avorkings 
of a man's house. And all of a sudden a priest will take a dislike for 
some little thing, or nothing, and then that man is marked, and period- 
ically the in-iest will take a piece of paper and write on it and say that 
he has reason to believe the individuals marked in the margin are — 
whatever he wants to call thejii — disturbers of the jjeace, etc., and will 
request that they be removed from his district, and the man will be 
taking his coffee in the morning, getting ready to go to his estate, and 
the civil guard will appear and say, "You are wanted." "What for?" 
" By order of the governor." And he is walked oti', and if he shows 
the least dis])Osition to dis})ute his arms are tied behind him and he 
has to tramp, tram]), tramp, down, and down, and down to Manila. 
That is one of the points especially raised by Aguinaldo, that arbitrary 
power to arrest at any time simply on the name of the governor. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Has the person so arrested no chance for a judicial inquiry? — A. 
'So, sir; the Governor-General has the exclusive power. 



\ 



TREATY OF PEACE. 451 

The CHAIE3IAN : 
Q. And he takes the word of the friar! — A, Yes, sir. 

Mr. K'EID: 
Q. To where do they banish them! — A. Generally to the south of 
Mindanao. 

The Chairman : 

Q. Is there any sucli thing as a fair administration of Justice in tlie 
courts! — A. That is one of the greatest misfortunes, and as a foreigner 
I would make many sacrifices to avoid a cause in the courts. You might 
as well leave the islands. They will follow you to the last dollar, and 
the thing will go on as long as there is anything to be got. There is a 
remarkable instance of that in the case of the Hongkong and Shanghai 
bank, which had some question with the house of Jurado & Co. The 
question is still on. They went to court over it. The bank certainly 
did make a mistake in wishing to close down upon them for certain 
promissory notes before they were due, but they put it on the ground 
that the promissory notes had been indorsed by everybody and any- 
body, even by boys back of the counter. 

The thing came into court, and Jurado & Co. found themselves in 
bad shape, and it came out and back again, and went from civil court 
to criminal court, and sometimes oise side would get the best of it and 
sometimes the other. The bank was shut up, and Mr. Townsend. the 
manager of the bank there, was notified that he must consider himself 
a prisoner. The consul protested against it, and he was ordered to be 
sent to Bombay or Calcutta as a persona non grata. He removed his 
things, and the whole thing was shut up. They sent for an English- 
man who was a machinist to pry the lock.s of the safe, and he said he 
could not do it. He was working on it for a week, and then said he 
could not do it, that he could not possibly pry these locks, and then 
they got up a little syndicate of natives, a little banker there whose 
name I forget, and some others, to personate the bank, and they 
thought they would be able to make a large claim out of it, and the 
last 1 heard of it the claim was for $1)30,000 Mexican, the claim made 
by this house of Jurado c^c Co., and they have kept on and can not get 
a settlement, and it is still pending. L bank myself with the bank. 
It has its offices in London at 31 Lombard street, and the brother of 
this man Jurado is also living in London, I believe in Chelsea, but his 
office is at 21 Billeter street. 

Q. They will never get a settlement! — A. No, sir; never. Years 
after this came up I was in Madrid, and I was going down by the 
offices of the minister of war, and I met this man Jurado from Lon- 
don, and he said the whole thing would be settled in a fortnight, and 
that he would get his claim. I went on to the minister of war, witb 
whom I had an engagement, and he said I was a little late, and I told 
him that I had been detained by meeting this man and his conversation 
witli me, and that he said the whole thing would be settled in a fort- 
night. He asked me if 1 would meet the man again, and I said that I 
might, perhaps. ''Tell him it is a lie, and that the matter is not settled 
yet." ' 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. Are those things managed by Spaniards? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Eeid : 
Q. Peninsulars! — A. Yes, sir. 



452 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The Chairman; : 
Q. Appointed by the liome oovernment? — A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Wli;it about"^the other ciuises? — A. 1 trhiuk I have, said enough 
about the ])riests. 

Mr. Fe YE : 
Q, Your remarks do not apply to the Jesuits .' — A. No, sir. 

Mr. Davis: 
Q. Nor to the native priests? — A. No, sir. They \v ant to clear out 
tlie ])riests, except the Jesuits as educators and schoohnasters. I do 
not think tliey would have much cause to object to theu). Another 
thing they object to is tbey have lifteen days' forced laljor. The natives 
must give lit'teen days" hibor, wiiich they can redeem by i)aying so much 
money down. Every governor when he comes to a province inquires 
how many '•polistas'"' or men subject to this tax there are, and then he 
goes to tiie towns and nuikes a bargain with the petty governors of the 
towns, the headmen of the towns, called '^<'apitansf' --Uow much will 
you get together to liberate so many men'?" And then the governor 
"will put down, say o,(>00 men's work, when, as a matter of fact, only a 
thousand work, and he ])ockets the njoney paid by the 4.000 to get off, 
and they object to this method very much, because it is a constant 
source of worry. 

Mr. Davis : i 

Q. Is that compulsory labor?— A. Yes, sir; and can be redeemed by 
a payment. 

Q,^ Enforced by punishment and slavery, if necessary?— A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. To whom does the money go ?— A. It is supposed to go to the 
Government, but it really goes only to the governor of the province. 

The Chairman : 

Q. He reports a great many, of whom only a few work, and pockets 
the money paid by the rest? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What other grounds of complaint ?— A. There is the civil guard. 
The institution, theoretically, is very good: it is no doubt necessary to 
have a civil guard, 

Mr. Eeid : 

Q. What is the civil guard ? — A. A mounted military police. 

Q. Natives? — A. The officers are Spaniards and the line natives. 
They call it the civil guard, what we call the constabulary, but their 
fuiu'tions are in rural districts; there are none whatever in towns 
except where specially appointed, or in mere villages, but in the city 
of Manila they have no functions. In my opinion the civil guard is 
very necessary — theoretically, a very good thing. It is necessary to 
have an armed force, a sort of military police, to prevent raids by real 
brigands on property; I should be very sorry to see the civil guard 
disestablished. 

Mr. Davis : 
Q. Wherein is the abuse?— A. The abuse is this: An officer will send 
a patrol of two men to walk through the district, ami generally to patrol 
it and see what is going on around there. These men, as they go along 
from hut to hut will steal— the people are miserably poor, and it is a 
great thing for them to lose two or three chickens or a little tobacco or 



TREATY OF PEACE. 453 

sugar — and they go along and pick up anything tLey like. Tliey will 
go to a mail and say: " Where is your document of personal identity?" 
and the man is out in the field, perhaps, and he says: " I have not got 
it; I left it somewhere else, at the house," and they arrest him at once. 
He says : " Let me off." " How much ?'' and he gets off if he pays. They 
do this on their own account. They will also trump up charges against 
the natives. If an officer of the civil guard can not get milk delivered 
as he w^ants it, or sugar, or whatever else he wants, or can not get a 
man to run his horses gratis, or anything wluitever he wants for his 
nse, he will trump up a charge, and the man is taken off" to the princi- 
pal town of the province on some trumpery charge. Then they will 
allow a certain license in the cock lighting. It is supposed to be pro- 
hibited, but it is alleged that it is so set in the native character that it 
can not be eradicated, and on Sundays and certain other days they 
allow it, and the guards will go in, and if they do not get a certain per- 
centage of the bets, etc., they are down on them. They are also con- 
stantly interfering with the internal workings of the households amongst 
the natives. 
Q. Any other ground of complaint? — A. Xo, sir; so far as I know. 

Mr. Reid : 

Q. What about the poll tax ? — A. That is the sedula of which I have 
spoken. They give in exchange for the payment of the tax a state- 
ment of personal identity, and require every one to have one, from the 
Govei'nor General down. 

Q. How much does that amount to ? — A. It is very light, in my opin- 
ion. The lowest grade, I think, is $1.2.1, Mexican, per annum, and it 
goes up to $2."), the highest. It is not a very high tax. Of course, the 
general complaint, which does not press so very hard upon the natives, 
nor so particularly, is the impossibility of obtaining jnstice in the 
courts. 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. Is the poll tax confined to the adult males! — A. 'No; women as 
well 5 every adult male. 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Children'? — A. They are put upon the list, but are not taxed nntil 
they are 18. 

Q. All persons over 1 8 ? — A, Yes, sir. You are, theoretically, counted 
as not existing unless yon have the paper of personal identity. If yon 
appear at any Government department, the first thing they ask is, 
"Where is your cedula!" If you can not show it, yon are called "non- 
existing." 

Mr. Fr YE : 
Q. Do you know anything about the port charges'? — A. 1 can not 
give the rates, but I do not think it works hardly. 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Do yon know of the existence of any coal in any of the islands 
you have traveled on ? — A. In the Island ot' Cebu. 

Q. Was it good coal, or simply lignite? — A, Lignite, I think. 

Q. Is it coal that can be used for running steam vessels? — A. 'No; it 
w^ould not be safe to use it alone for steam vessels. 

(^). It has been tried? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. There is no other coal ? — A. Yes, sir; in the island of Luzon. 

Q. Has it been worked? — A. Oh, yes; iDut I think it was a failure; 
and here and here [indicating on map]. That was mnch better coal. 



454 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. ( 'an tliat be used by itself for tlie operation of steam vessels'? — A. 
I do not think it wcjuld be safe; J do not think it is good enough. 

The C^AIRMA^• : 

Q. What do you say, from what yon know, as to these natives being 
capable of self government if left to themselves? — A. To si)eak briefly, 
I say ''Xo," The native has no expansive ideas; he can not go far 
enough to understand what it is to rule matters for the benetit of the 
common weal; he can not get past his own most personal interests, or 
his town, at the most. 1 think the greatest length he could go would 
be his own town. But constructing laws, and obeying them, for the 
benefit of the commonwealth, I do not think he is cai)able of it at all. 
1 think au attempt at a native government would be a fiasco altogether. 

(^>. Do you think they would submit to a free government, well man- 
aged and e(iuitable? — A. Oh, yes; of course, there wonld be some little 
dissatisiaction at first — it would not go down, I think, very agreeably 
at present; they would suffer a disai)i)ointment for the moment; but in 
a few nn tilths they would get over that. Aguinaldo has ideas now that 
he wonld like to be president. 

Mr. Gray : 

Q, Would the ])ass{ng into the hands of an anti-Catholic power be 
a source of irritation ? — A. No, sir; the mutter of religion would not 
trouble them at all. 

The Chairman : 

Q. They submit to the [)resent religion because it is a matter of policy 
to do so? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What do you say as to whether or uot, if it should be concluded 
that Luzon should be separated from the rest of the group, a govern- 
ment c<uild be maintained there of sufHcient resources in that island for 
the nniintenance of government ! In short, what would be the effect of 
seeking to establish a colonial government on the island of Luzon by 
itself first? — A. For the moment there would be a difficulty of labor. 
Nature is so prolific there that man can get along almost entirely with- 
out work. Of course in the city of jManila it is not the same, but the 
people from among whom you would draft for labor can almost live 
without work and get all they want, construct their houses entirely of 
wood, get wearing apparel to merely cover their nudity, and can get 
all they want to eat and drink without the necessity of working. 

But 1 think if Luzou were kept by yourselves, they wonld be so 
startled by the perfect paradise it would seem to then^ under the Gov- 
ernment of the United States tliat the natives of the other islands 
would hear of it from all sides. There would be steamers and canoes 
coming to aiul fro, and they wonld hear that they could walk the streets 
perfectly free, without being obliged to carry a piece of paper to show, 
and they would be as much astonished as was Aguinaldo when he 
found that he was on free soil and c(mld open his mouth when he was 
at Hongkong. It was months befoie he could open his mouth to 
speak freely concerning the rhilipj)ines. 1 think that would draw 
large immigration from the other ishinds to Luzou, assuming that the 
other islands were under S])anish dominion. Comlitional on that, I 
thiidc it would draw very large nuudjers from there, and that you 
would thus get over the laboi- diriiculty, and the islaiul of Luzon, 
being workecl up. would be suilicient to establish a very ]U'osperous 
colony. I think it would be a very line colony. 

Q. What would be its relation to other places in the Kast, sucli as 



TREATY OF PEACE. 455 

China and Japan? — A. There is a large trade in sugar for ITongkoug, 
a large refinery at Taku; and sugar is also sent to Shanghai, and the 
hemp is also shipped, principally to America; probably 00 per cent of 
the hemp, quite 90 per cent of the coffee. A disease has come to the 
cofi'ee plants, and the trade was injured, ami it has been wiped out 
almost entirely — is said not to exist. 

Q. Is a considerable part of the island said not to be cultivated^as 
yet undeveloped? — A. Yes, sir; I should say that a third of Luzon is 
virgin soil. 

Q. And is capable of being worked and developed? — A. Oh, yes. 1 
should say, taking into account the neglected estates — merely possessed, 
not worked, because of no means of transportation, merely owned by 
so-and so — putting the two together, I should say one half of Luzon is 
agriculturally d(n'mant. 

(.}. What kind of crops can be grown there ? — A. The center of Luzon, 
called the Black Busli, is a very fine valley watere<l by the Kio Grande, 
a river rising in the center of Luzon and emjitying itself in the extreme 
north of Luzon at a place called Taal, wheie steamers drawing 7 feet 
can get up. There is a steamer going up very occasionally, and you 
can go up 25 miles, I have been up it some distance myself, and it is 
navigable for a big boat, canoe — a canoe drawing a foot and a half 
draft. In such a canoe I have been very near to the source. With a 
little attention it would be made very navigable for light-draft craft. 
It runs through a very fine valley, and the specialty of that soil is the 
cultivation of tobacco. The otlier islands ])roduce tobacco. Negros 
produces tobacco, but it has been found that Luzon produces the finest. 
I have smoked the tobac<,'o of the Viscayas, and it is decidedly inferior 
to Luzon tobacco. It is the elements of the soil. There is no getting 
over it. The lasid is also very good for coffee in Luzon. Coffee has' 
been found elsewhere, but not found to prosper so well in the other 
islands as in Luzon, 

Cofiee has been tried in Cebu. I have seen it growing there, and 
Bell, Smith & Co. had some of this coffee brought down to see what 
they could make of it, but it has been proved not to be so good as that 
from Luzon. Luzon seems to have the very best soil for all products of 
the islands except sugar. Sugar seems most prolific in Negros, though 
I do not know that that makes mucli difference, as cane sugar cultiva- 
tion is a declining industry, and I think more attention should be given 
to coffee and tobacco than to the other, because cane sugar is being cut 
out entirely. As to t!ie trouble of keeping Manila, assuming the other 
islands to be occupied by other nations, if it sliould be suggested that 
the Spanish should regain possession of those other islands, I would 
suggest that it shnuld be on certain conditions, and they are as follows: 
First, the expulsion of the monastic orders and every individual ai)per- 
taining thereto, Si)ain to bind herself never to readmit them. Second, 
no im])ediraent of any kind, ])assport, license, permit, or any official 
formality, is to be put in the way of anyone, of any class whatever, who 
wishes to leave the islands, and every person shall be freely permitted 
to leave, excepting and in the case of a Judicial warrant having been 
issued against him for some alleged crime. Third, a Philippine com- 
mercial treaty to be made between the Ljiited States of America and 
Spain specially regulating the commerce and trade interest in all its 
features relating to the interisland traffic, i. e., the commercial relations 
between Luzon (American) and the other islands (Spanisli). Fourth, 
no alienation without permission of the United States. Fifth, Spain 
not to impose Sbwy export duties. 



4o6 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In regard to tlie second condition, it is not a mere theory; it has a 
l)ra(ti('al object. In it the free exit wouhl me;iu that they should not 
put an impediment in the way of the peoi>Ie .uoing" to Luzon. It is most 
necessary, in my opinion, tliat that shonhl be an expressed condition, 
that there should not be an impediment to the egress of those people 
from those islands, and by it yon will have the great advantage of get- 
ting over the labor trouble, and *hrough immigration and propagation 
in a generation the labor cpiestion will disappear entirely. 

Mr. Gray : 

Q. Free commercial intercourse between the islands? — A. There 
should be a treaty of commerce for interishind traffic, treating of rela- 
tions between Luzon and the other islands. I do not think you could 
ask Spain to open free i)orts unless yon make yourself jNLmila a free 
port. If you make Manila a free port, no custom-houses 

Q. I did not mean no custom-houses. — A. I should also put on Spain 
the condition of no exi>ort duties, and then that will permit produce 
coming from iSpanish islands to Luzon. 

Mr. Eeid : 

Q. Do you think it would add greatly to the complexity and difficulty 
of the problem to govern the whole group rather than Luzon alone? — 
A. Jt would add to the size of the establishment. 

Q. Would it add to the complexity of the problem to govern the 
entire grou]) ? — A. Xo, sir; 1 do not tliink it would, 

Q). You do not regard the problem as different in the southern part 
from the northern '! — A. No, sir; I think to allow the natives of Mindanao 
to follow their own ideas, to be a little less rigid on the laws of individuals 
on the JVIussuhnans of Mindanao, would answer the purpose. The diffi- 
culty is that they have never been subjected to any power, whereas the 
others have. I would suggest that you take that into account. You 
are taking over a people who have been subjected to a European 
power in Luzon; in Mindanao they have not been subjected, so, of 
course, how much they would regard it as a brand-new conquest would 
enter into consideration. 

The Chairman : 
(). You think the entire group could be taken and governed, or that 
Luzon could be taken and governed, with the free-trade regulations 
between the islands and the other stipulations you mentioned ? — A. Y'es, 
sir; either course could be pursued. 

Mr. Davis: 

(^. Do you think the native priests would assist in establishing and 
maintaining good government there? — A. Oh, yes; you would certainly 
have no op])Osition from the native priests. 

(}. A\'ould we have their active aid? — A. The native priests would 
not oi)])Ose at all; they would not take a hostile course; there would be 
no (lifliculty there. 

The Chairman : 

Q. How would thej^ regard the Protestant missionaries ? — A. I think 
it would be a matter of indiiference to them. 

(^. You thiidv the only trouble would be with the monastic orders? — 
A. From a religions point of view only; I do not think the native 
l)riests would gixc the least trouble. 



TREATY OF PEACE. -157 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Are these priests supported by tlie state? — A. Yes, sir; by the 
governmental tunds, 

Q. Would the withdrawal of goveruinent support make trouble with 
them? — A. I do not think they could get up any trouble. 

Mr. Davis: 

Q. Would they be disposed to do so ? — A. I do not think it would go 
past each individual feeling a little sore. You must remember they 
Bonstitnte the secular clergy, and the secular clergy are not bound by 
any vow of poverty. They are very good fellows, indeed; very hospi- 
table, and will put you up any time for a night or two. I should say 
that 7.> per cent of the secular clergy have quite sufficient to live upon. 
And they have lands. 

Q. State, if you know, what the amount of aid furnished, per annum, 
to one of these secular priests will average. — A. It is very tritiing all 
around ; I should say possibly SGOO Mexican to each one would be a 
fair average; about 8-10 per month. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. W^hat do you think the exactions of the church are on individ- 
uals? — A. 1 had some figures which 1 went over for the purpose of an 
article. If yon would allow me to leave that until another time, I have 
some notes in a book, and if you can raise that question a little later I 
could give you a more exact answer. 

The Chairman : 

Q. [ think you stated in your book that about seven-tenths of the 
revenues of the island are turned over to the church. How is that? — 
A. I must have calculated it closely at that time. 

The commission here took a recess until -.30 p. m. 

The commission met at 2.30 p. m. 

Mr. Foreman. In answer to the last question asked this morning, I 
will read an extract from an article written by me which it may be 
interesting to you to hear. 

The total revenues for the island, estimated, for 1896, were, in round 
numbers, 8(i,0()0,0(K) pesetas. If you will divide that amount by ten, it 
will give the amount in gold dollars, or $8,G00,()00. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. That is the real value? — A. In gold. 

Mr. Davis: 
Q. About twice that in silver? — A. Yes, sir. The disbursements to 
be made included the following items, viz — these are the actual figures 
for 1800-97. I will give it in pesetas 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Where do you derive that? — A. From statistics sent me from 

Madrid for the luirposes of my literary work. To the clergy I suppose 

we might call it an allowance made by the Government to the clergy, 

general allowance, 7,000,000 pesetas out of a total of 8(»,000,()00 pesetas. 

Mr. Gray': 

Q. $700,000? — A. Yes, sir. For the Franciscan College in Spain, and 

I)assages of priests from Spain to the islands, 275,000 pesetas, or 8i.'7,500 

gold. For the maintenance of Manila Cathedral, 294,000 iiesetas, or 

$29,400 gold. For the maintenance of the choir school, 20,000 pesetas, 



458 TREATY OF PEACE. 

§2,000 gold. Total, 7,.~)S0,000 pesetas, or $758,900 o-old; sothatthe net 
result is three-quarters of a inillion dollars gold out of a total of 
$8,000,000 gold. 

Mr. I) AVI : 

(}. About 10 per cent of the entire amount? — A. Yes, sir; it comes 
to something like what I put in my book. Of course the total amount 
varies from year to year. Another curious item comes out of this total 
revenue \vhi(;h, of course, would cease to exist under new arrange- 
nuMits — pensions and allowances })aid outside the colony, of absolutely 
no interest to the i'hilippine islanders. 1 have not noted it here, but 
they are pensions to the descendants of Christopher Columbus, to a 
man known as the Marquis de Bademont, the maintenance of consuls 
in the far East, which are absolutely of no value to the Philippine Isl- 
ands. The ccnisuls, as at Hongkong, are under the jurisdiction in no 
sense of the Covernor-General of the islands; if the (xover nor General 
wants to make use of them, he telegraphs to Spain and iSpain tele- 
graphs back to Hongkong, while, as a matter of fact, the distance is 
only 030 miles from ^lanila to Hongkong. This amount is 5,80(»,000 
joesetas, or $r)8!>,000 gold. For public works, highways, bridges, and 
jHiblic buildings, nothing. Besides the above amounts, paid direct to 
the clergy, the sums extorted by the priests for marriages, sale of indul- 
gences, feasts, masses, burials, baptisms, scapularies, etc., are estimated 
at about 10,000,000 pesetas, or -i^ 1,000,000 gold. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Does the church there have a right to levy a tax on the people? — 
A. Yes, sir; I think it was about the year 188;!, but, however, leaving 
the date, but certainly it was during the administration of Governor- 
General Jovelar. Up to the time of his administration the i)riestsused 
to get Ih reals — the Mexican dollar, or the dollar out of Spain, is 8 
reals; in S])ain the dollar is I'O reals. The dollar is distinguished this 
way: In S])ain you speak of reals veinte, L'O, and 8 reals fuertes, 
strong, hard reals, make a dollar outside of Spain; in the colonies 1^ 
reals had to be i)aid by every individual living within the district of a 
parish within a certain parish priests' jurisdiction. 

Mr. Davis : 

Q." Is there a tax levied by Spain on real estate"? — A. ]S"o, sir. 

Q. A tax on personal property levied in the islands? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Any direct tax of any kind, except a caj>itation tax, levied in the 
islands by Spain? — A. No. sir; tliere is a trading tax. 

Q. That is a license"? — A. Yes, sir. 

(). That license is levied there on all traders? — A. Yes, sir; if I 
wished to day to start a business of any kind, from that of a i)eddler to 
the establishment of a commercial house, in JManila I would have to 
get a license in order to do so. 

(). Tell us the range of those taxes — from what sum to what sum? — 
A. 1 think it is from about io-to ^'2~>0. 

Q. What tax is levied upon the lottery there, if any, or what license 
is required ibr the lottery? — A. There is no tax on the lottery, of 
course, because it is run by the Government, but it is generally under- 
stood that the prizes and the income of the lottery are so arranged in 
such a manner that the Government will assuredly get 25 per cent 
profit. 

Q. Is there an income tax? — A. No, sir. 

Q. is there a cock lighting tax in any way, by license or otherwise ? — 
A. Yes, sir. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 459 

Q. How much license! — A. I cau not tell exactly what it amounts to, 
)ut it is regulated in this way: They put it u]) to a tender or at auc- 
lion, and a number will go forward with tenders for the term of three 
'ears, and they undertake to pay a lump sum of so much, payable in 
)eriodical installments. 

Q. It has been stated that the church appropriated, or had some 
9ortion of the proceeds of that license? — A. 1 never heard that. 

Mv. Fryb : 

Q. Did you get through with your answer to my question as to 
;he taxing power of the church — they tax everyone so much? — A. Up 
10 the time of Jovelars administration, I think ISSo, the church 
flsed to have 14 reals a head for the sanctorum tax. Since that period 
they have no direct tax of so much a head, but now it is collected by 
bhe treasury, and they leceive what is estimated to be an efaiivalent 
From the treasury, so the tax remains the same, but is paid to tlie chiirch 
by the authorities. 

Q. Do the priests have any way of plandering the people of money ? — 
A. Oh, yes. I will just read tliat little piece again. Pesetas income the 
same, etc. The amount extorted by the <,'hu;ch for attestation is esti- 
mated at abont 10,()()(»,00l> pesetas— sl,()()0,000 gold. 

There is another way tlie jniests will get money out of the ])eo])le. 
They will say that the Feast of Our Lady of So and So is to take place on 
the I'Oth of this month, "1 shall look lo you to pay something to tliat;" 
and they will go to Captain So and So and say, "You are generous, and 
we exjiect so much," and if he says he can not pay so much, they will 
keej) asking, and perhaps reducing the amount, and lie is afraid to 
refuse entirely, and they will hnaliy squeeze out anything up to 8')00. 
How the money goes nobody knows. It goes into the hands of the 
priests and the feast comes off, the candles are there and ligiited. and 
all the necessary i)arai)liernaba, etc., usual at such times, and they have 
to l)e content. I su])])()se a large revenue comes from that. 

Mr. Davis: 
Q. Is there a stamp tax on the island ? — A. Oh, yes; the same stamps 
as in other countries. 

The Chairman: 
Q. A stamp tax for instruments, deeds, etc. ! — A. Tes, sir: the lowest 
value is 25 cents of a Mexican dollar. 

Mr. Davis: 

Q. Are those stamps required on all instruments! — A. Yes, sir; you 
cau not communicate with the authorities without paying the tax. 

Q. Ofiicial documents, notes, deeds, etc.? — A. Yes, sir; and you can 
not even communicate with any of the authorities without using" 
stamped jiaper. 

Q. Have you any estimate of the amount of revenue derived from 
that source? — A. I do not know" whether it is mentioned in my book. 
I iind the stamps are included in a lump item, (Tovernment monopolies: 
Stamps, cocktighting, opinnt. gambling, etc., one million one hundred 
and eighty-one thousand odd. 

(}. Is there an inheritance tax? — A. No, sir; but there is something 
which is tantamount to it. It is very rarely tliat one party can inherit 
from another without going through judicial legal formalities. You 
can not, in a simple way, become an heir and have your trustees and 
executors put the thing through nonjudicially; you are obliged in some 
way to appeal to the courts, and the latter squeeze terribly. 



4()0 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. Are those subject to any exactions? — A. Nominally; only stamps 
on the documents relatiuii' to it. ^ 

]\[r. i^iJAY: 

(). r>ut really? — A. As a matter of fact, when you put in your papers 
they will lie for a while, and the interested ]>arty will ji'o to the fountain 
head, the person tinally luivini;' the matter in charge, and he will ])Oob 
pooh the matter and send you back to the lowest man in the office, and 
you talk to him and cajole him and ])ut about a dollar in his hand, and 
he will push it along a little further, and you go from him to another, 
and you pay him, and so it goes up the scale. It might cost you a 
thousand Mexican dollars to get your iidieritance. Of course, the same 
thing obtains in ^])}iin. 1 was in Spain live years before 1 went to the 
Phili])pines. 1 just mention this to let you know that I went to the 
islands not as a foieigner to their methods and language; I was quite 
familiar with the language and the character of the Sjianiards; 1 went 
knowing the language and knowing the character. 

When I was in Spain, my occupation was mining. I put capital in 
some mines and w^orked those mines very successfully for tliree years. 
They i)aid admiiably, and 1 had some house property and sheds which 
\vere utilized during the Carlist war. I made a little claim, simply the 
damage done on tlie different sides, particularly by the Government 
troops. They used to fire at one house and knock down another. 
There were no Carlists at my house, but there was a Frenchman who 
had a house across the way very near, and the Government soldiers 
used to fire at his house and hit mine and knock down portions of it, 
and I made a little claim of about 82,000— the dollar was worth about 
three shillings, four ])ence. I was very young, and I thought 1 would ' 
go to Madrid and collect my claim. Every time that a shell would hit j 
my ])lace I would put in a protest with the local officials and with the | 
British consul at Bilbao. 

I went ro Madrid and put in a claim at the office of the home office, 
and I was talking to some friends, and I had been waiting some time, 
and they asked who had charge of it, and 1 told them no or.e, and 
they said for me to go to a court agent. I said, "If you will recom- 
mend one I will go to him, and perhaps it will get better attention." 
They said that the court agent would go to one and another about the 
matter, and perhaps would reach the minister, and that it would cost 
me probably about §50 or .$00. I went to the man they lecommended, 
and he came to my hotel and took two or three dollars at different times, 
up to ><r)0. He came to my hotel and said this and that, and I said I 
was not satisfied, that I wanted the thing pushed; that it was not our 
way of doing business, and that T did not want anything more to do 
with him unless he could show me some satisfactory results. He grew 
very indignant and said, "Oli, you think 1 am cheating you?" And I 
said, "Yes:" I thought he was a rascal; and he jumi)ed around and 
ranted and said he should require satisfaction, and I took off my coat 
and said, "I am prepared now to give it," and he ran down the steps, 
and 1 have not seen him from then to now. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. What would be the effect of stopping cockfighting and lotteries?— 
A. Lotteries you can stoj) at once. 

Q. There would be no trouble about that? — A. Xo, sir. 

(}. llow about the cockfighting? — A. 1 think there would be cock- 
fighting carried on secretly. I think it would be advisable to tolerate 
it. The life of these people is very dreary, these natives; they live in 



TREATY OF PEACE. 4G1 

these rural districts and see iiotbing- but uiountams and planted 
lands, and iftiiis is prohibited their vices will break out in some other 
form; -they would liave to have some form of amusement, 1 do not 
[think it would be practi(;able to absolutely suppress the coektightiug. 

Q, You think the lottery could be abolished without any troubled — 
jjA. Yes, sir. The natives are so used, when they do get a prize, to hav- 
liiig to tip so many ])euple and to having so many squeezes that they get 
jvery much disgusted a:id say it is a fraud, but it is not a fraud. I 
ll believe tlie matter is entirely fair: but the l)ase of a lottery system is 
about as strong as a house built of a pack of cards put on end. If the 
general idea got abroad that the lottery was a fraud the whole thing 
would vanish. It is not an involuntary thing. If 1 luyself thought tlie 
Spanish lottery was a fraud 1 would abandon it, and if the whole com- 
munity got that idea the lottery would \ anish like a pack of cards at 
la breath of wind. The lotteries could be suppressed, to answer your 
question. 

The Chairman : 
Q. Do you suppose, to change the subject, with your knowledge of 
the administration of the government in the Philiiipines and Spanish 
administration elsewhere, that if they were to agree with another Gov- 
ernment to institute reforms in the method of dealing witli the people, 
and taxing the people, and permitting the priests to do as yon say they 
do, etc., and the whole matter was left to this treaty or contract or 
engagement, it would be carried out by tlie Spanish authorities? — A. 
Please permit a little preamble to my answer. The Spaniards are such 
a proud people, and such sticklers in the matter of honor, and, as I 
understood, they were rigorous enougli on the point to cross swords 
with yourselves on a matter (>f honor, for T can not conceive any politi- 
cians could have dreamed of doing anything more than walking out of 
Cuba, it was utterly absurd to think they could do anything morethan 
sustain their honor — honor comes so vividly into what they do — that 
they would agree to do anything to get back the island of Luzon. 

Mr. Davis : 
Q. Would they keep their word ? — A. Very broadly speaking, I think 
there w^ould be all sorts of attempts, not from the Government, nor on 
account of instructions from the Government, but I think individual 
ofdcials would interpret it very broadly indeed. I must say that Span- 
iards, s[)eaking of the character of the Spaniards, are not loyal to their 
engagements, as Americans and English are; they do not think ''This 
is very repugnant to me, I dislike this very much, but I have given my 
word and must live up to it;" but they look to see if there is not some 
way they can get out of it. 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. They do not live up to the Psalmist's idea of "swearing to their 
own hurt and changing not?" — A. No, sir. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Have they not engaged to make reforms, heretofore, and not done 
so? — A. Yes, sir; I was going to state two remarkable examples. 
Gen. Martinez Campos was out in Cuba in the ten years' war which 
terminated in 1878. I was in Spain, and I remember the news came 
that the war was terminated, and llags were Hying and bunting, 
etc., at Bilbao to celebrate the termination of the war, but later came 
a letter to say that it was all a humbug, and they were all laughing 



462 TREATY OF PEACE. 

about it, but finally came the news tliat Martinez Campos had signed 
the treaty of Zanjan, and it was found that he had signed an agree- 
ment which about corresponds to the systwn of autonomy which was 
granted in January of this year. lie came back to Spain and became 
the idol of the people. He had terminated the war by this agreement, 
and the i)opula(;e Avould have him go into power as prime minister. 
The King called Canovas, and the latter said, "You better let him go 
iu: the higher he goes, the lower he will fall." 

rie went in, and the object of his going into power was of course to 
have carried through Parliament, or the (Jortes, the treaty which he had 
signed, for which he thought himself responsible in a certain sense, but 
he was i^ooh poohded and laughed at. They said, "The Cubans have 
laid down their arms, everything is quiet; why should we do anytliing 
more ; we have accomplished what we wanted." He said, " I have given 
my word of honor; my personal honor is affected." But they said, " Oh, 
you have fallen out of power, and you will never come in again. It is 
a very good trick. You have got each one to lay down his arms and go 
to his house, and now let the reforms go; never mind the engagement." 
They have done the same with the treaty or agreement of Biac-na bato, 
made with Emilio Aguinaldo, the rebel general. They paid, of course, 
the first installment, which had to be paid simultaneously with the exile 
of Aguinaldo and the 32 rebel leaders, and which was deposited in the 
Shanghai bank, but they paid no more. One of the conditions was that 
the families and others connected with the rebellion should not be 
molested in any form or sense whatever; but immediately that Aguin- 
aldo left for Hongkong the priests started to persecute those left 
behind, and the result was that another chief turned up — I knew his 
father very well — Alejandrino. He had tied, but returned, and is one 
of the leaders now. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. If that exodns of the friars, these priests of the monastic orders, 
was carried out, either voluntarily on their part or with some degree 
of compulsion api)lied to them, what disposition would be lUiide of their 
holdings of land; what would become of the laud? — A. What the 
natives, I think 1 may say pretty decidedly, would aspire to would be 
that the land should be declared to be the ])ossession of those actually 
in possession as tenants to day, holding it in rent from these corpora- 
tions. It is let in parcels. They would say, " the priests are gone, let 
us, as we stand, hold the land," and with very little disturbance at all 
the man iu possession holds his patch of land. i 

Q. They hold by a legal title now ? — A. Only by a contract with the 
priests. 

Q. I mean the monastic orders hold by a title? — A. No, sir. That is 
to say, I draw n)y information from this source — that Dr. Eizal chal- 
lenged the priests to bring forward their titles. He said, " If you will 
exhibit your title deeds, it will be satisfactory for you and for us; I 
shall be satisfied, my agitation will end, the people interested round- 
about will be satisfied, and >'ou certainly will insure to yourselves 
tranquillity by settling this matter on tlie exhibition of your title 
deeds," and they could not do it. They would go to the length of 
intriguing for three or four years to bring about the executiou of this 
Dr. Ki/.al rather than show their title deeds, and we can only surmise 
that the title deeds did not exist. 

(}. How long hiive they been flourishing there and holding these 
titles, so called! — A. I can not say. 

Q. It is an old business? — A. Yes, sir; very old. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 4G3 

Q. Would not the clmrcli claim the land"? — A. It would belong to 
the order. For instance, the Order of Augustine Friars would be the 
owners in collectively of those lands ; you would not be troubled by 
any individual claims. 

Q. The church as a corporation? — A. The corporation of friars. 

Q. Would not they not claim to succeed to the title by the bishop? — 
;A. Oh, no: the corporation of the friars itself is quite distinct. 

Q. Sujiijose they go out? — A. If all the friars go, they might as well 
emove their establishment. 

The Chairman : 

Q. The orders that now claim the title would still claim to own the 
lands, although tlieir people were not there, would they not? — A. I 
should think not. 

Q. AVhat would become of the land then? — A. Confiscate it from the 
orders . 

Mr. Gray : 

Q. On what ground? We have no law which will allow us to arbi- 
trarily do so. — A. They have uo title deeds, and it would not be con- 
fiscation exactly. 

Q. They have a possessory title? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Have been in possession for a hundred years or so? — A. Yes, sir; 
but it would be a great anomaly to have these native phmteis working 
these different patches of land and have a religious corporation claim- 
ing the lands. I would rather take the bull by the horns and say, 
''You clear out." 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. But you could impose upon them terms? — A. Yes, sir; you could 
make them give leases, uinety-niue-year leases, such as we have in Eng- 
land, Avhich are the nearest approaches to freeholds which we have in 
England. Spain is very desirous of holding the balance of the islands, 
in the first place 

The Chairman: 

Q. What do you mean by " the balance of the islands?" — A. I mean 
all except Luzon. In the first i^lace, on the score of honor, dignity, 
etc., to show that they are not turned out entirely, and also as a refuge 
for the priests. I do not think that they dream that any conditions 
are to be put u})ou them. lUit it would be a terrible calamity for the 
people if the priests should repossess themselves of the islands by yoiu" 
generosity. It would be a terrible calamity, and to take these islands 
would be an extention of your policy of humanity. It would be a ter- 
rible thing to return them unconditionally to Spain. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Any of them ? — A. Any of them. I should give none of them back 
unconditionally, for the reasons I have already suggested. 

Mr. Moore : 
Q. You stated they had a system of registration of property there in 
the islands, though it was very imperfect and not generally resorted to. 
Are these lands registered under that system, these monastic lands? — 
A. I can not tell you positively. A decree came out some few years 
ago to the effect that offices of registration of real property — real 
estate — were being organized, and calling upon everybody to put in 
the documents necessary for the registration of his estate. Upon this 



404 TREATY OF PEACE. 

a gi-eat many hurried up with their documents, but they waited so long 
for the i)roeesses of reiiistration that mauy witlidrew their ])apers aud 
tlioui^ht they would take their chance, iiud 1 learned from an official 
who is one of the principal men in this (lepartn)ent, he saiil to me quite i 
coutidentially, '• I cau tell you that, with the present staft" we have fori 
the rejiistvation of estates, with the enormous number of formalities wet 
have to go throufih with, it would take seventy years before we could 1 
get through the registration of the estates at the same rate we are now*! 
going." 

(}. Is tliis system a recent onef — A. Only within the last twelvev 
years. 

The Chairman : 

Q. It is not what we know as a registration system, where a man 
merely takes in his deed and leaves it for registration ''. — A. What they, 
mean is, you simply put in your proofs to the possession of the estate, 
and you get title deeds. As we understand the registration of title: 
deeds in England, you register your title deeds; if you want to get ai 
loan on the security of your real estate, the man to whom you apply, 
asks if you have registered your title deeds, and you say, "O, yes, 
aud he says he will loan you the money, but if you say you have notl 
registered your title, lie tells you that he will have to look into the; 
matter to make sure that another loan has not been made prior to this.. 
I would never loan a cent on real estate in the Philippines, because II 
would have n.o knowledge as to whether the property had not had onei 
or two or a number of loans on it previous to mine; there would be noj 
security on it at all. 

Mr. Gray : 

Q. The process there would be a sort of judicial process by which] 
you would have your title (juieted"? — A. Yes, sir. The last man who? 
signs these titles is called the "intendente" or chief "of the treasury," 
the man who gives the iinal signature. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Do you have to keep paying every step until you get to him'? — A. 
Oh, no; you pay at the end. 

Q. There is no robbery? — A. Except to get it expedited in the shape 
of tii)S to one and auother. 

The Chairman : 

Q. Is there any island in this group which has a good harbor audi 
but few people, sparsely populated, large enough to have an ample 
harbor, like Samoa, separated from the other islands'? — A, Not in Luzon. 

Q, Such as the English have at Hongkong, separated from the 
others of the group? — A, Oh, yes; Gubat. That is in the island of 
Luzon. There is an Englishman living there, Mr. Collingwood. 

Q. That is in the island of Luzon ? — A. Yes, sii*. 

(}. Subig Bay is the best, is it not? — A. Yes, sir. At one time they 
thougiit of establishing a naval station there. It has been for a long; 
tinu^- on the tai)is to establish a naval station there, transferring it fromi 
Cavite, but tlie objection is that the land runs very abruptly down toi 
the sea; it is very hilly, and you have no expanse of flat laud running ;| 
back from the bay. 

Mr. Frye : 

(}. What is the land back? — A. It would be a very high level. The 
approacli to the bay as a port would be rather difficult. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 465 

Q. Is that on the west side? — A. Yes, sir: the west coast of Luzon, 

Q. Is that protected agaiust the winds of the China Sea? — A. Yes, 
sir; you liave ouly a httle swell from the southwest monsoon; it is a 
very good port indeed. 

Q. What is that bend there [indicating on map] ? — A. That is 
Manila Bay, and that white place to the right is the lake, called the 
Laguna. 

Q. How deep is the water in Manila Bayl — A. Any ships can anchor 
there. 

Q. How near can they approach the shore; big ships — say, 26 feet? — 
A. I should say a mile from the city ; the bay is well protected. 

Q. Is 3Ianila a province by itself? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Called the Province of Manila ? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. There are docks and wharves there? — A. They have started a 
dock, but as fast as it has been built up it has been washed out, and 
there is no use of the work. It was started, I think, in 1880; there is 
no use. 

Q. Is all the commerce lightered? — A. Yes, sir; except the inter- 
island steamers, which have fortnightly departures. They have estab- 
lished a line of steamers which runs from the river ever\^ fortnight, 
touching every capital of every province in the islands. These steamers 
go everywhere, I think. 

Q. That steamer goes away up in the river? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What is the draft? — A. By jetties, sea walls, etc., you could carry 
it out, and then dredge the entrance, and I think steamers of pretty 
fair draft could go up — carry it out, say, half a mile and then dredge 
the entrance. Vessels drawing up to 13 feet can enter the river. 

Q. Then there must be a depth of about 14 feet of water. Do you 
know what the tide is? — A. I think they reckon the variation at 2 feet; 
the rise and fall at springs may be taken at 5 feet; the tides are very 
irregular. There is a small slip for ships established, just ten minutes' 
walk from Cavite, at a place called Kankow. It is a small slip with a 
hauling power of 500 tons, and small ships can be repaired there. 

Q. If we take Luzon alone, establish our Government there, and give 
the place all the freedom and comfort that we ordinarily bestow, and 
leave these other islands under Spanish dominion, is it not likely to 
provoke insurrections and revolutions in these other islands? — A. Most 
decidedly, unless you impose certain conditions on the Spanish. One 
condition alone would obviate anything very serious in the way of insur- 
rection — that is, an absolutely tree exit from the islands; no license, 
permit, passport, or any kind of impediment, unless there is a warrant 
issued for their detention from the courts. 

Q. That is the most important? — A. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman : 
Q. You are dealing with the Spaniards. Suppose they want to keejj 
people in their islands. You have that condition that they shall freely 
leave, unless some kind of judicial warrant has been properly issued 
which shall keep them there. Would it not be easy for them to get up 
some kind of procedure to detain whoever they wanted or whole groups 
of people ? — A. I thought of that myself, and saw that they could trump 
up charges against individuals, but they could not do so to any great 
extent. Suppose whole families wanted to make a general exit, how 
could they possibly trump up a charge against whole families? It 
would be so visible to everybody. 

Q. In other words, you would have free trade among the islands, and 

T p 30 



4()6 TREATY OF PEACE. 

free ri gilt to come and go, exit and entrance? — A. Yes, sir; I would 
say, of course, it might suit you to make a revenue port of Manila, and 
1 presume you would open any other ports wliere vessels of large draft 
could come, to have as many entrances aud exits as possible for trade 
if it could be found. That port in the extreme north of Luzon should be 
dredged and titted for trade which now goes to Manila. It would be 
absurd to make vessels come down to Manila when they could come 
from Hongkoug to Gubat and discharge. 

Mr. Rhid: 

Q. What would be the distance from that port to Hongkong'?— A. I 
did know once 

Q. Xot more than half the distance?— A. Three hundred and twenty- 
three miles, I think a captain of a steamer told me. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Is there a harbor there?— A. Yes, sir; a very fair one. I have 
been there myself in a steamer belonging to the Smith-Goddin Com- 
pany. On one occasion the captain said he had to go to Cape St. 
Vincent, and we were talking about the matter, and 1 think it was 
about o23 miles; something like that; only about half the distance. 

Mr. Gkay : 
Q. What is the distance from the little isthmus— not the great long 
tail, but from that little neck— to the northernmost point [Indicating 
on map] ?— A. We can tell from the degrees, 00 miles to a degree. 

Mr. Frye : 

Q. Is that on the northwest corner?— A. No, sir; about the center 
of the north. 

The Chairman: 

Q. There is talk about the number of islands being all the way from 
SOO to l,oOO. They must count all the little islands?— A. Oh, yes. 

Q. Those three groups you pointed out this morning are practically 
all the islands? — A. Yes, sir. Two hundred and seventy miles would 
appear to be the distance fi'om north to south of the island, taking off 
this j)iece indicated. 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. That is, in geographic miles; it would be a little more in statute 
miles, parhaps 275 to 280 miles? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Is there egress for ships through these islands, anywhere a chan- 
nel or strait?— A. Through the island of Luzon any channel? 

Q. Xo, sir; a strait between the islands.— A. Yes, sir; the Strait of 
San Bernardino is the trading exit. Small steamers can not manage it, 
and for sailing ships it is dangerous; the currents are tremendous. 
For a steamer drawing less than feet it would be very dangerous — a 
steamer that would run into the small creeks— or for launches. I have 
made particular impiiry into the navigation, because in the archipelago 
navigation counts very largely, and they have said to me, "Do not trust 
yourscll' in anything that draws less than 6 feet, because you are sud- 
denly twisted and turned around here and there." It is like it is in the 
Straits of Messina. 

Q. A big steamer could go through all right?— A. Yes, sir. 



I 

I 



TREATY OF PEACE. 467 

The Chairman : 
Q. Is Miiulora thickly populated? — A. ^o, sir; thiuly populated, aud 
the Spaniards hold in Mindora only three little coast towns, and — 1 do 
not know why, but they will not, most persistently, allow people to 
work up Mindora. A number of capitalists i)roposed to form a com- 
pany, aud they proposed to take the whole island of Mindora and 
indemnify the Government. They had an idea it was very valuable. 
But they would not allow it. From what I know, it is very valuable. 
My information came from a personal friend, a timber merchant who 
made his fortune there. I know he sent cutters to IMindora and found 
very fine hard wood, and as far as he could judge there was plenty of 
it. When I received my information from him his men were out pros- 
pecting and had found very tine wood. I have samples of it hanging in 
my study in London; they are on slabs hanging from strings, and I 
think there are 22 of the very finest hard woods on the string. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Any mahogany? — A. Kone. 

Mr. Keid : 
Q. What is the character, better than mahogany, richer in grain or 
color? — A. The finest is known as malave. It has rather the appear- 
ance of oak. But the bad feature about these hard woods of the Tropics 
is want of elasticity. Oak has a great deal of elasticity compared with 
these, consequently you could not get so much resistance out of a given 
thickness of malave as out of the same slab of oak. 

Mr. Frye : 

Q. That would not have the same effect as to finishing ? — A. Oh, no, sir. 
Mr. Re ID. 

Q. Are they introduced and used anywhere now? — A. Yes sir; in 
China. There are two species, the dark and the light, of a wood called 
narro. I have seen it used. On one occasion a man had a caprice for 
using them, and he had a portico made of it, and it was splendid 
indeed — beautiful. It is curious tbat Europeans out there generally 
like the dark narro, but natives have a fancy for the light. There is a 
large trade with Hongkong in it. 

Q. Does it resemble bird's-eye maple? — A. It is not so prettily 
spotted, but something of that nature, about that tint; that yellowish 
tint. In the Island of Mindanao, speaking of woods, there is known 
to be the ironwood, an extremely hard wood. It is very, very hard 
indeed. Of course, at the same time, it has the defect of being some- 
what brittle, but in substantial sizes, say in 3-inch growth, it is tre- 
mendously strong. I have a chapter on woods in my book. 

Mr. Frye. 
Q. Is there not oil in those islands? — A. Only in one place has it 
been discovered so far; that is in the island of Cebu, on the estate 
known as Calumampao, belonging to an Englishman named Pickford 
and a Mr. Wilson, an American. I know this young Wilson very well. 
He is a working partner of Mr. Pickford. The estate is situated close 
to the town of Toledo, and called Calumampao, and on that estate was 
discovered oil, petroleum, and a little syndicate was formed, in which 
two or three persons connected with the firm of Smith, Bell & Co., 
and connected with the firm of McLeod c\: Co., of Manila, were con- 
cerned, and they were working it when I left tfiere. 



468 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. Success fully ? — A. It was not retined oil, quiteprimitive, but it \\\ 
was tliere and L saw it. The oil as it comes from the deposit looked 
like chocolate, and I saw some of it. 

Mr. Keid. 

Q. What is the nature of the carriage-making industry in Manila? — 
A. It is very advanced. To keep a carriage in Manila does not signify 
anything socially. Everybody keeps a carriage; there is a great 
demand for them. 

Q. Tliev are small ? — A. Yes, sir; little victorias. 

Q. Weil built?— A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Would there be a chance for an export trade in carriages? — A. 
The question of freight would be a rather cumbersome thing. Singa- 
pore would be the nearest place to do anything with carriages; in 
Hongkong there is no such thing. I think there exist there six omni- 
buses which are looked upon as very wonderful, but which are very 
primitive, and which are only used by the Chinese. Mr. Keswick, of 
Jordan, Mason ^: Co., I think has a carriage; I have seen it once or twice, 
but it is a heavy sort of thing which is put away six months at a time, 
and only brought out when" any big personage came to Hongkong. 
But everyone of any importance resides more or less up on the Peak. 
When I lived in Hongkong I lived 600 feet up, and that was very low 
down indeed. 

Mr. Frye: 
<^). How did you go up and down! — A. By the use of coolies. I had 
four coolies, two in front and two behind, and they carried me in a sort 
of car swung on poles. 

Mr. Keid : 

Q. Can you give the cost of those carriages? — A. You can get a 
nicely built carriage for $350 Mexican. 

Q. A victoria? — A. Yes. sir. Something might be done with horses 
in Singapore. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Do they breed horses very largely?— A. Yes, sir. They are 
ponies, as we call them in England. They do not come above If hands, 
but they are very sturdy little things, and a splendid race of animals, 
very useful indeed, quite docile, of great endurance. The China pony j 
is a very cantankerous, bad-tempered animal, but the Manila pony is ' 
of very good temper. 

Q. Large enough for cavalry? — A. Oh, yes. And there is a great 
field there for breeding horses. Heretofore the people have not liked 
to go on breeding, because as soon as any official knows that you have 
a good pony he will come down on you. He will meet you on the 
highway, and if he sees you with a good pony he will want to know if 
you have a license to have the pony, and if you cannot satisfy him he 
will take your pony away. Right on the highroad, like a highwayman. 
The Spaniards would almost compel you to carry every kind of docu- 
ment in your waistcoat pocket; it is perfectly absurd. 

Q. What is that island directly south of Luzon?— A. Mindora. 

Q. That is the island on which you say the Spaniards do not allow 
anyone to do anything? — A. Y'es, sir; it is a great mystery why. 

Q. A good harbor on the island?— A. No, sir; very open. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 469 

Mr. Gray : 

Q. What about the earthquakes? — A. In this ceutnry the greatest 
of the earthquakes which may be considered of very great importance 
was that in the year 1803, when, amongst other damage done, the 
whole of the roof of the cathedral came off and the building collapsed, 
and it is estimated 2,000 people were killed. It shook down also the 
Governor-General's residence in the same square where the cathedral 
was situated. It shattered it to pieces. That was in 18(53, and two 
years ago only they started to rebuild this official palace. Since 1863 
the Governor-General has resided outside of Manila, in a place called 
Malacanan. 

Q. Have there been any earthquakes since? — A. In 1880 there was a 
serious earthquake, seventeen years after, and a great deal of damage 
was done, and all the people very much scared. All the foreigners 
escaped to the shii)8 in the bay. Very serious damage was done, 
although there was but little loss of life. In 1S8*J there was a cholera 
epidemic, which was a very rare thing, and I suppose liO Europeans died 
and about 40,000 natives, and a tyi)lioon came after the epidemic, and 
the whole thing vanished in twenty four hours. 

Q. What did the typhoon do? — A. Curried off the roofs of 50 or 60 
houses. Some of the corrugated iron work from the roofs was carried 
off" into the streets, and a number of Chinamen risked their lives to get 
it, and one had his head cut off. 

Q. Are they frequent? — A. There are more or less every year, but 
they are not so serious. Once every six or seven years there is one 
ratlier serious, and there is a certain amount of loss in schooners and 
sailing vessels and the interisland carrying trade. 

Q. There are volcanoes there? — A. Yes, sir. When the volcanoes 
are in eruption they know there is no danger. In this lake near 
Manila, known as the Laguna del Bayo, there is a very pretty and 
famous volcano known as the one of Taal. which was in eruption when 
I last heard from Manila. There is a business to be done there — the 
export of sulphur. At one time it was permitted, but all of a sudden 
the Government expressly prohibited it. There is another volcano 
there which is very famous, and one of the finest things to be seen, 
with the most perfect cone to be seen. In nature it is like an enormous 
limpet shell, and the most perfect, on the clean cut style, and that is 
the volcano of Mayon, in the extreme east of the island of Luzon, in 
the province of Albay. That is a very fine volcano; a grand sight to 
see it at night. Of course the whole island is supposed to be volcanic 
origin, and when the volcanoes are in eruption you know there is no 
danger; you know that there will be no earthquakes, and they do no 
damage. Of course some of the natives are stupid enough to live in 
the immediate vicinity and occasionally get killed. 

Q. When is the rainy season? — A. The middle six months of the 
year; the first three months and the last three months is the dry 
season. 

Q. From April to October? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. It is rather an uncomfortable season? — A. Yes, sir; drenching 
rains come, frightful downpours sometimes, but everything dries so 
quickly. 

Q. How in the other six months, from October to April ? — A. Out of 
those six months, four months absolutely not a drop; approaching it, 
it shades off". 

Q. Pleasant months? — A. Delightful. I would not choose any other 
place to live in the month of December. Anvwhere in the islands is 



1 

470 TREATY OF PEACE. M 

simply delicious; a most wonderful climate; altogether it is very agree- 
able liviug, a very pretty place. 

The Chairman: 

(}. Supi)ose that the island of Luzon were taken, and we should 
have a stipulation for free trade, for free intercourse between the islands, 
and that Spain shall never alienate any of the islands to any other 
power, what have you left of Spanish sovereignty in any of the other 
islands, what is h^ft to Spain, practically, in the islands not taken*? — A. 
Their honor. 

Q. Then, you have, practically, the islands deserted and no right to 
change the ownershiijf — A. Yes, sir. 

(}. In a case of that kind, would it not be as well to take the entire 
I)ro])erty and be done with it? — A. By taking the whole of the islands, 
it would be a favor to Europe by setting aside all chance of rivalry. 

Q. You do not seem to think it would be much of a burden! — A. No, 
sir; only a little more expense of administration, which I think would 
be covered by the islands themselves. 

Mr. Keid: 

Q. Do you have any doubt that, with a judicious administration of 
the revenues of the islands, those revenues would be surticient to cover 
the expenses of the islands"? — A. Yes, sir. 

i). You think they would be sufticient? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Do you think we would be able to recruit a sufficient number of 
native soldiers to form a garrison of sufficient defense? — A. I am in 
doubt about the island of Mindanao. It is a large island, and you could 
not think of recruiting any Mussulmans. 

Q. Do you think we could recruit, exclusive of Mindanao, enough 
native soldiers to maintain and defend our sovereignty over the whole 
group? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Frye : 

Q. I understand Spain has not much to do with that lower island of 
Mindanao?— A. Oh, no. 

The Chairman: 

Q. What would be the efi'ect — suppose we keep Luzon — if Spain 
should lind it too expensive to undertake to maintain her sway and 
sovereignty over the rest of the islands, of the establishment of some 
other power there? — A. I should make strenuous efforts to keep out 
the Germans. 

Q. Why? — A. Because Germany is just now Great Britain's very 
strong competitor in trade, and I think in the next generation will be 
the same with America. Perha])s it would be all right with this gen- 
eration, or for twenty-five years, but I thiuk Germany is, with the next 
generation, destined to be the great competitor. 

Mr. Gray : 

Q. Do you not think any government, with Christian civilization and 
better government, would be better than Spain? — A. I am looking at 
the material 

Q. The material comes with thiit; if you are looking at mere trade 
rivalry, that is another thing. — A. I do not think Germany has shown 
that she is capable of governing. 

The Chairman : 
Q. Your idea, in short, is this : You would prevent the alienation of 
the rest of the group because, peradventure, Spain might alienate to 



TREATY OF PEACE. 471 

Germany ? — A. Yes, sir. As to France, I always regard France as like 
taking a map, and it is practically blotted ont commercially. It pre- 
vents others coming in, but there is nothing to be got out of it. Meta- 
phorically speaking, it is simply blotting out that portion of the map. 
France does not develop anything; there is no development of any 
kind, and there is nothing to fear from France in competition of 
any kind, now or in the future, that I can see. May I make an obser- 
vation? The name of Japan has been brought up. It is, of course, 
quite out of the question, because it is a pagan nation. The natives 
have been brought up as Christians, and I am sure it would be opposed 
to the popular opinion in Europe, and in America, I should think. 
That excludes Japan, in my opinion. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Do you not think Japan will improve in that direction as she has 
in others? — A. I do not think so. 



STATEMENT OF COMMANDER R. B. BRADFORD, U. S. N., OCTOBER 
14, 1898, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT 
PARIS. 



Examiuation by th-e Chairman : 

Q. Will you please state your name, residence, and position in the 
United States Navy? — A. R. B. Bradford, commander. United States 
Navy, Chief Bureau of Equipment, Navy Department, Washimiton, 
D. C. 

(}. How louii' have you been in the naval service of the United 
States?— A. Since ISGl. 

Q. State briefly in what positions and capacities. — A. I have [»er- 
formed service in all the sul)ordin;ite iJirades of the Navy, including- 
command afloat and at various stations on shore. 

Q. In the course of your duties have you had occasion to visit the 
gi'oup of islands known as the Philippine Islands? — A. I have visited 
Manila on three different occasions. I have never visited any of the 
islands other than Luzon, except the coast along their shores.^ 

Q. When were you at Manila? — A. I was there first in 1867, again 
in 1868, and again in 1860; not since. 

Q. Have you had any occasion recently to investigate the situation 
on these islands? — A. During the past two months I have made a study 
of the islands and their value as colonies of the Ignited States. 

Q. Slate briefly what sources of information, other than your own 
visits there, you have had access to and had occasion to examine. — A. 
All the pul)lications on the subject I could find, particularly those 
bearing on mai'itime and naval matters, coal to be found, and harbors 
suitable for coaling and naval stations, and as bases for naval opera- 
tions. 

Q. Will you state what islands or places in your judgment are suited 
for naval bases, harbors, etc.? — A. I think the entire group would be 
a very valuable acquisition for naval and commercial purposes. The 
gi-oup is composed of over 400 islands, excluding rocks and islands 
not inhal)ited. These islands are so crowded together that anyone 
would in time of war require a large force for its defense, if the neigh- 
l»oring islands were in possession of an enemy. It would be less diifi- 
cult lo defend the entire group under such cii-cumstances than a single 
island. In case a division of the islands is made, those, in my ()pini(»n, 
of the most value from a sti-ategic point of view are Luzon, JMindoro, 
the Calamianes gi-ouj), Palawan, and Balabac. These command all 
the entrances to the China Sea fi-om the north end of Luzon to Borneo. 
Tlie best harl)oi-s for coaling stations are the following, mentioned in 
oi-d(M' of their i-elative importance so far as known: 

1. .Manila, or Cavite, island of Luzon, latitude 14° 2!)' north, longi- 
tude 120" 55' east; Suing i>ay, island of Luzon, latitude 14" 4(i' noi-th, 
longitude 120° 13' east, might be taken as an alternative. 
472 



TREATY OF PEACE. 473 

2. Malampaya Sound, island of Palawan, latitude 10° 53' north, 
longitude 122° 35' east. 

3. Iloilo, island of Panay, latitude 10° 42' north, longitude 122" 35' 
east. 

4. Cebu, island of Cebu, latitude 10° 18' north, longitude 123° 54' 
east. 

5. Pollok(orPolak), island of Mindanao, latitude 7° 21' north longi- 
tude 124° 13' east. 

There are many harbors in the Philippine group. Some of them, 
upon examination and survey, might prove more valuable than some 
of those mentioned above. It should be borne in mind that portions 
of the group are not well surveyed. There are almost numberless 
anchorages sufficiently sheltered for the transfer of ooal fr<^)m one ves- 
sel to another. 

So far as I can ascertain, coal is found in almost all of the large 
islands of the Philippine group. Its presence in the islands of Negros 
and Cebu has been known for a long time. Considerable quantities 
have been mined in Cebu, and coal miTiing thei'e only ceased because 
of the difficulties of transportation, the latter rendering it unprofita- 
ble. The German naval commander in chief reported to his Govern- 
ment during the present year that the Cebu coal was of good quality. 
The London Board of Ti-ade Journal for May, 1898, states that the 
Cebu coal is superior to the Japanese coal and slightly inferior to the 
Australian. Coal is found in the northern and southern parts of Lu- 
zon; also in Masbate and Batan. It is thought to exist in Samar and 
Mindanao. A few years ago the American ship Richard Parsons was 
wrecked on the west coast of Mindoro. Her master. Captain Joy, of 
Nantucket, Mass., was obliged to cross the island with his crew to ob- 
tain passage to Manila. While doing so he discovered immense out- 
croppings of coal in the interior mountainous regions of the island. 
The Spanish Government, upon learning of this discover}^, confiscated 
the lands, but nothing has ever been done toward developing this great 
discover}'. The coal mines of the island of Batan, near the Straits of 
San Bernardino, are now being worked by Messrs. Gil Ilermanos, of 
the island of Catanduans. The island of Palawan, on account of its 
proximit}' and similaiitj^ to North Borneo, where large amounts of 
coal are found, probablj' contains coal. 

Q. Where do you get this information that there is coal in these 
various islandsV — A. From data compiled in the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. In connection with tlie subject of coal, I desire to call 
attention to the fact that the Philippine Islands are on the range and 
midway between the great coal-producing islands of Formosa and 
Borneo. It is therefore natural to expect coal to be found in this 
group. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Formosa to the north and Borneo to the south? — A. Yes. The 
geological characteristics of the Philippine Islands also indicate the 
presence of coal. I do not think that any positive statements can be 
made as to the quality of the coal in these islands until shafts are 
sunk and a thorough investigation made below the surface croppings. 
We do know, however, that it is used at present by coasting steamers, 
sometimes by itself alone and sometimes by mixing it with a better 
quality, such as Cardiff. 

Not all the coal used in the Philippine Islands, however, is mined 
there, considerable amounts being imported. Coal is mined in quan- 



474 TREATY OF PEACE. 

titles in the nortli eud of IJorneo, and also on the British island of 
Labuan. The latter is of a i>ood quality and supplied for steaming 
purposes to l>ritish men-of-war and mail steamers. It is sold for 
about !j<4.50 a ton. This coaling station has recently been established 
and is becoming important. 1 think we maj' believe, judging from 
the doctrine of prolmbilities, that good coal will eventually be found 
in the Philippine Islands. I may mention that all of the important 
coal deposits of the world, so far as known at present, with the 
exception of those in the Philippines, are in the possession of either 
the United States, Great Britain, or Japan. While on the subject of 
coal, I desire to add that it is the duty of the Bureau of Equipment 
of the Navy Department to supply coal for naval puri)oses. As the 
chief of that l)ureaii, I have been much impressed during the recent 
war with the necessity of ac(|uiring coaling stations all over the world. 
I do not suppose any arguments are necessarj' to impress this fact 
upon the commission, but I will say that if the Hawaiian Islands had 
not been treated from the first as American territory, so far as using 
them as a coaling station is concerned, the operations undertaken at 
Manila would not have l)een successful. 

The necessity for coal at Honolulu was foreseen and a large amount 
collected there. The iirst three squadrons of troop ships en route to 
Manila were supplied with coal from that in store for the Navy. 
There was no other coal at Honolulu. Admiral Dewey, as soon as war 
was declared, was, of course, without a base of suijplies, without coal, 
and without even a harbor of refuge. He had been authorized, before 
war was declared, to purchase two large steamers and to fill them 
with coal. He took these wiuh him to Manila. Had he been defeated, 
he would have been obliged to abandon the Asiatic station. With the 
coal in the two steamers, had they remained in his po.ssession, he 
probably could have reached Hawaii, but not San Francisco. I am 
positive, if this countrj^ is to possess any colonies, however insignifi- 
cant, in the vicinity of the China Sea, that coaling stations are abso- 
lutely necessary in the Pacific along the route of communication from 
our coast. 

I do not think that the facilities afforded by the Ladrone Islands 
are sufficient for this jDurpose. It should be remembered that the 
Ladrone group of islands run north and south, and therefore practi- 
cally alTord but one port of call between Hawaii and the Philippines; 
in fact, there is but one harbor in this group, San Luis d'Apra, on the 
island of Guam, which is of much value. The Caroline Islands, 
including the Pelews, running east and west, and covering a distance 
of about 2,000 miles, are on the southern flank of the direct route to 
the Philipinnes. They possess many excellent harbors which will 
serve admirably as coaling stations and harbors of refuge. In the 
hands of an enemj' they would offer a serious menace to the line of 
communication between the Pacific coast and the Philippines. It so 
happens that the extreme eastern and the extreme western islands 
of the Caroline group possess excellent harbors. 

il. Will you name those islands? — A. The extreme eastern island is 
Ualan or Kusaie, and Yap is the extreme western, not counting the 
Pelew group. Between these is the important island of Ponapi, 
already recognized as a valuable port of call. The Pelew group is 
sometimes considered as part of the Carolines. 

Q. How far are the Carolines from the Ladrones, as to theii- i-elative 
position? — A. There [indicating on a chart] are the Carolines; here 
the Ladrones. The latter run north and south; the Carolines east 



TREATY OF PEACE. 475 

and west. Here are the Marshall Islands, under German control, 
directly to the eastward of the Carolines. They are not so important 
as the Carolines, because their harbors are not so good. The Mar- 
shall Islands are almost wholly of coral formation and afford but little 
vegetation. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Where are the Philippine Islands? — A. West of the Ladrones. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. North of the equator? — A. Yes. The Philippines extend from 
latitude 4° 45' north to latitude 21" 30' north. 

Q. Have you a map showing the American and Asiatic shores, 
both? — A. Yes; here it is. There are the Ladrones; here the Caro- 
lines; there the Marshalls; here are the Hawaiian Islands, and there 
are the Philippines. 

Mr. Davis: 

Q. How far north of the Ladrones are the Carolines? — A. The Caro- 
lines are south of the Ladrones. 

Q. Just turn the question round. — A. The island of Guam, the 
extreme southernmost of the Ladrones, is almost directly north of the 
island of Wolea of the Caroline group and a little less than 300 miles 
from it. Wolea has a good harbor and is inhabited. Guam is in lati- 
tude 13° 15' north, and the Northern Carolines are between latitude 
9° north and latitude 10" north. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Then, if we understand j^ou, you do not think the island in the 
Ladrones, assuming it to be Guam, the southern island, is sufficient 
for a coaling station between Hawaii and the Philippines? — A. I do 
not. Guam has the advantage of being farther north, and therefore 
more on the direct route from Hawaii to the Pliilippines than the Caro- 
lines, but it has not a very good harbor. 

Q. It is more in the direct line from the Hawaiian group to the 
Philippines than anj' one of the Carolines? — A. Yes; it- has that 
advantage. 

Q. You would not expect to go from the Ladrones to the Carolines, 
on the way to the Philippines, would you? — A. No; I should not. 

Q. Then what is the disadvantage in not having one or more of the 
Carolines, from our point of vicAv? — A. The Carolines possess better 
harbors; they are on several highways of commerce; thej" are uncom- 
fortably near the Ladrones, and they extend east and west along the 
route between the Pacific coast and the China Sea nearly 2,000 miles, 
affording numerous coaling stations and harbors of refuge. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. That is, in the hands of another nation they would be trouble- 
some or disagreeable? — A. They might be. Here are the Pelews [indi- 
cating on a chart] about 600 miles from the Philippines. I am firmly 
convinced that the Pelews, Carolines, and Ladrones should all be 
acquired if we are to possess any territory near the China Sea. 

The Chairman: 
Q. If the United States could have one of the Carolines, which one 
would you designate as the one best suited for our purposes? — A. 
Ponapi. 



476 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. Where is tliaf:' — A. It is about 300 miles west of Ualan, in lati- 
tude 7"^ north and longitude 158° 20' east. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. It is the largest, is it not? — A. No; not the largest, but it has 
some very good liarbors, is high and well watered and well wooded. 
Ualan, oi- Kusaie, the head<iuartersof the American missions, has also 
good hai-liors, and is similar in its characteristics to Ponapi. Yap, the 
exti-eine western island, excepting tlie Pelews, has good harbors, and 
is valuable. It is the seat of government for the western Carolines. 
Pona{)i is the seat of government for the eastern Carolines. Truk 
Islands are tlie largest group of the Carolines and the most densely 
populated. This small group has about 10,000 inhabitants. 

The Chairman: 

(}. Yap is more in the line of travel to the Philijipiues than any of 
the othei's of these islands? — A. No; I do not think it is. It is oidy 
on the route between the Fiji Islands and the North China Sea. Here 
is a chart showing the usual routes of full-powered steamers. Upon 
examination it appears that Ponapi is more directly on the commercial 
routes traversed b}^ steamers than any island of the Caroline group. 
Guam and Ponapi are both on the route from the Samoan Islands to 
the nortli end of Luzon. 

Q. We have a i^lace in Samoa? — A. We hope to have a coaling 
station there soon. In conjunction with Great Britain and Germany 
we exercise a protectorate over the Samoan Islands. This is the only 
claim we have to the vast territory known as the Polj'uesian Islands. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Is not the great-circle route the shortest from the Pacific coast 
to the Philippines? — A. Yes. It is 6,300 miles from San Francisco to 
the Pliilipj)ines by the great-circle route, and 7,000 miles via Hawaii 
and Guam. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Wediold the Aleutian Islands? — A. Yes. Unalaska is the best 
coaling station there. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Any harbor there? — A. Yes; Dutch Harbor, a faii'ly good one. 
The great circle-route from San Francisco to the China Sea and its 
neighboring islands is not often used, because of fogs near the Aleu- 
tian Islands in summer and heav\" gales during the winter. The 
regular trans-Pacific steamers avoid the Aleutian Islands for these 
reasons. The presence of fog also makes it difficult to enter the har- 
boi's of the Aleutian Islands. This colored map of the Pacific 
islands is very instructive. Tlie land colored red and all islands 
under whose names a red line is drawn belong to Great Britain; yel- 
low indicates German possessions; and blue, Frem-h. Islands too 
small U) color, belonging to Germany and France, have their owner- 
ship indicated by finely engi-aved names. 

i}. \Vhat is the gr<:^n? — A. The green islands are tliose that were 
independent when the nmp was constructed, or over which a joint pro- 
tectorate is exercised. Of tlie former, the Hawaiian Islands, now 
belonging to the United States, is the only example. Of the latter, 
the Samoan group, under the joint protection of the United States, 
Great liritaiu, and (lei-many; the New Hebrides, under the joint pro- 
tection of (Jreal IJi-itain and {'"ranee; and the Tonga, or Friendly, 



1 



TREATY OF PEACE. 477 

Islands, under the joint protection of Great Britain and Germany, 
are examples. Attention is called to the fact that there is nothing 
in all Polynesia remaining for any nation to acquire. Although the 
United States, by exploration, snrveyand discover}^, and by the work 
of her missionaries, has been interested in these islands in the past, 
her onl}^ claims now remaining to any is a joint interest in the Samoan 
group. England has made herself mistress of the seas and grown 
A^ery rich by her colonial enterpiise, and other countries are j)rotiting 
by her example. Even little Holland has colonies with 3(», 000,000 of 
inliabitants which yearly export products to the value of $125,000,000 
to *150,000,000. 

Q. You spoke of one selection, Luzon and Palawan. What other 
propositions did you find with regard to other coaling stations? Sup- 
pose Luzon alone, what is the difficulty? — A. I do not know that I 
quite understand you. You mean, which is the best coaling station 
in the entire group? 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. Manila, probabh", though Malampaya Sound, 
island of Palawan, is exceedingly valuable as a site for a naval 
station. 

Q. And, as I understand jou, the only trouble about Manila is the 
closeness of the neighbors; that the other islands might be in some 
other hands? — A. Yes, sir. The liarbor of Manila, A\'ithout tlie island 
of Luzon, would be a source of weakness rather than strength. 

Q. What is the dithculty about taking Luzon alone? — A. The prox- 
imity' of the otlier islands of the Philippine group. There are over 
400 islands in the group, crowded together. A cannon shot can be 
fired from one to another in many instances. To illustrate, we have 
the Hawaiian Islands. Suppose we had but one, and the others were 
possessed of excellent harbors, coal mines, valuable products, and 
minerals; suppose also the others were in the hands of a commercial 
rival, with a different form of government and not over friendly. 
Under these circumstances we should lose all the advantages of 
isolation. 

Mr, Davis: 

Q. Would not you thereby build up commercial rivals all over the 
archipelago? — A. I should suppose so. I have been speaking mainly 
from a military point of view. Speaking from a commercial point, I 
believe the Philippine Islands are capable of great development and 
valuable trade. They possess about 8,000,000 inhabitants, and are 
rich in products. Tliere is not one which does not produce something 
we need. After Great Britain we are the largest importers from 
these islands. Their mineral wealth is unknown, but we do know 
that there are valuable minerals in these islands. 

The Chairman: 

Q. From j^our point of view as a naval expert, what is the objection 
to the division you have indicated there, taking in Luzon, Mindoro, 
PalaAvan, and the islands between Mindoro and Palawan? — A. I think 
it a fairly good division, if a division must be made. This division is 
much more valuable than Luzon alone. I do not advocate taking a 
part, however. 

Q. What is your objection to taking that part? — A. The difficulties 
of defense, which I have already alluded to, and the fact that a whole 
loaf is better than half a loaf. 

Q. That is, if one has a chance to take more, he better do it? — A. 
Yes. All of these islands are verv valuable. 



478 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. From a military point of view, would you not be well protected 
from the rest of the group? — A. Only fairly so. The straits and chan- 
nels between the different islands are in nuiix}^ cases very narrow. 

Q. If you had the four islands, following- the red line and to the left 
thereof as we face the map? — A. Yes. 

Q. Would you not then be fairly well separated, in a naval and mili- 
tary point of view, from the rest of the group, and have a controlling 
situation in that part of the ocean? — A. Yes; fairly so. 

(^. Is it not a fact tliat Mindoro, Palawan, and Busuanga are 
sparsely populated islands? — A. They are. 

Q. Is it not a fact that, with I'elatiou to the China Sea, Palawan is 
the best of the islands? — A. I think it is. 

Q. Do you think ^'essels can get in there of large draft, on the Avest 
coast? — A. The harbors of PahiAvan? 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. Yes, sir; without doubt. 

(}. How many harbors on the west coast? — A. There are five bays 
with good anchorages at any time or with any wind. There are about 
10 other anchorages, good with certain prevailing winds only. 
Steamers that can weigh and go to sea in case of bad weather can 
anchor almost anywhere off the coast. The bottom is almost univer- 
sally mud, affording excellent holding ground. 

Q. Name them please; indicate l)y degrees. — A. The five first men- 
tioned are as follows, commencing to the southward: 

1. Eran Bay, latitude U° 5' north, longitude 117° 38' east. 

2. Tebeyu Bay, latitude !)^ 17' north, longitude 117° 58' east. 

3. ITIugan Bay or Banog, latitude 10° 6' north, longitude 118° 46' 
east. 

4. Port Barton, latitude 10° 29 north, longitude 119° 5' east. 

5. Malampaya Sound, latitude 10° 53' north, longitiule 119° 23' east. 
The last mentioned jDresents one of the most valuable sites for a 

naval station of any harbor of which I have any knowledge. In this 
respect it is sufficiently valuable to excite the cupidity of any nation. 
It is 19 miles deep, with a width of from 2 to 4 miles. The entrance 
is six-tenths of a mile wide, and between bold and high headlands. It 
has been ajDtly named "Blockade Strait." The sound is divided into 
parts of about equal depth. The channel to the inner section passes 
between islands comnuinding the approaches and affording the most 
perfect means of defense. Within is a broad sheet of water from 6 
to 10 fathoms deep, att'ording excellent anchorage and good holding 
ground. On this inner sound are the Spanish settlements Paukal and 
Baulae. The entire sound is surrounded bj- high lands, is well 
wooded, and affords an abundance of good water. It is the best place 
for supplies on the western coast. The Malampaya River emjDties 
into the innei" sound. Boats can ascend this river 2 miles, from which 
j)oint a good footpath leads to the eastern shore, adistance of 2 miles. 
In this resj)ect it is like Ulugan Bay, whicli is said to be 3 miles from 
the eastern shore, with a good road the entire distance. 

Mr. (tRAY: 
(}. Three miles fi-om the eastern shore? — A. Yes; one autliority 
gives it 3, and another 5. '^riie chart nuikes it 5. 
Mr. Davis: 
(}. Any harbor on the eastern shore? — A. An anchorage, but not a 
harbor. Tlicre is an excellent liarbor, known as Port Royalist, about 
1.-) miles south of tliis anchoi-age. It has a small arsenal, a slip, and 
a haibor liglit. Spanish gunboats have generally been stationed 
1 here. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 479 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Is it not a fact that the eastern shore is more approachable than 
the western sliore? — A. Both shores are more or less frini^ed with 
shoals, rocks, and islets, making navigation with the pi'esent charts 
dangerons in places. These dangers generally extend farther to sea- 
ward on the west shore than on the east. The PhilipiTine Islands are 
not well surveyed, and it is unknown dangei's that are most feared. 

The Chairman: 

Q. You have not any personal acquaintance with the character of 
the inhabitants of what is known as the Vizcayas group, between 
Luzon and Mindanao? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Xor with the inhabitants of Mindanao and the Zulu grouij':' — A. 
No, sir. 

Q. The possible division proposed would give the United States the 
western part of the group according to your line. Can you state how 
that would divide the group with reference to population? You have 
then Luzon, jVIindoro, Palawan, etc. — A. Practically it is the popula- 
tion of Luzon, which, according to the latest estimate, is about 
3,000,000. Mindoro has about 40,000, the Calamianes group about 
12,000, and Palawan about 15,000. 

Q. A little more than the i^opulation of Luzon? — ^A. Yes, sir. 

Q. By that division you would have control, practically, of the 
China Sea side of the group? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Fry: 
Q. Do you understand that Germany is trying to get Palawan? — A. 
Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. How do you know that Germany is trying to get it? — A. It has 
been so reported by the press for years; their cruisers frequent the 
islands and their engineers have explored them. 

Q. How have they been trying to get it? — A. By purchase, I pre- 
sume, but of this I have no knowledge. 

Mr. Reid: 

Q. Would that division which you have indicated there remove 
your objection to the dangerous proximitj^ of the other islands if in 
unfriendly hands? — A. No, sir; the division was made with a view to 
taking as little as possible in addition to Luzon, and at the same time 
maintaining control of a fairly good strategic line of outposts. 

Q. You would consider that the least evil, on a division of the 
group? — A. I do. 

Q. But as not removing the evil, from a militar}' point of view? — 
A. Precisely. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Still, you recognize the point that sometimes you have to submit 
to dangerous neighbors? — A. Possiblj'. I am only advocating it be 
avoided, if feasible. 

Q. Suppose you take the group, Avould you not have Borneo for a 
neighbor? — A. But north Borneo is English and the balance Dutch. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. When you have the option as to whether you will expose your- 
self to bad neighbors or not, do you think it the part of wisdom to 
abandon that option? — A. I do not. 



4.S0 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Do you not think we would rid ourselves of the possiblility of 
bail neighbors by keeping out of there altogether? — A. I will answer 
that ((uestion 

(}. Will you not answer it directly, first, please? — A. Will you please 
repeat it? 

Q. I ask you if we would not rid oui-selves of bad neighbors by 
keeping (nit of thei-e altogether? — A. Yes, sir; I would like to qualify 
that reply by saying it is my belief, if we are going to be a ccnnniercial 
or naval people, that it is absoluteh' necessary to have coaling stations 
and colonies tlie world over. 

Mr. Davis: 
Q. If we sliould leave them in the possession of Spain we would 
have a very bad neighbor there? — A, Most assuredly. 

The Chairman: 

Q. How much more of a militar}^ establishment will it require to 
occupy and maintain the supremacy of the United States in the entire 
group than in the group to the west of the line you have drawn? — A. 
None, whatever. 

Q. How do you make that out? — A. Because there is an element of 
safety in possessing the entire group which is not obtained l)y possess- 
ing only part of it. There is also an element of great uncertaint}' as 
to the disposition of the balance which can not be lost sight of. 

Q. That would also dei^end somewhat, would it not, on the char- 
acter and submissiveness of the inhabitants of the islands? — A. 
Naturally; but I do not believe there are any people anywhere in the 
Philippines more difficult to civilize than the North American Indians. 
We have civilized them. I think the enterprise of our people sufifi- 
cienth" great to civilize and settle the Philipjjine Islands and make 
them very valuable colonies; not only paying for their government, 
but providing a revenue; not immediately, i)erhaps, but before long. 
They are the richest colonies possessed by Spain. 

Q. That is rather an expression of hope than any statement you 
can make from personal knowledge? — A. Certainl3^ I am only giving 
my opinion, but it is based on the experience of other countries. It 
appears to me that Great Britain has made hei'self powerful and rich 
by her colonial enterprise. This is recognized by the Germans, by 
the French, and by the Dutch. The latter are now trying to follow 
in the footsteps of Great Britain, and with some success. If these 
countries possess all the island territorj^ of the world, their gOA'ern- 
ments will be able to discriminate against the introduction of the 
manufactures and against the commerce of our country. This I 
believe to be their object. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Wliose object? — A. The object of the countries which are annex- 
ing the island territory of the world and dividing np the coast of 
China. 

Q. You will have to except Great Britain, so far as her policy is 
develop(»d. — A. It is not difficult for a nation possessing colonies to 
discriminate by means of duties and jiort charges. 

(^ The ports of (4reat lii'itain ar(^ free A. Her Imme poi-ts are 

fre(^ to most goods, but how about Canada and other colonies? Are 
thcv free to our goods and our lislierman? 



TREATY OF PEACE. 481 

Tlie Chairman: 

Q. Yoii answered the question as to a military establishment. In 
your judgment, how much more naval establishment would it require 
to maintain ourselves in the entire grouj) than in the part to the 
west? — A. I included both in my answer. I inferred that j^ou in- 
cluded both the Army and Navy in j^our question, and I had partiular 
reference to both in my reply. 

Q. Have you any means of formiag a judgment as to how large an 
army would have to be maintained? — A. Onlj^ by reference to the army 
that has been maintained b}^ Sj^ain, which, so far as Europeans are 
concerned, has been very small. 

Q. How large a naval squadron would it be necessary to have in 
and about there? — A. The present squadron, the usual Asiatic Squad- 
rou, could take care of the Philippines. Probably some small coast 
guard and revenue vessels Avould be required in addition. 

Mr. Gray: 
(^. Would the present naval sijuadron be adeipiate if we were at 
war with (Tcrinan}', in regard to Luzon? — A. It is impossible to answer 
that question, because it would deiJend upon the niovement of German 
ships. If they went to the East, we would have to send more ships 
there; if they came to the A\^est Indies, we would have to meet 
them thei'e. In considering such a question, available coaling sta- 
tions, both for the Germans and ourselves, are of the lirst and greatest 
importance. 

The Chairman : 

Q- Vou base your opinions upon the belief thai tliese islands will 
readily submit to the control of the United States Government, and 
that there would be no great expenditure required for either naval 
or military force to subdue the islands to the Ignited States? — A, Some- 
what. I think the islands can be subdued, if there is any serious 
trouble, by a blockade. The inhabitants are entirely dependent upon 
1 he coast for their supplies and for a market. They are a pleasure-loving 
people, and would not care to submit long to tlie inconvenience of a 
war under these circumstances. It has been their custom to produce 
a few articles, such as hemp, sugar, and tobacco, for the general mar- 
ket, and with the proceeds of their sale to purchase all necessary 
commodities. They are not a manufacturing people, nor do they pos- 
sess the means of carrying on war anj' length of time. 

Q. Do you not think a commercial station in those islands is much 
more A'aUiable to the United States, with a view to its trade in China 
and Japan and other parts of that sea, than it is with reference to any 
trade with the islands themselves? — A. I think a commercial station 
at the Philippines valuable for that purpose. How valuable depends 
largel}^ upon our influence in China. The balance of trade there has 
been against us. Foreign powers seem to be at present in control of 
Chinese affairs, and if th^y are able to discriminate against us, our 
trade may not be valuable. 

Q. If the United States is to have a hand in the Chinese trade, our 
location in Manila and Luzon would be very valuable in that dii*ec- 
tion? — A. Very, indeed. 

Q. And probably mucli more valuable than any interisland trade 
would be? — A. It ought to be. It would be fatal to profit if our trade 
with China w^as obliged to pass through foreign hands. 

Q. Have you any means of estimating the value of these islands; 
T p 31 



482 TREATY OF PEACE. 

and if so, will you give ns an estimate, supposing they were to be 
acquired by purchase? — A. No, sir; I have none. 

Q. You mean you could not form an 3' esti«iate"? — A. I do not tlrink 
I could. 

Q. You miglit form an estimate, possibly? — A. I can only state that 
which you already know, viz, the price paid for Alaska and that asked 
for the Dutcli islands in the West Indies. 

Q. Suppose, to put it another way, you were taking this group of 
islands as a war indemnity, could you form an estimate ;is to how much 
you were getting? — A. It is a subject I have not studied. I did not 
expect to be asked to give an opinion on such matters, and I should 
prefer not to do so until I can study the question. I will say, I tliink 
them extremelj^ valuable, botli from a commercial and from a military 
point of view. 

Mr. Reid: 

Q. If our Government once thought Cuba worth an offer of $100,- 
000,000, what would you tliink the Philippine Archipelago worth? — A. 
Double that. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Have you stated what, in your opinion, ought to be done rela- 
tive to tliese positions in the East and in the Pacitic from investiga- 
tions which you have made?— A. I think that the entire Philippine 
group of islands, the Carolines, including the Pelews, and tlie 
Ladrones should be annexed to tlie United States. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Annexed b}^ what means; taken forciblj^? — A. Yes, primarily; 
and if tliej" can not be fairly taken, then purchased. I would like to 
sny that the Carolines and Ladrones are mere dependencies of the 
Philippines, and it is so stated in the Blue Book of the Captain- 
General of the latter. 

Q. That is, they had the same captain-general, but different local 
governors? — A. Yes. 

Q. How far are the Philij)pines from the Carolines? — A. The Pelews, 
generally included in the Caroline group, are about 600 miles from 
the Philippines. The Caroline group, including the Pelews, ex;tends 
about 2,000 miles east and west; the Ladrones about 540 miles north 
and south. Relatively, the Carolines and Ladrones form an inverted 
T. It is about 180 ndles from the westernmost Caroline proper to the 
Pelews and 220 miles from Yap to the Pelews. Yap is about 750 
miles from the Philippines. 

Q. How far is Guam from Manila? — A. Guam is about 2,575 miles 
from San Bernardino Strait. 

Q. How far to the Carolines? You say about GOO miles A. 

From (Tuam to the Carolines? 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. Guam is a little less than 300 miles north of Wolea, 
one of the Caroline group. 

Q. Wliat are the objections, in 3'our judgment, to taking Luzon 
alone, leaving off now the three lower islands of your western group? — 
A. From a military point of view oi' from a commercial j)oint of view, 
or both? 

Q. Cover both points, if you will. — A. It is difficult to foresee what 
would liappen should the Philippine Islands be divided after having 
always been under a single government. It is certain, however, that 
trade and commerce would seek new channels, and if Luzon were 



TREATY OF PEACE. 483 

detached from the otlier islands, Manila would no longer be the com- 
]nercial center of the gronp. The islands of the entire group are so 
closely connected that it is almost impossible to separate them in any 
scheme for an ofE'ensive or defensive war. There is no possible isola- 
tion with Luzon alone, nor would it be practicable to prevent smug- 
gling. Luzon would be open to attack from almost every direction; 
control over important strategic i^oints in its immediate vicinity would 
be lost ; control over contiguous waters would be lost ; ports of refuge 
near by would be lost; coal, teak and other valuable timber, and 
hemp produced in the south would be lost, and the opportunity to 
intercept a possible enemy passing through various straits extending 
from Luzon to Borneo would be sacrificed. We Avould also lose the 
richest and most productive islands of the entire group, particularly 
with reference to the hemp-producing districts. 

Q. Where are they? — -A. In Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Bohol. 

Q Is there any good harbor near to Luzon, in the Vizcaya group to 
the soutli of Luzon? — ^A. Yes; several in the islands of Samar, Lej^te, 
Panay, and Masbate. The latter, very near to Luzon, is celebrated 
for its good harbors. Vessels can anchor in many of the sounds 
]:)etween the islands, and I estimate there are not less than 100 
regular harbors in the group. Cebu and Iloilo are the largest com- 
mercial harboi's outside of Manila. 

Q. A considerable distance south of the extremity of Luzon? — A. 
They are about 135 and 160 miles respectively from the island of 
Luzon. The best harbor near Manila is Subig Bay. 

Q. On the island of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir; I do not know as I fully 
understand your question. 

Q. Suppose the United States was looking for a naval station and 
base of operations, and no more. What place would be tlie best, in 
your judgment, to take in the group? — A. Manila, probably. 

Q. Then you would have the entire surroundings in the hands of 
somebody else? — A. I am in favor of selecting Manila because there is 
alreadj^ a navy-yard there, a slip, and other facilities for repairing and 
building ships. There are also skilled workmen and other labor in 
abundance. Manila being a commercial port, I shovild expect a naval 
station might be maintained there without expense to the General 
Government. If a j)ort witliout trade or many inhabitants be selected, 
I should expect a naval station would be a constant and considerable 
expense to the Government. In the event of the latter course, I 
would recommend Malampaya Sound, island of Palawan. I do not 
advocate taking any port without at least the island in which it is 
located. 

Q. Do you think the group, or the group divided, taking the west- 
ern part of your possible division, would be self-sustaining? — A. I 
think the entire grouj) would. 

Q. Taking the western group, do you think that would be self- 
sustaining? — A. It would under present conditions; but should the 
remaining islands fall into the hands of some other power, able to 
divert the trade from Manila, it might not. 

Q. Manila might be very much improved if the Chinese and Jap- 
anese trade of the United States should be developed with that as a 
base? — A. I should think so, 

Q. You think Formosa is valuable to Japan? — A. I do. I know the 
coal obtained there is of fair quality and the products are valuable. 
The soil is fertile, produces excellent tea, and I think the Japanese 
will soon have it under a high state of cultivation. 



484 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. Have you been there since Japan acquired it?— A„ No, sir. 

(}. Do 5'ou know from tlie Japanese reports that it costs more than 
it amounts to, from the hostility of tlie n?itives? — A. The natives at 
the soutli end of Formosa are untamed and fierce savaues. The. Jap- 
anese liave much to contend with, no doubt, but tliej^ do not appear 
to be stopping- colonial progress on tliat account. 

JNlr. Frye: 

Q. If we should adopt your line of demarcation, what do you think 
Spain would do with the balance of those islands'? — A. Sell them co 
Germany. 

Q. Is not (4er)nan3" about as troublesome a neighbor as we could 
get? — A. The moso so, in my opinion. I thiidc it probable that the 
balance of the S])anish possessions in the Pacific not acquired by us 
will goto Germany. Germany has long desired to possess the Caro- 
lines, and she hoisted her flag at Yap in 1S8G. Our missionaries have 
l)een in the Caroline Islands for fifty j'ears, and all that has been done 
to educate and civilize the natives there has been done by xVmerican 
missionaries. 

(}. They are still there? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. The Morning Star makes its trips? — A. I believe so. Much of 
our knowledge of the harbors of these islands has been acquired from 
her voyages. 

Q. I'hat vessel is not permitted to go to Ponape?— A. I understand 
that the Spanish have excluded the missionaries and their vessel from 
the islands of Yap and Ponape, where the Spanish governors reside. 

Q. We have captured tlie entire Philippine Islands, have we not? — 
A. Practically' ; we have captured their capital. 

Q. Well, if there had been no armistice could we not have taken 
the whole group? — A. Yes, sir; I believe so, with little loss or expense. 

Q. \Yould you, as a naval officer and as interested also in the 
development of the commerce of the United States, be content, rea- 
sonably content, with the division you made in yoyr red line? — A. No; 
I do not think I would. The red lines were drawn for the purpose of 
showing what we should by no means omit, rather than to indicate 
what islands we should annex. 

The Chairman: 

C^. Put the question a little differentl3^ We started to free the 
island of Cuba, which, say, we have accomplished. That was the 
purpose of the war. We hold Porto Rico and the other islands in the 
\Yest Indies and the Lad rones as an indemnity in lieu of money. The 
only people of the Philippines with whom we have come in contact 
and to whom we owe an obligation because of supposed or actual 
cooperation or change of their situation are the inhabitants of the 
island of Luzon, where the insurrection has been carried forward at 
the same time, at least with our own military operations, so that, 
strictly, oui- obligation of cooperation is limited to that island. Now, 
if we add to Poi-to Rico, the islands in the West Indies, our possible 
and even probable intei-est in Cuba, the islands from Luzon down to 
Borneo to llie west of your line of possible division, would you not 
think w<' had made a jiretty fair, reasonable, and just settlement of 
the matters growing out of this wai-? — A. From a commercial point of 
view? 

Q. From an international point of view, as a great and generous 
nation. — A. Am I to understand that youi- (luestion refers to an 



TREATY OF PEACE. 485 

exchange of values in conneetion with the cost of the war and a suit- 
able recompense therefor? 

Q. Yes, sir; take it that way, if you wish.— A. I answer in the 
affirmative. I would like, however, to add something, with your per- 
mission, in connection with the Philippines which I think yon have 
omitted. It is the moral aspect of the case. If we take a portion of the 
islands only, are we not open to the accusation of taking the best and 
leaving tlie poorest? Have we a moral right to make a selection? We 
have driven the Spanish Government out of the Philippines; there is 
no Spanish anthority there now, or practically none. Are Ave going 
to take what we want and leave the remainder in a state of anarchy? 
I balieve we have incurred a moral obligation to take all of the islands, 
govern them, civilize the natives, and do the best we can with them. 

Another consideration. We were driven into this war. A war 
with Spain over Cuba has been foreseen for years. We did not want 
it, the sentiment of the people was against it, and we are not respon- 
sible for the results. We went into it against our will, and we made 
as good fight as we could. The result is we have practically taken 
those islands, and we ought to keep them. Of course, I am interested, 
primarily, from a military point of view, on account of my profession. 
I drew those lines, and they are original with me, to preserve so far 
as possible the military advantages which we had Avon, fearing that 
Luzon alone would be taken. I made commercial obligations and 
moral obligations entirely secondary, but I recognize that they exist, 
and so do tlie people of onr country. 

Q. ^Vhat foundation have you for saying the islands other than 
the island of Luzon are in the military possession of the United 
States? — A. Simply because we have captured the seat of government 
and pi-aeticall.y all of the Spanish forces. 

Q. Have you any doubt of the ability of the Spanish to maintain 
their government in the Vizcayas? — A. The greatest doubt. There is 
no question in my mind that they are not doing it. Spain has no 
colonial authority to-day; she has no navy; and she is a bankrupt 
nation. 

Q. What do you know of the disposition of the natives beyond 
Luzon? — A. Only what I read. 

Q. Do you know that this insurrection is confined to the island of 
Luzon? — A. No, sir. 

Q. It has been?— A. The Spanish have never had full control of the 
southern islands of the group. 

Q. No one has ever had control of ^Mindanao and the other islands 
except the Mohammedan natives there; they have never submitted to 
any civilized government?— A. The Spaniards have suppressed piracy 
in the Snlu Sea. 

Q. But the natives have never submitted to the Spaniards? — A. No, 
sir; I believe not, outside of certain fortified towns. 

Q. What I want to get at is on what you predicate your opinion of 
our moral obligation, after we have done Avhat we think is necessary 
to be done? — A. On the same ground that we interfered in Cuba. It 
is missionary work for some civilized nation, and a great deal of sim- 
ilar work has been done in Polynesia; moi-al obligations are not con- 
trolled by distance. 

Q. Such cultivation has been for the commercial advantage of the 
nation, as a rule?— A. Yes, probably a combination of missionary 
work and self-interest. 

Q. It comes to this, if I understand you, that, looking at it purely 



486 TREATY OF PEACE. 

as a eoiniuereial indemnity, tlie cost of the war would be indemnified 
by the portion of the group indicated and wliat we have talven in the 
West Indies, if it is to be talcen hx the United States, bnt you tliink 
lliere is a moral obligation on our part to take the rest of the group as 
^vell? — A. Yes; also a commercial advantage and an increased mili- 
tary advantage. I do not wish to be undei-stood as saying that I 
think tlie Spanisli islands west of the red line are as strong, from a 
military standpoint, as the entire Philippine group. 

Mr. Reid: 

Q. In reckoning the indemnity, do you include Cuba? — A. I did. 

Tlie Chairman: 

Q. Your idea is that the United States should have a strong hand 
in the future of Cuba? — A. Yes, sir, by all means. Self-defense 
requires it. 

Q. If we were not in the Philippines, were not taken there by the 
power of war, and they had a government to-day to apply for annex- 
ation to the United States, you think it would be a valuable acqui 
sition to the United States?— A. Yes, sir, I do. In reaching this con- 
clufsion I am much influenced by the recent action of Great Britain, 
Geriuany, and Russia in China. It seems to me that they are parcel- 
ing out the coast of China, and we should be in it, or as near it as 
possible. 

Q. Do you think to be "in it" in China we need to be all over the 
Philippine IshuKls? — A. I think it will be a great ad vantage to i^ossess 
all of them. 

(). We could be "in it" in China without being "in it" in the 
Philiijpines? — A. Perhaps, but I confess I do not see how. If we 
possess the Philippines we will not be far aAvay. 

Q. How far is it from top to bottom of the Philippine group? — 
A. About a thousand miles. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. If we were at war with a first-class power, would it require a 
greater naval establishment to defend ourselves if we were confined 
within what had been our limits up to the present year, or if we had 
islands and possessions and coaling stations, such as have been talked 
about here to-day, all over the Pacific Ocean?— A. That is a very 
extensive question. Naturally the more territory a country has to 
defend the greater the force, both naval and military, will be required. 
On the other hand, during a war with a naval power, with coaling sta- 
tions and poi'ts of refuge the world over, similar coaling stations and 
})orts of refuge outside of our own country then become, in my opin- 
ion, a source of strength rather than weakness. The necessity for 
such stations has already been i-eferred to by me while speaking of 
the experience of the war, which was of short duration and with a 
weak power. If we are going to inclose ourselves within a shell, like 
a turtle, and defend ourselves after the nuinner of a turtle, then any 
possession outside of our own country may be said to be a source of 
weakness. 

Q. Recurring, then, 1o the (luestion whether it would take a larger 
naval establishment to successfully hold our own in case of a war 
with a first-rate power if we wei-e in the condition we were in up to the 
l)resent time, your answer would be as we are at present situated, it 
would take a less naval establishment? — A. No, sir; that is not my 
answer. 



TREATY OF PEACE, 487 

Q. Then you think that if we had the Pliilippines for instance — 
the Hawaiian Islands we have, which we had not up to the present 
year — it would i-equire a less naval establishment to defend the 
places where we had placed our flag, 7,000 miles away from our pi-es- 
ent coast, than it would to defend the compact territory now known as 
the United States of America? — A. I have answered that question 
already to the best of my abilit3^ I can not call our territory compact. 

Q. With the exception of Alaska it is, is it not? — A. Part of it is on 
the Atlantic and part on the Pacific; that is not very compact. 

Q. Let me ask another question: Is there any nation in the world 
wliicli 1ms so large an extent of contiguous and compact territory as 
the United States? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. Is it not exceptional? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Is it not to oiu" advantage? — A. Yes, eir. 

Q. Is it not, witiiin our territory, absoliitelj' self-sustaining as no 
other country is? — A. Probably. 

Q. Therefore, I rejieat the question. I do not mean you to under- 
stand that you have not given an intelligent answer to my question. 
Still, I think you have missed the point whether, as a matter of fact, 
if we liad continued in the situation in which we were up to the pres- 
ent year, with this compact territory of such vast extent, and with 
our population and resources such as they are, it Avould not take, in 
case of a foreign war with a naval power, a less naval establishment 
thau if we had these islands in the Philippine Archipelago, extend- 
ing a thousand miles, open to attack, north and south? — A. I must 
answer "no." 

Q. You answer that it would take less to defend the coasts of the 
United States, plus the Philippine Islands? — A. A^es, sir; and I would 
like to give my reasons. For the purpose of illustration, let us sup- 
pose that war is declared and that the theater is in the neighborhood 
of the China Sea. Suppose we have on the Pacific coast 100 ships 
and no naval supply stations between that coast and China. Now, 
the point I make is, tliat we would be better off and more powerful 
with a chain of naval-supply stations stretching from the Pacific coast 
to China and 50 shi^os, or one-half the force under the conditions first 
mentioned. Yew realize the great changes that have taken place 
since the days of sails and muzzle-loading guns. With the rapid- 
firing guns of to-day the entire suppl}^ of amm unit ion may be expended 
in a few hours. Ships are helpless without coal. We must be able 
to follow the enemy with our ships the world over, as Nelson did. 

Q. Have not they to go with us? — A. That depends upon Avhether 
they desire to act on the offensive or defensive. 

Q. Will they not go where we are, to the most vulnerable point? — 
A. Naturally. 

Q. Would not they consider a point in the Philippine Islands, 7,000 
miles away from our home territory, more vulnerable than any ]3oint 
on our coast? — A. Not necessarily. 

Q. Why not? — A. Because of its small value. What is the value 
of all the I*hilippine Islands comjjared with that of New York? 

Q. Would not we be bound to defend our flag there? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Would not it require a larger establishment? — A. Possibl}'. 
We certainly want a larger one than we have now. 

Q. Would we not possibly require a larger establishment? — A. Yes, 
sir. An increase of colonies, the merchant marine, and the Navy 
naturally go hand in hand. 



488 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. I presume tlial we will act on the defensive only? — A. I hope 
not. 

(}. We would not be weakened by haWnu' these far places to 
defend";:' — A. Naval warfare can not ncnv be carried on witliout coaling 
stations. 

Q. Would it not require more to defend Manihi and Hawaii and 
Cuba? — A. We must alwaj-s take the disadvantages witli the advan- 
tages. 

Q. We would i'e(|uir(» a larger naval establishment than if we had 
not those places to defend? — A. Pei-haps. 

Q. Now, Commander, as you said something about the moral point 
of view, you consider that we have a moral duty, unless I misunder- 
stood you, to take the whole of the Phili|)pine group? — A. That is 
quite correct. 

Q. I suppose that you would recognize that one of the bases of tlie 
moral ol)ligation is an adherence to declarations which, from a national 
staiulpoint, amount to premises, would you not? — A. Yes, sir; cer- 
tainly. 

Q. Good moi'als i-equire adherence? — A. Certainly. 

Q. Having undertaken a wai' with a specific declaration that it was 
undertaken with an utter absence of intention to acquire territory, 
with a definite object defined and declared, and having accomplished 
that object so defined and declared, would not you believe there is 
some moral obligation to adhere to that declaration? — ^V. Nations, as 
well as individuals, have a right to change their minds. 

Q. Having made in the present war just such a declaration as I 
have described, and having, in the course of that war, carried it on as 
a civilized nation is entitled to carry it on, by striking the enemy 
wherever we can find him, we struck Spain in her territorj' in the 
Philippines, did we not? — -A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Now, the war having been accomplished, and the declared end 
in view achieved, are we not pledged morally by the declai-ation we 
have made to content ourselves with that achieved object and to 
relin<iuish that territory we occupied merely as an act of war? If, for 
instance, we might have attacked and seized as an act of war the city 
of Barcelona on the peninsula, would we not, when we achieved the 
object of the war, in morality ha^'e been bound by the position we took 
at the outset to abandon Barceloiui? — A. No, sir; not by the rules of 
war. 

Q. I am si)eaking of the rules of morality now? — A. Noi' by the ]'ules 
of morality either. We had a right to take it, and it is not immoral 
to keep what is our own. Besides, even when a contract is broken, 
the law, founded on justice and morality, requires a loss by one party 
to be shown, before damages can be awarded. I do not believe that 
Spain relaxed her efforts to defeat us on acccrant of the declaration 
you have referred to. Spain, by her oppression and misrule has lost 
most of the vast colonial teri-itory she once possessed. History has 
applauded those who brought about the separation and inscribed 
their names among the benefactors of the world. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. I would like to ask just one question in that line. Su])pose the 
United States in the progress of that wai- found the leader of the 
pi-esent Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hongkong 
and sent foi* him and l)rought him to the islands in an Ameriean ship, 
and then furnished him -1,0()U or 5,0()U stands of arms, and allowed 



TREATY OF PEACE. 489 

hitn to purcliase as many more stands of arms in Hon,ij;kong', and 
accepted his aid in conqnering- lAizon, what ivind of a nation, in the 
eyes of tlie world, we would appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and 
his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as thej" please? — A. We 
become responsible for everything he has done, he is our ally, and 
we are bound to protect him. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Snppose that cooperation, whether wise or unwise, was limited 
to the island of Luzon, where the insurrection of the Tagalos, a separate 
class of people inhabiting the other islands, existed, and we bonnd 
the United States in the forum of morals not to leave those people 
and not to leave a condition of warfare and chaos on that island, if 
Ave take that island, compose everybodj^ on that island, great and 
small, and protect them — does not that discharge the moral obligation 
to the people we have had as so-called allies? — A. I do not think I 
quite understand the question. 

Q. (Question repeated.) — A. No; for this reason: During the course 
of our naval operations at Manila, we destroyed or rendered useless 
all forces subject to the control of the representative of Spain at the 
capital of the islands. The power of Spain having become largely 
paralyzed, the native people of the southern islands have been enabled 
to practically' take charge. We, therefore, are responsible, in a more 
or less degree, according to the amount of power in Spanish hands 
before being attacked by us, for what has since taken place in the 
southern islands and what is taking- place there now. 

Q. We have simply put the inhabitants of the southern Islands in 
a better condition, so far as overcoming the objectionable power of 
Spain is concerned, than they were before; is not that true? — A. Pos- 
sibly, if they succeed. But there are interests in southern islands 
affecting civilized x^eople of different nationalities which have suffered. 
Again, I doubt very much if any native government is better than the 
Spanish Government was. 

Q. Tliere j'ou are getting outside of the moral obligation to relieve 
them froni an oppressive power. — A. I intended to confine myself to 
the indirect results of our action at Manila. 

jVlr. Davis: 
Q. Do you think this so-called moral question at all impairs the 
right of the United States to take indemnity for the cost of the war, 
whether in monej' or territorj'? — A. I do not. Judging from the prac- 
tice of all nations for the last hundred years, indemnity for the cost 
of war seems to be the first point to be considered by a successful 
belligerent. 

Mr. Reid: 

Q. The question I wish to ask you relates to the point of its being 
easier or more difficult to defend the coast of the United States when 
we had some outlying possessions. In the late war, suppose Admiral 
Dewey had been defeated in the harbor of Manila, instead of being 
successful, and suppose the Spanish fleet had been as powerful as we 
believed the Spanish fleet to be, and had been capable of ravaging 
our coasts on the Pacific if we were not ready to defend them, would we 
have been then in a better position to defend the Pacific coast against 
that triumphant fleet with or without the Hawaiian Islands? — A. 
Incalculably better off Avitli the Hawaiian Islands. They form a 
salient point which no force coming from the westward can afford to 
pass without first reducing. 



490 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. It would take more ships to defend tlie Pacific coast with them 
than it would without them':" — A. Xo, sir; I think not. A fleet would 
be stationed at the Hawaiian Islands 

(^. And leave your coast unprotected',:' — A. Xo, sir; the coast would 
not be unprotected. That duty would be performed by harbor defense 
shijis, torpedo vessels, submarine mines, and batteries. 

Q. Would it be safe to defend the coast with torpedo boats"; — 
A. Tliey would form an important element in its defense. 

Q. You would have to detach some of the ships to go to Hawaii? — 1 
A. The fleet would be best disposed at Hawaii, with cable communi- 
cation with iSan Francisco. 

Q. They would be detached from the number on the coast? — A. A 
fleet must be organized and kept intact somewhere to meet an enemy's 
fleet. 

(). Given a certain number of ships, adequate and necessary to 
protect the coast, would it not be necessary to have a number in addi- 
tion to that to protect Hawaii? — A. No, sir; not if the enemj^'s fleet 
is to come from the west. If it is to come from tlie north or south 
this would not be the best disposition. The enemy's fleet must be 
struck before it can coal, and its near i)resence must be ascertained 
bj' scouts. The acquisition of coal is the great problem in naval war- 
fare. How to get it and how to prevent the enemy from getting it 
are the first and greatest considerations. 

Q. Suppose they should pass to the north and not touch there at 
all? — A. Ver}' well. Then the coast defenses must stand them off 
until the fleet arrives and gives battle. 



STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES A. WHITTIER, U. S. V., BEFORE THE 
UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. 



Examination by Mr. Day : 

Q. Please state your name, the length of time you liave been at 
Manila, and the opportunities you have had for observation there. — 
A. Cliarles A. Whittier, brigadier-general, United States Volunteers. 
I left San Francisco on June 28 last, and went to Honolulu, which I 
left on July 8, and arrived at Manila on July 25. Remained in the 
harbor meeting the merchants, who came out to the ship as frequently 
as they could, until a prohibition was put on their frequent visits. 
Officers constantly came aboard of our ship on the way to and from 
camp, and reported the different stories about the conduct of the 
insui-gents and the Spaniards, and of the small engagements occur- 
ring, different evenings. After communications addressed by Admiral 
Dewey and General Merritt to the acting captain-general, asking him 
to remove his noncombatants, and next demanding the surrender of 
the city, which requests were both denied, the Belgian consul, as a 
semi-intermediary, came repeatedly to Dewey and proposed different 
methods of giving up the city after we had made an attack, which, he 
said, was necessary to satisfy the Spanish honor. So the guns opened 
on August 13, and after the white flag was shown I was sent, in com- 
pany with Lieutenant Brumby, oji the launch of the Belgiam consul, 
to receive the surrender. 

We landed by a stone pier running out into the water, which was 
rough and getting rougher, but we got ashore very comfortably at 
about noon, much better than those who went later in the afternoon. 
Two carriages awaited us, and an interpreter by the name of Carlos 
Casademunt, together with C 'olonel of the Staff Don Jose M. Olaguer 
and Captain of Artillery Don Francisco Chavairi, who also spoke 
English, conducted us to the house of the captain-general, where we 
found about 40 officers awaiting us. They had a number of images of 
stipulations, to two of wliich I coidd not consent, Ijeing that their 
arms should be given to them and the army sent back to Spain, though 
I think now it would have been wise to do so. Admiral Montojo, 
who had connnanded their vessels in the fight, was there, and seemed 
to have his wits about him better than the rest. I think the captain- 
general was much frightened. He rejjorted in great trepidation that 
the insurgents were coming into the city, and I said that I knew that 
that was impossible, because such precautions had been taken as 
rendered it so. The subject had been broached two days before and 
all the arrangements had been made. A little later they said that 
our people were on the front of the city, the corner of the walled city, 
and were firing there. I wrote a letter to the commander of the 
troops, who turned out to be General Greene, and asked that the 
firing should be suspended, which it was, and Brumby returned to 
Admiral Dewey. 

491 



492 TREATY OF PEACE, 

Goinii' tlii-oiigli the city we passed perhaps 1,500 Spaniards, with 
ni(hs old-fashioned artilh'ry, and the men h)oke(i very well, infinitely 
lu'ller tliaii the Soulheiiiers did at tiie sni-render of our other war. I 
wrote a note to General .Alerritt askin.u' him to come to the city. They 
said that the town hall, their ln)tel de ville, or the Ayuntamiento was 
the best place for head([uai-ters. We adjourned there, and I asked 
them tocleposit their arms in the courtyard, to which they demurred, 
sayiuij: that it was not yet a formal surrender, but they did stack 
them, and I went down to meet Merritt, missed him, and v/hen he 
ai-rived he found about o,()0() people there with arms. About o'clock 
a memorandum was made of the surrender, and the next day General 
Greene, Captain Lamberton of the Navy, Colonel Crowder, and myself 
were on the commission for the terms of surrender. After that I 
iiuule it a point to know all the merchants in the town. I knew all 
the Euiiiisli, the ])rincipal traders there. The only Americans in the 
place were Mi'. Daland, a custom-house broker, and a Mr. Russell, 
wliose father Avas an American; he is now connected with one of the 
leading firms. I went over the line of the only railroad in the Philip- 
pines, leavinji' one Saturday morning- and going up li'O miles through 
the rice iields, a country of marvelous and most extraordinary fertility. 

The next morning we started out cjirly and went up to Dagupan 
l]a:>-, the terminus of the road, that little niche on the left (indicated 
on the map). We found about 300 insurgents in the cars, who were 
going doAvn to some points on the line. They said they had been up 
at Yigan, where the Spaniards had a custom-house, and had been 
driven out. This station was all battered to pieces by the Spaniards 
in some previous engagement. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. What sort of looking people are the insurgents? — A. They are 
somewhat undersized, are fairly good in appearance, are brave, will 
stand any amount of hunger and hardshiji, and, well led, would be 
very good soldiers. The country on the line of railroad is divided into 
four parts or zones. There was one General Macabulus, whose head- 
quarters were at Tarlac, and it was said that Aguinaldo rather di-eaded 
his popularit}', and wanted to transfer him. There was good feeling 
betwiH'u them, however, and he sent down b}' Higgins $3G,000 as a 
contribution. This was Mexican, of course. In all my talk it will 
be of Mexican dollars, about 47 cents' worth in our money or in gold, 
Thiii trip was most interesting, but I have stated most of these things 
i)i my little story. We were the first officers who had been anj^where 
in the island outside the immediate environs of Manila. 

Tlie next Sunday', in company with a member of one of the chief 
mei-cantile houses and the senior J^ritish medical officer at Hongkong, 
Colonel Evatt, we went up the river Pasig on the lauiudi of tlie former. 
We went u}) about 28 miles to the laguna. Paixanang would have 
l)een better to see, but time would not permit. We went to Banos, a 
iiealth resort. There is an enormous tract of land on the laguna on 
tlie market, held by the priests. They wish to st-ll it for 11,700,000. 
It is an enormously productive country. You pass cascos loaded with 
coeoanuts and enormous <iuantities of nipa thatching for roofs. At 
this time I was coUector of the port, and during this time I heard all 
soi-ts of expressions, and I think I luid a very fair o])portunity, being 
amused with tlie natives and studying their i^eculiarities, to forma 
fair Judgment. I stand a little isolated in my oi)iiiious, however, per- 
haps. Men so quickly dismiss the natives from their minds as simply 



TREATY OF PEACE. 493 

"niggers" and "savages," but when you think of all they have done 
you must give them credit for great capacity. I think there is a very 
good autliority on this subject, Sir Frank Swettenham, of tlie British 
Straits Settlements Colony, from whom I have a letter written to Mr. 
Pratt, our consul at Singapore. Sir Frank Swettenham has written 
a very clever book of local stories. 

Mr. Day: 

Q. Does he live in the Philippines? — A. No, sir; in the Straits Set- 
tlements in the Malay Peninsula. His letter is as follows : 

Carcosa, Selangor, Malay Peninsula, October :.'S. 1S98. 

Dear Mr. Spencer Pratt: I send you all I have at present available. It may 
be all yon want. 

The Pliilippine.s are Malays, with more intelligence, more education, more 
courage, perhaps, than their confreres in the Peninsula. 

In one sense they would be easier to govern, because they have been for many 
years in contact with white men and understand their ways. Moreover, the 
majority are not Mahommedans. 

But, on the other hand, they have aspirations for political institutions and the 
management of affairs without the necessary experience, perhaps without the 
essential qualities to secure success. 

I should sav that our experiment in the Malay Peninsula might be successfully 
repeated in the Philippines, provided that the controlling power made it clearly 
understood of f/K' .stor^ that they meant to control and not only to advise and 
educate. 

If that point were never in doubt, and tlie means of enforcing authority were 
in evidence for a short time, the rest would be easy, and I firmly believe the 
results would surpass all anticipations. 
Yours, sincerelv. 
(Signed) ' Frank Swettenham. 

The above is very much my idea of the situation. I have prepared 
a little statement in regard to the Philippine Islands, their resources, 
etc., which I will read if you desire. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Please read it. 

General Whittier here read the following statement : 

"The Philippine Islands are estimated to be in number between 
(300 and 1,000, the latter, if we include the Sulu archipelago and 
Paragua, extending over about 12 degrees of latitude, including the 
Protectorate, extreme south of the Sultanate of Sulu (Jolo), with an 
area of about 114,500 square miles and a population estimated from 
5,500,000 to 8,000,000. About 25 islands are of commercial impor- 
tance, from practically all of which supplies of produce are collected 
and sent to Manila for baling, pressing, classification, and shipment 
to foreign ports. The principal islands are Luzon, Panay (of which 
Iloilo, the second port of the Philippines, is the important town), 
Negros, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Mindanao. The last named has a 
port of Zamboanga. Foreman, in his book (1872), says of this island 
and of Sulu, etc. : 

"Half of the Philippine archipelago still remains to be conquered, 
but only its Mussulman inhabitants have ever taken the aggressive 
against the Spaniards in regular warfare. (A change since with the 
effective action of the natives.) It is at a great sacrifice that the 
Spaniards can retain the little possession they have acquired in 
' the south, and frequent acts of violence are still perpetrated on them 
by the turbulent Mussulmans who virtually refuse to recognize other 
rights than those of their sultans, to whom they give allegiance. 



494 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Indeed it may be unliesitatingly asserted that tlie Spaniards hold no 
more domain in Mindanao and the Sultanate of Snlu tlian that of a 
(Uiy's marcli fi-om their respective garrisoiis; and in Mindanao par- 
ticularly not one-hnndreth part of tlie territory." 

Tliis same coiulition exists to a lesser degree in the other islands; 
large tracts of unexplored country, occupied by various tribes, witii 
more rumors than is actually known about their habits, ferocity, etc., 
this pari icularly the case with the mountainous country in the center 
pari of tlie northern portion of Luzon. It will require the intelligent, 
systematic work of years to open, develop, and govern these j)laces. 
"For ages it has been the Spanish official system to declare territories 
to be under their rule, without taking stejjs to make their j)OSsessions 
manifest to the rest of the world " — or to themselves. 

The Spaniards have apparently never known the number of the 
islands owned by them for all these years or the population. The 
last census — that of 1881 (?) — is \'ery vague. 

The products of the islands are : Sugar, rice, hemp, coffee (reduced 
of late years), tobacco, cocoa (small), cocoanuts (large and increas- 
ing), napa palms, bamboo for rafts, furniture, carts, baskets, boats, 
bridges, carr3'ing poles, floats, etc., hardwoods of great variet\. 
Fruits: Mangoes, bananas, pomela (larger than our grape fruit, of 
same family), oranges, citrons, chicos, guavas, lemons, pineapples 
(not of best quality, cultivated for the leaves to make pina and jusi, 
dress and line handkerchiefs, etc., fabrics), tamarinds, vanilla, sago 
(small products). No doulit it will be a great field for cotton. In 
fact, no eountrj' has such diversified possibilities. 

Account of four x)roducts exported to different countries, and all 
imported from the interior of the Philippine archij^elago during the 
vear 1897: 



Product. 



Hemp . - 

Sugar - . 
Cofifee-. 
Tobacco 



Where raised. 



Provinces of Sarsogan (Albay). Legas- 
pi, Jabaco, Camarines, S. & N. Ma- 
rinduque. Mindoro, Calbayez. Cebu, 
Iloilo, and other southern provinces. 

Batangas. La Laguna. Cebu, Iloilo 
(small quantities), N. Ilocos, S. Ilo- 
cos, Pangasinan, iSTegros. 

Batangas, Laguna, Cairti (province of 
Manila), Zamboanga, both Ilocos, 
Camarines. 

This ai'ticle is produced in almost all 
the Provinces of the Archipelago, 
and especially in Cagayan, Isabella, 
de Luzon, Ilocos (S. and N.), and in 
all the southern Provinces and in 
the Visayas. 



Amount 
paid for 
export 
duties. 



1562,022 



Free. 



55:3, 805 



Destination. 



Spain, Australia, China, the 
United States, France, Eng- 
land, Japan. Singapore, and 
other foreign ports. 

America, Australia, China, 
Japan, Spain, England. 

Spain, China, Japan, Singa- 
pore. 

Dutch possessions, England, 
France, Saigon, Singapore, 
English possessions, Aus- 
tralia, Spain, China, Egypt, 
France. 



Products. 



Quantity. 



Value of 
same. 



Hemp, raw and manufactured . . 

Sugar - 

Coffee - - 

Tobacco, raw and manufactured 



Kilograms. 
74, 936, 294 
75. 883. 919 
10.5.6:38 
22, 125, 020 



11, 820, .536 

10.810,4.51 

61,858 

9,350,219 



Manila hemp has a world-wide reputat ion, and is used for cordage, ' 
bonnets, hats, tapestiy, carpets, hamuiocks, and other network, etc. 

'i'he sugar product is enormous. More capital is requii'cd, and the 
com])ination of the producei's, with modern macliinery and improved 



\ 



TREATY OF PEACE. 495 

roads. It seems strange, entering the harbor of Hongkong, to see the 
niagnifice)it X3lant of a sugar refinery there, wliieh has made great 
profits, v.-hile at tlie Philippines practically the old rude methods 
prevail. 

The growth of the cocoamit palm, a inost profitable indnstr3% may 
be greatly increased, and its use for domestic purposes, in desiccated 
form (a ncAv method), and in the manufacture of oil and soap is enor- 
mous. Of this i^roduct in Ceylon, Sir J. West RidgAvay, governor, 
after giving surprising figures as to its developmont, naming the value 
of the local consumption then at 20,000,000 rupees (say 80,600,000 in 
gold), adds: 

That the cultivation of the cocoanut palm is rapidly increasing is a matter of 
congratulation, but should not be the canse of surprise. There is no cultivation 
so simple, so cheap, and of which the returns are so certain. 

There is an enormous i)roduction of tobacco and a ready market 
for all of the cigars and cigarettes made in the large factories of 
Manila. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. All the sugar product of the Philippines is shipped to the 
East? — A. They must send a great deal to Hongkong now, because of 
the refinery there, which I mentioiied, but some is shipped to America, 
Australia, China, England, Japan, Spain. I suggested to the pro- 
prietor of one of these cigar factories that thaj send their product to 
America, but he said they did not know about opening- a new trade; 
thej' had all the orders they wanted and for months ahead, and did 
not know whether it was worth while. 

There are good reports as to the coal mines opened in Mindoro and 
Cebu, but further examination by experts is necessary. I have no 
doubt there will be large discoveries of this and of iron. Man}' stories 
about gold — not confirmed— all from a country of which little is known. 
While the soil and conditions of other tropical countries permit pro- 
duction of one or two articles only in each jjlace, there is no doubt 
that these islands will yield everything possible for all of the others. 

The great necessities are roads, railways, improvements in sanita- 
tion, and establishment of cold-storage houses. Profit and comfort 
will also come from the operation of banks, cotton mills, paper mills 
(the best material for paper making is easily obtainable), soap and ice 
factories. Road making- should be undertaken on scientific princi- 
ples. The walls of the walled city of Manila should be demolished 
and the offensive moats filled, adding- in good health what is lost in 
picturesqueness, and giving the Government a large tract of valuable 
land to be sold or lea.sed. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Have you any idea what proportion of the land is now Govern- 
ment land? — A. There are two or three classes of lands occupied by 
the natives. On some of it they have erected houses; and there is a 
great deal which has absolutely no ownershiii of record, particularly 
in the mountains; and there is also much, especially in Mindanao, 
which should come to our Government. But this question needs full 
investigation bj' a land department. 

STATEMENT — resumed. 

Railways built to the mountains — distances from 20 to 250 miles — 
will give a new climate, where one can find at night a temperature, of 



496 TREATY OF PEACH 

rroiii 40 to (JO instead of tlie nionoloiious all-niglit 82, even at this 
season, of Manila, and where vegetables and fruits in variety maybe 
raised. The eountry to be open<Ml by well coiisidei-ed new lines will 
populate and develop fine sections. All this, of course, will lake 
time. 
Field-Marshal Roberts says: 

It (the Mutiny) hastened on the construetion of the roads, railways, and tele- 
f<rai)lis. which liave done more than anythin.y,- to increase the prosperity of the 
people and preserve order throughout the country. 

This, true of India, will be most effectively the case of the Philip- 
pines. T quote a jjortion of an article by ^Ir. .John I-'oieman in the 
Oontemi)orary Review for June, 1S!)8: 

The i-;huids are extremely fertile, and will produce almost anything to he found 
in the trojjics. I estimate that havely one-fourth of tiie tillahle'landls now under 
cultivation. There is at present only one railway, of 130 miles. A numher of lines 
would have to he constructed in Luzon. Panay. Negros, Cebu, and Mindanao 
islands. Companies would probably take up the contracts on ninety years" 
working concession and ninety-nine years' lease of acreage in lieu of guaranteed 
interest. The lands would become immensely valuable to the railway companies , 
and an enormous source of taxable wealtix to the protectorate. Iload making 
should be taken up on treasury account and bridge construc-tion on contract, to 
be paid for by toll concessions. The port of Iloilo should be improved, the 
cxTstom-houses abolished, and about ten more free ports opened to the world. 

Under the protectorate undoubtedly capital would flow into the Philippines. The 
coal beds in Luzon and Cebu islands would be opened out : the marl )le deposits 
of Montalban and the stone quarries of Angono (both near Manila) would surely 
be worked. The ijossibilities of development under a free, liberal government 
are so great that the next generation would look back with astonishment at the 
statistics of the present day. 

If we compare Egypt under British control (in fact, if not in name), 
Mr. Edward Dicey says: 

The British occupation has now lasted for over fifteen years. During the first 
five comparatively little was accomplished, owing to the uncertain a"nd provi- 
sional character of our tenure. 

In tliis time (fifteen years) the population increased from a little 
nndei- 7,()i)0,000 to close upon iO,(X)0, 000— this is not due to foreign 
immigration — "and can outy be accounted for by the fact that con- 
ditions of life amid the mass of population are more favorable, mar- 
riages more frequent, families larger, infant mortality, which before 
kept the population at dead level, is less frequent, tliat the general 
health of the people has improved. To i^nt the same idea in phuner 
words, the natives are better fed, better paid, better housed, better 
ch)thed," etc. 

That, I think, is rather pertinent to oui- probable stMtus in the 
IMiilippines. 

1 made the following jottings (»f a ti-ip over the line of the only rail- 
road in tile islands: 

On Saturday. September o. upon the invitation of Mr. Higgins, manager of the 
Manila railroad, who furnished his private observation car, and of Mr. Wood, of 
the firm of Smith, Bell & Co., who was our host, the party, consisting of Major 
Bement, Mr. Millet, Wood, Price, Higgins, and myself, made a trip over the line 
of the railroad, leaving at about 10 in the morning. One hundred and twenty- 
tlu'ee miles of railroad in fail' (U-dei'. telegraphic communications destroyed in 
many places, probably recjuiring a month for their restoration. 

The line runs through a country of most extraordinary fertility. Rice is the 
princii)al product, much sugar, possibilities of cotton, coffee, or almost anything, 
A small amount of indigo is grown on the northern i)art of the line. The stations 
are at short intervals, in accordance' with orders from the Spanish Grovernment. 
It is a country of splendid productive power, almost all of it is at present under 



TREATY OF PEACE, 497 

cultivation. We spent tlie night at Baulista (Bayamban), where Smith, Bell, & 
Co., have a rice mill and a new house just completed, about 100 miles from 
Manila. At 7 the next morning we started for Dagupan, a different country, 
prettier, high cocoanut palm trees, a house in one tree, and on the wliole the i>ret- 
tiest scenery I have yet seen in Luzon. At Dagupan we saw about 250 insurgents 
on the cars en route to Tarlac, one of the headquarters. The station is almost 
totally destroyed, uselessly, by the Spaniards in one of their battles. 

The insurrectionists practically hold all of the country between Caloocan, 3 
miles from Manila, and the road's terminus; but they are nowhere in evidence in 
great numbers. The plan seems to be to have one or two men on duty, while the 
others in numbers of fifty or so concentrate in the small i)ueblos in whicli the 
country abounds. At Malinta, about 6 miles oat, a new fort and small earth- 
works were being prepared; at Angelos, two stone barricades. ' 

Though everyone expresses a doubt as to unanimity and cohesion in the rebel 
ranks, I think Aguinaldo has a comprehensive plan. His infliience is constantly 
apparent and his orders, in the main, respected by the offcers and soldiers. One 
colonel, formerly a general (Gregorio Mayor), was waiting at the station for the 
the train, that he might report at Cavite to Aguinaldo, under the latter's orders; 
•and a commission from the latter, the chief of whicli we saw about 85 miles from 
Manila, had just succeeded in making an alliance with the leaders of the Iglesia, 
an independent band computed at 5,000 and organized by the priests and under 
their domination, in opposition to the insurgents. 

It is impossible to forecast how far the natives will adhere to Aguinaldo, but 
any little show of force and good government by us will, I think, put these prov- 
inces in a tractable condition and result in peace and increased prosperity for all 
concerned. The people want peace. They have had enough fighting and dis- 
turbance, and will be happy in a firm and jiist control. 

The country on the railroad is divided into four zones or military districts: the 
southern, from Caloocan to Polo, commanded by Gen. Pantaleon Garcia; the 
next, from Polo to Calumpit, by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar; the next, from Calum- 
pit to Paruao. by Thomas Mascardo, and the northern, from Paruao to Dagupan, 
by Macabulus. 

There are about 450 Spanish prisoners at Tarlac, and, strange to say, they are 
receiving good treatment. A few (six or seven) are at Gerona, among these two 
governors of provinces. 

The following extensions and new lines are under consideration by the railroad 
company and would be most valuable in the development of the island of Luzon: 
First, Manila to Batangas, south; second, Dagupan to Laoag, north; third, a 
branch, Gerona to Ailiaga, 18 miles; fourth, a branch from Guiginto to the 
Cagayan Valley for the tobacco district. 

Manila is naturally a healthy place, and the sanitary reforms necessary are very 
easy, especially as compared with much of the work in the east, particularly af, 
Rangoon, the chief town of Lower Burma. 

The islands have a small population when their area is considered. Luzon, 
larger than England, has onlv a'oout 8.500,000, or a little over one-tenth of 
England's; Panay, 2,000,000; Negrosand Cebu, 1,500,000; Mindanao, 2,000.000. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Mindanao 2,000,000? — A. That is what was stated to me. 

Q. That is beyond any estimate we have had. — A. I think it is all 
oonjectnre. No one has been through there to know about it. These 
figures were given to me hy Neil MacLeod, esq., large owner and 
manager of the Compania Maritima, the important steamship com- 
pany, engaged in interisland and coast trade. 

STATEMENT — resumed. 

If any sensible nation governs those islands for the purposes of 
development, a bureau of science, with the ablest chief and staff to be 
obtained, should at once be established, this to comprehend depart- 
• ments of geology, zoology, botany, and ethnology. The results obtained 
will be great ancl surprising. Also a land and forestry commission or 
a department of lands, survej^s, and works. There are immense tracts 
to fall into the hands of the Government, whicli could be sold or leased, 
all of which possibilities have received no attention from the Spaniards. 
T P 32 



498 TREATY OF PEACE. 

I Avent to Manila withoiil prejudice agaiii'st tlie Spaniards there, 
l)eThaps a little doubt fnl, on account of the Maine massacre, for 
which, up to the time of tlie iindinj.>- of tli^ court of inquiry, I had 
Ikhmi unAvilliiii>- to believe that Spain was responsible, l)ut testimony 
f)-oin all classes of people, Enji'lish merch.ants, the general nianaiier of 
the railway, also the general ihauager of the cable company (both of 
tlic last n'larried Spanish women), a Frenchman and his wife, the 
advertisements in the papers, their trejitment of their dead, their 
actions in battle and in civil administration, all convince me that they 
are without principle or courage, and brutally, wickedly cruel, with 
no improvement on three hundred and twenty-five years ago in the 
days of Philip IT. The boues (skulls, arms, legs) of their dead lie 
without the honor of a covering of earth, exposed in their fashiona- 
ble cemetery, exhumed on account of a failure by their descendants to 
pay rent for the tomb. The shooting in the Luneta (their favorite 
driveway) of dozens of so-called "rebels" and conspirators, notably 
Di\ Ri.-^al, a man of literary merit, with no trial, vague charges of 
behsnging to secret societies, with the hope of making their victims 
confess to what, in many cases, did not exist, was made a fete, adver- 
tised in the papers, "There will be music," and I have been frequently 
tol<l 1 hat women and children attended in their carriages. The tortures 
inflicted with the same, view of eliciting confessions, are too lu'utal to 
commit the narrative to paper. 

I have brought from Manila for the inspection of the Commissioners 
four carvings in wood representing tortures inflicted by the Spaniards 
upon the natives. They were executed by Bonifacio Arevelo, who is 
now practicing as a dentist in Manila. He is a man of fine presence, 
benevolent aspect, not sensational at all in his utterances, and in sul)- 
mitting them to me he wrote the wish that upon reaching Paris i 
would not forget that the Filipinos begged me to use my efforts to 
convince all concerned of the utter impossibility of the return by them 
to Spanish domination. He also gives a description of the models: 

Figure No. 1. — This figure represents the chastisement which or.e 
of the municipal authonties of Jaen (Nueva Ecija) suffered in the 
prison of that to^\ ii, the Spanish employees of the prison entertaining 
themselves by applying the most horrible tortures. 

Figure No. 2. — This represents an honorably and peacealdy inclined 
resident in a village of the province of Nueva Ecija, taken prisoner, 
brutally treated for being suspected, without cause, of belonging to 
the Katipunan, and afterwards shot. 

Figure No. 3. — This figure represents one of the many natives of 
the Philippines whom, during the late insurrection, the Spaniards shot 
without previous trial, in the outskirts of the village, leaving their 
corpses without burial. 

Figure No. .^.— This figure represents Mr. Moses Salvador, a young 
Tagalo, wlio studied sevei-al years in Eiirope. He is a native of Manila, 
iiui was imprisoned in September, ISOfi, for being a Freemason, was 
hoT-rlbly martyrized in the headquarters of the police, and, after many 
moiiths of imprisonment, was shot by order of the Spanish General 
Polavieja in the I.uneta, in company with several of his countrymen, 
all condemned on the same charge, of which several were absolutely 
innocent. 

The opinion of Alexandre Dumas, sr., in regard to tln^ Spaniards 
was often quoted in the Phili])]>ines, that they possess "honor without 
honi^sty, religicm without morality, pride with nothing to be proud of." 

The'rapacity, stealing, and immoralities of the priests are beyond 



TREATY OF PEACE. 49^ 

question, and the bitterness of the natives against them has been 
caused and aggravated l)y years of iniquity. To demand a wife or 
daugliter from a native has been a common occurrence. Failing to 
obtain acquiescence, the husband's or father's goods have been seized, 
he deported or thrown into jail, under an order easily obtained from 
the government in Manila. The priests' influence was paramount — 
thej'^are rich, and fathers (not only of the church), despised and hated 
by the peoi^le. 

The inefftciency, to put it mildly, of the Spaniards in war lias been 
so clearly demonstrated in this war that I will call attention onh* to 
the facts in Manila Bay and the defenses of the town. When it was 
absolutely known b}^ everyone there, on the last day of April, that 
our ships were on the way and very neai', tliat night many of their 
naval officers spent in town, far from tlie fleet. All their ships were 
destroyed, and every man of the American fleet (except one ui)on 
wdiora some heav.y metal on one of our sliips fell) reported for duty 
the next day. And j-et Admiral Montijo applied to DcAvey for a cer- 
tificate of good conduct on that occasion to show to the Madrid author- 
ities, M'ho lately ordered him home. 

Their inefficiency (and the creditable w^ork of the insurgents as 
well) is further proved bj' the fact that they were driven by the 
natives from Cavite 20 odd miles into the defenses of Manila, with 
never a successful attack, never a capture of arms or men. All the 
success was on the native side, and yet the Spaniards surrendered 
between 7,000 and 8,000 men, well armed, plenty of ammunition, and 
in good physical condition. The excuse of the latter may be that 
their enemy was in small bands — but they never captured one of 
these — and the small bands drove them to their walls. Jaudenes, the 
acting Captain-General, in reply to JVlerintt and Dewey's notice to 
remove his noncombatants, acknowledged that the insurrectionists 
surrounded the city, and that he could not move women, children, 
etc., out. (His fear and solicitude about the natives entering the 
city when I i^eceived the surrender of Manila were almost painful to 
witness. ) This admission demonstrates as well the military ability 
shown by the Filipinos, whose characteristics I will now enumerate. 

Agninaldo went to Cavite, under the permission of Admiral Dewey, 
in reply to a telegram sent by Spencer Pratt, esq., our consul-general 
at Singapore, who offered that chief monej" for his expenses. The 
offer was declined. After arrival (on one of our ships) he went ashore, 
accompanied by 13 stafl" officers, to organize his army; but no adher- 
ents appeared the first day, and Aguinaldo, rather discouraged, medi- 
tated returning to Hongkong. I think Dewey advised him to make 
another effort, at the same time saying that he must leave the public 
buildings at Cavite, where he had made his headquarters. Soon, from 
across the bay and from all sides, men gathered. The fact that Dewey 
permitted the armed men to move from the surrounding districts and 
for the rebels to take arms* (not many, says the Admiral) in the arsenal 
was the only help we gave him, excepting, of course, the most imj)or- 
tant destruction of the Spanish navy. From that time the military 
operations and the conduct of the insurgents have been most credit- 
able. Positions taken and the movements of troops show great ability 
on the part of some leader — I do not say it was necessarily Aguinaldo, 
but he gave the directions. 

The Chairman: 
Q. How^ many men did he get together? — A. His forces went around 
the city, taking the waterworks and the north part of the city, atfd 



500 TREATY OF PEACE. 

ruiminu- up llic i-ailroad. I asked tliat (|uestion of several, and the 
opinions dimmed widtdy— a!l the way from 8,000 to ;30,000 or 40,000 
men. 

<). Do you think he had as many as 8,000 men before the snrren- 
,U.,--' — \_ Yes, sir; the environment of the cit}' took a great many 
men. There is a vast extent of country there, including tlie water- 
works and running around the cit}^ and they certainly had to have 
more than that to do so. 

Q. How many arms did Dewey turn over to them? — A. I never 
knew exactly. I asked him that question and he said a very few. - 

Q. AVheredid they get the rest of their arms? — A. Some captured 
from the Spanish, some brought to him by deserters, and there were 
some sliipments of arms from Hongkong^ — I believe Americans brought 
them in — and tliey have lately taken some to Batangas in the southern 
part, and have taken some new 31axim guns in there, too. 

Mr Gray : 

Q. To the insurgents? — A. Yes. 

Q. Since the capitulation? — A. Yes; they changed the name of a 
vessel and used it. She had had a Luzon name, the Pasig, and they 
changed it to the Abbij. Dewey sent down and seized the boat, and i 
the insurgents followed to Manila Bay, hoping to reclaim it. In other • 
respects their demands, from their point of view, have not been 
unreasonable, and show a proper appreciation of tlie status. 

STATEMENT RESUMED. 

The day after the surrender (August 13) four representatives of 
Aguinaldo called on General Merritt, who assured them in general 
terms that "we are the friends of the Filipinos." At that time they 
occupied a portion of Manila. AYe soon demanded that they should 
give that up, to which Aguinaldo's representative agreed, but in 
seeking confirmation from him the condition was made that in case 
we gave up the country they should be restored to the positions then 
occupied and which they had taken greatly by their own merits. 
IIoAvever, matters have been amicably settled. Aguinaldo's head- 
(luarters are at Malolos, 23 miles up the railroad. His troops control 
all the settled i^art of the island (except Manila), as well as much of 
the southern country. 

The Chairman: 

Q. What do you mean by the "southern country"— those islands 
Ixdow? — A. Yes. 

Their conduct to their Spanish prisoners has been deserving of the 
praise of all the world. With hatred of priests and Spaniards, fairly 
held on account of the conditions before narrated, and with every 
justification to a savage mind for the most brutal revenge, I have 
heard no instance of toi'ture, murder, or brutalitj' since we have been 
in the country. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Did you ever talk with Admiral Dewey about his relations with. 
Aguinahlo? — A. Yes, sir. He read me a copy of Ids disi)atch in 
answer to Ih^' one in which lie is asked the ([uestion whether lie had 
made any promises, and lie said he had not. Aguinaldo went down 
will) his c(nicui-rence, without doubt, and the Admii-al allowed armed 
people to cross the bay and join him and made no remonstrance. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 501 

Q. Did he furnish him any arms'? — A. He says not, except the few 
furnished them from Cavite. Foreman, in his article, makes the state- 
ment tliat he has a treaty with Aguinaklo, and I went one morning 
and left the article with the Admiral to read, and he said it was not 
true. 

Q. This relation — whatever Admiral Dewey did — took place before 
he got the dispatch of inquiry from the Navy Dej)artment — some time 
before? — A. Yes. 

Q. How far does the Admiral say he encouraged Aguinaklo? — A. 
I do not think he says he gave liim any encouragement, except that 
he rather dissuaded him from returning to Hongkong when he was 
discouraged. 

Q. Did you get that statement from Dewey? — A. Yes. Aguinaldo 
was rather discouraged when any of the people failed to come to his 
banner on the first day. That dispatch also included a statement 
that he knew well the Filipinos and the Cubans, and that the Filipinos 
were a far superior people — I think that was in that dispatch ; it was 
in one. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Were they of material assistance to us? — A. Very great. If the 
protocol had not been signed I think the Spanish at home Avould have 
insisted upon their army doing something. They dismissed Augustin 
because he was not disposed to fight, and I think if they had not had 
this experience of having been driven Ijack into the city and the water 
cut off, so even that Jaudenes said he could not remove his noncom- 
batants, the Government would have insisted on liis making a fight, 
and he could liave made a very good one, for his position was strong, 
if they had any figlit in tliem at all. But every place had been taken 
from them by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and occui)a- 
tion of the country in an able manner. 

The Chairman: 
Q. The insurrection had been ended in December, 18f)7, by an 
arrangement under whicli money was paid in Hongkong and certain 
reforms promised. Were these promises ever carried out? — A. Not 
at all, and Primo de Rivera stated lately in the Cortes that he never 
made an}'. I was surprised at reading that statement. 

STATEMENT RESUMED. 

I talked with Spanish prisoners at Tarlac, an important militar}- 
station on the line of the railroad, and they said that they had had 
good treatment only. The wives of two officers had latelj' visited their 
husbands in Jail (one at Dagupan, 12o miles north), and gave same 
testimony. Aguinaldo, in a letter of August 1 to our late consul at 
Manila, Mr. Williams, said, "Say to the Government at AVashington 
that the Filipinos people abominate savagery-; that in the midst of 
their past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, 
and civil life." I believe the natives to be brave (under good leader- 
ship), most tolerant of fatigue and hunger, and amenable to command 
and discipline, if justice and fair dealing rule. Thej' are very tem- 
perate, as most of the natives of the East are. I have never seen a 
drunken one, and this with the exami^le of our soldiers, whom they 
imitate in everything else; very quiet, no loud quarrels, very good 
house servants and cooks. 



502 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Tlu'ir skill in Iradcs, oe'cupations, and prot'essions is very great. 
Critics will call this imitation, but imitatiijn of good things is not 
reprehensible. I refer now to the common people, and so will omit 
very al)le lawyers (one or two having raidvcd as the best of all nation- 
alties in the Philippines), and the highei- professions. 

As accountants, they are excellent. In t he custom-house sixty (more 
befoi-e) Avere emjjloyed during my administration. Any information 
desired, say the amount of imports and exports of last year, kind of 
articles, whence obtained, and where going, duties, etc., was sought 
f'l-om tliem, and the reply was always given in writing in a neat, satis- 
iactoi-y manner. All the cash was received by a native — 81,020,000, 
from .Vugust 22 to October 21, much of this in silver — all counterfeits 
and filled dollars were detected at once by his skill, and only $1 was 
returned to us from the banks. His neighl)or, who kept the record of 
receipts, was most systematic and al)le. The Spaniards depended 
al)solutely on them for the clerical work of the office, and the same 
in the other departments. 

I visited three factories for the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes : 
First, that of H. J. Andrews & Co., where 150 to 200 natives were 
employed; second, the Alhambra, which had 300 in April, now (300; 
third, the Insular, with 2,000. The Tal)acallera, largely owned in 
Paris, I was unable to see ; it has 4,000. These working people seemed 
to me of the best — quiet, diligent, skillful. The same qualities were 
apparent in the one cotton mill of the place, where at least 200 were 
employed. 

As mariners, quartermasters of large boats, and managers of small 
ones, their skill lias been proverliial over the East for years, and we 
had great oppoi-t unities dui'ing our three weeks in the bay of proving 
their ability and cleverness. 

Manila straw hats have been famous for years; also pina cloth and 
jusi cloth, the former made of pineapple fiber and the latter made of 
pineapple fil)er and hemp. 

The station masters and employees of the Manila Railway compare 
favorably with any I have ever seen at ordinary way stations. Clean, 
neat, pronijjt, well disciplined, their superiority' is largely due to 
excellence of the general manager, Mr. Iliggins, a man of great ability. 
Still the quality is in the men. The three servants in his house (on 
the line) have all learned telegraphy by observation and imitation. 

I have also some fine samples of their eml)roidery. 

They are admittedly extraordinary musieiaiis, and their orchestras 
and l)ands have found places all over the East, playing without notes 
with great harmony and sweetness. It seems to be instinct, and is all 
instrumental, with little or no vocal talent. All these accomplish- 
ments do not argue gi-eatness, but they do show that they are some- 
thing more than ignorant and brutal savages. I do not mean to 
ascribe to them all the virtues — they may be liars and thieves, it is a 
wonder they are not worse after the environment and example of 
centuries — but to my mind they are the best of any barbaric or 
uncivilized race I have ever seen, and open, I trust, to a wonderful 
development. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Is Mv. Higgins an Englishman or an American? — A. An Eng- 
lishman. TIk' i-aili'oad is an English one. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 503 

STATEMENT RESUMED. 

And now comes the vital C[uestion, What is be done with these 
islands, and, if we hold them, what form of government is to prevail? 
Whatever grave doubts one may have as to colonial extension on the 
part of America, we have gone too far, either by design or chance, to 
recede. It can not be denied that we owe it as a duty to the natives 
and to humanity that the islands should not b# I'estored to Spain 
(even if the}^ were they could not be held for a year). Any division 
of them is aV)solutely impracticable. This would induce constant 
friction, the ruin of Manila as the great commercial center; the impor- 
tant products would be sliipiped direct from the southern islands and 
goods sent directly there in exchange. One owner must hold the 
whole country and prescribe uniform duties and government. 

I will digress here to say that the British at Manila, at Hongkong, 
Singapore — all over the East — are more than anxious we shall hold 
the islands. There is such a contrast in the expression of good will 
and admiration of our country with the feelings of only a few years 
ago. It seems to me that everyday for the last six wveks some 
Englishman has said to me in the strongest terms, "There should be 
an Anglo-American alliance." They speak in the warmest terms of 
praise and sur]3rise at our moderation, absence of looting, thefts, and 
every kind of outi'age after the taking of Manila. Strange tliat they 
should make so much of a thing which, to our officers and people, 
seemed so obviously the proper and necessary thing. A few days 
before the surrender some British and other merchants and bankers 
came to our transports, asking from General Merritt safeguards, or 
the assurance of protection for the houses and persons of foreign resi- 
dents. I assured Mr. Wood, at the head of one of the largest houses 
(Smith, Bell & Co.), that they were in no danger. Noticing a look of 
incredulitv, I said: "You don't believe me?" "Well, I think the men 
getting away from their officers will take possession of the spirit shops 
and commit outrages." I replied: "It is not possible; it is not in 
accord wath the temper of our peojjle. If you will consider our civil 
war, where after the terrible losses, running over four years, no pun- 
ishment of a single person or appropriation of property was made, 
you may believe that we shall behave in no other way as the result of 
this little affair." I doubt if any tiling has inspired so much the 
respect of foreigners for us as this, which seems to me so natural a 
thing. 

To take all the islands und ignore the natives would be impracti- 
cable and unwise. 

On October 2o I w^ent, in the company of II. L. Iliggins, general 
manager of the ]Manila Railway, Limited, to Malolos for an interview 
arranged the day before with Aguinaldo. I found his headquarters 
were in a very nice house, ten minutes' drive from the railway station; 
a guard of twenty or thirty soldiers in the courtyard below. 

We were soon ushered by one of his officers, who spoke English, to 
the waiting room ujistairs, and I met Bvien Camino, a wise-looking 
counselor, wliom I met at Ajiintamiento the day after the fall of 
Manila. He carried us to the presence of the insurgent leader and 
president, who vras dressed, contrary to his usual daily garb, in a 
black smoking-jacket, of low-cut w^aistcoat and trousers, both black, 
large white tie — in fact, the evening dress common at our clubs and 
during the summer. 



504 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Biien C'amino left lis. I started the talk by aiiiiouiK'in<>' to Agui- 
naldo that I was to leave in a few days to appear before the Peace 
Coiuniission, and that I had a veiy frlendl\''feeling for the Filipinos 
and adniii'ation for many of their good qualities, their quiet, cleanli- 
ness, temperance, and great imitative i^ower, and a possibility' of 
learning almost any professi{m or business; that I would like to be 
able to present to the Commission his and his people's viev»'s and 
demands and Avhat relation they expected to hold to the United 
States in case we decided to keep the islands. 

Aguinaldo replied, rather naively, that his people Avere divided into 
two parties — those in favor of absolute independence and those of an 
American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; that he is 
waiting to see avIio will have the majoritj", in that case to take his 
l^osition. I pointed, out to him that it would probably be useless to 
try to bring those in favor of absolute independence to anj- change of 
opinion, but they must consider that they are without any n^vy and 
without capital, which is greatly needed for the development of the 
country; that the Philippine government alone did not possess the 
element of strength to insure the retention of the islands without the 
assistance of other governments. The}' would be at the more}' of any 
of half a dozen powers striving to take either a part or the wliole 
of the islands, and they must consider that their greatest prosperity 
would come by the gradual accession of power under American 
auspices. 

lie said : "Prat the civilized nations of the world would see that our 
possessions were not taken from us." I replied: "How* has it been 
in China, where England, Russia, France, German}', etc., all strive to 
control territory?" To this he could make no reply. I further asked 
what that side would expect America, acting the role of protector, to 
do. lie said: "To furnish the nav}', while tlie Filipinos held all the 
country and administered civil offices with its own people." "And 
what then would America get from this," said I. "That would be a 
detail," he said, "which would be settled hereafter." 

I asked how far they controlled Luzon and other islands. "Almost 
entirely," he said. That the different bands, little by little, were 
expressing their <lesire to join him. The Igorrottos had sent in some 
of their leaders the day before and were acting with him. . That he 
had had three representatives from Iloilo within a few da}'S on the 
same mission. 

We pursued all this subject of a protectorate for sometime without 
getting an}' nearer any satisfactory result. Mr. Higgins felt that 
Aguinaldo had been simplj' repeating a lesson, but I did not feel so 
sure of that. lie said that he had had many Americans to interview 
him, most of them reporters, I fancy, and he had always told them 
the same thing. Thereupon I stated that this was quite a different 
ease. "I am ordered, as an officer of the United States Army, to pro- 
ceed to Paris and give evidence on points which may be of vital inter- 
est to you . " After that his tone was d iff'erent. Buen Camino returned, 
and Aguinaldo i-epoi'ted to him everything he had said to us. After 
a little talk between the two, Ruen Camino said he, and he was sure 
the president, was in favoj- of an AnKM'ican protectorate, and seemed 
to approN'ethe suggestion that we should have the nucleus of an arm}'; 
that his people should be joined to it, tilling the places of minor offi- 
cers: and the ])ossibility and the hope witlii!! a few years that tliey 
should lill 1li(' most inipoi'tant civil and niililary functions. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 505 

Buen Camino said I could l^e certain that if a protectorate were 
granted that tliey would do their best to have it accepted l)y their 
people on the lines that I ha^^e stated, agreeing with me fully that to 
hold one island and gi-^ing the others to other powers would he most 
unfortunate, and not to !)e considered. 

They expressed pleasure at my having come to them, feeling that 
they had lieen rather neglected by the Americans. 

This I dictated liastily just after the visit, and it does not give the 
impression which the interview left upon me — a great desire for our 
protection, for the improvement of their people materially and intel- 
lectually, the wish to send their young peojDle to America for 
education. 

Subsequently (October 81, the day I left Manila) he sent three 
officers to me with the friendliest messages, expressing the wish that 
I should use my best influence with the commission in their favor. 

Many methods of government, with tliem as allies or subjects, are 
possible. I had often thought that it might be expedient at first to 
admit them to some of the minor offices in army and civil govern- 
ment, and if they show capacity, to enlarge their powers and oppor- 
tunities, until finally' they should have entire control, after proper 
compensation or an agreed subjection to us for our work and 
assistance to them. But, a]id I hope that I shall not be considered 
English mad in my deference to their practice, the result of so many 
3'ears of successful colonial governme]it — I am told by a governor of 
one of their colonies. Sir William McGregor, when I suggested such 
a course, that they have never thought it safe or expedient, when 
they have a colony of so many (in this case millions) of blacks, and so 
few white men, to intrust the government to the former. If of whites, 
as in Australia, yes, after trial trust the government to tliem, with 
what are practically supervising, or perhaps honorary governors, who 
maintain the connection with the mother or controlling country. 

It will l>e admitted that England iias been the only successful 
administrator of colonial government in the world. Holland has had 
a great career, but possibly things are not so well with it just now in 
Java and Sumatra; at any rate, it is not comparable to England. 
"The British colonial empire coinprises forty distinct and independent 
governments, besides a number of scattered dependencies under the 
dominion of protection of the Queen." "Of the forty, eleven have 
elected assemblies and responsible governments. " The other twenty- 
nine are divided into three classes: (1) No legislative council; legis- 
lative power delegated to officer administering the government, with, 
in most cases, power reserved bj' Crown of legislating b}' order in 
council. (2) Legislative council nominated by the Crown, with some 
power reserved, as in No. 1. (8) Legislative council partly elected, 
with reserve power in three countries, no general power reserved in 
five. 

The different conditions of countrj', races, traditions, etc., have 
made aljsolutely different laws necessarj' — one country a gold cur- 
rency, others silver; free trade, open ports, tariffs, duties, internal 
and personal taxation prevail without following anj" j^recedents or 
existing laws of England, varying throughout the colonies. 

Field-Marshal Roberts ("Forty-one years in India") says: 

It is difficnlt for people who know nothing of natives to understand and appre- 
ciate the value they set on cherished ciTstom. peculiar idiosyncrasies, and fixed 
prejudices, all of which must be carefully studied by those who are placed in the 
Ijosition of tlieir rulers, if the suzerain power is to keep their respect and gain 



506 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Their gratitude and affection. The natives of India (and I think this is tvwe oi' the 
Filipinos) are particularly observant of character and intelligent in ganging the 
capahilities of those who govern them: and it is because the English Government 
is trusted that a mere handful of Englishmen are able to direct the administra- 
tion of a coirntry with nearly three hundred millions of inhabitants, differing in 
race, religion, and maimers of life. Through<jut all the changes wliich India has 
undergone, political and social, dm-ing the present century this feeling has been 
maintained, and it will last so long as the services are filled by honorable men. 
who sympathize with the natives, respect their prejudices, and' do not interfere 
unnecessarily with their habits and customs. 

The condition exists in very many colonies, that hundreds of tlion- 
sands of natives are g'overned witli a handful of soldiers — in many 
cases witli non(\ The moral influence, justice, and fair dealing rule. 

Tills we may be able to accomplish in the Philippines, but we must 
have a colonial service; and to make this effective changes of officers 
must not be made with every change of government. Thei-e must be 
tlie surety ()f promotion to induce a good man to live — often alone — 
so far from home and in such a climate. Good pay for civil and mili- 
tary officers is most essential; and here I quote an article on this sub- 
ject from the Spectator of September 24, 1898: 

First of all. the Americans must realize that they are now face to face with a 
military problem which can not be solved by makeshifts. No douljt in the civil 
war they did wonders by means of makeshifts, but then the country was on fire 
with energy, and the theater of operations was. after all. a comparatively small 
one. or. at any rate, all on the settled portions of the North American continent. 
Makeshifts will not avail to keep 90.000 men. scattered from the Philippines to 
('uba. regularly supplied with the munitions of war and with those •• reliefs " that 
are essential to the welfare of an army when in foreign places and in unhealthy 
climates. The wastage in this army of 90.000 men caused by death, by disease, 
and owing to a short term of enlistment, will be very great, and the gaps will con- 
stantly have to be filled from America. That there will be little trouble in finding 
new recruits we are well aware, but it is not finding the recruit that is the diffi- 
culty. Wiien he is enrolled he will have to be equipped and transported to the 
place where he is lie-ded. jDossibly a hitherto unsurveyed island in the southeastern 
Pacific. But this means an elaborate system of transports and a relief system 
such as exists in the British army, with probably 6.000 or 7,000 soldiers always 
afloat, either coming home or going out to America's new colonial empire. 

All this, of course, i)resents no insoluble problem, but it does present one which 
will have to be tackled in earnest, unless there is to be a serious breakdown. Mil- 
itary organization means primarily an efficient headquarters staff", and this the 
the Americans will have to provide as quickly as they can. They have in their 
West Point officers as good material as exists in the world, but for the monient 
the supply is by no means equal to the demand. Still. Americans learn new work 
with extraordinary rapidity: and if only young men, and not "fossils," are put at 
the head of departments, things will soon shake dowm. As we have found in 
Egypt, if you are only careful to put the right men at the top and give them a 
free hand, they will soon discover and develop efficient subordinates." 

There is yet another point most vitally connected with the efiiciency of a large 
military force stationed abroad and in 'tropical and half -savage plac"es to which 
the Americans must give attention. They must pay their military officers well. 
Pay on what is practically active service in the Tropics ought to be double what 
it is at home. The colonels, captains, and even subalterns in Cuba and the 
Philippines wull be set to do most arduous and responsible work: and if good 
work is to be d(^ne. they must be well paid. There is no truer maxim in state- 
craft than that power will bo paid. If it is not paid officially, it will sooner or 
later pay itself. But such self -payment means ruin and demoralization. That 
the private soldiers will be liberally treated goeswnthont saying. What is not so 
certain is that the American people will realize that the officers to whom immense 
powers will be given must also be paid in proportion. Good salaries are the only 
instruments which can be i)ermanently relied on to kill corruqjtion.and it is abso- 
lutely essential that America should start her new colonial empire free from the 
slightest taint of corruption. If the salaries are good, it will be possible to intro- 
duce stringent rules against executi^■e officers holding land or engaging in any 
kind of si)eculation in the regions which they are occupying. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 507 

It is to siicli rules, coiipled with good salaries, that in tiie last resort we owe our 
siiccess in India. Put an American officer, civil or military, in a great position of 
trust and responsibility in some outlying district in the Philippines where his word 
will virtually be law," and pay him well and make it a matter of honor that he 
shall get no indirect gain from his position, and he will turn out a Lawrence. 
Grive the same man poor pay. and expose him. as he must be exposed, to great 
temptations in the way of illicit gain, and you will in practice be iinable to main- 
tain a high standard of' official duty. The Americans must not be misled by the 
fact 'that they will be able to get plenty of men, and apparently sound men. at 
small salaries. As Lord Cornwallis told his masters in the East India Company, 
they could get a dttzen men to be governor-general for no salary at all. but that did 
show that it would be wise not to give their governor-general proper remunera- 
tion. Depend wpon it. this apparently simple matter of salaries is of the utmost 
importance. If a man has a good salary, and therefore a desirable post, he has a 
perpetxTa.1 reminder that he has forfeited any right to private gain. If he is inade- 
quately paid, he has a sense of grievance and tells himself when he is tempted 
that he has a moral right to do for himself what the country ought to have done 
for him. 

Side by side with the problem of militaiy organization, and closely allied to it, 
is the ijroblem of civil administration. Very soon after the troops have taken 
possession of Cuba. Porto Rico, and the Philippines there will be an urgent need 
for civil administrators, inchiding judges, of all kinds. Here, again, the need for 
a satisfactory teniire of office and high salaries will become urgent, more urgent, 
indeed, than in the case of the soldiers, who are always largely protected by the 
sense of esprit de corps. It is in reference to this question of how to provide these 
civil administrators that we see the only signs of hopelessness and pessimism that 
have yet been exhibited by the Americans. G-rave Americans of experience and 
high standing are apt to say that they do not see where or how they are to obtain 
men of the kind we obtain for the Indian civil service. The material, they infer, 
does not exist. We do not believe it for a moment. The material does exist, 
only as yet it is in the raw. It will be the duty of America, in the coiirse of the 
next few years, to develop a body of Indian civilians — men who, if turned into a 
tropical swamp or forest and told to organize a government and administer it, 
will do so straight away. 

No doubt making a start will be a difficulty: but that once made, a tradition of 
good service will soon develop, and thousands of young men will come forward. 
After all, the States have never found any difficulty in filling West Point and 
their Naval College, and exactly the same stamp of man will do for civilian work. 
Look. too. at the success of the American missionaries. The same zeal and the 
willingness to work away from home among savages and semisavages will, we 
are certain, be placed at the disposal of the state. The men who fill our Indian 
civil service are mainly the sons of naval and military officers, of professors, of 
schoolmasters, of doctors, and, above all, of clergymen. All these classes are to 
be found in the States, and when once the need and the oijportunity are realized 
they will give their sons to the service of the state. Only one thing is necessary — 
the jiarent who thinks of bringing up a son for imperial work must be made to 
feel that his boy will have a real career open to him, good pay, a secure-tenure of 
his post, a pension when he retires, and an office conveying a certain amount of 
distinction and consideration. When America has developed, as we believe she 
will develop, a class of civilians, she will have added a most valuable element to 
her population. Once create a high standard of administration in Cuba and the 
Philiijpines, and the effects will be felt in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. 

A form of government (among the many) worthy of consideration is : 
1. A governor with an executive council of six members, say, 

Official members of legislative council: 

Colonial secretary (lieutenant-governor) . 

Treasurer. 

Attorney-general . 

Commanding officer of army. 

Commanding officer of navy. 

Commissioner of lands, or collector of customs, 

and also six unofficial meml)ers. 

The official members in many cases are advisory only, but must 
vote in legislative council with the governor. In many cases " To tlie 
natives a large share of self-government has been conceded ; their sys- 



508 TREATY OF PEACE. 

teiii of village and disli-iet councils has l)een recognized and improved 
and supplemented l)y an annual meeting of the high chiefs and rep- 
resentatives fr(mi eacli pi-ovince, presided o\'er by the governor. The 
regulations i-ecommended by these l^odies have, however, to receive 
the sanction of the legislative council before acquiring the force of 
law.-' 

To this should be added a coniuussioner (>]• minister of native alfairs, 
with a salary which should impai't a dignity and importance to the 
otilice, which should ])e purely advisoiy and given to one of their 
lead.ers. 

'2. Or, like the government of Ceylon, ''administered by a gov- 
ernor, aided by an executive council of five members and a legisla- 
tive council of eighteen, including the governor and executive council. 
The legislative council contains representatives of the principal races 
and interests in the island. For administrative purposes the island 
is divided into nine provinces, at the head of each of which there is 
a government agent. The larger towns have a local l)oard, and in 
the country districts" (of which the Philippines will mainly consist) 
"the natives retain their village councils and ti'il)unals for matters of 
minor importance." 

I lielieve tliat it Avill be an easy matter to secure the loyalty and 
fidelity of the natives, with the maintenance by us of a small and 
very quickly decreasing army. If we attempt the unwise thing of 
ignoring the natives, an army of 50,000 men will be none too small, 
including tlie exploration and a])solute control of the southern islands 
and government of the whole of all of them. Enlisting the natives, 
and giving them what is verj^ small food and pay compared Avith our 
allowances, v.dll make a good army of any size we wish, easily subdue 
any hostile tribes, open all the country, and reduce our present force 
of 20,000 to 10,000 men. I am confident, after a short time, to very 
much less. 

In connection with the settlement of the question of form of gov- 
ernment will come necessary legislation in the four most important 
questions of currency, revenue, opium, and the admission of the 
Chinese. That silver must remain the currency for a long time seems 
certain. This is a question (apart from whatever views we entertain 
on a gold standard or bimetallism) on which it would l)e difficult to 
educate the natives to the belief that our silver dollar is worth double 
the Mexican of the same weight and fineness, so an attempt to intro- 
duce it would result in doul)le wages and cost of products; hence, 
though the British are as tenacious as anyone of the gold standard of 
currency, by an order in council in 1894 a British dollar was author- 
ized to be issued for circulation in the East. It is identical in Aveight 
and fineness with the Japanese yen (same as Mexican dollar), and has 
been made legal tender in Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, and 
Labuan. Notes payable in th is are issued by the Hongkong and Shang- 
hai Bank, the manager of wliich, with its twenty-six branches, the 
recognized authority in the East, ex])ressed to me the opinion that we 
might to advantage repeat the experiment with the trade dollai'in tlie 
Philippines. 

I have no doul)t that it will be a po])ular and successful currency, 
and an Amei-ican bank of issue, abundantly secured, will be of great 
utility and pi'cclude the cum])r()us method of handling such masses of 
silver; l)ut the question, as well as the other three, on all of which 
tlie wisest differ, should be considered by a commission of experts. 
This especially in regard to revenue. Shall we have an open gate, a 



TREATY OF PEACE. 509 

free port? Shall we discriminate in favor of American goods, a policy 
not successful with the French in Cochin China? They admit their 
goods free there and have heavy duties on those of other countries at 
their four ports. Shall we have a land tax, source of the greatest 
revenue in India and the greatest permanent source of revenue in 
Egypt? 

I am inclined to believe in a personal tax, the j)eninsula system of 
a document of identity (cedula personal), which was adopted in 1884, 
and which, with some modifications, will be serviceable. These have 
ranged from -So to §37.50. Of the higher amounts of taxation there 
seems to be no complaint. The lowest might be reduced to -SI or 
•SI. 50. The cedula serves as a passport, and must be produced by 
the interested x)arties to make legal documents effective, and is noted 
in the legal instrument. 

In Ceylon a salt tax, road tax, and tax on consumers of imported 
rice is levied, running from 2.12 rupees (75 cents) to 0.09 rupees 
(13.30), or a little more with a large family, the latter applying to 
males, the head of a family of five. This was practically the same 
contribution by the natives to the support of the government. 

Further, great revenue should come from opium and tax on Chinese 
admitted. The British opium commissioner decided in effect that the 
reported ill-effects of opium have been greatl}' exaggerated; that it has 
not been a great injury to the Chinese as a nation, no more than spirits 
and tobacco have been to other countries. I have not the report at 
hand, bufi this is my imjjression. At all events the trade in it has not 
been suppressed and is a source of great revenue. In India, 7,000,000 
rupees; in Hongkong, a small area, $286,000 a year. To obtain this 
revenue bj^ any import duty is impossil)le. Smuggling is too easy 
and the Chinese, the only consumers, too adroit. The farining sys- 
tem, selling by auction or by advertisement for public tenders the 
monopoly to the highest bidder, is the only method. For Manila and 
the adjoining district, $550,000 was received for the privilege for three 
years, and it is probable that a large sum in addition was paid to 
some officials. The farmer paid also a duty of 2 pesos per 100 kilos 
(220 pounds). Our Treasury officials, not being aware of the farming 
custom, in their new regulations simj)!}^ left the 2 pesos duty, which 
would be less than $1 (gold) on 220 pounds, where the American would 
be $1,320. It would be absolutely impossible to collect any proper 
duty or prevent smuggling, but the farmer has been able to do this, 
and Avill be. 

Then the question of the admission of Chinese, with the strong 
arguments on both sides. The merchants of Manila are unanimous 
in their rei^resentations of the necessity for more coolie labor. They 
and many others require it in Manila, and think that it will be nec- 
essary in railroad building, and in the development of the country, 
saying, "There is no question of comi3eting with American labor 
here, there being no such in the country, nor can there be, the climate 
I)roliiblting that. Cheap labor and plenty of it is the life blood of the 
Philippines. There is room for three to four millions of Chinese 
comfortably, while 00,000 is the present estimate." 

The Chairman: 
Q. Room for them where? — A. In the island of Luzon. "Were 
any road making, new railway, or agriculture work being done, a 
million would be absorbed at once, and next year another million, 
and so on." This is the argument of those favoring admission. 



510 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Statement resumed : Taxes on the admission of these could be easity 
made 810. In fact, it lias been >?-H>; has run on f(n* years at varying 
lates, and still the Chinaman Avill come. I toive no doubt that many 
miiilit be admitted to advantage; probably there sliould be limitations 
as to tenure of stay, uumbei-s, and character of employment and pur- 
suits. Then admission will be opposed by the natives, but it is mj' 
conviction that they can be brought in this, as in other matters, to 
look upon it in a reasonable light, rd'ter our determination as to what 
is ex})edi<.'iit. 

AVith sli-ength, firmness, justice, and fair dealing, we can do any- 
thing with the native, and make a happy and jn-osperous countr}' 
beyond any present expectations. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. I Avould like to ask a question whicli occurs to me now. It was 
stated that one-lialf of the Spanish troops in the Philippine group 
was native. Do you know anything of that';' — A. I think quite that. 
The best figures we could have at the time of the surrender and bef(»re 
that and prettj' well carried out, was that they had between lo,5(!() 
and 14:,0()() men at Manila. I asked Jaudenes how many Si)aniards 
there were, and he said 7,500 to 8,000. We took 22,000 ritle*, but 
man}" were in the arsenal. In the other islands the proportion would 
be greater than that. 

Q. How did they succeed while this war was going on — this insur- 
rection- — in keeping these soldiers within their allegiance? — A. I think 
the way many of the insurgents got their arms was through deserticjus. 
But there were, of course, large numbers of men who had lived under 
Spanish rule and in contact with the Spaniards, who regarded the 
natives as a low order of people, the Spaniards as their masters, and 
they clung to them, as I sui:)pose the negroes did in our civil war to 
their white masters. 

Q. What kind of soldiers did the natives make with the Span- 
iards'? — A. I think very much the same as the ai'my Aguinaldo had. 
The Spanish army made a most wretched showing wlien you come to 
think of it, for Aguinaldo to go there without a man and then to 
drive even 7,000 Spaniards alone 25 miles to their defenses. It is 
about as feeble as their naval conduct. 

Q. AVhat proportion of native soldiers do j'ou think it would lie 
safe for us to have acting with our command, under white field 
officers but under native company' officers, in our control of the Phi- 
lippine Islands'? — A. I think the question of native company officers 
might have to be put off for some time, except the noncommissioned 
officers. I would first see Avhat turn things took in tliat way. I think 
the Filipinos have had enough fighting and Avaut peace, and they will 
gain respect for us, and I think in a little while it would require very 
few soldiers, possibly none. You take it in Burma. I talked with 
an Englishnum on our steamer, who is deputy chief of police or dep- 
uty collector, and lie said he had a considerable force under him and 
he was the only white man for 40 miles, and that he woidd not see 
another one for three months. 

Q. You think it would be safe to take half and half? — A. I think 
1hree to one would be safe. I think 10,000 men would soon suffice for 
us, and after a year it could be reduced to a much smaller number. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. Yon would want the commissi<med officers white just now'?^ — 
A. Yes ; I would let the civil offices go to some of them, and see how they 



1 



TREATY OF PEACE. 511 

got Oil, and I have no question of the result. In some of the Engiish 
provinces they have a civil governor and a native governor. The 
moment the latter rebels at any action of the governor he is speedilj- 
bronglit to agreement. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. In your judgment, from \vhat you have seen of the islands, how 
near will tlie revenues of the isiands support the government? — 
A. That is going to depend on which vray you make the revenue, and 
also the expenses — how much the army and navy will cost. The 
custom-house gave last year — which was, I suj)pose, a wretched year 
for business — between four and five millions of revenue at Manila. 
The personal tax was a great source of revenue, and the real-estate 
tax and the licenses were very great. But with a land tax and with 
a personal tax it is easy enough, without making it irksome, or without 
complaint, to pay the expenses of the islands. 

The Chairman: 

Q. And raise Iioav much revenue? — A. That is hard to say. 

Q. Thej' have been raising nine millions, we understand? — A. It 
should have been much more. Thefts and extortions prevailed. 
Monopolies were sold for which tlie Government received paltry sums; 
the concessions granted from Madrid, e. g., for the manufacture of 
beer, the sole privilege with immunity from all duties, the Govern- 
ment receiving only 8120 a year. The largest tobacco company had 
most valuable privileges with apparently little payment. The opium 
monopoly for Manila and the adjoining province paid the veiy inade- 
quate amount of al)out 8180, ()()() a year. Special f^es j)ertaining to 
the custom-house, etc., were paid to the archbishop. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Those things have been stopped. How do they take it? — A. The 
merchants like it very much. 

Q. Are the jiriests making any difficulty? — A. No, sir; the}' are too 
frightened, and many of them have gone away. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Do you think the^" will go home, all of them? — A. The thing 
will be so much changed that there is no profit to them or danger 
from their remaining. 

Q. As I understand it, then, j'our opinion is that with a fair and 
reasonable imposition of taxes in the islands, and reasonable duties 
on imports, the islands will supi)ort themselves in all the forms of 
government necessary, military and civil? — A. I think certainly it 
will. I do not saj' that the first year it is going to do that; you have 
to give time for it ; but I think there will be so much capital going 
into the place which will be willing to pay for privileges that it will 
only be a question of a short time. 

Mr. Reid: 

Q. Would it be possible, by a fair and reasonable tariff, equally 
applicable to the importation of all nations, collected at the princii3al 
custom-houses there, to raise monej' enough to administer the govern- 
ment? — A. A tariff alone? 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. On imports and exports? 

Q. On imports alone. — A. I should rather doubt that. But I've 
never heard complaints of the export charges, and very likely those, 



512 TREATY OF PEACE. 

with the imports, will suffice. I do not see any objection to the cedula 
tax. 

Q. Has not that bren the one of which the most cora^Dlaint was 
made? — A. It has been too high; I think that is the reason. I do not 
see the objection to the land tax. See how well it has worked in 
Egypt, and in India. Dicey says in his article that it is paid more 
readily than under the old government, l^ecause they know that they 
are being treated fairly, and that when it was once paid they would 
not be called upon to pay it again. I will read from Mr. Dicey's 
article: " Up to 1882 the acreage of taxable land in Egypt was calcu- 
lated at 5,000,000. It is now increased by over 000,00(3 acres, or close 
ui)on lo per cent. Yet the total amount of the land tax — the great 
permanent source of revenue in Egypt — is actually less in 1897 than 
it was in 1881." 

According to Sir Edwin's figures the average land tax per acre has 
been diminished during the above i^eriod from 22s. to 18s. 3d. The 
arrears of land tax, which formerly attained colossal proportions, 
have now been practically paid off. The fellah, when once he had 
paid his annual contribution, has no longer anj^ apprehension, as he 
had in the days of Ismail, of being called upon to pay again in 
advance long before the date of the next installment had become due. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. As 3'OU understood Mr. Reid's question in regard to the produc- 
tion of revenue from the taxes collected at the custom-houses; they 
were to be levied equally upon all nations, including the United 
States? — A. Yes. 



PRELIMINARY REPORT OF DR. GEORGE F. BECKER, OF THE 
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ON THE GEOLOGICAL 
AND MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. 



Department of State, 
Washington, November M, 1898. 
Sir: I liHve the honor to inclose, for the information of the com- 
mission, copy of a letter from the Secretary' of the Interior, trans- 
mitting- a copy of a preliminary report made by Dr. C4eorg-e F. Becker, 
of the "United States Geological Snrvey, in regard to the geological 
and mineral resonrces of the Philippine Islands. 

I have the honor to be, sir, yonr obedient servant, 

John Hay. 
Hon. William R. Day, 

Chairman of ihe United States Peace Commission, Paris, France. 
(Inclosure: From Tnterioi- Department, October 21), 1898, with 
inclosure.) 



Department op the Interior, 

Washington, October 29, 1898. 

Sir: In May, 181)8, by arrangement between the honorable the Sec- 
retary of War with this Department, Dr. George F. Becker, geologist, 
of the United States Geological Snrvey, accompanied the military 
expedition to the Philippine Islands, for the pnrpose of procuring- 
information touching the geological and mineral resources of said 
islands. 

Dr. Becker has made a preliminary report on the subject, a copy of 
which, togetlier with a copy of a letter from the director of the Geo- 
logical Survey, submitting the same for my consideration, are here- 
with transmitted for your information. 
Very respectfully, 

C. N. Bliss, Secretary. 

The honorable the Secretary of State. 

T P 33 513 



MEMORANDUM OiN THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE 
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



By Geokgk F. Becker, Uniicd States Geological Siirrey. 



This brief memorandum, prepared at the request of Admiral Dewey,' 
probably covers all tlie maiu discoveries in the geology of the Philip- 
pines which are of economic interest. It is drawn uj) from data 
recorded in the Spanisli mining bureau (Inspeccion de Minas), but not' 
published, manuscript mine reports by the late William Ashburner, 
verbal infoimation obtained in Manila, and from various technical 
publications, of Semper, Santos, Koth, Drasche, Abella, and others. 

Oidy about a score of the islands are known to contain deposits of 
valuable minerals. These are arranged below in the order of their 
latitude to give an idea of their geographical distribution, and to facili- 
tate finding the islands on the map. The latitude of the nothern end 
of each is taken as that of the island. The character of the valuable 
minerals stated in the table will afford a general notion of their resources. 

Mineral-hearing i.<<la7ids and their resources. [ 



Island. 



Lat. N. 
end. 



Character ot mineral resources. 



Luzon 

Catandnaue.s 

Mariuduque 

Mindoro 

Carraray 

Batau 

Eapu-Rapu 

Masbate 

Rouiblon 

Saniar 

Sibuyan 

Semerara 

Panay 

Billkan 

Leyte 

Cel)u 

NegroH 

Bohol 

Pauaon 

Mindanao 

Suln Archipelago 



38 

14 

13 

13 

13 

13 

13 

12 

12 
12 
12 
12 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
10 
10 
9 
6 



40 
8 

34 

32 

21 

19 

15 

37 

37 
36 
30 
7 

56 
43 
35 
17 

io 

10 
50 
30 



Coal, gold, copper, lead, iron, sulphur, marble, kaolin. 

Gold.' 

Lead, silver. 

Coal, gold, copper. 

Coal. 

Do. 

Do. 
Coal, copper. 
Marble. 
Coal, gold. 
Gold.'" 
Coal. 

Coal, oil, gas, gold, copper, iron, mercury (?). 
Sulphur. 

Coal, oil, mercury ( ?)• 
Coal, oil, gas, gold, lead, silver, iron. 
Coal. 
Gold. 

Do. 
Coal, gold, copper, platinum. 
Pearls. 



The distribution of each mineral or metal may now be sketched in 
somewhat greater detail. In many cases the information given in this 
abstract is exhaustive, so far as the available material is concerned. 
The coal fields of Cebu, however, have been studied in some detail by 
Mr. Abella, and in a few other instances more extended information 
has been condensed for the present purpose. 
514 



TREATY OF PEACE. 515 

COAL. 

So far as is definitely liuowii, the coal of the Philippine Islands is all 
of Tertiary age. and might be better characterized as a highly carbon- 
ized lignite. It is aualogons to the Japanese coal and to that of 
Washington, but not to the Welsh or Pennsylvania coals. Such lig- 
nites usually contain considerable combined water (8 to 18 per cent) 
and bear transportation ill. They are also apt to contain much sul- 
phur, as iron pyrite, rendering them subject to spontaneous combus- 
tion and injurions to boiler jdates. Nevertheless, when pyritous 
seams are avoided and the lignite is proiierly handled, it forms a valu- 
able fuel, especially for local consumption. In these islands it would 
appear that the native coal might supplant English or Australian coal 
for most purposes. Lignite is widely distributed in the archipelago; 
some of the seams are of excellent width, and the quality of certain of 
them is high for fuel in this class. 

Coal exists in various provinces of the island of Luzon (Abra, Cam- 
arinos, Batan, Sorsogon). The finest beds thus far discovered appear 
to be in the small island of Batan, lying to the east of the southern 
portion of Luzon, in latitude 13° 19'. These seams vary from 2 feet 
6 inches to l-i feet 8 inches in thickness. Analyses have been made 
in the laboratory of the Inspeccion de Minas, and the mean of seven 
'analyses gives the following composition: 

Per cent. 

Wiiter 13.52 

Volatile m.atter 37. 46 

Fixed cnrbon 44. 46 

Ash 4.56 

Sum 100.00 

One pound of this coal will convert 6.25 pounds of water at 40° C. 
into steam at 100° C. The heating eflect is about three-fourths of that 
of Cardiff coal. The same beds are known to exist in other small adja- 
cent islands, Carraray and Eapu-Eapu. A number of concessions for 
coal mining have also been granted on the main island of Luzon, just 
south of Batan, at the town of Bacon. No doubt the beds here are either 
identical or, at least, closely associated with the coal seams in the little 
islands. 

The coal field of southern Luzon is said to extend across the Strait of 
San Bernardino into the northern portion of Samar, Here coal is 
reported at half a dozen localities, but I have been able to ascertain no 
details as to the thickness or quality. 

In Mindoro there are large deposits of coal in the extreme southern 
portion (Bulacao) and on the small adjacent islands of Semarara. This 
fuel is said to be similar to that of Batan. 

The islands of Masbate and Panay contain coal, the deposits of which 
thus far discovered do not seem of much importance. Specimens from 
the southwestern portion of Leyte, analyzed in the laboratory of the 
inspeccion de minas, are of remarkably high quality, but nothing 
definite about the deposit is known to me. 

The first discovery of coal in the archipelago was made in the island 
of Zebu in 1827. Since then lignitic beds have been found on the 
island at a great variety of points. The most important croj^pings are 
on the eastern slope, within some 15 or 20 miles of the capital, also 
named Cebu, Though a considerable amount of coal has been extracted 
here the industry has not been a profitable one hitherto. This is at 



51(J TREATY OF PEACE. 

least in part due to ciude methods of transportation. It is said, bow- 
ever, that the seams are olten badly faulted. 

xVt Ulin^-, about 10 miles west of the capital, the seams reach a 
maximum thickuess of lo.h feet. Ten analyses of Cebu coal are at my 
disposal. They indicate a fuel with about two-thirds the calorific 
effect of Cardiff coal and with only about 1 per cent asli. Large quan- 
tities of the coal might, 1 suspect, contain a higher percentage of ash. 

The island of Negros is nearly parallel witli Cebu and appears to be 
of similar geological constitution, but it has been little exj)lored and 
little of it seems to have been reduced to subjection by the 8i)aniards. 
There are known to be deposits of coal at Calatrara, on the east 
coast of NegTos, and it is believed that they are of important extent. 
In the great island of Mindanao coal is known to occur at eight differ- 
ent localities, but no detailed examinations ot any kind appear to have 
been nuide. Seven of these localities are on the east coast of JMindanao 
and the adjacent small islands. They indicate the presence of lignite 
from one end of the coast to the other. The eighth locality is in the 
western province called Zamboanga, on the gulf of Sigbuguey. 

PETROLEUM. 

In the island of Cebu petroleum has been found associated with coal 
at Toledo on the west coast, where a concession has been granted. It 
is also reported from Asturias, to the northwest of Toledo, on the same 
coast, and from Algeria to the south. Natural gas is said to exist in 
the Cebu coal fields. On Panay, too, oil is rei)orted at Janiuay, in the 
province of Iloilo, and gas is reported from the same island. Petroleum 
highly charged with paraffin is also found on Leyte, at a point about 4 
miles from Villaba, a town on the west coast. 

GOLD. 

Gold is found in a vast number of localities in the archipelago from 
northern Luzon to central Mindanao. In most cases the gold is detri 
tal, and found either in existing water courses or in stream deposits 
now deserted by the current. These last are called " aluviones " by 
the Spaniards. It is said that in Mindanao some of the gravels are in 
an elevated position, and adapted to hydraulic mining. There are no 
data at hand which intimate decisively the value of any of the placers. 
They are washed by natives largely with cocoanut shells for pans, 
though the batea is also in use. 

In the Province of Abra, at the northern end of Luzon, there are 
placers, and the gravel of the River Abra is auriferous. In Lapanto 
there are gold-(iuartz veins as well as gravels. Gold is obtained in 
this Province close to the copper mines. In Benguet the gravels of 
the Kiver Agno carry gold. There is also gold in the Province of 
Bontoc and in Nueva Ecija. The most important of the auriferous 
Provinces is Camarines Norte. Here the townships of Mambulao, 
Paracale, and Labo are especially well known as gold-producing locali- 
ties. Mr. Drasche, a well-known German geologist, says that there 
were 700 natives at work on the rich quartz veins of this i)lace at the 
time of his visit about twenty- five years since. At Paracale there are 
parallel quartz veins in granite, one of which is 20 feet in width and 
contains a chute in Avhich the ore is said to assay 38 ounces of gold per 
ton. One may susi)ect that this assay hardly represented an average 
sample. Besides the localities mentioned, many others of this Prov- 
ince have been worked by the natives. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 517 

The islands ofMiudoro, Catanduanes, Sibiiyan, Simar, Panay, Cebu, 
and Bohol are reported to contain gold, but no exact data are acces- 
sible. 

At the south end of the small island of Panaon, which is just to 
the south of Leyte, there are gold quartz veins, one of which has been 
worked to some' extent. It is feet in thickness, and has yielded from 
$6 to -$7 per ton. 

In the island of Mindanao there are two known gold-bearing dis- 
tricts. One of these is in the province of Surigao, where Placer and 
other townships show gravels and veins. The second district is in the 
province of Misamis. Xear the settlement of Imponau and on the 
Gulf of Macajalar, there are said to be many square kilometers of 
gravel carrying large quantities of gold with which is associated 
platinum. The product of this district was estimated some years since 
at 150 ounces per month, all extracted by natives with bateas or cocoa- 
nut- shell dishes. 

COPPER. 

Copper ores are reported from a great number of localities in the 
Philippines. They are said to occur in the following islands: Luzon 
(provinces of Lepanto, Benguet, and Camarines), Mindoro, Capul,* 
Masbete, Panay (province of Antique), and Mindanao (province of 
Surigao). Many of these occurrences are probably unimportant. The 
great island of Mindanao, being practically unexplored, is full of possi- 
bilities; but as yet no important copper deposit is known to exist there. 
An attempt was made to work the deposit in Masbete, but no success 
seems to have been obtained. On the other hand, northern Luzon con- 
tains a copper region which is untjuestionably valuable. The best known 
portion of this region lies about Mount Data, a peak given as 2.500 
meters in height, Iving in latitude 10° 53'. longitude 120° 58' east of 
Greenwich or 124^ 38' east of Madrid. The range of which data forms 
one peak trends due north to Cape Lacay-Lacay and forms a boundary 
for all the provinces infringing upon it. 

Data itself lies in the Province of Lepanto. In this range copper 
ore has been smelted bv the natives from time immemorial, and before 
Magellan discovered the Phili])pines. The process is a complicated 
one, based on the same principles as the method of smelting sulpho- 
salts of tiiis metal in I^urope and America. It consists in alternate 
partial roasting and reductions to "matte," and eventually to block 
copper. It is generally believed that this process mnst have been 
introduced from China or Japan. It is practiced only by one peculiar 
tribe of natives, the Igorrotcs, who are remarkable in many ways. 

Vague reports and the routes by which copper smelted by natives 
comes to market indicate that there are copper mines in various por- 
tions of the Cordillera Central, but the only deposits which have been 
examined with anv care are those at Mancanyan (about 5 miles west of 
Mount Data) and two or three other localities within a few miles of 
Mancanyan. The deposits of IMancanyan are described as veins of 
rich ore reaching 7 meters in width and arranged in groups. Mean 
assays are said to show over 16 per cent of copper, mainly as tetra- 
hedrite and allied ores. The gangue is quartz. The country rock is 
described as a large quartzite lens embedded in a great mass of trachyte. 

* I am unable to tind this island, which probably is a very small one. 



518 TREATY OF PEACE. 

An attempt has been made by white men to work these dej^osits, but 
with no considerable success. The faiUire does not seem to liave been 
due to the (juality or (juantity of ore found. 

LEAD AND SILVER. 

A lead mine has been partially developed near the town of Cebu, on 
the island of the same name. 

The most important deposit of argentiferous galena is said to be at 
Torrijos. on the STuall island of Marindu(iue (latitude 13^ 34'). A metric 
ton, or l,(iO(» kilograms, is said to contain 9G grams of silver, G grams 
gold, and alio. 5 kilograms of lead. 

In Camarines, a province of Luzon, lead ores occur, but are worked 
only for the gold they contain. 

IRON. 

There is iron ore in abundance in Luzon, Carabello,* Cebu, Panay, 
and doubtless in other islands. In Luzon it is found in the provinces 
of Laguna, Pampanga, and Camarines Norte, but principally in Bula- 
can. The finest deposits are in the last-named province, near a small 
settlement named Camachin, which lies in latitude 15° 1' and longitude 
lL'4° 47' east of Madrid. A sumll industry exists here, wrought iron 
being produced in a sort of bloomery and manufactured into plowshares. 
The process has been described in detail, so far as I know. It would 
appear that charcoal pig iron might be produced to some advantage in 
this region. The lignites of the archipelago are probably unsuitable 
for iron blast furnaces. 

QUI civ SILVER. 

Rumors of the occurrence of this metal in Panay and Leyte have 
failed of verification. Accidental losses of this metal by prospectors 
or surveyors sometimes lead to the reports of the discovery of deposits, 
and ochers are not seldom mistaken for impure cinnabar. 

NONMETALLIC SUBSTANCES. 

Sulphur deposits abound about active and extinct volcanoes in the 
Philippines. In Luzon the princii)al sulphur deposits are in Daclan, 
in the i)rovince of Benguet, and at Colasi, in Camarines. The finest 
deposit in the archipelago is said to be on the little Island of Biliran, 
which lies to the northwest of Leyte. 

Marble of fine quality occurs on the small island of Komblon (latitude 
12° 37'). It is much employed in churches in Manila for baptismal 
fonts and other i)uri)oses. Marbles are also (juarried at Montalban in 
the province of Manila, and at Binangonan in the province of Marong. 

There are processions for mining kaolin at Losbanos in Laguna 
province. 

Pearl fisheries exist in the Sulu archipelago and are said to form an 
important source of wealth. 

Manila, Septend)er 15, 181)8. 

* I have not found this island on the map. 



DATA COKCERKING THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: THEIR HISTORY, 
PEOPLE, GEOGRAPHY, GEOLOGY, RESOURCES, AND STRATEGIC 

IMPORTANCE. 



INTRODUCTION AND NOTES ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
OF THE PHILIPPINES. 



By Eusiga Everett Hayden, United States Navy. 



The data herewith, selected as carefully as possible in the short time at 
my disposal, consist for the most part of quotations from authoritative 
sources giviug an outline history of the islands, their geology, geogra- 
phy, people, and resoui'ces. There is included also a copy of a special 
memorandum of information prepared for the President, by direction 
of the Secretary of the Navy, on the islands of Sebu and Negros. tlieir 
mineral and otjier resources and availability as naval stations, and a 
compilation of data regarding coal and petroleum in the Philippines 
and vicinity, a subject of the greatest importance in connection with 
the present value and disposition as well as the future development of 
the islands. 

Jagor, the well-known German authority, made the following striking 
prediction in the concluding woi"ds of his work on the Philippines, 
published in 1873: 

In proportion as the navigation of the woHt coast of America extends the iutlnence 
of the American element over the South Sea, the captivating, magic power which 
the great Repiihlic exercises over the Spanish colonies will not fail to make itself 
felt also in the Philijtpines. The Americans are evidently destined to bring to a full 
development the germs originated by the Spaniards. As cou(|aerovs of modern 
times, tliey pursue their road to victory with the assistance of the pioneer's ax and 
plow, representing an age of peace and connnercial prosperity in contrast of that 
by-gone and chivalrous age whose champions were upheld by the cross and pro- 
tected by the swoi-d. A consideral)le portion of Spanish America already belongs to 
the United States, and has since attained an importance which could not possibly 
have been anticipsited either under the Spanish Government or during the anarchy 
which followed. Witli regard to permanence, the Spanish system can not for a 
moment be compared with that of America. While each of tin; colonies, in order to 
favor a privileged class by inmieiliate gains, exhausted still more the already 
enfeebled population of the metropolis by the withdrawal of the best of its ability, 
America, on the contrary, has attracted to itself from all countries the most ener- 
getic element, which, once on its soil and freed from all fetters, restlessly progress- 
ing, has extended its power and iulluence still further and further. 

The actual present resources of the islands are well indicated in the 
accompanying papers, and in considering their future, under the con- 
trol of one or more governments that develop and foster, rather than 
conceal and suppress, natural resources and native talent, we must bear 
in mind the probable vast increase in production, poj)ulation, and com- 
merce, accompanied by the introduction of modern methods and all the 
established improvements in trans]>ortation, communication, and sani- 
tation. The commercial future of the islands, under such new condi- 
tions, will be a revelation to the world, and their strategic position and 
featuies must be(;ome of supreme importance in this great future field 
of commercial and naval rivalry. 

519, 



i)2(j TEEATY OF PEACE. 

It lias been pointed out by a recent writer that tlie openinu- oi' the 
Suez Canal broiigiit untold misery upon the coniparativels' li;i])py and 
industrious .Malays in the riiili[)pines, iuasnjuch as it resulted in the 
establisiinient ol' a Si)anish line of steamers, brin^ms- bureaucratic 
administration in place of the old paternal r(''«j;iine and awakening into 
renewed life and activity the dormant curse of 8i)anish civil and mili- 
tary rule. It seems sale to predict, however, that with the opening of 
the Nicaragua Canal, wliich will put 500 ndles of the fc^ulu 8ea, from 
Surigao to Jiahibac, on the direct great-circle route of equatorial steam 
navigation around the earth, the dawn of a new and glorious era of ])ros- 
])erity will succeed the long night of nearly four centuries of- Spanish 
domination. 

The Philippines are very nearly as large in area as the British Isles; 
they are larger than New Zealand, and as large as Italy, with her own 
Sicily and Sardinia and French Corsica and British Malta added. 
Indeed, the eastern archipelago may be roughly compared to beauti- 
ful, fertile, volcanic Italy, only more so. Imagine the plains and hills 
of northern Italy r«»nt from the snowy Alps by some volcanic (;ataclysm 
to form a big island like Luzon, with Genoa for Manila; soutliern Italy 
shattered into a score of islands, large an.d small, Masbate, Samar and 
Leyte, Xegros and Sebu, Panay, Bohol; Sicily enlarged to thrice its 
size, like Mindanao, joined l)y a line of islets and reefs to the ])rqiect- 
ing cape of Tunis, as the Sulu Ishnuls join that island to nortluast 
Borneo; call Corsica Miiidoro; elongate Sardinia to almost reach the 
African mainland, as Palawan does the northern ])oint of Borneo. The 
inclosed Tyrrhenian Sea will then correspond to the Sulu Sea, the Med- 
iterranean of the iar East, through whit^h commerce from the Pacilic 
must pass on the direct route to Singapore, tis it does here from Suez 
to Gibraltar: to the northward, the distant mainland (Austria, France, 
and Sixain) will correspond to China, Tongking, and Siam; to the south- 
ward (Egy])t, Tri})oli, Tunis, and Morocco), to New Guinea, Celebes, 
Borneo, and Sumatra; and the strategic importance of the archipelago, 
in peace or war, is clearly manifest. 

This great inland sea, the Sulu or Mindoro Sea, if once well charted, 
its channels lighted and buoyed, its Malay pirates su})i)iessed, its fer- 
tile islands cultivated and their mineral wealth explored, must become 
the scene of an enormous commerce, composed not merely of the ves- 
sels of a local coasting trade, but the seagoing ships and steamers of 
every nation engaged in the Asiatic, East Indian, and Australasian 
trade. The completion of the Nicarag:na Canal may result in the estab- 
lishment of an equatorial steamship line whose vessels will circumnavi- 
gate tlie globe on schedule trii)s in eighty days, and the great circle 
route from ibito, Nicaragua, to Singapore, via Honolulu and Guam 
Island, passes diagonally through 500 miles of the Sulu Sea, from 
Surigao Sti-ait to l>alabac. 

Similarly, the shortest route from Hongkong to all Australian and 
New Zealand ports, from Tongking to New Caledonia, from the Yellow 
Sea to eastern Java, Celebes, and west Australia, and from the entire 
North Pacific; Ocean to the Straits of Suiida ami Singapore, is by way 
of the channels of the Phili])i)ine archi])ehigo and its great inland sea. 

Strategically the Philippines are admirably located for commercial 
and imval operation, in jieace or in war, but evciy consideration of 
oifensive or defensive war, as well as the i)reservation of peace, seems 
to me to reipiire tliat the entire giou]^ shall be the ))r<)i)erty of a single 
power; indeed, it were far better lor that ])i>wer to own also what is 
now British North Borneo, bounding the Sulu Sea to the southward. 



1 



TREATY OF PEACE. 521 

One might think, fi^om a casvial glance at a map, that the defense of 
this great inland sea, with its intricate channels and numerous islands, 
exits, and entrances, would be ditlicult if not imi)Ossible. A closer 
examination of a chart, however, shows but seven clear channels, four 
on the east (San i'>eniardino, Surigao, Basilau, an<l Sibutu) and three 
on the west (Verde, Mindoro, and Balabac). Good harbors, timber, 
iron, and coal are prolific, even now when the ultinmte resources of the 
islands are not even estimated; hemp, the best in the world, is the 
])roduct par excellence of this region. In iact rhe entire mati'^riel of 
modern naval warfare is at hand, awaiting only the personnel to utilize 
it. Coal, the very life of modern commerce and naval war, is abuiulant 
in many islands of the group and may occur in all. The ownership of 
such resources, so near at hand, by a commercial rival and possible 
enemy, and the establishment close by of naval coaling stations and 
dock yards, would not tend toward the preservation of peace or the 
successful iinish of a ])rospective war. 

It is not, probably, either desirable or necessary to go into details here 
regarding the strategic value of the various islands, harbors, and chan- 
nels, better shown on charts than in type, nor to discuss the relative 
value of each. In fact, as stated above, all are so intimately related 
that it is practically impossible to disassociate them in any scheme 
of offense or defense. 

It will be better for the welfare of the native inhabitants, for the com- 
mercial interests of all nations, and for the peace of the v/orld if the 
contiol of the entire group of the Philip[)ine Islands remains perma- 
nently in tiie hands of the United States, The more one studi'es the 
subje(rt, in the light of past history and the certainty of a vast future 
expansion of our trade with China and Australasia, the more convinced, 
does he become that sovereignty over the entire group, from the little 
islands north of Luzon to the farthest coral reefs that stretch toward 
the eijuator from Palawan and the Sulu Ishmds, is essential to our 
future potential energy in the far East. 

Even the wild and unexplored Palawan, which forms a natural break- 
water for oOi) miles against the sweep of the southwest monsoon, is cap- 
able, if occupied, develo])ed, and fortified during long years of peace, 
of becoming a formidable base of operations in time of war. The 
importance ot Manila is due largely to its being for centuries the capi- 
tal of the archipelago and the reservoir of its productions and su})plies. 
Divide the group and you cut off streams of wealth that help till the 
reservoir. With a rival established at Tacloban, Iloilo, Sebu, or even 
Ulugan, the enormous resources of the Visayas and Mindanao might. 
and probably would, be diverted to build up a metro})olis that would 
surpass Manila in wealth and importance. Stratcgi;;ally the Philip- 
pines seem, like our Union, to be "one and inseparable." 



SEBU AND NEOROS ISLANDS, PHILIPPINES: THEIR MINERAL ,}f 
AND OTHER RESOURCES AND AVAILABILITY AS NAVAL, f 
STATIONS. 



1. The inclosed data have been prepared for the President in com- 
pliance with tlie Older of the Secretary of the Navy dated Angust 8, 
1808. 

2. The information has been compiled in this office, from records on 
file here, together with quotations and abstracts of intbrmation talvou 
from books in the library of the Navy Department and the United 
States Geological Survey. In the latter library a large collection of 
books on this general subjeet has been made, and a catalogue of pub- 
lications relating to the Philii)pines. 

3. The data herewith consist of an outline map of the Philippines,* 
upon which the principal coal bearing islands, so far as known, have 
been shaded in green, and quotations and abstracts from various pub- 
lications relating to the two islands under consideration, including 
extracts from recent consular reports published by the State Depart- 
ment,' and cablegram from our naval attache in Paris. 

4. Negros and Sebu are about the center of the Philippine group, 
forming part of what are called the Bisayas or Visayas Islands. Negros 
comprises about 5,00() square miles, and Sebu about half as many. They 
are long, in a north-south direction, and narrow, and separated by the 
Strait of Tafian. A volcanic mountain ridge stretches the whole length 
of each island, rising to a height of about 9,000 feet in the north of 
Negros. The tianks of the ridges and the low lands near the coasts are 
covered with luxuriant tropical vegetation, 

5. The principal coal deposits thus far developed occur in these two 
islands and in Masbate and Batan,- farther north. The coal, while 
inferior in quality, makes a good steaming coal when mixed with 
anthracite or Cardiff coal, and doubtless, when the mines are developed, 
will ])rove very valuable for naval and commercial uses. 

6. The geological formation of the entire group seems to be like 
Borneo to the southward and Formosa to the northward, the carbonif- 
erous beds being broken through by volcanic ])eaks, their exposed 
edges upturned along the fhmks of these peaks and partly covered by 
lava Hows, etc., thence dipping un<ler the limestone and coral beds near 
the sea. There seems to be no reason to doubt that the coal-bearing 
beds may be found upon any and all of the islands of the entire Phili])- 
pine grou]), connecting the already develojied mines of Borneo with 
those of Formosa, All the islands give strong indications of other 
mineral wealth. su(!li as gold, c()p])er, iron, lead, and ])r('cious stones. 
Their develo[)ment hitherto has been haphazard and unscientific, but 
the results achieved are very promising. 



' Omitt<'(l here. 

'A little isJaud southeast of Luzon, hit. 13 ■ 15 N., long. 121- 05' E. 
522 



TREATY OF PEACE. 523 

7. With regard to the availability of Kegros and Sebu for naval 
tatious, the port of Sebu, one of the ohlest in the Philippiues, is small, 
ut easily defended, and might make a useful naval and coaling station, 
ot equal, in any way, however, to Iloilo, Manila, or tSubig Bay, except- 
ng for its nearness to known c<»al deposits. It should be noted tliat 
Iiese islands in the central portion of the group can only be reached 
hrough narrow straits with intricate navigation, and if light-houses 
;nd other aids to navigation in these straits were in tlie hands of another 
)Ower than that owidng these two islands, they would be more or less 
uaccessible, especially in time of war. 

8. The value of ISI^egros and Sebu as naval stations for this country 
irould be greatly lessened if various other nations established stations 
n other islands of the Philippine grou]); as coal is likely to occur in 
iny of the islands, the tendency to establish such stations would appar- 
ently be very great, in addition to the agricultural and mineral wealth 
)f the region. 

Everett Hayden, 
Acting Chief Intelligence Officer, 

Office of Ij^aval Intelltgence, 

Navy Department, August 9, 1898, 



[Coal Trade Journal, May 1, 1895, p. 349.] 

Goal mining in the Fhilippine Islands. — The coal deposits in the 
island of Sebu are now being extensively developed. They are receiv- 
ing the support of tiie Government, in tiiat they are giving preference 
to native over foreign coal. 

[Hongkong, 180'), Chronicle and Directory for Cliin;i, Japan, etc.] 

This is the capital of the Island of Sebu, and ranks next to Iloilo 
among the ports of the Philippines. It was at one time the seat of the 
administration of revenue for the whole of the Visayas, hut this was 
removed to Manila in 1S4(». Sebu is a well-built town and ])ossesses 
fine roads, but the people are devoid of commeicial enterprise. The 
ti-ade of Sebu consists principally of hemp and sugar. The neighbor- 
ing islands of Leyte, Mindanao, and Oamiguin possess extensive hemp 
plantations, a Inrge proportion of the produce of which finds its way 
to Sebu for shii)ment. Tliere are some very valuable and extensive 
coal dei)osits in the Island of Sebu, but the iniiies have not as yet been 
worked witli any enterprise. The trade in 18^):^ is represented by the 
following figures: Imports, -^1(35,881; exports. *2,448,433, as compared 
with $20.J, (>.».") and |3,6-38,()o9, respectively, in 1891. The principal 
exports of 1893 were: Sugar, 17,240,442 kilograms, and hemp, 23,299,015 
kilograms. 

[Stanford's Compendium of Geography, Vol. II, p. 81-82.] 

Sebu, or Cebu, is a long aixl narrow island, lying immediately to the 
east of Xegros, from which it is separated by a strait from 5 to 15 
miles wide and over 100 miles in lengtli. Sebu is 130 miles long and 
not more than 20 miles broad in its widest ])art and contains 2,275 
square miles, or rather less than half the area of Negros. Several 
chains of mountains of no great height traverse it from north to south, 
but little is known of its geology except that it produces gold, silver, 



"(24 TREATY OF PEACE. 

and lead, and lias no active volcanoes. Coal occurs abundantly, and ; 
is of fairly good (luality: but the complete iie.ulect of all niineial wealth 
by the Spaniards is exhibited here as else\viliere. The inhabitants are 
almost exclusively Biscayans, Imt there are said to be a few Negritos. 
The population has greatly increased of late years, owing to the gieat:l! 
development of the sugar and abaca cultivation, and now luunbers-j 
ol8,0()l), but locusts and low prii^es have recently dealt as heavy a blow 
to Sebu as to Panay. In all these islands sugar growing will probably 
give idace to hemp or some more paying crop. In IS'JO only ;^,0(H> tons 
were exported, as against 11,001) tons in 18S!). and while in the latter 
year 34 vessels — almost all of which were British — entered the port, 
the number in 1890 only amounted to 14. 

The cai>ital, Sebu, digniti(*d by the title of city, is the oldest settlement 
in the Philijjpines, and was the seat of govern iiieut until the founding ;• 
of Alaniia. It was the lirst place of any importance visited by M agellan 
on his discovery of the group, and it was upon the little island of Mactan, , 
which forms the harbor of Sebu, that he met with his death on the liTth i 
April, 1521. Fifty years later Ijegas{)i planned and built the city. It 
is picturesfiuely situated and has a tine cathedral and several churches, , 
but the population is not large. The island forms a province of itself, , 
under the administration of a military governor. 

I niuiLikoiig, 1895, Cbroiiicle nncl Directory for China, Japan, oti-.J 

Tlie islaml of Xegi'os is extren)e]>' ferlile and contributes three fourths 
of the sugar shiifjied from lloilo, tlie ({uality of which is excellent. 

I Stanford's Conipeniliiuu of Geograpliy, Volume II, ]i. 8t).] 

Negros lies to the southeast of Panay, from which it is separated by 
a strait about 15 miles in width. It is ioO miies long and on the aver- 
age abi;ut ;)0 miles wiile. Its area is 4,(550 s(juare miles. Its coast is 
comparatively little broken by bays or inlets, and it has no good har- 
bors. A central chain of mountains runs through its entire length. 
For the most part these are of no height, but the Malaspina or Chalcon 
volcano, situated towards the northern end, forms an exception. Its 
height is estimated at 8,192 feet, and it is in a state of intermittent 
activity. Owing to the narrowness of the island, there are no naviga- 
ble rivers. The inhabitants are chiefly Bisayans, and number with the 
iSegritos. from whose abundance the island received its name, about 

The island is fertile, and produces sugar, rice, tobacco, and the tex- 
tile abaca and pina, and in common with Sebu and Samar a large amount 
of ca<;a(). Its coal mines appear to be no longer worked, fhe capital 
is Bacoled, on the west coast opposite to lloilo, where the ''politico- 
military'' governor resides, and there are numerous large villages 
around the coast, though few in the interior. IJinigaran, the former 
capital, contains over 12,000 inhabitants. 

IStauforcVs Conii)eiMliiini ol Geosrapliy, "Volume II. ji. ?A.] 

Lead occurs in Sebu, and iron o;es are very abundant in Luzon and 
Mindanao. Thafc there are extensive coal measures in the aichipelago 
there is little doubt, but they have been little exploited, and coal forms 
one of the largest imi)orts of the grou[). The Comi)Ostela mine only 
turned out 7(H» tons in 1881. As yet no deep shafts have been driven, 
and what has been obtained alibrds. very rapid combustion, and is not 
well suited for steamers. Sebu and Negros are especially rich in this 



TREATY OF PEACE. 525 

proluct. Since the archipelao-o lies midway between the s'reat coal 
beds of northern Borneo and Formosa, it is probable that the mineral 
will in fiiture be worked to great advantage. 

[British Admiralty, Eastern Areliipelago, Part I, Eastern Part, 1890.] 

Xef/ros Island. — So called from the number of Negritos or Actas found 
on it by the Spaniards; is about 118 miles long, and though larger thnn 
Sebu Island is ueitlier so rich nor so i)0[)ulous. Its coast is very little 
broken by bays or inlets, and does not contain any good haibor. A 
central chain of mountains runs through it from uortli to south, which 
attains its greatest heigiit toward the latter point. The rivers are 
but small, and unfit for the navigation of vessels of burden. 

The island produces the best cocoa in the Bisayas. besides rice, mnize. 
sugar, tobacco, cotton, and abaca [a variety of the banana plant from 
which Manila hemp is obtained]. 

INoTE. — The EDcyclopanlia Britannica says the poj)ulation in 1887 was 173,000. 



[From same publication as above.] 



Sebu Island. — Sebu is au island of some importance and interest, as 
its ])ort has been thrown open to foreign commerce. It is long and 
narrow, 114 miles in length, with a greatest width of 18 miles in the 
northern part. A chain of mountains traverses the island through its 
entire lengtli, containing beds of mineral coal and, it is stated, veins of 
gold. The rivers arc^ numerous but small, and generally unfit for eitlier 
navigation or irrigation. With the exception of a few tine valleys, cul- 
tivation is conJined mainly to the seaboard. The population of the 
ishmd is estimated at 38,000 souls. The chief ex^iorts are sngar, oil, 
hemi), tobacco, coffee, and pina silk. The chief imports are European 
goods, coal, and rice. 

[Note. — The Encyclopfi'dia Britauuica says the population in 1867 was 452,000. 
Reclns gives it as 518,000.— E. H.] 

[By Sir John Bovvring, London, 1859.] 

Speaking of minerals, it is stated that gold is found in many of the 
islands — "the mountains of Oaraga and Zebu are the most ]iroductive. 
Many Indian families support themselves by wasliing the river sands. 
In the time oi' heavy rains gold is found in the streets of some of the 
pueblos when tlie floods liave passed." Iron is also Ibund in various 
islands. "A coal mine is being exi)lored in Guila Guila, in tlie Island 
of Zebu, ou the river Manango, at a distance of about miles from the 
town of San Nicholas, which has nearly 20,000 inhabitants, and is by 
far the larg\'St town in the island. There are reported to be strata of 
coal from 1 to 4 feet in thickness." Various copper mines have been 
worked from time immemorial, and favorable reports sent to Europe. 

[From the American Naturalist, September, 1886. — By J. B. Steere.] 

The south end of Negros has appeared, as we passed around it, a great 
stretch of grassy plains and hills, now drj^and yellow, and burned over 
in some places. The mountains approach nearer at Dumaquete, and we 
could see forests on tiieir heights. They were volcanic, and what we 
judged to be ancient lava streams extended down from a height of two 
or three thousand feet to near sea level, and with such an even grade 
that they looked like gigantic railroad eml>ankments. * * * We 
found it [a variety of plant known as abaca, a so-called mineral hemp] 



526 TREATY OF PEACE. ■ 

gTowin.o' luxuriously at a lieijjht of 3,000 feet, while those varieties useds 
for food thrived bc>t near sea level and in the greatest heat. * * * 
Deer aud wild hogs were abundant. "- | 

[From Travels lu the I'hiliiipinos. — By F. Jagor, London, !875.] 

"Sebu, with a population of o4,0!M), is the cliief town of the island of 
the same name, the seat of goverunient and of tl)e bishoj) of the 
i^isayans, and within 48 miles' of Manila by steamer. It is as favor 
ably situated with regard to the eastern portion of the Bisayan grou: 
as lloilo is in tlie western, and is ac(iuiring increased importance as th' 
eini)orium lor its products." Among products mentioned are sugars 
tobac(;o, rice, colfee, wax, Spanish cane, and mother-of-pearl. "Th 
island of Sebu extends over 75 square miles.* A lofty mountain rang^ 
traverses it from north to south, dividing the east from the west side,,i! 
and its population is estimated at 340,000 — 4,o33 to the square mile.*!* 
The inhabitants are peaceable and docile; thefts occur very seldom,; 
and robberies never. Their occupations are agriculture, tishing, and 
weaving for home consumption. Sebu i)roduces sugar, tobacco, maize, 
rice, etc., and, in the mountains, potatoes; but the I'ice produced does^ 
}iot suffice for their requirements, th^re being only a little level land,! 
ami the deMciency is imijorted from Pauay. The island possesses con-j 
sideral)le beds of coal, the full yield of which may now be looked for, 
as the duty on exports was abandoned by decree of the 5th of May, 1869. \ 

According to the Mineral Eeview, Madrid, 18(;0, the coal in Sebu is« 
dry, pure, almost free of sulphur jjyrites, burns easily and with a strong • 
llame. The coal of Sebu is acknowledged to be better than that off 
Australia aud Labuan, but has not sufficient heating power to be usedi! 
unmixed with other coal on long sea voyages. According to the cata-f 
logue of the products of the Philippines (Manila, LSOG), the coal strata ji 
of Sebu have, at many places in the mountain range, which runs from 
north to south across the whole of the island, approached a thickness :<| 
of 2 miles. The coal is of middling quality, and is burned in the Gov- ; 
ernment steam works after being mixed with Cardiff. Average price, J 
Sebu, $C per ton. j 

[From Oceanica.— By Elis^e Reclns, New York, 1890.] 

The whole surface of the Philippines is essentially mountainous, the ' 
only ])lains that occur being the alluvial districts at the river mouths ■ 
a'.id the spaces left at the intersection of the ranges. Most of the sur- 
face appears to be formed of old rocks, especially schists, and, in the 
north of Luzon, granites. Extensive coal fields are found in the cen- 
tral islands, especially Cebu and Negros, and in many places these 
carboniferous beds seem to have been buried under more recent lavas. 
Later limestones have also been developed by the coral builders round 
all the seaboard, and there is clear evidence that along extensive 
stretches of the coast line these formations have been ui)heaved to a 
considerable height above sea level. They form at some points broad 
horizontal tables round the headlands, and here are found shells and 
other marine remains belonging to the same species still living in the 
surrounding waters. But about the Gulf of Davao, in South Mindanao, 
the contrary movement of subsidence has taken place, as shown by the 
dead or dying forests invaded by the sea. 

The Philippines abound in minerals. The natives collect gold in the 

'Evidently German miles, of which 1 (hnear) =4| statute. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 627 

alluvia of all the islands, but especially in the province of Benguet, 
[' central Ijuzoji, and about the iiortiieast point of Surigao, in Mindanao. 
Co])per is common in the Le])anto hills, borderintj on the same central 
district of Luzon, where from time immemor.al the natives have 
extracted the ore and wrouglit it into implements and ornaments. The 
blacksmiths also have at hand an excellent iron ore for their arms and 
instruments. Cebu is said to contain lead glance yieldiiig- nearly lialf 
of its weight in pure metal, while the solfataras of many extinct volca- 
noes have formed inexhaustible deposits of sulphur. 

[Extracts from Letters of German Captains. XV, Fansa. Vol. 21. 1884, p. 147.] 

The harbor of Zebu, capital of the Philippine island of the same name, 
is formed by a very narrow arm of the sea separating tiic island of 
Mactan from that of Zebu. It has a northern and a southern entrance, 
both very small and narrow, especially the nortliern one, where it is 
quite impossible to pass by a vessel of over WO or 300 tons. On the 
other hand, there would be no difficulty in passing even a larger ship 
in the southern entrance. 

There are for both entrances regularly appointed government pilots, 
who are supposed to be stationed in the northeast monsoon, near the 
light-house at the northern entrance, and in the southwest monsoon, 
near the beacons Norma and Lipata, at tlie southern entrance. When 
I came from Manila and passed the light-house at the northern entrance 
about 4.30 o'clock p. m., there was no pilot in sight (perhaps because it 
was Sunday), but as I had a good Spanish chart, and as the channel 
moreover is well indicated by buoys on both sides, I went on and got a 
pilot shortly before dark not far from the old tower Mandaui. This is 
the narrowest place of the channel, hardly wide enough for a larger 
ship lying at anchor to swing around. Although we now had the cur- 
rent against us, a light land breeze took us to a safe anchoring place. 
In the northeast monsoon the anchoring place southwest of the fort is 
in 10 to 20 meters depth. Ships are moored with chains of about 60 
meters each. There is a regular ebb and Hood tide, but high and low 
water never coincide with the change of the current. Besides, there 
seem to be, at the anchoring places of the larger shi])s, several counter 
currents (eddies), for the ships lie very uneasy, rolling from side to side, 
and hardly have the chains been made clear during the day when there 
is another half turn or round turn found in them in the morning. 

The best plan is, in case there is already a round turn in the chain, 
to make the two chains fast together, and then to give plenty of play 
to one chain. How great the strain is on a taut chain when the ship 
swings is shown by the fact that from our starboard chain, which was 
pretty taut, a link 2 inches thick was twisted loose and broken. If the 
chains had not been fastened together we should have lost anchor and 
chain. There are three wharves here, but only one of them, the one 
fjirthest east, is sometimes used by steamers and by sailing vessels 
arriving with cargoes of rice and salt. For use by them there are two 
iron mooring-buoys south of the wharf (bridge). * * * 

Hard wood is good and cheap. Calking work can be done by the 
natives; forging, if not too expensive, by Chinese or natives. 

Fresh water, 1 am told, is paid for at the rate of $1 per barrel. We 
got all of our drinking water ourselves, partly from the well near the 
fort, partly from that near St. Nicholas Church; the latter water is the 
better of the two. * * * — A. L. 



528 TREATY OP pea(;e. 

[Copy of cablegram receive.l Aiiuiist r,, I81I8, Ironi naval attache at T'aris.] 

Have received reliable informatiou that the coinniaiKler in chief (of) 
the German squadron in China recently forwarded to Berlin, Geri.ianv 
extensive report (of the) German enoineer on mineral resources of tlie 
Phili,,])ine islands, ])articularly coal deposits, all of which described 
containing- considerable sulphur, excepting- one deposit which, beino- 
Iree in>m sulphur, is necessary to the development of the mineral 
resource. I can not give name of fhe island containing this deposit. 



COAL AND PETROLEUM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND VICINITY. 



[Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., p. 749.] 

Minerals. — Though hitherto little advautag-e has been taken of its 
existence, there appears to be in several of the islands a fair ajuount of 
mineral wealth. Two coal tields are known to exist, one beginning in 
Caransan in the south of Luzon, and i^robably extending southward 
across the Strait of San Bernardino to Catbaloiigan, in Samar, and 
another occupying the western slopes of Cebu and the eastern slopes 
of Negros, and thus probably passing under the Strait of Tanou. In 
the first basin there is a bed from 10 to 12 feet thick cropping out of 
Gatbo, which has given good results as a fuel for steamboats; in the 
second Ceuteno reports at least 5 beds, of varying thickness and quality. 
The first discovery of the mineral was made in Cebu in 1827. Hitherto 
little success has attended the schemes of exploitation. 

[Encyclopsedia Britauniia, 9th ed., Coal, p. 59.] 

In the Dutch settlements, coal has been found in Sumatra and Bor- 
neo, the best known deposit being that at Pengaran, on the southeast 
of the latter island, where a mine has been worked by the Dutch 
authorities for several years. * * * In the British island of Labuan, 
off the north coast of Borneo, five workable seams, together about 27 
feet thick, are estimated to cover the whole island. 

The most important southern coal deposits, however, are those of 
Australia, which extend, with short intervals, from the Gulf of Car- 
pentaria to Bass Straits. In the northern districts the distribution 
appears to be somewhat similar to that seen in South America, Sec- 
ondary and Tertiary basins occupying the ground near the sea, while 
true carboniferous coal is found further inland. 

[Encyclopiedia Britannica, 9th ed., under Formo.sa, p. 416.] 

Coal, sulphur, and petroleum are the only mineral productions of 
Formosa which are known to exist in quantities sufficient to make them 
of economical importance. The principal coal fields are in the north of 
the island, near Kelung and Tam-sui, and the coal is all shipped in 
Kelung Harbor: In 1873, 45,000 tons; in 1874, 15,221 tons; in 1875, 
27,605 tons; in 1876, 31,503 tons. 

[From the Statesman's Year-Book, 1898.] 

Gold mining is being carried on in Luzon with favorable prospects, 
and coal miniug in Cebu, where, when arrangements for carriage are 
completed, the output is expected to be about 5,000 tons per nsonth. 

Longman's Gazetteer of the World, London, 1895, says that coal 
occurs in Luzon, Caransan, Isegros, and Cebu. 

TP 34 529 . 



530 TREATY OF PEACE. 

[Australasia, Vol. II, Gnillemard. In Stanford's Compendium of Geography, London, 1894.] 

Philippine Islands (p. 35). — That there are extensive coal measures 
in the arcliipehioo th«n'e is little doubt, birt they have been little 
exploited, and coal forms one of the largest imports of the group. The 
Compostela nnne (Zebu) only turned out 700 tons in 1881. As j^et no 
deep shafts lia\c been driven, and what has been obtained aflbrds very 
rapid combustion :ind is not well suited for steamers. Zebu ami 
ISegros are csi)ecially rich in this ]>roduct. Since the archipelago lies 
midway between the great coal beds of northern IJorneo and I'ormosa, 
it is ])iobable that the mineral will in the future be worked to great 
advantage. 

I'anay (p. 79). — Gold, copper, iron, and quicksilver have been found, 
and coal in Antique, but none of these are worked. 

Negros {p. 80). — Its coal mines appear to be no longer worked. 

Zebu (p. 81). — Coal occurs abundantly and is of fairly good quality, 
but the complete neglect of all mineral wealth by the Spaniards is 
exhibited here as elsewhere. 

ISa))i(ir (p. S2). — Coal is found, but no attempt has been made to 
investigate the minerals of the island. 

Mindcomo (j). 87). — It is probable that gold exists in tolerable quan- 
tities, and coal also, 

Java (p. 105). — Coal, indeed, is i)lentifQl, but it is poor, occurs in 
thin strata, and hardly repays working. Sulphur is abundant, and a 
further exploitation of the mineral oils should give good results. 

(P. 138). Tlie mineral-oil lamps which light nearly every peasant's 
hut consume over L'0,000,000 gallons per annum. Concessions were 
granted in 18U0, both in .lava and Sumatra, for the working of petro- 
leum, and the prospects are said to be very encouraging. 

>Snnn(tra (]>]). 1*08. L'O'.)). — The mineral wealth of Sumatra still remains 
for the most part undevelo]ted, although it is probable that before long 
the rich coal ticlds of Ombilin, which are situated toward the head waters 
of the Batang ilari, will be opened. They were discovered in 18(59, 
and have been estimated by M. de Crreve to contain 370,000,000 cubic 
meters. The mineral is of the Tertiary period, as it is probable that 
most of the Sumatran measures will prove to be. M. Forbes found coal 
in the Palembang district, and it exists near Malabu and other places 
in Ache. South of Padang, at Moko-moko, it is worked. * * * 
Concessions were granted in 1801 for working some petroleum wells 
lately discovered. 

Borneo (pp. 219-221). — The abundance and wide distribution of coal 
in the islands is remarkable. In this respect Borneo is by far the 
richest of all the islands of the Malay Archipelago. Schwaner says: 

The oociiri-ence of coal is more widespread than one miglit be led to think by a 
first examination. In the whole of the Iiill formation it constitntes a most impor- 
tant and almost never-lailing factor. All lissnres and openings that have been made 
use of for the investigation of the nnderground geology have led to the discovery of 
coal seams, and even the banks of the great rivers disclose them in many places. 

As far as is known, there is no coal of greater age than the Tertiary 
period. Most of it belongs to the Eocene, but the brown coals of the 
Miocene also occur plentifully. 

Mr. Motley, in liis report on the geology of Labuan and neighbor- 
hood, gives the following interesting description of its peculiarities: 

Tlie coal, dense and perfectly carbonized as it is, yet exhibits most uneqnivocally 
its A-egetable origin, and not only that, but even the kind of vegetation of which it 
has been composed is evident iroui the most cursory inspection of the heaps of coal 
brought out of the levels. It is clearly the product not of a bed of peat produced 



TREATY OF PEACE. 531 

by the decay of small vegetation, but of a mass of huge timber. At least one-half 
of the mass displays the grain and structure of wood, and frequently it separates 
naturally into the concentric layers of dicotyledonous wood. All the specimens I 
have examined have exactly the structure of the dipteraceous trees now forming 
the hulk of the timber growiug above them. The trees must have been of vast 
dimensions. I traced one trunk upward of 60 feet, and for the whole of that dis- 
tance it was not less than 8 feet wide * * * 

It is remarkable that sucli an evidently recent formation should be so 
iinich upheaved, the coal measures of Labuan and Brunei dipping from 
an angle of 24*^ to nearly or quite vertical, the dip being north north- 
west, or about at right angles to the direction of the great chain of 
mountains which rises nearly ])arallel to the coast. Mr. Motley's 
account of this coal fonnatiou would lead us to conclude that dense 
tropical forests growing on an extensive ])lain or river delta have been 
suddenly overthrown by flood or earthquake, or by sudden depression 
of the land, and had been covered with a deposit of clays or sands. 
He well remarks on the quantities of trees and shrubs which in the 
Tropics grow on the seashore, or even in the salt water, and thus accounts 
for the presence of marine shells in the shales, and., even in the coal 
itself. 

(Pages 245-246 :) The coal measures are practically inexhaustible, and 
have been worked at various places in almost every part of the island, 
both by Europeans and natives. The results, however, have been 
almost uniformly unsuccessful, but this failure must be ascribed to the 
undeveloi)ed state of the country and other causes of secondary impor- 
tance, and the mines will doubtless be worked with remunerative results 
in the future. The "Julia Hermina" mine, near Banjarniasin, whicli 
promised well, was hardly completed when, in 1859, an insurrection 
took place, the European statt" were murdered, and the works com- 
pletely destroyed. The Pengoran coal mine, also in the neighborhood 
of Martapura, was conunenced in 1848, but did uot average a larger 
annual output than about 6,000 tons, and was abandoned in 1884, as 
was also the neighboring Asahan mine, which had been working four- 
teei' years witli much the same results. A mine was also working in 
Koti, abandoned, and once more reopened in 1886. 

In Sarawak the raja opened a mine on a tributary of the Sadong 
River in 1880, the prospects of which are promising, nearly 50,000 tons 
having been raised in 1886. He also purchased, two years later, a con- 
cession for the working of the seams at the mouth of the Brunei Eiver. 
On the island of Labuan is a mine, till lately abandoned, which has 
caused the failure of tliree or more companies, but is now being suc- 
cessfully worked; while in Pulo Laut, the large island at the southeast 
point of Borneo, about 5,000 tons are yearly raised by the natives and 
supplied to Dutch steamers. There is little doubt that i)etroleum, 
which has been found in many places, will eventually become a work- 
able and most valuable product. 

Labuan (pp. 254-255). — The island of Labuan is situated on the north- 
west coast of Borneo, opposite the mouth of Brunei Bay. * * * The 
coal mines are now being worked by the new Central Bornean Company, 
who have steamers running twice a month to Singaiwre. 

Celebes (p. 301). — Coal is found in various places-in the Makassar 
district. 

(Page 304.) Coal of an inferior quality is found on the island. 

The Moluccas (p. 325). — E^ear Batjan are some coal mines which have 
been worked intermittently, though to no great profit, for nearly half a 
century. 

Oli Group (p. 326). — Coal and lignite exist, and probably gold, but 



582 TREATY OF PEACE. 

no explorntions have boon TuadC) aiuT the existing charts of the island 
are extremely iiiaecuiiite. 

Ceratn (p. 3lii)). — Coal exists, but of what period does not seem clear. 

Kerr Caledonia (p. 457). — Gold, antimony, mercury, silver, lead, cop- 
per, nickel, cobalt, and chrome have all been obtained, as well as coal 
of various kinds. * * * The coal beds are believed to oc('Ui)y a 
very lar^e area. Of late the (iovernment has charged itself with their 
exploration, and they are about to be worked; but hitherto they have 
produced nothing for want of capital and proper labor. It is esti- 
mated that the coal, which is said to be of good quality, can be sold at 
Noumea for as low a price as 12s. per ton. 

[Coal Tiiide Journal, May 1, 1895, p. 349.] 

Goal mining in the Philippine Islands. — The coal deposits in the island 
of Sebu are now being- extensively developed. They are receiving the 
support of the CJovernment in that they are giving preference to native 
over foreign coal. 

[Hougkoiig, 1895, Chronicle and Dlroctory for China, Japan, etc.] 

Sebn. — There are some very valuable and extensive coal deposits in 
the island of Sebu, but the mines have not as yet been worked with 
any enterprise. 

[British Admiralty, Eastern Archipelago, Part I, Eastern Part, 1890.] 

Sebu Island. — A chain of mountains traverses the island through its 
entire length, containing beds of mineral coal. 

[Bowring. London, 1859.] 

Cebu. — A coal mine is being explored in Guila Guila, in the island of 
Cebu, on the lliver Manango, at a distance of about miles from the 
town of San Xicholas, which has nearly 20,000 inhabitants, and is by 
far the largest town of the island. There are reported to be strata of 
coal from 1 to 4 feet in thickness. 

[F. Jagor, London, 1875.] 

Sebu. — The island possesses considerable beds of coal, the full yield 
of which may now be looked for, as the duty on exports was abandoned 
by decree on the 5th of May, 1869. 

According to the Mineral Review, Madrid, 1<S06, the coal in Sebu is 
dry, pure, almost free of sulphur pjrites, burns easily and with a 
strong flame. The coal of Sebu is acknowledged to be better than 
that of Australia and Labuan, but has not sufficient heating power to 
be used unmixed with other coal on long sea voyages. According to 
the catalogue of the products of the Philippines (Manila, 180G), the 
coal strata of Sebu have, at many places in the mountain range which 
runs from north to south across the whole of the island, approached a 
thickness of 2 miles. The coal is of middling quality and is burned in 
the government steam works after being mixed with Cardiff". Average 
price, Sebu, $(> per ton. 

[Prom Oceanica, Elis6e Keclus, New Tork, 1890.] 

Extensive coal fields are found in the central islands, especially Cebu 
and Xegros, and in many places these carboniferous beds seem to have 
been buried under more recent lavas. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 533 

[Boai-d of Trade Journal, London, May, 1898.] 

A dispatch, dated 6tli April last, lias beeu received at the foreir,u 
office from Her Majesty's minister at The Hague, transmitting statement 
of the production of petroleum in the Dutch East Indies, according to 
which, in the course of the past year or two, there has been a consider- 
able development of this industry, which promises to become very exten- 
sive. The prospective market for the product is a very large one, for 
not only among the natives of the Dutch East Indies is petroleum 
pretty sure to replace to a great extent the cocoauut oil now used for 
lighting purposes, but the whole of the eastern coasts of Asia, and 
especially China, will almost undoubtedly become consumers. 

The oil obtained in Sumatra is reported to be of excellent quality, 
with a higher flashing point and with a smaller loss in retiuing than 
the current American oils, while the cost of production is asserted to 
be materially lower than that of the latter. 

Among the most important enterprises lately brought before the 
Dutch public is the Mocara Enim Concession in Sumatra. This con- 
cession appears to have been pitched upon by the well-known Ameri- 
can monopoly, the Standard Oil Company, for the purpose of obtaining 
a footing in Netherlands India. 

Proposals were made to and entertained by the board of the Mocara 
Enim Company by representatives of the Standard Oil Company which 
would have had the effect of bringing the first-named company's opera- 
tions directly under the control of the latter, and a general meeting of 
the sliareholders of the Mocara Enim Company was advertised to have 
been held in the last days of February last for the purpose of ratifying 
the proposed agreement. 

Immediately before the day fixed for the meeting, however, the board 
of the Mocara Enim Company received from the Netherlands colonial 
minister a categorical declaration to the effect that the company's con- 
cession, which is of a preliminary nature only, would not be ratified 
should the company be placed under the control of the American 
monster monopoly. The meeting had in consequence to be postponed. 

It is understood that negotiations with the Standard Oil Company 
have been broken off for the present; but it is stated that the latter 
company had already purchased a considerable interest in the Mocara 
Enim Company. 

Since the interference of the colonial minister the Eoyal Netherlands 
Petroleum Company, for the exploitation of petroleum wells in the East 
Indies, which is the principal undertaking of that nature in Sumatra, 
has also made proposals to the Mocara Enim Company with a view to a 
practical amalgamation. 

As yet, however, no decision has been arrived at by either company 
as to the course to be adopted, but it is thought probable that a meeting 
of the Mocara Enim Company will be held shortly. 

Cebu. — The two coal mines situated in the east coast of the island of 
Cebu are said to yield sufficient coal to supply the local demand, and 
the quality is stated to be a little inferior to Australian and better than 
Japanese. 

Amour Valley. — The Amour Valley and those of several of its tribu- 
taries are rich in coal. In the valley of the Zeya, near its confluence 
with the Selendja, is found an inferior mineral, and in the Boureya 
Valley almost vertical seams have beeu proved in three or four places. 
In the neighborhood of Innokentieva, on the Amour, several lignite 
seams, 3 feet thick, are worked by the inhabitants, and on the lower 
Amour a series of seams, together 6^ feet thick, has been discovered. 



534 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Near Vladivostok coal deposits abound, while they also occur on the 
shores of the Jai)aii Sea. 

*SV(/.7/^(//». — Coal has been largely worked for-forty years in Sakhalin, 
aud at tlie present time attention is being especially directed to the 
deposits discovered in the immediate neighborhood of the gold mines 
on the shores of the Okhotsk Sea. 

lEnginet'i-ing, London, August 12. 1898.] 

(Jold is also found in some quantity, and there are two coal mines 
situated on the east coast of the island of Cebu, which yield suflicient 
coal to supply the local demand, and the quality is stated to be little 
inferior to Australian aud better than Japanese. 

[Advance Sheets of Consular Eeports, No. 131, June 3, 1898.] 

Ambassador Hay sends from London, under date of May 18, 1898, a 
pamphlet, written by Mr. Frank Karuth, F. E, G. S., entitled A IsTew 
Center of Gold Production, describing conditions in the Philippines. 
Mr. Karuth, who is president of the Philippines Mineral Syndicate, 
Limited, says in the letter to Ambassador Hay accompanying the 
jjamphlet : 

* * * I do not know of the occurrence of true coal in the islands. 
The beds which have been intermittently worked in the islands of Cebu 
and Masbate consist of lignite of very good quality. Some years ago 
large outcrops of such coal were found near the beach in the island of 
Masbate; but most of it, which could be got without mining, has been 
removed for the use of interinsular steamers. One of the syndicate's 
engineers, a man of experience as manager of coal mines in Lanca- 
shire, found Masbate coal quite useful for steamers. He calculates the 
quantity of coal available in a concession of about 00 acres at 1,200,000 
tons. The Masbate beds are so tilted as to form an angle of 70^ with 
the horizontal. * * * 

Masbate. — The coal which up to present times has been found in the 
Philippine Islands is not true coal, but lignite, probably of the Tertiary 
period, and of a variety which can scarcely be distinguished by the 
eye from true coal. There is no reason why true coal should not even- 
tually be found, for it is found and worked in Japan, whose geological 
formation has much in common with that of tlie Philippines. There 
has been no systematic search made in these islands for coal, and where- 
ever it has been found it has betrayed its presence by outcrops. Thus, 
in the island of ^Masbate, a local steamship owner drew his supplies 
from a bed of coal which is so tilted as to have the appearance of a 
vein. He supplied himself as long as his native laborers could get the 
coal with crowbars. 

Mr. Hilton, who examined this bed cursorily, estimated the available 
quantity of coal at about <)00,()00 tons in that particular concession. 
He is, however, o^» opinion that very much larger quantities are avail- 
able in adjoining concessions. These mines are practically untouched, 
and, as they are situated within a few miles of the coast, they can be 
worked at a ])rofit by whomsoever should venture to introduce the nec- 
essary cai)ital. Mr. Hilton, after trying it in a local steamer, gives it 
the ciiaracter of a "very good steam coal.'' A similar quality of lig- 
nite has recently been found in the district where the Philippines Min- 
eral Syndicate is now working, and it will soon be tried for the production 
of steam. 

Cebu. — The only coal deposits which have been to a certain extent 



TREATY OF PEACE. 535 

developed in the Philippine Archipelago, and of which a scientific and 
reliable record exists in the shape of a report by the chief inspector of 
mines, Senor Enrique Abella y Casariego, are those in the island of Cebu. 
This report is embodied in a work entitled Eapida Deseripcion Fisica, 
Geologica y Miuera de la Isla de Cebn (Archipelago Filipino). * * * 
The coal deposits of Cebu were first examined in 1855 by the Govern- 
ment mining engineer, Seuor Hernandez, who, without hesitation, 
described the coal as "lignita'' (lignite). A few years later, however, 
another Government engineer, Seuor Centeno, declared the formation 
in which the coal occurs to belong to the true carboniferous system, and 
proclaimed the discovery of a true coal field of large dimensions, the 
eastern rim of which cropped out in the island of Cebu, while its west- 
ern rim came to the surface in the island of Xegros. . Analysis proved 
Senor Centeno to be in the wrong, for the contents — or carbon — of the 
coal of Cebu do not exceed 54 per cent, against the minimum of 75 per 
cent, which true coal contains. 

Seiior Abella describes the Cebu coal as liguita piciformes (pitchy 
lignite), very black, and in some instances resembling canuel coal. In 
carefully conducted official trials, best Cebu coal figured as follows in 
relation to good Australian and British coal, viz, 156 parts Cebu equal 
to 147 parts AustraUan and 121 parts British coal. 

The carboniferous formation extends over the greater i^art of the 
island of Cebu. From Balamban and Sogod, as far as Malabuyuc and 
Bojoon, a distance of over 50 miles, there is scarcely a village that has 
not its show of coal outcrops. These have been worked on many points, 
and the aggregate amount of development is not inconsiderable. 

At one time the Government attached so much importance to the 
coal deposits in Cebu that it established a monopoly, but this was soon 
abandoned and the industry thrown open to all comers. For a time 
coal mining in Cebu became quite a rage, any number of concessions 
were taken up, and several companies established for their development. 
In one or two cases a considerable amount of capital was expended. 
Although faults frequently occur, large quantities of workable coal 
were found; but the absence of roads, and the necessity of investing 
large sums in railways, in order to meet the competition from England, 
Australia, and Japan soon caused a reaction and put a stop to the 
industry. The r)reseut annual i)roduction of Cebu does not meet one- 
tenth of the demand of Manila, where the annual consumption of coal 
exceeds 00,000 tons * * * in the mines of Ulung five beds have 
been ascertained to occur, measuring, respectively, o feet 8 inches, 3 
feet 8 inches, 3 feet 8 inches, 5 feet 8 inches, 5 feet.^ 



[Advance sheets of consular reports, No. 152, June 28, 1898.] 

On the small island of Batan, to the southeast of Luzon, just through 
the Straits of San Bernardino, there are exteuvsive coal deposits, now 
worked by Messrs. Gil Hermanos, of Virao, Island of Catanduanes. 
This coal is used by their own steamer Josef a Gorrono, plying around 
the coast of Catanduanes and occasionally coming to Manila with hemp, 
and also by other local steamers. The mine is called Visaya and stocks 
of coal are generally on the beach. There is a safe anchorage for ves- 
sels close by during the northeast monsoon. In the southwest monsoon 

1 Note by Mr. Karuth. — True coal has not been found as yet in the islands. All 
the coal mined in Cebu, Masbate, and elsewhere is "lignite" of very good quality, 
but wanting the proportion of carbon which is characteristic of true coal. True coal 
will perhaps be found in the islands of Mindero and Mindanao. 



53G TREATY OF PEACE. 

vessels can anchor anywhere around in smooth water. The coal is not 
equal to Japanese, but is good enough for au emergency and easily 
obtainable. The mines are situated in latitude l'S° 15" north, longi- 
tude 130° It!" east (meridian of 8au Fernando), approximately. 

Other extensive coal mines are also being worked in the village of 
Compostela, close to tlie city of Cebu. This coal is of superior quality 
and stocks are always available. 



[China Sea Directory, London, 1889, and Supplement, 1893.] 

Xorfhwest coast of Borneo (j). 115). — Coal is obtained from mines in 
the vicinity of Muara Harbor. (Supplement, 189.3, says: "These mines 
are known as the. Brooketown collieries. Tlie seam being worked is 28 
feet thick. There are many coal seams in the vicinity of Muara Eiver.") 
The mines now being worked (1S8(S) are connected by a tramway 
with the pier at the village, and are 1 mile distant from it. The coal is 
light, very friable, but of good quality, and is delivered on board for 
$G per ton. Quantities from 500 to 2,000 tons are kept in store, under 
cover. Two 50-ton schooners and a small tug are availal)le for coaling 
vessels at the anchorage, and GO tons can be put on board from them in 
twelve hours, the coal being taken otf in bulk and i)ut on board in 
baskets. 

In February, 1888, the principal mine was on fire; but as coal seams 
varying in thicdcness from 18 to 25 feet, running in a north by east and 
south by west direction have been fouiul between Bruni Bluff and 
Pisang Mount, and are b«^]ieved to exist from the town of liruni north- 
ward to the sea, the supply in this district, as soon as the necessary 
mining skill and money are forthcoming, maj' be said to be practically 
inexhaustible. The annual output of the mines, worked with the pres- 
ent crude means, is 10,000 tons, the depth as reached being 85 feet. 
About 220 Malays are employed. 

Labuan (p. 158). — A large supply of coal obtained from the coal mines 
at the north end of the island was formerly kept in store in Victoria 
Harbor; latterly about 300 tons obtained from the Muara coal mines 
has been usually kept in stock and put on board in baskets, either 
from the jetty or from lighters, at $7 a ton. The attendance of lighters 
can not always be depended on. 

Tony-King (p. 12, sui)plement). — Coal mines have been found a few 
miles off" Mines Kiver, east side of Hongai Bay or Port Courbet. A 
railway about 1 miles in length connects the Nagotna mine with the 
port jetty, and a large output was anticipated in 1801, something 
approaching 800 tons daily. The coal is said to be of good (piality. A 
steamer of 2,000 tons burden can lie afloat at the Jetty, and there is a 
good Avorkshop for small repairs. 

Toji(/Kin(/ (p. 180). — Several channels lead from Fai tsi long Bay, 
past Colosse Island, 738 feet high, to Kebao, where important coal beds 
have been found similar to those at Port Courbet. 

Borneo (j). 1). — Borneo appears to be rich in minerals. In the state 
of Landak the great diamond of the rajah of Matau was found. The 
territory of Montrado, north of Landak, has several gold mines. In 
British North Borneo gold, coi)per, tin, and coals have been found. In 
province Dent a seam of (;oal rises to the surface and is said to be of 
excellent ([uality. 

China iSea (]). 0). — Coals can be obtained at the following ports: 
Sarawak, Muara Harbor, Labuan, Kudat Harbor, Manila, Port Sual, 
Bangkok, Saigon, Tourou Bay, and Hoihau Bay. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 537 

Northwest Luzon (p. 347). — Coals are brought from Lingayen to Sual 
at $18 the ton. 

Anam, China, lat. 16° N., long. 107° E. (p. 461).— At Hong Sone, two 
days' journey to the southwest of Touron, is a considerable coal mine. 
The coal obtained from it burns quickly when used by itselfj its price 
in 1883 was 29 shillings the ton. 

[Eastern Archipelago, Part I. (Eastern Part), 1890. (British Admiralty).] 

Negros (p. 247). — Layers of coal have recently (1879) been discovered 
in this part of ^STegros, and outcrops of coal have been found in the 
rivers which enter the sea near the towns of Calatrava and Talabe. 

[Isaac M. Elliott, ex-U. S. Consul at Manila, in Scribner's Magazine for July, 1898, Manila and the 

Philippines, p. 19.] 

Mindoro. — The mineral wealth of these islands is not believed to be 
of great importance, although vast regions are practically unexplored. 
Gold has been found, but not in paying quantities. A discovery of 
immense value was made a few years ago in an accidental manner. The 
American ship Richard Parsons was wrecked on the western coast of 
the island of Mindoro. Captain Joy, of Nantucket, Mass., and his 
crew were forced to cross to a port on the eastern coast, in order to 
reach any vessel that could carry them to Manila. To do this they 
made a seventeen days' journey through the wilderness and over a 
range of mountains. In these mountains they came upon great ledges 
of coal, which are outcropping, and thousands of tons had broken off and 
accumulated at the base of the cliffs. On hearing of this discovery 
the Spanish Government immediately confiscated the lands, but they 
have never done anything toward developing this great deposit of coal. 
All the coal now used in the islands is imported from Australia. 

[Johnson's Cyclopedia, New York, 1894.] 

Japan. — Coal is largely worked on the northern coast of Kiushiu 
(Nagasaki, Karatsu), and in Yezo (Poronai). 

[W. B. Williams, President. Wni. Jamison, Secretary.] 

HiTEMAN Miners' Committee, 

Hiteman, loioa, May 31, 1898. 

Dear Sir : I made suggestions to our Eepresentative in Congress 
(J. F. Lacey) that it would be to the advantage of our Government if 
they would send an organized company of miners to the Philippine 
Islands to help establish and maintain order in those islands, and when 
that is done that we look after the mineral resources of the country. 
Inclosed yon icill find his reply, irhich is confidential. I shall now try to 
explain why I think it would be of benefit to us to control the coal 
mines in those islands. In the first place, the mines there have not 
been developed, for the reason that under the Spanish only they were 
taxed so that it was impossible to successfully work them. 

In Caransan there is quite a coal basin — this is south of Manila — and 
in the upper part of the Island of Luzon ' there are several veins of 
coal, which is of good quality; in some respects it is superior to the 
coal from Vancouver. Now, if we hold those islands and this mineral 
exists there, I think it would certainly show bad management on the 



1 Probably the mines near Liugayen are meant. — E. H. 



538 TT^EATY OF PEACE. 

part of our Government if vre neglected to make use of it. And if we 
could supply coal for our vessels in the Indian Ocean from the coal 
mines in the Philippines it would be a great saving to the Government 
and also be an incentive to enterprise and industry. Xow, Mr. Curtis, 
from reading yonr letters in the Kecord for the past four years, I know 
you are in a ])(»sition so that you can call the attention of the proper 
authorities to the suggestions which I advance, and if I have the sanc- 
tion of the authorities, 1 can organize a complete company of miners, 
from raining engineers to mule drivers, and all of the skilled labor 
needed aronnd a coal mine, and if it is not too much trouble I wish you 
would call some of the officials' attention to this matter. I am no 
father's son, but I am an American. 

Eespectfnlly, yours, Wm. Jamison. 

William E. Curtis, 

Chicago Record, 

HiTEMAN, Iowa, September 1, 1898. 
E. B. Bradford, Washhu/ton, B. C. 

Dear Sir: My information in regard to coal in the Philippines has 
been gained by intimate acquaintance with a Swede miner named 
Swanson, who had worked for some English company in their mines 
north of Manila. He left here some five weeks since, and said he was 
going back to the islands if he could possibly get there, 
Respectfully, yours, 

Wm. Jamison. 

[Copy of cipher cablegram received August 5, 1898, from naval attache at Paris.] 

Have received reliable information that the commander in chief [ofj 
the German squadron in China recently forwarded to Berlin, Germany, 
extensive rei)ort [of the] German engineer on mineral resources of the 
Philippine Islands, particularly coal deposits, all of which described 
containing considerable sulphur, excepting one deposit, which being 
free from sulphur is necessary to the development of the mineral 
resources. I can not give name of the island containing this deposit. 

NoiE — A later telegram from naval attache at Berlin states that the island above 
referred to is probably Sebu. 

IBy R. Toii Brasche. puhlisliedin rroceedings of the Royal Geological Service, Vienna, Austria, 

March?, 1876, p. 251.] 

Reference to coal mines of Bakon, in the extreme southeast of the 
island of Luzon; no details given. 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



[Johnson's Universal Cyclopedia (1895). — Article revised by C. C. Adams.] 

A group of over 400 islands, extending across 16 degress of latitude, 
between Formosa and the Muluccas. and forming the northern part 
of the Malay Archipelago. The largest are Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, 
Mindoro, Pan ay, Leyte, Negros, Masbate, and Sebu. The total area is 
estimated at 114,326 square miles, all under Spanish rule, and divided 
into 43 provinces. Population about 7,000,000. The Phili|)pine Islands 
are of volcanic origin. Active volcanoes are found throughout the 
whole group, such as Mayon in Luzon and Buhayan in Mindanao, and 
earthquakes are frequent and often violent. In 1863 Manila, the capital 
of Luzon, was nearly destroyed, and in 1864 the whole province of 
Zamboanga, in Mindanao, was fearfully devastated. The soil is exceed- 
ingly fertile, and as water is abundant, both in lakes and rivers, and the 
climate is hot and moist, vegetable life reaches here an almost gigantic 
development. 

The mountains, rising to a height of 7,000 feet, are covered to their 
very tops with forests of immense trees, yielding excellent timber and 
many of the most valuable sorts of wood. Teak, ebony, cedar, and gum 
trees, iron and sapan wood are interspersed with breadfruit and cocoa- 
nut trees, oranges, citrons, mango, tamarinds, and other varieties of 
fruit trees, the whole bound together with floating garlands of huge 
climbing plants and brilliant i)arasites. On the extensive slopes and in 
the valleys are cultivated abaca, or hemp, of which about 65,000 tons 
are annually exported. In 1890 8,000 tons of tobacco and 110,000,000 
cigars were exported. The other products are cotton, sugar, coffee, 
indigo, rice, wheat, maize, pepper, ginger, vanilla, cinnamon, cocoa, etc. 
Of dangerous wild beasts there are none ; oxen, buffaloes, horses, goats, 
sheep, and swine of peculiar but excellent breeds are extensively reared ; 
deer, wild boars, pheasants, ducks, and tine fish are abundant ; the for- 
ests swarm with monkeys, squirrels, parrots, sunbirds, and bees; the 
jungles with lizards, snakes, tarantulas, mosquitoes, and other insects. 
Gold is found, also iron, copper, coal, vermilion, saltpeter, quicksilver, 
sulphur (in large quantities, both pure and mixed with copper or iron), 
mother-of-pearl, coral, amber, and tortoise shell. 

The Philipi)ine Islands were discovered in 1521 by Magellan, who 
died here in the same year, and a few years later the Spaniards, under 
Villalobos, took possession of the group and named it in honor of King 
Philip II of Spain. The inhabitants consist partly of negritos, who 
have woolly hair and other characteristics of the negro, and seemed to 
have formed the aboriginal population. They live in the interior, are 
repulsive and savage in aspect, and roam in bands. There are only a 
few thousand pure-blood negritos left, as they have long been in process 

539' 



540 TREATY OF PEACE. 

of extermination by the Malay immigrants, or of absorption through 
crossbreeding with other peoples. The Malays are in a large part 
Eomau Catholics, settled in villages, and engaged in agriculture and 
fishing. They possess many fine branches of industry, as, for instance, 
their beautiful mats and their elegant linen fabrics, and they imitate 
European industry, shipbuilding, leather dressing, carriage building, 
etc., with great success. The Chinese and the mestizos, descended 
from Chinese fathers and native mothers, are mostly engaged in com- 
merce. Very few Spaniards reside in the islands, but the Chinese are 
very numerous, and natives of the Malayan race form the vast majority 
of the population. 



ABSTRACT OF ARTICLE ON PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



[In Longman's Gazetteer of the World, London, 1895.] 

Minerals: . 

Gold (Luzon, Bengner, Yicols, Mindanao, Misamis, Sungao). 

Galena (50 per cent pure). 

Copper (arsenical pyrites, 16 per cent pure copper, Luzon, Lepanto, 
Camarines, Masbate, Panay). 

Coal (Luzon, Cavansan [Carausan!], Negros, Cebu). 

Sulphur (Leyte). 
Products : 

Hemp, 

Sugar. 

Tobacco (only cultivated in all tlie Philippines since 1882), 

Coffee (principally since 1880). 

Woods. 

Eice. 

Some cacao. 

Cotton. 

Only one-fifth of the islands are under cultivation. 
Industries: 

Making cigars. 

Abaca tissues. 

Straw hats. 

Perfumes, 

Sugar (£2,500,000 exported). 
Imports : Food, dress materials, fuel, arms, machinery, and iron. 
Commerce: Greatest with England, then United States, Spain, and 

Germany. 
Exports and imports: 1891, £10,000,000; 1892, £12,500,000. 
Railroad : Manila to Dagupau, 70 miles. 
Telegraph: 720 miles; also cable to Hongkong, 

541 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



[From Engineering, London, August 12, 1898.] 

The present state of attaiis in the Philippine Ishinds naturally directs 
attention to the condition of their trade and causes speculation to be 
made regarding its future. A glance at the map shows that their 
geographical, and therefore their political, position is very important. 
They, along with Borneo, form the eastern shores of the South China 
Sea, which are therefore one-half Spanish and one-half British, while 
the British Malay Peninsula and French Cochin China form the western 
shores, with Hongkong, our chief far Eastern ])ossession, at the head 
of this narrow storm-tossed sea. jSTot only do they form an important 
station in the far Eastern seas, and a step to the vast population of 
China, but their great natural resources cause them to be a most desir- 
able possession; so that from various points of view it is of the utmost 
importance that they should not fall into the hands of any foreign 
power except America or Britain, either of which would not only 
develop their natural resources, but also use them for the purpose of 
maintaining an "open door" for the commerce of all countries with the 
far East. 

The (Teimans are beginning to express the opinion that they do not 
possess their legitimate share of the world, and to insist that in any 
new partition of any part of the enrth they should get their fair share. 
They are supposed to have cast longing eyes on the Philippines, but 
they are not likely to interfere by force, for they know that such a step 
would immediately open up a very large question, and nothing has 
happened in connection with the recent events which give them any 
grounds for diplomatic intervention, which the United States would be 
certain to resent. 

It is, indeed, probable that the real difficulties of the United States 
will only begin when they have made peace with Spain. If we are to 
judge from the opinions expressed in the American journals, the future 
government of the Philippines is very uncertain. The l^ew England 
press, as a Avhole, is decidedly opposed to the permanent holding of the 
islands. It is pointed out that under the Constitution there is no 
machinery for the government of 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 of people who 
could not be admitted to citizenship. Moreover, the possession of the 
islands would rend the Monroe doctrine from top to bottom, and would 
tell very much against the United States in any difiiculty with a for- 
eign power. 

On the other hand, some influential journals favor annexation and 
maintain that the time has come when America must abandon her 
isolation and join in the universal search for markets and footholds in 
distant ])arts of the world. They maintain that the possession of the 
Philipjjines would support an Asiatic tieet and give the United States 
5 fJ 



TREATY OF PEACE. G-lo 

a better position among the nations of the world, not only by increas- 
ing their commerce in the far East, but generally by enabling them to 
take that place among nations which the wealth, population, and men- 
tal resources of the country entitle it to. The Pacitic coast papers 
are specially eager in the matter, and insist that with an important 
station in the far East San Francisco and the Pacific coast as a wliole 
would become, in time, nearly as important as is the East now. Ameri- 
can merchants and manufacturers, under the protection of the Stars 
and Stripes, would develop the liches of the islands and create an 
immense field for commercial enterprise. Those journals not in favor 
of annexation are of opinion that the island should be transferred to 
England or Japan, whose interests are essentially the same as those of 
the United States. Such a step, however, would at once raise the 
opposition of Russia, and, probably, also of Germany and France. The 
well-known Eussian journal, the Novoe Vremya, had the following 
remarks on the subject: 

It looks as if the settlemeut of the question of the fate of the Philippine Islands 
will be prolonged for some long time to come, since all the powers that have any 
nse in their hands take a keen interest in this ripe and temptiog bunch of grapes. 
The future fate of the Philippines can be assumed in the following manner : Firstly, 
the United States can rest content with Cuba, and leave the Philippines to Spain; 
secondly, Spain may retain the Philippines, but under the guaranty of the United 
States the necessary reforms shall be introduced into the islands; thirdly, the 
Philippines might be given up by Spain, and then establish a more or less independ- 
ent republic under the protection of the United States ; and, fourthly, the Philip- 
pines can be annexed by the United States on the ground of enjoyment of the rights 
of a separate State. The last solution of the question seems to us the least likely 
to be carried into effect if one takes into consideration the distance of the islands 
from the American continent, the general predilection on the part of Americans to 
observe the Monroe doctrine, and the numerous population of the islands; this 
population can scarcely be expected to allow themselves to be turned into American 
citizens without a struggle. 

Whatever solution is arrived at, the writer thinks it desirable that 
Russia should have a coaling station in the Philippines. As the war 
between Japan and China started a great many important questions, 
so in like manner is that between the United States and Spain certain 
to raise some new factors in the complex game which is being played 
in the far East. 

The rebels against Spain in the Philippines evidently mean to insist 
on a re])ablic under the protection of the United States, an arrange- 
ment which they say will not disturb the balance of influence in the 
far East, and they promise to respect and protect the interest of all 
powers. They remember, they say, that the Japanese are their kins- 
men; that England is the great nation that commands 75 per cent of 
their import trade, and whose capital is invested to so large an extent 
in their undertakings; that America is their principal market for the 
exi^ort of sugar and hemp; that Germany and France are now opening 
up considerable trade, and that Russia, Austria, and Italy have no 
business connections in the islands. 

The principal articles imported into the islands include: From Spain, 
printed cotton cambrics, colored yarns, gunny bags, hats, umbrellas, 
leather goods, most of the wine, comestibles, etc., lentils, pulse, beans, 
and beer; from the United Kingdom, goods made of fine yarns, such 
as muslins, etc., printed jaconets, corrugated and sheet iron for roofing, 
cast-iron and yellow-metal goods, earthenware, tinned provisions, ham, 
bacon, and flour; from Germany, hardware and galvanized and enam- 
eled iron goods, cutlery, paints and oils, and beer; from the United 
States, practically all the flour consumed on the Manila market. The 



544 TREATY OF PEACE. | 

protective tariff, which came into force in 1891 , has caused a large and 
steadily increasing quantity of the trade in cotton goods and yams to 
be diverted from the United Kingdom to Barcelona, and has also put a 
stop, practically, to the import of linen goods. Gunny bags, which 
used to be imported from Calcutta, come now almost exclusively from 
Barcelona, and Spain likewise provides the greater part of the comes- 
tibles, wine, etc., for the same reason. The stajile products and prin- 
cipal articles of export from the Philippines are tobacco (leaf and cigars), 
sugar, hemp, and copra; and of minor importance, coffee, sapan wood, 
and buffalo hides. 

There is a large quantity of sugar machinery imported into the 
Philii)pine8 every year, mostly of British manufacture; but lately Ger- 
man manufacturers have been sending out some burnished mills, 
which have taken the fancy of many of the native planters, who like 
show and also long credit. The jiatnral products of the islands are 
timber, including many valuable woods yielding resins, gums, dye 
products, fine-grained ornamental wood, and heavy timber suitable lor 
building purposes, copper, and copper and iron pyrites. Gold is also 
found in some quantity, and there are two coal mines situated on the 
east coast of the island of Cebn, which yield sufficient coal to supply 
the local demand, and the quality is stated to be little inferior to 
Australian and better than Japanese. 

The report on the trade and commerce of the Philippine Islands for 
the year 1897, by Mr. Consul Rawson Walker, contains a considerable 
amount of information, but as it was written before the arrival of the 
United States tleet, many of the conditions are now completely changed. 
The most interesting feature in the report is a plan of the new harbor 
works at Manila, and which in the interval have been the scene of such 
important events. It is stated that when the works are completed at 
the port of Manila, there will be abundance of room, not only for men- 
of-war, but for all kinds of mercantile craft seeking to discharge their 
cargoes, or coming in ballast seeking freight. The possession of this 
harbor will add to the value of the Philippines as a naval and 
commercial station. 



TRADE AND INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES. 



[From tlie Bo.ird of Ttade Journal, Loudon, May, 1898.] 

The following information with regard to the economic condition of 
the Philippine Ishuids is taken from the most recent reports of the 
British consular ofUcials at Manila and other ports: 

The principal islands are Luzon, the most northerly of the group, in 
which is situated Manila, the head center of trade; the Yisayas group, 
including Panay and Cebu (where are Iloilo and Cebu, the other chief 
ports of the archipelago), and Mindanao in the south. The total popu- 
lation is estimated at 7,030,000 souls. 

The trade of the Philipi»ines is largely in the hands of the Chinese, 
of whom there are 50,000 in Manila alone, engaged in every branch of 
commerce and industry; but there are old established British lirms at 
Manila, with branch establishments at Iloilo and Cebu, and in latter 
years the (lermans, Belgians, and Swiss have been extending their 
trading oi)erations to a remarkable extent. 

The following table shows the value of the import trade of the prin- 
cipal articles into the three chief ports of the arciiipelago for the years 
1895 and 18U0, the latest obtainable. Owing, however, to the absence 
of official statistics, the figures must be looked upon as approximate 
only, being based on commercial information supplied to Her Majesty's 
consuls by merchants resident at the ports: 





Ports. 


Imports. 




1895. 


1896. 




£1, 367, 000 
145, 500 


£1, 587, 500 


Iloilo 


135, 000 


Cebu . ... 


2,000 










Total 


1, 512, 500 


1, 724, 500 







The principal articles imported include — 

From ,Sp((in, — Printed cotton cambrics, colored yarns, gunny bags, 
hats, umbrellas, leather goods, most of the wine, comestibles etc., 
lentils, pulse, beans etc., and beer. 

From the United Knujdom. — Goods made of fine yarns, such as book 
muslins etc., printed jaconets, corrugated and sheet iron for rooting, 
cast iron and yellow metal goods, earthenware, tinned ]>rovisions, ham, 
bacon, and flour. 

From Germany. — Hardware and galvanized and enameled iron goods, 
cutlery, paints and oils, and beer. 

From the United States. — Practically all the flour consumed on the 
Manila market. 

The protective tariff" which came into force in 1801 has caused a large 
and steadily increasing quantity of the trade in cotton goods and yarns 
T P 35 545 . 



546 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



to 1)6 diverted from the United Kingdom to Barcelona, and has also 
put a stop, practically, to the import of linen goods. Gunny bags, 
which used to be imported from Calcutta, come now almost exclusively 
from Barcelona, and !Si)aiu likewise i)r()vides the greater part of the 
comestibles, wine, etc., for the same reason. The staple products and 
princii)al articles of export from the Phili])i>ines are tobacco (leaf and 
cigars), sugar, hem]), and co])ra, and, of minor importance, coffee, sapan 
wood, and buffalo hides. The following table shows the value of the 
exports of the principal articles for the years 1895 and 1896: 



Articles. 



Tobacco (leaf) 

Cisiirs 

Sugar 

Hemp 

Copra 



£450, 000 

145, 000 

1,205.000 

1, 665, 000 

283, 000 



£500, 000 

150, 000 

1,600,000 

1, 500, 000 

375, 000 



The latest report of H. M.'s consul at Manila says that for the year 
1897-9.S, as far as the Luzon sugar crop is concerned, the outlook is 
])oor, and that the recent rebellion in the islands will lead to an almost 
total absence of any supplies from some districts and a considerable 
falling off in them. There is a large quantity of sugar machinery 
imported into the Philippines everj^ year, mostly of British manufac- 
ture; but more lately German manufacturers have been sending out 
some burnished mills, which have taken the fancy of many of the 
native i^lauters, who like show and also long credit. 

The principal customers for Philippine goods are the United States, 
the United Kingdom, China, and Japan. In 189('), 81,614 tons of sugar 
were exported to the United States, while China took 65,974 tons. 
United Kingdom 50.327 tons, and Japan 22,01*5. During the same 
year the United Kingdom imported 50,940 tons of hemp from the 
'Philipi)ines, and the United States 45,041 tons. China and Japan 
took 98,310,0110 cigars. United Kingdom 26,954,000, and the rest of the 
Continent of Europe 42,890,000. 

The natural products of the islands are timber — including many val- 
uable woods yielding resins, gums, dye products, fine-grained orna- 
mental woods, and heavy timber suitable for building purposes — copper, 
and copx)er and iron pyrites. In Paracele and North ('amarines there 
are veins of gold worked by the natives, and in the rivers of Sapan, 
Casiguran, and New Ecija there are found gold pyrites of good quality, 
while in Mambualao and Camarines there are gold mines in operation. 
There are also many hot springs of iron and sulphur waters, all of 
excellent miedicinal ])roperties. The two coal mines situated in the east 
coast of the island of Cebu are said to yield sufficient coal to supply 
the local demand, and the quality is stated to be a little inferior to 
Australian and better than Japanese. 



SPANISH COLONIES. 



LFrom the Statesman's Tear- Book, 1898.] 

The area and population of the various possessions claimed by Spain 
are as follows : 



ColoDial possessions. 



1. Possessions in America: 

Cuba (1890) 

Porto Rico 



Total, America . 



2. Possessions in Asia: 

Philippine Islands 

Sulu Islands 

Caroline Islands and Palaos. 
Marianne Islands — 



Total, Asia. 



3. Possessions in Africa: 

Kio de Oro and Adrar 

Ifni (near Cape Nun) 

Fernando Po, Annabon, Corisco, Elobey, San Juan. 



Total, Africa 

Total possessions . 



Area (Kng- 

lish siiuare 

miles). 


Population. 


41, 655 
3,670 


1, 631, 687 
806, 708 


45, 325 


2, 438, 395 


114, 326 
950 
560 
420 


7, 000, 000 
75, 000 
36, 000 
10,172 


116, 256 


7, 121, 172 


243, 000 

27 
850 


100, 000 

6,000 

80, 000 


243, 877 


136, 000 


405, 458 


9, 695, 567 



For administrative purposes the Canary Islands are considered part 
of Spain. Eio de Oro and Adrar are under the governorship of the 
Canary Islands, with a subgovernor resident at Eio de Oro. The 
country on the banks of the rivers Muni and Campo is claimed by 
Spain, but disputed by France. It has an area of 69,000 square miles 
and a poi^ulation of 50f),000. 

The extent of the Sulu Archipelago, under the Spanish protection, is 
defined in a protocol signed at Madrid JMarch 7, 1885, by representa- 
tives of Great Britain, Germany, and Spain, as including all the islands 
lying between the western extremity of the island of Mindanao on the 
one side and the islands of Borneo and Aragua on the other, exclud- 
ing all parts of Borneo and the islands within a zone of three maritime 
leagues of the coast. 

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 

These islands extend almost due north and south from Formosa to 
Borneo and the Moluccas, embracing an extent of 10° of latitude and 
9° of longitude. They are over 1,200 in number. The two largest ai^e 
Luzon (area 40,024 square miles) and Mindanao, and the total area 
is about 52,650 square miles.^ The population, including army and 



Table quoted above says 114,326 square miles, wliicli is evidently correct.— E. H. 

54'?', 



54.'^ tri:aty of peace. 

navy, iiiiinbers about 7,670,000. The capital of the Philippines, Manila, 
has 154,00-! inhabitants (1887); other towns are Laoag, 30,642; Lipa, 
43,408: I>anang, 35,598; Batangas, 35,587. Tiiere is a small resident 
Spanisli population and about 100,000 Chinese, in whose hands are the 
principal industries. The native inhabitants are mostly of the Malayan 
race, but there are some tribes of Negritos. The government is admin- 
istered by a governor-general and a captain-general, and the 43 prov- 
inces are ruled by governors, alcaldes, or commandants, according to 
their importance and position. 

The estimated revenue of the Philipi)ine Islands in 18!)4-1>5 was 
i^2,715,t)80, and expenditure i^li,(>5(),0:i(i. There is an export duty on 
tobacco, and almost every article of foreign ])roduction is heavily taxed 
on being imported. On muslins and ])etroleum the duty is about 100 
per cent of the cost. 

The chief products are hemp, sugar, coffee, copra, tobacco leaf, cigars, 
indigo, (lold mining is l>eing carried on in Luzon with favorable pros- 
pects, and coal mining in Cebu, where, when arrangements for carriage 
are completed, the output is expected to be about 5,000 tons per month. 

In the absence of official statistics, only approximate results can be 
given. In 1896 the imports were estimated at i;2, 187,500, aiul the 
exports at -$4,151,250. The chief imports are rice. Hour, wines, dress, 
petroleum, coal. The chief exports in 1896 were: Sugar, £1,600,000; 
hemp, £1,500,000; tobacco leaf, £500,000; cigars, £150,000; copra, 
£375,000. On an average about 34 per cent of the import value is from 
the IJnited Kingdom, 21 per cent from Hongkong and Amoy, 13 per 
CQnt from Spain, and 10 per cent from Singapore and British India. 
Imports into Spain from the Philippine Ishmds in 1895, 24,970,692 
pesetas; exports to Philippine Islands, 25,769,890 i)esetas. The total 
imports into Great Britain (board of trade returns) in 1896 were of the 
value of £1,536,533, and the exports of British produce to the Philippine 
Islands, £507,601. The chief articles of iiu})ort into Great Britain in 
1896 were hemp, of the value of £731,633, and unrelined sugar, of the 
value of £647,370. Of the British exports in 1896, the value of £307,019 
was for cotton manufactures and yarn. In 1895, 304 vessels of 425,025 
tons cleared the ports of Manila, lloilo, and Cebu. There are 720 miles 
of telegraph in the islands, and 70 miles of railway. 

The coin in use is the Mexican dollar, with locally coined fractional 
money. The import of foreign money is illegal, but that of Mexican 
dollars is permitted. 



SHIFTING OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN. 



[Deutsclie Warte, August 20, 189S.— Trauslation.] 

The recent changes in the political conditions of Oceania have taken 
place exclusively in the west. The Rnssian Empire., through its Sibe- 
rian coast province, borders in the north on the Pacitic Ocean; on its 
coast liussia had heretofore only the port of Yladivostock, blockaded 
by ice in winter; recently she has acquired from China Port Arthur, 
which, as well as the former, she has equipped as a large port for war 
purposes. Thereby Kussia has become one of the great powers in east 
Asia, offering strong competition to the hitherto preponderant intiuence 
of England. 

Germany., through her acquisition of the Bay of Kiao Chou, has 
found what she had hitherto lacked — a basis for her commercial rela- 
tions in that part of the world. Germany also has a share in the Aus- 
tralian Archipelago by reason of her possessions in New Guinea, the 
Bismarck Archipelago, and the Marshall Islands. 

EngUmd has enlarged her old possession of Hongkong, strives for the 
mouoi)oly of the Yaug-tse-kiang Valley, which is of the greatest 
importance as the commercial route to the interior of China, and has 
recently also made a settlement at Wei-hai-wei, between Kiao Chou 
and Port Arthur. Her influence in northern China has been consid- 
erably lessened through the Russian rivalry, which is making itself felt. 
The other insular possessions of Great Britain are shown on our map. 

France had in Tonkin the naval station of Saigoon; in addition, she 
has acquired Lai Chou, in the northern part of southern China, opposite 
the Island of Hainan. In tlie archipelago of Oceania she also has a 
number of smaller groups of islands extending east of New Caledonia. 

The colonial possessions of Holland extend from the East Indian 
Archipelago to New Guinea, of which latter she owns the western part. 
But her colonial possessions lack sufficient security, so that a catas- 
trophe similar to that of Spain is within the range of possibilities. 

Spain is nominally still in possession of the Philippines, the Palau 
Islands, and the Caroline Islands. The Ladrone Islands she will lose, 
as also a station in the Philippines. 

The United States has annexed Hawaii, and, as spoils of the war, the 
Ladrone Islands, with a coaling station on Guam Ishmd, have fallen to 
her share, and for the present also Manila, capital of the Philippines. 
Moreover, she will equip as a naval station the port of Pango Pango, 
acquired by contract, situated on Tutuila, the farthest of the three 
larger islands of the Samoa group. By this measure the power of the 
United States in the Pacific Ocean, where she also owns some smaller 
groups between the continent and Hawaii, will be very considerably 
increased, at the cost of an independent group (Hawaii), as well as of 
Sj)ain (the Ladrones and Manila) and Germany. 

549 



THE VOLCANIC REGION ABOUT MANILA. 



[Coiumunicntion to Councilor von Hauer. Duod. Manila, January 11. 1876. Contributionby Dr. Rich- 
ard von Diasclie. Proceeding.s of the Royal Geological Service. Vienna, Austria, Marcli 7, 1876.] 

After a sliort stay in Ceylon, I readied the Philippines, where I have 
been since the od of December. I have set myself the task of visiting 
the active volcanoes, as well as exploring the more than 2,000 square 
miles (German) ' of which the great Island of Luzon consists, in order 
to obtain a description of its geological formation. As I expect to re- 
main only six months, it is clear that I can not undertake any detailed 
study. The country and its people are such as to render travel difti- 
cult in every respect. Streets and roads exist only in the level lands; 
as soon as one enters the hill country every communication ceases, and 
every effort to advance is frequently impeded by impenetrable forests. 
The unreliability and astonishing laziness of the natives, left com- 
pletely ignorant by three centuries of priestly rule, contribute to the 
difficulties of travel. An additional hindrance is met in northern 
Luzon in the inimical races (JSTegritos, Igorrotes, etc.), who so frighten 
the timid Malays that they can not be hired for any price to accompany 
the traveler on his excursions. 

Under such circumstances the scientific results in no wise represent 
the efforts necessary to their attainment; and 1 trust, Mr. Councilor, 
that these few introductory words will excuse what may seem to you a 
small output for six weeks of work. 

The excursions which I have so far made are grouped as follows: 
(1) Plain of Pampauga, ascent of Arayat and the Cordillera de Zam- 
bales. (2) South shore of Lagnna de Bay and ascent of the extinct 
volcano Maquilin, besides a visit to the Solfatara "white land."' (3) 
Ascent of the volcano Taal. (4) Paray Kiver and Cueva de San Mateo. 

Let me biielly suuimarize my observations: 

Manila lies in a wide and fertile plain which belongs to a loamy 
bottom rising slightly above the sea, and contains countless remains of 
mussel shells of the varieties still living in the adjacent seas. This 
plain is surrounded on almost every side by an immense stratum of 
pumice tufa which stretches in rows of low hills as far as the San Mateo 
Mountains and Laguna de Bay. 

The large and slightly elevated plain of Pampanga, which extends 
north of the bay of Manila, from north to south, as far as the gulf of 
Lingayen, and covers a surface of over 100 sijuare miles (German), con- 
sists in its southern part of loose tuta, in which are found large pieces 
of very porous sanidin -trachyte, often with hoinblende crystal* From 
the village of Arayat to P<n-ac, at the foot of the Cordillera de Zamoales, 
I could always observe the same formation. Tlie Cordillera de Zam- 
bah'.s, more than 20 German miles long, reaches its greatest elevation 
(0,281 feet) in Monte Pinatubo, a ragged peak. Here the Cordillera, 



' About 40,000 Engli.sh square miles. — E. H, 
550 



TREATY OF PEACE, 551 

whicli at first extends in a iiortb and soutli direction from Monte Taguan, 
turns suddenly to the uortb\Yest, then returns to its former north and 
south direction from ?.Ionte Iba to Monte Verde on the gulf of Lingayen. 
If one were to draw a line from Monte Pinatubo to the isolated moun- 
tain of Arayat in the plain, one would notice that all the rivers north 
of this line flow in a northeasterly direction, while all those south of it 
flow in a southeasterly direction toward Eio Grande de la Pampanga. 
This circumstance may be observed particularly plainly from the top 
of the Arayat, where I first noticed this slope of the plain in both direc- 
tions, increasing toward Monte Pinatub<f. East of Monte Arayat this 
circumstance disappears entirely. 

The latter mountain, which hitherto has been called by all geographers 
an extinct volcano, owing to its isolated position and cone-like shape, 
is composed of a hornblende- andesite containing olivine, which is the 
most basic stone formation I have so far met with. Its summit does 
not show any crater, but instead three peaks separated from each other 
by large chasms. 

The following brief abstracts will indicate the general character of 
the remainder of this article and articles in Nos. 9 and 11 of same pro- 
ceedings and in the Yearbook of the society for 1876, Volume XXVI, 
page 157 et seq. : 

Description of extinct volcano Maquilin, which forms the western 
extremity of the series of volcanoes south of Laguna de Bay. The 
Maquilin is surrounded by many small crater lakes and hot springs, all 
containing sulphide of hydrogen. The hot springs of Tierra Blanca 
and Los Bafios, formerly famous, now abandoned. 

Active volcano Taal; last imjjortant eruption in 1754. Other vol- 
canoes: Babuyan Claro and V. l)idica in the Babuyan group north of 
Luzon; Cagua, Albay, and Bulusan in Luzon; ]\lala spina in Negros; 
Camiguin in island of same name; all of them have had recent erup- 
tions and have continually smoking craters. 

On the left bank of the Pinquiang liiver, in the valley of Bambang, 
rises the Monte Blanco, with many springs containing salt and sulphide 
of hydrogen; the whole mountain is iucrusted with salt and gypsum 
crystals; hence its name, Monte Blanco (White Mountain). In the 
valley of the Eio Aguo much gold is ibund and washed by tlie Igor- 
rotes. Large copper mines at Mancayan in Lepanto, where also sul- 
phide of coi)per, arsenic, iron and copper pyrites, etc., are found. The 
mines are not now worked. Xear Slancayan, medicinal hot springs 
(especially sulphur) of Meynit and Sadanga. 

Coal mines of Bakon, in southeastern I^uzon, not visited by writer. 
Much valuable ore of all kinds found on his trip from Lagnna de Bay 
to Legaspi, Province of Albay. 

[From Yearbook.] 

Tlie occurrence of salt-water fish and the salt contained in the lake 
of Taal indicate that at some time the interior of the old crater was 
connected with the ocean, and the communication was gradually cut 
ofl' by the i)roducts of repeated volcanic eruptions. The whole provinces 
of Cavite and Batangas and the environs of Manila are formed of 
products of eruptions of Mount Taal. The Laguna de Bay was prob- 
ably formerly a sliallow bay of the ocean and was separated from the 
latter by deposits of voh-anic eruptions. South Luzon consisted for- 
merly of a number of islands, the oldest of which was jirobably what 
is now the western part of the Province of Camarin. The landings of 
Calivac and Pasacao are presumably the most recent parts risen from 
the sea. 



THE TAGAL, HIS ABILITIES, AND WHY HE REBELLEI). 



[15y Frederic H. Sawyer, member Institute Civil Engineers, inclosed to tlie office of naval intellisrence 
by the United States naval attache in London, with his letter No. 2(i9, dated August '.iO, 1898. yiv. 
Sawyer was actii'g IJriti.sh ronsul for the Philijipiiies in 1885, ha.s re.'^idcd fourteen vear.s in Luzon, 
and has traveled exten.sively through the Philippines. The following paper was prepared by Mr. 
Sawyer and forwarded under date : Hotel Alteuberg, Miinster, Elsass, August 26, 1898.] 

The question whether or not to annex the Philippines is exciting 
ranch interest in the United States, especially since the surrender of 
Manila. 

.Little is known of the archipelago, either in England or America; 
in fact, before the war only those interested in the islands could say 
where the group is situated. 

1 resided in Luzon for fourteen years, visiting all the central and 
southern provinces, and made trips to Mindoro, Iloilo, Cebu, Palawan, 
and Calamianes. 

31y profession as a colonial engineer brought me into contact with 
all classes of tlie comnuinity from the landowner or planter to the 
laborers and mechanics who worked under my direction. 

The jiiost important race in the archipelago is the Tagal or Tagaloc, 
inhabiting Manila and the central provinces of Luzon, and as my long 
experience of them is extremely favorable, 1 am loth to see them 
described as they have been — as ferocious savages, intent on bloodshed. 

The Tagal, as I knew him, possesses a good deal of self-respect, and 
is of a quiet and calm demeanor. On great provocation he is liable to 
give way to a sudden burst of fury, in which condition he is very dan- 
gerous. But in general he shows great docility, and bears no malice if 
justly punished. He is fairly industrious, and sometimes is very hard 
working. Anyone who has seen him poling barges against the current 
of the Pasig will admit this. He is a sportsman, and will readily put 
liis money on his favorite horse or gamecock. He is also prone to other 
forms of gambling. He rarely gives way to intemperance. 

The j)osition held by women in a community is often taken as a test 
of its degree of civilization. 

Among the Tagals the wife exerts great inlluence in the family, and 
tlie husband rarely completes any important business without her con- 
cuii^ence and ajtproval. 

Children show great respect to both j^arents, and come morning and 
evening to kiss their hands. 

The houses of the well to-do natives are large and airy, and are kept 
scrupulously (ilean. Tlie Tagal in general is lu)spitable, and according 
to his means keeps oi)en house on least days and family festivals. 

As one who has enjoyed their hos])itality on many occasions when 
traveling in the ]n-ovinces, I can testify to their kindness and liberality. 

The Tagal makes a good soldier; he can march long distances bare- 
footed, and find food in the forests where European soldiers would 
starve. 

552 



TREATY OF PEACE. 653 

In action bis officer Las more trouble to bold biin in tban to urge 
him on. 

As sailors the Tagals are unsurpassed in tbe East. Tbey navigate 
their coasting craft, schooners, and "lorchas," with much skill; they 
serve as sailors and lirenien in the fine flotilla of coasting steamers 
belonging to Manila, and tbey man all tbe smaller vessels of the Span- 
ish navy in the Pbilipi)ines. Most of the British and foreign steamers 
in the far East carry four Manila men as quartermasters. They are 
reputed skillfnl and trustworthy helmsmen. 

Their ability as mechanics is remarkable. They build excellent 
coasting vessels, brigantines. schooners, and lorchas; also "cascos" 
and other craft for inland navigation or shallow waters. These vessels 
are most ingeniously contrived and admirably adapted to the conditions 
under which they are to be used. They make the most graceful canoes 
and paddle or punt them with remarkable dexterity. 

In Manila and Oavite are to be found numbers of native engine fit- 
ters, turners, smiths, and boiler makers, as well as quarry men, stone- 
masons, carpenters, bricklayers, and brickmakers. 

Excellent carriages are built in Manila, entirely by native labor. An 
incredible number of carriages and other vehicles are in use there. 

Painting and decorating is executed by Manila-men in excellent 
style. They learned this art from Italian painters. 

The Tagal is a good fisherman, and is very much at home at this 
work, using many most ingenious traps ami nets. Fish of all sorts and 
sizes abound in the Bay of Manila. 

Perhaps the most remarkable talent of the Tagal is his gift for instru- 
mental music. Each parish has its brass band, supplied with Euro]>ean 
instruments and generally wearing a uniform. If the village is a rich 
one, there is usually a string band in addition. These bands perform 
operatic and dance music with the greatest precision, and their services 
at balls and other entertainments can be obtained at a moderate cost. 
Dancing is a favorite amusement among the natives and half-castes, 
and they dance, in the European manner, waltzes, polkas, and the old- 
fashioned rigadoon. The brilliant dresses of the native women produce 
a fine effect in a well lighted ball room. The Grand Duke Alexis 
thought the ball given him by Don Joaquin Arnedo Cruz at Sulipan 
one of the most brilliant sights he had ever seen. 

The Tagals are good agriculturists. Their sugar plantations are 
worked on the "metayage" system, a sort of cooperative arrangement 
which gives good results. All the ciiltivation is done by natives of the 
islands, no Chinamen being employed on the land, except a few market 
gardeners near Manila. 

I think that the Tagals and other natives might be easily governed. 
Latterly they have shown themselves rebellions against the Spanish 
Government and especially against the priests, but the causes are not 
far to seek. 

In former times, when communication with S})ain was by sailing ves- 
sel round the Ca])e, the number of Spaniards in the islands was small. 

Each province was undei- an alcalde — mayor — vrho was both governor 
and judge; a xn'ovince with a hundred tliousand inhabitants had i)er- 
haps not more than live resident Spanish ofhcials besides the priests. 
All the wealthy parishes had S])an!sh monks as parish priests. The 
poor ones had native clergy. Tlie government was carried on accord- 
ing to the old "Leyes de Indias," By these wise laws the native was 
afforded great protection against extortion. 

He was in some sense a perpetual minor, and could not be sued foi 
more than |5. 



554 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Compare tliis liuniane and wise provision with the laws prevailing in 
British India, where the principal occupation of the lower courts is to 
foreclose the mortgages of the wretched ryot&:at the suit of the village 
usurer. 

These laws also conferred upon the native the perpetual usufruct of 
all the land that he cleared and cultivated, and he could not be removed 
from it. Iucon.se(juence. most of the cultivated laud in Luzon is to this 
day tlie property of the natives. 

The native also had the right to cut timber in the forests to build or 
rei)air his house or shi[), and could cut bamboos for his roofs and 
fences. 

It should t)e understood that the above jnivileges did uot extend to 
Spaniards, Chinese, or other strangers, but were a recognition of the 
natives' right to the land. 

The taxes were light, the principal one being a poll tax called the 
" tt ibuto." The customs duties were light and machinery for the sugar 
plantations came in free of duty. A friendly feeling then existed 
between the Spaniard and the native; the maintenance of such an 
economical administration was uot burdensome to the latter. 

With the opening of the Suez Canal, and the subsequent establish- 
ment of a Spanish line of steamers, all this cliauged. Hordes of hungry 
Spaniards arrived by every steamer, for whom places must be fouud. 
A bureaucratic administration was gradually substituted for the old 
paternal regime. 

Xew departments were organized and the old ones greatly extended. 
OSicials fresh from Spain were poured into every province. There were 
no ]ml)lic works in the islands, but the department was organized with 
assistant engineers, engineers, chief engineers, ins])ectors, and an 
inspector-general, all with liberal salaries and traveling allowances, 
central and provincial oftices, and a staff of writers and draftsmen. 

The pay and allowances of this department for many years exceeded 
the amount of money spent on works, and many of the works are 
wrongly designed and utter failures. 

There were no mines of any consequence, but a dei)artment of mines 
was organized — a useless expense. 

A department of woods and forests was organized, with a similar 
staff to that of i)ublic works. This became a serious grievance to 
the natives by putting great difficulties in the way of their exercising 
their ancient privileges iu the forests. So far as I know, this depart- 
ment never collected enough dues on the timber cut in the forests to 
pay its salaries ;ind expenses. 

A medical service was also organized at great cost and little advan- 
tage. Kesident physicians were appointed to the dilferent thermal 
springs, and no one was to be allowed to bathe without paying the 
doctor his fee. 

Model farms and schools of agriculture were started on paper, offi- 
cials were ap])ointed, and their salaries paid, but little or no money 
was forthcoming to lay out or stock these I'arms. Besides, the direct- 
ors were utterly ignorant of tropical agriculture, and had learned 
Aviiat little they knew iu a class room. 

A policy was now announced and acted upon to assimilate all the 
institutioiis of the archipelago to those of the peninsula — a policy 
almost too imbecile lor belief, but credible now we have seen to what 
depths of inaptitude a Spanish cabinet can descend. 

Additional and useless ships and troops were provided on the Phil- 
ip])ine establishment, and unnecessary little wars were got up against 
the sultan of lola and the dattos of Mindanao. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 555 

These expeditions involved great loss of life from fever among the 
troops and greiit ex])ense to the treasniy. They provided, however, 
pickings for tlie otticials and profits to contractors, titles for the 
overnors-general, decorations and promotions tor officers who had 
interest. 

Accordingly every year some new and oppressive tax was imposed, 
Tlie cnstoms duties were several times raised and articles formerly 
exempt were made to pay. An export tax on sugar and hemp, a tax 
on all trades and professions, on horses and carriages, a port tax, stamj) 
tax, a vexatious tax on all animals slaughtered, taxes on the hand 
looms used by the women in their spare time, taxes on sugar, rice, and 
:oil mills, on ships, boats, and lighters; all these and many more were 
imposed. All these duties and taxes, collected by a horde of rapacious 
and unscrupulous employees, might well disgust the native with the 
Government. All classes felt the oppression. The rich were black- 
mailed under threats of being reported as disaffected, while the poor 
su tiered from illegal exactions. 

Serious agrurian troubles arose between the monastic orders and the 
tenants on their vast estates. Toward the end of General Weyler's 
government a |)erilous state of unrest prevailed. But the arrival of 
Gen. Don Emilio Despujols, Condc de Caspe, to take over the gov- 
lernuient soon produced a better feeling. He meted out justice alike to 
priest and tenant, to Spaniard and native, and sent back to Spain sev- 
eral notorious offenders who were a disgrace to the Spanish name. 
The natives, seeing justice done them for the first time, became most 
fervent admirers of the Conde de Caspe, whom they looked upon as a 
savior. He became the idol of the people. This state of things was 
unfortunately of short duration, for the priests seeing that he was not 
their champion obtained his recall by cable. It is said that they paid 
$100,000 in Madrid to obtain this, Ilis departure was a wonderful 
sight; never had there been seen such demonstrations of affection to a 
governor-general. Innumerable multitudes of natives crowded the 
shores to see him embark, and every steamer belonging to the port 
accompanied him far ont to sea. 

With the sudden dejiarture of the Conde de Caspe there settled 
down on the native miinl the gloomy conviction that force alone could 
plead their cause and that their only hope was to rise in arms. 

Who can wonder at it ? With that horde of hungry taxgatherers 
ev^er vexing them, with all justice denied them, with exile from their 
homes to some distant island ever hanging over them, what else could 
they do? Their fight abnost unarmed against the Spaniards was 
heroic and merits the admiration of all brave men. With few excep- 
tions, their humanity has been equal to their valor. 

Altogether, I consider the Tagals to be a brave, kindly, intelligent, 
and interesting ])eople, worthy of a better government than they have 
had. At the same time they are not advanced enough to take the 
adniinistiation of the archi])elago, nor even of Luzon, entirely into 
their own hands. 

If an honest administration could be conferred upon them, I am con- 
vinced that in a very few years they would attain such a degree of 
prosi)erity as no other colony has hitherto achieved, and thus fully 
iustity their release from the curse of Spanish domination. 



WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE PHILIPPINES? 



[Review of Reviews, July 10, 1898.] 
[1. By an English resident.] 

Mr. John Foreman, an Englislunan who for some years lived in the 
Pliilippines, and whose articles for the last two or three years have 
been the chief source of popular information on the subject, contributes 
to the Contemporary Keview for July an article in which he discourses 
upon the future of the islands. He is hoi)eful, although under no 
delusion as to the possibility of governing the Phili])pine Islands on 
the principles of the Declaration of Independence. He says that the 
insurrection which broke out in August, 1890, was in no sense repub- 
licau in its nature. It had as its object the removal of certain specific, 
well-defined grievances. He says: 

The movement liad for its objects (1) the expulsion of the monastic .orders; (2) the 
abolition of the governor-general's arbitrary power to banish without accusation, 
trial, or sentence; (3) restoration to the natives of the lands held by the religions 
orders; (4) a limitation of the arbitrary powers of the civil guard; (5) no arrest 
without judge's warrant; (6) abolition of the tifteen days' per annum compulsory- 
labor. 

Aguinaldo, the leader of the revolt, is a smart, intelligent man of 
about 30 years of age. He is a landed proprietor who has served as 
petty governor of his native town in Cavite. By the arrangement 
•between him and Admiral Dewey, Mr. Foreman says: 

It is provisionally agreed that Aguinaldo shall set up a local republic. General 
AguiiKildo's plan is to establisb at Manila a congress, to which deputies from all the 
priijcii)al islands will be invited. I do not hesitate to prophesy that, unless under 
Kuropean or Auierican control, the scheme will end in complete failure. At tirst, no 
doubt, the islanders will welcome and cooperate in any arrangement wliich will rid 
them of monastic opjjression. The I'hilipiiine Islands, however, would not remain 
one year peaceful uniler an independent native government. It is an utter impossi- 
bility. There is such racial antipathy that the Visayas would not, in this generation, 
submit to what they would always consider a Tagiilog republic, and the Tagalogs, 
having procured the overthrow oi the Spauiads, would naturally resent a preponder- 
ance of Visaya inlluence. Families there are very closely united, but as a people 
they have little idea of union. Who would be the electors? The masses :ire decidedly 
tooignorant to be capable of voting intelligently. The votes would be entirely con- 
trolled by cli(jues of lamlowners. 

If the native republic did succeed, it would not be strong enough to protect itself 
against foreign aggression. The islands are a splendid group, well worth picking a 
quarrel and spending a few millions sterling to annex them. I entertain the lirm 
conviction that an unprotected united rei)ublic would last only until the novelty of 
the situation had Avorn off. Then, I think, every principal island would, in turn, 
declare its independence. Finally, there would be complete chaos, and before that 
took root America, or some Euroi)ean nation, would probably have interfered, there- 
fore it is l)etter to start with protection. I can not doubt that (Jeneral Aguinaldo is 
quite alive to these facts; nevertheless, I admire his astuteness in entering on any 
plan which, by hook or by crook, will expel the friars. If the republic failed, at least 
mmiastic power would never return. 

A )irotectorate under a strong nation is just as necessary to insure good adminis- 
tration in the islands as to protect them against foreign attack. Either Great Britain 

556 



II 



TREATY OF PEACE. 557 



or America ^voiild be equally welcome to the islanders if they had not the vanity to 
think they i oiild govern themselves. Unless America decided to start on a brand 
new policy, it would hardly suit her, I conjecture, to accept the mission of a protec- 
torate so distant from her chief interests. England, having ample resources so near 
at hand, would probably lind it a less irksome task. For the reasons given above 
the control would have to be a very direct one. I Avould go so far as to suggest that 
the government should be styled "The Philippine Protectorate." There might 1)e a 
chamber of deputies, with a native president. The protector and his six advisers 
should be American or English. The functions of ministers should be vested in the 
advisers, and those of president (of a republic) in the protector. In any case the 
finances could not be confided to a native. The inducement to finance himself 
would be too great. All races should be represented in the chamber. 

Should this proposal be carried out, Mr. Foreman thinks the future 
of the Philippines will astonish the world. He says: 

The islands are extremely fertile, and will produce abnost anything to be found iu 
the Tropics. I estimate that barely one-fourth of the tillable land is now under cul- 
tivation. There is at present only one railway of 120 miles. A number of lines 

) would have to be constructed iu Luzon, Panay, Xegros, Cebu, and Miudanao islands. 
Companies would probably take up the contracts on ninety years' working conces- 
sion and ninety-nine years" lease of acreage in lieu of guaranteed interest. The 

: lands would become immensely valuable to the railway companies, and an enormous 
source of taxable wealth to the protectorate. Koad making should be taken up on 
treasury account and bridge construction on contract, to be paid for by toll conces- 
sions. The ])ort of Yloilo should be improved, the custom-houses abolished, and 
about ten nmre free ports opened to the world. Under the protectorate undoubtedly 

! capital would flow into the Philippines. 

[2. By an Auiericaii Senator.] 

Ill the Xorth Anieri(*an lleview for June, Senator John T. Morgan 
discusses what the United States should do with the conquered ishuids, 
speaking of them, of course, in the prophetic-historical sense, for wheu 
Senator Morgan wrote the con(iuest was still to come. Senator Morgan 
is strongly of opinion that, whatever monarchical Europe may say, the 
United States must fulfill its destiny: 

We must respond in our policies to the energy with which our institutions have 
inspired our peojde in seeking wealth and commercial pursuits. Wheresoever our 
power may extenil beyond oui- continental boundaries it will be confined to the pro- 
i tection of the interesls of our own people by establishing such military outposts as 
will secure to them the full enjoyment of all their rights and the liberty of conunerce. 
The policy of colonization by conquest or coercion is repugnant to our national crei'd, 
which places the right of free self-government in supremacy over all other sovereign 
rights: and a colonial policy which discriminates between the rights of colonists and 
those of the ptM>ple who enjoy full citizenship in the United States would be repugnant 
to the principles of our National Constitution. 

This, it must be admitted, is somewhat vague, nor is it exactly 
clear what the Senator is driving at. He would establish a protector- 
ate over the Philippine Islands, but, speaking of the policy of the 
United States, he says : 

It will not inaugurate or support a propaganda in the l'hilip])ines, either political 
or religious; but it should not deny to itself the right to give its encouragement to 
good government in those islands, or to give to those people proper support against 
the unjust invasion of their rights by foreign powers. The fortunes of war have 
devolved this duty upon us. Annexation will not be a necessary or ])roper result 
of such moral or actual protection, because the United States is an American power, 
with high national duties that are, in every sense, American, and the Philippines 
are not within the si)here of American political influence, but are Asiatic, and 
should remain Asiatic. 

As with the Philippines, so with the other Spanish possessions; nor 
does Senator Morgan limit his survey to those possessions that are held 
now by Spain. He says: 

It is a new and inviting field for American enterprise and Intliieuce that ojjcns 
Porto Rico, Cuba, the Isthmian Canal, Hawaii, the Caroline and the Philippine 



558 TRFATY OF PEACE. 

Islands to fair trade and good government; and we sliall need only the guod will of 
those people to secure to us a just participation in its advantages. This ia an allnr- 
mg lield for comiiiest and dominion, but no compnlsiou will be needed to hold it, 
beyond the temporary necessity of preserving the ptsuce in these islands until the 
rightful government of their peo])le can be established on safe foundations. Con- 
quest would dislionor our motives in waging war against Spain, if we should hold 
the subjugated islands only in trust for ourselves. 

If by this last sentence Senator Morgan means that there is to be no 
attempt to enforce the United States taritt" against non-American 
goods ill tl'.e conquered islands, well and good, but it is to be hoped he 
will persist in that good resolution. 

[3. By an American consul.] 

In Scribner's Magazine for June Mr. Isaac M. Elliott, the American 
consul at Manila from 1893 to 1896, gives some account oi' the islands 
and their inhabitants. Mr. Elliott's narrative is illustrated by a num- 
ber of pictures talcen from pliotograplis, which give a rather i)leasing 
impression of JManila and its suburbs. Mr. Elliott was much imi)ressed 
by the excessive taxation levied by means of fees, stamps, and other 
imposts. He puts the case in a nutshell when he says tliat the church 
lives off the natives and the Spanish oflicials live off the importers. 
There are ninety-nine public holidays observed every year in addition 
to the (ifty-two Sundays. The eluirch is immensely rich, but although it 
plunders the natives, Mr. Elliott admits that it has been a civilizing fear 
ture, and has built schools and churches all over the Philii)pine Islands. 
The insurrection, he thinks, was a righteous uprising on the part of the 
Malays and half castes, who form the producing classes, against mis- 
government. The savages, or Negritos, have nothing to do with the 
insurrection. Most of the sugar produced on the island goes to the 
United States, Part of it, however, is taken by Hongkong. America 
talvcs most of the hemp, but none of the tobacco. Until within the last 
few years the United States were supreme in the Philippine trade, but 
of late years English firms have succeeded to the bulk of the business. 
The last American firms were crowded out three years ago by Si)anish 
intrigues, caused by tlie hatred of Americans growing out of the Cuba's 
trouble. In the Island of ]'\lindoro there are mountains so full of coal 
that thousands of tons have broken off" the outcropping seam and 
accumulated at the base of the cliffs. The Spanish Government 
immediately confiscated the land where the coal was discovered, but 
nothing has been done toward developing the seam, and all the coal 
used in Manila at present is brought from Australia. 

[•i. The Philippines and tlie Cliineso markets.] 

Mr. Truxtun Beale, writing in the North American Eeview on "The 
strategical value of the Philippines," is all for holding them, notwith- 
standing the objections of Senator Morgan. He would retain the 
Phili'ppine Islands, not so much for their own sakes, although that 
weighs with him, but because they would enable America to command 
the Chinese markets. He says: 

Few realize that China is yet a sparsely populated country. It is little more than 
one-third as thi(dvly ])o])ulated per sfpiare mile as the most sparsely populated ]iart 
of Eur()])e. It is not one-quarter as thickly populated as the most thickly populated 
part of Eurojje. I can conlirm the testimony of other travelers as to the great 
extent of uncultivated land in its interior. Its immense mineral deposits have not 
yet begun to be developed, and it is said to contain the largest and linest deposit of 
coal yet discovered. Contrary to the popular impression, the Chinaman is not a 
good business man. He is not an enterprising man. His sole idea in business is to 
turn his capital over rapidly and get quick returns iu trade. The idea of laying 



I 



TREATY OF PEACE. 559 

o'.it the protits of capirui for several years in order to ilraiu marshes or irrigate 
wastes never occurs to him. Tlie immensely increased trade that will result from 
the development of this country should be ours. 

[5. A lady's account of the islanders.] 

There are several miscellaneous articles in the mag^azines abont the 
Philippine Islands. Miss lAicy M. J. Garnett writes upon the Pliilii)- 
pine islanders in the Fortnightly Keview. She gives some interesting 
pictures of the manners and customs of the i)eople. She has much to 
say of the various saints, who have superseded the ancient idols more 
in name than in fact. The patron saint of Manila is St. Francis the 
Tearful, who on one occasion wept for three hours so coi)iously over 
the danger of Manila that many cloths were moistened. Another 
favorite saint is the Virgin Antipolo, who appears to have interposed 
more efficaciously for the prott-ction of Manila in the seventeenth cen- 
tury than she was disposed to do wlien Admiral Dewey entered the 
harbor. Miss Garnett discusses the marriage customs and legal status 
of tjie women at some length. Concubinage has been larg'ely substi- 
tuted for marriage, owing to the rapacity of the priests, who demand 
such exorbitantly large fees that the natives decide it is not worth the 
money. Tliey are jealous after marriage, but unmarried women are not 
very strictly looked after. 

The Philippine laws relating to the property of married persons are exceedingly 
quaint and interesting, being entirely in favor of the wife. The property of a 
bride is never settled on the husband. If a man is poor and his wife well to do, so 
they remain tbrougliout tlieir married life, he becoming simply the administrator of 
lier possessions, but having no right to them. If a husband becomes bankrupt in a 
business in which he has invested some of his wife's fortune, she ranks as a second- 
class creditor under the connnercial code. Such being the legal status of women 
in these islands, it naturally follows that they enjoy a considerable degree of per- 
sonal independence, which, in some localities, economic conditions tend to increase, 
especially among the working classes. The chief of these economic conditions has 
been the almost exclusive emi^loynient in the Government cigar factories of women. 
The stajile industry of the city being thus debarred from men, various occupations 
and industries usually performed by wouK^n fall to their share. In their homes, too, 
while the wife is earning the family bread — or rather rice, their staple food — the 
husband looks after the children and cooks the dinner. It is also very difficult to 
get women to act as nurses and maids in European fanulies. 

[G. Dr. Albert Shaw's view.] 

Mr. Bryan and Mr. Cleveland may deprecate extension of American 
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, but Dr. Albert Shaw has 
made up his mind that it has to come, and says so with emphasis in 
the new number of the American Review of Eeviews: 

The discussion of the future of the Philippines has gone on apace and has brought 
out a great variety of opinions. The surprising thing in the discussion has been the 
remarkable vigor and extent of the American sentiment in favor of the permanent reten- 
tion of the islands as an American possession. It is coming to be understood through- 
out the country that annexation of Hawaii, or the Philippines, or Porto Rico, does 
not by any means imply, either now or at any time in the future, admission into the 
sisterhood of Federal States whose government is provided for under the Constitu- 
tion. It is precisely as reasonable and possible that the United States should exer- 
cise general sovereignty over a distant island without bringing that island into the 
Federal Union as for Holland to exorcise dominion in .Java without bringing the 
people of that remote realm into domestic relation with the Netherlands. We do 
not intend to hand the people of the Philippines Itack to the Spaniards; and our 
sense of decency and respect for the enlightened opinion of mankind will not per- 
mit us to abandon them. Nor will the rivalries and conllicts of the European and 
Asiatic powers make it possible for us to select England or Holland or any other 
power as our residuary legatee. 



5n0 TIIKATY OF PEACE. 



riCTUKES FR031 MANILLA. 



Mr. F. T. r>ulleii, in a paper entitled "A Keniiuiscence of Manila," 
gives a very vivid picture of what he saw in the Pliilipi)ine Islands, 
which he visited many years aiio on a sailing ship from Honiikoug. 
Mr. Biillen has an extremely high estimate of the value of the Fhilip- 
l^ines. He says that they lorm a magnificent territory, si)endidly 
favored with every form of wealtli, and capable of supporting witii the 
greatest ease fifteen times their present i)Opuhition. Their climate, 
except in the low-lying valleys, is almost ])erfect. There was no energy 
shown anywhere excepting by the English, American, and (lerman 
mercliants, altliough the most industrious laborers are the (Uiinese. 
Mr. l>ullen thinks that Japan would probably succeed better than any 
other power in administering the Pliilii)i)ines. At the same time, he 
thinks that the tragedy of Formosa would debar them froi-i having a 
chance with the islands. Therefore, as we are out of it, Mr. Bullen 
thinks the United States will have to take in hand the administration 
of the great archipelago. 

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. 



lu the Forum, Mr. H. S. Towuseud, formerly inspector-general of 
schools at Hawaii, expresses a very strong opinion in favor of annexa- 
tion of the Sandwi(;h Islands by the United States. He speaks very 
highly of the intelligence of the Hawaiians. He says: 

When first I cam*! among the Hawaiiau people I was siirpi'ised to find the school 
children able to put to shame Avlth their knowhidge of G;irfield, (Jrant, Lincoln, 
"Washington, Gladstone, lieaconshcld, Bismarck. " I'nser Fritz," Nelson, and Xapo- 
leon, the Americ:in school children with whom I had come in contact. Although the 
Hawaiian press has deteriorated sonjewhat since that time, Hawaiiau newspapers 
Btill give a greater amount of news from foreign lauds than would be appreciated by 
the readers of American country newspapers. 

THE PHILIPPINES. 

Mr. F. F. Hilder, writing in the same magazine on the Philippine 
Islands, thinks that the Americans would do well not to lose their 
hold over the islands whicli have come into their possession by the for- 
tune of war. He says: 

The world contains no fairer nor more fertile lands, no more promising Held for 
commercial enterprise, and no peojde more worthy to l)e elevated to a higher plai e 
in the scale of nations, and to be assisted by education and good government to 
obtain it. This is no imaginative statement, but the result of i)ersonal observation 
of the country and of intercourse with its people. 

The Century Magazine for August contains a mass of jjapers relating 
to the war and the American conquests. They are: "The Island of 
Porto Kico," with i)ictures from photographs; " Facts about thePhili]> 
l)ines,'' by Mr. Vanderlip, As.sistant Secretary of the Treasury, with a 
discussion of pending ])roblems, with a ma]> and i)ictures from photo 
graphs; "Life in Manila,'' with pi(;tures from photographs; "An artist 
with Admiral Samjjson's ficet," with pictures from sketches made on 
the spot; "The sanitary regeneration of Havana," by the Surgeon- 
(icneral of the Army; "Cubii as seen from the inside," with pictures 
from photograi^hs. Mi-. A'anderli}), one of the brightest iind ablest of 
the Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury, says of the Philijipincs: " It 



TREATY OF PEACE. 561 

is as a base for commercial operations that the islands seem to possess 
the greatest importance. They occupy a favored location, not with 
reference to one part of any particular country of the Orient, but to all 
parts. Together with the islands of the Japanese Empire, since the 
acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines are the pickets of the Pacific, 
standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millions of China and 
Korea, French Indo China, the Malay Peninsula, and the islands of 
Indonesia to the south. Australasia may even be regarded as in the 
line of trade. The possession of the Philippines by a progressive com- 
mercial power, if the I^ficaragua Canal project should be completed, 
would change the course of ocean navigation as it concerns a large per- 
centage of the water-borne trafitic of the world. The project is alluring. 
In the undeveloped resources of the Philippines the sanguine radicals 
see a great opportunity for our genius. They recognize that in a decade 
we might make a change greater than has been wrought since Magal- 
hae's discovery until the present time. They see great development 
companies formed to cultivate tobacco and sugar by modern methods, 
others formed to test the richness of the unknown mineral deposits, 
and still others to develop transportation or to reap the treasures of the 
forest. They see also that with honest, intelligent, just, and humane 
government there might be astounding improvement in the character 
of the people." 

THE PHILIPPINES AND THEIR PEOPLE — AN UNPROMISING COLONY 

[Keview of Keviews, June 15, 1898.] 

In the Contemporary Review for June Mr. Claes Ericsson, who appears 
to have been an orchid collector, describes a visit which he paid to the 
Philippines in the year 1891. A perusal of his paper is not calculated 
to encourage very joyful anticipations as to the result if the Americans 
should decide to begin their colonizing experiments by taking over the 
2,000 islands with a population of 8,000,000, merely because Admiral 
Dewey destroyed half a dozen ships in the harbor of Manila. For 
what appears most clearly from Mr. Ericsson's paper is that the natives 
of these islands, whether they be Sulus, or Tagals, or Bisayas, are ele- 
ments in the question which will have to be reckoned with altogether 
independently of the fate of the Spaniards. In the island of Palawan, 
Mr. Ericsson says, the Spaniards have no real authority, and never 
interfere with the natives except where Chinamen or Europeans are 
concerned. Again he says, after visiting the other islands, "It would 
have been almost useless to ask the assistance of the Spaniards. I 
never met with one who could speak the Sulu language or any of the 
dialects. As a consequence, the supposed rulers know next to nothing 
of the natives, their customs, and wishes. None of the larger islands 
is really under the domination of the Spaniards, whose rule extends 
little farther than the range of their cannon. Of the native soldiery, 
not one in a s<;ore knows the name of his officers. 

In the chief town of the Sulu islands the Sulu were in the habit of 
taking pot shots at the Spanish sentries every night, and this, be it 
observed, was the former state of Spanish rule in the Sulu islands. 
Mr. Ericsson does not give a very cheerful account of the country itself. 
It swarms with venomous ants, whose bites suppurate like smallpox. 
Mosquitoes, he says, swarm as they do nowhere else on the earth, while 
as for alligators, he once counted thirteen moving in a troop along the 
beach at one time. Worse than all is a virulent fever, from which, at 
T P 36 



5G2 TREATY OF PEACE. ■ 

one place that he visited, half of the Spanish garrison was prostrate. 
Everywhere the people seemed wretchedly poor, and their habitations 
the worst hovels that he had ever seen in the far East. The aborigines 
are little people who are tyrannized over by the Sulus, who appear to 
spend their time in plundering their neighbors. The Sulus are pirates or 
the sons of pirates, who think nothing of murder, and who have never 
been subdued, and, in Mr. Ericsson's opinion, never will be by Spain. 
It is evident that if the Americans are to serve their apprenticeship to 
colonization they will have a pretty tough time in the Philippines. They 
will tind it somewhat difiticult to apply to those aborigines and their 
Sulu oppressors the great and glorious principles of the American Con- 
stitution ; but that, some of the Americans gravely assure us, is precisely 
what they are determined to do. The belief of some Americans in the 
saving efficacy of democratic government is quite touching. It will not, 
however, long survive the test of actual experience in the Philippines. 



FACTS ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES, WITH A DISCUSSION OF 
PENDING PROBLEMS. 



[The Century, August, 1898.] 
[By Frank A. Vandeelip, Aasistant Secretary of the Treasury.] 

The guns of Admiral Dewey did sometbing more than destroy a 
Spanish fleet in the harbor at Manila. Their echo came back to us in 
a question new in the history of our Government. In the shaping of 
the Constitution our fathers evinced a foresight that has ever since 
been our admiration; but their prescience looked ahead to no such 
problem as this one which a naval victory on the other side of the world 
has raised. It is a problem for the solution of which we have surpris- 
ingly little data. Neither precedent nor experience can be satisfac- 
torily drawn on, and we see with sudden clearness that some of the 
most revered of our political maxims have outlived their force. Wash- 
ington's Farewell Address, and the later crystallization of its main 
thought by President Monroe, had come to possess with us almost the 
force of a constitutional provision, and even to be regarded by the 
nations as one of the fundamentals of our Government. Our stanch 
belief in the value of that doctrine of political isolation has been shaken 
by Dewey's victory. The impending question of what shall be done 
with the fruit of that victory has made us examine in a new temper, 
and with new hghts, this political doctrine of ours ; and it has sharply 
emphasized to our minds the changed conditions surrounding us now, 
compared with those which gave birth and force to that doctrine. 

The world is much smaller now than when Washington read his fare- 
w^ell address. The Philippine Islands, although almost on the other side 
of the earth, are much nearer the seat of our Government, by the meas- 
ure of transportation and time, than were in that day regions that are 
now populous States. The same factors that have brought compara- 
tively close to us the most distant countries have developed a new main- 
spring that has become the directing force in international affairs — the 
mainspring of commercialism. In the days when Washington enun- 
ciated the policy of political isolation the questions that were before 
parliaments and assemblies were questions of individual freedom, of 
representative government, of civil and political rights. The debates 
of the legislative bodies of the nations are no longer on those lines. 
They are on finance and questions of commercial development. It is 
the age of commerce, and it is commerce that has for a generation 
been shaping the foreign policy of every nation but ours. It has been 
the flag of commerce, rather than of national aggrandizement, that has 
led the troops of England, France, and Germany through Africa. It 
was to plant the flag of commerce that there has been such maneuver- 
ing by the nations of Europe to gain footholds along the Chinese coast. 
And now, without the slightest premeditation on our part, and with 

563 



564 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the most inadequate preparation to handle the question, we have sud- 
denly found ourselves in possession of a vantage point more valuable 
than the prizes for which the great nations of Europe have been 
scheming. With the extraordinary conditions surrounding this sud- 
den acquisition of rights, it is natural that there should be the most 
intense interest in the characteristics and the commercial possibilities 
of these islands and their population of <s,{)00,OOU. To reach any 
intelligent opinion in regard to their disposition, we need, of course, 
as clear an idea as i)Ossible of just what they are, of the advantages 
to be gained by their retention, and of the diliiculties to be encountered 
in their administration. 

It is as a base for commercial operations that the islands seem to 
possess the greatest importance. They occupy a favored location, not 
with reference to one part of any particular country of the Orient, but 
to all parts. Together with the islands of the Japanese P^mpire, since 
the acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines are the pickets of the 
I'acilic, standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millions of 
China and Korea, French Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula, and the 
islands of Indonesia to the south. Australasia may even be regarded 
as in the line of trade. A glance at the map will readily show what a 
commanding position the archipelago occupies with reference to adja- 
cent territory. While it is true that the islands lie a little out of the 
direct line of ocean traffic in voyages by way of the eastern passage, 
there are reasons which operate strongly for a discontinuance of navi- 
gation by way of the Straits of Malacca and the China Sea to the 
Orient. 

The voyage by this course is one dreaded by all navigators at certain 
seasons of the year, when the Straits become the center of the worst 
storm disturbances known to the world, and when navigation is conse- 
quently restricted. With the opening of the Nicaragua Canal, how- 
ever, the trade of our Atlantic ports with the Orient will take the safer 
and shorter route thus provided; and in addition to this, the commerce 
of much of Europe which now seeks the East by the voyage through 
the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Indian Ocean, and the Straits, 
or by the Cape route, will turn in the opposite direction. The posses- 
sion of the Philippines by a progressive commercial power, if the iS^ica- 
ragua Canal project should be completed, would change the course of 
ocean navigation as it concerns a large percentage of the water borne 
traffic of the world. Europe looks to the Nicaragua Canal and the 
Pacific as offering a better route to the far Eastern countries; and in 
the event of its completion, the archipelago will be the gateway to all 
the trade of lower China and the countries south. Hongkong, the 
great warehouse where are stored and whence are distributed the 
products of the earth in the maritime trade of China, may, in the course 
of these changes now in prospect, become scarcely more than a distrib- 
uting point for the trade of the valley of the Sa-Kiang, 

In tlie trans-Pacific trade the Hawaiian Islands will afford a resting 
place for ships, and their importance will be immeasurably increased 
by the oi>ening of the canal and the diversion of ocean traffic from the 
channels it now follows. The Nicaragua Canal and the Hawaiian 
Islands will be invested with new interest to us by the unexpected 
acquisition of rights in the Philippines, which will then be a key to the 
Orient of vast importance to the United States, or to any other pro 
gressive nation which may have the opportunity to make of them a base 
for the distribution of far Eastern commerce. 

More than half of the people of the earth live in the countries which 






TREATY OF PEACE. 565 

maybe easily readied from thePhilippines. There is China, which, acord- 
ing to the latest estimates, has a population of more than 400,000,000 ; the 
East Indies (British, Dutch, and French), 343,000,000; Japan, 42,000,- 
000; British Australasia, 5,000,000; Siam, 5,000,000; and the Straits 
Settlements, 000,0:0— all together, a population ten times that of the 
United States. Trade relations can not at once be established with all 
these millions, for many of the populous provinces of China and far 
Eastern Asia lie remote from the coast, and it will be years before 
communication with the interior is opened by rail. Nevertheless, 
since the Chiuo-Japanese war railroad building iu China has been 
advancing rapidly. Out of adversity something of good has come to 
the Celestial Empire, and the lesson taught by the victorious Japanese 
has resulted in the birth of a new China. Ancient exclusiveness is 
being laid aside, and the Empire is already on the road to progress. 

How long the dominion of Hongkong over the maritime trade of China 
will last, even should the Philippines not become its rival as a distribu- 
tive market, is a question which may largely be determined by the 
occupation of Kiao-Chou, Port Arthur, and Wei-Hai- Wei. Kussia's great 
railway across her Siberian i)ossessions must also be taken into account 
in disposing of the trade of China. Penetrating the rich province of 
Manchuria, with the certain prospect of forming a junction with a road 
to be built from Shanghai, it will be only a few years before that city 
will be cojinected by rail with Europe. The great rivers of China, the 
Si-Kiang,the Yang tse Kiang, and the Yellow Eiver, have hitherto fur- 
nished the "only ready means of reaching the trade of the interior. 
Hongkong, at the mouth of the Si-Kiang, has monopolized the com- 
merce of the valley drained by that river, and the trade of Canton, 
formerly of much magnitude, has dwindled into insignificance. It may 
beeasily seen thattherecent acquisition of Kiao-ChouBay, Wei-Hai- Wei, 
and Port Arthur gives Germany, England, and Kussia, respectively, 
advantageous locations with reference to the commerce of the valley of 
the Yellow River. The onset made with a view to opening China to 
trade can not fail to result iu a remarkable transformation of the empire 
in a few decades — a change as complete as that which has taken place 
in Japan, which twenty-five years ago was as China is to-day, and is 
now a ranking power, a leading member of the family of progressive 
nations. 

The foreign commerce of all the countries of the far East exceeds 
two thousand millions a year. The reports of the Bureau of Statistics 
of the Treasury Department show that the imports are a few millions 
in excess of $1,000,000,000, and the exports about the same. In the 
total value of the foreign trade the United States has an interest of 
about $150,000,000, a little over 7 per cent. Our chief trade among 
these countries is with Japan. We buy more than 32 per cent of 
Japan's exportable products, and we supply 12 per cent of all the Empire 
buys abroad. We take one twelfth of China's exports, sending iu 
return one twentieth of her imports. Trade with the Hawaiian Islands 
is almost exclusively our own, more than 99 per cent of their exports 
being shipped to the United States, while they take from us 70 per cent 
of all their imports. We enter into the trade of British Australasia to 
the extent of 5 per cent of its total commerce. To the Philippine 
Islands we send but little over one two-hundredth part of their imports, 
while we take more than one-fifth of their entire exports and more than 
one half of their exports of sugar and hemp. The import figures must 
not, however, be taken to indicate the whole of American shipments to 
the countries named, for they represent only the trade direct. 



566 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Many exports of the United States are credited in English and 
American statistics to the commerce of Great Britain. Our interests 
in the Orient, however, may best be understood from the fact that, next 
to Great Britain, we have the largest commerce with these countries. 
Germany and France, although active in securing commercial advan- 
tages in China, have not yet acfjuired sufticient importance in trade 
returns to be classitied, exce[)t as "other Europe." There is a promis- 
ing field for our manufactures of cotton in almost all countries of the 
Orient. Within a few years our exports of raw cotton to Japan have 
doubled, and (mr trade with China has shown a marked tendency toward 
expansion. We have the bulk of the trade in mineral oils, although 
there is a growing competition with Russia, which maybe greater when 
the trans -Sibeiian road is completed. American flour also has gained 
a foothold, and the growers of the hard wheat of California, the best 
shipping wheat in the world, look to the far East as a future market 
for their exportable surplus. Machinery of all kinds is rapidly gaining 
in favor, and within a year one of the Chinese railroads has been 
equipped with Baldwin locomotives. One of the street-railway lines of 
Manila is now provided with American cars made in Phihidelphia, and, 
notwithstanding the great expense of transportation, they are pre- 
ferred to those of Germany, which were discarded. 

What is there in the Philippines, aside from their most important con- 
sideration as a base for the extension of trade? This magnificent archi- 
pelago has an area of about 114,000 square miles, or more than two- 
thirds that of the Spanish peninsula, and three times that of Spain's 
possessions in the West Indies. The chain extends in a southeasterly 
direction for a distance of some eighteen hundred miles, and separates 
the waters of the China Sea from the Pacific. Luzon, nearest Formosa 
and the coast of China, and the largest island of the group, is of sufti- 
cient extent to equal the combined area of Cuba and Porto Rico. The 
fertile island of ^lindanao, at the southern extremity of the archipelago, 
has an area equal to that of "The Pearl of the Antilles." Between 
these two great islands, Luzon and Mindanao, are others, smaller and 
of varying importance. Upon one of them, Panay, is situated the city 
of lloilo, rapidly developing into a jjort quite independent of the influ- 
ence of Manila, which, for the most part, controls the trade of the Phil- 
ippines. Apart from the chain pro|)er lies the island of Palawan, which, 
extending in a southwesterly direction from the island of Pauay, reaches 
almost to British Borneo, and is the western boundary of a body of 
water of great depth, known as Mindoro or Sulu Sea. 

The number of islands in the archipelago is variously estimated at 
from 500 to L*,000, the smaller figure relating to those which are sus- 
ceptible of cultivation or are valuable for their timber and minerals. 
Their area is as large as that of the six ISTew England States, with New 
Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. The area of arable land, however, 
is scarcely more than one-third of that contained within the limits of 
the States named. The reason for this is the volcanic origin of the 
islands and the consequent ruggedness of the country. In Luzon, the 
principal island and the one upon which Manila is situated, there is a 
fertile valley drained by the Cagayan, some I'OO miles in length and 
100 wide, lying between ranges of mountains on each coast. The val- 
ley of the Cagayan under good government has a bright future before 
it. At the mouth of the river is the town of Aparri, oi)posite the 
island of Camiguin, which stands guard over an extensive bay. In this 
bay harbor facilities may be found e<{nal to and safer than those in the 
bay of Manila, and persons who have been to the islands investigating 



I 



TREATY OF PEACE. 567 

their possibilities of development look to Aparri as likely to become a 
rival of Manila. This is so for the reason that Aparri is twenty-four 
hours nearer Hongkong and 400 miles nearer San Francisco than the 
capital of the island. As already said, Manila dominates the Philip- 
pine trade, although Iloilo has gained some importance as a sugar 
mart and Cebu is known for its exports of hemp. 

After centuries of Spanish misrule, the islands are scarcely more 
advanced than they were when, in honor of Philip II, they were given 
their name. Their varied resources are virtually undeveloped. Their 
people have never been taught how to take advantage of the bounties 
which nature has placed before them. 

Interest chiefly centers on the Island of Luzon, not only because 
Manila is situated on that island, but because of the diversity of its 
products. In the valley of the Cagayan are great tobacco fields, which 
rival those of the Vuelta Abajo of Cuba. The greater part of the sugar 
exported from the Philippines is produced on the Island of Luzon. 
Hemp, the main product of the group, is grown almost entirely on 
other islands. Rice is a staple crop, because, as with most other 
peoples of the Orient, it is the greatest article of food consumption. 
None is exported, however; and notwithstanding there is abundant 
territory suitable for rice growing, it has not been utilized, for the rea- 
son that the directing agencies have in this, as in all other instances, 
failed to induce the people to make the most of their advantages. 

Coffee also is grown, and the more civilized natives have each a little 
grove of trees, which produce 4 or 5 bushels of the coft'ee berry a 
year. Only small quantities are sent to the markets for export. A little 
corn is raised, mainly in the vicinity of Manila, where in season it is 
peddled on the streets, boiled or roasted. None is fed to stock, paddy 
rice being used for that purpose. Hay is unknown, its place being 
taken by a swamp grass, upon which the buffalo cattle, the draft animals 
of the Philippines, feed. 

The most important agricultural product is what is known to com- 
merce as Manila hemp. Thousands of tons of this fiber are raised annu- 
ally on the Pacific slopes of the southern islands, where it also grows 
wild. That this is the leading product of the Philippines is due to tlie 
fact that its cultivation requires the least effort. With only careless 
attention it is jiossible to raise many tons to the acre. The fiber is 
obtained from a species of plantain called abaca, a tree which grows to 
the height of from 15 to 20 feet and is from 8 to 12 inches in diameter. 
The trunk may be as easily separated as a stalk of celery. An ordi- 
nary knife only is required to cut down the tree, and a rude instrument 
is used to press out the juice and shred the fiber. After a little drying 
in the sun, and packing it into bales of 240 pounds each, it is ready for 
shipment. The United States and England take almost the entire 
crop. Hemp of this kind is grown nowhere else in the world. It is 
said that a fortune awaits one who can invent a machine which will 
accelerate the process of pressing out the juice and pulp, leaving only 
the fiber. A rude knife and a lever for holding it strongly in position 
are the instruments now in use. 

Next in the order of importance as a product of the soil is sugar. 
The poorest sugar in the world is produced in the Philii^pines, and yet 
the islands are capable of producing the best. The reason for the poor 
quality lies in the method of manufacture, and not in any disadvantage 
of soil, climate, or character of the cane, which is superior in saccharine. 
The methods of sugar manufacture which prevailed in the fifteen tli 
century are still in vogue in the Philippines. The last account of mills 



5G8 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In operation showed that there were in the islands 5,920 cattle mills, 
239 steam mills, and 35 water mills, while there were only 3 vacuum- 
pan sugar works. The })rocess of making sugar in these islands varies 
with locality, but all tlie product is what is known as a very low grade 
of muscovado sugar. It is not drained or clarified by any of the modern 
methods, and brings the lowest price in the markets of the world, 
except perhaps low grade sugar of a similar character made in Brazil. 
The estimated crop of the islands tor the season of 1897-98 is 190,000 
tons. Cuba's crop for the same period is estimated at 200,000 tons. 

Until the year 1890 the United States annually imported from 
110,000,000 to 300,000,000 pounds of Manila sugar, but since that time 
a market has been found nearer the supply, and China and Japan have 
become large consumers of Manila sugar. There are extensive rehneries 
at Hongkong, which take a considerable part of the product. Last 
year our imports of sugar from Manila were ouly a little over 73,000,000 
pounds. This falling oft" is due to two causes — one the market found 
in China and Jai)an, and the other the competition of the bounty-aided 
beet sugars of Europe, which have also the advantage of nearness to 
London and >Tew York, the great sugar centers of the world. The 
consumption of sugar is increasing so rapidly, especially in the United 
States, that, properly handled, the sugar resources of the Philippines 
will necessarily be developed in order to add to the world's sujiply. 
We annually imi)ort sugar to the value of $100,000,000, an amount 
which largely oflsets our exports of wheat. It is believed by the best 
authorities that by the employment of modern methods the industry in 
the Philippines may be made to rival Cuba in the output and quality of 
cane sugar. It has been a matter of comment that while sugar of 
excellent grade is produced in Cuba, in the Philippines, under the 
dominion of the same country, but little effort has been made to develop 
resources which even surpass those of Cuba. 

One reason for the superior quality of the sugar of Cuba, however, 
is to be found in the proximity of the United States, American capi- 
talists have there entered the held with modern ideas and modern 
machinery. Still other reasons may be assigned: In Cuba, Porto Rico, 
and the British West Indies, notwithstanding a lack of labor, the 
industry advanced until brought into competition with beet bounties. 
In the latter countries it has been necessary to import coolies to culti- 
vate the fields and work the mills, but in the Philippine Islands there 
are many thousands of laborers available for work in the manufacture 
of cane sugar. How to use the surplus labor in the Philippines has 
been, seemingly, more of a problem than the lack of labor in the West 
Indies. With such a redundancy there has been no inducement in the 
Philippines to introduce labor-saving machinery. There are in abun- 
dance two elements of iH'oductivity — land and labor. The intelligent 
use of cai)ital, added to these, would revolutionize the industry, and 
make the Pliilippines a great cane-sugar-producing country. 

The third product of the Philippines in the order of importance is 
tobacco. While the United States furnishes a market for the hemp 
and sugar of Manila, scarcely any of its tobacco or cigars is brought 
to this country, ex(;ei)t now and then upon sailing vessels engaged in 
the Eastern trade. But the crop is an im])ortant one, and Manila 
tol^acco and cigars have long held the same re[)utation in the East that 
the Havami product hokls in the West. Lately the industry has shown 
a tendency to expand, owing to the fact that the Spanish Government, 
realizing, in one instance at least, the elTects of an evil i)olicy, has 
abandoned its monopoly of the trade. Much revenue was formerly 






TREATY OF PEACE. 569 

derived by the Government from its exclusive control of the tobacco 
market, and for that reason it was maintained many years, until the 
industry languished. Delivery of the crop under the old system was 
required to be made at the Government warehouses in Manila, and the 
natives were bound to accept for it the standard price fixed by the 
Spanish authorities. Needless to say, this was far below the market 
value of the tobacco. The manufacture of cigars, cigarettes, and cut 
tobacco at Binoudo, a populous part of new Manila, has now assumed 
great proportions. One company employs 10,000 hands, and has a 
capital of $15,000,000. Spain has heretofore taken the bulk of the 
crop grown on the 60,000 acres under cultivation. 

There are few other jiroducts of agriculture to be mentioned. Fruit 
is not cultivated, but grows wild in abundance and variety character- 
istic of a tropical country. Bananas of delicious flavor, oranges of poor 
quality, mangos, guavus, and many other native fruits grow wild. 
TLere are no olives or figs and there is no vine culture. Dairy farming 
has not yet been established in the islands, although there is said to 
be great opportunity in that direction. Butter is imported from London 
in bottles, and naturally is held at a very high price. Throughout all 
the islands of the archipelago agriculture is yet in an undeveloped 
state. Vast opportunities may be found for exploiting modern methods 
of farming. There is not a farm in any of the islands which will com- 
pare favorably with even the worst on the American continent. Plow- 
ing is done with a sharpened stick, and nothing is known of agricultural 
labor-saving implements such as are in use in the United States and 
other civilized countries. Only the most primitivemethods areemployed. 

The mineral resources of the islands have never been developed, 
although they are known to be considerable. There is coal in abun- 
dance in Cebu and Negros. Gold is found in the alluvial deposits along 
the streams and at the mouths of rivers, particularly in Luzon and 
Mindanao. Copper exists in the central districts of Luzon, and lead is 
plentiful in Cebu. Immense deposits of sulphur are found in the craters 
of extinct volcanoes, and in some of the islands there is found a good 
quality of iron ore. 

"While riches await a progressive people in the development of the 
agricultural and mineral resources of the country, there is still another 
source of wealth not yet drawn upon, and toward which the attention 
of capitalists in this country has already been directed. A company is 
now forming for the purpose of invading the forests which clothe the 
slopes of the mountain ranges and cover thousands of acres of the 
valley lands not yet under cultivation. These forests, abounding in 
rare hard woods, are virtually untouched. More than sixty varieties 
capable of use are known to exist. The rarest are a green and a yel- 
low wood, which retain those colors in the finished product. They are 
susceptible of high polish, and for carving are said not to be surpassed. 
The trees are not large, but the logs cut from them will average a foot 
in diameter, and are quite large enough for all practical i)arposes. 
Some day, whether the United States retains possession of the Philip- 
pines or not, adventurous and enterprising men will push their way 
into the hearts of these valuable forests, and their treasures will be 
brought forth to decorate the interiors of our palace cars and residences. 

The present foreign commerce does not seem large in comparison with 
our own enormous and growing trade. In the best seasons $30,000,000 
a year will cover the exports and $25,000,000 the imports — a total com- 
merce in one year of about half the value of what we sell to foreign 
countries in a single month. 



510 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The proposition to retain permanent possession of this important 
group, raising as it does a problem entirely new to our scheme of gov- 
ernment, is not attended with unanimity of puUlic sentiment. Standing 
;ii)on the threshold of a new and momentous venture, it is natural that 
there should be at once two parties — the one radical and in favor of 
holding advantages fortuitously gained, ambitious to participate in the 
world's rivalry for new markets; the other representing the conserva- 
tive element, who, while realizing the temptation which the occasion 
presents, are nevertheless mindful of the dangers involved in a distinct 
departure from time-honored precepts hitherto regarded as necessary 
to the safety of our institutions. 

To the first of these the project is alluring. In the undeveloped 
resources of the Philippines they see a great opportunity for our genius. 
They recognize that in a decade we might make a change greater thau 
has been wrought since Magalhaes discovery until the present time. 
They see great development companies formed to cultivate tobacco and 
sugar bj' modern methods, others formed to test the richness of the 
unknown mineral deposits, and still others to develop transportation or 
to reap the treasures of the forest. They see also that with honest, 
intelligent, just, and humane government there might be astounding 
improvement in the character of the people. All this is recognized as 
well by the conservative party, to whom the commercial side of the 
question strongly appeals, but who fear the dangers from a govern- 
mental standpoint. To them the character of the population is a cause 
for hesitation in any plan of permanent control. There can be no 
thought of assimilation. It can not be expected that the people of 
these islands will ever be brought to a comprehension of our institu- 
tions. We need not even hope foi- sympathetic submission. In this 
race of natives and half-castes, with its considerable percentage of Chi- 
nese, our conservative party sees a people who must be governed in a 
manner foreign to our whole system. 

It is foreboded that a strong paternalism, virtually without represen- 
tation, is what the islands must have; and this element sees that the 
administration of such a system would be hampered by a legislative 
power always jealous of the executive, and in this case necessarily 
ignorant of the conditions and requirements of the problem. They 
argue that if we are to enter this field of antipodal development, we 
should clearly comprehend what a departure it would be from the lines 
of our historical growth, and we should recognize its full imi)ort; that we 
should at the beginning understand that our Constitution contemplates 
no such conditions ; that if we are to administer such a government as 
would be required of us, we should start with a solid foundation, laid 
in constitutional amendment, drawn with a full knowledge of the 
necessities of the case. But it is believed by them that if we take the 
time to give this subject the consideration necessary before such a con- 
stitutional amendment can be adopted, there will be little danger that 
we shall finally take an ill-advised or hasty step. 

Alaska might be ofi'ered as a precedent, but it is in our own hemi- 
sphere, and sparsely peopled; it involved no ])r()blem so difficult of solu- 
tion as would be that of a government for the Pliilii)]»ines. Still there 
are features of its acquisition and administration which, by analogy, 
might be applied to the permanent control of the i'hi]i])pines. Alaska, 
it will be remembered, was ceded to the United States by Russia on 
March 30, LSG7, and was soon thereafter formally delivered into our 
military i)ossession, (General Rousseau, of the Army, representing our 
Government. By an act of Congress approved July 27, ISkJS, the laws 



TREATY OF PEACE. 571 

of the United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation 
were extended over the vast territory thus acquired, and from tliat 
date until May 17, 1884, a period of sixteen years, these laws were ad- 
ministered and executed by the Treasury Department and its subordi- 
nate olticers. 

The act of May 17, 1884, provided for the appointment of a governor 
for Alaska, a Uuited States district court, with marshal, clerks, and 
deputies, and for United States commissioners to be stationed at vari- 
ous points in the Territory. Subsequently laws have been passed 
regarding town sites, and protecting fishing and mining rights: and 
the present Congress has passed a law defining the rights of railway 
corporations, extending the homestead laws over the Territory, and 
limiting the amount of land to be taken up, purchased, or occupied 
by any one person or corporation upon navigable waters. 

So that Congress has met the necessities of this Territory, as they 
have arisen from time to time, by suitable legislation; but no provision 
has been yet made for a territorial form of government with a legisla- 
ture. That will come in due time, and the future will see one or more 
States carved out of that great Territory, but not until it is peopled 
with men from the States in such numbers as to give assurance of 
stable self government. 

LIFE IN MANILA. 

[By Wallace Cdmming.] 

There is no place in the civilized parts of the world which has been 
so entirely unknown, even to well-informed people, as the Philippine 
Islands. Even the ubiquitous "globe trotter" passes them by, for they 
are off the regular route which runs from Singapore, via Hongkong, to 
Shanghai or Japan, and the China Sea is a specially unpleasant body 
of water to cross. The steamers running between Hongkong and Manila 
are so small that the trip is like a rough channel passage lengthened to 
between sixty and seventy hours. Of the alternative route from Singa- 
pore I will not speak beyond saying that the steamers on this route are 
Spanish, for to most people who have not had the advantage of a Spanish 
bringing up the usual Spanish steamer is not to be thought of. Never 
shall I forget the nightmare horrors of my own first passage from 
Hongkong to Manila. I was hurrying to Manila to enter the American 
house of Peele, Hubbell & Co. as a junior clerk. At that time (the 
autumn of 1882) Manila was being devastated by the worst epidemic 
of cholera ev^er known there. The death rate rose to 1,300 a day, and 
Peele, Hubbell & Co. having lost two clerks, and not knowing how 
many more might go, cabled me an ofi'er of a position. 

On reaching Hongkong 1 found that, owing to the quarantine against 
Manila, the next regular steamer would not leave for ten days or two 
weeks. Being blissfully ignorant of the fact that a person entirely 
unacquainted with the life and ways of the East, and not having 
enough knowledge of Spanish to swear by (barely enough, indeed, to 
swear with), is about as useful as the vermiform apjjendix — and with 
the same capacity of being very troublesome — I allowed myself to be 
persuaded to take passage on a tiny little German tramp steamer about 
to start. She was of less than 200 tons, with her cabin just forward of 
the engine, and separated from it by an iron bulkhead, which gave it 
the benefit of all the heat. It was barely large enough to accommodate 
a fixed table and four chairs, and had on each side a cabin with two 
berths each. There were two other passengers. One doubled up with 



572 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the captain; the other, a young Filipino, shared the other cabin with 
me. We ran into a typhoon just outside of Hongkong Harbor, and 
did not get out of it until we entered Manila Bay, six days later. 
Never did time pass so slowly. I had forgotten to bring any reading 
material. The cabin was unbearably hot. the deck was under water 
the whole time, and the bridge was the only place of refuge; even that 
was soaked with spray. The night was even worse, for though I was 
not sick, my little Filipino more than made up for my immniiity, 
and effectually deterred me from occupying the berth to which 1 was 
entitled. So I made a bed of the cabin floor, twisting myself around 
the legs of the table to prevent being rolled from side to side. We 
did arrive at last, however, though the steamer had such a list, through 
the shifting of her cargo, that dishes would slide oft" the cabin table 
even when we were anchored in the calm water of Manila Bay. 

The coast is a bold one at the entrance to Manila Bay, a small rocky 
island dividing the entrance into two unequal passages. The island is 
that Oorregidor so often mentioned in the reports of the naval battle. 
After passiug through the entrance, the bay widens out, extending 
about 41 » miles north and south, and the same east and west. 

Manila is on the eastern shore of the bay. About 7 miles nearer 
the entrance, on the southern shore, is Cavite, the scene of the great 
naval battle, where there are a drydock and an arsenal. We came to 
anchor on Sunday morning about a mile offshore. All vessels drawing 
over 10 feet discharge a part of their cargo in the bay and then enter 
the river Pasig, on which are located the principal business houses and 
wharves. Though any laud would have been most welcome after six 
days of such tossing as we had experienced, yet my tirst view of 
Manila was most unattractive. Two terrible typhoons had visited 
the city six weeks before, and the shores of the bay were literally 
strewn with wrecked vessels. Every vessel lying in the bay at the 
time had been driven ashore, while thousands of native houses were 
destroyed. 

The i)opulatiou of Manila was placed at about 300,000. That is 
probably not an overestimate, for it is certain that at least 60,000 people 
died of cholera during that epidemic. All statistics are, however, mere 
guesswork, for there are no ofticial figures. During all the years the 
Spaniards have owned the islands they have occupied only the mere 
edges, and great areas on the larger islands are as wild and unknown 
as at the landing of Magalhaes. " 

The old city, called there distinctively "Manila," is built in the angle 
made by the Elver Pasig and the bay. It is surrounded by stone walls 
40 feet thick, and a wide moat, in part double. Each gate has a port- 
cullis and is approached by a drawbridge, and the top of the wall is 
lined with cannon of two hundred years ago. It is said to be the most 
perfectly preserved type of the old walled city now left. In it are the 
cathedral, the archbishop's palace, most of the Government offices, and 
many convents and monasteries. Many European Si)auiards live there. 

S])reading far on the shore of the bay, and on both banks of the 
Pasig, on a perfectly flat, alluvial jflain intersected by luimerous creeks, 
are the different ])uel)los or wards (some fifteen or twenty in number), 
which together constitute what is known to the outside world as Manila. 
The i)opulation is a mixture of all races. Every color is rejiresented, 
from the blonde Caucasian Scaiulinavian to the darkest native. The 
latter is least common, and is usually an American negro from some 
shi]), or, more rarely, a specimen of the dwarfish aboriginals known as 
Negritos (little negroes). They have the thick lips, flat noses, retreat- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 573 

mg foreheads, and woolly heads of the West Coast African, and closely 
resemble the Bushman of south central Africa. They are numerous, 
and in the unknown interior of Luzon they live an utterly savage life, 
and have never been even nominally subdued. 

The Spaniard from " the Peninsula," as they call Spain, is invariably 
an ofilice-holder, or in the army or navy. He looks down on everybody 
else, and has come to make as much money as possible, no matter how, 
and then go back to spend it in Spain. Then there are the Filipinos — 
'<cl]ildren of the country," they are called — who are supposed to be pure- 
blooded descendants of Spanish settlers. But there are few of them 
without some touch of Chinese or native blood. There are from forty 
to sixty thousand Chinese. Many of them are wealthy, but the bulk 
of them are coolies earning 20 cents a day. The vast majority of the 
pojtulation is made up of every shade and cross, natives (Malays) 
and half-breeds (mestizos). Smallest in number, but controlling the 
entire import and export business, are the "foreigners" — English, Ger- 
mans, Americans, Swiss, etc. Most of the European countries are rep- 
resented. 

Among the first things to impress a stranger are the horses. 
Descended from horses brought from Mexico, they have become much 
smaller, while they are also much more shapely. In fact, I have never 
seen a better-looking breed. There is nothing of the pony about their 
shape, though in size they range between 48 and 52 inches. At first it 
looked absurd to see them ridden by big men whose stirrups hung down 
to the horses' knees; but I soon found out that they easily carried a 
rider weighing 200 jwunds. The foreigners have a jockey club, which 
holds two meetings a year at the beautiful turf track at Santa Mesa, 
To avoid sharp practice, members of the club only are eligible to ride. 
This necessitates a scale of weights starting at 132 pounds and rising 
to 154 pounds. It demonstrates the speed and strength of these mini- 
ature horses that a mile has been run in two minutes and ten seconds 
by a pony carrying 150 ])Ounds. Only stallions are used. Mares can 
not even be brought into the city. Nobody walks; everybody rides; 
and on any special fiesta thousands of carriages fill the streets. I doubt 
if there is a city in the world that can turn out half the number of 
private vehicles in proportion to the population. 

The better houses difl'er in some ways from any other in the world. 
Always of two stories, there is a high stone basement, with a carriage- 
way through to the court, where are the servants' quarters and domestic 
offices. The upper story is of wood, being complete in itself, so that in 
case of an earthquake it will settle together. The ceilings are covered 
with cloth instead of plaster. A wide stairway leads up from the car- 
riageway. Between 3 and 4 feet above the floor of this story is a wide 
window ledge with grooves running the whole length of every side. In 
these grooves slide blinds, and also frames in which are set small squares 
of oyster shell (called "conchas"). Both blinds and conchas run the 
full length of each side. Either or both can be closed at the same 
time, and both can be slid back to the width of one at each end, leaving 
the whole side open, and allowing the air to circulate as freely as in a 
shed. The roofs were formerly made of heavy curved tiles. Now gal- 
vanized iron is used, as it vastly decreases the chance of the roof falling 
during an earthquake, and lessens the damage if it does. On the other 
hand, the iron roof is much more likely to be blown off by the terrible 
typhoons. 

The native houses are built of bamboo, with thatched roofs made of 
the leaf of the nipa i)alm, and elevated from 6 to 10 feet on bambod 



574 trp:aty of peace. 

poles. When one builds a house in Manila it is necessary to decide 
whether to make it safe from earthqxiake or typhoon. The frail nipa 
house may swing like a ship in a heavy sea during an earthquake, but 
is perfectly safe, while the tile or iron roof may fall, killing and destroy- 
ing everything near it. But when the typhoon comes the nipa houses 
go down by the hundred, while the tile and iron roofed ones suiier little. 

Possibly the chief peculiarity of the Philippines is its position as the 
stronghold of the priest and the religious orders. Ail the great orders 
are established there; black, blue, brown, and white robes swarm in 
the streets. All education is in their hands, and in the country and 
village the priest is virtually all powerful. No translation of the IMble 
is allowed to enter the islands, and no Protestant church can be built, 
no service held. To illustrate the power of the Church, I will describe 
the ceremony 1 saw on Corpus Christi. There was a great procession, 
with all the officials, troops, and sailors taking i)art. Finally the pro- 
cession halted, and the archbishop drove slowly by in his carriage, 
drawn by four white horses, with outriders and guards. As he passed 
the colors of each regiment, the carriage stopped and the colors were 
laid on the ground. The archbishop descended, stood on them, and 
elevated the host to the four quarters, and then went forward to repeat 
the ceremony at each regiment. 

Formerly, a serious drawback to a visit to Manila was the lack of 
hotels; but now there are several. If the visitor has letters of intro- 
duction, there is also a pleasant and comfortable foreigners' club at 
which he may stay. Manila loves holidays. At one time there were 
over forty in each year. The number has been sadly diminished, though 
there are still thirteen left, I understand. Each i^ueblo has its saint, 
and on that saint's day the inhabitants give themselves over, as they 
do on all the great holidays of the church, to music, fireworks, cock- 
fighting, processions, etc. 

Almost all these processions took place at night, and the effect was 
most picturesque. There would be a line of marchers — men, women, 
and children — walking in single tile on each side of the street, every 
one with a lighted candle in his hand. At intervals, in the middle of 
the road, would come images of the Saviour, the Virgin, and the saints, 
borne on the shoulders of from ten to thirty men, surrounded by priests, 
and preceded by a band of music. Some of the images were covered 
with diamonds and other precious stones, said to be enormously valua- 
ble. In these cases there was always a guard of soldiers with fixed 
bayonets about the image. Often there would be thousands of people 
walking in these processions, and all the while it was moving tens of 
thousands of rockets and bombs would be fired. These rockets and 
bombs are homemade. The rockets consist only of a joint of bamboo 
filled with powder, exploding with a great noise, but with little light. 
The bombs are simply a handful of powder tightly wrapi)ed with hemj). 
They cost a mere tritle, but make a great noise, and no fiesta is com- 
idete without jilenty of them. 

The most curious procession is participated in only by natives and 
the ])oorer mestizos. It takes place, if I remember rightly, during Holy 
Week, and is a high solemnity. Every one walking in the procession 
is robed in his graveclothes. The garment is a long, loose gray robe 
with a hood, and it comes to the ground. The effect is very strange, 
and as the i)eople go they repeat continually: ^^Santa Maria, madre de 
DioH, ora pro nohisP^ It may seem strange that graveclothes are pro- 
vided before they are needed; but in Manila they are considered a 
prime necessity, and every native owns those clothes, even if he is bare 



TREATY OF PEACE. 575 

of all others. The ordinary dress of the uative man is trousers and 
shirt of " piece goods" (calico), the shirt being worn outside the trousers. 
On holidays they wear a shirt made of |n»rt, which is an expensive 
material. Native servants wear the same articles, but they must be of 
spotless white; and very suitable and nice looking it is, though 1 sup- 
pose that the idea of being driven by a coachman so dressed would 
shock the habitues of Central and Hyde parks. A curious freak of 
custom was that native servants were required to serve barefooted, 
while it was an insult if a Chinese servant appeared before his superior 
without his shoes. 

Our firm had a mess house, in which the partners lived, and which 
was open to all their American and English employees. Should the 
latter prefer to live elsewhere, $1,000 a year was allowed as the equiv- 
alent. 1 lived at the mess, finding it much the more comfortable. 
Indeed, it would have been hard to be dissatisfied with our way of liv- 
ing; and as it will show the style in which the great American houses 
in the East are conducted, I think it worth telling with some detail. 
The mess was a flue house, handsomely furnished, in one of the pleas- 
antest parts of the city. The table was supplied by a Chinese cook. 
He was allowed $500 a month, and given certain of the heavier grocer- 
ies, such as Hour, rice, etc. He paid his under cooks, and was responsi- 
ble for meals at the mess, and for breakfast (like the French dejeuner 
a la fourchette) and afternoon tea, which were taken at the office by all 
the employees, except on Sundays and fiestas. Then there was a major- 
domo, who had control of all the servant s and had charge of the house. 
There was also an extra house servant, and a Chinese porter, who 
opened and shut the great house doors, filled the baths, pulled the 
ljunka, and watered the street in the dry season. Then everyone had 
a personal servant, who took care of his room, attended to his clothes, 
waited on him at table, prepared his early breakfast (about 7 a. m.), 
and so on. Everybody also owned a horse or horses, which involved 
one more servant at least. Being a junior, I contented myself with 
one pony and a two- wheeled trap, something like a dogcart. The 
others drove victorias and jjairs. Three of our mess owned racing 
ponies, which inured to my benefit, as it gave me as much riding as I 
wished. After the bath and an early breakfast came the drive to the 
office, between 8 and 8.30; then work till 12.15, at which hour break- 
fast was served at the office; then work again until 5..30, interrupted 
between 3 and 4 by afternoon tea; then to the bungalow to dress, to 
drive, and back to dinner at 7.30. 

To a lover of music .Manila is a charming place. The natives have 
wonderful musical talent, and there were numerous bands. Those of 
the three regiments then stationed there were remarkably good, and 
four afternoons each week they played in turn on the Luneta, a sort 
of plaza on the shores of the bay just outside the old walls. I recall 
vividly the open-air concert, by three hundred instruments, given in 
honor of Prince Oscar of Sweden. The glorious full moon of the trop- 
ics, far brighter than in more northern lands, shining on the quiet 
waters of the bay, the innumerable lights, the brilliantly dressed crowd, 
and the thrilling music of the mighty bands, softened in volume on the 
great plain, combined to make it an occasion to be long remembered. 
The " Battle of Castellejos," which they played, was inspiring, and the 
effect was heightened by the repetition of the trumpet calls by soldiers 
who were stationed at intervals far off upon the plains, while the guns 
on the city walls added a touch of reality. 

During the height of the rainy season, from about the middle of June 



576 TREATY OF PEACE. 1 

to the middle of September, all outdoor pursuits are suspended. Tlie 
violence of the downpour is hardly to be imagined by dwellers in higher 
latitudes. The streets in Manila and some of the roads for a few miles 
outside are fairly good during the dry season, but quickly become 
nearly imi)assable M'hen the rains set in. As I have already mentioned, 
Manila is intersected in all directions by creeks, which are traversed by 
hundreds of canoes. These canoes are dugouts, often of great size, 
and the natives are most expert in handling them. They are indispen- 
sable at times when vast Hoods come down from the great lake, about 
30 miles from ^lanila, of whicli the river Pasig is the outlet. One 
storm will sometimes raise the river and overflow most of the city. 
After a few hours' rain I have gone direct from our steps into a banca 
(canoe) and been paddled through the streets to the ofHce. 

In this lake is found one of the most remarkable phenomena in the 
islands. Not very far from the center rises what is evidently the old 
crater of a submerged volcano. Circular iu shape, it comes up abruptly 
from the water, the sides several hundred feet in height, except in one 
place, where it is not more than 30. The natives are dreadfully afraid 
of it, saying it is full of crocodiles; but a party of us Avho went there 
in a steam launch induced them to drag their canoes over, and paddle 
us about. The interior walls rise perpendicularly, and are masses of 
vegetation which has found foothold in every crack and cranny. The 
water within seems to have no communication with the lake, and is no 
longer water, but a mass of corruption and putridity that fills one with 
shuddering horror. We saw no crocodiles. Perhaps our noise fi'ight- 
ened them; but I can not understand how fish could live in that mass 
of tilth, nor where the crocodiles would find food, if fish w^ere lacking. 
The depth of this i)lace is unknown, no bottom having been found in 
the soundings thus far made. 

I have no space here to write of many other interesting topics — the 
venality of the Spanish officials, from the lowest to the highest; the 
almost incredible impediments which they throw in the way of busi- 
ness; the character and customs of the women, Filipina, mestiza, and 
native; the fruits, including the mango, king of all, and the one hun- 
dred and sixty-five varieties of bananas, and — but the list itself might 
extend almost to the length of an article. 



A VISIT TO TPIE PHILIPPINES. 



[The Contemporary Review, June, 1898.] 
[By Claes Ericsson.] 

On June 13, 1894, 1 arrived in Manila Bay, from Singapore, on board 
the Nuestra Senora de Santa Loreto. The faith of the pious Spaniard 
who gave the steamer her long name had been abundantly justified, or 
she must have gone to the bottom years before, for a more ramshackle 
craft I never set foot upon. Luckily we had no rough weather, or these 
lines might never have been penned, the protection of "Our .Lady of 
Holy Loreto" notwithstanding. It was night when we came to anchor, 
and the sijecstacle of the lamps on the Luneta gave me a blessed feel- 
ing of security which had been lacking many a day. If the Nnesira 
Seilora, etc., should go down at her anchorage I might possibly swim 
ashore. 

Landing at 9 next morning, I visited the custom-house. Officials, 
Spanish and Creole, were lounging about, cigarette or cheroot in mouth, 
and presently one of them condescended to inform me tliat my luggage 
would be examined at 3 o'clock. It was then O.'K) a. m. At the 
appointed hour I returned ; but in Manila four years ago no one dreamed 
of hurrying, and another hour passed before I was free of the port. 
An acfiuaintance assured me, however, that my good fortune had been 
great; and when, three days later, I obtained a licensia, or permit to 
stay in the islands, the same gentleman consoled me for the delay vnth 
the remark that such dispatch was phenomenal — in Manila. During 
my stay I made the acquaintance of one of the leisurely otticials, a 
Creole. In a burst of confidence he gave me to understand that a great 
deal of money was received at the Manila custom-house, but the Gov- 
ernment saw very little of it. 

I am told that they have the electric light in Manila today, but in 
1891 the streets were lit with oil lamps, on posts more or less resem- 
bling the famous tower of Pisa. The fortifications had a very ancient 
look, not surprising when it is remembered that they were built between 
two and three centuries ago. Leaving the Luuetta, I passed through 
a beautiful avenue of feathery bamboos, swaying to the gentlest breeze, 
and so reached the town in time to witness a very pretty sight. It 
was a funeral. Four white ponies, harnessed in sky-blue and silver, 
driven by a coachman similarly arrayed, drew the liearse, Avhich was 
painted white, blue, and gold, and decked with plumes of snowy feathers. 

As my business in the Philippines was to collect plants on the moun- 
tains of South Palawan, I left Manila by the first steamer, taking two 
natives as personal servants. One of them, named Minico, was very 
small, not more than 4 feet in height, but brave enough, nevertheless. 
My fellow-i)assengers numbered seven. One of them, a gentleman of 
martial aspect, I addressed in my best Spanish : 

" It is a fine day, Captain." 

TP 37 ^^^ ■ 



578 TREATS OF PEACE. 

"Seftor," he answered, giving bis monstaclie an upward twist, "you 
mistake. I am a colonel." And lie turned on liis heel. There our 
atMiuaintanec bej^an and ended. The Spaniaitl is so Si'ldoni discourte- 
ous—at least, to Europeans— that I fear he was scarcely a ,iiood sample. 
Possibly, however, Admiral Dewey has by this time tauglitthe colonel 
l)etter manners. 

Steaming past the Calamianes Islands, we eventually anchored at 
Marangas, in J'alawan, which was my destination. 

The settlement comprised two small houses, iidiabited by Chinamen, 
and a sto(!kade less than a hundred yards s(iuare, containing a hut 
tor the ofticer in command, one for the garrison of 30 soldiers, and 
another for stores. At every corner of the stockade rose a watc^htower, 
thatched with "alang-alang" grass, occu])ied night and day by sentries, 
with loaded rilies, lek the "Moros," as the Spaniards call the natives, 
should attempt a surprise. 

1 advise no one to visit this Palawan settlement unless obliged. 
There was scarcely any food to be had for love or money. Mosquitoes 
swarmed as they do nowhere else on earth, I think. (3ne morning I 
counted thirteen alligators marching in a troop along the beach toward 
the mouth of a small river. Ants, millions of them, were every where- 
in the soup, the jam, my bed, my shirt, on the table— wherever an ant 
can crawl. A species more venomous I never encountered. My Manila 
men suffered terribly. Scarcely an inch of their bodies escaped, and 
the wounds, if rubbed, suppurated like smallpox. To crown all, Mar- 
angas is notorious for a special kind of fever of the most virulent 
chfiracter. Half the garrison ere down while I was there, and their 
commander was hardly ever well. 

The Chinamen were engaged in the "Damar" trade, which is earned 
on in rather a peculiar manner. The Sultan will not allow the natives 
of the interior to sell their resin to the Celestials direct; they must 
dispose of it to the Sulus, who dwell on the coast, and these trade with 
the' Chinamen. As may be supposed, the poor natives are plundered 
shamefully. , . , , ^ n 

Having arranged with Lo-Chang, the principal Chinese merchant, tor 
the use of a hut, I paid a visit to Lieutenant Garcia, the ofticer m 
charge of the stockade. He invited me to a vino tinto and a cockfight. 
The latter I should have preferred to decline, but it was soon over, and 
perhaps cockfighting is excusable in Palawan. It appeared to be the 
soldiers' onlv recreation, except potting alligators. 

The next day I called upon Faduka Maiasari Maulana Amiril Maum- 
inin. Sultan Muhammad Harum Narassid, lang de per-Tuan, ex-Sultan 
of the Sulu Islands, once the home of the most bloodthirsty pirates 
that ever sailed the China Sea, which is saying a great deal. On arriv- 
ing at tlie royal village of Bolini Bolini, which comprised the "palace"' 
and half a do/en ruinous huts of bamboo, my presence was announced 
by a gong stioke, which brought out the master of the ceremonies. 
Invited to stej) within, I crawled up the bamboo ladder— the "palace" 
stood on the usual ])iles— crossed the veranda, and in the farthest apart- 
ment found his liiglmess of the many titles sitting cross-legged on a 
divan. 

The Sultan was not in state attire; at least there was no suggestion 
of the imperial vellow in his close litting white trousers and vest, sli])- 
pers embroidered with seed pearls, and scarlet fez. The two attendant 
nobles were much more gaily clad. Both wore tight jackets of blue 
silk, decked with gold buttons, and trqusers of salmon red, ornamented 
with buttons of gold or gilt from the knee downward. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 579 

His Higimess, who appeared to be about 50 years of age. li;ul rather 
a pleasant expression, with a twinkle in his eye that reiuiiided me of 
Arabi Pasha. A chair was brought, also vermouth and chocolate. 
With a cup of the last in my hand, I explained tlie puri)ose of my 
visit, which was to crave the Sultan's assistance in exploring Marangas 
Mountain. Smiling, he promised as many coolies as I needed, and I 
took my leave. 

The ex-Sultau of Sulu is all-powerful in Palawan. Tlie S{)aniards 
have no real authority, and never interfere with the natives, except 
when Europeans or Chinamen are concerned. Some idea of the situ- 
ation may be gathered from the following incident which ha]>])ened 
during my stay at Marangas. The Sultan's son, a boy of W. desiring- 
to visit Lieutenant Grarcia, came with a crowd of retainers -At his lieels, 
all armed to the teeth with guns, pistols, spears, and the seidom absent 
kris. Every man pressed into the stockade. Had the Spaniards tried 
to keep them out there would have been a light. The danger was 
great, but all passed quietly, although a few weeks before a Sulu who 
had stolen by the sentries ran amok at the lieutenant, who would have 
lost his life within his own stockade had not half a dozen soldiers come 
to the rescue. At that time there was fighting- almost daily in the Sulu 
Islands and in Mindanao. 

As soon as the coolies i^romised by the Sultan arrived, I set out for 
IMarangas Mountain, no great distance. The heat was tremendous tis 
we pressed forward, first through tall "alang-alang" grass, and then up 
the bed of a mountain stream, strewn with bowlders big and little, many 
sharp as knives. Striking into the jungle, alter traveling some hours 
by the river, we found a track and, following it, presently arrived at 
a native hut — a mere roof on four poles, open at the sides, back, and 
front to all the winds that blew. The owner, a very old man, naked, 
except for a breechcloth, made off at once; but, on Minico ordering him 
to stop, the poor fellow came to a halt, shivering- with fear. Bowever, 
at the sight of a little tobacco and cloth his weather-beaten face wrinkled 
into a smile, and T soon persuaded him to guide us up the mountain. 
He led us to a village, whose inhabitants fled, shrieking; but again a 
little tobacco acted like a charm. We made friends and obtained shelter 
for the night, invited guests. 

Our hosts did their best to dissuade us from proceeding farther. 
My spirit, they said, would remain on the mountain to vex them, and 
many more awful things would be sure to happen. Nevertheless we 
pressed on. Finding the mountain too precipitous, however, we were 
obliged to turn back and try a different route. This took us to another 
small settlement which boasted an Orang Kaya (headman). The vil- 
lagers at our previous halt had told me that he was very rich and would 
entertain us in a royal manner, hoping, no doubt, to induce us to depart 
from their spur of the mountain. I found him very old, and his riches 
appeared to consist of an earthenware plate and a wooden club 3 feet 
long — his only weapon. 

Everywhere the people seemed wretchedly poor, and their habitations 
were the worst hovels I had seen in the far East. But these aborigines 
have no settled places of abode. They sometimes throw a hut toijether, 
cultivate a tinj^ plot of ground for a year, then move on. The majority 
are always wandering- about. As for the Sulus, they appear to do no 
work at all. When they are not robbing' the inland natives they ]>ass 
the time in laments for the bad old days when they, the Orang Laut, 
ruled the seas far and near. The old piratical spirit survives. They 
have never been subdued, and, in my opinion, they never will be — by 
Spain. 



580 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The aborigines of Palawan must be very near tlie bottom of the 
human scale. I have watched them sleei)iug- round a fire at night in 
as much security as they ever know. Their tiny limbs were never 
still, quivering and stretching, and at the least sound in the jungle 
they were on their feet, wide awake, ready to fiee, A mysterious 
])eoi)le, uncanny, scarcely human, yet, in comparison with their Sulu 
masters, honest and trustworthy. 

We camped near the hut of two old people, a man and a woman, whom 
a few yards of cloth and a little tobacco made more happy than they 
had ever been in their wretched lives, perhaps. So far 1 had seen no 
large animal in Palawan. There was much talk of some mysterious 
beast, but the descriptions were so indefinite that I was unable to decide 
whether it was a goat or a buffalo. Not one of the natives with whom 
I conversed had ever seen it. 

Three days constant climbing took us to the summit of Marangas 
Mountain. On the bowlders were hundreds of spider-like Kenantheras 
(orchids). I saw many Phakvnopsis also; and ferns, Lijcopods and 
Alomcias, were very plentiful. Leaving coolies to collect the orchids, 
I returned to Marangas with Minico and the other Manila man. 

Desiring to ascenda mountain near Bulugay, 1 hired a Sulu boat and 
crew. There was trouble immediately. The turbulent Sulus refused to 
put to sea with the men from Manila^, and I was obliged to meet them 
halfway, by sending one of my servants home. Minico I contrived to 
retain. "^ Perhaps his insignificant appearance aided me. Anyway, I 
soon had cause to be thankful that I stood firm. Practically I was now 
at the mercy of Sulus, pirates, and sons of ])irates to a man. Before 
engaging them I had been warned that two of their number had under- 
gone eight years' imprisonment for the murder of a European; and 
judging by the looks of the remaining five it was not difficult to imagine 
that it would give them the keenest pleasure to cut my throat. Stal- 
wart fellows they were, and not unpicturesque in their tight blue pants, 
sleeved waistcoat decked with many buttons, gay sarong (a bag-shaped 
sash), and fez, or turban. Each bore in his sarong a kris and pistol, 
while a daredevil glitter in the eyes of every one of them was evidence 
enough that they would use those weapons on the slightest provocation. 

Starting at 2 o'clock in the morning, we reached Bulugay by 8, and at 
once set out for the panglima's (war chief's) village. In reply to an 
inquiry with regard to coolies, the pangliraa, a big fellow, told me that 
there were plenty of men to be had, but all were very wicked. I could 
quite believe him, but I must admit that the natives here did not look 
nearly so savage as the Kayans in Sarawak or the Muruts of E^orth 
Borneo. 

In the evening one of my Sulus came and whispered in my ear: 
"Tuan. datu, him say, 'Ada orang putih naik disini, baik buleh, tapi 
diangan dia balek,'" which translated means, " Sir, the datu (chief) 
has said, 'Let the white man come here, but take care that he does not 
return.'" 

The prospect was not pleasant. I consulted Minico at once. He 
infi)rmed me that it was generally knoAvn that the datu of the district 
and the Sultan were not on friendly terms, meaning that if his high- 
ness of P>olini-Bolini could catch the chief, kris or bow-string would 
snes'dily settle the quarrel; but Minico did not think the datu would 
harm me. He Avas inclined to believe that the Sulus wished me to 
hasten from the neighborhood of the Panglima's village without coolies 
for some motive of their own. An hour afterwards the faithful fellow 
touched my arm, signing me to follow him. With a finger on his mouth, 
he led the way to the hut occupied by my rascally crew. Approaching 



TREATY OP PEACE 581 

noiselessly, we listened to their conversation. They were talking about 
me. I heard one sug<iest that a i)ush over a cliii' would be the safest 
way to compass my end. Another declared that would be foolisli. It 
would be much better to take me a long way up the mountains and hold 
me there for a ransom of -S-iOO. The majority seemed to be of this 
opinion, and Minico and I stole away. Between the Datu and the 
"Men of the Sea" I seemed likely to come to grief, but forewarned is 
forearmed. 

We ascended the mountain next day. Nothing happened, perhaps 
because my revolver was seldom out of my hand. Leaving men to col- 
lect the plants, I returned with the Sulus to the coast and embarked for 
Marangas. Wanting coolies for a journey to Datu Guah's village and 
an ascent of Panilingan Mountain, L i)aid the iSultan another visit; but 
the master of the ceremonies whispered that the moment was unfavor- 
able. His highness was susa — that is, he had been vexed or troubled. 

By means of discreet inquiries I learned the nature of his susa. It is 
a rather common story in tiie far East. Unable to lodge the whole of 
his wives in the '-[jalace,"' his highness boarded a few of them — not the 
prettiest, I suspect — in the houses of his ftllowers. One of these peris, 
an outcast from the Palawan [)aradise through want of room, consoled 
herself in the usual way — quite innocently, 1 was assured. The news 
reaching the Sultan, he sent for the venturesome lover and smilingly 
bade him be seated opposite himself. Not being altogether an idiot, the 
man had come armed. From his sarong the jeweled handle of his kris 
protruded, i)lain to see. After a few complimentary commonplaces had 
been exchanged his highness remarked the weapon. 

"Allah has been good to you, S'Ali," said he. "Those emeralds are 
very line, and the diamonds are as stars in the heavens. If the blade 
match the hilt, you have a treasure. Show it to me." 

Thrown off his guard, S'Ali drew the kris from its sheath and, hold- 
ing it by the wavy blade, presented it to the Sultan. Instantly half a 
do;<en of his highness's attendants threw themselves ujion the unfortu- 
nate fellow. He was overpowered in a moment and his hands securely 
tied behind his back. 

"Take him out," said the Sultan, still sun'ling. 

S'Ali was led away and lowered to the ground. Not a word did he 
utter. It was Kismet. Why waste his breath ? I did not learn the 
manner of his end, but it would be eitlier by kris or bowstring. Let 
us hope it was the lirst. In the hands of a skillful executioner tlie kris 
is a merciful weapon. He was buried in the jungle behind the Sultan's 
"palace." Such was the susa of Muhammad Ilarum Narrasid, lang 
de per-Tuan — "he who rnleth" — in the year of our Lord 1894. And 
the Spaniards were supposed to govern tiie island of Palawan ! I could 
understand why the Sultan did not care to see a European so soon after 
his crime. However, I obtained the coolies a)id sent them on. 

It had been my intention to ascend the mountain from Datu Guah's 
village, but before T could make a start the coolies returned burdened 
with plants. Deciding to convey these to Marangas at once, Minico 
and I reembarked in the Sulu boat, putting to sea in half a gale. 

The dariger was considerable. To add to it, the two convicted mur- 
derers began to quarrel. One of them was squatting behind me at the 
time, steering the craft. Presently he flung down his paddle and, 
drawing his kris, tried to rush past; but I held my revolver to his head. 

"Sit down," I said. "I'll shoot the first man that strikes a blow." 

That cooled him, and after a great deal of wrangling I persuaded him 
to pick up Ills steering isaddle, but not before both he and his o])ponent 
liad told me that they did not care a paddy-husk for me or my pistoj. 



582 TREATY OF PEACE. 

As the tempest grew more violent tbe boat tossed perilously, com 
pellin^" the crew to paddle their hardest to keep her prow straight. 
Loud and frequent were the shouts of " Kaj^u ! Kayu!" (literally 
"wood," meaniuo- "To the paddles!"). Suddenly, just as the outlook 
was at its blackest, the wind blowing in gusts, and the fragile craft 
threatening to fall in pieces, u]) Jumped my lighting cocks again. Half 
measures are of no use with Hulus. I rose, also, though 1 had great 
difticulty in keeping my feet. 

"By Allah," I said, "if you idiots don't sit down, I'll give you to the 
sharks!" 

Had either attempted to pass me I should have been compelled to 
fire. An amok Sulu is a terrible being ashore; two of those fiends on 
a small boat at sea would have been too awful to contemplate. Every 
man must have fought, or jumped overboard, for the amok strikes at 
friend and foe indiscriminately. The eyes of both showed all white; 
their krises quivered with the i3assion that shook their sinewy frames. 
Minico, in the prow, drew his weapon. Firing a shot into the sea to 
show them that my revolver was not em])ty, I waited patiently, looking 
first one and then the other in the eye. They sat down at last; indeed, 
the boat rocked so violently that they could not well stand. So the 
danger passed. 

Knowing what I did of those men it may seem foolhardiness to have 
risked my life in their company, and perhaps it was. But I knew the 
worst of them, which was not the case as regards the others. Soon 
after landing at Marangas Minico took me aside. 

"Tuan," said lie, "take care Sulu men no catch you alone. Sulu 
him no like to be threatened and not strike. They call him woman." 

The hint was enough. I discharged the fire eaters and went about 
warily. 

After waiting in vain six weeks for the steamer from Labuan, I 
resolved to visit the Sulu Islands, or Islas de Jolo, as the Spaniards 
call them. With this intent Minico and I embarked on the ^ISolus, 
which carried the Spanish mails. Calling at Simagup, a stockade on a 
hill, about as interesting and healthy as Marangas, we next proceeded 
to Alfonso XIII equally flourishing and desirable as an abiding i^lace. 
Soon after leaving the ^JSohis lost her propeller in a heavy south- 
easter. For three days we drifted, the steamer dragging her anchors. 
Every hour saw us nearer to the rocks, and we could almost count the 
minute that would elapse before we should be ashore, when some- 
one caught sight of smoke on the horizon and joyfully shouted, 
"Canoniero!" 

It was the tiny gunboat usually dispatched round the coast from 
Simagup in the wake of the mail, possibly to prevent piratical attempts. 
She took us in tow, and after a stiff pull got us on the move, hauling 
us through a line of reef, which we had escaped by a miracle, and 
eventually to the Bay of Balabac, where we remained until a larger 
gun vessel came and took on board the passengers for Sulu. Next 
day we anchored off the town of Sugh. In the morning I went ashore 
with Minico. 

Traversing a long narrow bridge, with a watchtower on the left hand 
and a ])avilion on the right, we passed through a couple of strong gates 
into the town — a pretty little place, beautifully kept. Every street 
was lined with trees, yet scarcely a leaf could be seen on the roadway. 
At the end of the main road leading from the jetty we came to a neat 
square, where twice a week the residents gather to enjoy the music of 
an excellent band. Sulu ladies, mostly in wide Chinese trousers, bright- 
colored jacket of silk, with many l)uttons, and gay sarong thrown over 



TT7EATY OF PEACE. 583 

ithe slioiilcler, walked about freely. Some wore the sarong over their 
heads. All were clad in garments of the most brilliant coloring, and 
many of them were handsome, but they lost their charm on closer 
acquaintance. 

Thanks to Minico, I found a lodging in the house of a native. It 
would have been almost useless to ask the assistance of a Spaniard. I 
never met one who could speak the Snlu language or any of the dia- 
lects. It is not considered worth while to learn them. In consequence, 
the supposed rulers know next to nothing of the natives, their customs, 
and wishes. Everywhere I found that the people detested the "Cas- 
tillas," some of whose laws and regulations press most hardly upon 
them. For instance, if a Tagal from North Luzon, or a Bisaya from the 
south, can not produce his receipt for taxes at a moment's notice he is 
liable to imprisonment. He is not allowed to go home for it, but must 
I carry it on liis person. A Tagal told me that he was within an ace of 
being sent to the war in Mindanao through leaving his tax receipt at 
home. The police, he said, steal about at night and arrest natives 
indiscriminately in the hope of finding some without that safeguard. 
This, however, does not apply to the Sulus. So far the Spaniards have 
failed to compel tliem to pay taxes. 

None of the larger islands ares really under the domination of the 
Spaniards, whose rule extends little farther than Che range of their can- 
non, I heard of large reinforcements being sent from Spain, but at 
that time there were very few European soldiers in the Philippines. 
No others can be relied upon. The native soldiery are mostly Luzon 
men. Not one in a score knows the names of his officers, or cares to 
know. Indeed, I once asked a Spanish soldier the name of his captain. 
"Qaien sabe?" was the answer ("Who knows'?"). 

The town of Sugh is protected by a loopholed wall, which incloses 
three small forts. Outside there are two large ones. The gates, of 
which there are three on the land side, aie opened at 6 a. m. and closed 
at 6 p. m. All natives entering must give up their arms to the guard 
at the gate. The seaward gate is closed at 10 p. m., after which hour 
no native must leave his house. 

One day I ventured inland for a couple of miles. None of the 
natives, of whom 1 met not a few, took the slightest notice of me. 
Just about a quarter of a mile from the town I passed a watchtower, 
where fighting, more or less serious, was always going on. Every 
night the Sulus crept up, took pot-shots at the sentries, and then 
bolted into the bush. So at least I was told. Such was Spanish rule 
in the chief town of the Sulu Islands. 

The steam launch arriving from Sandakan, the princi])al port on the 
eastern coast of North Borneo, I took a passage, and, sending my 
collection on board, bade the faithful Minico good-bye, and left Sugh 
in the launch's boat. I do not remember the launch's name, but the 
Spaniards called her the Gallinero, on account of the large number of 
fowls which formed the greater part of her cargo. 

The navigator of the Gallinero was a Chinaman. I asked him how 
long he had tilled his post. He said that was his first trip. Tlie 
owner, in whose office at Sandakan he had been a clerk, had put him 
in charge. I am a pretty well seasoned traveler, but this was too 
much. My equanimity deserted me, for the launch was a wheezy old 
tub which miglit settle down of her own accord at any moment. 
However, we — that is, the crew, about fifty Sulus, myself, and more 
than two thousand fowls — reached Sandakan safely the next day. At 
New Ceylon I caught the steamer for Singapore. 



SPAIN AND THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



[The Contemporary Review, July, 1898— By John Foreman.] 

The existing hostilities between Spain and the United States ot 
America have suddenly brought into singular prominence the colony 
geographically known as the Philippine Islands. I say "geograph- 
ically" advisedly, for, owing chiefly to its jealously exclusive adminis- 
tration under Spanish dominion, it has become neither a resort tor 
globe trotters nor a place of call en route elsewhere for steamers of 
regular lines. The bulk of the export and import trade is in the hands 
of half a dozen British firms and a few other foreign honses, and not 
many years ago if one'talked to a man of average general information 
about tlie Plnlipi)ine Islands his knowledge of them went very little 
beyond the fact that the archipelago was somewhere in the vicinity of 
China and that its capital, Manila, was a place whence cigars were 
imported. Literature, too, respecting the islands has been very scant. 
The last comprehensive work descriptive of the colony was published in 
1891, and prior to that no book pretending to give even a partial account 
of the colony was written since 1859. The most northerly island is 
(excepting a few islets of no importance) Luzon, situated about 200 
miles^due south of Formosa Island. Manila, the capital (on Luzon 
Island), is some G30 miles from Hongkong, or, say, sixty hours steam in 
the vessels which regularly ply between these ports. The run from 
Singapore to Manila in the regular (Spanish) mail is about five days 
and a half. In normal times there is the monthly Spanish mail from 
Europe (the Oompania Transatlantica), calling at Singapore both ways; 
an intermediate steamer also runs between Manila and Singapore, and 
one may also count on a Hongkong steamer about every five days. 

The archipelago consists of an undefined number of islands and 
islets, usually estimated at about 000, extending over approximately 
12° of latitude, including the protectorate (in the extreme south) of 
the sultanate of Sulu. The islands of commercial importance, whence 
the supi)lies of produce are collected for reshipment from the ports 
open to foreign trade, number about twenty-five, the chief of which 
are Luzon, Panay, Negros, Sdniar, Leyte, Cebu, and Mindanao. Besides 
Manila there are three other ports open to foreign trade, all under very 
vexatious and restrictive regulations, namely, Iloilo, in the Island of 
Panay; Cebu, in the island of the same name, and Zamboanga, in 
Mindanao. 

This last port, however, is rarely visited by a foreign ship on account 
of the i)rohibitive dues. There are no foreign capitalists present or 
represented t'nere, and the Spaniards being in virtual possession of 
oidy the coast of this second largest' island of the group, while the 
hin'terland is held by unsubdued natives, there is almost no traflic with 
Zamboanga. The "archipelago may be regarded as ethnologically 
divided into three parts, namely, Luzon and the northern islands con- 
stituting broadly the Tagalog sphere, the southern islands the Yisaya 
584 



TREATY OF PEACE. 585 

Sphere, and the extreme southern islands, or Snhi Sultanate, the semi- 
independent Mussulman division. Between these three groups there 
exists great racial antipathy. By far the most civilized and amenable 
are the Tagalogs, whose ancestors are supposed to have emanated from 
the Malay Peninsula centuries ago. They are hospitable to a degree 
which can hardly be realized by anyone who has never left Europe. 
The Alsayas are hospitable only for mercenary motives, callous, 
uncouth, and of brutal instincts, excepting only the Cebuanos, who 
are the most docile of all, and who, in hospitality, somewhat approa(;h 
the Tagjilog. Excepting Cebii people, the Visayas are supposed to be 
an oifshoot of the northern emigrants to a great extent amalgamated 
with the Mussulman occupants of the extreuie south. 

The lowlands of ISegros (the largest sugar-producing island) are well 
known to have been peopled by generations of criminals who Hed 
from civilized jurisdiction in Luzon and the adjacent islands. Indeed, 
up to forty years ago the Negros people were a lawless crowd. In the 
old capital town of Jimamaylan they defied European authority and 
murdered the governor. The sultanate of Sulu is, nominally, only the 
Island of Sulu (called by the Spaniards Tolo), but, as a matter of tact, 
the tribes of Mindanao and Basilan islands and the Tagbanuas tribes 
of BaMbac and Paragua islands, if they acknowledge any authority at 
'all above their local chiefs, give allegiance to the Sultan. They abso- 
lutely reject Christianity, and are known in the islands as Moros. The 
theory is that this sultanate, as well as that of Brunei (Borneo), was 
founded by Mussulman emissaries about eight centuries ago. In the 
island of Sulu (Tolo) the Spaniards, after centuries of strife, hold only 
the free port of Tolo, the scene of many massacres of Spaniards, while 
the capital of the Sultan is at Maybnn, on the south coast, liuuning 
due west from Sulu there is a chain of islets extending toward the 
coast of the British North Borneo Company's possessions. 

The history of the Philippines is extremely interesting: but, like 
that of most Spanish settlements, its pages record far more deeds of 
strife, treachery, and oppression than of glory to the rulers or happi- 
ness to the ruled. Space will not allow me to take more than a rapid 
glance at the most striking incidents. At the dawn of the sixteenth 
century the Pope had been complacent enough to dispose of the known 
and unknown universe. Taking Cape Verde as the starting point, the 
Western Hemisphere was given to Spain and the Eastern Hemisphere 
to Portugal; that is to say, all newly discovered lands within the limits 
defined henceforth came under the respective influences of Spain and 
Portugal with the Papal blessing, and on the condition that the fore- 
most consideration in the colonizing schemes should ever be the salva- 
tion of souls. Every act of the pioneers primarily, and of the estab- 
lished colonial governments which followed, was absolutely subjected 
to the predominant interests of the church. 

The Crown of Spain itself was nominally in the gift of the Pope* 
Hence, while no expedition could sail without the royal warrant, the 
benediction of His Holiness was that which most charmed the warrior, 
who, zealous as he might be in the service of his King, felt that he 
carried with him a still more sacred mission from heaven. No doubt 
every Castilian soldier was guided by those same feelings which finally 
inspired Ignacio de Loyola to hang up his sword in the little Basque 
church and seek that "end which justifies the means." The spirit of 
the times, too, was that of chivalry, a thirst for adventure, a love of 
conquest and domineering sway, only kept within bounds by the super- 
stition and fanaticism of the age. But a more material incentive tired 



586 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the enthusiasm of the lower social orders. The soul-stirriug tales 
brought back from the uewly discoveretl world beyond the great Atlau- 
tic, the sight of the treasures wrested from the i)ossession of the infidel 
Aztecs and Incas, bore au intiuence as potent on the minds of the 
masses as the highest ideals of religious chivalry which iutiamed the 
ambition of the leaders. 

The treaty of Tordesillas, which embodied the will of the Pope above 
referred to, had for its real motive the laudable and peaceful obje(;t of 
terminating the rivalry between Spain and Portugal. It only partially 
succeeded, however, for, while the Spaniards and Portuguese agreed 
to navigate oidy in their respective spheres, even the Pope himself 
was unable to determine the line of longitude dividing these spheres of 
intiuence at the other side of the globe. And this is where the i^oint 
of dispute arose which indirectly brought about the discovery of that 
group of islands since known as the Philippines. Each nation claimed 
that the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, fell within its half. 

Then there appeared on the scene in the Portuguese court a certain 
cavalier, named Hernando de Maghallanes (Ferdinand Magellan), who, 
having failed to secure the attention of the king to his scheme for a 
voyage of discovery, offered his services in the Spanish capital. Here, 
after many tedious delays, he was permitted to approach the Spanish 
King, Charles I, who, in the end, gave his royal assent to the discovery 
of a western route to the Moluccas. A fleet was fitted out, and sailed 
under the command of Maghallanes. It was in this voyage that he 
discovered the channel now known to the world as the Straits of 
Magellan. The Pacific Ocean was crossed, the Ladrone Islands were 
visited en route, and eventually Maghallanes found his way to au 
island which now forms one of the Philippine Archipelago, namely, 
Cebu. 

After a series of negotiations with the native king, he declared the 
King of Spain to be the suzertun lord. Then he went to fight the bat- 
tles of his master's new liege and was unfortunate enough to be fatally 
wounded by an arrow. Half a century had passed away when, in 1570, 
a new exi^edition was sent out from Mexico to annex the island dis- 
covered by Maghallanes and the group known to be adjacent from 
information received from the crews of Maghallanes' fleet. The leader- 
ship was confided to Miguel de Legaspi, who proceeded to Cebu Island, 
and after protracted eiibrts and arrangements with the chieftain 
declared the island to be under the suzerainty of the King of Castile. 
Here he founded a colony and initiated the disastrous policy of favor- 
ing the intermarriage of Spaniards with natives, under the mistaken 
impression that it was the true means of drawing closer the ties with 
the conquered race. Then, having heard that there was a kingdom of 
Mayinla within a few days' sail, he went in search of it and found him- 
self in IJorneo, in the Sultanate of Brunei. There he was informed that 
traders came down with all sorts of fine goods, including silks and 
other fabrics, so, with more or less crude sailing directions, he brought 
his ships up to Maynila. 

The king of that place peacefully accepted the treaty offered, includ- 
ing the suzerainty of the King of Spain, and in 1571 Legaspi proclaimed 
Manila to be the (;ai)ital of the Philippines in lieu of Cebu, wlii(;h place, 
however, remained thenceforth an ei)iscopal city, it was found that 
the (Jhinese, from time immemorial, were in the habit of coming <lowu 
to Manila, with the northwest monsoon, in their junks laden with Canton 
goods, and the natives went out in canoes to barter alongside. The 
Chinese would not trust themselves on land. With the southwest 



TREATY OF PEACE. 587 

inonsoon they returned to China. Legaspi encouraged this trade, and 
little by little, under a more settled government, the Chinese ventured 
ashore. They became so numerous that they had to be specially located, 

I and an establishment, the Alcayceria, was erected for them outside the 
city. It resembled a big circus, with pigeon-holes all around for their 
dwellings. Later on they were admitted inside the city, and the par- 
ticular place allotted to them was called the Parian. The city gate there 
is still known as the Puerta del Parian. Several times the Chinese 
have unsuccessfully risen against the Spaniards. 

The present population of Manila, which is about 350,000, includes 
some 60,000 Chinese and 10,000 Chinese half-castes. These hold quite 
four- fifths of the retail trade. In the provinces there are about 40,000 
Chinese and Chinese half-castes. 

There are three chief channels of speech in the islands which may 
be termed languages, namely, Tagalog, Visaya, and Moro, of which 
the total numl)er of dialects is reckoned at twenty-two. The official 
language everywhere is Spanish. Besides the groups of natives already 
alluded to as being more or less under Sjianish dominion, there are 
several independent mountain tribes known as Negritos, Igorrotes, 
Tinguianes, Tagbanuas, etc., who never have been subdued. I remem- 
ber meeting the expedition sent north from Manila in 1881 to reduce 
them to submission. It was a total failure; but the general was 
rewarded with the title of Conde de la Union and a Te Deum was 
chanted in the capital in thanksgiving for imaginary victories. 

The theory which soothed the consciences of the lirst military leaders 
was that either the soul must be prepared for salvation in the living 
man or the body must be annihilated. For generation after generation 
raids were repeatedly made on the natives for the crime of passive 
resistance to what they could not comprehend. With the cry of " Viva 
Castila!" bands of Spanish soldiers opened the way with blood for the 
monk to enter into the breach and palliate the wound with silvery 
phrases to the terror-stricken converts. The cry of Castila came to 
rejjresent everything that was terrible beyond all hope of mercy, and 
was, and is to this day, used in that same sense. Castila in the north 
and Cachila in the south mean the same, and often in the rural dis- 
tricts I have heard the cry of fright, "Castila!" as a child noticed me 
approaching. Mothers, too, in my presence, have often made their 
children cease crying by pointing toward me and pronouncing in sub- 
dued tone the dread word, "Castila!" 

After years of study of the native character, 1 have come to the 
conclusion tliat the Philippine islander is very matter-of-fact. He is not 
unwilling, but unable, to conscientiously accept an abstract theory. 
Christianity, with its mysteries, has therefore no effect on his char- 
acter, but he becomes accustomed to do that which his forefathers 
were coerced to do, namely, to accept the outward and visible signs 
without being imbued by the inward and spiritual grace. The mere 
discipline — the fnct that, nolens volens, they must at a given hour on 
a given day appear dressed in their best and attend the church and 
(in the case of headmen) go to the monk's residence to " kiss hands" — 
has certainly had the effect of taming the masses into orderly beings. 
Yet restraint of any kind is repugnant to him. He likes to be as free 
as a bird, but he is of a pliant nature, and easily managed with just 
treatment. He is extremely sensitive to injustice. If he knows, in his 
own mind, that he has done wrong, he will submit to a thrashing with- 
out any thought of taking revenge. If he were punished out of mere 
caprice, or with palpable injustice, he would always have a lurking 



588 TREATY OF PEACE. 

desire to give it quid pro quo. He lias an innate contempt for eowai ds, 
lience his disdain for Chinese, but will follow a brave leader aiiywlierc, 
and will never be the first to yield to hunger, fatigue, or possible 
chances of death. lie takes every trouble with profound resignation- 
he promises everything and perf(n-ms little; his word is not worth a 
straw, and he does not feel that lying is a sin. He is inconstant in the 
extreme, and loyal so long as it suits him, but as a subject he can be 
easily molded into any fashion which a just, honest, and merciful 
government would wish. 

From the foundation of Manila in 1571 up to the year 1819 the colony 
of the Philippine Islands was a dependency of Mexico. During that 
long i)eriod there was absolutely no direct intercourse between the 
mother country and her far Eastern colony. Everybody and everything 
destined for the Philippines passed through Mexico until that American 
colony threw off the Spanish yoke. Thenceforth, for fifty-one years, 
communication with Spain was via the Cape of Good Hope. The com- 
mercial history of the Philippines would be too long to relate here in 
extenso; suffice it to say that it is a series of struggles between the 
colonists, who sought liberty to trade freely with Mexico and China, 
and the Spanish King and his councilors and the trading community 
in Spain, who persistently determined to curtail that freedom as much 
as possible. The p(dicy of the Si)auisli merchant class was to hold 
Mexico as their exclusive market. They opposed Phili})pine traffic with 
China because this necessitated silver dollars, which they knew must 
come from Mexico surreptitiously, if the islanders were not openly 
permitted to give goods in exchange. 

The famous galleons, which were so frequently intercepted and seized 
by British privateers from the days of our Queen Elizabeth onward, 
formed the only connection between Mexico (Acapulco) and Manila. 
The regulations for shipping were, however, so restrictive that only 
the favorites of the authorities ever secured a chance. The arrival of 
the galleon in Manila Bay was the event of the season or the year. 
For the Europeans it was a sort of Eobinson Crusoe life, with addi- 
tional possible dangers. The ferocious (at times bloody) contentions 
between church and state authorities were enough to obliterate all the 
moral prestige which the Spaniards ever had or might have had 
among the natives. The galleon usually brought, together with the 
Mexican dollars, fresh restrictive royal decrees and a motley crowd of 
all sorts and conditions of men; friars who had to relate how they had 
saved the ship from total wreck by an ajjpeal to the Virgin ; a mob of 
notaries who had bouglit their offices in public auction in the City of 
]\Iexico; some dignitary who was destined to fan the flame of discord; 
perhaps a crowd of low type fortune seekers, and last, but not least, a 
mysterious individual of gloomy aspect whose ndssion none understood, 
but who would turn out to be the official "snake in the grass"— a spy 
from the holy ollice of the In(iuisition — a social scourge. 

For about a century and a half after the foundation of Manila the 
provincial government was handed over to the mercy of low-class 
Spanish adventurers. A common soldier would be rewarded for his 
services with an encomienda, i. e., a tract of land over whi(;h, together 
with the natives settled thereon, he had almost absolute control. Tlie 
lives of the natives became a perfect misery. Successive reforms 
brought first a functionary who was at the same time governor, judge, 
and licensed tradei'. 

The abuses were so glaring that, after long entreaty, he was super- 
seded by a judge-governor, and I remember when, a few years ago, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 589 

these offices were divided. Kow each branch of government has its 
separate delegate iu each province, and there are also two provincial 
supreme courts. There is also a fortnightly subsidized steamer service 
from Manila to each provincial government. All appointments are 
made direct from Spain, and with every new ministry in Madrid comes 
a flock of new favorites to the islands. The Governor-General is usually 
a lieutenant-general iu Spain, with the local rank of captain-general, 
but recently captain-generals (in Spain) have been sent out. 

I have so far only alluded to the civil and military government, 
which is virtually nothing more than the executive of the ecclesiastical 
authority. The real rulers of the islands are the four corporations of 
friars — namely, the Austin, Dominican, Franciscan, and IJecoleto 
orders. Their influence has been predominent since the foundation 
of the colony. In times gone by there have been most fierce contests 
between the governors and the monastic orders, in which the former 
have almost invariably been the losers. One governor general, Busta- 
mente, was murdered in his palace at the instigation of the holy friars, 
who followed up his dead body and hooted as it was being dragged 
through the streets of Manila. They caused Governor-General Solano 
to be poisoned. Only last year a certain father Piernavieja, who had 
committed two murders in the provinces and was still permitted to say 
mass, was put to death by the rebels. Any governor-general who dis- 
pleases the monks is recalled. In recent times. General Dcspujols had 
to leave in 181>2, after eight months of office, because he ceased to be a 
persona grata to the j^riests. A native, Dr. Ilizal. had written and 
published some facts about the monastic orders, and Despujols refused 
to have this man put to death for it. 

Then, again, he ordered a search to be made in a convent of the 
Austrian friars, and there found a printing press and seditious leaflets 
being printed for the priests, who intended, by distributing them, to 
attribute to the natives an attempted revolt. General Blanco (now iu 
Havana) was recalled at the instigation of the friars, because he proved 
to be too humane for them when the rebellion broke out. Finally they 
succeeded in having appointed a Governor- General after their own 
hearts, Camilo Polavieja, through whom they had the Dr. E,izal above 
mentioned executed in Manila in January of last year. His widow 
was a Hongkong American girl. 

In 1872 there was some discontent among the secular native clergy, 
because the monks persisted iu holding the incumbencies, notwith- 
standing theu' own rules of community and the council of Trent decree 
which prohibited it. The friars, therefore, determined to nip this native 
ambition in the bud. They instigated a little revolt of the troops at 
Oavite and attributed the plot to the native clergy. Four native priests 
fell victims to the intrigue and were publicly executed. Then, following 
up the scheme, native priests were declared incompetent to hold incum- 
bencies. At the same time several of the best families of Manila were 
banished and despoiled of their property. I am personally acquainted 
with two of these victims; one resides in Hongkong, and the other has 
for years past had his office near Leadenhall street, London. 

Manila is an archbishopric and there are six provincial bishoprics. 
The total number of parishes will be about 620, of which the friars hold 
about 95 per cent. As parish priest the Spanish friar is beyond all con- 
trol of the civil government. He can neither sue nor be sued. He is 
quite independent of all State authority. He may prove to be the 
vilest criminal with all impunity. His superiors would pretend to 



590 TKEATY OF PEACE. 

pnnisli him, but they would never expel him ; they are themselves sheeji 
who j)rotect their own lambs. 

Ue acts, however, as voluntary (and very willing) government agent. 
He meddles in every public affair of tlie townsiiip by recognized right. 
If he can not have things all his own way and inllnence every public 
act, from the election of native headman downward, he singles out for 
revenge all those who have outvoted him. And this is generally what 
happens, at one time or anotlier, in half the parishes. If a young nmn, 
who has been educated in Manila or Hongkong, returns to his native 
town with somewhat advanced ideas, or merely salutes the priest as a 
gentleman instead of kissing his hand as his spiritual father, he, too, 
is nmrked for social ruin one day. The father of a family of attractive 
daughters has also to be careful lest the charms of his offspring bring 
about his own fall. In short, in one way or another, the native who 
possesses anything worth having has either to yield to the avarice, 
lust, or insolence of the Spanish priest, or to risk losing his liberty and 
])osition in life. The parish priest has simply to address what is called 
an '"oticio" (ofUcial advice) to the governor of a province, who remits 
it to the Governor-General, stating that he has reason to believe that 
the individuals mentioned in the margin are persons of doubtful mor- 
ality, or cons})irators, or disloyal, or whatever he may choose to dub 
them, and recommend their removal from his i^arish. In due course a 
couple of civil guards will suddenly appear at the door of each named 
individual. Without warrant or explanation of any kind further than 
"by Older of the governor," he is marched off" to the capital town and 
cast into prison. Later on he is sent up to Manila, and Avithout trial or 
even defined sentence, he is banished to a far-distant island. 

In lSf)G I met three old friends of mine on board a steamer, who weie 
being transported in precisely similar circumstances. I could hardly 
believe my own eyes. They were well-to-do planters, and the last tiuie 
I saw them, prior to this occasion, I was the guest of one of them iii 
their town of Taal (Batangas Province). His well-served table, his 
carriage and horses, had been at my disposal. IsTow, alas! I fouiMl 
these men treated as criminals, with iron anklets slipped on one iron bar 
and padlocked. They were on the u}>per deck, exposed to the rain, sun, 
and heavy dews day and night. All I could do for them was to secretly 
supplj^ them with food and clothing. In the law courts nothing can be 
obtained without " greasing the palm," and then it only brings a sen- 
tence with a loophole for reopening the case when the judge likes. The 
same system of "squeeze" obtains in all the government departments, 
from the half-dollar slipped into the hand of the native scrivener to the 
thousand dollars or more quietly laid on the table of the dignified holder 
of the vscales of justice. 

From the preceding facts it may almost be surmised what are the 
causes of the rebellion. The movement had for its objects (1) the 
expulsion of the monastic orders; (2) the abolition of the Governor- 
General's arbitrary power to banish without accusation, trial, or 
sentence; (3) restoration to the natives of the lands held by the 
religious orders; (4) a limitation of the arbitrary powers of the civil 
guard ; (a) no arrest without judge's warrant; {(>) abolition of the fifteen 
days ])er annum compulsory labor. The government was quite uni)re- 
pared for this rebellion, wliich broke out in August, 1890. The first 
official acts were very impolitic. Three hundred representative natives 
were arrested on suspicion, and this probably spread the movemeni, 
A week after this the first battle was fought (at San Juan del Montej, 



TEEATY OF PEACE. 591 

and I rode over the scene of slaughter a iew hours after, before the 
slain were removed. A few days hiter 1 witnessed the execution of 
the tirst four who Avere doomed to pay tlie extreme penalty. Two 
months afterwards I saw 13 Chinese half castes shot at Cavite. 

For want of troops General Blanco acted on thedefeiisive till reenfoice- 
nieiits came from S]>ain, but meanwhile the altercations with the arch- 
bislio[), who i)resscd for the most bloodthirsty measures, caused lilanco 
to l<e recalled. General [51aiu;o was succeeded in December, 181)0, 
by General Polavieja, and he wa-t in turn su[)erseded by General Primo 
de Rivera, whose place is now occupied by General Augusti,in clvronio 
feud with tiie archbishop. 

The warfare in the northern provinces lasted from September 1, 1896, 
till December, 1897, when the Spaniards sued for peace and commis- 
sioned a well-known native of Manila, named Paterno, to negotiate it. 
The terms were drawn up in the treaty of BiacnaBato, and signed 
on December 14 last between General Primo de Rivera and General 
Aguinaldo. As Aguinaldo had obtained all that he iiad fought for, he 
and his chieis retired to Hongkong, accompanied by Colonel Piimo 
de Rivera, to await the fulfillment of the terms of the treaty. 

Gen. Eniilio Aguinaldo is a smart, intelligent man, of a serious 
mien, small in stature, and apparently a little over thirty years of age. 
He has served as the petty governor ot his native town in Cavite 
province and speaks Spanish very well for a native. He is by uo 
means an adventurer with all to gain and nothing to lose, but a landed 
jnoiirietor. He is a would-be reformer of his country, but, convinced 
that all appeal to Spain is futile, he has at last resorted to force. Gen. 
Primo de Rivera is now safely back in Madrid, and the Phili])}une 
Islander and the treaty of BiacnaBato are laughed at. This is a 
rej)etition of Cuban policy. 

It is on these grounds that Aguinaldo holds himself justified in 
returning to the scene of his battles, not again to fight for reforms to 
be effected by those wlio have uo honor, but to cooperate in forcing 
the Spaniards to evacuate the islands. In April last General Aguin- 
aldo concluded a secret agreement with Admiral Dewey, subject to 
ratification by the United States Government. Since then we know 
that Aguinaldo has arrived in Cavite and been well received by his old 
followers. 

The climate of Luzon Island is excellent, and the Spanish undisci- 
plined troops of tender age and frail physique will have little chance 
against the swarthy Americans and Aguinaldo's party. It is provi- 
sionally agreed that Aguinaldo shall set up a local republic. General 
Aguinaldo's jdan, I am informed, is to establish at Manila a congress 
to which deputies from all the principal islands will be invited. I do 
not hesitate to prophesy that, unless under European or American 
control, the scheme will end in complete failure. At first, no doubt, 
the islanders will welcome and cooperate in any arrangement which 
will rid them of monastic oppression. The Philippine Islands, how- 
ever, would not remain one year a peaceful united archipelago under 
an independent native government. It is an utter impossibility. 
There is such racial antipathy that the Visayas would not, in this 
generation, submit to what they would always consider a Tagalog 
republic, and the Tagalogs, having procured the overthrow of the 
Spaniards, would naturally resent a preponderance of Visaya infiu- 
ence. Families there are very closely united, but as a people they 
have little idea of union. The rivalry for prestige at the present 
day between one village and another on the same coast is sufficient 



592 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to prove the tendency to disintegrate. The native likes to localize, 
to bring everything- he re([uires or asi)iie.s to within his own small 
(•ircle. If his ambition were to be a leader of men he would be con- 
tent to be a king in his own town. Native Ideas are not expansive 
and fai-reaching. Then the question arises, Who would be the electors'? 
The masses are decidedly too ignorant to be capable of voting intelli- 
gently. The votes would be entirely controlled by cliques of land- 
owners. 

If the native republic did succeed, it would not be strong enough 
to protect itself against foreign aggression. The islands are a splendid 
groni>, well worth ])icking a quarrel and spending a few millions sterling 
to annex them. I entertain the tirm conviction that an unprotected 
united republic would last only until the novelty of the situation ha(i 
worn off. Then, I think, every principal island would, in turn, declare 
its independence. Finally, there would be comjdete chaos, and before 
that took root America, or some European nation, would probably 
have interfered; therefore It is better to start wifch protection. I 
can not doubt that General Aguinaldo is quite alive to these facts; 
nevertheless, I admire his astuteness in entering on any plan which, by 
hook or by crook, will expel the friars. If the republic failed, at least 
monastic power would never return. 

A protectorate under a strong nation is just as necessary to insure 
good administration in the islands as to i^rotect them against foreign 
attack. Either Great Britain or America would be eipially welcome to 
the islanders if they had not the vanity to think they could govern 
themseives. Unless America decided to start on a brand new policy it 
would hardly suit her, I conjecture, to iiccept t!ie mission of a pro- 
tectorate so distant from her ciiief interests. England, having ample 
resources so near at hand, would probably find it a less irksome task. 

For the reasons given above, the control would have to be a very 
direct one. I would go so far as to suggest that the government should 
be styled "The l'hilip])ine Protectorate." There might be a chamber 
of deputies, with a native president. The protector and his six advisers 
should be American or English. The functions of ministers should be 
vested in the advisers and those of president (of a republic) in the 
I)rotector. In any case the finances could not be confided to a native. 
The inducement to finance himself would be too great. All races 
should be represented in the chamber by men of their own class, 
otlierwise there would be wire-pulling by the half-castes to secure a 
monopoly. 

The total population of the islands amounts to about six millions. 
The chief products are hemp, sugar, leaf tobacco, and cigars. The 
articles of minor importance for export are choice hard woods, dye- 
woods, copra, rattans, palm-leaf hats, gums, etc. The islands are 
extremely fertile, and will produce almost anything to be found in the 
Tropics. I estimate that barely one-fourth of the tillable land is now 
under cultivation. There is at present only one railway of 120 miles. 
A number of lines would have to be constructed in Luzon, Paiiay, 
Negros, Cebu, and Mindanao islands. Companies would probably 
take up the contracts on ninety years' working concession and ninety- 
nine years' lease of acreage in lieu of guaranteed interest. The lands 
would become immensely valuable to the railway companies, and an 
eiH)rmous source of taxable wealth to the protectorate. Ivoad making 
should be taken up on treasury account, and bridge construction on 
contract, to be paid for by toll concessions. The port of Iloilo should 



TREATY OF PEACE. 593 

be improved, the custom-houses abolished, and about ten more free 
ports opened to the world. 

Under the protectorate undoubtedly capital would flow into the 
Philippines. Tlie coal beds in Luzon and Cebu islands would be 
opened out; the marble deposits of Montalban and the stone quarries 
of Angono (both near Manila) would surely be worked. The possibili- 
ties of development under a Iree, liberal government are so great that 
the next generation would look back with astonishment at the statistics 
of the present day. The chamber of deputies would no doubt adopt 
measures to avert the danger ol an overwhelming inllux of Chinese. 

The city of Manila is situated at the mouth of the Pasig- River, on the 
eastern extremity of a bay which is 27 miles across froiii east to west. 
At the western extremity there is the island of Corregidor, which, if 
fortitied and equipped ^ith modern armament, would command the 
entrance to the bay. Six miles southwest of Manila City there is a 
little neck of land on which stand the fort and arsenal of Cavite. 
Cavite and the headland are now in possession of Admiral Dewey's 
forces. An attack on the Americans by sea is of course out of the 
question since the annihilation of the Spanish fleet. Any body of 
troops moving along that strip of land which connects Cavite with the 
mainland of the island could be effectually shelled from the American 
ships. Dewey and his party are therefore perfectly safe pending the 
arrival of reenforcements. 

The city of Manila is practically divided into two parts. The official 
or walled city is built on the left bank of the Pasig River and the 
commercial city is situated on the Island of Binondo, which forms 
the right bank of the same river. They are connected by a well-built 
stone bridge, a little over a mile up the river. Proceeding up the river, 
which is very tortuous, one reaches a lake fed by numerous streams 
which tlow down the crevices of the surrounding mountains. 

The banks of the Pasig are beautifully picturesque, quaint, and 
interesting. For about a mile and a half from the stone bridge men- 
tioned above they are dotted with charming villas, the English club 
at Kagtajan, the (Governor-General's chalet, etc., surrounded by palm 
trees and all the luxurious grandeur of tropical vegetation. In early 
morning the Pasig presents a lively scene, with the hundi'eds of canoes 
skidding rapidly downstream laden with supplies for the capital. 
Excei^ting a few shops and craftmen's workrooms there is no trade in the 
walled city, the jirincipal buildings being the cathedral, many churches, 
the archbishop's ])alace, the univ^ersity, high schools, military and civil 
government oftlces, an ordnance dejjot, and other official establishments. 
The Governor-General's official residence was destroyed by an earthquake 
in 1803, and a new one is in course of construction. The walls which 
entirely encircle the city were, no doubt, a formidable defense up to a 
century ago, but are quite useless against modern artillery. This is I'ully 
recognized by the Spaniards themselves, who have indeed frequently 
discussed their demolition, but tradition and a pist appreciation of 
their worth in case of rebellion have preserved them. Of the ordnance 
mounted on the walls there are two pieces of modern type. According 
to the latest reliable advices, the Spaniards are going to the useless 
trouble of putting the drawbridges in order and flooding the sur- 
rounding moats, and throwing up earthworks and sandbag defenses, 
all of which would be very efl'ectual against an unsupported attack 
of the rebels only. Across the river, the quarter of Binondo (with 
the suburbs) constitutes the tri5diug center. Here are located the 
foreign and other merchants' offices and warehouses, and the whole 
trade of Manila is transacted on this side of the river. It has no 
T p 38 



504 TREATY OF PEACE. 

military defenses of any kind, and the bombardment of the Spaniards' 
stronoliokl might, for obvious reasons, be very well confined to the left 
bank of the Pasig Kiver. This would, for military purposes, be just as 
effectual as a general bombardment, for surely the Spaniards would 
never attempt to hold out after their walled city had been leveled. If 
they did, the rest could be as well accomplished after the landing on 
the city ruins, and thus the principal trading interests (mostly foreign) 
would not be sacrificed. 1 do not consider the rebels concentrated 
around Manila sufticiently strong or well enough organized to effectu- 
ally starve the Spaniards into surrender. The natives are fine soldiers 
when well led; so, if after the walled city is demolished the Spaniards 
still hold out, tlien the cooperation of the rebels will be invaluable in 
the final assault. 

Spain as a conquering nation has been a great success; but the days 
of con(|uest have long gone by. As a colonizing nation she has proved 
a great faihire from the beginning, for wlierever she has ceased to hold 
her own by s'.icer force of arms no merited gratitude of a i)rosperous 
people has been able to hold together those bonds originally created by 
the sword. Where military despotism has opened the way, generous 
intelligent administration has not followed in the wake to promote the 
happiness and well-being of the subjected races. The two great factors 
in the decline of Spanish rule have been religious despotism and greed. 
Liberty to till the laud and take the produce thereof, to journey from 
place to i)lace, to cull the wild fruits of nature, has only been wrung 
from the Spaniards bit by bit. Kepressive measures, contrary to the 
spirit of the times and repugnant to the instincts of the people, never 
did succeed anywhere. The natural result is reaction, revolution, and 
social upheaval by force. The most loyal colony is that which yearns 
for nothing at the hands of the mother country. 

It seems almost incredible that statesmen of the caliber of the late 
C;i novas del Castillo, himself a historian, accustomed to look back and 
weigh the consequences of statecraft, should have been so blind to the 
power of the will of the people. Historical precedent should have 
taught him how realizable was the theme of Cuba libre. But stubborn 
pride and a failure to act opportunely have left Spain with only tra- 
ditional glory. TTiifortunately, this very glory has compelled her to 
pick up the gauntlet thrown down by the United States. Spaniards 
are so constantly chewing the cud of their past victories — ever patting 
each other on the Ijack over the deeds of remote heroes — that they fail 
to see why the warrior of a hundred battles, now tottering with 
decrepitude, can no longer enter the lists and break lances with a 
more virile comtjctitor. Spaniards can not tolerate being told the bare, 
distasteful truth. If the ministers, who, from behind the scenes, are 
able to appreciate the comparative forlornness of their resources and the 
futility of resistance, were to deny the popular romance, that what 
Spain has done she can do again, the first spark of revolution would 
be kiiuUed. 

[Jndouhtedly not a few of them go abroad and read, mark, and learn 
to their indi\idual advantage; but who of them would have the cour- 
age to return to Spain and expose her fallacies, with no prospect of 
carrying conviction, and a certainty of being declasse — asocial outcast 
with the e))ithet of anti-Espanol? 

So to tlie inspiring strains of the Marcha de CAdiz the youth, 
encouraged by the beauty of every town and village, has gaily gone 
forth to sacrifice its all for national j)ride and letters of gold in the 
annals of its country. 

HamblrGt, June, 1898. 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDERS. 



[The Fortnightly Review, July, 1898. -By Lucy M. J. Garnett.] 

Both the great island possessions— in tbe West and Bast Indies, 
respectively— which are now the seats of war between Spain and the 
United States were, for a time during last century, possessions of 
the British l^iiipiro. Havana and Manila were both captured by 
Great Britain in ITOi', and Cuba and the Philippines occupied. Avery 
rare and interesting plain narrative of the capture of Manila was 
published by Kear-Admiral Cornish and Brigadier-General Draper in 
reply to accusations of infringement of the capitulations made against 
these officers by the Spaniards. Their own allegations are sufficiently 
strong: "Throngli the whole of the above transactions the Spaniards, 
by evasions, avoided complying with the capitulations in every one 
respect excei)t in bringing tlie money from the Mhericordia and Ordenta- 
cara [ships I, which it was out of their power to secrete. They base- 
fully and uiigratefnlly took up arms against us after having their lives 
given them. They preached publicly in their churches rebellion," etc. 
At the peace of Paris, however (17G3), which concluded the seven 
years' war, Canada, Louisiana, and various islands in the West Indies 
having been ceded by France, and Florida and Minorca by Spain, Great 
Britain on her i)art ceded to the latter power Cuba and the Philippines. 
Yet there is still to be seen— or was during my residence at Manila— at 
the mouth of tlie Pasig, and under the ramparts, a dilapidated brick 
and stucco monument with an inscription celebrating the expulsion of 
the invading British by the noble and patriotic Don Simon de Anda— an 
inscription which afforded great amusement to British naval officers 
visiting the port. 

Few" island clusters are so uniformly beautiful avS the Philippine 
group, nor among these can any vie with its chief island, Luzon, in 
verdure-clad, cloud-capped mountains, fertile plains and valleys, wide 
fresh-water rivers, placid inland lakes, and sparkling waterfalls. Dis- 
covered by the great Magellan in 1521, and named twenty-one years 
later by Villalobos in honor of Philip II, then Prince of Asturia, this 
archipelago was finally won for the Spanish Crown by the intrepid 
Miguel de Legaspi. First obtaining a footing in Cebu, he, in 1564, 
subdued part of Luzon and founded Manila, gradually extending the 
Spanish dominion into the rest of the islands forming this group. 

The Philippine islanders comprise many races and tribes, presenting 
varied characteristics. They may, however, be classed generally into 
three chief groups: Ilocan Malays in the north of the archipelago, 
Tagals in the center, and Bisayaus in the south. In the north, more 
particularly, there is an infusion of Chinese, Formosan, and Japanese 
blood; on the eastern shores are traces of Polynesian or Papuan admix- 
ture, while part of the population of the large southern island of Min- 
danao resemble the Dyaks of the opposite Boruean coast. But though 

595 . 



596 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the Philippines have been for over three centuries a Spanish possession, 
it is c'oin])ute(I that, at the present day, one-fifth of the population of 
Luzon and one fourth of that of the southern -Bisayas islands are still 
nnsubjected to Hpain, while in Mindanao only small portions of the 
coast districts are occupied by the Spaniards. The only section of the 
native inhabitants which has been completely subdued, converted to 
Cliristianity, and domesticated are the Tapils and some of the Bisayans 
of the soutbeni islands. 

The Ta.uals are of a markedly Malay type, having smooth black 
hair, proiiiinent cheek bones, lari^e lively eyes, and Hattish noses witli 
dilated nostrils. They are, as a rule, of rather low stature, slightly 
built, and of a copper color, more or less dark. The absence of beard 
ill the men gives them a juvenile appearance, even when middle-aged, 
and their features generally are smooth, smiling, and unwOrn. 

Whatever may luive been the original character of theTagals, it has 
doubtless been greatly modified by their subjection to Spanish rule, 
and equally so by tlieir conversion to Christianity; and they now pre- 
sent such a strange compound of contradictory qualities that their 
moral portrait is difticult to depict. The character of the domesticated 
native is, indeed, a series of surprises. Those who take the trouble to 
study him are every year led to some new conclusion. Perhaps it is 
best summed up in^lie words of one of their priests: "They are big 
children, whom one must treat as little ones." The TagaVs leading char- 
acteristics, however, doubtless depend less on himself tlian on natural 
laws; he is what his environment has made him. The old tribal cus- 
tomsj which had the good of the community for their aim, and consti- 
tuted his primitive morality, are now, when not altogether forgotten, 
reserved for native intercourse; and the Tagal has no moral code to 
direct his dealings with his Spanish master save that which he himself 
has taught his servant. Before entering the palm-leaf hut of a friend . 
he will spend fully three minutes in the interchange of courteous 
phrases; but he enters a European house without ceremony. 

A Tagal keeps his word, and yet he is a liar. Anger he holds in hor- 
ror, he compares it to madness, and prefers to it drunkenness, which he 
also greatly despises. Insult and injustice he can not brook, and will 
unhesitatingly use the knife to avenge either. He will never willingly 
confess a fault, but lie to hide it; yet he receives a hogging for it with- 
out a murmur. l)ebt he considers rather as an inconvenience than a 
calamity; when in pecuniary ditticulties he will spend all his ready 
cash on a feast to his friends, to keep up appearances, and he never 
thinks of returning a loan unsolicited. He, on the other hand, never 
repudiates his debts, but transmits them to his heirs if, at his death, 
they remain unpaid. Misfortune he bears with stoical and fatalist 
indifterence; concerned only with his immediate necessities, he is apt 
to let the morrow take care of itself. Under the eye of a master he is 
the most tractable of beings, and will go without food for hours, with- 
out complaint, if supplied with betel nut to chew. He gives himself 
no airs as a servant, and if hired as a coachman will raise no objection 
to being employed as cook, carpenter, or boatman, being leady to turn 
his hand to anything. He has a profound respect for the elders of his 
family, treats his children kindly, and extends his aid and protection 
to everyone claiming relationship, however remote. 

When, in tlu; interior, he is called upon to offer hospitality to stran- 
gers, he not only refuses to accept ])ayment from them in return, but 
l)laces at their (iisi)osal his ponies, vehicles, and gun, and shows them 
every attention in his power. An intrepid climber and rider, he mounts 



TREATY OF PEACE. 597 

the tall forest trees like a monkey, using feet and bands equally; he 
rides barebacked the most spirited pony, plunges without hesitation 
into shark-infested waters, and dives into alligator-haunted lakes to 
attack their occupants. Endowed himself with courage of this descrip- 
tion, he has the greatest admiration for bravery in others, and an equal 
contempt for cowardice. Under a leader in whom he has coulidence he 
nmkes an excellent soldier; but, losing him, he becomes at once demor- 
alized. Incapable of organization on any considerable scale, no revolt, 
if confined exclusively to the Tagals, would have a chance of success. 

Brigandage, which has long been common in these islands, first 
came "into prominence about the middle of the eighteenth century. 
This profession has a great attraction for the Tagal, not so much on 
account of the gain he may defive from it, as of the life of freedom it 
offers him, and es('ai)e from payment of the tributo which, though by 
no means a heavy tax, he much disliked paying in the years before its 
repeal. I have heard of cases when the only reason for a native's tak- 
ing to the mountains has been his unreadiness with the few shillings 
demanded of him, probably lost in the cockpit on the preceding day. 
These outlaws are occasionally arrested by the guardia civile and 
lodged in prison, but by the connivance of the legal functionaries, who 
fear the vengeance of their comrades, they are either set free, allowed 
to escape, or are comfortably established in some penal settlement. 
The more ignorant Tagals of this class believe that certain i)ersons are 
endowed with an uncanny power, called by them anting-anting, which 
renders its possessor invulnerable. Brigands, when captured, are 
often found wearing a medallion with the image of the Virgin, or some 
saint, as a symbol of anting. The neighborhood of the famous shrine 
of Antipolo, to which I shall have occasion again to refer, and the hills 
of San Mateo, are favorite haunts of these marauders, though we cer- 
tainly saw nothing of them during a delightful excursion made to the 
latter region. Another class of outlaws, known as remontados, are to 
be met with in the hills. As their name implies, they are natives who, 
weary of the thraldom of civilization, have cast it aside to return to 
the wild, free life of their remote ancestors, with no taxes to pay, no 
forced labor to perform, their wants satisfied with game from the hills, 
fish from the streams, berries and wild honey from the woods. 

Gambling may be said to be the one vice of the Philippine Islander, 
and takes chietiy the form of cockfighting — more ruinous for him in 
its effects than the earthquakes and cyclones by which his home is 
occasionally devastated. With the Tagal, even more than with the 
Malay generally, this pastime is a passion i)ushed to the extreme. In 
every native hut, in every craft fioating on the Pasig, a cock is to be 
found undeigoing training as careful as that bestowed in the west on 
a race horse — though ]ierhaps to perish on its first appearance in the 
lists. A native at leisure is seldom seen without his gamecock, a 
pretty creature, not much larger than a bantam, which he carries under 
his arm ; and should his hut take fire, his first thought is his favorite, 
which, having secuired, he leaves the rest to fate. Cockfights are held 
regularly on Sundays and festivals, and, in Manila, on one day in the 
week as M^ell; and the laws regulating them, which contain as many as 
a hundred clauses, are very strict. The spectators stand, or squat on 
their heels — the favorite native posture — on a sloping floor, at the foot 
of which are the lists. The maximum stake is $50, and one spur only 
is allowed to each cock. The Chinaman, who farms the </i(Uera, col- 
lects the bets, which, relatively to the wealth of the company, are 
enormous, Tagals of the poorest class often staking from three to four 
dollars and going supperless to bed in consequence. 



598 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Meantime the owners of the iiist enmhiitauts are arming tlieir cham- 
pions Avith a sharp steel spur some 2.] inches long with as much care 
as is given to saddling a horse I'or the Derby. 'When all the bets have 
been collected, the cocks are faced. iShoukl one run away without 
being injured, which does not often occur, he is declared beaten, and a 
new antagonist brought to face the victor. This time the combatants 
are probably more e(]ually matched, and the excitement of the reeking 
crowd of Tagals and Chinamen increases. The cocks tly at one another, 
meeting breast to breast, their ni)lifted claws directing the points of 
their spurs at the adversary, again and again endeavoring to strike a 
fell bh)W, chance generally determining the victory according to the 
vulnerability of the part penetrated by the blade. At last one of the 
cocks reels, falls, and expires, and the* victor executes a triumphant 
dance over the bleeding corpse of his vanquished foe, while the shouts 
and exclamations in Tagoloc and Chinese, which haveaccoin})anied the 
struggle, increase to a perfect babel. 

Another form of gambling, to which the women are almost as partial 
as the men, is the purchase of tickets iu the Government lotteries. 
These tickets are divided and subdivided until a share may be bought 
for a peseta (Od.).and much of the spare cash of the natives thus finds 
its way into the cofi'crs of the hacienda. This gambling propensity of 
the Tagals is occasionally exploited in various ways. During my resi- 
dence in Manila a bazaar was organized for the benefit of the general 
hospital, but instead of the articles collected being sold in tlie usual 
way they were piled into a pyramid in the center of the temporary 
construction erected for the pur])ose, the lottery tickets disposing of 
them being sold in the numerous stalls held by the leading ladies of the 
Spanish and foreign communities. A five dollar packet of tickets con- 
tained one prize only; it might be of the value of a shilling or two, or 
of several pounds, and a single ticket at the price of a peseta had as 
much chance of winning one of the latter as a five dollar packet one of 
the former. Accordingly, all ranks of natives, on three successive 
evenings, thronged to the bazaar, and spent their money liberally, 
patronizing, in preference, the stalls held by foreigners, apparently 
having more faith in the bona fides of these than of the Spaniards, with 
the result that at the combined British and American stall, at which I 
assisted, several hundred pounds were taken. 

Tlie sixteenth-century colonizers of the Philippines had the wisdom 
to allow the natives they domesticated to retain, to a great extent, 
their own tribal government, the only change of any importance made 
in the existing system being the total abolition of the form of slavery 
practiced. While the S]>anish Governor-General took the place of the 
sultans and greater chiefs, the datos, or feudal lords, were appointed 
gobernadorcillos, or petty governors of the villages and townshi]>s, 
which were termed, according to their importance, pueblos and visitas, 
or retained their native appellation of barangay. To these petty gov- 
ernors and their lieutenants and cabezas, as the head men are termed, 
were intrusted the duties of mayor, magistrate, and tax collector, 
res])ectively. They were made responsible for the jioll tax, levied, 
until 1884, under the name of tributo, on every adult native; for the 
proi)er performance of the statute labor, which consists of forty days' 
road mending and other nnmicipal work, and some days' service as 
cuadrilleros, a kind of municipal and cantonal gendarmerie commanded 
by the gobernadorcillo. 

Such, in brief, is the internal organization of these islands, instituted 
at the conquest, and i)erpetuated till the ])resent day, to the great 
advantage of their rulers. The nmss of the population were probably 



TREATY OF PEACE. 599 

not long in coming to regard favorably a religion and government which 
abolished slavery and replaced by exact laws the former somewhat 
arbitrary rule of their datos. The latter, finding themselves abandoned 
by their vassals, were naturally glad to secure what honors and power 
were left to them by the conquerors through the exercise of these new 
functions. Though nominally no longer hereditary, but elective, these 
offices probably continued for some time to be the appanage of the feudal 
lords. At the present day there are living in Manila descendants of 
these former sovereigns of the archipelago, who enjoy a certain consid- 
eration, and have been invariably loyal to their Spanish rulers. 

The Philippine laws relating to the property of married i^ei sons are 
exceedingly quaint and interesting, being entirely in favor of the wife. 
The property of a bride is never settled on the husband. If a man is 
poor, and his wife well to-do, so they remain throughout their married 
life, he becoming simply the administrator of her possessions, but hav- 
ing no right to them. If a husband becomes bankrupt in a business in 
which he has invested some of his wife's fortune, she ranks as a second- 
class creditor under the commercial code. Even on her death, the 
husband can not, save under a deed executed bj^ her in the j^resence of 
a notary, derive anj^ benefit from her estate, as her children, if she have 
any, and if not, her nearest blood relatives, are her heirs. Thus it not 
unfrequently happens tliat the father of wealthy children is himself 
impecunious, and dependent on their generosity for support; though at 
the same time he is comi)eiled by law to manage their affairs while 
minors, and, at their majority, to render a strict account of his stew- 
ardshi]). A married woman continues to use her maiden name, to which 
she adds her husband's with the prefix de. This she abandons when 
left a widow, save for purposes of business or convenience. Children 
also bear the names of both father and mother; that of the mother 
comes last, and is consequently the more prominent. It is, however, only 
since 1844 that the mass of the natives have adopted family designa- 
tions. In that year a list of Spanish surnames was sent to the priest 
of every parish, from which the head of each household chose the cog- 
nomen which best pleased him. Thus, one may find such noble names 
as Legaspi de Salceda, Lopez de Vega, etc., borne by the dusky-hued 
natives of the interior of Luzon. 

Such being the legal status of women in these islands, it naturally 
follows that they enjoy a considerable degree of personal independence, 
which, in some localities, economic conditions tend to increase, espe- 
cially among the working classes. The chief of these economic condi- 
tions has been the almost exclusive employment in the Government 
cigar factories of women. The staple industry of the city being thus 
debarred from men, various occupations and industries usually per- 
formed by women fall to their share. Into male hands has fallen to a 
great extent the manufacture and embroidery of the gauze made from 
the long silky fibers of the pineapple plant. By the men are also 
woven, on primitive handlooms, the dainty jusi-striped gauzes made 
from Chinese silk and the hemj^en abaca. In their homes, too, while 
the wife is earning the family bread — or rather rice, their staple food — 
the husband looks after the children and cooks the dinner. It is also 
very difficult to get women to act as nurses and maids in European 
families; and more than one English family of my acquaintance found 
themselves under the necessity of drafting into the nursery one or more 
of the muchachos or '-boys" of the household, often finding these male 
nurses more satisfactory in many respects than the women. This ap- 
proximate "equality of the sexes" in the Philippines, not accorded to 



GOO TREATY OF PEACE. 

tliem by Cbristiauity, but to a great extent merely a survival of their 
own ancient tribal customs, afi'ords turtber evidence of the untruth of 
the assumption by the Mill school of the inuuemorial and world-wide 
''subjection of women," 

Marriages among the Tagals are usually arranged not by the princi- 
pals but by their i)areuts. The father and mother of a marriageable 
youth visit the relatives of the maiden selected, and in conventionally 
tlowcry and allegorical language hint at the possibility of a matrimo- 
nial alliance between their respective families. The replies of the 
maiden's parents are equally vague and circumlocutory, and plain 
speaking is only resorted to when it has become evident that the par- 
ties are mutually agreed. Tagal mothers are mercenary to a degree, 
and when both j^arties are native, if a hitch occurs it is usually owing 
to a disagreement about dollars. If, however, the suitor is a half-breed, 
or European, he is unconditionally accepted, ambition and vanity get- 
ting the better of avarice. Tliese preliminaries settled, the donations 
propter nuptias are paid by the youth's father to the bride's parents to 
defray the expenses connected with the wedding, and a settlement, 
termed in Tagaloc vigaycaya, is often made by him on the bride. The 
young couple then present themselves to the priest, though not neces- 
sarily together, kiss his hand, and inform him of their intention to 
marry. The cleric appoints the day for the wedding and publishes the 
banns in the church. The religious ceremony takes place at the con- 
clusion of the first mass, between 5 and 6 o'clock in the morning. 
When the eucharist has been administered to the wedding party, an 
acolyte places a kind of mantle on the shoulders of the couple. The 
officiating priest recites a formula, puts certain questions, receives the 
customary replies, and in five minutes the nuptial knot is tied. As 
they leave the church a bowl of coin is presented to the bridegroom, 
from which he takes a handful and passes it to the bride, who returns 
it to the bowl, thus symbolizing his endowment of her with all his 
worldly possessions. Conventionally stolid and impassive, the young 
couple are escorted to the home of the bride, where the day-long cata- 
pusan, as these fami!}^ festivities are termed, are about to begin. If the 
parties are well-to-do, the vicar and headmen of the parish are invited, 
together with any Europeans who may happen to reside in the near 
neighborhood. A table is laid a la Russe with dishes of all kinds, 
sweets predominating, such potables as bottled beer, gin, chocolate, 
etc., together with cigars and betel-nut, being liberally supplied. 

During the intervals of feasting, the company are entertained with 
native dances, such as the Balitao and Comitan. The former is per- 
formed by a couple who stand opposite to and dance round each other, 
keeping time to the slow plaintive air which accompanies their song. 
In poetic strain the swain bewails the rejection of his advances by his 
ladylove. iShe in her turn reproaches him for some imagined fault. 
Explanations follow, and finally all is harmony. The Comitan is a pas 
seul, i)erformed by a girl who dexterously balances on her head a tum- 
blerful of water while she executes a variety of steps accomi)anied by 
writhing movements of the body. The guests residing in the parish 
retire to their own homes ibr the afternoon siesta, returning again 
toward sunset to take part in the evening festivities. If Europeans 
are ])resent, the bride is with difficulty induced to remain in company; 
but however great her bashfulness may be, there is not the slightest 
trace of it on her countenance, which still maintains an impassive and 
unconcerned expression. Little privacy is, however, to be found any- 
where in the house of rejoicing, for a crowd of lower-class natives, 



I 



TREATY OF PEACE. 601 

anxious to share in the good fare and amusements, fills every corner 
and obstructs every doorway and window. 

As before mentioned, it is usual for a settlement to be made on the 
bride by the husband's parents. If they have no dowry to offer, and the 
match is not otherwise objected to, the matter is sometimes arranged, 
amoiigthevillagers,by the youth undertaking to serve the bride's parents 
as capitad for a given number of years, after the manner of Jacob and 
Laban. This custom is, however, open to grave abuse. For, after his 
period of service has exi)ired, the maiden may, after all, be refused to 
her suitor by her avaricious parents, and a second capitad taken on in 
his place. The old Leyes de Indias vainly tried to combat the abuse of 
this ancestral custom, and one of these native laws i^ermits a promised 
bride to be deposited in safe custody while her parents are called upon 
to show cause why the marriage should not take place. 

Irregular unions are, however, extremely common, and for this, 
strange to say, the clergy are largely responsible. Though a regular 
tariff of marriage fees exist, the priests often set these aside, and 
demand a quite exorbitant fee calculated upon the supposed wealth 
of the parties. Tagals having a rooted aversion to being married 
elsewhere than in their own parish, this abuse of power is not easily 
evaded. The consequence is that, in village and town alike, many 
dispense altogether with the religious ceremony, and content them- 
selves with the old communal or family sanction, the customary gifts 
being presented to the bride's father, and the usual festivities lield. 
Young couples seldom set up house at once, but reside with the wife's 
or husband's parents so long as the?e is room; and when the parents 
are old and past work, they in their turn are received into the homes 
of their married children. When a couple set u^) housekeeping in a 
bahay of their own, one or more poor relations are sure to attach them- 
selves to the new household in the capacity of permanent hangers-on; 
even Europeans, foolish enough to marry native women, immediately 
find themselves hopelessly saddled with at least one incubus of this 
kind, unless, indeed, they happen to be men of exceptionally firm 
character. 

The Tagals, while exceedingly jealous of their wives, appear to attach 
little importance to their irregularities before marriage so long as they 
are constant after, and are consequently somewhat careless of the honor 
of their daughters. The now widcvspread custom of forming matrimo- 
nial unions without benefit of clergy naturally also facilitates irregular 
connections with Europeans. A present of money to a girl's parents 
suffices, from a native point of view, to constitute her the mujer — 
woman— wife of Senor So-and So, who installs her, as mistress, in a 
hut in some native quarter. When the connection comes to an end, 
the girl has no difiicnlty in finding a more permanent mate among her 
own people, especially if, as often happens, she is in receipt of a small 
pension. Infant mortality is very great in the Philippines. It is com- 
puted that 25 per cent of the children born of native parents die within 
a month, and death in childbed is also of very frequent occurrence. 
Both circumstances are in all probability greatly due to the traditional 
practice of closing up every aperture of a house containing a lying-in 
woman to i^revent the entrance of an evil spirit called Asuan, much 
dreaded on such occasions. An illustration of the extent to which a 
European, on marrying a native woman, must adapt himself to native 
ways was afforded in the case of an Englishman married to a half breed, 
who allowed this ridiculous superstition to imperil the lives of his wife 
and child, to say nothing of the discomfort to which he was himself 



602 TREATY OF PEACE. 

subjected by its observance in a climate where, for Europeans at least, 
a tborougli draft is indispensable for comfort. Another cause of this 
excessive infant mortality is that youu<i- children are very lightly clad, 
if clad at all, and a sadden tail of temperature often causes a chill on 
the stomach to which they succumb in a few hours. 

]\Iixed marriages have always been encouraged by the government 
of the IMiilip]>ines, special advantages being granted to military men 
who marry the daughters of the country. Three centuries of inter- 
marriage between European men and native women, and also between 
the latter and the numerous Cliinese immigrants, have consequently 
added to the original population a large proportion of half breeds 
representing every degree of admixture. The Chinese mestizos alone 
are said to constitute one sixth of the domesticated native population; 
and the Spanish mestizos, together with the Creoles, or "sons of the 
country" (hijos del pais), as they term themselves, form an influen- 
tial body, the majority of whom are established as traders in Manila 
and the provinces. Owing to their European descent, more or less 
distant, the Spanish half breeds are endowed with quicker i^erceptions, 
greater business capacity, and wider intellectual faculties than the 
pure Tagals. Many of them are well educated, but few display much 
nafural talent. A certain number of mestizos, both Spanish and 
Chinese, have amassed large fortunes as middlemen between the 
native growers and the European merchants. 

Although in the Philii^piues no distinct line of demarcation is drawn 
between races and classes, the social position of these half-breeds and 
Creoles is somewhat equivocal, though vastly superior to that of the 
Eurasians of British India. As a class they are continually struggling 
to obtain the position and consideration accorded to the Peninsular 
Spaniards, who refuse to give them their daughters in marriage, while 
their dusky-hued connections form ai)erpetual reminder of their native 
origin. Vainly endeavoring to disown kinship with the latter and 
assert an equality with the Castilas, they bear a grudge against these 
for possessing so unmistakably Enropean a birthright. The moral 
result of this is that they are, generally speaking, morose in disposi- 
tion, captious in temper, evasive and vacillating, dissatisfied with their 
lot, fond of litigation and political intrigue, and inclined to foster 
grievances against the Government. The better educated among them 
aspire to becoming reformers of their country's institutions; and, even 
previously to the late revolts, a certain number have been imprudent 
enough to give proof of the desire entertained by many to overthrow 
Spanish rule in the islands and establish instead a Philippine republic. 
But even in the exceedingly unlikely event of such a termination to 
the present rebellion, the new state of things could only be of very 
short duration. It is, I believe, an ascertained fact that the increase 
of energy introduced into the Philippine native by European blood 
lasts only to the second generation; and, left to himself, the tendency 
of the mestizo is ever to revert to the maternal type. The native is 
too indolent and the hold of civilization upon him too slight ever to 
make anything higher than municipal self government possible in these 
islands. 

The Philippines being, according to the Plain Narrative, "maintained 
by the Crown of Spain at the request of the church for proj)agating the 
Christian faith among the Indians," the influence of the church has 
naturally here been always paramount. An archbishop at Manila, 
with various bishops in the j)rovinces, constitute the hierarchy, and 
the spiritual needs of the people are administered to by a vast body of 



; TREATY OF PEACE. 603 

friars of all orders, and secular clergy, both European and native. 
The Jesuits also occupied numerous important posts in the archipelago 
previous to their expulsion from Spain in 1767, and are now again 
reestablished in many parts, and particularly in Mindanao. The great 
majority of cures are served by Spanish friars, who, after their arrival 
in the country, remain for some years in the monasteries in order to 
complete their studies, and in particular to learn the special dialect of 
the district for which they are designed. Spanish secular priests also 
occupy some of the canonries in Manila and the interior, and a certain 
number of native priests, educated in the seminaries of the orders, fill 
the less important curacies. 

The progressive party in the islands are opposed to this predomi- 
nance of the monastic orders who, as a body, prefer the interests of the 
Government to those of their parishioners, and demand their retire- 
ment to their monasteries, or to mission work, leavingthe parish churches 
to be served by the secular Spanish and native clergy. The authorities 
are naturally opposed to sucli a change, as they have always found the 
cooperation of the friars essential in securing obedience to enactments 
affecting their liocks. No royal decree pronounced with sound of trum- 
pet would have a fraction of the effect produced on the ignorant and 
fanatical population by the fantastic threats and promises pronounced 
with uplifted cross by their spiritual guide. This has been proved 
again and again. During the British oceu])ation of Manila in 17G2, 
"the priests and friars publicly exhorted rebellion, and preached it 
meritorious to take up arms and destroy us.''^ At the beginning of the 
campaign against the Moliammedan Sultan of Soulou, in 1876, when it 
was found necessary to increase tlie native army, recourse was had to 
tlie eloquence of the friars in order to obtain willing and enthusiastic 
re(;ruits. And there can not be the slightest doubt that at the present 
moment a crusade is being strenuously preached against the invading 
"infidels," statements calculated to excite the fiercest and most fanat- 
ical hatred being unscrupulously made from the puli^it to the ignorant 
masses. 

Eoman Catholicism is undoubtedly the form of Christianity best 
calculated to impress native races. Their pagan idols reappear in the 
form of saints and martyrs, and gratify the instinctive want of anthro- 
pomorpliic and visiljle objects of worship. The mind of the Philippine 
native is realistic to a degree, devoid of all conception of things 
abstract, and his ideas of religion are limited to its outward symbols 
and the rites connected with them. The mass does not greatly appeal 
to his religious emotions. Petty officials were formerly bound, under 
l)ain of the lash, to attend; but the want of a clean shirt is quite suffi- 
cient reason for a private individual to absent himself. Ko pressure is, 
however, necessary to secure the attendance of the women, many of 
whom pass half their lives between adoration of the images, Mariolatry, 
and the confessional. The dwellings of the majority of the natives are 
but slight and perishable constructions of bamboo and the leaves of 
tlie nipa palm, yet room is found in them for an oratory, while the 
churches which tower in their midst are solid stone edifices with mas- 
sive square or octagonal belfry towers, buttressed to withstand the 
frequent earthquake shocks to which these volcanic islands are sub- 
ject. The interior is a mass of rich ornament, the image of the Madonna 
and the high altar being often of solid silver, masterpieces of native 
workmanship, for even the poorest Tagal village possesses its platero, 
or silversmith. 

' A Plain Narrative. 



GO!- TKEATV OF PEACE. 

The great religious event of the year for villagers and townsfolk alike 
is the feast day of the local patron saint — tiesta de iiosotros, in native 
l)arlance. All day long the ])arish is en IT'te. The quaintly picturesque 
wooden houses and nipa huts, with their high pitched, thickly thatched 
roots, which line the roadwuy, embowered in feathery band)oo clumps, 
tall betel i)nhiis, and spreadinu phuitains, are all decorated for the occa- 
su)n. Festoons of (Miinese lanterns surmount the garden fences and 
swing between the trees, while triunqjhal arches span the roadway at 
intervals. Towai'd e\enii)g the great square in front of the church is 
crowded witli holiday malcers of both sexes, Tagals, Chinamen, many 
of wliom are nominally at least Christians, and half castes. Most of 
the mestizas and many of the Tagal women are arrayed in full skirts 
of brightly chec^ked, striped, or brocaded silk, and those anu^ng them 
who content tliemselves witli cotton outvie their wealthier sisters iu 
vividly contrasting red, blue, and yellow. Over this the Tagals wear a 
piece of dark-blue stuff, fastened aj)ron-wise tightly around the hips 
and descending to the knee. The bell lsha])ed sleeves of their short 
loose jackets, made of ]»ifia gauze, and the kerchiefs of the same mate- 
rial worn on the shoulders, and outof doors on the head, have their 
borders decorated with elaborate lace like needlework. Their long 
black tresses, which when loose often rea<di to their ankles, are neatly 
coiled at the back of the head, where they are secured with gold- 
mounted ]>ins and combs, often set with real diamonds, as are also the 
bracelets, earrings, and long watclu-hains which the Tagal eh'gante 
delights in wearing. The stockingless feet are ])rotected from the dust 
by chinelas, colored slippers, consisting merely of a sole and accommo- 
dation for four toes, the snuUl toe renuiining outside. 

The native dandies wear white duck trousers and a shirt, which latter 
may be jnore or less of the cut familiar to us when made of white calico, 
but the front is elaborately embroidered, tucked, or frilled, and the 
back is disposed in full kilts, unconlined by the trousers. Camisa 
fuera, " shirt outside," is the technical term for this native fashion, 
which greatly scandalized an elderly English ladj^ on her arrival at 
Manila. "Emily, niy dear, don't look!" she exclaimed in a horrified 
whisper to her daughter, when this costume first met her shocked gaze. 
"Don't look! The servant has forgotten to dress himself!" The 
camisa fuera, however, takes rather the form of a blouse, and conse- 
quently stiikes a European less oddly when made of pina gauze, of the 
prettily stiiped Jusi, or of the hemi)en abaca. With these the native 
pure and sini})le wears the salacot, a mushroom-shaped, sun i)roof hat, 
sometimes inlaid round the brim with a pattern in silver. This head- 
gear of his forefathers is discarded to a great extent by the townsman 
for a straw hat of European form, as he has discarded chinelas for 
patent leather boots. The children, boys ami girls, are made up into 
quaint little miniatures of their elders, though, as above mentioned, 
their costumes are ordinarily either of the simplest kind or conspicuous 
by their absence. 

liut the sun has now set, and after a few brief minutes of twilight 
the warm star-spangled night has drawn forth the whole population ; 
private festivities are for the time being suspended, attention being 
centered on the ])rocession now about to leave the church. Every lamp 
and lantern is aglow throughout the parish; the whole fa(;ade of the 
church and the Tem])le Bar-like structure of the gates look as if au 
immense swarm of tlie tiretlies flitting among the tree toi)S had sud- 
denly clustered over them; and forth from the sacred portals streams 
the great procession. First comes a group of children, dressed like 



TREATY OF PEACE. 605 

early Christian martyrs, or fathers of the church, wearing miters and 
false beards, and bearing wooden crosses, thus fulfilliug vows made on 
their behalf by their parents. Then black-veiled, black-robed tigmes, 
with great garlands of feathery green leaves on their heads and tapers 
in their hands, representing Jews in turbans and gaberdines. Next is 
borne past, on a litter, the recumbent figure of Christ on a couch of 
crimson velvet, almost hidden by gold ornaments. Other images follow 
at intervals, bedizened with velvet, satin, and lace, and sparkling with 
jewels, diamonds, rubies, and emeralds; between them march military 
bands, with groups of clergy in full canonicals, and officials in robes of 
office. The last image that figures in the procession is that of Our Lady 
of the Seven Sorrows, borne aloft on a magnificent litter, and eclipsing 
with the blaze of her jewels and the gorgeousuess of her apparel not 
only all the preceding saints and saintesses but also her Divine Son. 
The rear is brought up by a crowd of joyous natives, who follow in a 
double line, men and boys on one side, women and girls on the other. 

After perambulating the parish for an hour or so the procession 
reenters the church with its tapers, images, and band for the final 
benediction, and the rest of the evening is devoted to festivity. The 
chief inhabitants keep open house, and all entertain their friends from 
neighboring parishes according to their means. In the houses of the 
wealthy mestizas, which are of palatial dimensions and furnished hand- 
somely, balls and tertulias, or receptions, are going forward, most of 
the former being saya bailes, at which the native costume for both men 
and women is so strictly de rigueur that it is often assumed for the 
occasion by Spaniards and foreigners. For the public generally there 
are magnificent displays of fireworks and dramatic representations 
something after the manner of the miracle plays of the middle ages, 
from which the clown is never absent, the promi)ter being equally en 
evidence, and all the seats are free. 

The patron saint of the city of Manila generally is St. Francis the 
Tearful — San Francisco de las Lagrimas. According to the legend, an 
image of this saint in the house of a native at Dilao, near the capital, 
was on one occasion, when the city was in danger, seen to weep so 
copiously "that many cloths Avere moistened," while with outspread 
hands it, for three hours' space, besought God's pity on Manila. As 
soon as this miracle was made publicly known, the saint was, with one 
accord, declared the protector of the city and his image removed to 
the Franciscan Church within the walls, where it has since remained. 
The anniversary of this saint is naturally a general holiday. Toward 
sunset thousands of vehicles issue from the streets of Binondo, Tondo, 
and the other suburbs, and cross the bridges to the wide boulevard 
which encircles three sides of the fortifications, terminating at the 
mouth of the river Pasig. Elegant victorias and landaus, drawn by a 
pair of stout ponies, are filled with mantilla-veiled Spanish beauties 
and bejewelled Mestizas; light carromattas and calesas are brilliant 
with the trailing sayas of their dusky Tagal occupants; every available 
wheeled vehicle, indeed, in the city has been requisitioned to swell the 
stream of traffic flowing seawards. Military bands discourse operatic 
music, and greetings are interchanged while the Manilenas inhale the 
refreshing sea breezes blowing in from the bay. Ocean steamers lie 
out in the anchorage, outlined in shadow on the smooth waters, while 
the setting sun, disappearing behind the grand mountain mass of 
Mariveles, throws its dark serrated summits into clear relief against 
the glowing western clouds. The eye, dazzled by this blaze of natural 
splendor, turns for relief to the moss-grown, mellow-toned walls of the 



606 TREATY OF PEACE. 

city — a city belonging: in appearance to another age, witli its moat, 
drawbridges, and old bronze cannon bristling; on tlie ramparts from 
wbjcli now thniidcrs fbrtb the sunset gun. - Every rein is tightened, 
every hat lifted in salutation to the Angelas, which simultaneously 
sounds from every convent and church in tlie city. The short succeed- 
ing twilight passes, the carriage lamps twinkle as far as the eye can 
reach, and the gay throng again wends its way homewards. 

The history of the miraculous shrines in these islands would fill a 
volume. The most popular, however, is that of the Virgin of 
Antipolo — Nuestra Sefiora de 33ueu Yiage y de la Paz — at which 
miracles are constantly reported to be wrought. Brought from Mexico 
in l()o(), this \'irgin was, in the Chinese rebellion thiiteeu years later, 
committed to the tlanies. When all around had been reduced to ashes, 
these inlidels found the sacred image still intact and resplendent, her 
brazen body without a blemish. Again was she committed to the 
tlames, and again found by the Si)aniards, who had arrived in the 
meantime, unhurt, save for a wound in the face inflicted by the knife of 
a sacrilegious rebel. After helping to drive out the Dutch in 1630, the 
image was again taken back to Acapulco as protectress of the King's 
galleon. Having crossed the ocean six times, the Virgin was, in 1072, 
brought back to the Philippines, and finally, escorted by a joyous mul- 
titude, was deposited in her present resting i^lace in the Church of 
Antipolo — "birds, beasts, flowers, hills, and waters greeting her as she 
journeyed." The annual festival of this Virgin, which is held in the 
month of May, is attended by thousands. The villagers, who number 
some 3,000, depend chiefly on these pilgrims for their subsistence, their 
land being too mountainous to be very productive. A large trade in 
rosaries, holy pictures, and sacred knickkuacks generally is done by 
the priests, some 130,000 being annually spent there by visitors. Many 
make vows to climb the steei) ascent to the church itself on their knees, 
in return for benefits vouchsafed. A very good-looking mucliacha, who 
had been employed as nurse at the British consulate, enjoyed the repu- 
tation of having achieved this feat, in addition to that of being 
exceedingly inconstant in her affections. 

Other famous shrines are those of Our Lady of Casaysay, on the 
coast of Balangas, also brought from Mexico; a cross at Baiian, vener- 
ated since loOo; and the Holy Cliild of Cebu, said to have been found 
on the shore of this island by a Basque soldier, Juan de Camus. The 
latter image is of ebony, lo inches only in height, laden with silver 
trinkets and other offerings. When this object is exposed to view on 
its festal day, the -((th of January, the honors of a field-marshal are 
l)aid to it, and pilgrims from the remotest districts and islands cross 
tlie seas to purify their souls at the shrine of the Santo Nino de Cebu. 

I began this paper with recalling the former British occupation of 
the Philippines, and as it seems likely that they will soon be occupied by 
our American kinsmen, or possibly, by some arrangement with them, 
reoccui)ied by ourselves, I shall conclude by pointing out their exceed- 
ingly important geographical and political position. The eastern shores 
of the South China Sea are formed by the Philippines and Borneo, and 
are, therefore, one-half Spanish and one-half British; and tlie British 
Mahiy Peninsula and French Cochin China form the western shores, 
with Hongkong at the head of this narrow storm-tossed sea. Thus 
situated, I can not but agree with the politicians who think it would 
be impossible for (Ireat Britain to allow^ these islands to come into the 
possession of any other great ])ower than the United States or our- 
selves. Certainly the Spaniards have by their misgovernment hardly 



TREATY OF PEACE. G07 

less forfeited here than in Cuba all rightful claim to remain in posses- 
sion after defeat in the war which that misgovernment has provoked. 
The trade of the Philippines has long been chiefly in the hands of 
British and American Arms. Under either British or American Gov- 
ernment these islands would undoubtedly have their immense material 
wealth developed as it has never yet been, or ever will be, under such 
an effete power as Spain. And, it may be added, that with the Philip- 
pines go the great islet, rather than island groups to the eastward, the 
Ladrones or Eobber Islauds, a penal settlement, and the Carolinas. 
May the near future bring better government to the rightly rebellious 
Philipx)ine islanders. 



A SKETCH OF THE ECOiNOMIC CO>yDIT[ON OF THE PHILIPPINES. 



IJy Max L. Tornow. 



The general interest in the Philippines, which for a long time seems 
to have been all but forgotten by the rest of the world, was again thor- 
oughl}' awakened by the recent cannonade off Cavite. Andeven ,with 
the final settlement of the Philippine question, it is scarcely to be 
expected that the islands can again fall into forgetfulness. A glance, 
therefore, at the economic condition of the country would appear not to 
be out of place, accompanied by a tew more important statistics, for an 
exhaustive consideration of the subject would occupy far more space 
than the present ])amphlet admits of. 

1. Commencing with the produce of the soil, two important points 
strike us as speaking to the varied and fertile character of the land: 
The geographical position of the islands — embracing sixteen degrees of 
latitude — and the plentiful supply of water. On the other hand, in 
addition to smaller obstacles raised by the administration, particularly 
as regards large i)lantations, the want of labor militates seriously 
against industrial extension, so that of the arable land only a very 
small part is to day under cultivation. The result is that, notwithstand- 
ing the richness of the soil, we find that the total returns are nothing 
like what they should be. 

]Srot only do all tropical fruits flourish, but also the plants of the tem- 
perate zones, such as wheat, barley, and potatoes. Experiments were 
made with wheat and barley some years ago, and met with every suc- 
cess; and there is to-day a German planter in Benguet cultivating pota- 
toes. I am fully convinced that in certain ])arts the vine could be grown, 
and at all events those fruits which demand a mild climate. Attempts 
have been made with tea to a little extent, and the results have not 
been unfavorable ; but to all extensive planting (and this is the only way 
in which it is remunerative) the want of railways, good roads, and 
laborers offers the greatest difficulty. Not less annoying is the attitued 
assumed by the Spanish officials and the monks, unless the planter is 
ready to dance at their command. 

The principal agricultural products exported are sugar, hemp, and 
tobacco, and to some extent coffee, the cultivation of which, however, 
has of late greatly decreased. Indigo, sapanwood, and copra must not 
be left unmentioned, for they may certainly be expected to take a 
higher place in the Philippine trade in the future than to-day is the 
case, liice and maize are only grown for home consumption, and even 
for this ])urpose the supply is not large enough. Eice is imported from 
Saigon and liangkok and cocoa from Java, although the extremely 
fertile soil of the Philippines could produce all that is required at home 
and enough to admit of a large export trade as well. 

Formerly, in 1850 to 1800, or even later, rice was exported from the 
islands, but the quantity gradually decreased until exportation ceased 
608 



TREATY OF PEACE. G09 

altogether, and fiually tbe grain began to be imported. Tlie blame lies 
with tlje miserable administi'atiou of the country. The planters can no 
longer compete with Rangoon, Saigon, and Bangkok, where the 
autliorities know how to meet the farmers when necessary, and where 
the ships are not exposed to endless chicanery, such as is practiced by 
the Manila customs-house officials. For this reason most foreign vessels 
are careful to steer clear of the latter port. Sugar is chiefly exported 
from the Visayas Islands, and tbe trade is almost exclnsively over 
Iloilo, the largest place after Manila, sitnated on the island of Panay. 
Cebn, the third largest port of the archipelago, does now but a small 
and steadily declining trade in hemp. 

The best tobacco grows in the north of Luzon, in tlie province of 
Isabella, and the south of Cagayan, the most northern province of that 
island, in tlie valley of the Kio Grande de Cagayan. The uortberu 
provinces of Luzon, from the gulf of Lingayeu in the west to the Pacific, 
are separated from Manila by a range of high mountains, theCaraballo, 
over which there is, with the exception of a path and the telegraph, no 
road whatever, much less a railway. The tobacco, therefore, is sent on 
covered boats, so called -'barangaijanes," down the Eio Grande to 
Aparri, and there shipped by steamer to Manila. A flat-bottomed steam- 
boat also runs from llagan, when the water allows it, otherwise she 
only goes as far as Tuguegarao. In tliis way the transport from the 
most southern tobacco center, Echague, which, as the crow flies, is only 
about 150 miles, olten takes quite three weeks. 

Tobacco has also been planted on the west coast of the northern part 
of Luzon, and also on the Msayas Islands. This, however, is of inferior 
quality and is mostly exported to Spain. In Manila it is not used, unless 
perhaps bv the Ciiinese factories of inferior cigarettes. Eegarding the 
tobacco monopoly, abolished in 1883, 1 shall have some remarks to 
make later. 

An important and world-famed article is Manila hemp, or abaeo, a 
product of the Musa textilis. It is remarkable that, although there are 
the most varied species of the Musa flourishing all over the Tropics 
and in warm climates generally, the 2h(s<i textilis appears to thrive to 
the best advantage only in the Philippines. Attempts to grow the 
pilant in other places have been uniformly unsuccessful. Like its better- 
known relative, the edible hanana [2hisa paradisiacu), the stem of the 
plant is formed by the leaf-stalk, in the center of which again is the 
blossom-stem. The finest growth is obtained in the volcanic and rainy 
districts of the Philippines, especially in the Cajnarines Sur, Albay, 
Samar, Leyte, INIarinduque, Cebn, and in some of the small neighboring 
islands, as'^well as on the South Negros and Mindanao. 

The valuable hemp fiber is found in the petioles, from which it is 
taken before the plant has borne fruit, as otherwise the fibers lose in 
elasticity and luster. In two or three years the plant is generally so 
far matured that it can be cut down, the leaves removed, the green 
epidermis stripped from the stem, and the bast strips either torn off 
lengthwise or the petioles separated singly, and the inner membrane 
Avith the pulpy i.ortion of the plant as well as possible removed. The 
bast strips thus obtained are then drawn under a knife, in order to 
scrape away any pulp that may have remained on them. The product 
after having been dried in the^sun is then ready for shi])ment. This 
process, though simple, involves a great loss of fiber, which might be 
avoided by the use of more efficient st]ii)ping machines. It is difficult 
to accustom the native to anything novel; but when once progress has 
T p o9 



610 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



gained a general footing lieadway will soon be made in particular paths 
also, ^tlanila lien»i) has so far been equaled by jione, much less excelled. 

The principal article is fair current, with its higher and lower grades. 
Of less importance is qnilot and the silk-like lupiz, which, besides their 
use in the manufacture of fine native fabrics, are also employed for supe- 
rior toilet articles in l^hiropc, esi)ecially in the ladies' hat trade. From the 
current sorts excellent shiyrs cables and miner's ropes are made, and in 
America, where great quantities are consumed, they are used to make 
grain-binders for harvesting. Hemp comes on the market in bales of 
L' Spanish piculs (280 i)0unds, English), The price varied much, being 
subject often to great tiuctuations, which naturally gave rise to specu- 
lati(ni. About the middle of the present century the price varied 
between $4 and $5 (with high course of exchange), steadily rising; in 
the sixties we find it already at |7 to s9; in the eighties, $11 was the 
average. In 1S90 it was artificially pushed up to 1 17— an immense 
crash being the natural result— and all this at a high or even higher 
course (3s. Sid. to 3s. lid. per $1). 

The course now began to fall steadily until, after the outbreak of the 
war, it stood at Is. lO.^d. Of late the pri(;es for fair current have 
been between $0 and $9 per picul, at a course of 2s.; and at the end of 
April the ton was sold in London at £19. During the blockade of 
Manila the price was pushed to nearly £4i). At the eiul of the war it 
fell again to £28.10. The table opposite shows the fluctuation of the 
course and price of hemp from January 1, 1892, to April 21, 1898, when 
the war broke out. 

In 1818, 201 piculs at |4 were exported. There is no record of the 
exportation of hemp until 1840. In this year the amount exported is 
stated to be 136,034 piculs (8,502 tons). Thirty years later, in 1870, 
the amount had risen to 488,500 piculs (30,535 tons). The export then 
increased still more considerably. The following figures show how it 
has stood during the past six years: 






Year. 



Piculs. 



10Q9 ! 1,581,100 

is9^ :'::::;:;:. ::::::; 1,282,942 

1SQ4 i 1,591,902 

Ifiq^ , 1,004,590 

lilt ::":::::;;:::::::::::::.:; 1,531,810 

ii97;:::::::::::: \ 1,689,754 



98,818 
80, 184 
99,497 
104, 038 
95, 738 
a 105, 610 



a From Manila only. 



The chief consumers are England and the United States. The rela- 
tive consumption by the different countries in 189G is seen from the 
following table: 



Country. 



England 

■United States 

China and Jai)an 

Australia 

Singapore, India 

European Continent. 



Piculs. 



815, 044 

615, 554 

49, 494 

33, 892 

12,166 

5,660 



Total ! 1.531,810 



English 
tons. 



50, 940 

38, 473 

3, 093 

2,118 

760 

354 

95,738 



TREATY OF PEACE. 611 

The cliffereuce between the large export to Euglaud and the small 
amount which goes to the Continent — the very last on the list — is 
striking. Euglaud, however, acts here only as middleman, selling 
extensively again to the Coutinent, which accordingly buys at second, 
or, rather, third, hand. 

Various species of the cocoanut palm are found dispersed throughout 
the whole arcliipelago, though the exportation has only been consider- 
able during the last few years. Uuder a more satisfactory state of 
affairs in the interior of the country, the export trade in copra prom- 
ises to increase still further, in spite of the large consumption of the nuts 
by ihe natives themselves. The meat of the cocoanut forms a staple 
article of food, both raw and prepared artiticially. 

The archipelago is very rich in timber, notwithstanding that the 
exploitation for building purposes has been going on for over three hun- 
dred years, and exportation formerly, especially, was very large; nor 
have new plantations ever been thought of. Sapan wood for dyeing 
purposes is also a product of the islands, and there is a regular, though 
small, export done in it. 

That the Philippines are amongst the most fertile colonies on the face 
of the earth is well known, and has formerly been frequently men- 
tioned; it is less generally known that they are also amongst the most 
neglected colonies in existence. According to the Spanish authorities 
themselves, only one-tenth of the available arable land is uuder culti- 
vation; as a matter of fact, the amount is probably much less. What 
might not be made of this beautiful country, were this mismanagement 
but once and for all to cease! 

Cattle breeding has been carried on by some mestizos for many years, 
evidently with success, or the business would have died out. Of late 
it has been found more profitable to import the extremely cheap 
Queensland cattle; but the fact that cattle thrive nearly everywhere 
is a proof that cattle breeding on an extensive scale is possible. A 
small number of sheep are imported frou) China, for consumption by 
foreigners; it is by no means improbable, however, that in some prov- 
inces, at any rate, they would thrive well. There are but few goats; 
of swine and poultry, on the other hand, there is a surplus, the tlesh of 
the former, especially, forming a favoiite dish of the natives. 

In addition to the small but very tough horses, resembling those of 
Java, that most useful of domestic animals, the carabao, or black (gray) 
buffalo, thrives to the best advantage. The white species is also occa- 
sionally to be found. The buffalo is employed for many purposes — for 
working the pumps on plantations, for sugar presses, etc., and is also 
used as a beast of draft. In the mountains the buffalo is met with in 
the wild state; it is, however, undoubtedly only the domestic species 
which has been neglected. Nevertheless, in the course of years, the 
degeneration has been so great that there now exists a clear distinction 
between the wild and the domestic buffalo. The wild animal has a 
more compact head and short horns, while the domestic animal has a 
long head with long, broad horns. Neither horses nor buffaloes are 
indigenous to the Philippines ; they havebeen imported by the Spainards. 

'2. Nor is it alone the arable land which forms the resource of the 
country, little regarded as this source of wealth has unfortunately 
hitherto been. There is another, and doubtless not less valuable, prop- 
erty, represented by the mineral riches now silently slumbering beneath 
the soil. 

The islands yield pit coal, iron, gold, silver, copper, etc., for the most 
part of good (piality, and recently petroleum has been struck. Car^ul 



()12 TlfEATY OF PEACE. 

and expert exj»luintioiis have several times been uiulertakeii by engi- 
neers, yet never to the extent necessary to start lucrative mining-, nor 
yet over a sutliciently extensive area. The tbrmer "inspector general 
de montes,"' Don Jose Centeno. and J3on Antonio Hernandez are deserv- 
ing of special mention for their exploration in this direction. 

Coal is probably spread over the whole archipelago. It was first 
discovered in 1S27 in the island of CJebu: then in ^S^egros, Mindanao; 
on the island of Luzon, in Canmrines and Albay, and in many other 
islands. The wealth thus appears almost inexaustible. The coal in 
Cebu is of the best (piality, numerous experiments having shown it to 
be e(|ual to Newcastle coai. Hernandez found four seams running 
parallel irom north to south at a small depth, and 1>5 miles long. In 
1874 four further seams were found where Don Isaac Conui worked 
the Caridad and Esi)eranza collieries in a small way. In Albay, 1 ndle 
southeast of the sniall harbor of Sugod, is one of the most extensive of 
the many seams which have been found in Albay. It is 5 or G yards 
deep, and runs for a long distance. From this mine, from different 
places over a distance of a mile or more, 130 tons of coal were dug and 
practically tried on some steamers. 

According to the reports of the man ofwar Berenguela and the 
stciunshii^s But nan and Corref/idor, which exi)erimented with the coal, 
the latter resembles that of Australia, with the advantage of being 
less liituminous. This is an agreement with the scientific analyses and 
experimemts of the coal made in Madrid. Small workings were begun, 
but exploitation corresponding to the worth could not be looked for, as 
with the tickle Government and administrative mismanagement, capi- 
talists feared to finance such undertakings, especially in the way of 
foreigners, the Government put every possible hindrance, so that a 
profitable return seemed questionable, and the capital invested in dan- 
ger. The workings were consequently very limited, and up till this 
day Australia and Japan exixnt coal to Manila, a state of things 
which, it may be hoped, will soon be changed. 

Iron, also, has been found in many of the islands. The best is that 
in Luzon, in the provinces of Morong, Laguna, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, 
Pampamga, and Camarines, which, according to Centeno campares 
most favorably in quality with that of Sweden. The ore contains from 
75 to 80 per cent pure iron, and is found in tbe midst of immeuwse forests, 
so that there is thus a ])ermanent supply of fuel, if ])roi)erly used. In 
addition to this, there is often water power in the neighborhood which 
could be profitably utilized. In the above-mentioned provinces, Cen- 
teno discovered large masses of almost pure magnetic iron oxide 
(hierro oxidulado magnetico, casi puro). After what has been said 
above, it is not surprising that here, also, there has been no thorough 
exploitation. In the inovince of Bulacan the natives manufacture a 
veiy i)rimitive iron plowshare and pots for cooking (carahays); but 
even here there has been a gradual decline since the commencement of 
this century. 

Copper exists in the i)rovinces of Tayabas, Camarines Sur, and 
Antique and on iMasbate; the best quality, however, in the district of 
Lepanto (Luzon) near Mancayan, Suyuc, Bumuan. and Agbao. Here 
mines were worked by the Com])ariia Cantabro Filipina, but abandoned^ 
after ab(mt ten years, in sjjite of the wealth of mineral, on account of 
the scarcity of labor. The first si)ecimen of black copi)er was obtained 
in 18(34. In 1807 the output was li,4<'.4 (luintales (2,231 cwt. 83 lbs.) of 
line copper; in 1870,4,020 ijuintales (3,041 cwt. 8 lbs). The want of 
workmen then caused the yield to decline, until in 1875 the nuues were 
closed altogether. 



1 



TREATY OF PEACE. 613 

It is probable that gold occurs in every part of tlie archipelago. In 
a small way it has been extracted by the natives for many years in cer- 
tain places, particularly in Luzon. It is found instratitied, and in 
creeks, from which the natives prefer to wash it. The best known 
sources are in Camarines Norte, the mountains of Mambulao, Paracale, 
and Labo, and the northern spurs of the Carabollo Mountains. Alluvial 
gold is said to exist largely in Nueva Ecija, near the village of (Japan; 
in Tayabas the metal is found in the mountains in the neighborhood of 
the village of Antimonon. In Mindanao, where gold has likewise been 
discovered, it is believed to be present in particularly prolitable quan- 
tity. Mindoro, Panay, as well as some other small islands, are also 
places where the precious metal has been ibund. 

It now remains to inquire into the question as to whether it would 
pay to work gold mines at all. For as yet, at all events, no positive 
proof has been furnished of gold mines being profitable, although dur- 
ing the last few years the subject has been discussed. In 181>3 the 
Mambulao Gold Mining Syndicate was formed in London, engineers 
sent out, and workings actually commenced in ^lambulao. Difficulties, 
however, arose, the jn-incipal no doubt being that a large X)art of the 
shares were not allotted, and the w^trkiug capital therefore too small. In 
general, the participators speculated on the advaiitageons sale of a 
part of their concession and the starting of a limited liability company, 
something of a gold fever broke out in Manila, and on all sides con- 
cessions were ac(iuired by Englishmen, some Germans, and Swiss. Xot 
one of these concessions, however, seemed the result of a sound bona 
fide project; the object in view was always the promotion of companies 
and disposal of the concession at a good ])rotit, leaving all the risk to 
the shareholders. It is not imimssible that this would actually, in 
some cases, have taken place, and a speculation in shares followed sim- 
ilar to that on a former occasion in Singapore and Hongkong, to the 
detriment of general trade. The rebellion of 189() fortunately put an 
end to speculation; Euro])ean capital for such i)uri)oses was not to be 
found during the disturbances, and methodic^al working in some 
provinces eipially impossible, (juite apart from the other difficulties 
mentioned above. 

Centeno further states that mercury was formerly fonnd in various 
places. At the end of the last century a bottle was sent to Manila 
from Mindanao, and a second from Capiz. Jn 1848 mercury was dis- 
covered in CasiguroTi, in tlie province of Albay, but the general opinion 
was that the tind was altogether insignificant. At all events, none of 
these discoveries appear to have been of any importance. 

At the beginning of the seventies two beds of galena were discov- 
ered in Zebu, in the neighborhood of the village of Consolacion. Spec- 
imens were analyzed at the mint at Manila, and showed, it is true, 
only 47 per cent of lead, but also 1 ounce gold and 2 ounces silver per 
hundredweight. Nevertheless, the beds were not of sufficient signifi- 
cance to assure profitable working even on a small scale, so the mines 
were again abandoned. The departnu^nt of mines in Manila did cer- 
tainly recommend further exploration in Zebu, but so far as I am aware 
earnest steps were never taken. In Mambulao and Paracale the beds 
of galena and red lead ore have been got ready for working, and are 
probably very rich. The workings, however, have always been aban- 
doned again, presumably, chiefly, on account of these Spanish under- 
takings being insufficiently financed from the commencement, and 
because of the lack of the necessary circumspection. 

There is naturally an abundance of suli)hur in this volcanic archi- 



614 TREATY OF PEACE. 

pelago. That Avliich occurs on the Buhisan in Albay, the Taal in 
Bataugas, and the Apo in jMindauao beinj;' of fairly pure quality. 
Ideally extensive beds, worthy of exploitatioirj were found years ago m 
Leite, in the interior, not far from Dulag-, and were worked on a 
small scale by tlie natives. In 1818 3,410 piculs, at $2.50, were 
expoited, and Dr. Jagor states that the price paid in Manila for this 
sulphur in the fifties was from $1.50 to $4.50. For the last twenty 
years, however, the sulphur industry has been wholly dead. 

Alabaster is found in Caniarines Sur, and there is a beautiful marble 
at l>ohol and Guiniaras, near lloilo. Granite of excellent quality is 
quarried at the other side of the Bay of Mariveles, opposite to Manila. 

Hock oil was found some years ago in C«ibn and I'aragua and prom- 
ises to be of importance. I have neither seen samples nor come across 
any ollicial rei)ort in the matter, but 1 have received direct information 
from various trustworthy Indians and Mestizos. 

o. With the excei)tion of tlie cigar manufacturing, which until Janu- 
ary 1, 188o, was monopolized by the Government, the islands are not 
of industrial ini])oitance. Manila possesses two large sugar refineries, 
some distilleries, and rope works. Lately rice mills and a tiour mill 
have been set up in Luzon for the ]»nrposes of home consumption. The 
hats made by the natives of strips of reeds in Baliuag also play an 
important part in the export trade, being shipped largely to America 
and Paris. The cigar cases (petacas), likewise manufactured in Baliuag, 
are of less importance. Though of no great significance for the trade, 
the ilang-ilang essence should be mentioned, the Philippines l)eing the 
only i)lace where it is produced. The essence is made from the green 
blossom of the ilang ilang tree, one of the Anonacea^ (" Anona adora- 
tisima," according to Blanco; '• Cananga adorata,"' according to Hook), 
and finds its way principally to Paris. It forms the basis of all finer 
quality perfumes, and has, indeed, become an almost indispensable 
article in the perfumery branch. The distillation of the essence, and 
the business in general connected with it, is carried on exclusively by 
Germans. • 

Coa(;h building is of great imi)ortancein INLinila. The home demand 
is enormous, as every inhabitant of any standing lias Ins carriage, and 
the wealthier mestizos excel in the luxury of their vehicles. 

That soap and other such articles of ]iopuhir use are manufactured 
is scarcely necessary to state. There are also three lithographic estab- 
lishments, owned by Germans. 

Besides the Baliuag industry, above referred to, the natives manu- 
facture excellent homesitun fabrics of cotton, heni]), silk, and ]>ina (the 
fibers of the i)ineapple leaf); i)ina-cloth embroidery is also a domestic 
industry. These articles do not lank at all in the export trade of to-day, 
but they may certainly be expected to do so before long; the more so 
if the industry continues tw advance as it has done during the past 
year or so, not only as regards the fabrics themselves, but also the 
designs and colors. Some coarse hemp textiles have already been 
exported within the last few years; the finer hemi) and hem]) and silk 
fabrics, though much jnized l)y ladies for dressmaking, have not yet 
entered into tlie tiade, not liaving so far fi)und favor witli the Parisian 
costumers. A most interesting exposition of the i)r()du('e<)f the Philip- 
pines wasatforded by the exhi))ition (Exj)Osisi()n Pegional de b'ilipinas), 
which was held at (Government cost at Manila in 1895. 

It is certain that the Phili])i)ines, whose i)osition is already assured 
by the mineral wealth of the country, will also ])lay a part in the in- 
dustry in the future ecpial to, if not surpassing, that of Japan. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 615 

4. There seems to me to be no doubt that even before the arrival of 
the Spaniards these islands had relations with the Malay Archipelago 
and China, and to a certain extent carried on barter, particularly with 
the latter country. Regular trade, however, first began to develoi* in 
1572, when Legaspi established himself in Manila. The inhabitants of 
Cagayan rehited to Don Juau de Salcedo in 1572 that their cotton 
fabrics were fetched every year by Chinese and Japanese vessels. 

Manila is without doubt the most advantageously situated port and 
trading place in the East, and forms the center of the trade between 
China, Japan, the Dutch archipelago, and Anstralia. The position of 
the Philippines is likewise extremely favorable for the west coast of 
America, and Manila should be the natural mart of eastern Asia. 
That it does not already occupy this position is owing to the bad sys- 
tem of administration on the part of the government. Had it been 
otherwise, I am exceedingly doubtful whether Hongkong could ever 
have reached its present state of importance in the face of Manila. 

During the northeast monsoon most ships going through the Straits 
to China run right across to Luzon, to get protection against the 
strong contrary winds. It would therefore be '.piite in their course 
to touch at Manila, but they avoid the port for the reasons stated 
above — the chicanery of the customs officials. For the same reason 
the regular steamers between Hongkong and Australia steam right 
past the Bay of Manila without running in. Passengers from Manila 
to Australia have, therefore, first to cross to Hongkong and tlsen take 
passage from there, returning again directly past Manila and Zam- 
boanga (so close to the latter that the people may almowst be recog- 
nized on the shore) to the first touching place — Thursday Island, or 
Port Darwin. 

After 1572 trade commenced also between Manila and New Spain, 
which for individual Spaniards in Manila proved very profitable. Be- 
tween 1590 and 1595, however, the citizens of Manila petitioned several 
times to the King for liberty of trade, but always in vain; the restric- 
tion on commerce remained as before. In IGIO the Seville merchants 
begged that the trade between INIanila and New Spain might be closed, 
as they wanted to do business direct, by the Cape, with Manila, without 
the intervention of the American colonies. This was, nevertheless, 
impossible, on account, principally, no doubt, of the fact that the Aca- 
pulco silk trade ga^■e occupation to over 14, ()<!() ])ersons in Mexico. 

Galleons were sent every year from Manila to Xavidad, and i'rom lu02 
to Acapulco, containing merchandise to the value of 8250,000. maxi- 
mum admitted by the Government, and bringing back double the price. 
Later this maximum rose to 8300,000, and in 1734 to 850n,000. Finally 
the amount reached 8000,000, and the home freight double the value. 
From Manila tlie galleons — called "iiao'' — took spices, cotton fabrics, 
silks, etc., and gold articles and other products of China, India, and the 
Philippines; 50,000 silk stockings are also especially mentioned. (Refer: 
Lord Anson's Journey Round the World, 1749, and the descrii)tion of 
Spanish commerce by J. C. S., Dresden, 1763.) The home freight con- 
sisted chiefly of silver dollars; and there were also passengers, persons 
going to seek their fortune in the Philip[)ines, and officials and soldiers 
sent out by the Madrid Government as substitutes. 

The merchandise yielded twice its value in Manila, and as is recorded 
sometimes even four times, which in certain cases may no doubt have 
been the case. The profit, however, did not all go into one pocket, but 
was divided among a number. The Go\'ernment issued warrants 
(boletins) remitting the shipping of cargo to the monasteries, pensioned 



61C TREATY OF PEACE. 

officials, and otlier privileged persons, who then sold them to merchants; 
in this manner tlie profits were distribnted. The resnlt was tliat mer- 
chandise of very hiyh value was sliipped, and "the nao often so packed 
with cargo that the guns had to bo stowed away. On tlie home Journey 
tliere was often over 8'>,00l>,rr0() value on board. As tliese shi[)s were 
maintained at the expense of tlie Grovernnient, it is natural that a por- 
tion of the shipping" fees was reserved for the royal exchequer. 

(Generally the well laden nao sailed from Oavite in July, steering to 
northward to ?A)'^, where, taking advantage of the western winds, they 
made for the shores of California, then coasting southward to Aca- 
pulco. The voyage was always most difticult and dangerous, and often 
very long, lasting sometimes six months or more. In later years the 
shi})S sailed more commonly through the Straits of San Bernardino, 
south of Luzon, thongh this did not shorten the voyage. Arrived at 
the Californian coast, they ran into San Lucas, where tliey took in pro- 
visions, and received information as to the movements of pirates in the 
waters, naturally a matter of great concern, considering the value of 
the cargo. The home voyage to Manila was easier and quicker, seldom 
occupying more than two months. The ship sailed southward from 
Acapulco till about 10"^ X., taking the passage to the JMarian Islands, 
and then farther, through the Straits of San Bernardino, to Manila. As 
the time arrived when the nao could be expected, nightly fires were 
lighted on two high rocks, so that the vessel might find her way through 
the islands. (In old works the islands Cuam and Eota are mentioned.) 

The imos were vessels of 1,200 tons or even more, and were manned 
as war ships and armed with -50 or 60 cannon. Notwithstanding this, 
they sometimes, together with their costly cargo, fell a booty to priva- 
teers, pirates, and war ships of inimical powers. In June, 174o, Lord 
Anson, on board the Centurion, captured the JSfyestra Soiora dc Caba- 
donga, a much larger galleon, captained by Don Jeronimo de jMoutero, 
off Cape Espiritu Santo, on the Samar coast. 

The captain of the galleon, who bore the title "general," received 
on the Acapulco trade a percentage of about $40,000 for each voyage; 
first ofiicei's, likewise, were paid commissions. 

Toward the end of the last century the profits began to decline, 
decreasing more and more; sometimes the ships even found the market 
in Acapnlco perfectly flat, without any demand. This was because of 
American traders, and of English merchants supplying all the require- 
ments direct from Europe; smuggling also played its })art. Thus it 
happened that the ships were often unable to return for long periods 
of time. The last nao which left Manila, in ISll, did not return from 
Acapulco until 1<S1.">. 

In 1785 the Real Compafiia de Filipinas was started, having its seat 
in Cadiz, and with a ca})ital of •**' 7,000,000. This com])any more or less 
monopolized the whole trade, until on August 15, 1780, a decree was 
issued, ])ermitting European vessels to import Asian ])r()duce, ami to 
import only such Si)anish, Philipjnne. and American produce as the 
comi)ania had imported. A second decree, dated 0(;tober lo, 1803, 
deprived the con)]»ania of still further ])rivileges, and declared the 
harbor of Manila open to all nations. Certain rights the compania 
still retained, however. In 1811. absidute liberty of tiade was allowed 
to the whole world. As the resnlt of the introduction of the new Co- 
digo de Comercie, July \~*. \S:V.i. the privileges of the compania ceased 
altogether in 18;>L A year later the exportation of numnfactured 
tobacco and cigars was also ixuinitted. 

I'ntil the close of the preceding century, 1701*. foreigners were not 
allowed to settle in ^lanila (although Laperouse, 1787, mentions the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



617 



French merchant Sebir in this town). As sood as the permission was 
granted the tirst foreign honses were established, the nnmber continn- 
ally increasing so that to-day the external trade is almost exclnsively in 
foreign hands; 1851 saw the establishment of the Banco Espanol Fil- 
ipino; but by reason of bureaucratic formalities and strict limits 
imposed, transactions were much impeded. It is only in recent years that 
matters have bettered, rendering fair and eas banking business pos- 
sible. Up to 18G0 and still later, banking transactions were therefore 
done almost wholly through two large American houses. Today we 
find branches of the Chartered F>ank of India, Australia, and China, 
and of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, doing the 
princi])al business. 

The Cousulado, established in ITTli and removed on January 1, 1834, 
and the Junta de Comercio, founded on January 1, 1835, have done 
practically nothing at all for trade and shiiiping. The export and 
import trade, as already remarked, lies almost exclusively in the hands 
of foreigners, principally English, Germans, and Swiss. The retail and 
intermediate trade is done by the Chinese. The Spanish, in addition 
to the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas — which, however, 
pays but a small dividend — and some inland traders, own a number 
of millinery shops for town costumes and cosmetic stores. 

How greatly the trade done by foreigners surpasses that of the S])an- 
ish is seen from the tables below giving the external shipping trade and 
tolls. Since 180() there has been no American house in Manila. 

The trafhc between Manila and the provinces is carried on mostly 
by means of thirty-five steamers and a large number of smaller sailing 
vessels. The sole railway runs from Manila to Dagupan, the port of 
Pangasinan, a rice growing province, on the west coast of Luzon, on 
the (lulf of Lingayen. The only large line of ships touching at Manila 
is the Compania Transatlantica, from Barcelona to Manila, which, 
however, also has Liverpool as a shipping port, as the steamers would 
otherwise scarcely be able always to secure a full cargo. The chief 
profits of the line are no doubt earned from the enormous transport to 
and fro of oflicials and soldiers; in nearly every ship all berths are 
occupied. There is a brisk trade done with Hongkong, through four 
or five steamers under the British fiag; for the largest part of the 
goods goes over Hongkong, being transshipped. A steamer runs to 
Singapore, meeting the French mail steamer, by which the principal 
European postal trattlc is carried on. 

Despite the fact that the foreign flag was everywhere at a disadvan- 
tage, and the Spanish, on the contrary, privileged, the former has always 
been the really dominating. Though formerly foreign vessels were 
obliged to run in in ballast, nevertheless they took outward freight. 
The privilege shown to the Spanish flag died not ease till 1872, and con- 
sisted at that time in a reduction of 25 per cent on the custom-house 
charges. This was gradually diminished, every year by 5 per cent and 
in the last year by 10 per cent at once. 

The following table shows the state of the shipping trade in Manila 
in earlier years : 





1827. 


1828. 


1829. 




Incom- 
ing. 


Out- 
going. 


Incom- 
ing. 


Out- 
going. 


Incom- 
ing. 


Out. 
going. 




96 
34 


98 
29 


99 1 89 146 
31 1 38 41 


145 




43 








Total 


130 127 


130 , 127 i 187 


188 

















G18 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



1 



In 18GS, IIL* foreign vessels with 74,054 tons, mostly in ballast, 
entered to take up cargo, and 93 Spanish vessels entered and sailed 
with cargo. To show a com])arison of the trade during the i)ast two 
years, 1 have compiled the following table: 







Incoining. 


Outgoing. 




Ships. 


Tonnage. 


Ships. 


Tonnage. 




18fl6. 


181 

47 


264, 868 
92, 541 


175 
49 


251, 439 




95 80' 








Total 


228 


357, 409 


224 


347, 241 




1897. 






204 

48 


301. 199 
84, 326 


197 
50 


292 "^19 




88, 649 








Total 


252 


385 525 


247 


380 808 











At the commencement of the century the imports were far grreatcr 
than the exports; then the two became about equal, and finally the 
exported goods ranked first. In recent years the exports have aLvays 
exceeded the inii)ort by some 30 per cent — a very promising sign of the 
])roductive capacity of the country. 

The imports to Aragon, in 1818, according to the duties paid, 
amounted to — 

Under foreign flag .$1,680,200.25 

I 'uder Spanish flag 616, 071. 85 



Total 2,296,272.10 

as against an exportation of — 



Ai'ticles. 



Hemp pieuls. 

f 'ordage qwiniaLs . 

Hemi) rope do . . 

Cotiee cavans . 

Sugar pieuls - 

liidigii quintals. 

Liquid indigo do. . . 

Sa])au \\ cod picuLs . 

Shells do.. . 

Tortoise shell do. . . 

Sid]iliur do. - - 

Klj.niy do... 

Hulled lice : do. .. 

Shark tin.s do. .. 

lu'clie do iner do. . . 

I'iids' lu'st.s do... 

M'liite hii'iis' ucsts do 

Dried craljs do. .. 

Pure cotton do.. . 

Glu.' do... 

Kattan do... 

Wax do 

G(dd taels. 



Quantity. 



Tinil)er trunks.. 

Cowrie .shells cavans.. 

Salt do.... 

Cocoa gantas . . 

Uuni gallor.s.. 

Plowshares pairs.. 

( arpenlers' axes 

I'.ulialo liides 

Co\viiid(^s (tanned) 

Stag hides 

Mats 



I'.uri mats 

Ilat.s 

Various 

Hiding horses . 

Total.... 



261 

555 

5 

84.5 

14, 405 

.S, 200 

1, 10.') 

18, 825 

236 

31 

3, 410 

2,610 

1, 5;i2 

42 

2. 260 
5.08 

94.24 
1. 3:i2 
1,176 

310 
1.192 
1,280 

230 
1.391 
1, 066 
1,000 

105 
1,348 

580 

420 

3, 8.')3 
3,153 

084 

1, 280 

73 1 

748 



Average 
price. 



$4.00 
5.00 



6.00 

7.00 

60. 00 

3.50 

1. 25 

8.00 

350. 00 

2.50 

1.75 

1.50 

16.00 

24.00 

130.00 

3200. 00 

6.00 

22. 00 

2.50 

4. 50 

28.00 

13.00 

1.25 

2.00 

.25 

1..50 

.50 

..50 

. 50 

.374 

. 75 

.13 

.30 

1.00 

.30 



Total. 



12 



50,00 



$1, 044. 00 

2, 775. 00 
625. 00 
507. 00 

100, 835. 00 
192, QUO. 00 

3, 867. 50 
23, -Ml. 25 

1, 888. 00 
10, 850. 00 

8, 525. 00 

4, 507. 50 

2, 298. 00 
672. 00 

54, 384. 00 

738. 40 

301,568.00 

7, 002. 00 

25, 872. 00 

775.00 

5, 364. 00 
35, 840. 00 

2, 990. 00 



738. 
2, 132. 00 
250. 00 
157. .lO 
647. 00 
2'.i0. 00 
210.00 

1, 257. 37 

2, 364. 75 

88.92 
3St.00 
731.00 
221.40 
6. 433. 95 
600. 00 

6, 945. 29 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



619 



There was, therefore, nearly three times as much imported as ex- 
ported. The' list of articles ex])orted, with their prices, is interesting". 
Of the leading articles of to-day sugar was the only one of importance, 
but even this came after white birds' nests and indigo. Comparing- 
with this the table of Dr. F. J. F. Meyen, on board the Prussian mer- 
chant ship rrincess Louise, 11 years later, we find a great increase in 
exports — in the case of sugar tenfold the amount, though with hemp, 
again, not at all. 

He gives the exports as follows: 



Articles. 



Sugar picul.. 

Indigo do... 

Sapan wood do. . . 

Hulled rice (1U,793 cavan) do. . . 

Unhulled rioe (30,830 cavan) paddy do... 

Eum ' gallons . . 

Cigars kilograms. . 



1829. 



120,274 
11,809 
11, 675 

104, 357 
28, 027 
19, 551 
52, 843 



1830. 



138, 387 

13,863 

11, 594 

a 179. 532 



a 197.486 cavan. 



b 4,257 arobas. 



The remaining less important articles are omitted. 

Since foreigners have no longer been so harassed by Spanish privi- 
leges, trade has steadily increased, even if not to the extent that it 
should. The trade of the Philippines should be twenty times what it is 
to-day. At the end of the twenties, imports and exports were practi- 
cally equal: 



Year. 


Imports. 


Exports. 


1827 " 


$1, 048, 680 
1,550,933 


$1, 093, 690 


1828 


1, 475, 034 






Up to the seventies both had been increased more than tenfold, and 
the exports considerably exceeded the imports; in round numbers: 


Year. 


Imports. 


Exports. 


1870 . . .-SU. 000. 000 


.$16, 000, 000 


1875 


13,0110,000 


19.000.000 


1880 


17, 000, 000 22. 000. 000 









The only exce])tion is the year 1872, when the exports stood at 
$lG,oUO,0()i) and the imports at 822,0U0,(J00. In 1892 the exports were 
$33,0()0,0()(). the imports $2o,0()0,000. 

It is a ditticult matter to give statistics of the imported goods, since 
the innumerable articles are not entered separately at the custom-house, 
but, for purposes of duty, are placed in certain classes. Some of the 
leading goods may be mentioned, however. From England, all Man- 
chester articles play an important part, together with a number of less 
significant wares, such as hardware and leather goods. From Germany 
come better class textiles, tricots, hardware, paper, leather, steel and 
iron, machinery, etc. From Switzerland, St. Gallen laces, muslins, and 
silks. From France, Lyon, silks, machinery for cigarette making, and 
paper. 

From Austria, principally only Vienna furniture and Bohemian glass- 
ware. From Belgium is sent glass and glassware, iron, paper, cement, 



620 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



etc. From Russia and America, kerosene, and from the latter country 
also tlonr and tinned meats — as Spain exported formerly almost only 
preserved foods in tins — and wines. Within the last few years she has 
connnenced to import into the Philippines other articles, to compete 
with the wares of other countries. The Spanish "oods are in every 
way inferior to those of foreii;n manufacture, hut on account of their 
bein^- free from import duty the prices are considerably lower. 

In the following- table the exports during- the last five years are given. 
The minor articles have been omitted: 

X. — Principal exports from the Pliilippines from January 1 to December 31, 1S96. 



To— 



Sugar. 



Hemp. 



Grent Biit.un 793. 165 

United Slate.s 16,000 

Europe 774, 852 

A ustralia 

China, .Japan, India 1, 379, 377 

Cauacla 97,920 

Divare irkwater 526, 874 

Total ill 1896 3,588,188 

Tola! in 1895 , 3,694,769 

Total in 1894 1 3,109,108 

Total in 1893 1 4,184,296 

Total in 1892 3,954,060 



Piculs. 

815, 044 

615,554 

5,660 

33, 892 

61.660 



Coffee. Tobacco. 



Piculs. 
199 



74, 370 
1,531,810 
1,664, .599 
1,591,962 
1, 282, 942 
1, 581, 100 



(^Uintah: 

47, 816 

132 

154, 930 

62 

16, 076 



Cigars. 



Tkouiand. 

35, 010 

180 

32,610 

14, 850 

112, 540 

610 



Sapan 
wood. 



Copra. 



Piculs. Piculs. 
a, 340 32. 2U0 



1,434 
3,287 
9, 008 
5,102 
21, 801 



219,016 
225, 677 
191,500 
230, 572 
254, 063 



195, 800 
198. 270 
140. 075 
133, 046 
133, 404 



53, 663 
38.919 
7.'), 115 
76, 588 
52, 452 



548.812 
3.895 



585, 907 
594, 409 
510, 633 
188, 404 
292, 536 



Articles. 


1896. 


1895. 


1894. 


Sugar 


$14, 000, 000 

11,160,000 

07. 500 

2. 630. 000 

1. 990. (100 

70. 000 

2, 630, 000 
224, 000 


$12, 239. 000 
13.317,000 

1,5S. 000 
2, 705. 7.50 
1,780.200 

58. 400 
2. 898. 000 

60 800 


$12, 590. 000 

12,750,000 

412, 000 

2 310 000 


Honip 


Corteo 


Tobacco 


Cigars 




Sapan wood 


102 000 


Copra 


5yQ QQO 


Various 


115 000 




. 




Total 


32, 771, 500 


33, 225, 150 









The exports from Manila alone, the most important place to be con- 
sidered, were, during the past six years, as follows: 

15. — Exports from M<iuila iv the years 1892-1897. 



1 
Year. 


Hemp. 


Cordage. 1 


1 
Coffee. 1 


Tobacco. 


Cigars. 


1892 


Piculs. 
1, 408. 444 
1, 1.-.4, 76(i 
].3'_'-_'. 0011 
1, 44(), 990 
1,3:13,118 
1,689,754 


Pictds. ' 
1,354 

•J, 200 
l.XOO 
3,774 
3,619 
3,873 
1 


Piculs. 1 
21,801 1 
.5,006 
9, 000 1 
3,080 
1,434 
4,947 ; 
I 


Quintals. 
254, 063' 
230. 5721 
194, 5001 
222, 5101 
212, 7061 
319,8831 


Thousand. 
133. 395 
]30,:i20 
138, 000 
198, 270 
195, 800 
183, 735 


1893 

1894 


1895 


1896 


1897 





Year. 



Sugar. 



Dry. 



Picxds. 

1892 921, 354 

1893 1, 359, 737 

1894 1, 200, 000 

1895 1, 440. 000 

1896 1,4,56, .549 

1897 839,994 



Wet. 



Piculs. 
250, 369 
521,980 
295, 000 
285, 1,59 
272, 337 
82, 062 



Indigo. 



Quintals. 

6,534 

971 

* 1,599 

26 

5,419 

4,468 



Sapan- 
wood. 



Piculs. 
29,314 
53, 767 
40, 000 
27,210 
14. 234 
16. 631 



Copra. 



Piculs. 
186, 519 
168.122 
475. 000 
226. 626 
561,268 
749, 207 



Shells. 



Piculs. 

223 

254 

350 

1,367 

1. lOl 

1, 180 



1 For tlie most part to Spain lor the miino]H>l,\ 



TREATY OF PEAC^E. G21 

111 the June (1898) number of the National Geograi)liic Magazine, 
called "the Philii)pine number," are some articles about tlie islands. 
Althougli for the most part interesting, especially for anthropologists, 
they are, in economic matters, inaccurate. None of the statistics are to 
be dei)ended upon, for even at the commencement, in mentioning the 
trade of 189'>, there is an error of about twenty eight million dollars. 
In 189(! the export alone was 5:^32,771,500. The figures given by me are 
correct, as, indeed, statistics can only be correct. The trade is indeed 
small, compared to what it should be; but amounts, such as are given 
to the author of the magazine article, were reached twenty-live years 
ago. 

To give the statistics of the imports even only approximately cor- 
rect is impossible, wherefore 1 have refrained altogether from giving 
detailed statistics in this regard. The author of the article referred 
to tabulates the American goods, among which wheaten flour in par- 
ticular must strike the eye of anyone really knowing the conditions of 
the trade. lie gives the value of the imi)orts as lowest in 1893, with 
$7,800, and the highest in 1890, with §l8,-}90, which iigures are much 
too low. The value of the Hour imi)orted from America must be at 
least five or ten times as much. 

The terms in the produce market in Manila are always cash down. 
In business with the provinces the Manila house has frequently to make 
advances, which certainly means risk; but if one is cautious with whom 
cue deals the business is safe enough here also. It is always the main 
thing in the case of transmarine places just springing up to know the 
state of affairs precisely, and to be in a ])Osition to form a sound Judg- 
ment at a moment's notice. The business between the importers and 
the Chinese retail dealers is done either by means of accei)tance (pagare) 
at six months, or, as is more general of late, cash within four to six 
weeks, with 5 per cent discount. Unfortunately the four to six weeks 
are very often exceeded. Insolvencies frequently occur among the 
Chinese. The creditors usually prefer to come to an arrangement, for if 
once the matter comes before a iS])anish court it is the invariable rule 
that the creditors get nothing at all. 

Fines (multas), particularly in differences with the custom-house are 
imposed in a most annoying manner, on every i)ossible occasion, since 
the ofticials receive a share of the tine imi)Osed. A shij) which, for 
instance, does not deliver precisely the number of bales in the manifest 
is fined for each bale more or less $100. In every bill of entry the 
weight must be stated beforehand, and if it is not correct a fine is 
inflicted. In this way there are a hundred kinds of chicanery practiced, 
all costing much unnecessary expenditure of money, the greater part of 
which goes into the jiockets of the ofticials. 

The tobacco monopoly, with all its heartless severity and imposts, 
was introduced in 1781 under the governor, Don Josr Vasco y Yargas, 
as the Government again found itself in a critical financial condition. 
The population guessed at what was coming and opposed the introduc- 
tion, so that the law was onl}' carried by force of arms. The law pre- 
scribed that every native might plant tobacco, but might only sell it to 
the Government. In the tobacco districts every native had to grow a 
certain number of plants and devote all his attention to them, without 
ever leaving them. The collecting of caterpillars was done by women 
and children, just as to-day. 

This would, however, all have been well enough had the peo])le been 
able to enjoy the fruits of their labor, but the worst has still to be said. 
The tobacco was sorted — " aforado, " as it is technically called — and that 



622 TREATY OF PEACE. 

unfit for use burned so as to ])revent fraud. The principal matter in 
sorting- ^A•as tlie length — 18 inches and over was priinera class; 18 to 
14 inches, secuuda class; 14: to 10 inches, tercera class, and 10 to 7 
inches, ((uarta class. Smaller but good leaves were sometimes classed 
as .") and (!. 

Vov valuing the tobacco the ofticials used a scale according to which 
the "planter received some 20 to oO per cent of the real value. But he 
was not paid in cash. He received a certilicate, a kind of treasury bond. 
Had the people had security for the payment of these bonds at an early 
<late, the latter wonldsoon, no doubt, have come into currency as paper 
money. But, far from this being so, no one would have them, knowing 
that live or six yeais might pass before they were redeemed. The 
tobacco planters lived under nu>re miserable conditions than the worst- 
kept slaves, and were glad if some noble philanthropist, with an eye to 
usury, would give them half the valne of tlieir certificates. And such 
disgraceful usury it hardly was, for who could say whether the pur- 
chaser was not risking his 50 per cent? Frequently the bonds were 
practically given away. In the cigar manufactories in Manila 30,000 
work people were emploj^ed, and were always paid in cash, so that their 
lot was more envious than that ol the planters. That under this sys- 
tem, in spite of the enormous army of officials, a profit of four or live 
million dollars was annually yielded can be easily understood. 

The savior of the unfortnnate tobacco planter was one of those 
Spaniards in whom there was still the blood of the hidalgo the 
intendent general, Don Jose Jimeno Agius. In his report in 1871 he 
relentlessly exposed the condition of afifairs under the monoi)oly and 
strongly advised its abolition, unless the Government wished to de- 
stroy tobacco planting altogether and bring about the absolute ruin of 
the ijlanters, living, as it was, in the greatest misery. Furthermore, 
he showed that the necessary new buildings and plant in the factories 
would pretty well absorb all the profit of the ensuing year. This very 
competent and energetic man could not, however, carry his wishes into 
effect at the time. Not until ten years later, in conjunction with the 
colonial minister, Fernando de Leon y Castillo, was he able to bring 
about the abolition, and on July 1, 1882, the planters were freed from 
their chains. 

On January 1, 188;>, the free manufacture of tobacco was also allowed. 
Already at the commencement of Jaly, 1881, the fact was known, and 
the tobacco report of my house, dated July 9, 1881, commenced: ''We 
head our report with the joyful and most important news of the decreed 
abolishment of the tobacco and cigar monopoly." We entertained the 
fear, however, that the rate of duty would be raised, and such was 
actually the case. Tobacco and cigars paid an export duty, and the 
import duty was raised 50 per cent. At first, however, the treasury 
bonds had to be redeemed, and this was done by means of auctions, 
whereby 8150,000 was redeemed monthly to those who offered their 
bonds at the lowest rate. The Government had even the impudence to 
declare that denuinds of over 80 per cent would not be regarded. The 
first bondliolders were ready to take 45 and 55 per cent; but it was 
soon found that there was a number of holders who were prepared to 
take vigorous steps, and refused less than 80 ])er cent. This caused the 
Government to hasten the redemption, and at the close had cleared a 
balance of two and a half million dollars. 

Since January 1, 1883, various cigar factories have been established, 
of which, however, only a few turn out a really first class article. The 
cigars manufactured by many Chinese factories and by the natives as a 
home industry are of very inferior quality. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



623 



A new tariff of duties was introduced in 1891 whicli professed to be 
based upon a duty of 20 per ceut. In reality, however, nearly all 
articles yielded more, some even over 100 per cent of the value. Then 
there were still various additional fees to pay on imports, and the 
export fees were also several times changed. Today the practice is as 
follows : To the importation tariff, which iu the case of some articles is 
increased by '20 per cent, there are harbor dues amouuting to 10 per 
cent added and 8 per cent of the value of the goods, which is fixed by 
law. Spanish goods pay only the harbor dues and the 8 per cent of 
the value, and thus get upon the market, to the disadvantage of other 
better and originally cheaper produce. 

Of the produce of tbe country, the jjrincipal pay export duties as 
follows : 



Hemp 

Indigo 

Liquid indigo . 
Rice 



Per 100 
kilograms gross. 

, $0.75 



50 

05 

2.00 

Sngar 10 

Cocoannts and copra 10 

Tobacco from Cagayan Isabella 3. 00 

Tobacco froai Visayas Mini laiiao 2. 00 

Tobacco from other provinces 1. 50 

Manufactured tobacco 3. 00 

And all produce pays 81.50 per 1,000 kilograms harbor dues. 

In 1880 the harbor dues, on both exports and imiiorts, were raised, at 
first by 20 per cent of the import duty and 1 per cent of the export 
value, for the purpose of building a new harbor, and this, with some 
few alterations, remains so to this day. The harbor is a long way from 
being ready, nor will it ever be finished if the present system continues, 
even though of late the work has been a little expedited. At a normal 
rate of work, what has been done could have been finished in one or two 
years. With the aniount received through the increased dues ten har- 
bors could have been built, but probably the money no longer exists. 

The duty returns were, in — 

1828 $227, 000 

1829 229,115 

1830 228,061 

In the last few years they have stood much higher, this being prin- 
cipally caused by foreign houses. For the past three years the returns 
were : 





1895. 


1896. 


1897 




$2, 818. 900 
361, 400 


$3,106,100 
425, 900 


$3, 322, 500 
903 000 








Total 


3, 180, 300 


3, 532, 000 


4 225 500 







Thus the foreign houses paid, in 1895, 87 ])ev cent; 1896, 88 per cent, 
and 1897, 73 per cent of the indirect duties. 

During the recent years the Spanish figures have risen by reason of 
the increased export duties on tobacco, which the Compania General 
shipped for the Spanish monopoly. 

I now come to the question. What must be done in order to bring the 
production and trade of the colony into the condition in which they 
should be? The answer follows from what has alreadv been stated. 



624 TREATY OF PEACE. 



11 



Before all, the system of administratiou must be cliauged, and com- 
iiieife and slii])i)inj;', industry and mininj;-, as also plantiug, yiv^eu free 
l)lay, (juite independent of the nationality oT the persons eoucei-ned. 
On the contrary, if the natives are not numerous enough to supply suf- 
ficient workmen, Chinese coolies should be brought over under goveru- 
]neut supervision in the same way as is done in Sumatra The export 
duties sliould be wholly abolished and the imi)ort duties put on a suit- 
able basis. The harbor works at Manila should be completed, and safe 
landing places also for larger steameis erected. And if not a free port, 
at all events a bonded Avarehouse is necessary. 

I mention firstly and i)rincipall3' Manila, whicli will always remain 
the center and principal emi)orium. A beginning must be made by 
opening up Luzon, by laying dowji good roads and constructing bridges, 
of which to-day there is an absolute <learth. The waterways should 
be controlled, particularly those which {;an be easily made navigable. 
Tlie construction of railways should be continued, in order to connect 
the interior provinces with JNIanila. The most important line would be 
one from Manila through Nueva Kcija, the Caraballo ^Mountains, the 
l)rovince Nueva \'iscaya, into the valley of the llio Grande de (Jagayan. 
Then a branch of the line, already existing, from Manila to Dagupan, 
to the natural naval i)ort Suhig, winch was recently decided upon, but 
has not yet been constructed. Communication with the Pacific coast, 
and miraerous branch lines, will also gradually be required. Only a 
few i)oints can be touched upon here. 

A railway from Manila over Mariquina to Antipolo would be of 
great importance for Manila itself. It would jiass through an extremely 
well-populated country which already supplies Manila with agricul- 
tural produce and articles for the native population, and finally, after 
about 'JO miles, ascending with a i)retty steej) gradient, reach Antipolo. 

Antipolo, a famous place of i)ilgriuiage in tlie Philippines, lies on 
the west spurs of the Cordillera, in the province of ]\lorong. it enjoys 
a cool, agreeable climate, and therefore would, without doubt, form a 
very suitable health resort for the inhabitants of Manila, and, indeed, 
perhaps a climatic health resort in general. For Europeans, working 
under great strain, such a place would be invaluable, particularly dur- 
ing tlie hot season, when the night temjierature falls so little that 
refreshing sleep is often quite out of the question. Xoris it absolutely 
necessarj' that Antipolo itself be chosen; a still more suitable spot 
might perhaps be found in the neighborhood; the chief point is to set 
about the matter in a practical way and properlj- carry through the 
scheme. 

Antipolo is frequently visited by foreigners. The route lies over what 
for the Philijipines are tolerably good, but compared with those of 
J^ngiish colonies miserably bad, roads to the Pasig. The river is then 
crossed, and a farther journey over bad, and sometimes worst possible 
roads brings us through Cainta, Taitai, in one afternoon to Antipolo. 
The effect of the Journey is felt over the whole body for hours afterwards. 
I have had in April, whilst the heat in Manila was unbearable, to put 
on a summer overcoat in the evening in Antipolo. 

For such unilertakings as 1 have mentioned, and which can only be 
carried out by conii)anies, it is absolutely necessary that concessions 
be granted with i)roniptness and dis])atch. Hitherto the custom has 
been to dally for years, until finally all interest in the matter was lost. 
Once a concession was actually granted for a railway to Antipolo, but 
the line was never constructed. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 625 

It would take us too far to deal with everything which would serve 
to rapidly bring the country into a prosperous condition, aud lead to 
lucrative undertakings. What should be done is, in general, to be 
gathered from a consideration of the present unsatisfactory state of 
affairs. If once the first step were taken, others would follow, and not 
only in Luzon, but over the whole archipelago. 

I must not neglect to give some particulars of Manila itself. 

At the place where the outlet of the inland sea of Bay (Laguna de 
Bay, called after the place Bay on the south shore of the sea, not after 
^'Bahia Bay," as Dr. Meyen* wrongly infers), the river Pasig, flows into 
the bay of Manila, lies on the left-hand bank the real fortified town 
Manila, therefore also called Intramuros. It is inhabited by monks, 
officials, soldiers, and some shopkeepers; foreigners do not reside there 
nor have they proi)erty in it. liunning southward along the shores of 
the bay is the promenade Luneta, where concerts are held every evening 
and where there are two suburbs, Ermita and Malate, much frequented 
by foreigners and containing many fine villas. On the right bank of 
the Pasig is the wholly unfortified Binondo, where are the chief busi- 
ness and warehouses, factories, custom-house, and harbor office. 
Further north, ou the shore of the bay, is Tondo, which is really a 
native suburb containing native huts; to the east are Meisig andTrozo. 
These are the places lying on the beach. In the direction up the river 
on the right-hand shore are the suburbs Sta Cruz, Quiapo, San Miguel, 
Tanduai, and Sampaloc. 

The population to day is given at 300,000; but this is in any case not 
to be regarded as exact, as a proper census has never been taken. 
With the suburbs the number of inhabitants is probably higher. 

In the right sense of the word Manila can not be said to be unhealthy. 
On the contrary, it is one of the more healthy of tropical towns, though 
malignant and intermittent fevers do occur, even if more seldom than 
elsewhere. Cholera, which formerly was a fretiuent guest in the form 
of epidemics, has been completely driven away by the excellent water 
supply. The water conies from Santolau, about 9 miles distant, and 
is collected in the reservoir at San Juan del Monte and thence con- 
ducted to Manila. There has been no outbreak of cholera siilce 1889. 
]^For the water supply the general governors, Carriedo and Moriones, 
are to be thanked. Of these, the first, in his will, left a sum of money 
to the town for the purpose, and the second, some years later, had the 
work carried out, when no one else thought of troubling about it. 

Houses have to be erected according to certain rules laid dpwn, in order 
to guard against the numerous earthquakes. They are for the most 
part two-storied dwellings, below of stone and above of wood, with 
galvanized iron roofing. If the roof is tiled the ceiling must be of 
planks strong enough to resist the fall of the roof. Since January 23, 
1895, the town has been lighted by electricity, and in a number of 
houses the electric light has also been introduced. The installation 
has been carried out partly by an American company and continued 
by a German company. So far there is no electric tramway, nor is 
electricity as yet used industrially. This is principally due, no doubt, 
to the company " Electricista," which has not been able to make its 
electric power station yield a good dividend as yet. 

There are horse tram lines in the city aud a steam tram runs to 
Malabon, a large village situated to the north. 

* Eeise des preussisclien Seehaudlungeschiffes " Princess Louise." 
T P 40 



626 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Besides the private vehicles, there are in the city a large number ot 
hackney coaches. These are divided into three classes: The carruajes 
(laudau with two horses), qiiiles (two- wheelers, closed, door behind, 
one horse), and carromatas (two-wheelers drawn by one horse). The 
latter are also used in the interior so far as tliere are any roads. The 
transport of goods is carried on by means of two wheeled carts drawn 
each by a butJalo and holding some 1,UU0 kilograms. 

Life for foreigners upon the i:*hilii)pines is (juite agreeable, and, par- 
ticularly in Manila, there are comfortable residences; nor is there lack 
of company, excursions, and other sources of recreation. In other 
respects, also, creature comforts are by no means neglected, provided 
the reciuirements are not too high. If once the city and neighborhood 
were developed in the manner indicated, there would be little to be 
desired to make life there thoroughly agreeable. Manila would then 
soon surpass all other tropical towns as regards health and comfort. _^^ 

What the future may bring the rich and beautiful Philii)i>ine Islands 
it is dihicult to say. It is, at all events, my sincere hope that this 
insular domain may soon blossom forth into that degree of imiJortance 
to which it is by nature entitled. 

(Signed) Max C. Toenow. 

ViLLEN COLONIE GRUNEWALD, NEAR BERLIN (GERMANY), AUQUSty 

1898. 



PROTECTORATES, COLONIES, AND NON-SOVEREIGN 

STATES. 



THE PROTECTED MALAY STATES. 

Under tbis head are usually iucliided (1) Perak; (2) Selangor; (3) 
Negri Sembilaii, or Mue States, which in itself is a sort of federation, 
as the name implies, and (4) Pehaug. On account of their proximity 
to the Straits Settlements, these native states and the colony had vari- 
ous commercial and political relations, even before 1874. But in that 
year Sir Andrew Clarke, with the a[)proval of the secretary of state, 
took steps to suppress the disorder in Perak which was menacing British 
interests, and succeeded in concluding the Pangkor treaty. As a result 
of this compact a British resident was stationed in Perak, and later one 
in Selangor. These residents were nominally advisory ofticials, but it 
soon became understood that when their advice was volunteered it was 
necessary for the native rulers to take it, esi>ecially if it related t(j a 
matter of collecting revenue or incurring expenditure. On the other 
hand the residents showed no disi)osition to impose their "advice" 
upon the native rulers excei)t where the interests of order and justice 
seemed to require it. The first British resident in Perak, Mr. J. W. 
Birch, was murdered by the Sultan in 1875. This event was followed 
instantly bj' the military occupation of the country and the banish- 
ment of the Sultan and his fellow conspirators. From that time, says 
the Colonial OfHce List (1898), the record of the State has been one of 
"remarkable progress." 

In 1880, a British agent, styled superintendent, was appointed for 
Negri Sembilan; in 1889 he also received the title of resident. 

In 1887 the Raja of Pahang surrendered to the British Government 
the control of his foreign relations, and in the following year Pahang 
became a protected State on the same terms as Perak and Srlaugor 
and Negri Sembilan. The Raja, or Sultan, himself re(iuested the 
appointment of a British resident. 

In 1887 the sultan of the neighboring State of Johore placed his for- 
eign relations in the hands of the British Government and agreed to 
receive a resident. Johore, however, did not join in with the four other 
States when, in 1895, they signed a treaty constituting their countries 
a fe<leration to be known as the protected Malay States, to be adminis- 
tered under the advice of the British Government. Each State agreed 
to assist the other States with men and money in case of need; pro- 
vision was made for a native militia for the common defense of the 
federation, and in return for the protection of Great Britain it was 
agreed that a certain number of these troops should be furnished for 
the defense of'^the Straits Settlements, on requisition by the governor 
thereof^ in case of war between England and any foreign power. Under 

627 



628 TREATY OF PEACE. 

this treaty, wliicli is now tlie supreme law of the federation, the system 
of government is as follows: 

Each of the tiiree native States of Perak, SMangor, and Pahaug has 
its sultan, and Negri iSenibilau, instead of one sultan, has a federation 
of chiefs. Tiiese native i)rinces are nominally sovereign. But in each 
of the four States there is a British resident, appointed by the secre- 
tai'.v of state, "whose duty it is to aid the native rulers by advice and. 
generally carry out the executive functions." (Col. Oft'. List, 1S9S.) 
in each' State there is a state council, consisting of the native prince 
and his advisers, together with the British resident and his staff of 
Euroi)ean assistants. This council is really the supreme authority. 

The four residents are subordinate to an ofiicial api)ointed by the 
secretary of state, under the provisions of the treaty of 18t)5, and styled 
resident-general of the Malay States. He in turn is subordinate to the 
high commissioner for the Federated Malay States, who is always the 
governor of the Straits Settlements. The treaty also provides for a 
sort of federal council, to meet i)eriodically in one of the States, to dis- 
cuss the affairs ot the federation. This council consists of the high 
commissioner (i)resident), the resident general, the four residents, the 
native i)rinces, and their most important chiefs. 

Besides the high commissioner and his private secretary and the 
resident general and his private secretary there are five other ofilicers 
of the federation — a judicial commissioner, a legal adviser, a command- 
ant, a commissioner of lands and. mines, and a secretary for Chinese 
affairs. 

The European assistants of each resident consist of a secretary, an 
auditor, an engineer, a senior magistrate, a state surgeon, a superin- 
tendent of posts and telegraphs, an insi^eetor of schools, and. a junior 
or district magistrate for each administrative district. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Bay. 

"No. 508.] American Embassy, 

London, August 21, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter I have 
received from Mr. Forbes, to whom it was written by Gen. Sir Andrew 
Clarke, who, as I have hitherto had occasion to mention to you, is one 
of the greatest living authorities in England on all subjects connected 
■with the government of the islands in the Malay Archipelago. I may 
add that the letter was written with the expectation that it would be 
transmitted to you, and I send it in the hope that you may have time 
to glance at it before your departure for Paris. 

I am, etc., John Hay. 



Copy of private letter received from Lieut. Gen. Sir Andreiv Clarice, 
E. E., G. C. M. G., etc. 

[Confidential.] 

42 Portland Place W., August 15, 1898. 
Bear Mr. Forbes: As the action which I took in 1874 for the paci- 
hcation of the native states in the Malay Peninsula suggests a prece- 
dent for dealing with a somewhat similar condition now existing in the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 629 

Philippines, I, at your request, send a note in further explanation of 
that action, as described iu general terms by me in the paper I read last 
May at the i\'oyal Institution of Great Britain. 

Very full details of this action are given in the Blue Book presented 
to Parliament, but some are omitted or vaguely alluded to, one impor- 
tant omission being the measures I took, as soon as I had learned of 
their existence, to secure the cooperation and support of the people 
who were providing the means l3y which alone the then state of 
anarchy and confusion could be maintained. 

Opening communication with these persons, I undertook to secure 
for them, on the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace 
and order, an ami)le refund of the advances they had made and a pre- 
emption in the share of the prosperity which would be sure to follow 
the restoration of tranquillity to the disturbed provinces. 

Assure those who are now feeding the agitation in the Philippines 
that similar results will follow the adoption of similar means, and there 
will be no need of the thousands of troops which I see stated can alone 
put down Aguinaldo and the so-called rebellion. 

Aguinaldo, and the other leaders associated with him, learning that 
the sources from whence they draw their suijplies would be no longer 
available, would at once come to terms, and the United States repre- 
sentatives in the Western Pacific would have the same experience as 1 
had in the Malay Peninsula. 

As soon as this influence and cooperation had been secured, then, 
under the supreme authority and direct control of the U. S. A., the 
federation of the Philippines under their several chiefs and headmen 
would follow. This federation, as a protectorate of the U. S. A., would, 
under this designation, be administered under the advice and guidance 
of the United States officers, in accordance, as far as possible, with 
native manners and customs, and above all, with religion. Christian 
and Moslem. The laws hitherto enforced in the Philippines would 
remain operative for the time being, but a fiscal system similar to that 
of the Malay Protected States, and to that recently established at San- 
tiago, with practically free ports, will be adopted. 

The administration of a protectorate on the lines indicated, which 
in the application, as in the instances of the Malay States, have met 
with marked success, would give more elasticity and freedom in dealing 
with the very special circumstances now existing in the Philippines 
than direct annexation and the establishment of a Territory of the 
Eepublic of U. S. A. 

There were in 1874, as now, strong convictions that to restore order 
naval and military operations on a large scale would prove imperative, 
and that even then beneficial results in dealing with the Malay race 
could not be by any means assured. 

I had many warnings that nothing but failure and disaster could fol- 
low my proposed intervention into the affairs of the Malay Peninsula. 

Similar i)redictions are now made in regard to the assertions of 
United States influence in the Philippines. I believe the task would 
be no more difficult, and perhaps easier, than that which I accomidished 
in the Malay Peninsula. In some respects it is a manifest advantage 
to have to dfal with islands which lend themselves to political grouping. 

T^o doubt the presence of moderate military force will be at first 
desirable at one or two important centers, but I attach more value to 
ample naval provisions, especially of gunboats able to move freely 
among the islands and to ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea. 

So to the fleet and its officers I would advise that the political and 



630 TREATY OF PEACE. 

civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first 
instance, be intrusted. 

Tossibly it would be well to f^ive the admiral coinnianding the aid of 
an able and experienced lawyer, as Judicial advisei, tolielpin the reviews 
and settlements of civil and criniiiial cases dealt with by the existing 
courts of justice. 

I take it for granted that party patronage will not enter into the per- 
sonnel of the start' selected for service in the protectorate, and 1 have 
reason to believe that among <)l'li(;ers of the United States Navy, active 
and retired, can be found numy men of wide ex])eri»n('e, broad views, 
and generous sympathy, well fitted to administer the affairs of the pro- 
tectorate. For a little while, the want of knowledge of the native 
languages will be found of some difticulty; this will necessitate great 
caution in the use of interi)reters. 

Subject only to revenue demands the ports should be made as free to 
trade as are the Malay states of the peninsula; indeed, in this as well 
as in their financial and magisterial system, their practices should, as 
far as applicable, be followed. 

Though, from start to finish, all administrative and executive pro- 
ceedings should be conduc-ted by and under the authority of the pro- 
tecting power, all iniblic notices and documents should be in the name 
of the federated States. 

I anticii>ate little or no difficulty if the same spirit and sympathy as 
has ever ruled the English authority since its intervention in the affairs 
of the peninsula is followed in the islands with their Moslem popula- 
tion, but the large native Catholic population may present problems 
not so easy of solution. 

For the teachers and guides are of one race, while the disciples and 
flocks are of another. 

Much will depend upon what are the present real relations existing 
between the priests of the Konmn Catholic Church and their congrega- 
tions. On this there is much conflicting opinion. 

Whatever may be the situation, I am inclined to believe it would be 
both just and wise to treat the priests with full and generous consid- 
eration and secure their aid and cooperation. 

The priest or i)astor of the native Catholic might be encouraged 
rather than otherwise by the protecting ])ower to remain with their 
flocks; but the ''orders," giving them fair compensation for their 
endowments, should be advised to return to Spain. 

Such a jiolicy would secure the supi)ort of the Vatican. 

This assumes, of course, that, without calling upon them to surrender 
their nationality, they will accept loyally the altered condition of afiairs 
and devote themselves to reconcile their flocks to the new circumstances, 
submitting themselves as examples of obedience to the administration 
of the protectorate. 

Of course, I assume there would be hesitation on the part of the 
United States authorities about deporting all, other than natives of the 
islaiuls, who were known to oppose criminally the new order of things, 
and this should be applied to all priests who were known to use their 
influence and authority with their flocks in keeping alive agitation or 
disturbance. 

Much has been said and written of the oppressive conduct of the 
priests, and that the present rebellion is largely, if not wholly, due to 
this. 

This may be so, but I doubt if to any great extent. To the general 
lax and corrupt civil adraiuistratiou it must rather be attributed. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 631 

I do not anticipate any difficulty in dealing with the Chinese. They 
will be found at once on the side of a strong and just government. 

1 am afraid these notes are very crude and incomplete, but as mere 
suggestions they may be of use. 

My view may, perhaps, be summed up in a single sentence. Enlist 
native sympathy by fairness and Justice, and rule through native 
agents supervised by carefully selected American residents. 

If this policy is fairly tried, I am convinced that in a few years the 
prosperity of the protected Philippine States will astonish the world. 
Believe me, my dear Mr. Forbes, yours very faithfully, 

Andrew Clarke. 
True copy. 

F. B. Forbes. 



[Private.] 



24 Cheniston Gardens, W. 

My Dear Mahan: As an earnest well-wisher of your country, I am 
following events very carefully Just now. I gather that the President 
and many thoughtful Americans are somewhat alarmed at the idea of 
assuming responsibility for the future of the Philippines, and that this 
at the present moment is with you a great question. It is also a great 
question for us, and on the ultimate decision important issues depend. 
Sow, may I give you my opinions, offered only with my best good 
wishes? Spanish rule in any form in the Philippines must end. On 
the whole, it has been worse in the East than in Cuba, because there 
was less publicity. If you take a waiting station and leave the islands 
to stew in their own juice, there will be anarchy first and a considera- 
ble annexation afterwards. 

Other powers will also want to look in, and of the general confusion 
which may arise there is only one thing that can safely be predicted: 
Spain will not benefit. This at least is certain. I fully see how difficult 
the present situation is, and I quite know how the solution may seem 
almost hopeless. It is most natural that Americans should feel chary 
of accepting responsibilities over the destinies of 8,000,000 j)eople of 
somewhat mixed nationalities — people who can fight. 

Yet I venture to think that in our empire there is a close parallel to 
the conditions in the Philippines, and that we solved the problem, as 
it is certain, to my miiul, that you can now solve it. If you will look 
up the past of the native states of the Malay Peninsula, you will find 
conditions closely a])proximating to those of the Philippines. Fighting 
was incessant; trade and development were at a standstill. There is 
no corner of the world in which the development has been so swift and 
so ])erfec(ly successful. These native states are now prosperous and 
contented. Their trade has increased by leai)S and bounds. This is 
an advantage to us and to the rest of the world. Piracy, the joy of the 
Malay population, has disai)peared. Civilization is making rapid way. 

How has this almost miracle been accomplished? I^Iot by trooi)S, 
not by force in any form, but wholly by a policy which I suggest is' 
Qow open to you. My namesake. Sir Andrew Clarke, inaugurated the 
policy whi<'h has led to the most astounding results. In the main it 
consisted only in admitting native rule, and placing by the side of each 
native ruler a strong and upright Englishman, who guides and restrains. 
If you can look into the facts, you will find that they are as I state. 



632 TREATY OF PEACE. 

There is a small Sikh police whose superior officers only are Englisli- 
meii. That is the only force applied, and in late years there has been 
absolutely uninterrupted and yearly increasing prosperity. As this is 
only a small corner of the earth, the facts are little known even here, 
and Americans can not know them. 

Well, here, I am (convinced, lies your solution, and in some respects 
you have the advantage, because the Philippines break up easily into 
geogra])liical groups, as the Malay States did not. Aguinaldo is a 
present difficulty, is he not? I know nothing of him; but he is evidently 
ca])able. ^lake him ruler of a portion of Luzon, with a fixed salary, 
and i)ut by his side an honorable and a strong man. Select other native 
rulers for other grou])s, and treat them in the same way. You will at 
once rally all native feeling to your side. Americans have told me that 
you can not lay your hands on the right men, having no trained colo- 
nial officials. I have told them this is an illusion. You can find in 
your Navy and Army the few men of the right stamp who are needed. 
Our "trained officials'' are not by any means the greatest of our suc- 
cesses. A soldier initiated the present system in the Malay Peninsula. 
Two sailors ])roved his most cai)able subordinates. 

Do turn this over in your mind and, if you can, get the President to 
look into our administration of the Malay States and its extraordinary 
success. Here is a i)rotectorate in the best sense, and it does not cost 
us a farthing. Have your naval stations and try this political experi- 
ment, I suggest. The results will surprise you, and they will be 
beneficial to the world. 

Yours, very sincerely, 



(Make any use j^ou like of my letter.) 



G. S. Clarke. 



BEITISH IKDIA. 

The present form of government of the Indian Empire is established 
by the act 21 and 21* Victoria, cap. 106, called an act for the better 
government of India, sanctioned August 2, 1858. By this act all the 
territories heretofore under the government of the East India Company 
are vested in Her Majesty, and all its powers are exercised in her 
name; all territorial and other revenues and all tributes and other i^ay- 
ments are likewise received in her name and disposed of for the pur- 
poses of the government of India alone. 

The secretary of state for India is invested with all the powers for- 
merly exercised by the company or by the board of control. By act 39 
and 40 Victoria, cap. 10, proclaimed at Delhi before the princes and 
high dignitaries of India, January 1, 1877, the Queen of Great Britain 
and Ireland assumed the additional title of Era])ress of India. 

Th(» executive authority in India is vested in a governor-general, com- 
monly, but not officially, styled viceroy, aj^pointed by the Crown, and 
acting under the orders of the secietary of state for India. The gov- 
ernor general's council is invested with power to make laws for all per- 
'sons, whether Ihitisli or native, foreigners or others, within the In(lian 
territories under the dominion of Her Majesty, and lr)r all subjects of 
the (hown within the dominions of Indian princes and states in alliance 
with Her Majesty. 

The government of the Iiulian Empire is intrusted to a secretary of 
state for India, assisted b}^ a council of not less than ten members, 



TREATY OF PEACE. C33 

vacancies in which are now filled up by the secretary of state for India. 
But the major part of the council must be of persons who have served 
or have resided ten years in India and have not left India more than 
ten years i>revious to the date of their appointment; and no person 
not so qualified can be appointed unless nine of the continuing? members 
be so qualified. The office is held for a term of ten years, but a mem- 
ber may be removed upon an address from both Houses of Parliament, 
and the secretary of state for India may, for special reasons, reappoint 
a member of the council for a further term of five years. No member 
can sit in Parliament. 

The duties of the council, which has no initiative authority, are, under 
the direction of the secretary of state for India, to conduct the busi- 
ness transacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the government 
of India. Moreover, by the act of 1858, the expi'iiditure of the reve- 
nues of India, both in India and elsewhere, is subject to the control of 
the secretary of state and council, and no grant or appropriation of any 
part of such revenues can be made without the concurrence of a major- 
ity of votes at a meeting of the council. In dealing, however, with 
questions affecting the relations of the government with foreign powers, 
in making peace and war, in prescribing the policy of the government 
toward native states, and generally in matters where secrecy is neces- 
sary, the secretary of state acts on his own authority. The secretary 
has to divide the council into committees, and to regulate the transac- 
tion of business. At least one meeting must be held every week, at 
which not less than five members shall be iiresent. 

The government of India is exercised by the council of the governor- 
general, consisting of five ordinary members and a public works mem- 
ber, whose post may be left vacant at the option of the Crown. The 
commander in chief may be, and in fact always is, appointed an extraor- 
dinary member. Governors and lieutenant-governors become extraor- 
dinary members when the council meets within their provinces. The 
ordinary members of the council preside over the departments of 
finance and commerce, home revenue, and agriculture, military admin- 
istration, legislation, and public works. The viceroy usually keeps 
the foreign department in his own hands. The appointment of the 
ordinary members of the council of the governor-general and of the 
governors of Madras and Bombay is made by the Crown. 

The members of the council, together with from 10 to 16 " additional 
members for making laws and regulations," formulate a legislative 
council; these additional members are nominated by the viceroy. In 
accordance with the new regulations under the Indian councils act 
(55 and 5G Victoria, cap. 14), tour of the members so nominated are pre- 
viously recommended by the nonofficial members of the four provincial 
legislative councils, and the fifth is recommended by the Calcutta 
Chamber of Commerce. The proceedings in the legislative council are 
public. The lieutenant-governors and chief commissioners of the other 
ten provinces are appointed by the governor-general, subject to the 
approbation of the secretary of state for India. 

The governors of Madras and Bombay have each a legislative and 
executive council and a civil service of their own. The lieutenant- 
governors of Bengal and of the Northwest Provinces (with Oudh) have 
each a legislative council only; the other administrators of provinces 
have no councils and no legislative powers. Although the viceroy is 
supreme, the local governments of the various provinces enjoy a large 
measure of administrative independence. Each province is broken 



634 TREATY OF PEACE. 

into divisions njider commissioners, and then divided into districts, 
which form the unit of administration. At the head of each district is 
an executive ollicer (colle{;tor or maoistrate'or deputy commissioner), 
who has entire control of the district and who is responsible to the 
governor of tlie province. Subordinate to the majiistrate, in most dis- 
tricts, there are ii joint ma.nislrate, an assistant magistrate, and one or 
more dei)uty collectors and other ofticials. In some cases the magistrate 
collector is also Judge, while in others tlu^ two functions are separate. 
Thcie are about 24(> such districts in British India. 

India is administratively divided into Ihitish territory and native or 
feudatory States; the former is uiuler the direct control, in all respects, 
of British oflicials. The control that the supreme (jovernment exercises 
over the native States varies in degree; but they are all governed by 
the native i)rinces, ministers, or councils, with tlie help and under the 
advice of the resident or agent in political charge either of a single 
State or a group of States. The chiefs have no right to make war or 
peace, or to send ambassadors to each other or to external States; they 
are not permitted to maintain a military force above a certain specified 
limit; no European is allowed to reside at any of th^ir courts without 
special sanction; and the supreme Government can exercise the right 
of dethronement in case of misgovernment. Within these limits the 
more imi)ortant chiefs ])ossess sovereign authority within their own ter- 
ritories; some of them are required to pay an annual tribute; with 
others this is nominal, or not demanded. 

LOCAL GOVEKNMENT. 

There were, in March, 1805, 752 municipal towns, with a population 
of 15,500,000. The municipal bodies have the care of the roads, water 
supply, drains, markets, and sanitation; they impose taxes, enact 
by-laws, make improvements, and spend money, but the sanction of the 
provincial government is necessary in each case before new taxes can 
be levied or new by laws can be brought into force. By the local self- 
government acts of 1882-1884, the elective principle has been extended 
in a large or small measure all over India. In all larger towns and in 
many of the smaller towns, a majority of mend)ers of committees are 
elected by the rate payers; everywhere the majority of town committees 
consists of natives, and in many committees all the members are natives. 
For rural tracts, exce]>t in Burma, there are district and local boards 
which are in charge of roads, district schools, and hospitals. 

AREA AND POPULATION. 

According to the census taken February 26, 1801, the total area ot 
all the British provinces was 904,003 square miles. This is the sum of 
the aieas of 250 districts. The total i)opulation was 221,172,052, an 
increase of 22,312,;U() over that indicated by the census of 1881. The 
average po])ulation per stpiare mile was 220. 

In the census results the total poi)ulation of India is divided into 118 
groups on the basis of language. But even the different native 
languages do not denote separate ethnical groujjs, many of them being 
only dialects, and nearly all of them ca])able of classification into a 
few groups. There were, however, 3.34 males and 20 females who S})oke 
an unrecognizable language. The following table shows the chief lin- 



TREATY OF I'F, ACK. 635 

guistic groups with a population (in millions and two decimals) assigned 
thereto : 

Aryo-lndic 195.46 

Dravidian >'■'• °" 

Kolaiiau i^-96 

Gypsy f^ 

Khasi I" 

Tibeto-Biirnian 7. 129 

Mon-Aiinam -^^ 

Shau 1° 

Siiiitic - '1 

Ar\ o Iranic 1. 33 

Semitic 05 

Aryo-Eiif opean 25 

Tlie following table gives all the langnages or dialects which are more 
prevalent than Englisli, with the population, in millions aud two deci- 
mals, of those who speak them as parent tongues: 

Hindi 85.68 

Bengali 41-34 

Teluou 19-89 

Mahialhi 18-89 

Tamil 15. ^3 

Gu.jani ti 10-62 

KauareBe 9. to 

Uriya 9-01 

Burmese 5. 93 

Malav;1hira •'^•43 

Urdu 3.67 

Siiidln ^-^9 

Sautuli 1-71 

W. Pahari 1- o2 

Assamese 1.43 

Goiidi 1-38 

Central Paliaii 1-^2 

Miirwiidi 1- 1^ 

PuisLtii 1-08 

Karen "^ 

K«^l 65 

Tuln 49 

Kachbi 44 

Gypsy -. 40 

Oraou ^' 

Kond 32 

The English language is next in order with a population of 238,499. 

The British-born population of India amounted, according to the 
census of 1871, to 04,001 persons, in 1881 to 89,798, and in 1891 to 
100,551. In 1891 the total number of persons not born in India, 
inchuling the French aud Portuguese possessions, was 601,037. Of 
these 478,656 returned as their birthplace countries contiguous to India; 
60,519 countries in Asia remote from India, includiixg China; 100,551 
the United Kingdom; 10,095 other European, American, and Austral- 
asian countries, while 11,810 were born in Africa, etc., or at sea. 

RELIGION. 

The most prevalent religion in India is that of the Hindoos, their 
number being nearly three fourths of the total population. Together 
with the Mohammedans, who number 57,321,104, they comprise over 
92 per cent of the whole community. The Buddhists are mostly in 



C^P^(^ TREATY OF PEACE. 

Burmali, as will be se(Mi from the lollowinj;- suininary, wbicb also shows 
that the number of Christians is a little over 2,250,000: 

Iliniloos 207,731,727 

Sikhs 1. 907. 833 

Jains l,4Hi, 638 

Kiuldliists 7, 131,3fil 

Parsft's 8tt, DO I 

MohaniiiUHlaiis 57, 321, UU 

Christians 2,284.380 

Jews 17, 194 

AniniistB 9,280,467 

Others 42,763 

Of the Christians enumerated above (2,284,380) the following are 
the chief subdivisions, as given in the oflicinl returns: 

Romau Catholics 1,315,263 

Church of England 295,016 

Presbyterians 40,407 

Dissenters 296,9.38 

Oth.T Protestants 63, 976 

Syrians, Armenians, and Greeks 201. 684 

INSTRUCTION. 

In 1891 there were 2,007,558 males and 107,0(>2 females under 
instruction. There were 11,554,035 males and 543.405 females not 
under instruction, but able to read and write, and there were 1 18,810,408 
males and 127,720,708 females not under instruction and unable to read 
and write. In 1804-95 the total expenditure on public instruction was 
Ex. 3,327,448 against Ex. 07,100 in 1805 and Ex. 30,400 in 1858. Of 
the sum spent in 1804-95, Ex. 571,008 came from local rates and 
cesses, Ex. 140,237 from municipal funds, Ex. 717,200 from subscrip- 
tions, etc., Ex. 981,870 from fees, and Ex. 910,972 from jirovincial 
revenues. 

At the head of the national system of education in India there are 
five universities — Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Allahabad, and the 
Punjab — which, though merely examining bodies, have numerous affil- 
iated colleges, in whi(^h a prescribed higher education is given than at 
the schools. There are normal schools in every province for training 
teachers, and a staff of inspecting officers visits all schools on the 
departmental lists. Medical colleges, engineei'ing, and other technical 
schools have also increased, and there are a few art schools. In 1895 
2,203 students matriculated at the Universitv of Calcutta, 918 at 
Madras. 034 at Bombay, 770 at Punjab, and 032' at Allahabad. 

In 1804 there w^ere 457 vernacular newspapers published regularly in 
10 different languages. Only one daily vernacular newsi)aper circu- 
lates as many as 1,500 copies; only one -weekly as many as 20,000. 
During the year 7,505 books and magazines, including many transla- 
tions and new editions, appeared, about nine-tenths being in native 
languages. 

JUSTICE AND CRIME. 

The ])residencies of Madras aiul Bombay and the lieutenant gov- 
ernorsliips of I>engal and the northwest ])rovin('es have each a high 
couit sui)rcMie both in civil and criminal business, but with an ultimate 
a])])eal to the judicial committee of the privy council in England. Of 
the minor provinces, the I*uiijab has a chief court with five Judges; the 
central provinces, Oudh and 8ind, have each one judicial commissioner. 
Burma has a judicial commissioner and a recorder. For Assam the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 637 

high court at Calcutta is the highest judicial authority, excepting in 
the three hill districts, where the chief cominissiouer of Assain is judge 
witliout appeal in civil and criminal cases. In each district the col- 
lector magistrate is judge, botli of first instance and api)eal. 

Appellate and original jurisdiction is exercised in the superior courts 
by about 450 judges. During 1890 there were 1,720 civil judges under 
the superior courts, nearly all of which civil judges were natives of 
India. In bengal, ]Madras, and Bombay the proportion of natives sit- 
ting in appellate courts is considerable. 

FINANCE. 

The total revenue of India for 1896-97 (budget estimate) was, in tens 
of rupees, 97,620,700. It was derived as follows: 

Ex. 

From liind revenue 26, 093, 300 

Oiiinui 6,895,300 

Salt 8, 700,00u 

Stamps 4,732,700 

Excise 5,744,700 

Proviucial rates 3, 660, 800 

Customs 4,481,900 

Assessed taxes 1, 843, 200 

Forests 1,732,300 

Ee-i-istratiou 428, 800 

Tribute : 892,200 

Interest 818,300 

Post-office, telegraph, and miut 2,914,300 

Civil departments 1, 657. 800 

Miscellaneous 975, 900 

Eailways 21,583,200 

Irrigation 2, 883, 300 

Buildings and roads 664, 600 

Military departments 879, 100 

The most important source of public income is the land. The land 
revenue is levied according to an assessment on the estates or holdings. 
In the greater part of Bengal, about one-fourth of Madras, and some 
districts of the northwest provinces the assessment was fixed perma- 
nently one hundred years ago, while it was fixed periodically at inter- 
vals of from twelve to thirty years over the rest of India. In the 
permanently settled tracts land revenue falls at a rate of about two- 
thirds of a rupee per acre of cultivated land, and represents on an 
average about one-fifth of a rental, or about one twenty-fourth of the 
gross value of the produce. In the temporarily settled tracts the land 
revenue averages about one and one-half rupees per acre of cultivated 
land, representing something less than one half of the rental, and about 
one-tenth or one tweltth of the gross value of the produce. 

The total expenditure in 1896-97 (Budget estimate) was, in tens of 
rupees (Rx.), 97,157,600. It was incurred as follows: 

Kx. 

Interest 3,676,700 

Kefiinds, compensations, etc 1, 835, 000 

Charges of collection 9,321.900 

Post-office, telegraph, and mint 2, 733, 500 

Civil salaries, etc 15,399,500 

Miscellaneous civil charges 6, 030, 300 

Famine relief and insurance 598. 500 

Railway construction 14, 500 

Railway revenue account 23, 857, 500 

Irrigation 3,203,600 

Buildings and roads 6, 140, 600 

Army 25,174,900 

Defense works 57,500 



638 TREATY OF PEACE. 

It will be seen tliat far the largest branch of expenditure is that for 
the army. In the year before the great mutiny the expense of the 
army was i;3,0U0.0()0 Ex., and afterwards it rose to 2o,()()(>,d()0 Ex. The 
regular army consists of 74,0;>(i l^uropeans and 145,5(!5 natives. 

Keturns published in 18S4 sliowcd that the various feudatory states 
of India had armies numbering 1*49, So,") men and 4,237 guns. A large 
])rop()rtion of tliese tbrcjcs were little better than an undisciplined 
lahble, but in 1888, after the native chiefs liad loyally ottered large sums 
of money toward the cost of imperial defense, the Indian government 
elaborated a scheme for the triuning and equi])inent ol" incked contin- 
gents of troops in certain states, and measures are now in ])r()gress 
which w ill enable the chiefs to furnish contingents of troops lit to take 
their i)lace in line with the regiments of the Indian army. These 
special contingents are known as imi)erial service troops, and they 
now number about 19,000. Sixteen British inspecting officers have 
been a]i])ointed. 

The health of the regular Indian troops has been so improved by bet- 
ter barracks, by (piartering a larger proportion of the European soldiers 
at hill stations, and by attention to sanitary conditions that the death 
rate, which before the mutiny was 0.9 per cent for Europeans and 2 per 
cent for natives, has been reduced to 1.(5 and 1 per cent, resj)ectively. 

EAST AFRICA (BEITISH). 

British East Africa consists of a large area on the mainland (includ- 
ing the East Africa ])rotectorate and rhe Tganda protectorate) under 
the immediate control of the foreign olitice, together with the islands of 
Zanzibar and Pemba, still governed through their Arab Sultan. 

By the Anglo-German agreements of jS'ovember 1, 188G, and July 1, 
1890, the southern boundary of the territory extends in a northwest 
direction from the north bank of the mouth of the Eiver Umba, going 
round by the north of Kilimanjaro to where the first parallel of south 
latitude cuts Lake Victoria. Thence across the lake and westward on 
the same parallel to the boundary of the Congo Free State. To the 
north and east the British sphere (which merges indefinitely with the 
old Sudan provinces of Egypt) is bounded, according to the Anglo- 
Italian agreement of 1891, by the Juba Eiver up to 6° north latitude, 
by that parallel as far as 35° east longitude, and by that meridian 
northward as far as the Blue Nile. 

It is coterminous with the Italian sphere of influence and with 
Abyssinia as far as the confines of Egypt. To the west it is bounded 
by the Congo Free State, the line of partition being 30° east longitude 
noitliward to the Nile-Congo watershed, which then becomes the 
frontier as far as the northernmost point of that State (the source of 
the Mbomu). North of this the British sphere has at present no west- 
ern delimination, and debouches on the independent jMohammedan 
states of that region. The total area thus embraced probably extends 
to over 1,000,000 sr|uare miles. Treaties have been made with almost 
all the native chiefs between the coast and the Albert Nyanza, and 
wit': the Semoli tribes occupying the interior between the Juba and 
Tana, whereby commercial a<'cess to the (lalla country is now ojtened. 

In 1880 the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar were delindted, 
and weie I'ecognized as including a continuous strip of coast, 10 nules 
in depth, reaching from Cape Delgado to Kipini on the Ozi Eiver. 
Outside this tract it was agreed that Germany should have as a S})here 
of influence the couutry stretching inland from the Elver Eovuma north- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 639 

ward to the Umba River, Eno'land's spliere of influence extending 
northward from the Uiuba. Northward of Kipini the Saltan of Zanzi- 
bar retained several stations where he had hitherto kept garrisons, 
viz, Lamu, Kismayu, Brava, Merka, Mo^adischo, Warsheikli. Of these, 
however, the last lour were ceded to Italy on August "26, 181)2, and the 
Italian Government took over their administration on September 26, 
1893. 

The German East African Association, in virtue of a concession signed 
in May, 1888, acquired the right to administer the Mrima or mainland 
(including the customs of the Sultan's ports) Irom the Kovuma to the 
Umba Kiver on the north, the Sultan of Zanzibar being subsequently 
paid the sum of 4,0<!0,0U0 marks in return for the cession by him of all 
his rights to and on the coast line, which thus became an integral part 
of the German sphere, or, as it is now called, German East Africa. 
The Imperial British Africa Company acquired the right to administer 
the coast from the Umba to Kipini for fifty years on condition of an 
annual payment to the Sultan, and in 1889 further acquired the ports 
and islands (including Lamu, Manda, and Patta) to the north of the 
Tana. A further settlement of territorial questions in 1890 conferred 
on England the protectorate of Zanzibar, including the island of Pemba, 
and left to British influence the territory from the Umba north to the 
Juba Kiver, including the territory of Witu, which was for a time placed 
under the control of the British East Africa Company. 

By the end of 1892 the company had occupied the country as far as 
Uganda and between that and Lake Albert Edward aiul the river 
Semliki, By arrajigement with the Government, the company retired 
from Uganda at the end of March, 1893, and on June 19, 1894, a British 
protectorate was declared over Uganda proper. On July 31, 1893, the 
company withdrew from the administration of Witu, which was tem- 
porarily placed under the administration of the Sultan. On June 15, 
1895, a British protectorate was proclaimed over the territories lying 
between and not hitherto included within the protectorates of Zanzibar, 
Witu, and Uganda proper, and the whole of this region has since been 
divided, for administrative purposes, into two districts, called, respec- 
tively, the East Africa Protectorate and the Uganda Protectorate. The 
former extends, roughly speaking, some 400 miles inland, and the latter 
fiom that frontier to the interior limits of the British sphere. On June 
30 the company evacuated the territory leased from the Sultan, the 
administration being taken over by Her Majesty's Government. 

THE EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE. 

The East Africa Protectorate, which extends from the Umba to the 
Juba River and inland as far as the borders of Uganda, is placed under 
the control of a commissioner and consul-general, who is also British 
agent at Zanzibar. It is divided for purposes of administration into 
four provinces, each under a subcommissioner : (1) The coast province 
(Seyyidieh), capital Mombasa; (2) Ukamba, capital Machakos; (3) 
Tanaland. including Witu, capital Lamu; (4) Jubaland, capital Kis- 
mayu. The total population is estimated at 2,500,000, including 13,500 
Asiatics and 390 Europeans and Eurasians. Mombasa (24,700) is the 
capital of the whole protectorate, and has a fine harbor, which has been 
much improved by the construction of jetties and other works. It is 
connected with Zanzibar by submarine cable and with Lamu by a tele- 
graph line, via Golbanti (Tana River). The principal other ports are 
Lamu and Kismayu, toward the north, and Vanga and Takaungu, 



G40 TREATY OF PEACE. 

toward the south. A railway is in coarse of constrnotion toward Lake 
A'irtoria, l^gaiida. lu February, 1898, about 120 miles were in oper- 
ation. 

The fustonis revenue for the year 1890-97 amounted to 306,191 rui)ees, 
and for the })revious year 2.'}0,.'507 rupees. The imports for the year 
1890-97 were valued at 3,925,597 rupees and exports at 1,172,020 rupees, 
and tliose for the year 1895-9() at, imports 2,053,995 rui)ees, exports 
1,100,401 rupees. Shipping entered, 1893, 100,002 tons; cleared, 100,388 
tons. On June 30, 1892, the Sultan of Zanzibar withdrew his reserves 
under the Berlin act, thereby i)lacing: all his dominions within the Free 
Zoi,e. At the mainland i)orts 5 per cent import duty is levied under 
the Brussels act. The principal exi)orts are ivory, India rubber, cattle 
and jioats, <irain, co])ra, gum copal, hides and horns, etc. The impoi'ts 
arc ^Manchester goods, Bombay cloth, brass, wire, beads, provisions, 
etc. Mangrove logs (borites) for building purposes are imported at 
Mombasa from other parts of the coast. Trade is at present princi- 
pally in the hands of East Indian merchants (Banians). 

Trade is steatlily increasing, although it has lately been hampered in 
the southern parts of the Brotectorate by the rebellion ol Mubarak, 
which was, however, successfully put down in April, 1890, and a hope- 
ful t'eeling now prevails. The Masai, w^ho had given some trouble to 
caravans in the interior, seem likely, in future, to respect the British 
authority. The higher plateaus are largely covered with rich grass, 
and are considered particularly favorable for ranching operations. 

THE UGANDA PROTECTORATE. 

In July, 1890, this protectorate was extended so as to include, in 
addition to Uganda propei-, Unyoro aud other countries to the west as 
far as the boundary of the British sphere (see above), as well as Usoga, 
to the east. The protectorate is administered by a commissioner, but 
the infant son of King Mwanga nominally reigns in Uganda proper. 
Order is maintained by means of a trained force of Sudanese. Regular 
criminal courts have been established, and there is a kind of native 
parliament. Roads have been made since the British occupation, but 
outside trade will be imiiossible until the completion of the railway, 
the construction of which from the coast was begun in the latter part 
of 1895. The soil is exceedingly fertile and coffee is thought likely to 
succeed. The natives show much skill in iron working, pottery, etc. 
The capital is Mengo, close to which is the British fort Kampala. The 
commissioner resides at Port Alice, on the Victoria Nyanza. Port 
Victoria, further east, is to be the terminus of the railway, and is 140 
miles by road from Mengo and 100 by the lake. Forts have been 
established in Unyoro and other districts on the borders of Uganda. 

Both Protestant and Ron)an Catholic missionaries have made many 
converts, and the adherents of the two communions long formed antag- 
onistic factions, but their differences are now composed. 

ZANZIBAR PROTECTORATE. 

SULTAN AND GOVKKNMENT. 

The Sultan, or, more correctly, the Seyyid, Hamoud bin Mohammed 
bin Said, about 44 years of age, nephew of the late Sultans Ali, Kha- 
lifa, and Burghash, suc<;eeded to tlie Sultanate on the death of Seyyid 
Hamed bin Thwain on August 27, 1890. lie w^as one of two claim- 
ants, and was selected by the British Government as being the most 
lilting. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 641 

Zanzibar dominions were gradually acquired by tbe Imams of Mus- 
cat at various dates between the years 1098 and 1807, partly by con- 
quest from the Portuguese and partly from native chiefs. Tbey were 
held as an appanage of Muscat until the death of Seyyid Said, when, 
on a dispute as to the succession arising between Seyyid Thwaiu, of 
Muscat, uncle of the present Sultan of Zanzibar, and Seyyid Majid, of 
Zanzibar (both being sons of Seyyid Said), the dominions in Africa 
were made independent of tlie present State, and conlirmed under 
Majid by an arbitration of Lord Canning (dated 1801), then Governor- 
General of India. Besides the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and smaller 
islands, the Sultan's authority nominally extended along the coasts and 
indefinitely inland, from Warsheikh, in 3° north latitude, to Tunghi 
Bay, in 10° 42' south latitude; his intluence, however, being exercised 
but a little way from the coast, except along a few trade routes. As 
mentioned above, the Sultan's dominions were gradually restricted in 
area between the years 1880 and 1890, until they finally included only 
the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. 

In October, 1891, a regular government was formed for Zanzibar, of 
which Sir L. Mathews is prime minister. All accounts are now kept in 
English and Arabic, and are always open to the inspection of the 
British consul general, and no new uu<lertakings or additional expendi- 
ture can be incurred without his consent. On February 1, 1892, Zanzi- 
bar was declared a free port, but the importation of spirits, arms, 
powder, and mineral oils remains subject to regulation. 

AREA, POPULATION, RELIGION. 

The island of Zanzibar has an area of 025 square miles, and Pemba 
360 square miles. The population of the island is estimated at 150,000, 
and that of the island of Pemba at 50,000. There is a considerable 
foreign population, mostly engaged in trading. There are about 50 
Englishmen, 50 Germans, a few Americans, Frenchmen, Italians, Greet s, 
and Roumanians, the two latter nationalities being under British pro- 
tection. There are also about 7,000 British Indian subjects, through 
whose hands almost the whole trade of Zanzibar and of East Africa 
passes, directly or indirectly. The town of Zanzibar has a population 
estimated at 30,000. 

Mohammedanism is the religion of the country, most of the natives 
of the coast and islands being Sunnis of the Shati school, though many 
are heathen; while the Sultan and his relatives are schismatics of 
the Ibadhi sect. There are Christian missions (Church of England, 
Wesleyan, Independent, and Koman Catholic) on the island and far 
into the mainland. 

There is a French hospital at Zanzibar, attended by French sisters 
of mercy, and a hospital at the Universities Mission. Sir Tharia 
Topan's hospital for Indians is now completed, but is not yet in use. 



Justice among the Sultan's subjects is administered by various 
" Kazis," with an appeal to H. H. among Europeans by their consuls 
in all cases in which they are the accused or defendants. By a decla- 
ration signed December 16, 1892, the Sultan has delegated to the Brit- 
ish agent and consul-general his right to try all cases in which a British 
subject is plaintiff or accuser and the defendant or accused is a Zanzi- 
bar subject or the subject of a nonchristian state without a treaty. 
T p 41 



(j-t'i TREATY OF PEACE. 

The British court has also jurisdiction over all slaves originally freed 
by Iler Majesty's agent and consul-general, but as the legal status of 
slavery was abolished on the (!th of April, 18D7, the relations between 
master and slave are no longer recognized by the tribunals. Most of 
the civil cases are brought into the British court, from which there is 
an appeal to the Bombay high court. To it also i)ertains admiralty 
jurisdiction with reference to the slave trade, and it is a naval prize 
court, by virtue of the Zanzibar (prize) order in council, 1888. 

FINANCK AND COMMEUCE. 

The revenue of the Sultan was mainly derived from customs dues 
and taxes on produce, cliietly cloves. Under the new arrangement 
with England the Sultan's privy purse, which will be kept separate 
from the general revenue of the country, has been fixed at about 120,000 
rupees annually, and the remainder of the revenue will be devoted to 
the charges for police, harbor improvements, and jmblic works. All 
the public expenditure must receive the sanction of the Sultan and the 
British agent and consul-general. 

There is a regular army of about 900 men, including police, under the 
command of General Baikes. 

In 180o the imports amounted to £1,293,646, and in 1896 to £1,275,470, 
and were distributed as follows: 

From Great Britain a £118, 022 

British India - 6385,537 

Sultan's dominions: Zanzibar and Pemba .' 6134, 331 

German East Africa a202,813 

Germany 664,597 

America a90, 975 

Holland a71, 311 

Madagascar, Mauri tins, and Comoro Islands 642, 021 

British East Africa 645,422 

Benadir ports 33, 433 

France 17, 566 

Other countries a 69, 848 

The exports in 1895 amounted to £1,119,841, and in 1896 to £1,158,- 
806. In 1896 the chief exports were: 

Piece goods « £336, 229 

Specie a 137, 557 

Cloves rt 102, 045 

Ivory al27, 109 

Pico 659,738 

Coi)ra a64,802 

Pu blK>r 6 17, 569 

(iuin coiial 616,060 

Hides o 11, 306 

Tortoise shell 68, 160 

Sim-sim 65, 519 

Chillies 5,484 

llil>l>opotanius teeth a 5, 285 

Other articles 6 261, 873 

In the year 1896 166 vessels (other than coasting vessels) entered the 
port, ajnong which were included 59 vessels of 98,273 tons, British; 
60 vessels of 88,483 tons, German; 27 vessels of 49,967 tons, French. 

There is a special coinage issued under the Sultan's authority, of 
which the Maria Theresa dollar is the unit; but the British Indian 
rupee is the coin now universally current, though in all business trans- 
actions the dollar is the standard of value. The dollar has a fixed 
value of 2 rupees 2 annas, and the rupee is worth 47 cents. 

a Increase as compared with 1895. 6 Decrease. 



) 



TREATY OF PEACE. 643 

EGYPT. 

Egypt is nominally a province of the Ottoman Empire, but maintains 
an autonomous government, under the rule of the Khedive, subject to 
the annunl payment of a tribute of £(582,092. The title of khedive, 
which is hereditary, was given by a lirman of the Sultan of May 14, 
1847. The intervention and ))ractical occu])ati()n by Great liritain began 
with the revoltof Arabi Paslia, which tlie ivhedive was unable to subdue. 
The revolution headed by iMohanimed Ahmed, who i)roclaimed himself a 
nialidi, resulted in the extension and conlirniation of the British power. 
In October, 1802, the British army of occupation had ab(iut 3,500 men. 
It was increased in January, 1803, by two battalions. There ap}!ears to 
be a local military and police force of about 10,000 men. In 180!) the 
public revenue was upward of £10,500,000. The public expenditure 
amounted to nearly £10,000,000. The consolidated debt at the end of 
December, ISOC, amounted to nearly £94,000,000. 

In 1875 the British Government acquired by purchase something less 
than a majority ot the shares in the Suez Canal, ly a convention 
signed at Constantinople October 29, 1888, an agreement was made 
between the principal European powers to exempt the canal from block- 
ade, and to secure to the vessels of all the signatories, whether armed 
or not, the right of passage in war as well as in peace. 

The StiUesnian's Year Book ISDS says that, by a tirman of May 27, 
1866, obtained on the condition of the soveieign of Egypt raising his 
annual tribute to the Sultan's civil fund Irom £376,000 to £720,000, the 
succession to the throne of Egypt was made direct from father to son 
instead of descending, alter the Turkish law, to the eldest heir. By a 
lirman issued June 8, 1873, the Sultan granted to Isnuiil 1 the rights 
of concluding commercial treaties Avith foreign powers, and of main- 
taining armies. 

The administration of Egypt is carried on by native ministers, sub- 
ject to the rule of the Khedive, but from 1879 to 1883 two comptrollers- 
general, appointed by France and England, exercised considerable 
powers in the direction of the affairs of the country. (See Khedivial 
decree, Xovember 10, 1879.) The intervention of England in 1882 was 
not partu'ipated in by France, and on January 18, 1883, the Khedive 
signed a decree abolishing the joint control of England and France. 
In place of this control the Khedive, on the recommendation of Eng- 
land, appointed an English financial adviser, without whose concur- 
riince no financial decision can be taken. 

The Egyptian ministry is com posed of six members : (1) The president, 
who has the department of the interior; (2) the minister of finance; (3) 
justice; (4) war; (5) public works and public instructiou; (6) foreign 
affairs. By an organic law of May 1, 1883, representative institutions 
were created, including a legislative council, a general assembly, and 
])rovincial boards. The legislative council is a consultative body, con- 
sisting of 30 members, of wiiom 14 are nominated by the Government. 
It meets once a month and examines the budget and all proposed admin- 
istrative laws, but it can not initiate legislation, and the Government 
is not obliged to act on its advice. Of its members, 15 residing in Cairo 
receive an allowance of £90 a year for carriage expenses, and 15, being 
delegates from the provinces and provincial towns, receive £250 a year 
for residential expenses in Cairo, besides traveling expenses to and from 
Cairo once a month. 

The general assembly, which consists of the members of the legisla- 
tive council, with the addition of the 6 ministers and 46 members popu- 



644 TREATY OF PEACE. 

larly elected, lias no legislative functions, but no new direct personal 
or land tax can be imposed without its consent^ It lias to be summoned 
at least once every two years. The membcrsp^heu convoked, receive 
an eijiht days' allowance at £1 a day, with railway expenses. The 
council of ministers, with the Khedive, is the ultimate lejiislative 
authority. Since 1887 an Ottoman high commissioner has resided in 
Cairo. Egy])t proper is administratively divided into six governor- 
ships (moafzas) of principal towns, and fourteen mudiriehs, or prov- 
inces, subdivided into districts or kisms. 

There arc four .judicial systems in Egypt: 1. The courts of the reli- 
gious law, concerned chielly with the personal status of Mohammedans. 
2. The mixed courts instituted in ! 87."). dealing with civil actions between 
persons of dilferent natioisalities and to some extent with criminal 
offenses. 3. The consular courts, wherein foreigners accused of crime 
are tried. 4. The native courts for civil actions between natives, or 
crimes by natives. The Statesman's Year-Book, referring to these 
courts, says: 

The native courts, instituted 1884-1889, with both foiei,;;ii and native Judg.s, now 
consists of 6 courts of first instance, an appeal court at Cairo, and 42 suniniary 
courts for cases of moderate importance. With spc^cial reference to these trihuiials 
a l^ritish adviser was appointed in 1X91. A committee of judicial surveillance 
watches the workings of the courts of lirst instance and the summary courts, and 
endeavors by letters and discussion to maintain pniity and sound law. 

There is an Egyptian procureur-gem-ral, who, with other duties, is intrusted with 
criminal prosecutions. The police service, which has been subject to freciuent modi- 
fication, was, in 1895, put under the orders of the ministry of the interior, to which 
an English adviser and English inspectors were attached. Tlie provincial police is 
under the direction of the local autliorities, the mudirs or governors of provinces, 
and the omdehs or village headmen. To the latter, who are responsible for the good 
order of the villages, a limited criminal jurisdiction has been intrusted. 

On April 5, 1880, the Khedive issued a decree appointing an inter- 
national commission of liquidation to examine the financial situation of 
Egypt and to draft a law regulating the relations between Egypt and 
her creditors. The debt of Egypt is now administered by this commis- 
sion. The United States, while not represented in the commission, is 
always consulted in the arrangements respecting the debt, and has so 
far given a formal assent to whatever changes have been proposed with 
the concurrence of the powers represented in the commission. 

The United States, besides maintaining consular courts in Egypt, is 
a party to, and is represented in, the mixed tribunals. It has two 
judges in those tribunals. 

In 1882 the Egyptian army was disbanded by a decree of the Kedive, 
and in December of that year the organization of a new army was 
intrusted to a British general ofticer, to whom was given the title of 
sirdar. The present sirdar is MaJ. Gen. Sir Herbert Kitchener. It 
is said that there are about one hundred English officers serving at 
present in the Egyptian army, which has a total strength of 18,(M)(). 
As has been above stated, an English army of occupation has remained 
in Egypt since ls82. Its strength is over 4,()0(>, The Egyptian (Gov- 
ernment contributes £87,000 annually to meet the cost of the army of 
occupation. 

Egypt has practically no navy. 

TONKING. 

This territory, annexed to France in 1884, has an area of 34,740 square 
miles and is divided into fourteen provinces, with 8,000 villages and a 
population estimated at 9,000,000. There are 400,000 Roman Catholics. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 645 

The King of Auuam was formerly represented in Touking by a viceroy, 
but ill July, 1897, he consented to the suppression of the viceroyalty 
and the creation of a French residency in its place. Chief town, Hanoi, 
an agglomeration of many villages, with a i)opulation of 150,000. Includ- 
ing the region formerly claimed by Siam, but annexed in 1893, the total 
area is about 12-5,000 square miles an<l the ])opulati<iu is estimated at 
12,000,000. Tiiere were 18,555 troops in 1.^92. including 0,500 native 
soldiers. The chief crop is rice, exported mostly to Hongkong. Other 
products are sugar cane, silk tree, cotton, various fruit trees, and tobacco. 
There are copper and iion mines of good quality. French companies 
work coal mines at Hongay, near Haiphong, and at Kebao. The chief 
industries are siik, cotton, sugar, pe])pcr, and oils. In 1890 the imports 
of meichandise into Tonking amounted to 25,204,013 francs; exports, 
7,500,898 francs. Chief imports are metals and metal tools and 
machinery, yarn, tissues, and beverages; chief exports, rice (2,301,000 
francs) and animal products. Tiie transit trade to and from Yunnan 
amounts to about 5,(t00,0i)0 and 3,200,000 francs, respectively. In 1896 
there entered 1,107 vessels, of 401,451 tons. The Phulang-Thuong- 
Langson Railway is 04 miles long. It is proposed to extend it to 
Nacham, on the Chinese frontier. In Aunam and Tonking in 18i>5 
there were 79 post-oflices. Local revenue of Annam and Tonking 
(Budget of 1897), $7,902,000. The expenditure of France for Tonking 
in the Budget of 1898 was 24,450,000 francs. 

BULGARIA. 

Bulgaria is a protected State in the true sense, viz, it is a State 
which intrinsically is not strong enough to maintain its independence 
against the neighboring Ottoman Empire, and which owes its separate 
existence to an act of the powers, the object of which was to secure 
general tranquillity. 

The treaty of Berlin (1878) provided that Bulgaria should be an 
autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of the 
Sultan, having a Christian government and a national militia. The 
Ottoman army should no longer remain in it. The executive was to have 
the title of prince, and to be elected by the people and confirmed by 
tlie Sublime Porte, with the assent of the powers. No member of any 
reigning European house was to be eligible for the princeship. An 
assembly of notables was to draw up the constitution prior to the 
election of the first prince. In the interim the principality was to be 
provisionally governed by an imperial liussian commissary with the 
assistance of an imperial Turkish commissary and consuls delegated 
by the other powers. After the election of the prince the principality 
was to enjoy full autonomy except in the following particulars: 

{a) Its annual tribute to the Porte. 

(b) Its obligation to assume part of the Ottoman debt. 

(c) Its being bound by the subsisting treaties between Turkey and 
other iiowers. 

(d) Its obligation to protect religious liberty in its constitution. 

(e) The prohibition to levy transit dues. 

In nearly all other resi)ects Bulgaria was to be on the footing of an 
independent State. 

The treaty also provided for a separate government for Eastern Eou- 
melia, which was to be a "])rovince" "under the direct political and 
military authority" of the Sultan, "under conditions of administra- 
tive autonomy." It was to have a Christian governor general, nomi- 
nated by the' Porte, with the assent of the powers, every five yeilrs. 



646 TREATY OF PEACE. 

He was to have tlie power of sunimoiiinj;- the Ottoman troops when 
necessary, etc. Thus Eastern Koumelia was not a protected State, but 
siini)ly a province with a certain amount of home rule in matters of 
civil administration. 

In 8e))t('mber, 1885, the government of Eastern Eoumelia was over- 
tlirowu by a revolution, and the jjrovince became, for all purposes, a 
l)art of liulgaria. 

Note. — The iitlier "Danubian priiici]ialities," namely, liiniinania, Servia, and Moii- 
teneiiTO, present features of interest only in so far as tbi^y are eases of iiroo-ress Ironi 
the •■ protected" stage to absolute independence, instead of from the protected stage 
to that of complete colonialism — a reversal, in short, of the usual order of things. 
From very early times Moldavia, Wallachia, f>ervia. and Monten<'gro had been among 
the most unruly of the possessions of the Turkish Crov.ii, and long and bitter strug- 
glts wre frequently necessary to nniintain even the semblance of the Imperial 
authority there. As early as 18l.'9 Turkey had been obliged to recognize the separate 
existence of Servia, at least as a protected state; and Montenegro was certainly no 
more than a protected state after Kussia, in 1S,51, had recognized Danilo 1 as (ios- 
pndar, or Prince. The whole Danubian question, as to the exact extent of the pro- 
tectorate exercised by the Porte, was in a very unsettled condition until, by the 
Treaty of Berlin (1878), the absolute independence of Servia, ^lonteuegro, and 
Wallachia-Mpldavia, joined together as Rouniania, was recognized. 

THE DUTCH EAST I:N^DIES. 

Before 1798 the Dutch possessions in the far East were governed by 
the Dutch East India Company. In that year the East India Coiiipauy 
was dissolved. At present the supreme law or constitution of tlie 
J)utch colonies is the "Eegulations for the Government of Netherlands- 
India,''' passed by the King and States-General in 1854, 

Under this organic law the chief executive or governor- general is 
assisted by an advisory council of five. He has residuary goveininental 
powers, and may consequently make any law not specially reserved to 
tlie province of the legislature of the mother country or forbidden by 
the '•Kegulations." 

For i)uri)oses of internal administration Dutch East India is divided 
into residencies, each of which is presided over by a resident, who is 
accountable to the governor-general. Under each resident are several 
assistant residents and several controleurs. All these ofticers are 
api'ointed as the result of a kind of civil-service examination. Under 
tlieni is a hierarchy of native officials, some of whom are ])aid salaries, 
l)ut perhaps the greater number by i^ercentages on the taxes they can 
gather from the natives. 

The Dutch l^ast Indies are sometimes divided into (1) Java and (2) 
the Outposts. In Java the natives are forced to submit to the ''cul- 
ture system"' inaugurated by A"an den Bosch in 1832, which amounts 
prac(i(;ally to forced labor, under Government supervision, in the cul- 
tivation of coffee. (Until 1870 the culture system extended also to 
sugar, indigo, pepper, tea, and tobacco.) The Outi)osts never had the 
culture system, with the exception of a few residencies. 

IJeligious liberty is provided for by the "I'egulations." 

As to the administration of justice, the laws for Europeans are simi- 
lar to those of the mother country, aiul are interpreted by European 
judges. Natives a^e still governed by their own customs and institu- 
tions ami are Judged largely by their own chiefs. In 1895 the native 
population was about 32,(»0(),()0(). There were also about 151,(100 Chi- 
nese, 21,000 Arabs, and 27,000 other Orientals. The Europeans num- 
bered about ()2,061. 



THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES— A SKETCH OF THEIR GROWTH 
AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, BY FRANCIS B. FORBES. 



The following sketch has been compiled exclusively from Parlia- 
mentary Papers and other English i^ubli cations, the list of which is 
given below. It has been my aim, as far as possible, to tell the story 
in the words of the original reports and dispatches, which have some- 
times been reproduced without acknowledgment. If this has entailed 
a certain amount of repetition, I hope, on the other hand, that the 
narrative has gained in interest more than It may have lost in concise- 
ness, through the many side lights thrown upon the curious social 
system of the Malays and upon the methods bj^ which it has been 
transformed under foreign influence. 

Francis B. Forbes. 

London, November H, 1898. 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED. 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS. 

Correspondence relating to tbe affairs of certain native states in the 

Malay Peninsula in the neighborhood of the S. S Cllll. 

Further ditto ditto C1320. 

Ditto ditto ditto C1505. 

Ditto ditto ditto C1512. 

Ditto ditto ditto -., C1709. 

Ditto ditto ditto (maps and sketches re- 
ferred to in C1505. 1876) _ _ C1505. I. 

Straits Settlements. Instructions to the British residents and other 

papers relating to the protected Malay States C2410. 

Straits Settlements. Return for copy of treaty of 1855 between the 
Sultan of Johore and his Tiamonggong and for the correspondence 

respecting Muar since the death "of the late Sialtan of Johore 120. 

Straits Settlements. Instructions to British residents and other pa- 
pers relating to protected Malay States _ ... C2410. 

Ditto Papers ditto C3095. 

Ditto Correspondence respecting slavery in Malay 

States C3285. 

Ditto Further ditto C3429. 

Ditto Correspondence respecting protected Malay 

States C3428, 

Ditto ditto C4192. 

Ditto Agreement between S. of state for colonies and 

Sultan of state and territory of Johore C4627. 

Ditto Agreement between governor of Straits Settle- 
ments and Sultan of Pahang C5352. 

Ditto Further correspondence protected Malay States C4958. 

Ditto ditto C5566. 

Ditto ditto C5884. 

Ditto Papers relating to ditto C6222. 

Ditto ditto Rep ts. for 1890-.. C6576. 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1891... C6858. 

Ditto Reports on the ditto Repts. for 1892.. _ C7228. 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1893- -. C7546. 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1894--- C7877. 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1895 ... C8257. 

Ditto Federated Repts. for 1896.-. C8661. 

647' 



1874 
1876 
1876 
1876 
1877 

1876 

1879 



1879 

1879 
1881 

1882 
1882 

1882 
1884 

1886 



1887 



1889 
1890 
1892 
1893 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 



648 ^ TREATY OF PEACE. 

Correspondence respecting the federation of the protected Malay States, May, 
189:}, to December, 1895. (Taiping, 1896.) 

Minutes of tlie session of chiefs of the federated Malay States held at Kuala 
Kangsar, Perak, on 14, 15, 16, IT July. 1897. (Taiping, 1897.) 

London Chamber of Commerce Journal. December 5th, 1889. 

Address by Lieut. Col. Sir Andrew Clarke, G. C. M. G., C. B., C. L E., on "The 
economic development of the Malay Peninsula." 

Roval Institution of Great Britain, May 27th, 1898. Paper bv Lieut. General 
The Hon. Sir Andrew Clarke. R. E., G. C. M. G., on "Sir Stamford Raffles and 
the Malay States." 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Ill the early part of this century the British East India Companj% 
chiefly through the enterprise of Sir Stamford Raffles, liad acquired 
the so-called "Straits Settlements" — Singapore, ^Malacca, Penang, 
and Province Wellesley. These settlements are dotted along the west 
coast of the Malacca Peninsula, and between them were small Malay 
States, in the affairs of which the East India Company had always 
declined to intervene, a policy which was continued Mdien, later on, 
the Settlements were transferred to the direct authoritj' of the Crown. 

These native States were, however, always in various stages of 
anarchy, and their perpetual quarrels became more and more intoler- 
able. Things reached a crisis in 1S72, when, in addition to the squab- 
bles of the Malay chiefs, the Chinese miners in Larut divided them- 
selves into two camps and carried on organized warfare with piracy 
in the neighboring waters. By the end of 1873 the paralysis of trade 
and the decimation of the population had become a serious danger to 
the adjoining British settlements, as Sir Andrew Clarke has well 
described in his address before the Royal Institution on the 27th of 
last May. 

Years of guerrilla warfare [says Sir Andrew Clarke] between rival Malay chiefs 
and their adherents, on the one hand, and between various Chinese secret societies 
and factions, on the other, had put a stop to all legitimate work. Towns and vil- 
lages had been destroyed, mines closed, orchards wasted, and fields left unculti- 
vated for j-ears. 

There was no safety for life and property, no money, no trade, and little food in 
the country. Lawlessness and oppression prevailed everywhere, and those who 
found it hard to live on shore took to the water and made the Straits of Malacca 
the scene of their operations, so that hardly a day passed but some small trading 
vessel would be attacked and burnt after the entire crew had been murdered. 
, Probably at no time had the ill fame of the Malacca Straits so truly justified its 
reiiutation for acts of piracy as in the closing months of the year 1878. 

For particulars of the terrible sufferings and terrible oppression of the Malay 
working classes, men and women, it would be well to consult the reports written 
by the residents and forwarded to the colonial office. Brietly, it may be said that 
while the facts were more than enough to justify the interference of Great Brit- 
ain, far too long delayed, it happened that at this very time influential Malay 
chiefs in Perak, Selangor and Suujie Ujong sought the assistance of the governor 
of the Straits Settlements to put an end to a state of affairs which had got beyond 
their control, and in Perak the claimant to the supreme power asked that a Brit- 
ish officer might be sent to aid him in the administration of the government of the 
couutr3\ 

This was the moment at which it was decided to interfere for this purpose, and 
what is known as the engagement of Pangkor was the result. The governor of 
the Straits Settlements went to Perak, taking with him the officers considered 
best (pialified to assist in the difficult task of pacifying i\Ialays and Chinese, put- 
ting down all violence with a firm hand, healing old sores, making, or attempting 
to make, reconciliation of (luarrels, restoring to their homes women who had 
been captured and carried into slavery, and dividing the mining lands between 
opposing factions of Chinese. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 649 

II. — The engagement of pangkor. 

Sir Andrew Clarke, who arrived in Singapore late in 1873, to take 
over the governoi-ship of the Straits Settlements, had been instructed 
by the iinj)erial Government to study the situation carefully, and to 
report as soon as possible. But he found affairs so critical that he 
decided to act at once, on his own responsibility. He had private 
negotiations opened with the headmen of the Chinese, the result of 
which was that all boats, stockades, and arms were delivered up to 
him. At the same time he communicated with the chiefs of Perak, 
whom he invited to meet him to concert about the British protectorate, 
for which they had been persuaded to apply, and in order that the 
disputed succession to the throne of Perak might be settled once for 
all. The last precautions taken by Sir Andrew Clarke before the 
meeting of the chiefs are characteristic of his humanit}', his tact, and 
his energy. "I provided a supi^ly of food,'' he reports, "as I had 
every reason to believe ver}- great distress existed in the river, and I 
also made provisions for removing any troublesome or lawless persons, 
whom it might be necessary to get rid of, to Singapore or Penang." 

Finally, on the 20th of January, 1874, the chiefs of Perak, assem- 
bled at Pangkor at the governor's invitation, signed an engagement 
witnessed by him for i^lacing their State under British protection. 
As this document was the model of others signed soon afterwards by 
the sultans of Selangor and Sunjie Ujong, the following summary will 
be of interest. 

I quote the ijreamble in full, and give an abstract of the principal 
articles. 

engagements entered into by the chiefs of perak. dated JANUARY 20, 

1874. 

Whereas a state of anarchy exists in the Kingdom of Perak, owing to the want 
of settled government in that country, and no efficient power exists for the protec- 
tion of the people and for securing to them the fruits of tlieir industry; and 

Whereas large numbers of Chinese are employed and large sums of money 
invested in tin mining by British subjects and others residing in Her Majesty's 
possessions, and the said mines and property are not adeciuately protected, and 
piracy, murder, and arson are rife in the said country, whereby British trade and 
interests greatly suiter, and the peace and good order of the neighbouring British 
settlements are sometimes menaced; and 

Whereas certain chiefs, for the time being of the said Kingdom of Perak, have 
stated their inability to cope with their present difficulties, and together with those 
interested in the industry of the country have requested assistance: and 

Whereas Her Majesty's Government is bound by treaty stipulations to protect 
the said Kingdom and to assist its rulers. 

The document goes on to recite the articles of arrangement which 
Governor Sir Andrew Clarke has proposed "as mutually beneficial to 
the independent rulers of Perak, their subjects, the subjects of Her 
Majesty, and others residing in or trading with Perak," the more 
important of which may be summarized as follows: 

The disputes as to the Sultanate are settled by the recognition of 
Abdullah as Sultan, and of Ismail (then acting Sultan) as Sultan 
Muda, the latter to have a ijension and a small territory assigned to 
him. Other ari-angements as to chiefs are also recited. 

All revenues are to be collected and all appointments made in the 
name of the Sultan. 

The Sultan is to receive and jDrovide a suitable residence for a 
British Resident, "whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all 
questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom." An 



650 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Assistant Resident is to be stationed at Larut, subordinate only to 
the Resident. The cost of these Residents and of their establishments, 
to be determined by the Governor of the Straits Settlements, is to be 
a first eliarge on the revenue of Perak. 

A ciNil list, reuulating- the income to be received by the Sultan and 
otlier cliiefs and officers, is to be the next eliai'ue on the revenues. 

Tlie collection and control of all revenues and the general adminis- 
t ration of the country are to be regulated under the advice of the 
Resident. 

As soon as order shall be restored in Perak, one or more British 
officers sliall take immediate measures "for restoring, as far as prac- 
ticable, the occupation of the mines and the possession of machinery, 
etc., as held in-evious to the commencement of these disturbances," 
and the decision of such officers is to be linal as to payment for 
damages. 

The remaining articles refer to boundary adjustments and the paci- 
fication of the district so long disturbed. 

In an address to the London Chamber of Commerce (November 6, 
1889), Sir Andrew Clarke gives a graphic account of his method of 
handling the Malay chiefs and the Chinese : 

The principles on which I acted were very simple. Personal influence has 
alwaj-s great effect upon natives of the type of the Perak chiefs, and this influence 
I endeavored to apply. Where it was possible, I sought interviews with them and 
pointed out the effects of the evils from which the country was suffering. Their 
real interests were peace, trade, and the opening up of their country. In place of 
anarchy and irregular revenues, I held out the prospect of peace and plenty. I 
foiind "them in cotton. I told them that, if they would trust me, I would clothe 
them in silk. Their rule had resulted in failure. I offered them advisers who 
would restore order from chaos without curtailing their sovereignty. They were 
willing to listen to reason, as the vast majority of persons, whether wearing silk 
hats or turbans, usually are. 

Tlie following extract from the same address is valuable on account 
not only of the intimate knoAvledge displayed of Chinese secret socie- 
ties in British colonies, but of the shrewd suggestions as to the best 
means of keeping them under control by Government. ' ' The troubles 
of the Peninsula,'' he says, "were largely due to the fighting procliv- 
ities of the Chinese, supported by secret societies, which were directed 
by influential Chinamen, even in Singapore itself. The Chinese secret 
society is a bugbear to some minds, and I may be pardoned for a brief 
reference to it. Secret societies are the natural and inevitable out- 
come of an arbitrary and oppressive government, such as exists in 
China, and the Chinaman, having acquired the hereditary habit of 
creating such organizations, carries it with him to the country of his 
adoi)ti(>n. In China the secret society is doubtless almost entirely 
political, constituting a danger to the State. Transplanted to another 
country, it entails no necessary political dangers and becomes practi- 
cally a species of guild for mutual protection, of the nature of a ben- 
.efit or a burial club. 

"Such combinations do, however, frequently lend themselves to 
lawlessnes and crime, or even, as in Larut, to the civil war of rival 
factions. Tlie main evil is the secrecy observed in the deliberations 
and proceedings of these societies. Try to suppress them altogether, 
and you will drive them deeper below the surface and render them 
really dangerous. On the other hand, recognize them so long as they 
keep within tlie confines of law, insist as far as possible upon open 



TREATY OF PEACE. 651 

meetings and pnblicity of accounts, and you will then find a powerful 
lever ready to your hand. You will be able to hold the leaders respon- 
sible for illegality; you may even manipulflte the secret society to your 
own ends. This' was the course pursued with success in the case of 
the Malay States; and lam indebted to the chief s of the Chinese 
secret societies for support readily accorded as soon as they under- 
stood the principles upon which my action was based." 

If, in studying the Blue Books of this period, one reads between 
the lines in the light of the above passage, it is possible to realize how 
much of Sir Andrew Clarke's success in calming the Chinese factions 
and in arbitrating their disputes was due to his personal influence 
with the heads of their secret societies. 

After the engagement of Pangkor was signed, more arms were sur- 
rendered, and a bond was executed by leading Chinese, binding them- 
selves "to keep the peace towards each other and towards the Malays, 
in a penalty of 50,000 dollars, as well as to observe certain articles set 
out in the arrangement, and, above all, to entirely complete the dis- 
armament of their stockades." 

Sir Andrew Clarke, in his report to the secretary of state for the 
colonies, just quoted, alludes to another question of grave importance. 
He adds: 

I found at the same time incidentally that women and children had been taken 
captive and were even then detained in slavery, while it was alleged, and posi- 
bly with truth, that the former were kept for the purposes of prostitution against 
their will. Common humanity alone demanded my action under such circum- 
stances, and judging from our past experience of all negotiations with Eastern 
nations, and seeing the evident desire that existed on all sides for impartial arbi- 
tration by British officers of their claims, I decided at once on appointing, with the 
full consent of the Sultan, a commission of three officers to settle the question of 
right to the mines, and to endeavor to discover and restore all women and children. 
I have little doubt, from the character of the officers I appointed, of their success, 
and I expect by the next mail to be able to assure your lordship that this part of 
the question is satisfactorily settled, and the more especially as the Chinese 
agreed to consider the decision of these officers as final. 

Sir Andrew Clarke concluded this dispatch as follows: 

I am perfectly aware, as I have already said, that I have acted beyond my 
instructions, and that nothing Init very urgent circumstances woiald justify the 
step I have taken: but I have every confidence that Her Majesty's Government 
will feel that the circumstances at the time— the utter stoppage of all trade, the 
daily loss of life by the piratical attacks on even peaceful traders, and by the fight- 
ing of the factions themselves, and the imminent peril of the disturbances spread- 
ing to the Chinese in our own settlements— justified me in assuming the responsi- 
bility I have taken. 

In a dispatch, about a month afterwards. Sir Andrew Clarke gave 
at length his ideas as to the necessity of Residents in these native 
States, and of the character and scope of their functions. "The 
Malays," he says, " like every other rude Eastern nation, require to 
be treated much more like children, and to be taught; and this espe- 
cially in all matters of improvement, whether in the question of good 
government and organization, or of material improvement by opening 
means of communication, extending cultivation, and fostering immi- 
gration and trade. Such teaching can only be effected by an officer 
living on the spot, whose time should be devoted to carefully study- 
ing the wants and capabilities of each State, and to make himself per- 
sonally acquainted with every portion of the country, and thus fitting 



652 TEEATY OF PEACE. 

himself for tlic post of eounsclor wlieii the time for opening up the 
couutrj' arrives." Again, in tlie same (lisi^ateh, he says: 

By the ninth clause the Sultan, the Bandahara, the Mantri, and other officers 
are to be provided for hy a regular civil list to be hereafter arranged; and of 
course the Sultan will be advised to appropriate the balance of his revenue, what- 
ever it may be. to public works and improvements. 

This \vatching the collection of the revenue and controlling its expenditure will 
form no insignificant part of a Resident's duties: and as far as bringing about a 
good system of government is concerned, will be about the most important por- 
tion of them. 

The collection of the revenue, from whatever source derived, and however 
legitimate, is carried on at present among these States with a perfect absence of 
all system and without any fixed rules or tariff, while it is at all times accom- 
panied by individual instances of extortion or. as more faniiliarly known in the 
Chinese and Malay States, by •' squeezing." 

To check this, and to induce the Sultan to select proper men for the collection, 
will be the Resident's special care, and the process will not be an expensive one, 
as the staff required will be comparatively small, since the country, intersected as 
it is by rivers, is admirably adapted for the collection of the royalty on the min- 
erals which must pass down these rivers to the sea. 

The revenue on grain and on opium and spirits, all legitimate sources for rais- 
ing a revenue from, will require much consideration and care, but will. 1 have 
little doubt, hereafter form an important item in the resources of the country and 
afford ample means for its development. 

The dispatch closes with these earnest words: 

I have now endeavored to explain to your lordship all that has taken place in 
this last intervention in the affairs of Perak, as well as all the terms of the engage- 
ment then entered into between the chiefs, and my reasons for according to those 
terms mj' cordial assent. 

I trust your lordship will understand that by so giving my assent I have in no 
way bound Her Majesty's Government to any particular cause, and that it is per- 
fectly possible now to withdraw from the position I have temporarily assumed. 

But your lordship will, I feel sure, allow me at the same time to express my 
conviction and that of all the members of my councils that, looking to the long 
and intimate relations of Great Britain with the Malayan States, to the proximity 
of these settlements, and to the state of anarchy and misrule which has for some 
years prevailed in Perak and Selangor, the time has arrived when, as a nation, we 
shall be neglecting a great and paramount duty if we any longer delay that inter- 
vention which the causes of civilization and good order now so loudly demand. 

The governor's action was received with the greatest satisfaction 
by all liis fellow-conntrymen who had important interests in the 
Straits Settlements and vicinit}^ as was shown bj^ pnblished resolu- 
tions and letters from the chamber of commerce in Singapore and the 
Straits Settlements Association in London. And on March 11, 1874, 
the Times published a letter, giving to the English public a suc- 
cinct account of what liad passed, and predicting the immediate 
advance in prosperous development which the protected States would 
show as the consequence of the new order of things. Under the sig- 
nature of " Malacca" was veiled the personality of a man well known 
for Ills familiarity with Malayan affairs, and I quote the following 
passage, which touches the crucial point of the whole question : 

The success of Sir G. Clarke's experiment, however, will depend materially on 
the personal character of the resident who is to represent British power and to 
exercise British inlluence. If he is liked and respected by the Malays, he will lead 
them easily, as the Brookes have done in Borneo. But to be liked and res])ected 
he must understand them, their language, character, and habits. He nuist be 
patient, cool, and firm, and he must be sober, truthful, and incorruptible. 

On September 24, 1874, Lord Carnai'von, secretary of state for the 
colonies, wrote to (Tovernoi- Clarke, complimenting him on the ability, 
zeal, and tact which he had displayed, appro\iug generally of his 



TREATY OF PEACE. 653 

course and giving liim a message for the native chiefs, in consequence 
of which the following jiroclamation was issued on the 2d of Novem- 
ber: 

PROCLAMATION OF THE GOVERXOR OF THE THREE SETTLEMENTS, SINGAPORE, 
PENANG, AND MALACCA, TO THE MALAY RAJAHS, ELDERS, AND PEOPLE, TO MAKE 
KNOWN TO THEM THE GOOD WISHES OF THE GREAT QUEEN OF ENGLAND. 

Whereas disturbances existed in several of the Malayan States in the neighbor- 
hood of the Straits Settlements, and the chiefs and rulers of the said States being 
unable themselves to keep the peace and protect the people under their rule, 
applied to this Government for assistance and protection, and this Government 
intervened to settle guch disturbance and to aid the said chiefs and rulers to gov- 
ern their respective countries, and arrangements were made with them for that 
purpose: and whereas the said matters were referred to the Government of the 
Great Queen in England: Now, this is to make known to all that a letter has 
been received from the Right Honorable Earl of Carnarvon, of Highclere Castle, 
Newbury, high steward of the University of Oxford, constable of Carnarvon Cas- 
tle, doctor of civil law, principal secretary of state to Her Most Gracious Majesty 
Victoria, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, and 
Empress of India, minister of the Great Queen, in which the minister giving the 
orders of the Great Queen's Government says, in that letter about the engage- 
ment entered into tit Pulo Pangkor, in Perak. on the 10th of January, 1874, that the 
engagement is approved by the Great Queen: and the minister charges the gov- 
ernor of the three settlements to acquaint the several chiefs who have entered 
into these agreements that Her Majesty's Government have learnt with much 
satisfaction that they have now combined under our advice to put a stop once for 
all to the reign of anarchy and piracj^ which has unhappily so long been allowed 
to prevail, and which naturally resulted in the cessation of all legitimate trade 
and the impoverishment of the country, and at the same time to inform them 
that Her Majesty's Government will look to the exact fulfilment of the pledges 
which have now been voluntarily given, and will hold responsible those who vio- 
late the engagement which has been solemnly agreed upon. 

The minister of the Great Queen also says that it is to be hoped that the wealth 
and material prosperity of the Malay Peninsula may largely increase, and that 
the chiefs and people may gradually be led to understand that their true interests 
are best served by the natural and unrestricted growth of commerce which will 
surely follow upon the maintenance of peace and order within their respective 
territories; and this we make known to all the rajahs, chiefs, and people that may 
be made acquainted with the wishes of the Great Queen's Government. 

By his excellency's command, 

T. Braddell, 
Acting Colonial Secretary. 

Colonial Secretary's Office, 

Singapore, November 2nd, 1874' 

This TJi'oclamation was communicated \)y Sir Andrew Clarke to Lord 
Carnarvon, who, on December 17, conveyed to the governor his formal 
approval thereof. 

At a meeting of the legislative council of the Straits Settlements, in 
September, Governor Clarke had made a long and carefully weighed 
statement of the late situation and of tlie measures he had taken to 
bring order out of chaos, for the successful prosecution of wdiich he 
asked their approval, their advice, and their supjDort. 

He appealed to history to show the evil results of the appearance of 
foreigners in Malaya, anxious only for gain and careless of any feel- 
ing of responsibility toward the natives, and he quoted the following 
extract from a recent paper by Mr. Braddell, the acting colonial 
secretary : 

Before the downfall of the Malayan Empire at Malacca the trade of the penin- 
sula was collected in certain depots, and there was then a recognized government, 
which, although low in the scale of civilization, afforded protection to producers 
and encouraged traders to visit the ports. The trade remained at Malacca, under 
the Portuguese, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, but gradually declined 
with the authority of the Portuguese in these seas; and when the Dutch took 



654 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Malacca, in 1641, the evil effects of the system of European nations establishing 
themselves in the native States and monopolizing the trade of those States had 
become visible in the decrease of population, the loss of trade, and the grovfth of 
piracy. The effect of the establishment of Europeans in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was to destroy the power and the i)restige of the native gov- 
ernments, and as the Europeans did not afford any protection beyond the walls of 
their factories, anarchy and confusion arose. The people were left without pro- 
tection for life and property: they were discouraged from agriculture and trade, 
not only by oppression and enforced monopolies on the part of Europeans in their 
neighborhood, but also from the want of protection before afforded by their own 
governments. 

Each petty rajah assumed independence of his former suzerain, and in his own 
district exercised, as far as he could, power at the expense of the people within his 
Jurisdiction. It was to have been hoped that the establishment of British colonies 
in the Malayan Peninsula at the end of the last and the beginning of the present 
centurj^ would have been beneficial to the neighboring native States. And so per- 
haps it was at first: but the Indian government were early dissatisfied with the 
result of the establishment at Penang, and soon stringent orders were given to the 
local government not to interfere in the native States on any pretext whatever. 
The result has been unfortunate as encouraging the existence, by noninterference, 
of a state of misgovernment and anarchy difficult to describe, and which might in 
a great measure have been prevented by an intelligent fostering of the existing 
native governments, protecting them not merely from external aggression, but 
also from internal troubles. 

Governor Clarke impressed upon his council the impoi-tant fact that 
the document sii^ned at Pangkor was not a treaty, but an engagement 
voluntarily entered into by the chiefs among themselves; that the 
chiefs had practically come to the British authorities saying, "Give 
us i^eople to open up our countrj'; we are quite ready to take your 
advice and be guided by your influence." He thought that, even if 
this new policy might possibly entail some sacrifices at first on the 
Straits Settlements, the effect would be commensurate, and that, apart 
from their responsibilities as officials or as traders, or apart from their 
higher duties as Englishmen to their flag, their country, and their 
Queen, the success of the Malays themselves, whenever thej^ had 
come under English influence and protection, w^as quite sufficient to 
justify tlie course he had adopted, or even a stronger and more deter- 
mined one. "This," he said, "is a great and imperial question to 
think out and consider. I do not ask you now to come to any final 
decision upon it, or to decide without thought and in haste; but, 
standing as we do here on the grave of ancient empires, let it be now 
our mission, gentlemen, to gather together their scattered fragments 
and form them into the cradle of a new and fair dominion, federated 
in justice and morality, and which will exceed in usefulness to man- 
kind, and in honor to our nation and faith, all that has preceded it on 
these shores." 

Such was the j)olicy by which the British Government was guided 
in assuming a protectorate over the Malay State. If it was inspired 
by high considerations of humanity and morality ; it av as none the less 
statesmanlike and i^ractical. And it may fairly be said that it has 
been unswervingly pursued by the Residents and other British officers 
during nearly a quarter of a centurj?^ of successful administration. 

ITT. — Early Troubles. 

At the start Governor Clarke made only five British appointments, 
a Resident for each of the three States, with an Assistant Resident 
in Perak and one in Selangor. All of these gentlemen, whether as 
military officers, barristers, or members of the Straits Settlements 
civil service, had learned to speak the Mala}^ language, were ac- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 655 

quainted with the country, and had experience in dealing with the 
people. 

To give an idea of the qualifications for which the governor sought 
in liis officers I quote from his report of their appointment to the 
colonial office. Speaking of Mr. Birch, who was to be Resident at 
Perak, the governor had not selected him until — 

By the success which had attended one or more missions, with which he had 
been lately intrusted, he had given evidence of his ability, and still more, of his 
tact and judgment in dealing with natives. His experience, long and varied, as a 
settlement officer in Ceylon, as well as his intimate acquaintance with oriental 
life, customs, and habits, point out Mr. Birch as in every way eminently qualified 
for undertaking the task of initiating all the practical measures essential for the 
1 future administration of a semicivilized country, 

Mr. Birch further possesses in a remarkable degree untiring physical energy and 
endurance— powers of infinite value to one whose duties will necessarily entail 
upon him constant exposure to climate and weather in a country which, the 
navigable rivers having once been left, affords as communication but ill-defined 
paths through swamps and through the thickest of tropical jungle, and as shelter 
from the sun and rain often no other protection than that given by a kanjang, or 
native mat. 

These few men, inspired hj- a high ideal of duty to their own coun- 
try, set to work to bring back settlers by restoring confidence, with 
such success that in the mining district of Larut, where the popula- 
tion had dwindled to 4,000, the steady influx of immigration during 
eleven months brought the number up to 33,000, of whom 26,000 were 
Chinese. The British officers tried to infuse some order into the col- 
lection of the revenue and, by starting roadmaking and other public 
works, to turn State expenditure into profitable channels. 

The Sultans, however, seemed indifferent or helped themselves as 
before to the taxes as collected, in defiance of the engagement of 
Pangkor, while the chiefs sulked, as their promised "allowances" 
could not be regularly j)aid until the collection of revenue was better 
organized. The Residents established courts, either following the 
Indian code or seeing that substantial justice was administered in a 
rough-and-ready fashion according to Malay law and custom, and took 
in hand the ai3pointment of native headmen responsible for order in 
the villages and rural districts. Native ijolice forces were organized 
and jjroper police stations l^uilt as fast as possible. 

Slow as progress was, and great as were the difficulties encountered 
among both Malays and Chinese, the reports at the end of 1874 never- 
theless showed that much good preliminary work had been accom- 
plished; but they were no sooner published in England than they 
became the target for criticisms which were j)robably focused by 
Lord Stanlej^, of Alderly, in a private letter to Lord Carnarvon. The 
main objection in each case seems to have been that the Resident had 
made too much of himself or his office, whereas his influence should 
have been kept in the background and the native ruler in question 
alone made to appear to decide and to order. 

Lord Carnarvon forAvarded this document to Governor Jervois with 
a request for explanations and added : 

I desire clearly to impress upon you that, in my opinion, the British Residents 
should, in all ordinary cases, confine their action to advice tendered by them to 
the native rulers, under whose direction the government of the country should be 
carried on. 

^The governor, in reply, showed that many of the criticisms were 
based on ignorance of the circumstances, and while admitting that in 
some cases the name of the native ruler ought proi)erly to have been 
used, he insisted that no injustice had been done. 



656 TREATY OF PEACE. 

As H rejoinder to the elaiin that the Resident's policy should not be 
pi-oininent enon,i>h to make the native iniler feel his dependent posi- 
tion too nineh, the governor adds: ' 

If the native chief once felt certain that the Resident was there only to "advise." 
and that in the event of his advice being refused he would simply say, " I wash 
my hands of the alt'air," and then wait inactive till the next opportunity of offer- 
ing his advice occurred, from that moment his position in the native state would 
be worse than useless. Then the chiefs, whatever the Resident might say, would 
either ignore him completely or tell tlie people he was a party to and approved of 
their proceedings. 

Snltan Abdiillali, of Perak, who owed his position solely- to British 
influence, was the very one who threw most obstacles in the way of 
the new regime, and who seemed to take most pleasure in flouting 
tlie Resident's advice. Finally Governor Clarke addressed him a 
charactei'istic letter, froin which the following are extracts: 

First, then, our friend* must never forget that our Resident in Perack is our 
representative, acting with our authority; and our friend will best consult his 
own interests and those of his country, by following the advice of the Resident; 
and our friend must also remember that by the sixth clause of the Pulo-Pangkor 
engagement, it is provided that the Resident's advice must be asked and acted 
upon by our friend on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and 
custom's: and, again, by the tenth clause, it is provided that the collection and con- 
trol of all revenues and the general administration of the country be regulated 
under the advice of the Resident. 

Our friend, therefore, must not forget that by this engagement not only our 
friend, but the other chiefs of Perak, bound themselves not to collect any taxes 
whatever, such taxes and all revenues being entirely in the hands of the British 
Resident. 

We now send to our friend a copy of a proclamation which we have issued with 
regard to the collection of the revenue of Perak, and this proclamation must be a 
warning to everyone, whether rajah or ryot, never to attempt to collect any tax 
or any sort of revenue without distinct written instructions from the Resident 
of Perak, or the Assistant Resident at Larut. And it must also be a warning to 
persons not even to pay such tax to anyone unless they are sure that such persons 
are duly authorized by the Resident to receive it. 

In the same letter, after exj)ressing his regret tliat a man had been 
killed in Perak by one of the chiefs, and that the Sultan had not 
moved, the governor called on Abdullah to do Avliat was right and 
just witliout favor. But he adds significantly: 

We seriously caution our friend that in no case is he to exercise or give an order 
for the death of any man of any country, including Malays, without the order for 
his death being made after full and impartial trial and with the signature of 
approval of the Resident, and in cases for a sentence of death the law as given in 
the Koran is that which should be followed. 

As the year 1875 drew to a close, afi'airs in Perak became more and 
more involved. Ismail, who had been deposed by the chiefs at the 
time of the engagement of Pangkor, continned to be recognized by 
many as their ruler, the more so as he held on to the "regalia," 
which Malays consider to be the high symbol of sovereignty. He was 
a weak man, wholly under the influence of the chiefs, who had once 
raised him to tlie Sultanate. On the other hand, Abdullah, the 
rightful Sultan, was in eciually bad hands, and, already of vicious hab- 
its, had l)ecome a confirmed opium smoker. Between the» two, the 
internal condition of Perak seemed to be relapsing into its former 
anai'chy, aiul the "advice "of the Resident was practically unheeded. 
Finally, Governor Sir William Jervois, who had succeeded Sir 
Andrew Clarke in May, after nuiking a tour of the States, and con- 

*The term "our friend" in Malay does not imply anything more than the pro- 
noun "you" in English. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 657 

ferring with the various chiefs, came to the concliisiou that nothing 
remained but to have PeraJi governed by British officers in the niime 
of the Sultan; that the policy of mere "advice" must at once be 
changed into one of "control." Accordingly, on October 15, he issued, 
on his own responsibility, a long proclamation, reciting the failure of 
the chiefs to observe the engagement of Pangkor, and their self-con- 
fessed inability to restore order or to govern the country, and 
announcing that, in compliance with the request of the Sultan and 
chiefs, the British Government had decided to administer Perak in 
the name of the Sultan through commissioners with full powers; that 
a council of Malays of the highest rank would assist the commis- 
sioners, and that all people were w^arned to conduct themselves 
accordingly. 

This proclamation was posted about Perak, apparently without inci- 
dent, until, on the 1st November, Mr. Birch, the British Resident, was 
murdered, and tlie situation at once became very critical. Troops 
w^ere immediately brought from the nearest depots in the Straits and 
telegrams for reenf orcements sent to Hongkong and India. The secre- 
tary of state for the colonies telegraphed on the 14th that two regi- 
ments, with artiller}^, would leave Calcutta as soon as possible, but 
that the Imperial Government would in no case "sanction their use 
for annexation or any other large political aims." 

In a strong dispatch of December 10 to Governor Jervois, Lord Car- 
narvon expressed his surprise that a sudden and "serious departure 
from the policy which had been, after much consideration, sanctioned 
by Pier Majesty's Government, and which, it must be remembered, 
was in the nature of an experiment to be very cautiously proceeded 
with, v,as being commenced or even contemplated." The first inti- 
mation to the colonial office had been the governor's dispatch, which 
arrived nearly three weeks after his telegram announcing the dis- 
astrous consequences of his action. Furthermore, this change of 
policy had been in opposition to the tenor of his instructions from 
time to time. 

Lord Carnarvon declined to enter into the question of how far gov- 
erning by British officers in the Sultan's name really differed from an 
assumption of actual sovereignty, or how far it is likely to succeed. 
But he pointed out that if the governor had been strongly convinced 
of the inefficiency of existing arrangements, and felt that he had 
devised a better system, he would have been right in submitting the 
case to the cQlonial office, where it could liave been considered. If 
tliere had been urgent need of an instant change of iDolicy, of which 
no evidence had been sent, the governor could have asked instruc- 
tions by telegraph. But it was difficult to understand the omission 
of this obvious duty, save by supposing that the governor had been 
so convinced of the soundness of his own judgment that he had acted 
in lamentable ignorance of the fact that he had no authority v.iiat- 
ever for what he was doing. Lord Cai-narvon regretted, therefore, 
that, as at present advised, he was quite unable to approve the gov- 
ernor's action with regard to Perak. 

The murder of Mr. Birch had been committed just at the close of 
the Ramadan, or fasting month, when Mahoiuetan intolerance and 
fanaticism are always at their worst. There is good reason to suppose 
that the crime itself may have been an act of private vengeance, but 
it is certain that tlie occasion was seized as a propitious moment for a 
revolt, for which certain chiefs were more or less prepared, and for 
kindling into flame all the smoldering embers of lawlessness. 
T P 42 



658 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The Imperial Government had never blinked the fact that witli- 
draAval from Perak was i!iipossil)le, nor did it lose a moment in dis- 
patching sutticient forces 1o <[uell the insni-reT'tion, to protect life and 
proi)erty, and to pnnishthe gnilty. 

The military operations were shaip and decisive, the cliiefs were 
cowed by their severe lesson, and the people learned that "British 
protection" meant absolute secni'itj' in the fntnre against the ruin 
, that had come from Intcriiecine war and piracy. 

When, therefore, after the disturbances, the Residents resumed 
tlieir original functions of "advisers," their prestige had been so 
much increased by recent events that there was no further trouble in 
the gradual development of that policy of "control" which Governor 
Jervois had attempted to establish by a stroke of his pen. 

Three men, charged with the murdei'of Mr. Eirch and of hisattend- 
fuits, were captured during the disturbances. They were tried before 
ji rajah appointed by the Sultan of Perak, and two British assessors 
named by the governor. All were found guilty and sentenced to 
death, but on the ad\'ice of the governor, the Sultan commuted the 
sentence of two of them to penal servitude for life. The other, aftei' 
<?onfessing his own guilt, was hanged in the presence of the Sultan 
and of his principal chiefs. 

It was known that some natives of veiy high rank were not only 
directly concerned in the murder, but in the subsequent disturbances, 
and finally the Maharajah Lela, with six others, vv^as solemnly tried 
before a court consisting of two rajahs, appointed by the regent of 
Perak, and two British assessors named l)y the governor. 

The prisoners were defended by an English barrister, and the pro- 
ceedings were in all respects like those of an English court, save that 
tlie trial was carried on in the Malay lauguage, and that the examina- 
tion and cross-examination by counsel for the defense were made by 
him through the cou]"t. After a trial lasting eight days, which the 
English counsel for the defense admitted to have l^een very fair, all 
the prisoners were found guilty and sentenced to death; but again the 
governor jind council intervened on the side of mercy, and only the 
Maharajah Lela, a district headman, and another were hanged. The 
others were sentenced to penal servitude for life. 

The ex-Sultan Ismail, who was suspected of at least connivance in 
the outrages and revolt, surrendered himself to the J^ritish authorities 
in Penang; but, after careful inquiry, was allowed to remain under 
surveillance in Joliore. At the same time Ismail surrendered the 
"regalia" of Perak, and so put an end to an unpleasant question. 

The evidence of Sultan Abdullah's complicity with the whole con- 
spiracy seemed direct, and he, with several of his chiefs, was invited 
to go to Singapore, and to appoint a regent during his absence. With 
the approval of the secretary of state for the colonies, the executive 
council in Singa]jore, presided over by Governor Jervois, made a 
thorough investigation of the case, and decided that Abdullah's con- 
duct had been such as to preclude his being allowed to return to Perak, 
while it was cfpially undesiral)le that he shoudd nMuain elsewhere in the 
Malay Peninsula, where he would be subject to intriguing influences. 
A proclamation was accordingly issued declaring that he Avas no longer 
Sultan, and he and the chiefs were detained in Singapoi'e till their 
depo)'tation as political prisoners to a more distant Bi-itish i)OSsession. 

No troops were withdrawn until the death sentences had been 
executed under the orders of the coui'ts. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 659 

IV. — The residents at work. 

During the clistiirhed period the future government of the protected 
States had continued to be tlie subject of anxious tliought and corre- 
spondence botli by the inij^erial authorities and those in the Straits 
Settlements. Governor Jervois suggested on more than one occasion 
that direct annexation might yet prove to be tlie simplest solution of 
the difficulty, but Lord Carnarvon continued to have faith in Sir Andrew 
Clarke's policy of a protectorate, which he insisted sliould at any rate 
be given a longer and fairer trial than liad j^et been i^ossible. 

Writing in this sense on June 3, 1876, he recommended the governor 
to establish in eacli State a mixed council for the Sultan, as this would 
give a chance to some of the principal chiefs to take a useful part in 
the administration of the country. It would, moreover, give the Resi- 
dent and other officers on the council opportunity to gauge the strength 
of native feeling on questions of proposed reform, and such knowledge 
would tend to an exercise of greater discrimination in the nature of 
the advice given by the Resident. 

Whatever [Lord Carnarvon adds] may be the ultimate policy which it may be 
necessary to adopt in the Malay Peninsula, it is clearly our object to make the 
best use of existing materials, and with this view it should be our present policy 
to find and train up some chief or chiefs of sufficient capacity and enlightenment 
to appreciate the advantages of a civilized government, and to render some effec- 
tual assistance in the government of the country. 

In the same dispatch he repeats that he " thinks it undesirable that 
the British officers should interfere more frequently, or to a greater 
extent than is necessary in the minor details of government." 

On the otlier hand, he urges the expediency of fixing the allowances 
to the Sultans and chiefs with as little delay as possible, " so that the 
chiefs should understand their interest in supporting the system of 
revenue devised by" the Resident. The chiefs, moreover, should be 
clearly informed that any collection of revenue by them would entail 
the stoppage of their allowances. 

In the spirit of Lord Carnarvon's policy of making the best use of 
existing materials, local government in the villages and rural districts 
was left to the native headmen, as to whom in the State of Perak, 
Governor Jervois writes as follows to the colonial office: 

In every village of Perak there is a headman or "pungulu." who, subject to 
good behavior, generally holds his office by right of descent. The pungulus of 
villages are sub]ect to the datu or headman of the district, and under him collect 
the local taxes, receiving for their services a percentage thereon, arrest offenders, 
are responsible for the peace of their villages, and provide, on requisition from 
the datu, a certain number of men and boats for the public service. Such being 
the custom of the country, the establishment of a police force, with duties similar 
to those performed by the datus and penguins, would be regarded unfavorably, 
as subversive of former precedent and as antagonistic to the just influence of the 
headmen. Nearly all the villagers in a village in Perak are more or less related 
to each other, so" that upon the commission of any crime or misdemeanor the 
police might have much difficulty in tracing and securing the offenders, while the 
pungulu. on the other hand, responsible as he is for the order of the village and 
anxious as the villagers would be to support their chief, would have no such diffi- 
culty. Taxes again would be paid more willingly to the pimgulu than to the 
police officer, whom the natives might not regard as the rightful collector of their 
local imposts. 

At the same time Governor Jervois, in pi-oposing his scheme for the 
Perak police force, says: 

The country then will be divided, as at present, into districts, over each of which 
will be a datu, reporting at stated intervals to the ruler of the state, and over 



660 TREATY OF PEACE. 

each village in a district a pungulu. responsible and reporting periodically to the 
datu. If a datu or pungulu be guilty of any misdemeanor, such as -'squeezing" 
the people or collecting illegal taxes, he will be liable to be deprived of his office. 
Under this system I propose that the police shall be stationed in positions from 
whence thev can readily be made available for the support of the datus and pun- 
gulus, and," when necessary, for the maintenance of law and order in the district. 

It wnll also be necessary to station police at the mines, the custom-houses, on the 
seacoast. and at the Residencies. 

The mines are the principal seats of Chinese labor, and here police stations are 
more especially necessary, to prevent faction fights among the Chinese and gener- 
ally to keep in order the Chinese population, which is beyond the control of a 
Malay headman. Such a popiilation must be managed by a Chinese headman, 
and police are required to keep the peace between the Chinese and the Malays. 
Of course, the same applies to places having a mixed population of Chinese, Klings, 
and Malays. 

The presence of police at the mouths of rivers is necessary for the prevention 
of smuggling and in connection with the collection of excise dues. Police are 
also required at the custom-houses to act as excise men. to support the European 
collector of revenue and enforce his authority, and to guard the collections, 
especially from the Chinese population, which invariably collect around a custom- 
house. ^ J.1 Tl • 1 

A force of police, irrespective of the guard, is necessary also at the Kesidencies, 
which will be at the centers of government, for the conduct of business, the trial 
of cases, the conveyance of messages, and to act as boatmen. 

Governor Jervois further recommended that the police force slionld 
be selected from the Malay race, but that natives of Perak should not 
be emploved as police in their own state. 

Besides tlie police, a Resident's guard of about 200 Sikhs and 
Pat bans was formed under a British commandant, who was also super- 
intendent of police, and responsible directly to the Resident. Tiie 
guard and police wt^re all armed with rifles and l^ayonets. A part of 
the force w^as also to be instructed in artillery drill. 

As to revenue, by far the largest item was the export duty on tin, 
the mining of which had been the main attraction of immigrants 
(chiefly Chinese) to the protected states. Next in amount came the 
import duty on opium, and the remainder was raised from various 
excise dues, land rents, harbor dues, and taxes on houses, vehicles, 
pawnbrokers, etc. Most of these taxes were, in kind, such as the 
people had long been accustomed to pay, but owing to the regularity 
and justice wiiich British officers had introduced into their imposition 
and collection, not only was the revenue largely increased but the 
burden on the population was lighter than in the old days of arbitrary 
" squeezing." 

A treasurer at the headquarters of each state collected the princi- 
pal taxes, wliile districts were under collectors, who often acted as 
jimgistrates. All public expenditure was defrayed by the treasurer, 
and local current expeiises were settled by the collectors, under sanc- 
tioned estimates. Where the revenues of any particular district were 
iiisufHcient to meet the local expenditure, the necessary funds were 
supplied by tlie treasui-er, in whose hands all accounts were centered. 
An officer' appointed by the governor visited the various treasuries 
and offices throughout^ the States once a year, to audit the public 
accounts, to report thereon, and to inform the go^■ernor as to the 
general condition of affairs. 

Such were the essential features of tlu" original revenue system of 
tlie protected States. There w^ere early dilferences of detail in the 
tliree States, and modifications of practice have necessarily resulted 
fnnn the experience gained as population and revenue grew together. 
But tlu' [)i-inciple of "retaining the sole control both of taxation and 
expemliture in the liands of'^tlie Residents has i-emained unchanged 
to this day. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 661 

For the year 1877, the total revenue of the three States was in 
round fio'ures $640,000 and the expenditure $622,000. Of the latter, 
rather less than 880,000 went in allowances to the sultans and chiefs, 
wliile the Residents, officers, and establishments cost nearly %25(),000. 
The total police forces were about SOO men, who had cost only 1112,000, 
These early figures are interesting. 

As tin mining was the great industry, and the Chinese immigrants 
were those who worked the mines to the best advantage, this class of 
the population became the mainspring of the countiy's prosperity, 
but at the same time required close, attention from the rulers. 

Certain customs of land tenure and mining were found to exist be- 
fore the protectorate, and these, as far as possible, were allowed to 
form the basis of proper laws and regulations. The customs varied 
originally in tlie different States, and some perplexity arose in later 
years from their divergence, but uniform land and mining codes were 
finally adopted by the Federation. 

Efforts were made by the government to attract foreign capital and 
enterprise to the working of the tin mines, and considerable sums were 
invested in foreign machinery and plant. These enterprises can not 
be said to have met with very marked success, but with the improved 
means of communication so rapidly developed by the States, they may 
have a more prosperous future in store for them. 

The importance of the tin output is shown by the fact that about 
47,000 tons of this metal were exported in 1896, yielding an aggregate 
revenue to the Federation of over 83,100,000. 

Valuable, however, as the mining industr}^ was, especially at the 
start, by attracting thousands of immigrants and by furnishing an 
ample and secure source of revenue, it was not considered prudent to 
allow the future prosperity of the States to rest on a single article of 
commerce, the supplies of which might fall off materially in time. 
Nearly the whole country was forest or impassable jungle, but the 
soil is' rich and adapted for the cultivation of most tropical products. 

The attention of the Residents was therefore soon directed to the 
encouragement of agriculture. New districts were opened up as fast 
as funds were available, by the cutting of new roads. The govern- 
ment botanists in Singapore and the authorities in Kew Gardens 
studied the local flora and gave to the public information as to what 
was already there, and what might be made to grow there. The 
States made the acquisition of land easy for planters, and gave assist- 
ance by money and otherwise to infant agricultural enterprises. The 
cultivation of rice, coffee, and other staple articles has been fostered, 
and inducements have been offered to foreign settlers to cultivate 
large estates for which capital, the command of labor, and modern 
systems are indispensable. With wise foresight, the Residents have 
also endeavored to check the alienation for mining purposes of too 
much State land in any one district, and to bring forward agricul- 
turists, even though the immediate effect of this policy might be to 
retard much needed public works, through want of the new revenue 
which the mines would have afforded at once. It was believed that 
agricultural development, though slower, would be a greater boon to 
the people in the long run. 

A forestry department was also gradually established in Perak for 
the proper conservation and working of this great source of national 
wealth. A scientific officer, who has studied in the corresponding 
department in India, is in charge of this. 

In connection with agriculture, irrigation works were begun at-an 



662 TREATY OF PEACE. 

early date, and are still beini>- steadily carried on at a large cost to the 
States. But State expenditure in this way insures a future revenue 
from tlie imposition of a water rate. 

In a (iountiy wliieh was found destitute of any means of communi- 
cation beyond the rivers and an occasional native path or elephant 
track, i-oad and bridi;-e making was one of the first duties of the Resi- 
dents. The dilticulties were considerable, the money was not always 
available, the staff was small, but their energy was great and their 
determination st ubl)()rn. The country is now ti-aversed by a network 
of several thousand miles of roads and paths, the main routes being 
well graded and nuicadamized. The latest great road, completed at 
a cost of nearly -^1 ,.^)t)(>,UOO, connects the Statesof Selangor and Pahang. 
It is abt)ut 85 "miles in length, and is carried across the main moun- 
tain range of the peninsula at a heiglit of 2,700 feet. 

Railways followed roads in due course, and about 150 miles were 
being operated in ISiJG by the States of Perak and Selangor. In Negri 
Sembilan there is a short line of 25 miles, operated by a private com- 
pany, but with a State guaranty of interest on a certain capital. The 
total receipts from these railways in 1S9G were $1,345,000. 

As to other pu])lic works, after dwellings for the Residents and their 
staff, the construction of police stations, barracks, hospitals, and 
prisons had first to be attended to. Custom-houses, courts, and other 
Government offices were put up by degrees afterwards. There is a 
good system of State telegraphs throughout the country. 

The question of native education has always been before the Resi- 
dents, and both vernacular and English schools were established at 
an early date. It was felt that the future success of the new regime 
depended upon a more intelligent appreciation of its advantages than 
was possible so long as the ^Malays continued to be proud of their 
childlike ignorance. Specially was education looked forward to as 
the only means of raising the character and status of the native head- 
men and of creating a larger class of Malays capable of taking part 
in local government. 

I find," however, in many of the reports expressions of discourage- 
ment and regret at the meager results which seemed to have been 
obtained. Notwithstanding this, the system was continued in a spirit 
of perseverance that was most creditable, and the education officer of 
the new federation must find the ground well prepared for his work. 
In the latest report before me (LSDO) from Perak the Resident writes: 

His Highness the Sultan takes much interest in Malay education, and on my 
return to Perak, after an absence of some years, he drew my attention to the 
advance that had been made, and pointed out how easily the Malays can be led in 
such matters by those who understand their character. At first the common 
Malays were opposed to education, as they were to vaccination: now they have 
faith 'in both, and this result has been obtained by patience on the part of the gov- 
erning authorities, and not by the enforcement of compulsory legislation. 

The staff of Europeans for all the administrative work which I have 
sket ched has never been large, and while it lias natui-ally been increased 
with the growth of popuhition and the multii)lication of duties, the 
liesidents appear to have been almost always shoi'thanded. If so 
few Englishmen have been able to acc()m])lish so much, it has been 
because they have been well selected at first, in respect of their apti- 
ludes, their character, and their physi(iue; because they luive been 
re(iuii-ed to deal justly and sympathetically with the natives, and 
l)ecause, remaining for years in the service, they have had time not 
merely to acquii-e experience of their own but to win respect, perhaps 
affection,. from the Malays. 



TREATY OF PEACE. GGi^ 

As appears above, the Sultans liav^e been advised to select State 
councils to act as legislative bodies and to assist in the general gov- 
ernment. These councils consist usually of the Sultan, the British 
Resident, the Rajah Muda (successor to the Sultanate), a few chiefs 
of high rank, some Datus, or district headmen, and often one or two 
Chinese headmen. Before federation the sultans in council also heard 
capital cases and acted as supreme courts of appeal from the magis- 
trates' decisions. 

The State council of Perak had another important function to per- 
form in 1S86. The government of Perak, since the deposition of Sul- 
tan Abdullah in 187G, had been in the hands of Rajah Muda Yusuf as 
regent, and the Imperial Government decided that the time had come 
to revive the title of Sultan in his favor. 

The matter came before the State council on the 7th of OctoPjery 
1886, when the Resident presented and explained the instructions of 
the secretarv of state for the colonies to tlie governor and those of the 
governor to himself. The native members of the council being invited 
to express their opinions, the Rajah Idris said that he was "altogether 
of opinion that the proposed measure should be carried out; first^ 
because of the liigh birth and position of the regent; second, because 
of his age and experience; third, because, having excellent opportu- 
nities, he (Rajah Idris) has noticed that his highness is always of 
accord with Her Majesty's Resident, as the agent of his excellency the 
governor; fourth, because of the strong language of the telegram of 
the secretary of state, which he confidently believed will be insisted 
on; and lastly, because the regent is a wise prince and would never 
think of attempting to act contrary to the advice of the British Gov- 
ernment. 

It need not be suspected that the third, fourth, and last of Rajah 
Idris's reasons were given with any intention of sarcasm or irony. 
The Rajah had really reached the conviction that Biitish "advice'* 
would be good in the future as it had been in the past, and that^ it 
was simply an act of loyalty, no less than of self-interest, to vote for 
a man who could be trusted to follow it. 

The other chiefs expressed similar views in their own words, and it 
was unanimously decided to "recommend to his excellency the gov- 
ernor that His Highness, the Rajah Muda, be elevated to the dignity 
of Sultan and Yang-de-per-tuan of Perak, and that he shall at his 
installation be required to take an oath to govern the country accord- 
ing to the existing system of administration and under control of the 
British Government." 

On the proposal of the new Sultan, who had come to the council 
chamber after his election, the Rajah Idris was then declared by the 
council as "Rajah Muda, with the ancient right of succession to the 
sultanate." Both the Sultan and his successor were subsequently 
granted increased allowances, bringing the former's up to $1,500 and 
the latter's to 1750 per month. 

V. — Slavery. 

It will be remembered that by the engagement of Pangkor the cliiefs 
had bound themselves to abide by the advice of the British Govern- 
ment on all matters save those affecting the Malay religion and cus- 
toms. This proviso had been inserted by Sir Andrew Clarke, in order 
that the natives should at once feel assured that British protection 
would involve no interference with their hereditary institutions, and 



664 TREATY OF PEACE. 

there can be no question tliat tlie signature of the engagement was 
due, in great measure, to tlie existence of this clause. Sir Andrew 
Clarke was perfectly well aware that many Mah\v "customs," having 
the force of law, were repugnant to Westei-n ideas and prejudices, 
but he wisely trusted to time, influence, and education to modif}^ or 
abolish them. 

Tlie arbitrary manner in which Malay custom was interpreted in 
their own intei'est by the chiefs is well shown in tlie following note 
to a report by 3Ir. F. Swettenham, written in 1875: " Malay society 
professes to be governed by the 'Ilukum Isharat' (the Divine law of 
the Koran), and the 'adat Malayu' (lit. Malay custom). This last, 
the 'adat Malayu,' when originally drawn up, was a just and equi- 
table code, under which, though occasionally^ severe punishments 
were given, yet in the main if acted upon might have fairly suited the 
people living under its influence. Successive rajahs in each native 
state liave so altered this code that the custom actually in force now 
bears but the vaguest resemblance to it. Every alteration made has 
been for the worse, leaving out the good and introducing bad ' adat,' 
until now whatever is done by a chief consulting only his own incli- 
nation is justified bj^ him as 'adat Malayu.' The very few upright 
chiefs now to be found say there is )io longei-.auy 'adat Malayu,' but 
that everything is done b}' 'adat suka liati,' i. e., the custom by 
which a man can best suit his own purpose and inclination." 

Of all these customs the most abhorrent to men of the Anglo-Saxon 
race was the practice of slaverj^ in various forms, which had long 
obtained in these states, although the population was Moslem, and the 
special practice of debt, slavery was condemned by all rigid Moham- 
medans. The Imperial Government took up the question seriouslj^ in 
1878, by calling on the governor and residents to make full reports, 
and by asking for suggestions "to secui-e the earl}^ alleviation of any 
specially prominent abuses, and the ultimate adoption of a social 
system consistent with those principles on wiiich the general policj^of 
this country on the subject is based." 

The Resident at Selangor at once reported that sometime previouslj^ 
a woman who had worked as a slave for thirty years in consequence 
of a debt of only S30 had applied to him for relief on hearing that 
slavery was not allowed on British territory. The Resident had at 
once gone to the Sultan, who, while admitting that the laws of Selan- 
gor did not acknowledge slavery in any shape, said that it had become 
a custom, but that the slaves were treated as members of the families 
with which they resided and worked. "His Highness, with great fair- 
ness and liberality, stated that it was his opinion that all slavery 
should be quietly dropped and ignored; that slave debtors should have 
the oppoi'tunity of appealing to the nuigistrates, who should decide the 
cases as they arose." The nuigistrates should requii-e proof of the 
original debt and of the period during wliieh the debtor liad been held 
in servitude. Tlie debtor's work during this time was to be calculated 
on a fixed scale, less a reasonable sum for food and clothing, and if 
the debt was found to be satisfied by services rendered the slave debtor 
was to be released. Should there still Ije a balance against the debtor, 
he was to have the option of returning to his creditor, to i-ender serv- 
ice at a rate to be determined by the magistrate, or to accept judg- 
ment for the amount, to be enfoi'ced in tlie usual manner. This 
system, the Resident said, had become a I'ule very generally followed, 
notably by the Sultan, his family, and his near retainers. Thus, with- 
out active interfei-ence with the customs of the count l■^' and with no 



TREATY OF PEACE. 665 

public notice of tli? abolition of slavery, the practice was dying out 
and would certainly never be revived under the Sultan's rule. 

In 1882 the governor was able to inform the colonial office that slavery 
was then unknown in Selangor. In Sunjie Ujong also, the governor 
said, the custom might " almost be said to be as extinct as if it liad never 
existed. It seems to have, some years ago, died a kind of natural 
death, instructions having been issued by the govei-nor of the Straits 
Settlements to discourage it by all possible means." No proclama- 
tion had been issued, but the resident, bj' strict enforcement of a sys- 
tem similar to that of Selangor, had in a short time suppressed the 
practice. 

In Perak, however, the case was much more difficult, as appears 
from the reports rendered in 1875, in pursuance of Governor Jervois's 
instructions. Not only was the ]Malay population many times greater 
than in Selangor, but debt slavery was one of the chief customs, "one 
of the pillars of tlie State," to use Mr. Swettenham's words, "an abuse 
jealousl}^ guarded by the Perak rajahs and chiefs, and especially by 
those who make the worst uses of it." 

Debt slavery had always existed in some form or other in all the 
Malayan States, but the aggravated type which had been developed 
in Perak may best be shown b}* an abstract of Mr. Birch's report of 
July 28, 1875. 

Any man or woman owing money and unable to pay was liable to 
be taken up by the creditor, without process of law, and made to work 
at the pleasure of the creditor, the debtor's earnings becoming the 
creditor's propertj', while no wages were given and no credit was 
allowed in reduction of the debt. 

The only chance of freedom was through the payment of the debt 
b}^ some one else; even then, tlie creditor might, and if a rajah prob- 
ably would, refuse tlie offer of payment. Sometimes, hoA\ever, the 
debtor could better himself by getting payment made by another 
person, and by becoming the slave of his new creditor. 

Tills was the primitive custom of Perak, but a far worse system had 
been introduced, whereby a del3t contracted by a married man bound 
his existing wife and children, all children born afterwards, and the 
children's offspring for generations. 

If an unmarried man or woman in debt slavery married, the jDcrson 
so taken in marriage and all offspring were equally bound. In these 
cases the wife and children, male or female, were bound to the cred- 
itor as master, forced to the severest kinds of drudgery, ill-treated, 
and punished, sometimes even with death. 

Not only was no allov/ance made for services rendered by the debtor 
or his family, but the debt was often increased by fines imposed for 
alleged misconduct, or for loss of or damage to the master's property. 

Prostitution was often forced upon the women and girls, but in 
every case was encoui-aged by the creditor or master, and often half 
the earnings were taken by his wives and concubines. 

Again, the numerous female nurses and servants in the Sultan's 
house were absolute slaves, acquired by force. The Sultan had only 
to send his sword or dagger to any house where there was a girl to 
whom he or any of his household had taken a fancy and the parents 
had to give her up. None of these women dared to attempt to escajDC, 
and, if one married, the husband and children became also slaves. 
The nurses were fed, but got no clothes. The rest got neither food 
nor clothes. All were believed to be i^rostitutes for their own support, 
and probably part of their earnings went to the Sultan's concubines. 



666 TREATY OF PEACE. 

^leu and women l)olongin2: to a wild tribe in the interior were 
hunted down and sold into slavery, and Mr. Birch believed that they 
received the worst treatment of all. 

Finally, there had been an active trade in slaves from among the 
Batak tribe in Sumatra before the Dutch took possession of the island. 
The importation had ceased, but, including the children of the original 
captives, many still remained. 

Sir. Birch, however, reported that tlie mere presence of a British 
Resident had already had some little effect, although, under the Pang- 
kor engagement, he could only offer advice, which, on this subject, 
was almost sure to go unheeded. 

I5y 1S7S not much change for the better was noticeable, save that 
the Bi'itish officers in the country had not failed to make it clear that 
they objected to aid in the recapture of i-unawaj^ slaves, and that, in 
one way and another, some fugitives had managed to find refuge in 
the European quarters. The Resident reported that on his arrival 
in 1877 he had found it necessary to refuse to allow the Residency 
grounds to be made a shelter for these poor people, feeling that the 
engagement of Pangkor forced him to consider the rights of the mas- 
ters. He had, however, consulted with the regent and the chiefs, who 
had agreed to the following proposals from him: 

1. That as Resident and a judge of tlie highest court in the country 
he should not be called upon to interfere to restore to their owners 
any slaves who had deserted l)efore his arrival in Perak. 

2. That every person who, on his arrival, was an acknowledged 
slave debtor or slave in possession of his master should be recognized 
as legally in that position, and tliat the police and magistrates should 
assist in preventing them from leaving their masters, except on pay- 
ment of their debts or redeeming themselves at a fair price. 

3. That the master should be bound to receive the offer of payment 
or redemption and to free the slave forthwith. 

4. That no free person should be reduced to slavery after the day of 
the Resident's arrival in Perak. 

0. That the masters were to feed, clothe, and cease to maltreat their 
slaves, in order to retain their services; and 

6. That the Government, as soon as possible, would itself redeem 
the debts of both classes of slaves on terms to be arranged. 

Later on the Resident (Mr. Low) wrote as follows: 

1 concur with the principal natives that the introduction of a measure which 
formed no Y)art ot the original contract would practically amount to a confiscation 
of their property, the value of the labor of this class of persons being scarcely 
more than nominal, and I adhere to the opinion that the just and politic course is, 
as has been done, to prohibit any extension or renewal of the practice, either of 
slave indebtedness or slavery, to secure good treatment of the servile classes under 
penalty of enforced manumission, to reduce claims when they come before the 
magistrates to the mijiimum which justice to the creditor will permit, to await 
the increased means of freeing themselves which must develop for the poorer 
classes upon the extensive introduction of European capital in agricultural indiis- 
tries. and finally to purchase at a rate which, in conseciuence of the notorious dis- 
couragement with which everj^ case is treated by the European officers and the 
courts and the pressure of other influences, will in time be •■much diminished 
from what would probably be considered a fair equivalent. 

The secretary of state for the colonies seemed to be satisfied that 
nothing moi-c could well be done at the moment, but he urged the 
Resident and his subordinates to exercise the greatest possible care 
to prevent the enforcement of slavery in any fresh case. 

In 18S(), on (4ovei-n()r WehVs arrival at Singapore, he learned that 
cases had occui red in Peiak in which Chinese prostitutes who had 



TREATY OF PEACE. 667 

sold themselves, or been sold by others to the brothel keepers and 
\\ lio had tried to escape, had been given back by the police, under 
magisterial direction, to work out tlieir debt by prostitution. This 
matter had been under consideration by the previous governor, who, 
however, had not instructed the authorities in Perak. As it was clear 
tliat the engagement of Pangkor about Malay custom had, at any rate, 
no application to Chinese, and as, in Governor Weld's words, "the law 
oL' nature^ the law of civilization and true policy, all pointed in one 
direction," the Resident was instructed to stop immediately all recog- 
nition of brothel slaverJ^ 

The following notice was accordingly issued in Perak: 

The government having had under consideration that contracts of an immoral 
character are made in some parts of the state, by which women are kept in 
enforced servitude to the owners of brothels, it is hereby notified that such prac- 
tices, being contrary to morality and to the laws of all civilized states, will not 
1>' countenanced by the government, nor enforced in the courts, nor by the police 
or other authorities of Perak. 

The law as regards contracts of this nature must be understood to be the same 
in all respects as that which prevails in Her Majesty's colony of the Straits Set- 
tlements, and all persons detained against their will are entitled to claim the 
protection of the magistrates. 

All the authorities concerned continued to make a most careful 
study of the best method of securing the manumission of all slaves at 
the earliest possible moment, and of averting at the same time any 
occasion for serious discontent among those of high rank, who were 
the principal slave owners. The matter was finally in shape to be 
laid before the iSultan of Perak in council on the 9th of October, 1882. 

Some of the native councilors then urged the great difficulty of 
such an early abolition of slavery as was desired by the British Resi- 
dent, and pleaded for an extension of the time ovei- two rice harvests. 
This would give the slaves an opportunity to earn enough to redeem 
their own d'ebts, without the necessity of any compensation money 
being voted by the Government. 

In reply to this, according to the official council minute — 

the Resident said that in his opinion the question of saving money to the State was 
not so important as that of freeing it as soon as possible from the obloquy under 
which it now stood in the eves of civilized communities. He quite felt that some 
time ought to be given in which preparation might be made for the change which 
the abolition of slavery might be expected to bring about, especially in the house- 
holds where the services of females were indispensable, and with the permission 
of His Hiahness the Regent, he would suggest for the consideration of the chiefs 
whether it might not be arranged that the slaves and debtors should remain at the 
disposal of their masters until the 31st of December, 1883. their services being val- 
ued at half the amount of compensation which may be decided as appropriate in 
each case, the Government at the end of that period making a free grant to each 
owner of the remaining half of the full value of the servant, ?aid so providing 
for his absolute manumission and freedom from all further liability at the date 
mentioned, power being reserved to the servant at any time to borrow the whole 
sum from Government on condition of working out in labor on the public works 
that partonlv for which he would have served his master till the 3 1st of December, 
1888. Such a measure could not be applied to women, as public employment 
could not be found for them: and the Resident feared that these must remain in 
their present condition until the end of 1883, when they will be entitled to com- 
plete freedom and the balance of the compensation, which might have been 
adjudged or agreed upon, be paid by the State to the master, as in the case of the 
men. 

Resolutions embodying the Resident's plan were then passed unani- 
mously, and on the following day the council voted a body of 
"Instructions for the guidance of courts and magistrates appointed 
to carry out the orders of His Highness the Regent in council .for 
the manumission of slaves and bond debtors in Perak." 



66S TREATY OF PEACE. 

The rest was only detail administrative woi'k, and was completed 
without trouble. As early as May 3, 1883, Governor Weld wrote to 
til!' colonial otitiee as follows: 

The manumission of the slaves is proceeding rapidly, but very few fi'eedmen 
will consent to leave their masters or mistresses, whilst they, on their part, almost 
universally say that they set them free " for the glory of GJ-od." and refuse to take 
the State's money. ■*How can we take money for our friends who have so long 
lived with us. many C)f them born in our houses'^ We can sell cattle, fruit, or rice, 
but not take money for our friends.'" Such expressions have been used in verj' 
many cases in different parts of Perak. Many slave children whose own mothers 
are dead always call their mistress "mother," and the attachmeiit is reciprocal. 
In fine, this investigation has Ijrought into notice many of the fine qualities of a 
most interesting and much maligned race, and affords conclusive proof that the 
abuses wiiich are sure to coexist with slavery could not have been general, and 
bore no comparison with those often accompanying negro slavery in our own 
colonies. 

FEDERATION. 

As time rolled on the population of the protected States had rapidly 
increased, while their prosperity had advanced with comparative 
steadiness under the peaceful conditions of the new system. More- 
over, the old tribal enmities had died out, partly from the impossi- 
bility of the sultan of one State invading another without instant pun- 
ishment, and greatly through the new intercourse between the peoples 
which improved communication had made easy. 

On the other hand, while the principles of good government had been 
ingrafted on the natives, both chiefs and people, the Bi-itish admin- 
istrators necessarily found the details more complicated with the 
growth of the States. The main lines of development had been the 
same in all of them; but as each Resident had tried to " make the best 
use of existing materials" in his own province, many original differ- 
ences of native " custom," to which 1 have already alluded, had in tiuu' 
become inconveniently divergent. Moreover, other States, the largest 
of which was Pahang, had at intervals placed the]nselves under impe- 
rial in-otection. 

Pahang was more backward than Perak and Selangor, and having 
no immediate source of much revenue, pending the development of 
its rich mineral deposits, it had been forced, like the group of small 
States calletl Xegri Sembilan, to obtain pecuniary aid from its 
wealthier neighbors. 

The Residents, the governors, and the colonial office had therefore 
been occupied for some years in elaborating a plan by which all the 
States might be welded together in such a way as to insure greater 
unifornuty in their administrative systems, and to foster that higher 
sense of mutual interdependence which might turn them into a united 
nation. 

Finally, in July, 1895, a treat}', which took practical effect on Julj^ 
1, 18!Hi, was concluded between the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri 
Sembilan, and Pahang, and the governor of the Straits Settlements 
on behalf of the British Govei'nment, by which these States agreed to — 

(a) Federation for administi-ation purposes, with an undertaking 
to render mutual assistance. 

(/>) 'J'he appoiutment of a Resident-General, as the agent and repre- 
sentative of the British Government, uiidoi' the governor of the Straits 
Settlements. 

(/•) The organization of a force of Indian soldiers for service in 
any part of the Malay Peninsula, or, if required, in the colony of the 
Straits Settlements. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 669 

The following is the text of the treaty: 

Agreement between the governor of the Straits Settlements, acting on the 
behalf of the Government of Her Majesty, the Queen, Empress of India, and the 
rulers of the following Malay States— that is to say, Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and 
the Negri Sembilan. 

1. In confirmation of various previous agreements, the Sultan of Perak, the 
Sultan of Selangor. the Sultan of Pahang, and the chiefs of the State.> known as 
the Negri Sembilan. hereby severally place themselves and their States under the 
protection of the British Government. 

"2. The above-named rulers and chiefs of the respective States agree to consti- 
tute their countries a federation, to be known as the Federated Malay States, to be 
administered under the advice of the British Government. 

o. It is to be understood that the agreement herebj^ agreed upon does not imply 
that any one ruler or chief shall exercise any power or authority in respect of 
any State other than that which he now possesses in the State of which he is the 
recognized ruler or chief. 

4. The above-named rulers agree to accept a British officer, to be styled the 
Resident-General, as the agent and representative of the British Government, 
under the governor of the Straits Settlements. They undertake to provide him 
with such a salary as is determined b^^ Her Majesty's Government and to follow 
his advice in all matters of administration other than those touching the Moham- 
medan religion. The appointment of the Resident-General will not affect the 
obligations of the Malay rulers toward the British Residents now existing or to 
be hereafter appointed to ofiEices in the above-mentioned federated States. 

■). The above-named rulers also agree to give to those States in the federation 
which require it such assistance in men, money, or other respects as the British 
Government, through its duly appointed officers, may advise; and they further 
undertake, should war break out between Her Majesty's Government and that of 
any other power, to send, on the requisition of the governor, a body of armed and 
e<iuipped Indian troops for service in the Straits Settlements. 

Nothing in this agreement is intended to curtail any of the powers or authority 
now held by any of the above-named rulers in their respective States, nor does it 
alter the relations now existing between any of the States named and the British 
Empire. 

The first main object of tlie federation was to give the governor an 
adviser — in the words of the first report of Sir Frank Swettenham, 
now Resident-General — "an adviser who shonld be in tonch with the 
rnlers and Residents of all the federated States; an adviser who, 
knowing tlie ofticials, tlte people, and the work that was everywhere 
proposed or going on, would speak in sympathy with the interests 
and aspirations ot the Malay States and those engaged in developing 
them, whether as officials, planters, miners^ or traders." Tlie other 
main object was to secure continuity and uniformity of administration 
in all cases where the conditions were identical. The exceptions are 
"very few." 

Sir Frank Swettenham enumerated the following matters as to which 
either agreement had been already reached or it was hoped to take 
early action: Assimilation of detail in the management of State rail- 
waj^s, cooperation of all the states in the cost of assisting Indian immi- 
gration, management of savings banks on identical lines, identical terms 
in all the states for the snrvey, acqnisition, and holding of lands, for 
cutting tirovernment timber, and gathering jungle prodnce ; similar con- 
-stitution of sanitary boards, similar taxes for vehicles, general similar- 
ity of powers and their application, harbor regulations, boat and fishing 
licenses, etc. 

He ends the paragraph by saying: 

There is no lack of material, but there are hardly enough to deal with it, and 
high speed und§r a forced draft is destructive to machinery and not perhaps the 
most economical and satisfactory in the long run. 



670 TREATY OF PEAf'E. 

FEDERAL ORGANIZATION. 

Hiijh coinmissioner. — At the head of this federal organization is 
the governor for the time being of the Straits Settlements, who is 
high commissioner and tlie direct representative of the Queen-Empress. 

To liim, as such, the Resident-General reports and the sultans or 
chiefs of the states may consult with or appeal to liim as occasion 
may arise. 

Ftderal coinicll. — The federal council, meeting in different states 
by rotation, is i)resided over by the higli commissioner, or, in his 
absence, by the Resident-Gf^neral, (jr, failing him, by the sultan in 
whose state the council is asseuibled. The federal council is com- 
posed of the councils of the four federated states. 

In starting the scheme of federation it was not intended to give 
this council any power of legislation, but to make it a consultative 
and advisory body, whose deliberations should pave the way for uni- 
form legislation by the councils of the various states. E(iually in the 
matter of finance it appears to be resti'icted to settling tlie main lines 
of federal responsibilities, which thereafter form a first charge on the 
different state revenues and are provided for in their budgets. 

Governor Sir C. B. H. ^Mitchell, in submitting his scheme of feder- 
ation to the secretary of state for the colonies, on May 1, 1805, said: 

The meeting of the federal council should be attended with us much pomp and 
circumstance as possible. It should draw up. at its first meeting, its own rules 
for the conduct of business, and no efforts should be spared to sbow the Malay 
rulers that the federal bond would not have the effect of lowering the dignity and 
prestige which now attaches to each siiltan and chief. 

The first and so far the only session of the federal council was 
accordingly held at Kuala Kangsar, in Perak, on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 
and 17tli July, 1S!)7; that is to say, after a year of federation, all 
the chiefs being present. No better material for indicating the scope 
and natiire of the functions of this assembly can be found than in the 
re^iort of its first sessions, of which the following is a summary: 

After short speeches by their highnesses, the sultans of Selangor and 
Perak, the high commissioner made an address, which was translated 
into Malay by the Resident-General. He began: "Sultans, rajahs, and 
chiefs of the Federated States, I rejoice to meet for the first time 
together, in this auspicious year of Hei- Majesty's jubilee reign, the 
heads of the four States that have, under Her Majesty's protection, 
fedei'ated for tlieir common good." He then very briefly sketched the 
results of the first year, alluded to the more important questions of 
finance, and concluded by saying: 

I trust that our meeting in this way will have the effect of improving our knowl- 
edge of each other, and of the needs of the different States, so that we maj' together 
work for the common good of the federation, the object tliat Hin- Majesty and we, 
her agents, have had in view in the advice we have given to you, the heads of the 
States. 1 declare the meeting of chiefs to be now open. 

A salute of twenty-one guns was then fii-ed. The Resident-General 
spoke of this asseuiblage of sultans as an unprecedented event. On 
the previous evening he had '' heard one sulfan congratulating anotlier 
on the happy circumstances of their meeting an<^l conti-asling them 
with tliat oi" former years, befoi'e British protection liad l)een sought, 
wlien lire and sword were the almost invai'iable acconi])animcnts of 
a sultan's visit to a neighboring Slate." lie then i-ead a telegram of 
congratulation which the foui- sultans desired to dispatch to the (^ueen- 
Empress, and the high commissioner promised to forward it. 

The council, after passing standing rules of i)i'ocedure, at once took 



TREATY OF PEACE. G71 

up the question of finance, and the debts of tlie States of Pahang- and 
Negri Sembihin to Selangor and Perak and the colony of the Straits 
Settlements Avere assumed by the council as a federal liability. Selan- 
gor and Perak have no debts. The next important matter discussed 
was a loan on federal responsibility for railway and road extension, 
part of which ^vas to aid by federal guaranty the poorer States, wliose 
financial position did not allow of their borrowing money abroad alone. 
No final vote was, however, takeii, the Resident-General i^ointing out 
that, as the federated States were under^ British protection, it was 
" necessary to obtain the apj)roval of the secretary of state in such 
matters." 

Irrigation schemes, harbor regulations, and a better adjlistment of 
the export duty on tin, the staple product of the States, were gone into. 
Tlie appointment, title, powers, duties, salaries, and emoluments of 
"penghulus" (Malay headmen of villages) were discussed at length 
by the chiefs and Residents, the aim being to secure more uniformity 
than had existed. With the same object, a long discussion also took 
place on the registi-ation of Mahometan marriages and divorces; the 
administration of estates under the Mahometan law of inheritance; 
the regulation of the "attendance of Maliometans at mosque on 
Fridaj^s;" the payment of a tax called "zakat," and a partial applica- 
tion thereof toward mosque expenses; the jurisdiction of "kathis;" 
and the punishment of certain offenses punishable under Mahometan 
law, but not provided for l)y the penal code. The Resident of Selan- 
gor was prepared to go so far as "to advocate that all the Mahometan 
laws and the Malay customs affecting them should be embodied in 
one code." But the Resident-General pointed out the great difficulty 
of drawing up such an enactment, desirable as it would be, and there 
was much diversity of opinion among the sultans and chiefs on nearly 
every point. The Sultan of Perak thought that "questions affecting 
the Mahometan religion sliould not be brought up for discussion in 
the federal council, but that such matters should be left for the con- 
sideration of the local councils." Finall}', on the proposal of the 
Resident-General, it was agreed that the local councils should first 
consider the matter, and that an "orang-alim" should be appointed 
to decide what customs sliould be included in the enactment. 

The session ended with an address by the high commissioner, the 
Resident-General interpreting. 

Resident-GenerdJ — Residenis — State councils. — The Resident-Gen- 
eral resides in Selangor, and is to have a house and office wherever 
else it may be found necessary; but it is his duty to travel as much as 
possible in all the states, keeping himself in touch with the native 
rulers, the Residents, and all matters of administration. While 
traveling or residing in any state he can communicate directly with 
anyone on any subject, but he is to issue no instructions save through 
the Resident. Similarly, if addressed on any stibject hy any native or 
European, olificial or unofficial, he Avill only reply throttgh the Resi- 
dent, after constiltation with him. He is, however, to ttse his dis- 
cretion in cases of urgency, bttt must then inform the Resident at the 
earliest possible moment. 

Each Resident carries on the work of his state as was done before 
federation, except that the Resident-General has ftill powers to issue 
instructions to him. If there is a difference of opinion, the Resident 
may appeal through the Resident-General to the high commissioner, 
btit pending the result of the appeal must act on his instructions. 

The various state councils meet and condtict their business as 



672 TREATY OF PEACE. 

formerly. Tlicy are leg-islative ami advisory bodies and have no con- 
trol over public expenditure, but they may, as formerly, decide on 
the selection, remuneration, removal, and retirement of native officers, 
subject alwaj^s to the sanction of the Resident-General and high 
commissioner. 

Each Ilesident furnishes the Resident-General for transmisssion to 
the higli commissioner drafts of the legislativ^e measui-es jjroposed 
to be laid before the state council in sufficient time to allow of their 
consideration by the high commissioner l)efore the meeting, and no 
legislative enactment can he published or acted upon until the high 
cominissioner's sanction has been given to it. 

Annual reports are prepared b}' the Residents for the Resident- 
General, in duplicate, before April 15. They are drawn on something 
like one model furnished b}' the Resident-General, who forwards them 
to the high commissioner, with a concise report of his own upon the 
l^rogress of all the states. 

Cii'il service. — All the oihcers serving the government of the native 
states form one service and are eligible for promotion from one state 
to another, their service counting as continuous; but each state is 
liable for pension in proportion to the period passed by an officer in 
its service. 

There is one pension order for all the native states and a widow- 
and-orphan fund compulsory on all those who join the service. 

Witliin certain limits of salary appointments and promotions are 
dealt with by the Residents, but the approval of the Resident-General 
is required in case of posts carrying somewhat higher salaries. All 
other cases must be l-eferred, through the Resident-General, to the 
high commissioner. 

Xo dismissal of an officer on the fixed establishment whose salary 
exceeds 8300 can be made without reference to the Resident-General, 
and if the salary exceeds $G00, without the sanction of the high com- 
missioner. 

In the case of officers on the provisional and temporary establish- 
ment, or paid out of open votes, reference to the Resident-General is 
only necessary if the salary exceeds -si, 200 per annum. But in all 
cases of dismissal it is absolutely necessar\' that the officer concerned 
shall be first called upon to give a written reply to the written charge 
of which he is accused. 

Vacation leave may be given by the Residents, up to six weeks only. 
Beyond that, up to three montlis, the Resident-General maj^ grant 
leave of absence, either vacation, or on half paj" , or without salary. 
Aj)plicants for more than three months' leave must be referred to the 
high commissioner, as also all leave for even a shorter jjeriod, should 
tlie officer be proceeding to Europe and desire to draw salary from the 
Crown agents. 

In phice of the "junior officers" who were appointed without being 
called upon to pass a competitive examination, cadetships were estab- 
lished with federation, open to natural-l)orn British subjects, who are 
selected by competitive exami)iation, held by the civil service com- 
missioners simultaneously with the examinations for the civil service 
of India. The inilial salary uf cadets is somewhat higher than that of 
the former junior ollicers. but the emoluments of the latter, on passing 
the prescribed native language, have now been improved. 

Justice. — The powers of magistrates, the practice of courts, the 
scales of fees, and all judicial procedure are being, as far and as fast 
as possible, assimilated in all the States. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 673 

A judicial commissioner was appointed and assumed his duties in 
July, 1896. He goes on circuit to headquarters of each State to hear 
appeals, which formerly came before the various sultans in council. 
He also tries capital cases. 

A ver}^ important federal officer is the legal adviser, who, among 
other duties, drafts the enactments which it is desired to have passed 
by the different State councils. The scope of the legislation wliich 
was at once undertaken will appear from the following list of the 
more important measures drafted* by the legal adviser during his first 
ten months' work : 

I. To provide for the appointment of a high commissioner. 

II. To provide for the appointment of a judicial commissioner. 

III. To amend the law relating to banishment. 

IV. To provide for a widow's and orphan's pension fund. 

V. To amend the law relating to limitations of suits. 

VI. To enable sentences of imprisonment imposed in any one of the federated 
Malay States to be carried into etfect in any other of the said States. 

VII. For shortening tlie language used in enactments and other written laws. 

VIII. To prohibit the importation and circulation of foreign coin (in certain 
states). 

IX. To provide penalties for the nonpayment of customs duties in the Negri 
Sembilan. 

X. To amend the rates charged for the survey of State lands in the Negri 
Sembilan. 

XI. The land code. 

XII. The mining code. 

XIII. To provide for the recognition of certain Chinese laws and customs. 

XIV. Criminal procedure code. 

XV. Companies enactment. 

XVI. Stamp enactment. 

The Resident-General, who reported the above on May 13, 1897, stated 
that the civil-procedure code was also in preparation. 

In each state there is a corps of Englisli magistrates for districts 
regulated according to area and iiopulation, and Malay headmen also 
hold courts for petty cases throughout the Federation. Many officers 
already in charge of other departments also act as magistrates. 

Advocates are admitted to practice before the judicial commissioner 
and in the courts of the senior magistrates of the different states, and 
sooner or later they will jjrobably be allowed to plead in all courts. 

Military and police. — By the treaty of federation the Sultans have 
engaged to maintain a body of Indian troops, and by September 1, 
1890, the regiment of " Malaj'^ State Gudies" was practically formed 
and up to its full strength of 18 officers, 000 noncommissioned officers 
and men, and 53 noncombatants. These soldiers, who are Sikhs, are 
distributed as needed in the different states, and, in many cases 
relieve the local police from military duty which they had to perform 
in earlier dajs. 

There is a commissioner of police for the Federated States, and at 
the beginning of 1897 the strength of the police forces was reported 
as follows by the different Residents: 
Perak: 

European officers and inspectors 15 

Sikhs and Pathans— native officers, noncommissioned officers, and 

constables .-- .-. 473 

Mounted orderlies — Indian 14 

Malays— noncommissioned officers and constables 302 

Detectives and charge takers - - - - - 39 

Total- 843 

T P 43 



G74 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Selangor: 

European officers . . 8 

Pathans - ..._... 32 

Malays — noncommissioned officers and constables 585 

TotaL _. 575 

Negi-i-Sembilan: 

European officers 3 

Malays — noncommissioned officers and men . 350 

Total 253 

Pahang: 

European officers 3 

Malays — noncommissioned officers and men 304 

Total 307 

Total officers, noncommissioned officers, and men for Federation 1. 977 

The colonel of the Regiment of Guides is also federal inspector of 
prisons, and a uniform system of prison regulations is going into force 
in all the States. The object of Government being to concentrate the 
prisoners as far as iDossible, legislative authority was obtained for the 
transfer of prisoners from one State to another. It is considered that 
the strict discipline necessary is best assured by the supervision of 
military officers. 

The military and police forces are under the absolute control of the 
Residents, subject to instructions from tlie Resident-General or High 
Commissioner. 

Lands and mines. — A federal commissioner of lands and mines was 
at once appointed, as the paramount question of land tenure, under- 
Ij'ing that of mining privileges, was one upon which most divergent 
views were held by the Governments of the different States. The 
Resident-General, however, during the first j^ear of federation, sum- 
moned in conference the Residents, the legal adviser, and the com- 
missioner of lands and mines, and a uniform land code was framed, 
which was accepted by all and approved by the High Commissioner. 
This measure had to pass through the councils of the States before 
the mining code, also drafted, could be submitted. 

CJtinese affairs. — The Chinese are considered as the most imiDortant 
part of the working community, and the federal secretary for Chinese 
affairs holds an office of great responsibility, which calls for very high 
qualities and great experience. 

In Perak and Selangor, where great numbers of Chinese have alwa3-s 
been attracted by tin nnning and otlier industries, Chinese protector- 
ates have existed from the first. Disputes in connection with labor 
and immigration contracts, the protection of women and girls from 
the worst kind of slavery-, sanitation, hospitals, the sujiervision of 
fi-iendlyand the control of secret Chinese societies, give constant work 
to these officers. In each place, as far as possible, thej' secure the 
cooperation of the headman, called " Capitan China," and other lead- 
ing menibers of the Chinese community, from whom numerous in- 
stances of loyal support and assistance are recorded in the reports. 
At least one of these influential Cliinese is usually to be found in 
every State council. 

Oilier adininisfrative departinritfs. — In the sclieme of Federation, 
di-awn up by (Governor Mitchell, in 1895, pi'ovision was also made for 
a chief engineer of public woi'ks, a chief i-ailway engineer in charge 
of the construction and working of all the State railways, a chief sur- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 675 

veyor, a chief accountant, a chief surgeon, an inspector of schools, 
and an inspector of posts and telegraphs. None of these had, how- 
ever, been appointed at the end of the year 189G, the latest date to 
which published reports have been available to me. 

Division of general expenses. — The cost of all charges common to 
the States and the salaries of all federal officers and establishments 
are divided proportionately among the four States, each State con- 
tributing in proportion to its revenue. 

Taking the figures for 189(J, the amount payable by Perak, the most 
highly developed State, in proportion to revenue, is about identical 
with what would have been chargeable in proportion to population. 
Selangor, however, with only four-sevenths the population of Perak, 
has so large a revenue from her tin mines, while Negri-Sembilan and 
Pahang are as yet so little advanced, that she has to pay nearly as 
much as Perak. Negri-Sembilan and Pahang, with 28 per cent of total 
population, are together called upon to bear less than per cent of 
federal responsibilities. But, as has already been seen, one of the 
declared objects of Federation was to have the jDoorer and backward 
States aided to develop their resources by their more prosperous sisters, 
who advance money on the general federal guarantee, repayable by 
the debtor State as soon as its surplus of revenue over expenditure 
will iDermit. 

As the Resident-General says in his first report: " Hitherto Pahang 
has been only a drain on the resources, first, of the colony (Straits 
Settlements), and then of the western Malay States, because it had 
very little revenue of its own to meet the cost of improved adminis- 
tration and had no reserve funds to pay for the expensive luxury, by 
putting down two risings against British control on the part of discon- 
tented Malay chiefs. If almost nothing is done to open a country, 
by roads or other public works, the natives may be excused for failing 
to realize the advantage of British interference, and the remedy in 
Pahang, as has been proved elsewhere under somewhat similar cir- 
cumstances — in Egypt, for instance — is to spend a great deal more 
monej^ to secure the return of what has gone already. It is an excel- 
lent example of wliat is called 'throwing good monej^ after bad,' in 
the sense that what was gone was bad, for it was spent on nothing 
that could give a return, while the much larger assistance now being 
given by the solvent States is being expended in works of the utmost 
utility." 

Statistics. — This sketch of federation maybe closed by a few figures 
for 1896 showing the revenue and expenditure of the four States, as 
given in the Resident-General's report to the secretary of state for 
the colonies: 

The total revenue was |!8,434,083, of which the more important 
items were — 

Export on tin $3, 126. 974 

Land 511,237 

Posts and telegraphs 140,230 

The total expenditure was $8,598,147, out of which there was spent 
on — 

Works .\ $974,843 

Roads 2, 065, 950 

Railway construction 984, 774 

Total 4,025,567 



61 C) TREATY OF PEACE. 

As Sir F]-ank .Swettcuham says: "These figures spealv for them- 
selves, and show tliat last year the Malay States dexoted practically 
half their income to 'improvements.' It is this expenditure which 
mainly accounts for the past and continued prosperity of these States." 

'J'lie value of trade for 1896 was returned at rather less than 
$50,000,000 (imports, $21,050,480; exports, *28,42G,G:33),and the popu- 
lation was estimated to number 010,000, spread o\er an area, accord- 
ing 1o Wliittaker's Almanac, of nearly 2!), 000 square miles. 

As regards tiie ivvenue derived from the above-mentioned foreign 
trade, it is evident that the export duty on tin is only the most con- 
venient method of collecting a mining royalty. In the matter of 
imports, if the trade has grown to comparatively large proporti(nis 
and continues to develop steadily, it is because, with the exception of 
opium and spirits, all merchandise imported has been subject to such 
light ad valorem duties that free ti-ade may be said practically to 
exist. 

Xo wonder that the Resident-General was encouraged to believe 
that the prospects of the Federated States were never l)righter than 
at the close of 1896. "But," he insists, "we can not afford to sit 
still. The country is, to a great extent, an unpopulated jungle; 
money must be spent in developing its resources, and men of energy 
— miners, planters, traders, and Government servants — must be 
encouraged to drive the work along. That, at least, is the only way 
to secure the continuance of advancement at the rate come to be 
expected of these States. Some properties are not worth develop- 
ing; but, if nothing else has been done, there is proof here of how 
well the country repays intelligent administration." 

VII. — CONCLUSIOX. 

It is time to sum up the results which have ]>een obtained during 
twentj'-four years from the simple but statesmanlike conception of a 
protectorate which Sir Andi-ew Clarke first evolved in the engagement 
of Pangkor — an administrative experiment which stood alone at the 
time and had no parallel in ]>ritish control over alien races elsewhere. 

All pirac.y and land fighting, whether by Chinese or Malays, has 
been absolutely stamped out. Taxation has been made very light, 
and yet ver}- productive.' Slavery has been suppressed. Roads and 
railway's have been constructed in pathless forests and jungle. 
Prisons and hospitals have been built and maintained. Above all, 
the chiefs have been reconciled to the new life, and the equality^ of 
all races and classes before the law is everywhere recognized. All 
this has l)een done, as Sir AndreAv Clarke says, " by the Residents 
laying down and insisting on the constant recognition of the i)i-inciple 
that the interests of the people they Avei'e sent to govern should be the 
first consideration of Government officers. Bj- learning their lan- 
guages, their prejudices, their character, and by showing them that 
considei-ation which alone can secure sympathy and a good under- 
standing between government and peoi)le, their respect and, to some 
extent, their affection has been won. The natural tendencies of our 
race are not exactly inclined to these lines and what has been done, 
and the present feeding as to how the natives shoidd ])e treated is due 
to the personal influcjice of a succession of Residents Avho gained 
their knowledge l)y tlieir owji intelligence and experience." 

In all this, as lias been seen, thcic has l)een vei-y little direct inter- 
ference by the Iiiqx'rial (iovei-iimenl . It is time that in the earlier 



TREATY OF PEACE. 677 

years the secretary of state for the colonies felt obliged to draw back 
a governor or Residents Avithin the main lines of the policj^ which 
Great Britain had deliberatelj' adopted, and which she was deter- 
mined to see carried out. But this policy has now taken root and 
developed into a well-understood and working constitution, which 
might by chance be wrong!}' interpreted at times, but which it is 
hardly conceivable that any British officer would attempt to override. 

On the other hand, no native has an object in plotting for a change. 
Each sultan sees his own flag flying in his kingdom and everj^ law or 
decree promulgated and enforced in his name. He lives in greater 
state and receives more honor than ever before. His civil list is 
assured to him, and the public revenues, many times greater than 
could have been exacted by the foulest oppression of the old regime, 
are now largely spent in permanent improvements, which add an 
" unearned increment" to the value of his i)rivate estates. The same 
is true of the chiefs in their degree, and as long as the people -are 
contented under a just and beneficent administration none can ever 
find means to organize a revolt, for the Residents have absolute 
control both of the sword and of the purse. Indeed, for some years 
past there has been no imperial interference at all, nor is any prob- 
able under normal circumstances. If the powei* is ever exercised it 
will perhaps be in the direction of resti'aining the federation from 
unduly pledging its credit by foreign loans. But this contingenej' is 
still remote. 

Those who have done me the honor of reading thus far will, I am 
sure, have been impressed like mj-self by a striking fact in connection 
with this protectorate. I allude to the marvelous elasticity of the 
original organization, which has not only created a prosperous nation 
out of wari'ing tribes of Malays, but, with no sliarj) shock to native 
customs or feelings, has been strong enough to exercise such acts of 
dominion as the deposition of a sultan, the settlement of his succes- 
sion, and a general manumission of slaves. 

I may fitly conclude hy quoting a few eloquent words from Sir 
Andrew Clarke's address before the Royal Institution : 

Not by wars involving the slaughter of native races, not by drafts upon the 
imperial exchequer, not by the ageuc.v of chartered companies, which necessarily 
seek first their o^\^l interests, has the development of the Malay States been 
attained. Their present peace and marvelous advance in prosperity have been 
due to a sympathetic administration, whicli has dealt tenderly with native preju 
dices and sought to lead upward a free people instead of forcibly driving a su'' 
ject race. 






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